



S E C R E T // N O F O R N // 20331001

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09360



JTF-GTMO-CDR

1 October 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue, Miami, FL 33172

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000254DP (S)

JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

1. (S//NF) Personal Information:

- JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Muhammed Ali Husayn
- Current/True Name and Aliases: Muhammad Ali Hussein Khenaina, Abu Galib, Bedawiy, Muadh al-Waili
- Place of Birth: Kitaf, Yemen (YM)
- Date of Birth: 1978
- Citizenship: Yemen
- Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9YM-000254DP



2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in overall good health.

3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment:

a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) on 1 May 2007.

b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: *If released without rehabilitation, close supervision, and means to successfully reintegrate into his society as a law abiding citizen, it is assessed detainee would probably seek out prior associates and reengage in extremist support activities. Detainee's defiance toward the Yemeni delegation, coupled with his aggressive behavior and the extreme content of letters he has mailed, which include animosity and hatred toward the US, indicate detainee would possibly participate in extremist activities if given the opportunity. Detainee is assessed to be a member of al-Qaida. Guesthouses where*

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REASON: E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 20331001

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detainee stayed are typically those used by individuals recruited by al-Qaida for militant training or fighting on the front lines. Abd al-Hakim Abd al-Karim Amin Bukhari, ISN US9SA-000493DP (SA-493, transferred), alleged that, while staying at an al-Qaida sponsored guesthouse in Afghanistan (AF), detainee was tasked with observing other guesthouse residents to determine if they were spies. Detainee's true identity, family and tribal affiliations are unknown. JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be:

- A **HIGH** risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies
- A **LOW** threat from a detention perspective
- Of **MEDIUM** intelligence value

c. (S//NF) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee's assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation.

- Added reporting of detainee's presence at Usama Bin Laden's (UBL) Tora Bora Mountain complex
- Added information that detainee's name was found on a trust account list, which provides further indication detainee stayed at an al-Qaida affiliated guesthouse
- Added new alias, Muadh al-Waili¹

4. (U) Detainee's Account of Events:

The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.

a. (S//NF) Prior History: Detainee received a diploma in basic Islamic studies from the Koran School in Najran, Saudi Arabia (SA). Upon graduation, detainee returned to Yemen where he taught the Koran and worked on his family's farm.² Detainee received basic small arms and grenade training in his home village due to endemic tribal fighting in the region around his village.³ In 1998, detainee spent approximately 21 days in Karachi, Pakistan (PK), at the University of Islamic Studies, but left because too few classes were taught in Arabic.⁴

¹ >HARMONY AFGP-2002-905527-HT

² 000254 KB 10-JUN-2002

³ 000254 INITIAL SCREENING 04-JAN-2002

⁴ 000254 MFR 06-SEP-2002

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b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: In early September 2001,⁵ detainee traveled from Yemen to Afghanistan to escape tribal feuding and retaliatory killings. Detainee originally wanted to travel to Syria or Jordan, but Sayf al-Jamry, who detainee met at a mosque in Sanaa, YM convinced him to go to Afghanistan.⁶ Al-Jamry arranged and paid for detainee's travel and accompanied him on the trip. Detainee and al-Jamry flew to Karachi, via Dubai, United Arab Emirates (AE), where they stayed a few days in a hotel. They continued their trip overland to Quetta, PK staying in an unidentified house for two days awaiting transportation to Afghanistan. Detainee continued on to Kabul, AF where they stayed with al-Jamry's friend Abu Omar.⁷

c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: Al-Jamry left detainee at Abu Omar's house and continued on to train at an al-Qaida camp in Kandahar, AF.⁸ Detainee stayed at Abu Omar's house for about two months; and while there, gave his passport to Abu Omar for safekeeping. Detainee swapped his watch for Abu Omar's digital Casio wristwatch. Detainee ventured outside Abu Omar's house only for occasional trips to the market.⁹

5. (U) Capture Information:

a. (S//NF) On 11 September 2001, detainee learned of the terrorist attacks in the US and wanted to leave Afghanistan, fearing US retaliation. In mid-November 2001,¹⁰ Abu Omar arranged for detainee's travel to Khowst, AF where he was to stay at the house of Afghan Habib Allah until Abu Omar or Emad Abdallah Hassan, ISN US9YM-000680DP (YM-680), showed up. In early December 2001, after nearly two weeks of waiting and no communication with either Abu Omar or YM-680, detainee joined a group of five unidentified Arabs and an unidentified Afghan guide and headed towards the Pakistani border. Detainee's group walked through the mountains for approximately seven days before meeting up with another group of about 18 people, comprised mostly of Arabs.¹¹ On approximately 17 December 2001, Pakistani authorities apprehended detainee and approximately 20 other Arabs, and they were taken to Kohat, PK.¹² Detainee was transferred from Kohat to US custody on 3 January 2002.¹³

⁵ Analyst Note: Other reporting suggests detainee traveled on 8 August 2001 (see photocopy of airline ticket on page 27 of HARMONY PAK1-2002-805325 30-JUL-2003).

⁶ 000254 302 30-SEP-2002

⁷ 000254 302 09-JUN-2002

⁸ Analyst Note: Sayf al-Jamry is assessed to be YM-680. It is assessed detainee accompanied YM-680 to training.

⁹ 000254 MFR 06-SEP-2002, 000254 302 30-SEP-2002, 000254 MFR 29-AUG-2002

¹⁰ Analyst Note: Detainee's timeline has an approximately six-week gap. Detainee stated he arrived in early August and stayed at Omar's house for two months. In later reporting, detainee provided a departure date of mid-November 2001, thus allowing ample time for training or other related extremist activities.

¹¹ 000254 302 09-JUN-2002

¹² TD-314/00963-02

¹³ 000254 302 09-JUN-2002, 000254 PROFILE 11-JUL-2002, TD-314/00845-02,

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b. (S) Property Held:

- Pocket litter Casio Model CPW 310 digital watch¹⁴
- 8,530 Pakistani Rupees (PKR)¹⁵

c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 8 June 2002

d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide information on the following:

- Yemen-based tribal unrest
- Al-Qaida recruiter Sayf al-Jamry
- Afghan ingress and egress routes

6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee's Account: Detainee has provided a consistent timeline, but his story is assessed as false, as are the details of his intentions and activities in Afghanistan. Detainee has maintained he went to Afghanistan to teach the Koran, a common cover story used by extremists who went to Afghanistan for militant training. Detainee was extremely confrontational and refused to cooperate with the Yemeni delegation that visited JTF-GTMO in August 2005, especially concerning why he was using a false name. Detainee is probably hiding pertinent information that links him to activities or personnel, which probably associates him to hostile activities or intent toward US interests.

7. (U) Detainee Threat:

a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a **HIGH** risk, as he as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies.

b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: *If released without rehabilitation, close supervision, and means to successfully reintegrate into his society as a law abiding citizen, it is assessed detainee would probably seek out prior associates and reengage in extremist support activities. Detainee's defiance toward the Yemeni delegation, coupled with his aggressive behavior and the extreme content of letters he has mailed, which include animosity and hatred toward the US, indicate detainee would possibly participate in extremist activities if given the opportunity.* Detainee is assessed to be a member of al-Qaida. Detainee stayed at guesthouses typically used by individuals recruited by al-Qaida for

¹⁴ Analyst Note: This particular model has a built in prayer compass that points to Mecca, and has automatic alarm presets for the daily Islamic prayer rituals.

¹⁵ Analyst Note: Approximately equivalent to \$140 US at time of capture.

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militant training or fighting on the front lines. While at an al-Qaida sponsored guesthouse, detainee was possibly tasked with observing other guesthouse residents to determine if they were spies. Detainee possibly engaged in hostilities against US and Coalition forces at UBL's Tora Bora Mountain complex.

- (S//NF) Detainee attended the Dimaj Institute in Yemen, operated by radical Islamic cleric Shaykh Muqbil Bin Hadi al-Wadii.
 - (S//NF) Detainee admitted attending the Dimaj Institute for religious training prior to al-Wadii's death, which occurred in 2001.¹⁶
 - (S//NF) Shaykh al-Wadii was the leader of a major fundamentalist Islamic group and ran an assortment of institutions and organizations in Yemen designed to promote the Salafi *manhaj* (movement to jihad). Al-Wadii's institutions have attracted more than 100,000 students over the past 20 years.¹⁷ The FBI assesses al-Wadii was linked to UBL, and that al-Wadii's study centers, particularly the Dimaj Institute, are "incubators for the holy war that UBL has declared against the US."¹⁸
 - (S//NF) According to al-Qaida facilitator Sharqawi Abdu Ali al-Hajj, aka (Riyadh the Facilitator), ISN PK9YM-001457DP (YM-1457), UBL provided funding to Shaykh al-Wadii to establish a paramilitary training camp. Select students were often taken from the Dimaj Institute and sent to the camp, where they received instruction in firearms, bomb making and assassination.¹⁹
- (S//NF) Detainee stated Sayf al-Jamry²⁰ persuaded detainee to travel to Afghanistan. Sayf al-Jamry made travel arrangements and traveled with detainee from Yemen to a guesthouse in Kabul.²¹ (Analyst Note: Sayf al-Jamry is assessed to be an al-Qaida facilitator.)
 - (S//NF) On 6 August 2001, two sequentially numbered Yemeni Airline tickets were sold to Muhammad Ali Hussayn and Abdallah Emad Abdallah. According to ticket stubs, both parties purchased round-trip tickets for an 8 August 2001 flight from Sanaa to Dubai to Karachi and return on the same route.²² (Analyst Note: The Yemeni delegation that visited JTF-GTMO in 2005 claimed detainee used a forged passport under the name "Muhammad Ali Hussayn." The Sayf al-Jamry with whom detainee claimed to have traveled to Afghanistan is assessed to be YM-680, based on the similarity between YM-680's name and the name Abdallah Emad Abdallah, and on the assessment that the photos on Abdallah Emad Abdallah's passport and identity card are of YM-680.)

¹⁶ IIR 6 034 0600 04

¹⁷ Shaykh Muqbil al-Wadii Yemen Times 5-AUG-2001

¹⁸ Shaykh Muqbil al-Wadii New York Times 17-DEC-2000

¹⁹ >IIR 4 240 0941 08

²⁰ Analyst Note: Detainee has also referred to al-Jamry as Sayf Ali al-Jubali.

²¹ Shaykh Muqbil al-Wadii New York Times 17-DEC-2000, 000254 KB 10-JUN-2002, TD-314/00963-02

²² HARMONY PAK1-2002-805325 30-JUL-2003

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- (S//NF) Detainee followed a travel route routinely used by al-Qaida members, including staying at several al-Qaida affiliated facilities.
 - (S//NF) Detainee stayed in a Karachi hotel for a few days before continuing on to Quetta.²³ (Analyst Note: Hotels in Karachi were normal stop-off points for fighters transiting into Afghanistan. However, no information is available on the specific hotel where detainee stayed in Karachi.)
 - (S//NF) Detainee stated he traveled by bus from Karachi to an unidentified house in Quetta, where he stayed for one day before heading toward Kabul.²⁴ (Analyst Note: This is most likely the Taliban Daftar Guesthouse, which was routinely used as a waypoint for Yemeni and Saudi al-Qaida members en route from Karachi to training or fighting in Afghanistan. Similar to detainee's account, personnel usually took a bus or taxi from Karachi to Quetta and stayed only a short time at this house before getting assistance from the Taliban to cross the border.²⁵)
 - (S//NF) Detainee, along with Fadil Bin Hussayn Bin Saleh Bin Hautash, ISN US9YM-000259DP (YM-259),²⁶ stayed at Abu Omar's al-Qaida safe house in Kabul for two months. During this time Abu Omar gave detainee a Casio watch, and detainee gave Abu Omar his passport for safekeeping.²⁷ (Analyst Note: Abu Omar is assessed to be al-Qaida facilitator Abu Omar al-Sharqi, aka (Abu al-Yahya al-Sharqi), who assisted al-Qaida members in Kabul and Loghar, AF. Abu Omar aided Arabs, including YM-259, to escape Afghanistan after the US bombing campaign began.²⁸ Turning over passports for safekeeping was standard procedure for al-Qaida personnel upon entry into a guesthouse. Al-Qaida forgers and operatives probably used the passports to prepare false documents to facilitate movement of future al-Qaida operators.)
 - (S//NF) Detainee reported that al-Jamry left him at Abu Omar's house and went to training.²⁹ According to Yasin Muhammad Salih Mazeab Basardah, ISN US9YM-000252DP (YM-252), YM-680 attended training at al-Faruq Training Camp.³⁰ (Analyst Note: Detainee describes Abu Omar as YM-680's friend, supporting the assessment that YM-680 is an al-Qaida member. Detainee

²³ 000254 302 09-JUN-2002

²⁴ 000254 302 09-JUN-2002

²⁵ Analyst Note: At least 15 other Yemeni and Saudi detainees cited travel paths almost identical to detainee's, including specifically mentioning the Taliban Daftar Guesthouse in Quetta (see for example TD-314/29268-02, IIR 6 034 1550 03, TD-314/52613-02).

²⁶ 000259 302 16-APR-2002

²⁷ 000254 302 09-JUN-2002, 000254 302 30-SEP-2002

²⁸ 000259 302 07-MAY-2003, 000259 302 16-APR-2002, 000259 MFR 22-FEB-2002, 000254 MFR 29-AUG-2002

²⁹ 000254 302 09-JUN-2002

³⁰ 000252 SIR 16-JAN-2003

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vacillates on the question of whether YM-680 offered detainee training in Afghanistan.³¹⁾

- (S//NF) A variant of detainee's name, Muhammad Ali Khaninah, was found on a document listing trust account information. This individual's alias was listed as Muadh al-Waili. Al-Waili indicates membership in the al-Wailah tribe, which is the dominant tribe in the area of Yemen where detainee claims to have lived.³² (Analyst Note: Such lists are indicative of an individual's residence within al-Qaida, Taliban, and other extremist guesthouses, often for the purpose of training or coordination prior to travel to the front lines or abroad. Trust accounts, also referred to as safety boxes or safety deposit boxes, were simple storage compartments such as envelopes or folders that guesthouse administrators used to secure the individual's personal valuables, such as passports and plane tickets. These items were entrusted to the guesthouse until completion of training or other activity.)³³
- (S//NF) SA-493 identified detainee as Bedawiy, whom he met at the al-Nibras Guesthouse. SA-493 stated that, on the orders of the guesthouse leader, detainee always accompanied new people wherever they went, including into the local town. SA-493 believes detainee was tasked with "observing" and assessing new people that arrived at the guesthouse, to make sure that they were not spies.³⁴ (Analyst Note: This responsibility implies a higher level of trust placed in detainee than in ordinary recruits.)
 - (S//NF) Al-Nibras was a UBL-associated waypoint and support center for Arabs transitioning between local training camps in the Kandahar area and the front lines.³⁵ Al-Qaida member Sakr al-Jihad operated the al-Nibras Guesthouse. SA-493 confirmed an individual named Sakr al-Jihad was the *emir* (leader) of the al-Nibras Guesthouse.³⁶
- (S//NF) YM-252 reported detainee was at Tora Bora. YM-252 recounted when YM-252, detainee, and three other JTF-GTMO detainees sat and spoke with senior al-Qaida leader Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, ISN US9KU-010024DP (KU-10024). YM-252 stated all the young fighters loved KU-10024 because he had a lot of charisma and was very humble.³⁷

³¹ 000254 302 30-SEP-2002, 000254 302 09-JUN-2002, 000254 KB 10-JUN-2002

³² >HARMONY AFGP-2002-905527-HT

³³ >DAB Guesthouse Administration 14-Apr-2008

³⁴ 000493 SIR 26-JAN-2005

³⁵ IIR 6 034 0837 02, IIR 6 034 0279 05, IIR 6 034 0782 04

³⁶ IIR 6 034 0279 05

³⁷ >000252 SIR 17-JUL-2008 Analyst Note: The other JTF-GTMO detainees present were Abd al-Aziz Abd al-Rahman Abd al-Aziz al-Baddah, ISN US9SA-000264DP (SA-264, transferred); Ibrahim Muhammad Ibrihim al-Nasir, ISN US9SA-000271DP (SA-271, transferred); and Abd al-Aziz Muhammad Ibrahim al-Nasir, ISN US9SA-000273DP (SA-273, transferred).

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- (S//NF) In August 2005, a Yemeni delegation interviewed detainee to determine detainee's identity, possession of probable false documents, and his familial ties and activities in Yemen. Detainee was patronizing, defiant, and uncooperative during the interview.³⁸
 - (S//NF) The delegation stated the name in detainee's passport and detainee's real name do not match. The Yemeni delegation asked detainee why he was hiding his real name.³⁹
 - (S//NF) Detainee refused to identify any family members, only providing the name "al-Aklanny" for his mother and uncles.⁴⁰ (Analyst Note: A village named al-Aklin is located approximately 5 km from detainee's birth village of Kitaf.⁴¹)
 - (S//NF) The Yemeni delegation asked detainee to provide information on his family, stating detainee's face and picture had been published in open media. The delegation members stated they knew detainee was Yemeni, but the Saudi Arabian government thinks detainee is Saudi and wants him.⁴² (Analyst Note: Detainee's tribal region is located approximately 50 km from the Saudi border. Although the Yemeni delegation did not specify, the Saudi government may want detainee for involvement in his family's illegal or extremist activities against the Saudi government.)
 - (S//NF) The Yemeni delegation asked detainee about his association with a probable Saudi named "Shaykh Mana." Detainee's response was that he did not know him, but he did attend his funeral in Saudi Arabia.⁴³ (Analyst Note: Shaykh Mana is possibly Shaykh Faris Mana, a known Sadah area businessman and arms merchant. Mana's brother, Shaykh Hasan Mana, is the Deputy Governor of the Sadah region.⁴⁴)
 - (S//NF) Detainee's defiance toward the Yemeni delegation, coupled with his aggressive behavior and the extreme content of letters he has mailed, which include animosity and hatred toward the US, indicate detainee would likely participate in extremist activities if given the opportunity.⁴⁵
 - (S) Detainee has addressed letters to the US President and Congress threatening punishment from Allah, stating that it is "time to be destroyed, suffer and lose." Detainee has also threatened that the US President would "taste the death," telling him to await "the humiliation by the swords of Islam."⁴⁶

³⁸ 000254 SIR 21-JUL-2005

³⁹ 000254 SIR 21-JUL-2005

⁴⁰ 000254 SIR 21-JUL-2005

⁴¹ 000254 KB 10-JUN-2002

⁴² 000254 SIR 21-JUL-2005

⁴³ 000254 SIR 21-JUL-2005

⁴⁴ FBIS GMP20070306825005

⁴⁵ 000254 SIR 21-JUL-2005

⁴⁶ 000254 GUAN-2005-T03001, 000254 GUAN-2004-T04113

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Addressing a letter to the Muslims of the world who “carry their weapons on their shoulders,” detainee “implored” them to remember that “American criminals...hated God’s book.”⁴⁷

c. (S//NF) Detainee’s Conduct: Detainee is assessed as a **LOW** threat from a detention perspective. His overall behavior has been compliant and rarely hostile to the guard force and staff. He currently has 55 reports of disciplinary infraction listed in DIMS with the most recent occurring on 31 March 2008, when he was found in possession of contraband. He has nine reports of disciplinary infraction for assault with the most recent occurring on 15 November 2006, when he spat on the guard force. Other incidents for which he has been disciplined include inciting and participating in mass disturbances, failure to follow guard instructions/camp rules, unauthorized communications, damage to government property, attempted assaults, assaults, provoking words and gestures, and possession of food and non-weapon type contraband. In 2007, he had a total of six reports of disciplinary infraction and two so far in 2008.

8. (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:

a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of **MEDIUM** intelligence value. Detainee’s most recent interrogation session occurred on 23 September 2008.

b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Detainee’s recruitment and travel were facilitated by al-Qaida personnel. Detainee stayed at al-Qaida affiliated guesthouses, and was described as working in a position of trust by reporting on new jihadists transiting the guesthouse. Detainee traveled with 20 al-Qaida associated Arabs from Khowst to the Pakistani border. Though detainee traveled to Afghanistan, no reporting has specifically placed him on the front lines or in a combat unit. No reporting indicates detainee received any type of formal paramilitary training in Afghanistan.

c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee can provide dated information on al-Qaida recruiters and facilitators operating in Yemen and Afghanistan. Detainee probably has specific information about YM-680, his activities, and his associations. Detainee probably has information about al-Qaida facilitator Abu Omar al-Sharqi and personnel and activities affiliated with his Kabul guesthouse. Detainee is possibly withholding information relating to his involvement in activities against US and Coalition forces, but it would probably not be critical, unique, or actionable. Detainee is assessed to be only partially exploited.

d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:

⁴⁷ 000254 GUAN-2005-900050

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- Al-Qaida recruiting and facilitation network in Yemen
- YM-680
- YM-259
- SA-493
- Abu Omar al-Sharqi
- Timeline data on 20 Arabs caught at Pakistani border with detainee
- Yemeni family and tribal activities

9. (S) **EC Status:** Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 17 December 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant.



D. M. THOMAS, JR
Rear Admiral, US Navy
Commanding

* Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessment can be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College October 2001 guide *Intelligence Warning Terminology*.