

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

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REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction
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DATE WITHDRAWN 04/11/2000
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11/9/10*

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Gerald Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Saturday, October 25, 1975
9:30 a.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office
The White House

Kissinger: If you go to China straight from Anchorage... The Japanese want you to stop through Haneda.

The Japanese are beside themselves about the Emperor's trip -- and yours. There is a magazine of the Emperor's visit and all the copies are sold out and are collectors' items. I have never seen anything like it.

But to get to Peking by 3:00, you have to leave Anchorage by 9:00. It makes a terribly long day of it.

President: What do you suggest?

Kissinger: I don't know what, except to postpone the banquet the first night. I just think it is hard on you.

President: The physical part doesn't bother me. I just think that with the other changes it doesn't look good. Betty can do it.

Kissinger: Well, we'll ask them to have the banquet end by 9:30 and start the next day not before 11:00.

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (b) (3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to det.

There is one embarrassing thing. [REDACTED]
[Congressmen] Addabo and maybe Leggett are getting money. Sue Thompson in Albert's office is the ROK CIA contact and pay master.

President: What is our obligation?

Kissinger: It's illegal. We should probably talk to Levi about it.
[REDACTED]

President: I think we have to give the material to Levi.

Kissinger: There is the Sue Thompson part.

[There was discussion about the Speaker.]

[The Secretary hands the President a summary/analysis of his conversation with Mao.]

President: How is Mao's health?

Kissinger: When you see him you think he is finished; he can hardly articulate. He speaks a few words of English but it is impossible to understand. The interpreter has to guess at the words until he nods -- or he writes out the words. Mao's theme is our weakness. We are the "swallow before the storm." We are ineffectual. What we say is not reliable. He thinks we won't use nuclear weapons in Europe and would suffer another Dunkirk. He says we can no longer stand on Chinese shoulders to reach the Soviet Union. "China must be self-reliant." It is sort of admirable. These are the same people of the Long March.

I said we had a common opponent. He said he likes Schlesinger's view of the Soviet Union better than mine. They wanted Schlesinger to visit. That would drive the Soviet Union wild. But I said we could have military exchanges to see what we could do. He said, "No. After the war starts we will talk, not before the war." They want to do the same as Stalin did in World War II -- be sure that a war starts in the West so both will be exhausted by the time China has to get in.

I guarantee you that if we do go into confrontation with the Soviet Union, they will attack us and the Soviet Union and draw the Third World

around them. Good relations with the Soviet Union are the best for our Chinese relations -- and vice versa. One weakness is the problem -- they see us in trouble with SALT and detente. That plays into their hands. They can't understand the Congress -- what the Congress did on Turkey, Hawk missiles, etc.

I think you can't take any guff from them, and you have to be cooler than Nixon in your toast.

[Discussion of schedule.]

Kissinger: I don't think you should not just go to China. People will say what did you go for? Then they will have you by the balls in terms of making it look worthwhile. The best thing you can do is something in contrast with Nixon: Don't stay long, don't go to another city. Any other city visit, even if it's different from where Nixon went, will look like a repeat to the American people.

When I saw the communique my first reaction was to cancel your trip. Bush's reaction was the same. But when we thought about it, we changed our minds. It would lose us all our leverage with the Soviet Union. It would upset the Japanese. It would give the Chinese a chance to invite all the Democratic candidates over to say you screwed up the Chinese policy.

President: How about adding India?

Kissinger: No. That's too big a shock. Manila and Djakarta is just a jab at them. India and Pakistan would add two days minimum. Manila/Djakarta bolsters our friends, and you'll get a big reception in Manila.

President: I agree. Manila will please the Conservatives. I think you are probably right. Let me think it over just a bit and I'll let you know.

[He hands the President the U. S. draft press statement of the China trip.]

President: It sounds all right. This sentence about peaceful settlement of Taiwan by the Chinese themselves -- this is what we have said before, isn't it?

Kissinger: Yes. The conservatives will like it; the PRC won't like it much.

President: How is George Bush doing?

Kissinger: Magnificently. I am very, very impressed with him. I was not enthusiastic about his appointment, but he has grown into the job and I think he will one day be a considerable national leader. He is a big cut above Moynihan -- who is turning into a disaster. To call Brazil a fascist dictatorship [because of its vote on the anti-Zionism resolution]....

President: When did he do that?

Kissinger: He is going wild about the Israeli issues. Garment, his aide, is a Jewish agent.

President: I agree with you about George. He is a fine man.

Kissinger: [Reads parts from the analysis of the Mao conversation.]

President: What is going to happen when Mao dies?

Kissinger: There is no way anyone can know that. He is on the verge of becoming a vegetable, but he has the uncanny ability to go right to the heart of things. No small talk, in the sense that everything has meaning.

President: I called Trudeau when I had to cancel. He spoke highly of our efforts for him at the economic summit.

Did you see the options for getting to Paris?

Scowcroft: I did but Henry hasn't.

President: I think the best way is to stop here and change planes.

Kissinger: Whatever is more convenient for you. There's no reason to stop unless you want to.

President: [Reads the schedule]. I want only a small group. No Hartmann or speechwriters.

Kissinger: I will take Sonnenfeldt.

[Some discussion of arrangements].

Kissinger: We should be the dominant people there. The economic people want to be tough. I think we should lead. I think we should rise above the economic details and show that the democracies can master their future.

President: I agree. I told Greenspan I want to be familiar with the economies of all the countries besides ours.

Kissinger: You can come out of this as a great world leader. You should unify the West, rising above the economic bickering.

President: Our economic news this week is far better than we expected.

Kissinger: I am speaking at Pittsburgh on the 11th and will outline what you will be doing.

President: Good idea. We didn't get out in front on the CSCE and it hurt us at first.

Kissinger: The Israelis are giving us a hard time about the Rabin visit. They don't want to come in November. December is bad because it will be just after you get back from China. The next time is the end of January. Let's face it -- they want to push it off until you get into the primaries so you can't squeeze them on Syria. You would get back from your trip about 4:00 a.m. on the 8th. If they come on the 9th or 10th I could stay until noon on the 10th.

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WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST WHM

REDACTED

2/16/11

✓ P/K 250575

K If you go straight from Anchorage... The jets want you to stop thru Canada. The jets are behind themselves about a European trip - and yours. The magazine from a European insert are sold out + are collectible items. I have never seen anything like it.

But to get a pickup by 3:00 you have to leave Anchorage by 9:00. It makes a terribly long day of it.

P What do you suggest?

K I don't know what, except to postpone a banquet a night. I just think it is harder on you.

P The physical part doesn't bother me. I just think that w/ a certain change it doesn't look good. Betty can do it.

R Well, we'll ask them to have a banquet end by 9:30 + start a next day not before 11:00.

There is one embarrassing thing. [redacted]

[redacted] Adelro + maybe he gets anything wrong. Sue Thompson in Albert's office is a ROK CIA contact + pay master.

P What is our obligation?

K It is illegal. We should probably talk to him about it. [redacted]

P I think we have to give a material to her.

K There is a Sue Thompson part (discussion about a speaker)



(Hand P_a summary of Mao comm. (in))

P. How is Mao health

R. When you see him you think he is finished. He can barely articulate. He speaks a few words of English but it is impossible to understand. The interpreter has to guess at the words until he nods - or writes out words. Mao's theme is our weakness.



We are a shallow people. We are in a trap. What we say is not believed. We must use more in Eur + could suffer another Dunkirk. We can no longer stand on Chinese shoulders to reach S.C. China must be self reliant.

It is sort of admirable. These are some people of - Long March.

I said we had a common opponent. He said he likes Schels view of S.U better than mine. He wanted Schels to visit. That would drive S.C. wild. Best I said we could have military exchange to see what we could do. He said no, after war starts we will talk, not before war. They want to do a sand do Stalin in WW II - because that also starts in a war + both will be phoned by the time China has to get in.

I guaranteed you that if we do go into com-portation w/ S.C., they will attack us + S.C. + draw 2nd world around them. Good relations not w/ S.C. are best for our Chinese relations - and vice versa. Our weakness is a position they see us in trouble w/ S.C. + detente - that

play with their hands. They can't understand
Every - Turkey, Bank missiles, etc.
I think you can't take any guff from them &
have to be better than Niger in your toast
(Discussion of schedule)

K I don't think you should not just go to China.
People will say what did you go for? Then they
will hum you by a balls in terms of making it
look unattractive. The best thing you can do is to
contrast w/ Niger - don't stay long, don't go to
another city. Any other city visit, even if you
attend Niger event, will look like a rip-off to
Am peop.

When I saw a communique by first Nat this
was to enjoy your trip. Good reaction & same,
but when we talk about it we change. It
would be no all-out leverage w/ S.C. Would
support & pass. Would give a Chinese a chance
to invite all the Demo candidates over & say
you succeeded w/ Chinese party.

P How about adding India?

K No. That is too big a shock. Mumbai/Jakarta is
just a job at hand. India/Pak would add a
day minimum. Mumbai/Jakarta holds
our friends & you'll get big reception in
Mumbai.

P I agree. Mumbai will please & encourage.
I think you are not right. Let me think
it over just a bit & I'll let you know.

(Hans P brief press statement)

P It sounds all right. This sentence about peaceful settlement of Tunisia by Chinese themselves - this is what we have said before, isn't it?

K Yes, the conservatives will like it - the Star/KC don't much.

P How is George Bush doing

K Unimpressedly. I am very very impressed w/ him. I was not enthusiastic about his appointment but he has grown in a job & I think he will one day be a considerable world leader. He is a big cut above Unzueta - who is turning into a disaster. To call Brazil a fascist dictatorship -

P When did we do that?

K He is going wild about Israeli issues. Garment, his aide, is a Goddamned Jewish agent.

P Do you w/ you about George. He is a fine man.

(K reads from News summary)

P What's he's going to happen when Mao dies?

K There is no way anyone can know that. He is on verge of becoming a vegetable, but he has a concerning ability to go right to the heart of things. No small talk, in a sense that everything has meaning.

P I called Trudeau when I had to come. He spoke highly from efforts at the Euro summit.

Did you see a option for getting to Paris?

S I did but K hasn't.

P I think a best way is to stop here & change
plans.

K whatever is your commitment for you. No
reason to stop unless you want it.

P (Reads a schedule 2 years time)

I want only a small group. No Kudron
or specialists.

K I will take Sonnenfeldt.

(Some discussion of arrangements)



K We should be a dominant people there. I am
sure people want to be tough. I think we should
lead. I think we should raise about a few
details & show that a dominant can master
their future.

P I agree. I told Serapan I want to be familiar
w/ the economics of all the major countries besides
ours.

K You can come out of this as a great world
leader. You should unify what, rising
above a few, backing.

P Our own news this work is far better
than we expected.

K I am speaking at Pittsburgh on 11th & another
what you will be doing.

P Good idea. We didn't get out in front
CJCE & it hurts at first

K The I am going as a hard time about
Robin's visit. They don't want to come in

Two Ford - Florida

Wm. Dec is bad cause just after you
get back from China the whole time is
not Jan. Let's face it - they want to push
it off until you get into a prison as
you can't signle them on Spain.
You could get back for you they about
400 am am - Feb if they can am -
9th + 10th I could stay til noon on -
10th

