SOUTHERN COMMAND

S E C R E T // NOFORN // 20321231

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA APO AE 09360



JTF-GTMO-CDR 31 December 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 9lst Avenue, Miami, FL 33172

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000240DP (S)

JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

1. (S//NF) Personal Information:

- JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Abdullah Yahia
- Current/True Name and Aliases: <u>Abdallah Yahya Yusif al-Shibli, Abu Amar, Abdullah Yahya Tahir al-Zabeedi, Abdullah Yahya Yusif al-Shalabi, Abdullah Yahya Tahir al-Zubayda, Umar al-Yemeni</u>
- Place of Birth: <u>Jeddah, Saudi Arabia (SA)</u>
- Date of Birth: 10 September 1977
- Citizenship: <u>Yemen (YM)</u>
- Internment Serial Number (ISN): <u>US9YM-000240DP</u>
- 2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in overall good health.


3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment:

- **a. (S) Recommendation:** JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) on 11 December 2006.
- **b.** (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is assessed to be a member of al-Qaida who traveled to Afghanistan (AF) to receive militant training. Detainee has been placed in Afghanistan up to two years longer than he claimed, and attended multiple al-Qaida training camps where he received advanced militant training. Detainee was recruited by a known al-Qaida operative who facilitated his travel to Afghanistan and provided detainee with a false passport. Detainee participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces and admitted

CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES

REASON: E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C)

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carrying a weapon in Usama Bin Laden's (UBL) Tora Bora complex. Detainee's name was found on al-Qaida documents and he admitted staying at known al-Qaida guesthouses. JTF-GTMO has determined this detainee to be:

- A **HIGH** risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies
- A **LOW** threat from a detention perspective
- Of **MEDIUM** intelligence value
- c. (S//NF) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee's assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be annotated by \triangleright next to the footnote.)
 - Revised detainee's capture information

4. (U) Detainee's Account of Events:

The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.

- **a.** (U) **Prior History:** Detainee resided in Saudi Arabia until 1995, when detainee moved to Yemen to attend college. Detainee attended Saba University in Sanaa, YM, graduating in approximately December 2000 with a bachelor's degree in accounting. After graduating, detainee sold honey to make enough money to begin work on his master's degree. ¹
- **b.** (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: One of detainee's honey customers introduced detainee to a mujahid named Marwan Jawan Qasim, aka (Abu Ali al-Yafi), who had fought in Afghanistan and Chechnya. Detainee and al-Yafi became friends and during the year prior to detainee's travel to Afghanistan, al-Yafi spoke of life as a mujahid. Detainee traveled to Afghanistan to fulfill his Muslim duty of learning to defend himself. Detainee knew the mujahideen participated in armed conflict in Afghanistan, but al-Yafi told him he would not have to participate in the fighting. Detainee planned to spend three months training at the al-Qaida operated al-Faruq Training Camp, return to Yemen, find a wife, and settle down. In August 2001, with financial assistance and travel instructions from al-Yafi, detainee traveled to Kandahar, AF, via Tehran, Iran (IR), and Tayyebit, IR.² Detainee traveled using a

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¹ IIR 6 034 0744 02, 000240 302 24-APR-2002

² IIR 6 034 0744 02, TD-314/50977-02, Analyst Note: This route of travel is unusual for recruits from Sanaa, YM, indicating detainee may have been located somewhere other than Sanaa at the time he traveled.

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passport provided by al-Yafi in the name of Abdallah Yahya Tahir al-Zubayda.³ At the Iranian-Afghani border, detainee told the Iranian guards he wished to go to Kandahar, "where other Arabs were gathered." Once across the boarder, a driver took detainee to an unidentified Arab house in Herat, AF. Using an address provided by the owner of the house, detainee traveled to the Badr Abd al-Karim al-Sudayri aka (Zubayr al-Haili) Guesthouse in Kandahar, where detainee met al-Haili. Al-Haili asked detainee the purpose of his travel, to which detainee responded he desired to receive training to defend himself. Al-Haili agreed to assist detainee and detainee stayed at the guesthouse for approximately one week.⁴

c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: Detainee then traveled to al-Faruq Training Camp, where he received training in the basic handling of Kalashnikov (AK-47) and Seminov rifles and the rocket propelled grenade (RPG) launcher. During the second week of training, detainee fell ill and was taken to the camp clinic to recover. Detainee returned to the Zubayr al-Haili Guesthouse and remained there for three weeks before traveling to Kabul, AF, for a week. During this timeframe, detained resided in two different guesthouses: one known as the Hamza al-Qaiti Guesthouse, and the other as the Hamza al-Ghamdi Guesthouse. Detainee was in the al-Ghamdi Guesthouse when the events of 11 September 2001 occurred. Detainee heard suspects in the attacks were located in Afghanistan and the US forces were heading to Afghanistan. At that time, detained was told to go to the front line, since Kabul was no longer safe. Detainee traveled by truck, assuming he was fleeing the area, but was taken to the Malik Center. He stayed at the Malik Center for three weeks during which time he trained on various Russian-made weapons. Detainee returned to Kabul and then traveled to Jalalabad, AF. In Jalalabad, detained was told to proceed to an unidentified Arab house. From the Arab house, detained was taken to a "big garden" outside the city limits. Detainee remained in the "garden" for three weeks until the US bombing campaign of Jalalabad began (between 7 October and 14 November 2001). Detainee then traveled with a group led by Abu Thabit to the Tora Bora Mountains. When the bombing slowed, detainee headed down the mountain range.⁷

5. (U) Capture Information:

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³ TD-314/50977-02, Analyst Note: In 000240 MFR 22-SEP-2003, a variant of this name is Abdullah Yahya Tahir al-Zabeedi.

⁴ 000240 MFR 17-SEP-2003, TD-314/50977-02, IIR 6 034 0744 02, Analyst Note: A variant of Zubayr al-Haili is Zubayr al-Haiely.

⁵ 000240 MFR 17-SEP-2003, 000240 MFR 22-SEP-2003, TD-314/50977-02, IIR 6 034 0744 02

⁶ 000240 MFR 22-SEP-2003, TD-314/50977-02, IIR 6 034 0744 02, Analyst Note: The front lines were engaged in combat and it is unlikely detainee would be told to go there to seek refuge from hostilities in Kabul. Detainee most probably traveled to the front with the full understanding he would engage in hostilities and that hostilities against US forces were eminent.

⁷ IIR 6 034 0744 02

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- **a.** (S//NF) Detainee said as he descended the mountain in mid-December 2001 with a group of about 62 others including Abu Thabit, the group came under attack by low flying aircraft and large bombers, and many of them were killed or wounded. Detainee and two or three others met a couple of Afghans who took them to a stable and then a house where they were captured by Afghan authorities. Detainee's capture is assessed to have resulted from the al-Qaida withdrawal from Tora Bora. Detainee's account describes the initial group of about 65 al-Qaida fighters who attempted to escape Tora Bora only to come under US air attack. Detainee was captured by Afghan authorities on or about 16 December 2001 in the village of Suleiman Khel, AF, and transferred to US custody on 10 January 2002. 10
- **b. (U) Property Held:** None¹¹
- c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 7 February 2002
- **d.** (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide information on the following:
 - Location and layout of training camps and safe houses
 - Biographical information on leaders of training camps and personnel managing safe houses
 - Routes of travel from Yemen to Afghanistan
- **6.** (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee's Account: Detainee initially provided a fairly consistent yet general timeline, which was substantiated by historical events or information provided by other JTF-GTMO detainees. Detainee now refuses to verify previously reported information and his timeline is now questioned by other reporting. Detainee initially admitted completing the al-Faruq basic training course, but currently denies completing it. Detainee admitted training at the Malik Center. Of note, the Malik Center was an advanced training facility; therefore it is highly unlikely that detainee attended the Malik Center without completing the necessary training at al-Faruq. Detainee's basic training is reported by other detainees who place him in Afghanistan up

⁹ >TD-314/14605-04, Withdrawal from Tora Bora Analysis

⁸ IIR 6 034 0744 02, 000240 MFR 22-SEP-2003

¹⁰ 000240 INITIAL SCREENING 10-JAN-2002, IIR 2 340 6302 02, Analyst Note: Detainee stated he was captured on the 30th of Ramadan, which converts to 16 December 2001. Detainee was reported captured with Muhammad Souleimani Laalami, ISN US9MO-000237DP (MO-237, transferred) and Bandar Ayid Humud al-Utaybi, ISN US9SA-000332DP (SA-332, transferred).

¹¹ (S//NF) Analyst Note: Khaled Qasim, ISN US9YM-000242DP (YM-242), reported in IIR 6 034 0160 03 that he took \$200 US from detainee at the prison in Kabul.

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to two years earlier than detainee's claim. There are subsequently large gaps in detainee's account.

7. (U) Detainee Threat:

- a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.
- **b.** (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: Detainee is assessed to be a member of al-Qaida. He accepted recruitment and facilitation from a known al-Qaida operative who provided detainee with a false passport, and his name was found on al-Qaida documents. Detainee attended multiple training camps, received advanced militant training. Detainee participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces on the front lines and in Tora Bora and used extremist affiliated facilities in Afghanistan.
 - (S//NF) Detainee is an assessed member of al-Qaida. Detainee was recruited by a known al-Qaida recruiter and is listed on al-Qaida affiliated documents.
 - o (S//NF) Detainee admitted Marwan Jawan Qasim aka (Abu Ali al-Yafi), recruited and facilitated detainee's travels. Detainee identified Marwan as his friend. 12
 - Marwan Qasim Jawan was a Yemen-based recruiter and facilitator for al-Qaida and the Taliban, ¹³ and is associated to numerous JTF-GTMO detainees. Jawan was a veteran mujahid of Chechnya and Afghanistan who recruited mujahideen to travel to Afghanistan to train at the al-Qaida operated al-Faruq Training Camp and to participate in jihad. ¹⁴ Jawan also served as a bodyguard for Usama Bin Laden. 15
 - (S//NF) Khaled Qasim, ISN US9YM-000242DP (YM-242), who identified detainee from training, admitted that his recruiter was Abu Ali al-Yafai, and stated al-Yafai accompanied him to Afghanistan. ¹⁶ (Analyst Note: It is possible that detainee and YM-242 were recruited and traveled together.)
 - o (S//NF) Detainee admitted using a false passport provided by his recruiter, Marwan, for his travel to Afghanistan. 17
 - o (S//NF) Detainee's name and or alias were found on recovered al-Qaida affiliated documents.

 ¹² IIR 6 034 0744 02, 000240 302 24-APR-2002
 ¹³ IIR 6 034 0744 02, IIR 6 034 0109 02
 ¹⁴ 000043 SIR 02-MAR-2004, IIR 6 034 0744 02, IIR 2 340 6120 02

¹⁶ 000242 302 25-AUG-2002, Analyst Note: Variants of Yafai include Yafiaa, Yafi and Yafy

¹⁷ 000240 MFR 22-SEP-2003, TD-314/50977-02

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- (S//NF) A variation of detainee's passport alias was found in documents recovered in raids of safe houses associated with suspected al-Qaida members in Karachi. Detainee's trust account reportedly possessed a Yemeni passport and [plane] ticket. ¹⁸ (Analyst Note: Such lists are indicative of an individual's residence within al-Qaida, Taliban, and other extremist guesthouses, often for the purpose of training or coordination prior to travel to the front lines or abroad. Trust accounts were simply storage compartments, such as envelopes or folders, which were used to secure the individual's personal valuables until completion of training or another activity.)
- (S//NF) Analysis of floppy disks recovered in raids on suspected al-Qaida safe houses on 10-12 September 2002 in Karachi, revealed an Arabic-language document titled "Passports.doc." A variation of detainee's passport alias appears in the file, which provided a list of mujahideen and the contents of their trust accounts. ¹⁹
- (S//NF) Detainee attended multiple training camps and received advanced militant training. Detainee received basic, technical, anti-aircraft, and artillery training.
 - o (S//NF) YM-242 admitted he and detainee attended both basic and technical militant training together. (Analyst Note: YM-242 claimed he traveled to Afghanistan in approximately August 1999. YM-242's timeline is more supportive of the basic and advanced training received by YM-242 and detainee than detainee's claimed August 2001 travel. Detainee is assessed to have been in Afghanistan up to two years longer than claimed.)
 - o (S//NF) Detainee admitted he traveled to Afghanistan to receive three months of training at al-Faruq. Detainee claimed he attended one week of training, fell ill, and then departed al-Faruq with the understanding that he could return when he desired to finish training. Sa
 - o (S//NF) Detainee admitted he traveled to the Malik Training Camp where he received anti-aircraft and artillery training.²⁴ Detainee noted weapons for the front lines were stored at Malik.²⁵ (Analyst Note: Anti-aircraft and artillery are advanced

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¹⁸ TD-314/40693-02, detainee is listed in number 169, TD-314/47683-03, detainee is listed in number 119

¹⁹ TD-314/42895-02, detainee is listed in number 121

²⁰ IIR 6 034 0160 03, 000242 302 13-Sep-2002, 000242 SIR 29-Jun-2004

²¹ 000242 KB 12-MAY-2002

²² IIR 6 034 0744 02

²³ 000240 MFR 17-SEP-2003, 000240 SIR 22-SEP-2003, Analyst Note: Basic training lasts about six weeks, and the duration of advanced/technical training was about six weeks, this would account for the three-month period.
²⁴ IIR 2 340 6120 02, 000240 SIR 23-SEP-2003, 000240 KB 11-FEB-2002, Analyst Note: Malik Center is a known al-Qaida training facility that was typically attended after basic training, such as al-Faruq. This corroborates that detainee did complete his basic phase training.

²⁵ 000240 MFR 22-SEP-2003

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al-Qaida training courses. Senior al-Qaida trainer Tariq Mahmud Ahmad al-Sawah, ISN US9EG-000535DP (EG-535), stated it was unlikely detainee attended Malik without first completing the basic training at al-Faruq, completing military training or participating in earlier fighting in Afghanistan or Bosnia. It is assessed detainee did complete basic training.)

- (S//NF) Detainee participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces in Tora Bora.
 - o (S//NF) Detainee admitted being on the back lines, and fled Jalalabad with Abu Thabit. Abu Thabit was second in command of a front line unit of the 55th Arab Brigade, north of Kabul. Detainee retreated to Tora Bora with Abu Thabit to escape the allied assault on Jalalabad. Abu Thabit gave detainee a weapon and in Tora Bora, Abu Thabit served as the commander of a multi-national group of 20 fighters from Algeria, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. Detainee remained under the leadership of Abu Thabit until Abu Thabit's death during their attempted escape. (Analyst Note: Detainee possibly served with Abu Thabit on the front lines as well.)
 - o (S//NF) Detainee reported when the group reached the top of the mountains at Tora Bora, Abu Thabit spoke with detainee's former al-Faruq commander, Abdul Qadus. Detainee spent over a month in Tora Bora after being issued a weapon. (Analyst Note: Abdul Qadus was an al-Qaida operative, al-Faruq commander, and Tora Bora commander.) (29)
 - (S//NF) According to assessed al-Qaida member Abdul Latif Nasir, ISN US9MO-000244DP (MO-244), Abd al-Qadus led all centers (camps) in Tora Bora ³⁰
 - o (S//NF) Yasin Muhammad Salih Mazeeb Basardah, ISN US9YM-000252DP (YM-252), reported seeing detainee in Tora Bora. 31 (Analyst Note: YM-252 has provided extensive information about other detainees, much of it corroborated.)
 - o (S//NF) Assessed al-Qaida member and admitted Moroccan Islamic Fighting Group (GICM) member Muhammad Souleimani Laalami, ISN US9MO-000237DP (MO-237, transferred), stated he was captured with an individual (assessed to be detainee) named Abdullah Yahia Yousf al-Shabli aka (Ammer), who he met at a

²⁶ Analyst Note: The 55th Arab Brigade served as UBL's primary battle formation supporting Taliban objectives, with UBL participating closely in the command and control of the brigade. Nashwan Abd al-Razzaq Abd al-Baqi, aka (Abdul Hadi al-Iraqi), ISN US9IZ-010026DP, had primary operational command of the 55th Arab Brigade, serving as UBL's military commander in the field.

²⁷ >COLISEUM ANS-1005-04-0132, IIR 2 340 6120 02, 000240 MFR 23-SEP-2003

²⁸ IIR 6 034 0107 02, 000240 MFR 23-SEP-2003, 000240 KB 11-FEB-2002,

²⁹ 000240 KB 11-FEB-2002, Analyst Note: Variations of Oadus include Oudoos and Kudus.

³⁰ IIR 6 034 0449 02

^{31 &}gt; 000252 FM40 26-Sep-2006

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stable in Suleiman Khel, AF.³² MO-237 was identified as an al-Qaida fighter in Tora Bora.³³

- (S//NF) Detainee claims he was assisted by Afghans during his escape from Tora Bora who took him to a stable and then to their house. He stated these Afghanis were part of the Hadhrat Ali Group. After a few days, detainee was turned over to the Haji Qadir Group. 35
 - ♦ (S//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR AND NZL) Hadhrat Ali, Haji Abdul Qadir, and Dr. Amir Yunis Khalis composed a triumvirate (a political regime dominated by three individuals) of the reformed government in Jalalabad as of late November 2001.³⁶
- o (S//NF) EG-535 stated after the initiation of the US bombing campaign in Tora Bora, he took up a defensive position with a group of individuals including Amer al-Yemeni (possibly detainee), Bilal al-Suri, Abu Ali al-Emirati, Abu Jaffar al-Jazairi, Abdallah al-Jazairi, and Khalid al-Kuwaiti.³⁷
- (S//NF) Detainee resided in al-Qaida and Taliban operated guesthouses.
 - O (S//NF) In Kandahar, detainee resided in a guesthouse operated by senior al-Qaida operative Zubayr al-Haili, ³⁹ with whom detainee associated. ⁴⁰ (Analyst Note: Zubayr al-Haili (detained) was a senior member of al-Qaida, former UBL bodyguard, and had prior knowledge of the 11 September 2001 attacks. Al-Haili operated the al-Nibras aka (al-Ansar), aka (Hajji Habash) Guesthouse in Kandahar. The al-Nibras Guesthouse was a known al-Qaida transit point for processing al-Faruq Training Camp recruits or fighters en route the front lines. Zubayr al-Haili also operated al-Qaida training camps in Afghanistan and was the leading facilitator who assisted fighters entering and exiting Afghanistan.)⁴¹
 - o (S//NF) In Kabul, detainee resided in two al-Qaida affiliated guesthouses: Hamza al-Ghamdi and Hamza al-Qaiti. 42 (Analyst Note: These guesthouses were located in

³² IIR 2 340 6302 02, Analyst Note: The GICM is a National Intelligence Priority Framework (NIPF) Priority 2A Counterterrorism target. Priority 2A targets are defined as terrorist/extremist groups that have demonstrated intention to attack US persons and interests and are taking action to develop or acquire WMD capability. The GICM is believed to be disbanded.

³³ IIR 2 340 6464 02

³⁴ IIR 6 034 0744 02

³⁵ 000240 MFR 23-SEP-2003

³⁶ 3/OO/32340-01 Tearline

³⁷ TRRS-04-03-0907

³⁸ TD-314/24907-02

³⁹ IIR 6 034 0744 02

⁴⁰ 000240 MFR 17-SEP-2003, TD-314/48574-02

⁴¹ IIR 6 034 0059 05

⁴² 000240 MFR 22-SEP-2003, See IIR 6 034 0297 05, IIR 6 034 0059 05, and IIR 6 034 0088 05 for additional information on these guesthouses.

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the Wazir Akbar Khan area of Kabul; a former diplomatic district taken over by the Taliban and al-Qaida for housing and training.)

- o (S//NF) While in Herat, detainee resided in two unidentified guesthouses. ⁴³ (Analyst Note: Detainee has not specifically identified these guesthouses. Based on detainee's desire for assistance at the time to travel to "the place where Arabs were" in Kandahar, it is assessed that they were not Arab guesthouses and were both associated with the Taliban. Taliban guesthouses were frequently utilized as stopover points by Arab mujahideen en route Afghanistan.)
- **c.** (U//FOUO) **Detainee's Conduct:** Detainee is assessed to be a **LOW** threat from a detention perspective. Detainee's overall behavior has been mostly compliant and semihostile to the guard force and staff. Detainee currently has 21 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS with the most recent occurring on 15 October 2007, when he was reported modifying mail. Detainee has one Report of Disciplinary Infraction for assault occurring on 22 July 2004, when he spit on a guard. Other incidents for which detainee has been disciplined include failure to follow instructions and camp rules and threatening guard force. In 2006, detainee had a total of three Reports of Disciplinary Infraction and seven so far in 2007.

8. (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:

- **a.** (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of MEDIUM intelligence value. Detainee's most recent interrogation session occurred on 28 September 2007.
- **b.** (S//NF) Placement and Access: Detainee traveled to Afghanistan as early as 1999 to attend al-Faruq Training Camp, and was placed in multiple training courses. Detainee resided in various al-Qaida guesthouses and therefore interacted with numerous al-Qaida members and other extremists. Detainee was on the front lines and in Tora Bora along with Abu Thabit. Detainee has large gaps in his timeline left to disclose.
- **c.** (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee was actively recruited to attend militant training by a known al-Qaida recruiter. His time in Taliban and al-Qaida guesthouses afforded him the opportunity to learn about other residents, al-Qaida operations, and visitors. Detainee attended training at al-Faruq and the Malik Center. He may be able to provide information about trainers, camp assignment processes, and trainees (including other detainees) at al-Faruq and the Malik Center. Detainee possibly can provide additional information on a group of "special" trainees at al-Faruq. As a result of his extended time in

⁴³ IIR 6 034 0744 03, 000240 MFR 17-SEP-2003

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the Tora Bora region, detainee probably has information on leadership, operations, and within the region.

d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:

- Al-Qaida recruitment, facilitation, guesthouses, operations, and methodologies
- Al-Qaida basic and advanced training
- Tora Bora operations including leadership and possibly escapees
- Front line operations
- Taliban support to al-Qaida
- Support to Trans-National Terrorism
- Terrorism Targets, Activities, and Related Facilities
- Terrorist/Foreign Fighters Training and Motivation
- Terrorist Biographical Information
- Terrorism Radicalization Factors
- Terrorist Operations in CENTCOM AOR
- Terrorist Recruitment of Juveniles
- Communications

9. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 2 November 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant.

MARK H. BUZBY

Rear Admiral, US Navy

Commanding

^{*} Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessment can be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College October 2001 guide *Intelligence Warning Terminology*.