

# Security Intelligence, Audit and Compliance



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## Agenda



## Actions



## Is the Mainframe Vulnerable?

## Hacking/Theft (just to mention a few)

- Department store mainframe security hack
- Health care mainframe security hack
- Mainframe computer physically lost from college campus
- Airport mainframe computer physically moved

### Insider Threat?

- Long considered the most serious threat
  - Insiders have access
  - Insiders have knowledge
  - Insiders have economic motivation
  - Insider collusion is a "force multiplier"

## **Mainframe security**

#### What's the risk?

- Disclosure of sensitive data
- Service interruption
- Corruption of operational data
- Fraud and ID Theft
- Theft of services



#### What's at stake?

- Customer trust
- Reputation and Brand
- Privacy
- Integrity of Information
- Legal and Regulatory Action
- Competitive Advantage



## Breach cost?

- **\$ Research and recovery**
- **\$ Notify customers**
- **\$ Lost customer business**
- **\$** Problem remediation
- \$ Claims from trusted vendors and business partners



## \$\$ Damage to brand image





## **Mainframe Vulnerabilities**

**Mainframe Security Report 1:** 

Security Officer Representation: We restrictively secure our mainframe based-on the concept of "least privilege". Nobody gets access to anything unless it is approved.

Report Finding: The mainframe security and the protectionby-default mechanisms of the mainframe security software have been promiscuously configured to the point of providing access by default instead of protection. The security of system and application resources cannot be assured.

Reality of security contradicts perception





## **Mainframe Vulnerabilities**

#### Mainframe Security Report 2:

Security Officer Representation: It is our practice to empower business units to make decisions regarding the security of their applications and services.

Report Finding: As authorized by a business unit, CICS regions were running with full security bypass privilege, leaving CICS technical resources and the data of all applications vulnerable to system programmers, CICS sub-system programmers, and application programmers. Result: No separation of function between applications; no assurance of data privacy protection; no assurance of production operation.

#### No Security Implementation Standards a.ka. "Adult Supervision"





## **Mainframe Vulnerabilities**

**Mainframe Security Report 3:** 

Mainframe security is being managed and administered using legacy practices and standards that pre-date the increased technical sophistication of the mainframe and its increased leverage for Web-based services. As such, security is woefully inadequate to assure security, privacy, and compliance in the current environment.

Mainframe is Dead Legacy... Low investment, weak skills, weak governance, maybe coupled with a false sense that the mainframe is inherently secure



## **Story of a Security Consultant**

**Unix System Services Hack** 

Due to the regular mis-configuration of security in the z Unix System Services environment and inappropriate use of security bypass privileges, one security practitioner has repeatedly demonstrated the ability to compromise mainframe security and grab any data desired.

His record hack time: Less than 20 minutes!!!

One of the successes was by invitation against a security software company.





## **Advice From a Career Auditor**

"You don't know what you don't know, and what you don't know <u>will hurt...!</u>"

Senior Manager , U.S. Government Accountability Office

SHARE 2012 Atlanta

SEC Project Keynote Presentation



## **Information Security Optimization Principles**

Vision	<ul> <li>Strategy, Policy, Standards</li> <li>Governance, Organization</li> <li>Business Alignment</li> </ul>		
	Information asset identification		
Visibility	<ul> <li>Risk assessment</li> <li>Prioritized focus and investment for early and high impact</li> <li>Event monitoring and investigation</li> </ul>		
Accountability	<ul> <li>Enterprise-wide ownership, responsibility, and participation</li> <li>Distributed responsibility for funding and executing solutions and processes</li> </ul>		
	<ul> <li>Defined, continuous operational solutions and processes</li> </ul>		
Sustainability	<ul> <li>Automated balanced, coordinated, and cost-effective solutions to protect and enable the enterprise both ESM and support solutions</li> <li>Automation – audit reporting, monitoring and compliance</li> </ul>		
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## Advice From a Career Information Security Consultant

"If nobody is minding the store, someone will surely steal the goods"

Quote from Security Consultant from TATA America International Corporation

The one thing you can do to immediately strengthen security without risking unintended denials of access is to initiate aggressive monitoring and investigation.

What you see will surprise you! The visibility will convince you! The implications will motivate you.

Obtain Security Intelligence: You need to determine what you don't know before you can do anything meaningful!



## **A Final Keystone Issue**



Relative to the Information Security trilogy of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability, legacy mainframe security implementations consistently exhibit a strong bias to Availability, at the expense of Confidentiality and Integrity.





## **A Final Keystone Issue: Balance Required**



Balance is needed across C, I, and A to assure effective security. Lack of balance results in exposures and vulnerabilities

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## Your Conflict: Regulation versus Reality

#### Regulation

- Change management
  - Clearly defined process with approval and reporting
  - Ability to identify changes
- Security management
  - Separation of duties
  - Identification of exposures and mis-configurations
  - Clear audit trail and accountability

#### Data security

- Data confidentiality and integrity
- Prevent improper access to financial, medical or personal data
- Monitor access to data by technician, administrator, outsiders

#### Reality

- Separation of duty impractical tasks with small teams
- Many highly authorized IDs necessary for final go-to technician
- Mainframe installations often rely on "system special" and "uid(0)"
- Red-tape bypassed for high-impact problem resolution
- Manual monitoring impractical due to volume of data
- Human mistakes cause service outages
- Cleanup projects are long running and expensive



## Concerns

## Actions

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## **Take Charge**



#### As you move into the action phase

- You need to take the lead to set the foundations
- Prepare and obtain top level management support for a foundational Security Implementation & Administration Policies document (when was the last time these were reviewed)
- Actions must be based upon what you see and what needs to be controlled as defined by your policies that support the business compliance and risk
- What do you look for and how do you move towards the target state of control and compliance?
- What do you have in the way of software that can help or what do you need?
- Automate the review and enforcement of controls both existing and those established during this ongoing process



## **Common IT General Control Deficiencies**

#### **Excessive Access to Systems / Databases**

- Developer / programmer access to production environment
- Developer / programmer access to production data
- DBA access
- System Administrator access

#### Lack of Access Controls

- User provisioning and administration
   Changes in responsibilities
   Changes in organization
   Terminations
- No documented access policies and standards

#### Lack of General monitoring of the security infrastructure



## **Technology can help**

#### Define the security policy in monitoring tools

- Operating system and security settings against baselines
- Operating system and security changes against baselines
- Data access against standards
- Access by technicians should fit production profile
- etc.

#### In case of conflict

- Deny the action, prevent the change from taking place, or
- Issue a real-time message to data security officer, or
- Generate an exception report for review by management

#### Document

- Baseline or security standard
- Exceptions and transgressions





## Introducing QRadar: From head of IT security at a North American Bank

A head of IT security at a bank was now at a new bank and reporting on the security situation.

"I haven't seen any evidence of sophisticated attack attempts against the bank within the past month."

Her supervisor thought that was very good news, and that the bank must be protected.

"No, it's not good. Other banks like ours are tracking several sophisticated attempts each week. Here I don't see any of that information but I know they must be are occuring."



## **Customer Challenges**



#### **Detecting threats**

Arm yourself with comprehensive security intelligence



#### Consolidating data silos

 Collect, correlate and report on data in one integrated solution



#### Detecting insider fraud

Next-generation SIEM with identity correlation



#### Better predicting risks to your business

 Full life cycle of compliance and risk management for network and security infrastructures



#### Addressing regulation mandates

• Automated data collection and configuration audits





## **Solving Customer Challenges**

Major Electric Utility	Detecting threats	<ul> <li>Discovered 500 hosts with "Here You Have" virus, which other solutions miss</li> </ul>			
Fortune 5 Energy Company	Consolidating data silos	<ul> <li>2 Billion logs and events per day reduced to 25 high priority offenses</li> </ul>			
Branded Apparel Maker	Detecting insider fraud	<ul> <li>Trusted insider stealing and destroying key data</li> </ul>			
\$100B Diversified CorporationPredicting risks against your businessIndustrial DistributorAddressing regulatory mandates		<ul> <li>Automating the policy monitoring and evaluation process for configuration change in the infrastructure</li> </ul>			
		<ul> <li>Real-time extensive monitoring of network activity, in addition to PCI mandates</li> </ul>			





## **Challenge 1: Protecting Risks against the Business**

	9	Id		Offense Source	Magnitude	Source IPs
Potential Data	BBP	160	Destination Vulnerable to Detected Exploit preceded by Exploit/Malware Events	202.153.48.66		202.153.48.66
Loss		154	Policy: Chat or IM Traffic Detected containing Chat.MSN	10.0.110.17		10.0.110.17
	ER Y	236	Communication to a know Bot Command and Control containing Chat.IRC	10.0.5.69		10.0.5.69
Who? What?	Cop/	148	Sensitive Data in Transit containing Web.Facebook.Application	10.0.240.170		10.0.240.170
Where?		125	Policy: Local: Clear Text Application Usage	10.0.100.104	-	10.0.100.104
11110101		501	Communication to a known Bot Command and Control containing HTTPWeb	69.20.125.168	and a late	69.20.125.168
		150	Login Failures Followed By Success from the same Username	roberta_hite		10.0.5.226
		155	DLP - Potential Data Loss containing Web.MSNLive.Text	10.0.240.251		10.0.240.251
		146	Login Failures Followed By Success to the same Destination IP	80.96.34.22		80.96.34.22

Event Name	Event Count	Time 🔻	Username	Source IP	Who? An internal user
Session: Not a valid new password	1	08:30	MARKN	172.16.150.230	
Session: Current password has expired	1	08:30	MARKN	172.16.150.230	
Datasets and Resources: Insufficient authority	1	08:30	RACFU01	172.16.150.230	
Datasets and Resources: Successful access	11	08:30	RACEU01	172.10.150.230	—— How many times? 11
Datasets and Resources: Successful access	1	08:30	RACFU01	172.16.150.230	
Datasets and Resources: Successful access	22	08:30	RACFU01	172.16.150.230	
Session: Not a valid password	7	08:30	NANCY	172.16.150.230	
Datasets and Resources: Successful access	1	08:30	RACFU01	172.16.150.230	Where were they from?
Session: Successful RACINIT initiation	1	08:30	RACFU01	172.16.150.230	

How much data sent?

11:44	10.0.5.204	54724	8.19.18.8	80	tcp_ip	Web.Misc	1 163 (C)	1 563 (C)	6	4
11:44	10.0.110.77	64935	123.6.136.75	2275	udp_ip	other	298 (C)	0	2	0
11:44	10.0.110.77	64935	67.225.25.146	54417	udp_ip	other	596 (C)	646 (C)	4	2
11:29	10.0.240.63	51392	<b>121.7.199.156</b>	29255	tcp_ip	other	36 677 (C)	1 804 (C)	30	24
							1			. 1

Threat detection in the post-perimeter world User anomaly detection and application level visibility are critical to identify inside threats

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## **Challenge 2: Addressing Regulatory Mandates**

Offense 286	2 Summary 📥 Attackers 💿 Targets 🛅 Categorie	Annotations	Networks 🗄 Ev	rents
Magnitude			Relevance	2
Description	1 events in 1 catego			
Attacker/Src	10.103.12.12 (dhep workstation 103 12 12.acme.org)	2009-09-29 15:09.0		
Target(s)/Dest	0s			
Network(s)	IT.Server.main	Not assigned		
Notes	PCI Violation Use Case PCI DSS specifies that insecure protoci identify such activity. In this offense the system has captured cle	ols may not be u artext network ac	sed. This scenari tivity (telnet and F	o der TP) t

PCI compliance at risk?

possible violation

Event Name 🔻	Log Source	Source IP	Source Port	Destination IP	Destination Port
Compliance Policy Violation - C	Flow Classification Engine-5 :	10.103.12.12	1482	10.101.3.30	23

**Unencrypted Traffic** 

IBM Security QRadar QFlow saw a cleartext service running on the Accounting server PCI Requirement 4 states: Encrypt transmission of cardholder data across open, public networks

#### **Compliance Simplified**

Out-of-the-box support for major compliance and regulatory standards Automated reports, pre-defined correlation rules and dashboards



## Introducing the IBM Security zSecure Suite IBM Security zSecure suite

Compliance and audit solution that enables you to automatically analyze and report on security events and detect security exposures even outside the security product

Real-time mainframe threat monitoring allowing you to monitor intruders and identify mis-configurations that could hamper your compliance efforts

Policy enforcement solution that enforces compliance to company and regulatory policies by preventing erroneous commands



Note: ACF2 and Top Secret are either registered trademarks or trademarks of CA, Inc. or one of its subsidiaries.

Combined audit and administration for RACF in the VM environment plus auditing Linux on System z

Enables more efficient and effective RACF administration and auditing, using significantly less resources. Provides access monitoring, RACF offline, database merge capabilities

Reduces the need for scarce, RACF-trained expertise through a Microsoft Windows–based GUI for RACF administration

Allows you to perform mainframe administrative tasks from a CICS environment, freeing up native-RACF resources and provides API



## **Baseline**

## Why establish a baseline

- Each system will have specific and different characteristics
- Know where you started
- Know where you are headed
- Know where you have gotten

## Examples

- Freeze an image of your operating system
- Unload a copy of your security definitions



## **Baselines**

- Use the baselines to create "Where we are"
- Examples to consider
  - z/OS Integrity
    - z/OS itself
    - System Critical Datasets
    - Authorized Libraries
    - Program Properties Table (PPT)
    - Command Authority (System, Operator)
    - User Supervisor Calls (SVCs)
  - ESM
    - ESM System Options
    - Critical User Attribute (CUA)
    - Public Data Sets and Resources
    - Password (Default and Trivial)
    - ESM Common Problems
- What do these look like?

## Find mis-configuration and vulnerabilities

#### Situation:

- z/OS and RACF protect each other
  - System datasets must be protected...
- Verifying the protection is time consuming

- Best Solution Available?:
  - Individual reports for RACF, PARMLIB, UNIX....
    - Manual correlation and verification?
  - Annual external audit

## **zSecure Solution**

- zSecure Audit takes information from RACF, z/OS, UNIX
  - o Identifies inconsistencies and vulnerabilities
  - o Shows the privileged users that can chance z/OS, RACF
    - Or bypass security
  - o Adhoc reports
  - o Automatic reporting and monitoring in batch jobs

AUTOMATION, AUTOMATION, AUTOMATION

Reduce human error and increase security levels

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## **System Critical Datasets**

Many system datasets and activities are critical to overall security and effectiveness.

#### SYS1.PARMLIB

 The IEASYSxx member of SYS1.PARMLIB contains controlling system parameters that specify how other members are to be used by the system as well as certain operating characteristics.

#### SMF Datasets

 Certain system libraries are instrumental to the operation of MVS providing controlling parameters as well as history and audit trail functions. Any violation of those datasets could severely impact system reliability and personnel accountability.

#### Master Catalog

 The MVS Master Catalog contains indices used to reference other catalogs and data groups. Write access to the Master Catalog should be restricted. Such access could potentially damage strategic information or, perhaps, render the system unusable.

#### AND MANY MANY MORE



## A Few of the System Critical Datasets – Automatically Checked by IBM Security zSecure

- APF data sets
- LPA data sets
- Page data sets
- Swap data sets
- ESM data sets
- RRSF data sets
- SMF recording data sets
- System dump data set
- TSO user administration data set UADS
- SYS1.NUCLEUS and SYS1.LPALIB
- JES2 and JES3 checkpoint data sets
- JES2 and JES3 spool data sets
- JES2 and JES3 parameter data set
- JES2 and JES3 STC/TSU proclib

- MSTR proclib
- MSTR parameter library
- MSTR VIO administration
- DFHSM data set BCDS, MCDS, OCDS
- HFS data sets
- DMS database DMSFILES
- DMS authorized parameter library
- DMS default parameter library
- CA1 tape management catalog TMC
- DFSMS SCDS and ACDS (integrity)
- IODF file, if DSN could be found
- Couple data sets
- RMM control dataset
- TLMS volume master file VMF
- ABR archive control file ACF



## **Common ESM Problems**

#### USER/GROUP Maintenance

- Finding user and grouping inconsistencies
- PROGRAM Class Maintenance
  - Check for obsolete conditional permission lists when program definitions have been removed
  - Check for non-existent data set/volume program combinations
  - Checking for program definitions not describing any physical module

#### DATASET Maintenance

- Finding and protecting unprotected data sets checks depending on the current protection setting
- Removing unused discrete definitions resulting from volume-level operations
- Finding and removing redundant discrete definitions
- Removing unused generic definitions (after deletion of 'subject' data sets)
- Finding and resetting unnecessary ESM-indicated bits (where no discrete definition exists)
- STARTED Class Maintenance
  - Finding inconsistencies in started task definitions



## **Beyond Baseline: Automated Clean up and Control**

## Now you have established the baselines – you can clean up •BUT

- How do you maintain and prevent re-contamination?
- After the fact clean up
  - using SMF event reporting
  - Utilizing your baseline comparison reports
- Before the fact prevent the problem
  - Once your policies are defined and codified
  - Establish a means to prevent conditions outside the policies from taking place control and verify commands, before their execution can undo

#### AUTOMATE AUTOMATE AUTOMATE



## **Benefits of Automating with Technology**

- Facilitate compliance with security requirements and policies
- Leverage seamless integration with an enterprise-wide view of audit and compliance efforts
- Monitor and audit incidents to help detect and prevent security exposures, as well as assess compliance
- Automate routine administrative tasks to help reduce costs and improve productivity
- Understand the security baseline and when it changes to keep security intelligence at it's highest and up to date







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## **Beyond Baselines – Moving Forward**

### Now

- Baselines to measure progress
- Baselines to compare changes
- Clean up the environment
- Prevent subsequent contamination
- Monitoring the environment
- You can answer the question:

## **How Secure is My Mainframe?**

TBM





# QUESTIONS



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