E62

Converting From IMS/SMU To RACF Security

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Session E62

All references to RACF are intended to imply either RACF or an equivalent security product

IMS V8 Announcement



IBM United States
Software Announcement 202-229
September 24, 2002

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Compatibility: IMS V8 is upwardly compatible from previous versions, allowing existing applications and data to be used without change. Migration and coexistence support is provided for IMS V6 and V7 with V8. Review the Preventative Service Planning (PSP) information for further, current details.

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IMS V8 is the last release to support the Security Maintenance Utility (SMU). Customers using SMU should migrate to the Resource Access Control Facility (RACF) or an equivalent product.

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Objectives



To convert SMU security to RACF security, you need to

- Know where to look to determine if you use SMU
- Understand which IMS <u>resource types</u> (e.g. transactions, commands, terminals, etc.) are protected by SMU
- Understand the <u>type(s) of protection</u> (e.g. password, LTERM based entry restriction, sign on, etc.) that was used to secure each IMS resource

At the end of these two sessions you should be able to

- Determine if your IMS systems use SMU security
- Identify IMS resources which are protected by SMU
- Identify the type(s) of SMU security used to protect IMS resources
- Determine if the SMU security for a resource can be converted to RACF security
- Define the requirements for RACF security for IMS resources

Agenda

Part 1

- IMS security facilities
- SMU security overview



Part 2

- Converting SMU security to RACF security
 - IMS commands
 - IMS transactions
 - IMS databases and data sets
 - Terminals
- Considerations
 - TYPE1 automated operator (AO) programs
 - Application Group Name (AGN) security
 - Start of dependent regions
 - Program Specification Blocks (PSBs)
 - Logical Terminals (LTERMs)
 - Transaction Codes

IMS Security Facilities



IMS provides 5 security facilities/mechanisms to protect resources

- 1. Default security (for IMS commands only)
- 2. Security Maintenance Utility (SMU)
- 3. Program Specification Block (PSB)
 - This is a mechanism that limits an application's view of database segments to only those segments defined in the Program Communications Block (PCB)
- 4. RACF
- 5. User/installation exit routines
 - IMS provides samples for some security exits, such as
 - Command Authorization Exit (DFSCCMD0)
 - Transaction Authorization Exit (DFSCTRN0)
 - Security Reverification Exit (DFSBSEX0)
 - Sign On/Sign Off Security Exit (DFSCSGN0)
 - Build Security Exit Routine (DFSBSEX0) Sample on the web



- ✓ Resources SMU may protect
- √ Types of SMU security
- ✓ SMU security generation



SMU Security Overview

SMU consists of internal IMS modules which provide security for IMS resources

SMU security may be used protect <u>static</u> IMS resources

- Commands
- Transactions
- Databases
- Terminals
- Programs/Program Specification Blocks (PSBs)
- Dependent regions

Resources SMU May Protect

IMS Resource Type	SMU may secure if resource is
Command	Entered from any of the following sources: Static terminal Time Controlled Operations (TCO) script TYPE 1 automated operator (AO) program
Transaction	Entered from any of the following sources: Static terminal Time Controlled Operations (TCO) script Static Intersystem Communication (ISC) link Multiple Systems Coupling (MSC) logical link
Database	An IMS database
Terminal	A static VTAM or BTAM terminal
Program/Program Specification Block (PSB)	An IMS Program Specification Block (PSB)
Dependent region	Any of the following types of IMS regions: Message Processing Program (MPP) Interactive Fast Path (IFP) Batch Message Program (BMP)
Connection thread	A z/OS address space [e.g. CICS-to-DataBase Control (DBCTL)] that requests connection to the IMS control region

Types of SMU Security

1. Password security

- 2. Terminal based security
 - There are 2 types of SMU terminal security
 - I. LTERM based security
 - SMU has a limit of 65,535 LTERM definitions
 - II. Sign on
 - ► The terminal user is required to enter: /SIGN ON userid password
 - SMU has a maximum of 32,767 terminals which may be required to sign on
- 3. Transaction-command security
- 4. Application group name (AGN) security

SMU Password Security

Password security may be used to

- Protect IMS commands
 - Passwords may be assigned to commands
- Protect IMS transactions
 - Passwords may be assigned to transactions
- Make some IMS resources
 (e.g. terminals, programs, transactions, and/or databases)
 unavailable or available for use
 - /LOCK and /UNLOCK commands are used in with resource passwords

/LOCK NODE(pswd1)
/LOCK PTERM(pswd2)
/LOCK LTERM LTERMA(pswd3)
/LOCK PROGRAM PAYPGM(pswd4)
/LOCK TRANSACTION PAYTRAN(pswd5)
/LOCK DATABASE PERSNLDB(pswd6)
/UNLOCK NODE(pswd1)
/UNLOCK PTERM(pswd2)
/UNLOCK LTERM LTERMA(pswd3)
/UNLOCK PROGRAM PAYPGM(pswd4)
/UNLOCK TRANSACTION PAYTRAN(pswd5)
/UNLOCK DATABASE PERSNLDB(pswd6)


Compliment terminal based security



SMU Password Security Options

SECURITY MACRO

PASSWD=	TERMNL=	SECLVL=	TRANCMD=	TYPE=	SECCNT=	RCLASS=
<u>NO</u>	NO	NOTRAN,NOSIGN	NO		0	IMS
YES	YES	NOTRAN,SIGNON	YES		1	XXXXXXX
FORCE	FORCE	NOTRAN,FORCSIGN	FORCE		2	
		TRANAUTH,SIGNON			3	
		TRANAUTH,FORCSIGN				
		FORCTRAN,FORCSIGN				



/NRE CHECKPOINT 0 PASSWORD
/ERE COLDSYS FORMAT ALL PASSWORD

/NRE CHECKPOINT 0 NOPASSWORD

| /ERE COLDSYS FORMAT ALL NOPASSWORD

SMU Terminal Based Security

Terminal based security may be used

- To restrict command and/or transaction entry to one or more specific (or authorized) LTERMs
 - Let's call this "LTERM based" terminal security
- To require one or more physical terminals/nodes to sign on
 - Let's call this 'user sign on' security
 - For example, first input from the terminal must be /SIGN ON followed by a userid and password
 - /SIGN ON ACOLEMAN RACF4ME
- With or without password security

SMU Terminal Based Security Considerations


Considerations

- SMU modules can **NOT** validate the userid provided at sign on
 - The userid may be verified by
 - RACF
 - One or more sign on exit routines
 Sign On Exit Routine (DFSSGNX0)
 Sign On / Sign Off Security Exit Routine (DFSCSGN0)
 - Both RACF and one or more sign on exit routines
- SMU provides terminal based security for **static** terminals only
 - The following terminal types are <u>not</u> supported
 - Extended Terminal Option (ETO)
 - Advanced Program to Program Communications (APPC)
 - TCP/IP
 - Multiple Console Support/Enhanced-Multiple Console Support (MCS/E-MCS)
 - ► Etc.

LTERM-Based Security Options

SECURITY MACRO

PASSWD=	TERMNL=	SECLVL=	TRANCMD=	TYPE=	SECCNT=	RCLASS=
NO	<u>NO</u>	NOTRAN,NOSIGN	NO		0	IMS
YES	YES	NOTRAN,SIGNON	YES		1	XXXXXXX
FORCE	FORCE	NOTRAN,FORCSIGN	FORCE		2	
		TRANAUTH,SIGNON			3	
		TRANAUTH,FORCSIGN				
		FORCTRAN,FORCSIGN				




/NRE CHECKPOINT 0 TERMINAL
/ERE COLDSYS FORMAT ALL TERMINAL

/NRE CHECKPOINT 0 NOTERMINAL
/ERE COLDSYS FORMAT ALL NOTERMINAL

(User) Sign On Security Options

SECURITY MACRO

PASSWD=	TERMNL=	SECLVL=	TRANCMD=	TYPE=	SECCNT=	RCLASS=
NO	NO	NOTRAN, NOSIGN	NO		0	IMS
YES	YES	NOTRAN, SIGNON	YES		1	XXXXXXX
FORCE	FORCE	NOTRAN,FORCSIGN	FORCE		2	
		TRANAUTH, SIGNON			3	
		TRANAUTH,FORCSIGN				
		FORCTRAN, FORCSIGN				





/NRE CHECKPOINT 0 USER | /NRE CHECKPOINT 0 NOUSER

/ERE COLDSYS FORMAT ALL **USER** | /ERE COLDSYS FORMAT ALL **NOUSER**

SMU Transaction-command Security


Transaction-command security is

- Also referred to as <u>tran-command</u> security
- Used to protect IMS commands issued by automated operator (AO) programs that use the DL/I CMD call
 - AO programs that issue the CMD call are TYPE1
 NOTE: SMU does <u>not</u> support security for TYPE2 AO programs.
 TYPE2 AO program use the DL/I ICMD (Issue Command) call to issue IMS commands. Command authorization support for TYPE2 AO programs is provided by RACF and/or Command Authorization Exit.
- Supported in the following environments
 - DB/TM (or DB/DC)
 - DCCTL

Transaction-Command Security Options

SECURITY MACRO

PASSWD=	TERMNL=	SECLVL=	TRANCMD=	TYPE=	SECCNT=	RCLASS=
NO	NO	NOTRAN,NOSIGN	<u>NO</u>		0	IMS
YES	YES	NOTRAN,SIGNON	YES		1	XXXXXXX
FORCE	FORCE	NOTRAN,FORCSIGN	FORCE		2	
		TRANAUTH,SIGNON			3	
		TRANAUTH,FORCSIGN				
		FORCTRAN,FORCSIGN				



/NRE CHECKPOINT 0 TRANCMDS
/ERE COLDSYS FORMAT ALL TRANCMDS


/NRE CHECKPOINT 0 NOTRANCMDS
/ERE COLDSYS FORMAT ALL NOTRANCMDS

SMU Application Group Name (AGN) Security

AGN security provides mandatory, 3-part protection

- Each dependent region/thread must provide an AGN name in either:
 - Startup JCL via the AGN=agn_name specification
 - Database Resource Adapter (DRA) connection request
 AGN=agn_name specification
- RACF (or an equivalent product) or the Resource Access Security Exit (DFSISISO) must authorize the region/thread to the <u>agn_name</u> supplied in region/thread JCL at the time the region/thread request a connection to the control region
- Each agn_name and the resources it includes must have been previously defined to IMS via a SMU security generation. IMS validates the agn_name exists prior to completion of region/thread initialization

AGN Security Illustration



3 RACF DB

AGN Group Resources

Regions/threads are restricted to use of resources in the agn_name (or AGN group) supplied at startup/connection

	RESOURCES WHICH MAY BE INCLUDED IN AN AGN GROUP						
Region Type	PSB(s)	Transaction Code(s)	LTERM(s)				
BMP Region	1	V	(1)				
MPP Region							
IFP Region							
JMP Region		V					
JBP Region	1	V	(1)				
CCTL (e.g. CICS-DBCTL)	V						
z/OS Address Space running Open Database Access (ODBA) program							

Note 1: Logical terminal or transaction code for the OUT=xxxxxxxx specification on the JCL used to start the Batch Message Program (BMP) or the Java Batch Program (JBP).

AGN Security Options

SECURITY MACRO

PASSWD=	TERMNL=	SEC	ECLVL=			TRANC	CMD=	TYPE=		SECCNT=	RCLASS=
NO	NO	NOT	OTRAN,NOSIGN			NO				0	IMS
YES	YES	TON	OTRAN,SIGNON			YES				1	XXXXXXX
FORCE	FORCE	TON	OTRAN,FORCSIGN			FORCE				2	
		TRA	TRANAUTH,SIGNON TRANAUTH,FORCSIGN							3	
		TRA									
	FORCTRAN,FORCSIGN			IGN							
	NOAGN NORACTRM NOT		NOTRA	ANEX NOSIGNEX		GNEX	NORACFOM		l		
	RACFAGN		RACFT	ERM	TRANE	XIT	SIGN	EXIT RA		RACFCOM	
	A CALEDIA										


IMS.PROCLIB(DFSPBxxx)

AGNEXIT

ISIS=0 | 1 | 2

ISIS=0 means AGN security is turned <u>off</u>. **ISIS=1** means AGN security is turned <u>on</u> and RACF grants/denies the region/thread request to connect to the IMS control region using the specified AGN (<u>agn_name</u>). **ISIS=2** means AGN security is turned <u>on</u> and the AGN Exit Routine (DFSISISO, instead of RACF, grants/denies the region/thread request to connect to the IMS control region using the specified AGN (<u>agn_name</u>).

SMU Security Generation



SMU Security Listing

```
//
         PROC OPTN=UPDATE, IMS=',0',SOUT=A,SYS2=,RGN=2048K
                                                                 RC=16
                   PGM=DFSISMP0, PARM='LIST, 0'
//S
         EXEC
//STEPLIB DD DSN=IMS.&SYS2 MODBLKS.DISP=SHR
//
           DD DSN=IMS.&SYS2 SDFSRESL,DISP=SHR
//SYSPRINT DD SYSOUT=&SOUT, DCB=(RECFM=VBA, BLKSIZE=129, LRECL=125)
//SYSPUNCH DD UNIT=SYSDA, SPACE=(CYL, (2,2)),
               DCB=(RECFM=FB, LRECL=80, BLKSIZE=400),
//
//
               DISP=(NEW, PASS)
//SYSLIN DD UNIT=SYSDA, SPACE=(TRK, (1,1)),
               DCB=(RECFM=F,BLKSIZE=80),
//
//
               DISP=(NEW, PASS)
//SYSUT1
           DD UNIT=SYSDA, DCB=(BLKSIZE=500, RECFM=FB),
               SPACE = (CYL, (2,2))
//
           DD UNIT=(SYSDA, SEP=SYSUT1), DCB=*.S.SYSUT1,
//SYSUT2
               SPACE = (CYL, (2,2))
//
//SYSIN
           DD DSN=NO.SYSIN.DD.ASTERISK
//C
        EXEC PGM=ASMA90, PARM='OBJECT, NODECK', COND=(12, LT, S), REGION=&RGN
//SYSLIB
           DD DSN=SYS1.SDFSMAC,DISP=SHR
//SYSPRINT DD SYSOUT=&SOUT DCB=BLKSIZE=1089;
//SYSLIN
           DD UNIT=(SYSDA, SEP=SYSPRINT), DISP=(, PASS),
//
               SPACE = (CYL, (2,2)),
//
               DCB=*.S.SYSPUNCH
//SYSUT1
           DD UNIT=SYSDA, SPACE=(CYL, (10,5))
//SYSIN
           DD DSN=*.S.SYSPUNCH, DISP=(OLD, DELETE)
         EXEC PGM=IEWL, PARM=(LIST, NE, OL, 'RMODE=ANY'), REGION=&RGN,
//L
//
               COND = (4, LT, S)
//SYSPRINT DD SYSOUT=&SOUT, DCB=(RECFM=FBA, LRECL=121, BLKSIZE=605)
//SYSLMOD DD DSN=IMS.&SYS2 MATRIX,DISP=SHR
           DD DSN=*.C.SYSLIN,DISP=(OLD,DELETE)
//INPUT
           DD UNIT=(SYSDA, SEP=INPUT), SPACE=(CYL, (5,1))
//SYSUT1
//SYSLIN
           DD DSN=*.S.SYSLIN, DISP=(OLD, DELETE)
```

SMU Input Statements (1)

) (COMMAND DIS SMU PASSWORD SECURITY **PASSWORD** SHOWME) (COMMAND STO SMU LTERM BASED TERMINAL SECURITY TERMINAL DESTCEI) (TRANSACT PAYTRAN SMU PASSWORD AND PASSWORD IOUMONEY SMU LTERM BASED TERMINAL SECURITY TERMINAL LTERM1) (PASSWORD PEOPLE SMU PASSWORD SECURITY DATABASE CUSTOMER) (AGN ORDERAGN AGPSB ORDERPSB SMU AGN SECURITY AGTRAN ORDERTRN AGLTERM LTERM2) (SIGN SMU (USER) SIGN ON TERMINAL SECURITY STERM ALL) (SIGN SMU (USER) SIGN ON TERMINAL SECURITY STERM NODE1234 STERM NODE5678

SMU Input Statements (2)

) (CTRANS AOTRAN TCOMMAND STA TCOMMAND STO	SMU TRANSACTION-COMMAND SECURITY
) (TCOMMAND DBR CTRANS OPRNTRAN	SMU TRANSACTION-COMMAND SECURITY
) (DATABASE ACCTSREC PASSWORD UOME	SMU PASSWORD SECURITY
) (PROGRAM BILLING PASSWORD MAIL2YOU	SMU PASSWORD SECURITY
) (PTERM 123 PASSWORD XM2Y3C	SMU PASSWORD SECURITY
) (TERMINAL LTERM5 PASSWORD TPC1MB COMMAND LOC TRANSACT TRAN123	SMU PASSWORD AND SMU LTERM BASED TERMINAL SECURITY
) (TRANSACT MSCTRAN TERMINAL MSNAME1	SMU LTERM BASED TERMINAL SECURITY

SMU Input Statements (3)

) (TERMINAL DESTCEI COMMAND DIS SMU LTERM BASED TERMINAL SECURITY COMMAND STA **ITIME CONTROLLED OPERATIONS (TCO) LTERMI** TRANSACT TRANA TRANSACT TRANB) (TERMINAL DESTCE COMMAND DIS SMU LTERM BASED TERMINAL SECURITY COMMAND STA [TIME CONTROLLED OPERATIONS (TCO) LTERM] TRANSACT TRANA TRANSACT TRANB SMU I TERM BASED TERMINAL SECURITY) (COMMAND STO **ITIME CONTROLLED OPERATIONS (TCO) LTERMI** TERMINAL DFSTCFI SMU LTERM BASED TERMINAL SECURITY) (COMMAND STO [TIME CONTROLLED OPERATIONS (TCO) LTERM] TERMINAL DESTCE


Summary

Objectives

- ✓ Determine if your IMS systems use SMU security
- Identify IMS resources which are protected by SMU
- Identify the type(s) of SMU security used to protect IMS resources
- Determine if the SMU security for a resource can be converted to RACF-provided security
 - Define the requirements for RACF-provided IMS resource security
 - Security facilities
 - SMU security overview

Converting SMU security to RACF security

- IMS commands, IMS transactions, IMS databases/data sets,
 and terminals
 - Considerations for TYPE1 AO programs and AGNs



- Part 2 Converting From IMS Security Maintenance Utility (SMU) to RACF Security

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Objectives



To convert SMU security to RACF security, you need to

Know where to look to determine if you use SMU



- Understand which IMS resource types (e.g. transactions, commands, terminals, etc.) are protected by SMU
- Understand the type(s) of protection (e.g. password, LTERM based entry restriction, sign on, etc.) SMU uses to secure each IMS resource type

At the end of these two sessions you should be able to



- ✓ Determine if your IMS systems use SMU security
- ✓ Identify IMS resources which are protected by SMU
- Identify the type(s) of SMU security used to protect IMS resources



- Determine if the SMU security for a resource can be converted to RACF security
- Define the requirements for RACF IMS resource security

Agenda

Part 1

- IMS security facilities
- SMU security overview



Part 2

- Converting SMU security to RACF security
 - IMS commands
 - IMS transactions
 - IMS databases and data sets
 - Terminals
- Considerations
 - TYPE1 automated operator (AO) programs
 - Application Group Name (AGN) security
 - Start of dependent regions
 - Program Specification Blocks (PSBs)
 - Logical Terminals (LTERMs)
 - Transaction Codes

Converting SMU security to RACF security

- ✓ Generating IMS/RACF security
- ✓ IMS commands
- ✓ IMS transactions
- ✓ IMS databases and data sets
- ✓ Terminals
- ✓ Considerations
 - **★ Application Group Name (AGN) security**
 - **★ Program Specification Blocks (PSBs)**
 - **★ Logical Terminals (LTERMs)**
 - **★** Start of dependent regions



IMS/RACF Overview

RACF security differs from SMU

- SMU security is terminal based whereas RACF authorization checking is userid based
 - RACF uses a
 - Unique userid to identify each person
 - Password to authenticate the identity of each person

IMS users

- Are required to sign on when RACF performs user verification and resource authorization checking on behalf of that userid
 - Userid is provided via sign on
 - Userid provided at sign on is used in all subsequent RACF resource authorization checks
- Are people and things, for example
 - Time Controlled Operations (TCO) scripts should be coded to issue: /SIGN ON userid password

Generating IMS/RACF Security

SECURITY MACRO

PASSWD=	TERMNL=	SEC	LVL=			TRANC	MD=	TYPE:	=	SECCNT=	RCLASS=
NO	NO	ТОИ	RAN,	RAN,NOSIGN						0	IMS —
YES	YES	ТОИ	RAN,SIGNON			YES				1	XXXXXXX -
FORCE	FORCE	ТОИ	IOTRAN,FORCSIGN							2	
		TRA	RANAUTH,SIGNON							3	
		TRA	NAUT	H,FORCSI							
		FOR	CTRA	N,FORCSI	GN						
											
	NOAGN		NORACTRM		NOTR	ANEX	NOSI	GNEX	EX NORACFO		1
	RACFAGN	RACFTERM		TRANEXIT		SIGNEXIT			RACFCOM		
AGNEXIT											
								RAC	FR	ESOURCE	CLASSES
XXXXXXX	CXXXXXXX		-	TXXXXXXXT		PXXXXX	PXXXXXXX S		XXX	XXX F	XXXXXXX
	DXXXX	XXX		GXXXXX	XXXXXXX		XX	UXX	XXX	XXX H	IXXXXXXX
AIMS	CIMS DIMS			TIMS		PIMS		S	IMS		FIMS
7 111110			111110							1 11010	

IMS RACF Startup Parameters

AOIS= Issue command (ICMD) security option

CMDMCS= MCS/E-MCS command option

APPCSE= APPC security option

OTMASE= OTMA security option

TRN= Transaction authorization option

SGN= Sign on authorization option

the security facility

ISIS= Resource Access (AGN) security

RCF= RACF security option(s)

RVFY= RACF reverify option

RCFTCB= Number of RACF TCBs

Do not designate

IMS/RACF Security Options

ISIS=

- 0 No resource access security
- 1 RACF Resource access (AGN) security
- 2 User exit (DFSISIS0) resource access security userid validation

RCF=

- N Do not call RACF for sign on, transaction, or command security checking
- **C** Call RACF only for command authorization for commands entered from ETO devices
- **S** Call RACF for command authorization for commands entered from both static and ETO devices
- **T** Call RACF for sign on and transaction authorization
- Y Call RACF for sign on and transaction authorization as well as for commands authorization for commands entered from ETO devices
- A Call RACF for sign on and transaction authorization as well as for command authorization for commands entered from both static and ETO devices
- **B** Includes option A, but negates the loading of the sign on verification security table (DFSISSOx) from IMS.MATRIX
- **R** Includes option S, but negates the loading of the sign on verification security table (DFSISSOx) from IMS.MATRIX

IMS/RACF NRE and ERE Restart Options

/NRE -OR- /ERE COLD START KEYWORDS

DESCRIPTION

CMDAUTH RACF command authorization (Static and ETO terminals)

NOCMDAUTH Deactivate command authorization (Static and ETO terminals)

CMDAUTHE RACF command authorization (ETO terminals)

NOCMDAUTHE Deactivate command authorization (Static and ETO terminals)

TRANAUTH Activate transaction authorization

NOTRANAUTH Deactivate transaction authorization

USER Activate userid verification

NOUSER Deactivate userid validation and verification, transaction

authorization and command authorization

- SIGN ON Security must be active for RACF authorization checking
- RACF authorization is USERID based
- The userid is provided at sign on (e.g. /SIGN ON STEVE PASSWD9)

Converting Command Security to RACF

SMU and IMS tasks

- List Matrix data set contents
- Browse SMU input statements
 - Identify commands protected by password security
 - Identify commands protected by LTERM based terminal security
 - Identify commands entered by Time Controlled Operations (TCO)
- Change SMU security definitions
 - SECURITY macro
 - PASSWD=NO
 - ► TERMNL=NO
 - TYPE=(RACFCOM)
 - Perform SMU generation ???
- <u>COLD</u> startup/restart options

 - /NRE and /ERE
 - ► CMDAUTH or CMDAUTHE
 - NOPASSWORD and NOTERMINAL

- Create RACF profiles (security definitions)
 - Group (ADDGROUP)
 - User/Userid (ADDUSER)
 - People, TCO, AO programs, etc.
 - Connect Userids to Groups (CONNECT)
 - IMS commands (RDEFINE)
 - ► CIMS | DIMS
 - ► CXXXXXXX | DXXXXXXX

 Add installation defined resource classes to Class Descriptor Table (CDT) and RACF Router Table
- Authorize userids/groups to RACF command profiles (PERMIT)
- Activate command resource classes (SETROPTS CLASSACT)

Command Considerations

RACF <u>OR</u> SMU is invoked for command authorization, not both

Command Authorization Exit (DFSCCMD0)

Invoked after RACF

IMS command

- Profiles in RACF classes
 - Must be exactly 3 characters, for example
 - ► DIS, STA, STO, DBR, etc.
 - Grouping class (e.g. DIMS, DXXXXXXX, etc.) profile names may be up to 8 characters
 - Commands protected (ADDMEM) by a grouping profile must be exactly 3 characters
 - Command should be protected in only one resource class
 - Do <u>NOT</u> protect the same command in CIMS and DIMS
- Passwords
 - RACF 'REVERIFY' option may be used in lieu of SMU password
 - RACF user password must be supplied with command input
 - Requirements for 'REVERIFY' support
 - User must sign on to IMS
 - IMS startup parameters specify RVFY=Y
 - APPLDATA section of command profile contains 'REVERIFY'

Sample RACF Commands - IMS Commands

- => **ADDGROUP** IMSGRP1 SUPGROUP(IMSUSERS) OWNER(RACFADMN)
- => **ADDUSER** IMSUSERA NAME(BILL STILLWELL) PASSWORD(IMSPW99) OWNER(RACFADMN) DFLTGRP(IMSGRP1)
- => CONNECT IMSUSERA GROUP(IMSGRP1) AUTHORITY(USE) UACC(NONE)
- => RDEFINE CIMS DIS UACC(NONE)
- => **PERMIT** DIS CLASS(CIMS) ID(IMSGRP1) ACCESS(READ)

3 CHARACTER COMMAND PROFILES

- => RDEFINE DIMS DBACMDS ADDMEM(STA STO DBR) UACC(NONE)
- => PERMIT DBACMDS CLASS(DIMS) ID(IMSGRP1) ACCESS(READ)

UP TO 8 CHARACTER GROUPING PROFILE

- => RDEFINE CXXXXXXX DIS APPLDATA('REVERIFY') UACC(NONE)
- => PERMIT DIS CLASS(CXXXXXXX) ID(IMSGRP1) ACCESS(READ)

REVERIFY RACF PASSWORD

- => RDEFINE DXXXXXXX DBACMDS ADDMEM(STA STO DBR) UACC(NONE)
- => PERMIT DBACMDS CLASS(DXXXXXXX) ID(IMSGRP1 TCOUSID) ACCESS(READ)
- => SETROPTS CLASSACT(CIMS DIMS CXXXXXXX DXXXXXXXX)
- => SETROPTS RACLIST(CIMS DIMS CXXXXXXXX DXXXXXXXX) REFRESH

Converting TYPE 1 Automated Operator (AO) Programs to RACF

SMU and **IMS** tasks

- List Matrix data set contents
- Browse SMU input statements
 - Identify AO command transaction programs/PSBs secured with SMU
 -)(CTRANS aotran TCOMMAND DIS
 -)(TCOMMAND DIS CTRANS aotran
- Change SMU security definitions
 - SECURITY macro
 - ► TRANCMD=NO
 - Perform SMU generation
- <u>COLD</u> startup/restart options
 - /NRE and /ERE
 - NOTRANCMDS

Application tasks

- If you require the protection today
 - Modify applications to issue the DL/I ICMD call (ISSUE COMMAND) in lieu of the CMD (COMMAND) call

Consideration

 May want to wait to see what happens before making application changes!!

- Same as for commands if AO programs are TYPE2 (ICMD call)
- NONE if applications are not modified and continue use of CMD call
 - RACF does <u>NOT</u> currently support CMD call security

Converting Transaction Security to RACF

SMU and IMS tasks

- List Matrix data set contents
- Browse SMU input statements
 - Identify transactions protected by password security
 - Identify transactions protected by LTERM based terminal security
 - Identify transactions entered by Time Controlled Operations (TCO)
- Change SMU security definitions
 - SECURITY macro
 - PASSWD=NO
 - TERMNL=NO
 - TYPE=(RACFTERM)
 - Perform SMU generation
- <u>COLD</u> startup/restart options
 - TRN=Y or TRN=F
 - RCF=T | Y | A | B | R
 - /NRE and /ERE
 - TRANAUTH
 - NO PASSWORD and NOTERMINAL

- Create RACF profiles
 - Group (ADDGROUP)
 - User/Userid (ADDUSER)
 - People, TCO, etc.
 - Connect Userids to Groups (CONNECT)
 - IMS transactions (RDEFINE)
 - ► TIMS | GIMS
 - ► TXXXXXXX | GXXXXXXX
 - · Add installation defined resource
 - · classes to Class Descriptor Table
 - (CDT) and RACF Router Table
- Authorize userids/groups to RACF transaction profiles (PERMIT)
- Activate transaction resource classes (SETROPTS CLASSACT)

Transaction Considerations

SMU password and/or LTERM based terminal security

- Invoked after RACF and/or user exit routines for transactions entered from static terminals
- Should be removed prior to cut over to RACF transaction security

Exit routines

- May need to be coded for non-signed on users and/or back-end (MSC and/or shared queues) systems
 - Transaction authorization (DFSCTRN0 and/or DFSCTSE0)
 - Build Security Environment Exit (DFSBSEX0)

RACF

- Databases on different z/OS system should be synchronized
- Transaction profiles should only be created in 1 resource class
 - Do <u>NOT</u> create transaction profile in TIMS and GIMS
- 'REVERIFY' may be used in lieu of SMU password security
- Use with installation exit routines
 - May need Build Security Exit Routine (DFSBSEX0)
 - Transaction Authorization Exit (DFSCTRN0) is not invoked if RACF denies authorization to transaction
 - Security Reverification Exit (DFSCTSE0) is invoked unconditionally for transactions requested via
 - CHNG calls and AUTH calls
 - Deferred conversational program to program message switches

Sample RACF Commands - IMS Transactions

- => **ADDGROUP** IMSGRP1 SUPGROUP(IMSUSERS) OWNER(RACFADMN)
- => **ADDUSER** IMSUSERB NAME(STEVE NATHAN) PASSWORD(IMSPW91) OWNER(RACFADMN) DFLTGRP(IMSGRP1)
- => CONNECT IMSUSERB GROUP(IMSGRP1) AUTHORITY(USE) UACC(NONE)
- => RDEFINE TIMS PAYTRAN1 UACC(NONE)
- => **PERMIT** PAYTRAN1 CLASS(TIMS) ID(IMSGRP1) ACCESS(READ)
- => RDEFINE GIMS PAYTRANS ADDMEM(RAISE AWARD BONUS) UACC(NONE)
- => PERMIT PAYTRANS CLASS(GIMS) ID(IMSGRP1) ACCESS(READ)
- => RDEFINE TXXXXXXX PAYTRAN1 APPLDATA('REVERIFY') UACC(NONE)
- => **PERMIT** PAYTRAN1 CLASS(TXXXXXXX) ID(IMSGRP1) ACCESS(READ)
- => **RDEFINE** GXXXXXXX PAYTRANS ADDMEM(RAISE AWARD BONUS)
 UACC(NONE)
- => **PERMIT** PAYTRANS CLASS(GXXXXXXX) ID(IMSGRP1) ACCESS(READ)
- => SETROPTS CLASSACT(TIMS GIMS TXXXXXXXX GXXXXXXXX)
- => SETROPTS RACLIST(TIMS GIMS TXXXXXXXX GXXXXXXX) REFRESH

Converting Database Security to RACF

SMU and IMS tasks

- List Matrix data set contents
- Browse SMU input statements
 - Identify databases protected by password security
- Change SMU security definitions
 - SECURITY macro
 - ► PASSWD=NO
 - Perform SMU generation
- <u>COLD</u> startup/restart options
 - RCF≠N (Any RCF= value except N)
 - /NRE or /ERE NOPASSWORD

Application tasks

- Modify application to issue DL/I
 AUTH (authorization) call if needed
- RACF acts as data store for database profiles

- Create RACF profiles
 - Group (ADDGROUP)
 - User/Userid (ADDUSER)
 - Connect Userids to Groups (CONNECT)
 - IMS databases (RDEFINE)
 - PIMS | QIMS | SIMS | UIMS FIMS | HIMS | OIMS | WIMS
 - PXXXXXXX | QXXXXXXX
 SXXXXXXX | UXXXXXXX
 FXXXXXXXX | HXXXXXXX
 OXXXXXXXX | WXXXXXXX
 - · Add installation defined resource
 - classes to Class Descriptor Table
 - · (CDT) and RACF Router Table
- Authorize userids/groups to RACF database, segment, field, and/or other profiles (PERMIT)
- Activate transaction resource classes (SETROPTS CLASSACT)

Sample RACF Commands - IMS Databases

- => **ADDGROUP** PERSNL SUPGROUP(SYS1) OWNER(RACFADMN)
- => **ADDUSER** USERD NAME(RICH LEWIS) PASSWORD(IMSPW75) OWNER(RACFADMN) DFLTGRP(PERSNL)
- => CONNECT USERD GROUP(PERSNL) AUTHORITY(USE) UACC(NONE)
- => RDEFINE PIMS EMPLDB UACC(NONE)
- => **PERMIT** EMPLDB CLASS(PIMS) ID(PERSNL) ACCESS(READ)
- => RDEFINE QIMS COMPDBS ADDMEM(SKILLSDB DEPTDB) UACC(NONE)
- => **PERMIT COMPDBS** CLASS(QIMS) ID(PERSNL) ACCESS(READ)
- => RDEFINE SIMS NAMESEG UACC(NONE)
- => **PERMIT** NAMESEG CLASS(SIMS) ID(PERSNL) ACCESS(READ)
- => RDEFINE UIMS EMPLSEGS ADDMEM(EMPNOSEG SALARY) UACC(NONE)
- => **PERMIT EMPLSEGS** CLASS(UIMS) ID(PERSNL) ACCESS(READ)
- => RDEFINE FIMS PAYFIELD UACC(NONE)
- => **PERMIT** PAYFIELD CLASS(FIMS) ID(PERSNL) ACCESS(READ)
- => RDEFINE HIMS EMDBFLDS ADDMEM(NAME ADDR) UACC(NONE)
- => PERMIT EMDBFLDS CLASS(HIMS) ID(PERSNL) ACCESS(READ)
- => RDEFINE OIMS DB2VIEW1 UACC(NONE)
- => PERMIT DB2VIEW1 CLASS(OIMS) ID(PERSNL) ACCESS(READ)
- => RDEFINE WIMS DB2VIEWS ADDMEM(DB2VIEW2 DB2VIEW3) UACC(NONE)
- => PERMIT DB2VIEWS CLASS(WIMS) ID(PERSNL) ACCESS(READ)

Sample RACF Commands - IMS Databases

- => SETROPTS CLASSACT(PIMS QIMS PXXXXXXX QXXXXXXXX)
- => SETROPTS CLASSACT(SIMS UIMS SXXXXXXX UXXXXXXXX)
- => SETROPTS CLASSACT(FIMS HIMS FXXXXXXX HXXXXXXXX)
- => SETROPTS CLASSACT(OIMS WIMS OXXXXXXX WXXXXXXXX)
- => SETROPTS RACLIST(PIMS QIMS PXXXXXXXX QXXXXXXXX) REFRESH
- => SETROPTS RACLIST(SIMS UIMS SXXXXXXXX UXXXXXXX) REFRESH
- => **SETROPTS** RACLIST(FIMS HIMS FXXXXXXXX HXXXXXXX) REFRESH
- => **SETROPTS** RACLIST(OIMS WIMS OXXXXXXX WXXXXXXX) REFRESH

Converting Data Set Security to RACF

IMS tasks

- **COLD** startup/restart options
 - RCF≠ N
 - Any RCF= value except N)

Considerations

- IMS data set and/or database data set may be secured by RACF
- However, authorization checking is performed against the <u>DL/I</u>
 address space userid
 - May be used to prevent test applications from updating production data

- Create RACF profiles
 - Group (ADDGROUP)
 - User/Userid (ADDUSER)
 - Connect Userids to Groups (CONNECT)
 - IMS data sets (ADDSD)
 - DATASET
- Authorize userids/groups to RACF data set profiles (PERMIT)
- Activate DATASET resource classes (SETROPTS CLASSACT)

Sample RACF Commands - IMS Data Sets

- => **ADDGROUP** PRODSYS SUPGROUP(SYS1) OWNER(RACFADMN)
- => **ADDUSER** DLIUSID NAME(DL/I PRODUCTION SYSTEM)
 PASSWORD(DLIPRDA) OWNER(RACFADMN) DFLTGRP(PRODSYS)
- => CONNECT DLIUSID GROUP(PRODSYS)
- => ADDSD 'PARTS.DBDS' UACC(NONE) GENERIC
- => **PERMIT** 'PARTS.DBDS' ID(PRODSYS DLIUSID) ACCESS(UPDATE)
- => ADDSD 'IMS.TCFSLIB' UACC(NONE) GENERIC
- => **PERMIT** 'IMS.TCFSLIB' ID(PRODSYS DLIUSID) ACCESS(UPDATE)

Converting Terminal Security to RACF

SMU and IMS tasks

- List Matrix data set contents
- Browse SMU input statements
 - Identify terminals protected by password security
 - Identify terminals protected by user sign on terminal security
 -)(SIGN STERM ALL
 -)(SIGN STERM nodename
- Change SMU security definitions
 - SECURITY macro
 - PASSWD=NO
 - TERMNL=NO
 - Perform SMU generation
- <u>COLD</u> startup/restart options
 - SGN=Y or SGN=F
 - RCF≠N (Any RCF= value except N)

- Create RACF profiles
 - Group (ADDGROUP)
 - User/Userid (ADDUSER)
 - Connect Userids to Groups (CONNECT)
 - IMS terminals (RDEFINE)
 - TERMINAL
 - GTERMINL
- Authorize userids/groups to RACF terminal profiles (PERMIT)
- Activate terminal resource classes (SETROPTS CLASSACT)

Sample RACF Commands - IMS Terminals

- => **ADDGROUP** SYSPROG SUPGROUP(SYS1) OWNER(RACFADMN)
- => **ADDUSER** KENNIE NAME(KEN BLACKMAN)
 PASSWORD(THEKING) OWNER(RACFADMN) DFLTGRP(SYSPROG)
- => **CONNECT** KENNIE GROUP(SYSPROG)

=>SETROPTS TERMINAL(READ)

- => RDEFINE TERMINAL NODE1234 UACC(NONE)
- => **PERMIT** NODE1234 CLASS(TERMINAL) ID(KENNIE) ACCESS(READ)
- => **RDEFINE** GTERMINL IMSNODES UACC(NONE)
- => **PERMIT** IMSNODES CLASS(GTERMINL) ADDMEM(NODEA NODEB NODEC) ID(KENNIE) ACCESS(READ)
- =>SETROPTS CLASSACT(TERMINAL)
- =>SETROPTS GENERIC(TERMINAL)
- =>SETROPTS RACLIST(TERMINAL)
- =>SETROPTS GENERIC(TERMINAL) REFRESH
- =>SETROPTS RACLIST(TERMINAL) REFRESH

Converting AGNs to RACF

Consideration

- May want to wait to see what happens before making AGN changes!!
- SMU security required even with RACF

SMU and IMS tasks

- List Matrix data set contents
- Browse SMU input statements
 - Identify AGNs secured using SMU
 -)(AGN agn_name AGPSB PSBA AGTRAN TRANA AGLTERM LTERMA
- Change SMU security definitions
 - SECURITY macro
 - ► TYPE=RACFAGN
 - Perform SMU generation
- <u>COLD</u> startup/restart options
 - ISIS=1

- NONE if current AGN security continues to be used
- For RACF security checking at region/thread connect time
 - Create RACF profiles
 - Group (ADDGROUP)
 - User/Userid (ADDUSER)
 - Connect Userids to Groups (CONNECT)
 - ► IMS AGNs (RDEFINE)
 AIMS | AXXXXXXX
 - Authorize userids/groups to RACF AGN profiles (PERMIT)
 - Activate AGN resource classes (SETROPTS CLASSACT)

Sample RACF Commands - IMS AGNs

- => ADDGROUP PRODREGS SUPGROUP(SYS1) OWNER(RACFADMN)
- => **ADDUSER** DEPREG1 NAME(PRODUCTION REGION 1)
 PASSWORD(IMSREG1) OWNER(RACFADMN) DFLTGRP(PRODREGS)
- => **CONNECT** DEPREG1 GROUP(PRODREGS)
- => RDEFINE AIMS AGN1 UACC(NONE)
- => **PERMIT** AGN1 CLASS(AIMS) ID(DEPREG1 PRODREGS) ACCESS(READ)
- => RDEFINE AXXXXXXX AGN2 UACC(NONE)
- => **PERMIT** AGN2 CLASS(AXXXXXXX) ID(DEPREG1 PRODREGS) ACCESS(READ)
- =>SETROPTS CLASSACT(AIMS AXXXXXXX)
- =>SETROPTS RACLIST(AIMS AXXXXXXX)
- =>SETROPTS RACLIST(AIMS AXXXXXXX) REFRESH

Summary

Objectives

- Determine if your IMS systems use SMU security
- Identify the IMS resources which are protected by SMU
- Identify the type(s) of SMU security used to protect IMS resources
- Determine if the SMU security for a resource can be converted to RACF-provided security
- Define the requirements for RACF-provided IMS resource security
- Security facilities
- SMU security overview
- Converting SMU security to RACF security
 - IMS commands, IMS transactions, IMS databases/data sets, and terminals
 - Considerations: TYPE 1 AO programs and AGNs
 - May want to wait before converting to RACF