



IBM Systems Group

I1: z/OS Security Server Update

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Agenda

- **z/OS Version 1 Release 5**
 - ▶ Dynamic RACF Templates
 - ▶ Multilevel Security
 - ▶ RACF Support for DB2 Version 8
 - ▶ PKI Services
 - ▶ Packaging

Agenda

- **z/OS Version 1 Release 6**
 - ▶ Common Criteria
 - ▶ Dynamic Class Descriptor Table (CDT)
 - ▶ Password Enveloping and LDAP Change Log Support
 - ▶ Multilevel Security Auditing

Agenda

- **Planned for z/OS Version 1 Release 7**
 - ▶ RACF USER-related enhancements:
 - Mixed-case passwords
 - Detect or Prevent password recycling
 - Maintain revoke date when resuming users
 - Improve SETR INACTIVE processing for new users
 - ▶ RACF Availability enhancement:
 - Automatic RVARY SWITCH to backup for some errors
 - ▶ RACF API enhancement:
 - R_admin functions to extract USER, GROUP, and CONNECT information
 - ▶ RACF Security enhancement for servers:
 - Nested ACEEs
 - ▶ Several PKI Services enhancements

z/OS Security Server (RACF) Update: V1R5

RACF Dynamic Templates

What are the “RACF Templates”?

- **Map how profiles are written on the RACF database.**
- **Are updated to add new segments or fields for line items, either at a release boundary or in a PTF.**
- **Exist in three places:**
 - ▶ The latest version shipped with RACF
 - ▶ The version on the database, written there by utility IRRMIN00
 - PARM=NEW initialize new database
 - PARM=UPDATE update the templates on existing database
 - ▶ The in-storage version
 - Built by RACF Initialization and used when accessing profiles
 - Can only be updated via IPL

Issues with the RACF Templates

- **Install a new release of z/OS. If IRRMIN00 not run**
 - ▶ RE-IPL required

- **IRRMIN00 requires correct IRRTEMP1 source. Latest level not obvious.**
 - \$/VERSION HRF7707
 - \$/VERSION OA01234
 - ▶ If wrong level used RE-IPL required

- **Apply a PTF with template changes**
 - ▶ RE-IPL required even if no modules in PTF require IPL

- **Could mistakenly run IRRMIN00 to initialize the database rather than update it, wiping out database.**

Many consider these issues to be system outages

What are “Dynamic RACF Templates”

- **RACF Initialization builds the in-storage templates automatically from the latest level whether or not IRRMIN00 PARM=UPDATE was run**
- **IRRMIN00 PARM=NEW and PARM=UPDATE automatically writes the latest level of templates to the database**
- **IRRMIN00 PARM=UPDATE will not write down-level templates to a database.**
- **New templates can be activated by a new option on IRRMIN00, PARM=ACTIVATE**
- **IRRMIN PARM=NEW no longer works against a RACF data set which is currently used by RACF on current system.**

Dynamic RACF Templates...

- **Are no longer shipped in source format as IRRTEMP1! They are shipped as a module in compiled format as IRRTEMP2.**
- **Contain the release and apar level so RACF can determine the latest level of the templates:**

```
$/VERSION FMID/APAR# rrrrrrrr.aaaaaaa
```

```
$/VERSION HRF7708 00000010.00000000
```

```
$/VERSION OA01234 00000010.00000010
```

```
$/VERSION OA01567 00000010.00000020
```

```
$/VERSION HRFxxxx 00000023.00000020
```

- **SET LIST operator command displays the in-storage template level and the dynamic parse level in effect on the system.**

```
RACF STATUS INFORMATION:
```

```
TEMPLATE VERSION           - HRF7708 00000010.00000000  
DYNAMIC PARSE VERSION      - HRF7708
```

Dynamic RACF Templates...

- **During IPL, RACF Initialization puts the templates in storage**
- **If the Master Primary database level is higher or the same as IRRTEMP2, RACF builds them from the database**
- **Otherwise, RACF builds the in-storage templates from IRRTEMP2 and issues message:**

```
ICH579E RACF TEMPLATES ON DATABASE ARE DOWNLEVEL:  
HRF7708 00000000.00000000; USING TEMPLATES AT LEVEL  
HRF7708 00000010.00000000 FROM IRRTEMP2.  
RUN IRRMIN00 PARM=UPDATE
```

IRRMIN00

- **No longer makes use of the SYSTEMP data set, which customers typically pointed to SYS1.MODGEN(IRRTEMP1). Now it gets the templates from IRRTEMP2.**
- **Fail PARM=NEW if the output database is active on the system where IRRMIN00 is invoked.**
- **Will not apply downlevel templates to a database.**
- **Makes templates active dynamically for the new PARM=ACTIVATE invocation when the templates on the active master primary database are a higher level than the in-storage templates.**

IRRMIN00...

■ **PARM=NEW**

- ▶ Formats a non-VSAM DASD data set as a RACF database.
- ▶ Now fails if invoked against an active database on the system where IRRMIN00 is invoked

■ **PARM=UPDATE**

- ▶ Writes new templates to the database
- ▶ Now fails if new templates are not at higher level than ones in database

■ **PARM=ACTIVATE**

- ▶ If the active master primary database has higher level templates than those in storage, they are copied to storage

z/OS Security Server (RACF) Update: V1R5

Multilevel Security

Multilevel Security

- **Multilevel security is the ability to mix different categories and classes of information within the same computing environment in a controlled manner**
- **Evolved from level and categories, through SECLABELs (RACF 1.9)**
- **With z/OS V1.5 multilevel security is extended to:**
 - ▶ UNIX System Services
 - files and directories
 - processes
 - sockets
 - ▶ Rows within a DB2 table
 - ▶ TCP/IP networks
- **Additional Information in these sessions:**
 - ▶ I10: Multilevel Security (MLS) Update (Wed, 11:00)

z/OS Security Server (RACF) Update: V1R5

RACF Support for DB2 Version 8

RACF Support for DB2 Version 8

- **Ever since OS/390 R4, RACF has provided a “plug-in” DB2 External Security Module (DSNX@XAC) for DB2**
 - ▶ Shipped with RACF in 'SYS1.SAMPLIB(IRR@XACS)

- **Starting with DB2 Version 8 (GA: March 2004), this plug-in is now shipped with DB2 in the SDSNSAMP library, member DSNXRAC**
 - ▶ FMID: HDRE810

- **Support for the new DB2 SEQUENCE object**
 - ▶ Two new RACF general resource classes: MDSNSQ, GDSNSQ

- **Support for long DB2 names**

- **ACEE available to DSNX@XAC in many cases where it was not before**
 - ▶ “-” commands from TSO or the MVS console

RACF Support for DB2 Version 8...

- **Multilevel Support:**

- ▶ DB2 Version 8 allows the assignment of SECLABELs to rows within a table
- ▶ Several existing DB2 RACF general resource classes updated with SLBLREQ=YES to require a SECLABEL if SETR MLACTIVE is in effect

- **Note: Use of RACF “plug-in” exit is not required for row-level multilevel support**

z/OS Security Server (RACF) Update: V1R5

PKI Services

PKI Services Overview

- **PKI Services is a z/OS component which provides a complete certificate authority**
- **Full certificate lifecycle management**
 - ▶ User requests driven by customizable web pages
 - ▶ Automatic or administrator approval process
 - ▶ End user or administrator revocation process
- **New news: PKI Services for z/OS V1R5 now certified as Identrus-compliant for CA software**
 - ▶ Rich Guski will discuss this further on Thursday, in session H13 at 9:15

PKI Services Enhancements with z/OS V1R5

■ **Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs)**

- ▶ The distinguished name of the CRL can now be placed in certificates
- ▶ CRLs can be partitioned within the LDAP name space
- ▶ simplifies searching of CRLs

■ **Performance Improvements**

- ▶ New VSAM indices (status and requestor)
- ▶ Use of system SSL services

PKI Services Enhancements with z/OS V1R5

■ **Certificate Suspension**

- ▶ Prior to z/OS V1.5, certificates could be either 'active', 'pending approval', 'revoked', or expired.

- ▶ With z/OS V1.5, certificates may be suspended for a period of time.
 - Suspended certificates appear on the next CRL with a reason code of certificateHold
 - New certificate status of 'SUSPENDED'
 - MaxSuspendDuration
 - New CertPolicy keyword to indicate length of the suspended grace period in days or weeks

z/OS Security Server (RACF) Update: V1R5

Packaging

z/OS V1R5 Packaging

- **The z/OS V1.4 Security Server contains:**
 - RACF, DCE Security Server, Firewall Technologies , LDAP Server, Open Cryptographic Enhanced Plug-in (OCEP), Network Authentication Services, PKI Services

- **With z/OS V1.5, the Security Server contains:**
 - RACF

- **The new z/OS V1.5 Integrated Security Services element contains:**
 - DCE Security Server, Firewall Technologies , LDAP Server, Open Cryptographic Enhanced Plug-in (OCEP), Network Authentication Services

- **PKI Services is moved to the z/OS V1.5 Cryptographic Services element**

z/OS Security Server (RACF) Update

z/OS V1R6

z/OS Security Server (RACF) Update: V1R6

Common Criteria

Common Criteria

- **Common Criteria certification for z/OS R6 completed:**
 - ▶ **Labeled Security Protection Profile (LSPP) at Evaluation Assurance Level 3+ (EAL3+)**
 - ▶ **Controlled Access Protection Profile (CAPP) at EAL3+**

- **See:**
 - ▶ http://www.ibm.com/servers/eserver/zseries/security/ccs_certification.html
 - ▶ http://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifiz/zert/reporte.htm#Grossrechner_Systeme

z/OS Security Server (RACF) Update: V1R6


Dynamic Class Descriptor Table (CDT)

Why Dynamic CDT?

- **To update the RACF Class Descriptor Table and Router Table the installation must:**

- Write assembler code
- Assemble and LinkEdit modules
- IPL the system
 - Creates availability problem if running 24x7 production environment

!?\$% !!!



- **Many customer requirements have requested the ability to update the RACF CDT with no IPL**
- **Solution in z/OS V1R6:**
 - Dynamic Class Descriptor Table
 - Router Table must be updated only for exceptions

Customer Value of Dynamic CDT Support

- **Availability**
 - No IPL necessary to add, update, or delete an installation-defined class
- **Ease of Use**
 - RACF commands can be used to add an installation-defined class
 - No ASSEMBLER coding required
 - No update to RACF Router Table required when adding an installation-defined class
 - Easier to change attributes of a class



Easy !!!



Summary of steps to Create a Dynamic Class

- **Use new IBM class named CDT to create a class definition**
- **Use new segment CDTINFO to define class attributes**
 - Use the RDEFINE and RALTER commands to define the class attributes – profile in the CDT class
 - RDEFINE CDT dynamic-class-name UACC(NONE)
CDTINFO(class-attribute-1 class-attribute-2 ...)
- **Use the SETROPTS command to build the Dynamic CDT in the Dataspace**
 - SETROPTS CLASSACT(CDT) RACLIST(CDT)

Related Enhancements in RACF

- **RACF Router Table**
 - Updates are no longer required for new classes or new REQSTOR/SUBSYS combinations

- **RACROUTE REQUEST=STAT**
 - New keyword allows sequential search of classes in CDT

- **SETROPTS LIST Enhancement**
 - Class names alphabetized

- **Class Name Restrictions Relaxed**
 - Minimum length of class name is 1 character (was 4 characters)
 - Dynamic classes can have a number as the first character

z/OS Security Server (RACF) Update: V1R6

Password Enveloping and LDAP Change Log

What is Password Enveloping / LDAP Change Log?

- **Challenge**

- ▶ **Currently, RACF can receive password updates, but can not send local changes outbound (without exits)**

- **Solution**

- ▶ **Allow outbound-password update propagation**
- ▶ **Designed for use by IBM Directory Integrator (IDI) 5.1.2**
- ▶ **Available z/OS Releases 3, 4, and 5 via APAR:**
 - OA03853 – RACF updates
 - OA03854 – SAF updates
 - OA03857 – LDAP updates

What is Password Enveloping? ...

- **Three parts to the solution:**

1. **RACF**

- ▶ Mechanisms for storage and retrieval of changed user definitions (including passwords).

2. **LDAP**

- ▶ Change log support for SDBM (RACF) back end.
- ▶ LDAP interface to retrieve enveloped changed user/password information.

3. **IBM Directory Integrator (IDI)**

- ▶ Event handler for polling z/OS LDAP change log.
- ▶ Java method for decrypting the RACF password envelope.
- ▶ Sample assembly line which detects a RACF password change, retrieves the password envelope, decrypts it, and applies the password to an entry in IBM Directory Server.

z/OS Security Server (RACF) Update

Enhanced SECLABEL Auditing

z/OS V1R6 Multilevel Security Audit Enhancements

- **Multilevel Security Auditing (SECLABELAUDIT) enhancements**
 - Extends the auditing function of RACF
 - Meets requirements for evaluation of z/OS V1R6 to the Common Criteria for certification to the
 - Labeled Security Protection Profile (LSPP) at Evaluated Assurance Level (EAL) 3+.
 - Controlled Access Protection Profile (CAPP) at Evaluated Assurance Level (EAL) 3+.

z/OS V1R6 Multilevel Security Audit Enhancements

- **What is SECLABELAUDIT**
 - Provides additional auditing of access attempts to protected resources based on the auditing option in the profile of the security label associated with the resource
 - Enabled/Disabled by:
 - Activating/Deactivating the SECLABEL class
 - Enabling/Disabling the SETROPTS SECLABELAUDIT option
SETR SECLABELAUDIT/NOSECLABELAUDIT

z/OS V1R6 Multilevel Security Audit Enhancements

□ Overview of Multilevel Security Auditing

- Auditing based on SETROPTS SECLABELAUDIT has been changed such that:
 - Auditing is also done based on the security label of the user if it is different than the resource's security label and the resource's security label did not request auditing.
- This support has been extended to existing RACF Services as well as z/OS Unix System Services (callable services)
- Enabled/Disabled by:
 - Activating/Deactivating the SECLABEL class
 - Activating/Deactivating the existing SETROPTS option - SECLABELAUDIT/NOSECLABELAUDIT

z/OS Security Server (RACF) Update

z/OS V1R7 Planned Items

RACF USER-related Enhancements: Mixed-Case Passwords

- Allows RACF to distinguish between upper- and lower-case characters in passwords.
- Supported by TSO/E, CICS TS 3.1 (and 2.2 and 2.3 via PTF), Console logon, JOB statements, and z/OS UNIX functions.
- Controlled by SETR PASSWORD(MIXEDCASE | NOMIXEDCASE)
 - ▶ Do not enable mixed-case passwords unless all local systems sharing RACF DB are at z/OS R7
 - ▶ For RRSF, RACF will ensure passwords are in upper-case if sent to an RRSF node at z/OS R6 or earlier.

RACF USER-related Enhancements: Mixed-Case Passwords...

- Additional SETROPTS password rules:
 - ▶ NATIONAL
 - # (X'7B'), \$ (X'5B'), and @ (X'7C')
 - ▶ MIXEDCONSONANT
 - Upper- or lower-case consonants (A-Z, a-z)
 - ▶ MIXEDVOWEL
 - Upper- or lower-case vowels (a, e, i, o, u, A, E, I, O, U)
 - ▶ MIXEDNUM
 - Upper- or lower-case alphabetic, or numeric, or national
 - At least one upper-case alpha or national, one lower-case alpha, and one numeric
- Old rules (ALPHA, ALPHANUM, CONSONANT, VOWEL, NOVOWEL) will **not** match lower-case alphabetic characters.

RACF USER-related Enhancements: Mixed-Case Passwords...

- Example of password rules:

- ▶ SETROPTS PASSWORD

- RULE1(LENGTH(8) ALPHANUM(1:8))
 - Accepts passwords of length exactly 8, containing only upper-case alphabetic or national or numeric, with at least one alphabetic or national and at least one numeric
- RULE2(LENGTH(6:8) MIXEDNUM(1:8))
 - Accepts passwords of length 6 through 8, containing mixed-case alphabetic or national or numeric, with at least one upper-case alphabetic or national, one lower case alphabetic, and one numeric.
- RULE3(LENGTH(5:8) NATIONAL(3) MIXEDNUM(1:2,4:8))
 - Like RULE2, except requires a national character in position 3 and will allow passwords of length 5 through 8.

RACF USER-related Enhancements: Mixed-Case Passwords...

■ Notes:

- ▶ RACF will remember whether a user has ever had a mixed-case password. If not, when comparing a password entered by the user RACF will check both the value as presented to RACF and the upper-case version of that value.

- ▶ When the user is changing his password, RACF will check that the new password and current password, when converted to upper-case, are different. Example:
 - If current password is ABCD
 - Then new password aBcD will be rejected

RACF USER-related Enhancements: Detect or Prevent Password Recycling

- Problem: Users can change passwords repeatedly and recycle their password history, keeping same password.
- Part 1 of Solution: With SETROPTS AUDIT(USER) in effect, RACROUTE REQUEST=VERIFY (logon, etc.) processing will create a type 80 SMF record indicating a password change.

RACF USER-related Enhancements: Detect or Prevent Password Recycling...

- Part 2 of Solution: SETROPTS PASSWORD(MINCHANGE(nnn))
- The MINCHANGE value specifies the minimum lifetime of a user's password, from 0 (not limited) up to the SETR PASSWORD(INTERVAL(mmm)) value.
 - ▶ Before nnn days, a user cannot change his/her own password again.
 - ▶ Helpdesk personnel authorized via IRR.PASSWORD.RESET need CONTROL authority to change a user's password before nnn days.
 - ▶ SPECIAL and group-SPECIAL users can change another user's password during that interval, but not their own password.

RACF USER-related Enhancements: Maintain revoke date when resuming users

- Problem: Administrator specifies
ALTUSER U1 REVOKE(mm/dd/yy)
then U1 forgets password, becomes revoked early, and administrator resumes U1.

RACF removes the REVOKE date.

- Solution: RACF will keep the revoke date.
- ALTUSER has new keywords NOREVOKE, NORESUME which will clear the REVOKE or RESUME dates, if present.
- LISTUSER and LISTGRP will show REVOKE and RESUME dates, even if in the past.

RACF USER-related Enhancements: Improve SETR INACTIVE processing for new users

- Problem: SETR INACTIVE(30) specified. Administrator creates new user U1, who does not logon for 45 days.

When U1 does logon, RACF does not consider him inactive, and allows the logon.

- Solution: RACF will put the user's creation date into the LJDATE field during ADDUSER processing. Then RACROUTE REQUEST=VERIFY (logon, etc.) processing will have a value to use for checking inactivity.
- LJTIME is not set during ADDUSER, so logon processing and LISTUSER and applications can still tell the user has never signed on.

RACF Availability Enhancement: Automatic RVARY SWITCH to backup for some errors

- **Problem:** RVARY SWITCH is needed to recover from device errors on primary RACF DB, but
 - ▶ It can take awhile to issue this command, especially if operator needs to supply the password.
 - ▶ RVARY cannot work while requests to use the DB are in process, so even after entering password, operator must VARY the device offline.
- **Improvement:**
 - ▶ If major device errors have occurred, affecting RACF and other users of the device, operator can VARY the RACF primary DB device offline (V nnn,OFFLINE,FORCE).
 - ▶ z/OS will terminate any outstanding requests with I/O error.
 - ▶ RACF will detect this I/O error, see device is offline, and automatically RVARY SWITCH to the backup
 - No password needed
 - SWITCH will happen on all systems in SYSPLEX Communication.

RACF Availability Enhancement: Automatic RVARY SWITCH to backup for some errors...

■ Notes:

- ▶ RVARY is still the preferred method for many cases.
 - VARY will affect all applications using data on that volume

- ▶ However, if the device is really broken, the other applications are probably in trouble, anyway.

RACF API Enhancement: R_admin extract function for USER, GROUP, and CONNECT info

- Problem: R_admin callable service allows programs to issue RACF commands, including LISTUSER and LISTGROUP, but:
 - ▶ 1. Output of commands is not a programming interface
 - ▶ 2. Output is difficult to parse to extract the needed data
 - ▶ 3. RACF restricts output to 4096 lines
- Solution: New R_admin functions to extract USER, GROUP, or CONNECT info

RACF API Enhancement: R_admin extract function for USER, GROUP, and CONNECT info...

- New USER-related functions:
 - ▶ Extract USER
 - ▶ Extract next USER
 - ▶ Extract CONNECT
- New GROUP-related functions:
 - ▶ Extract GROUP
 - ▶ Extract next GROUP
- Data returned in a structured format
 - ▶ Segment name
 - ▶ Field name
 - ▶ Data

RACF API Enhancement: R_admin extract function for USER, GROUP, and CONNECT info...

- Problem state callers require access to FACILITY resource:
 - ▶ IRR.RADMIN.LISTUSER for USER-related extract functions
 - ▶ IRR.RADMIN.LISTGRP for GROUP-related extract functions
- Normal LISTUSER and LISTGRP security rules also apply

RACF Security Enhancement for Servers: Nested ACEEs

- Scenario: A server authenticates a client, creates ACEE, and then does access checking.
- Problem: Sometimes a check should use the server identity, not the client identity.
 - ▶ Example: Server may use SSL or TLS for communication security, but after client authentication occurs, it may be the client (today) who needs authority to use ICSF crypto services or keys.
- This is solved for FTP today, in different ways depending on z/OS release, via PTFs
- Not solved for other servers, though, and a fix like the one in FTP is very complex
 - ▶ We need a simpler solution

RACF Security Enhancement for Servers: Nested ACEEs

■ Solution:

- ▶ The server tells RACF to create a client ACEE, but to also embed a copy of the server ACEE in the client ACEE, as an ENVR object
- ▶ The administrator (only if instructed by server documentation) tells RACF to use the embedded ACEE.
 - Example: `RALTER CSFSERV CSFENC
 APPLDATA('RACF-DELEGATED')`
- ▶ Server then uses `RACROUTE REQUEST=FASTAUTH` to do the authorization check
- ▶ `FASTAUTH` first checks client authority to the resource, and if that fails, checks server authority

PKI Services Enhancements

- Support for DSA (Digital Signature Algorithm) in key generation and signing
 - ▶ Today only RSA supported
- Enhancement to CRL Distribution Point information: Support URI to indicate location of Certificate Revocation List
 - ▶ Today only the DN (distinguished name) format supported
- Create ARL (certificate revocation list) for CA certificates generated by PKI services
 - ▶ Today PKI Services creates CRL only for user certificates
- Provide basic OCSP (Online Certificate Status Protocol) responder support
 - ▶ Today OCSP support, if desired, requires 3rd party provider

Summary

- **z/OS Version 1 Release 5**
 - ▶ Dynamic RACF Templates
 - ▶ Multilevel Security
 - ▶ RACF Support for DB2 Version 8
 - ▶ PKI Services
 - ▶ Packaging
- **z/OS Version 1 Release 6**
 - ▶ Common Criteria
 - ▶ Dynamic CDT
 - ▶ Password Enveloping and LDAP Change Log Support
 - ▶ MLS Auditing

Summary

▪ z/OS Version 1 Release 7

- ▶ USER-related:
 - Mixed-case passwords
 - Detect or Prevent password recycling
 - Maintain revoke date when resuming users
 - Improve SETR INACTIVE processing for new users
- ▶ Availability:
 - Automatic RVARY SWITCH to backup for some errors
- ▶ Programming:
 - R_admin functions to extract USER, GROUP, and CONNECT information
- ▶ Server Security:
 - Nested ACEEs
- ▶ PKI Services Enhancements