### SMF Digital Signatures in z/OS 2.2

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## Agenda

- What is a digital signature?
- How digital signatures enhance SMF data
- Configuration and Usage

# What is a Asymmetric Cryptography

- Also known as Public-Key Cryptography
- Used for message encryption (i.e. to transmit a key for symmetric encryption) or for message signatures
- Utilizes very large random numbers Strength lies in the inability to factor these very large numbers
- The term "asymmetric" comes from the use of different keys, a public key and private key, to perform these opposite functions

# What is a Digital Signature?

- A way to ensure the source and validity of data
- The signer will first hash the data and then encrypt the hash with their *private key* – The encrypted hash is the *signature*
- The consumer of the data can hash the same data and decrypt the signature, using the *public key*, to obtain the signer's hash
- The hashes will then be compared When these values match then the data contents and source are verified

# Storing SMF Digital Signatures

- Digital Signatures are stored in SMF2 records
  - Subtype 1 provides a grouped signatures
  - Subtype 2 provides interval based signatures
  - Data must be validated on interval boundaries
- New data included in these records includes counts of records included, start and end times of the data included and the hashing and signature methods
- SMF2 records today are generated by IFASMFDL and IFASMFDP and is ignored by these utilities by default

## Storing SMF Digital Signatures (cont)

• Looking at a data set dumped from a logstream the SMF Type 2 records will be integrated into the data



## When SMF Signs Records

- The SMF data is signed on the way to System Logger
  - This function is only available when using SMF Logstream Recording!
  - As each block of records is written to the logstream
    - Each record is individually hashed
    - Running hash maintained per unique SMF type/subtype
- Periodically, the hash will be encrypted and the digital signature data will be recorded to the logstream as a *group signature record*
- On the global interval a signature is created for all data hashed since the previous interval and recorded to the logstream as an *interval signature record*
- These operations are performed with the *private key*

## When SMF Moves Signature Records

- IFASMFDL and IFASMFDP understand signature records
- Both utilities can optionally carry them to an OUTDD data set with the records of an associated SMF type/subtype
  - OUTDD data sets can be independently verified



# When SMF Verifies Records

- IFASMFDP can verify a set of SMF records has not been tampered with when signature records are available.
  - The Signature Records must have been carried through successive IFASMFDL and IFASMFDP passes over the data



# Setup Steps

- The first step is create a public/private key pair via ICSF
  - SMF does not care about the type of key (clear or secure) as long as the available hardware can support it
- Scope of the key usage can be per enterprise, sysplex, system or logstream
- SMF needs the token name to perform the PKCS#11 functions via ICSF as well as the type of encryption – For example RSA or Elliptical Curve
- The SMF address space and any invokers of IFASMFDP will need access to ICSF, PKCS#11 and the appropriate key
  - See SAF resources CRYPTOZ, CSFSERV and CSFKEYS

Setup Steps – cont.

- Update the SMF configuration to sign record
- New option RECSIGN can be specified globally or per LSNAME
  - The logstream must be defined with a MAXBUFSIZE of 65532
- Default is NORECSIGN
- Sub-options include HASH, TOKENNAME, SIGNATURE

```
RECSIGN(HASH(SHA512), SIGNATURE(RSA),
TOKENNAME(TAMPER#RESISTANT#SMF#TOKEN#NAME1))
```

- These options are dynamic however changing these options requires some operational coordination
  - Data can only be verified with a single set of parameters, new and old data must be segregated

## Setup Steps – IFASMFDL

- IFASMFDL can carry signature data with the SMF records
- By default IFASMFDL will drop signature records
  - The NOSIGSTRIP option can be used to have signature records written to OUTDD data sets
  - IFASMFDL will carry signature records transparently
- If there are multiple OUTDD statements for different types and subtypes IFASMFDL will carry the correct signature records to each OUTDD
- When signature records are carried the IFASMFDL output reports a TYPE2 record as written for each signature record

## Setup Steps – IFASMFDP

- IFASMFDP can carry signature records and perform validation
- New IFASMFDP parameters NOSIGSTRIP and SIGVALIDATE
  - NOSIGSTRIP behaves the same as with IFASMFDL
- SIGVALIDATE indicates that signature validation is to be performed, Suboptions include TOKENNAME and HASH

SIGVALIDATE(HASH(SHA512),
TOKENNAME(TAMPER#RESISTANT#SMF#TOKEN#NAME1))

• Default: NOSIGVALIDATE (don't perform validation)

#### Setup Steps – IFASMFDP

- The relationship between PARMLIB member SMFPRMxx and the IFASMFDP options
- The TOKENNAME and HASH values must match between SMFPRMxx and IFASMFDP
- The TOKENNAME is associated with the public/private pair of keys
- IFASMFDP only needs to access the public key SYS1.PARMLIB(SMFPRMxx)



## IFASMFDP SIGVALIDATE Considerations

- The behavior for DATE, START and END are slightly different. Align each with an interval to ensure complete intervals of records can be validated.
- Records must retain the same order and contents as they where originally written for signature verification to succeed
- IFASMFDP ends processing after the first failure is detected

# **Configuration Changes**

- Encryption options can be changed dynamically
  - This is not advised as it creates operational problems
  - IFASMFDP needs to be told the encryption parameters and can not validate a data set with a mix of parameters for a single SMF type/subtype from a given SID
- If options must be changed create a new logstream with the new options
  - Temporarily run with both logstreams then turn off the old logstream
  - Now there is a clean break between data signed with the old and new parameters

# Configuration Changes (cont)

- New SMFPRMxx setting RECSIGN with options HASH, TOKENNAME, SIGNATURE apply at specific times
  - Records written before the first global interval of IPL are signed immediately
  - Records written before the first global interval of a logstream which has not been previously been signing are signed immediately
  - Records will not be signed until the global interval after a SET SMF or SETSMF command is processed for logstreams which had previously been signing

## IFASMFDP Record Validation Report

- Report line generated for each SMF type and subtype processed for each SID seen
- Includes time span and counts for records that were verified
- Counts include records processed, groups processed and intervals processed
- A group is a subset of records that were signed together
- An interval is the signature generated on the SMF configured interval time
- Provides information about failures
- A signature failure is the highest level failure
- Additional checking is performed to see if the error could be due to a missing or added record or an entire missing interval of records
- Manual examination will be required to determine the root-cause of the error

## Dissecting an IFASMFDP SIGVALIDATE Report



When all data validates the report ends with this message. On a failure this would provide additional information

## Validation Reports – When it fails

- The report will end with VALIDATION FAILED status
- Only a single error is reported per IFASMFDP run
- IFA742I reports details about the failure

### Validation Reports – IFA7421 Reasons

- CRYPTOGRAPHY FAILURE ICSF RC/RSN=<rc>/<rsn>
  - ICSF is inactive or other ICSF high level error
  - Check Cryptographic Services ICSF Application Programmer's Guide
- INCONSISTENT RECORDS RECORDS DO NOT MATCH EXPECTED COUNTS
  - Potential inserted or deleted record
- INCONSISTENT RECORDS RECORDS DO NOT MATCH EXPECTED TIMES
  - Interval record does not have the correct time relative to previous Interval record
  - A record does not have a consistent time relative to other records in the group
- INCONSISTENT RECORDS FIRST FLAG DOES NOT MATCH
  - Group records set a first flag for the first group in each interval
  - Interval record set a first flag for the first interval written
  - Altered, inserted or deleted signature data

# Validation Reports – IFA7421 Reasons (cont)

- RECORD AND SUPPLIED CRYPTO OPTIONS DO NOT MATCH
  - When signature record contains different SIGVALIDATE options than IFASMFDP parameter
- MISSING RECORDS STARTING INTERVAL
  - Started validation without initializing interval signature record and failed
  - Change your START time or possible deletion of records prior to validating the first interval record
- MISSING RECORDS ENDING INTERVAL
  - When last interval record time does not match IFASMFDP ENDTIME parameter
  - Change END time or possible deletion of trailing records
- INCOMPLETE VALIDATION ENDED WITH PARTIAL INTERVAL
  - Outstanding records were not validated, missing an interval record

## IFASMFDL and IFASMFDP Exits

- The IFASMFDL and IFASMFDP provide an exit interface to intercept records that are processed
  - This is the USER2 exit that can be specified on the SYSIN statement
- This exit will get control for signature records that will be written to the output data set
- The SIGSTRIP option will cause these records to not be written but also will not provide them to the USER2 exit

**Toleration Support** 

- Without enabling the new options nothing changes
- Signatures can be turned on however validation processing is not required – It is performed as needed
- At any point signatures can be stripped by IFASMFDL and IFASMFDP to provide an output data set with NO signature records
- Coexistence APAR OA47012 will provide toleration support to accept and ignore the new SMFPRMxx keywords on z/OS V1R13 and V2R1 systems

# Appendix

- z/OS MVS System Management Facilities (SMF) SA38-0667
- Z/OS MVS Initialization and Tuning Reference SA32-0991
- z/OS Cryptographic Services ICSF Administrator's Guide SA22-7521

# Thank You!