


z/OS[®],RACF[®] V2.1 Update

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Agenda

What's new with z/OS V2.1 RACF?

- Common Criteria Evaluation Update
- RRSF
 - Support for TCP/IP V6
 - Comments in the RACF parameter library
 - TLS 1.2 cipher suite support
- New and improved RACF Health Checks
 - RACF_AIM_STAGE, RACF_UNIX_ID, RACF_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRATION, RACF_SENSITIVE_RESOURCES, RACF_PASSWORD_CONTROLS, RACF_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM
- Certificate issuer distinguished name, subject distinguished names and signature algorithms, in IRRDBU00 output
- RACDCERT Enhancements
- &RACUID in home directory path name
- Access controls for JES2/JES3 job classes
- PKI Services Enhancements
- Statement of Direction



Common Criteria Update

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Common Criteria Update

- Recent Common Criteria Evaluations of Interest:
 - Z/OS V2.1, EAL4+, 2 September 2014
 - z/OS V1.13, EAL4+, 12 September, 2012
 - z/OS V1.13/RACF, EAL5+, 27 February, 2013
 - z/VM Version 6 Release 1, EAL4+, 20 February, 2013
 - PR/SM on IBM Systems z196 GA2 z114 GA1, 1 March, 2012
 - PR/SM for IBM zEnterprise EC12 GA1 EAL5+, 19 February, 2013
 - PR/SM for IBM zEnterprise EC12 GA2/BC12 GA1 EAL5+, 19 February, 2014

http://www.ibm.com/security/standards/security_evaluations.html has the details

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RRSF

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RRSF: Quick TCP/IP Review

- Starting with z/OS V1.13, you can link RRSF nodes using TCP/IP instead of APPC! This means that you can now:
 - Manage your RRSF network using the same skills as the rest of your TCP/IP network.
 - Ensure that the same network security policy (IDS, IPS, etc.) is in place for your RRSF network as in place for the rest of your z/OS TCP/IP network.
 - Utilize the encryption and peer-node authentication of AT-TLS
 - Convert a node from using APPC to TCP/IP without stopping communication
 - Keep up with improvements in z/OS Communications Server Security.



RRSF: IPv6 Support

- Starting with z/OS V2.1, RRSF supports the use of TCP/IP V6 for communications between/among your RRSF nodes
 - Once the z/OS Communications Server on your local note is configured for IPv6:
 - IPv6-format addresses will be displayed
 - You do not have to migrate to IPv6 all at once: Some "remote" nodes can be IPv4 and some IPv6.



RRSF: IPv6 Addresses

Description	IPv4	IPv6
Address length	32 bits long (4 bytes)	128 bits long (16 bytes). 64 bits for network number, 64 bits for host numbe
Total addresses	4,294,967,296 (about 4.3 billion)	About 3.4 x 10 ³⁸
Address format in text	nnn.nnn.nnn.nnn Where 0<=nnn<=255	xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx Where x is hex number. Double colon (::) designates any number of 0 bits
Example	9.127.42.144	2001:0db8:85a3:0000:0000:8a2e:0370:7334
Equivalent addresses	10.120.78.40	::ffff:10.120.78.40 IPv4-mapped IPv6 address
Unspecified address	0.0.0.0	: : (128 0 bits)

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RRSF: TARGET LIST (V1.13)

NODE1 IRRM010I (< STATE - C	PERATIVE ACTIVE	A PROPERTIES OF LOCA	AL RRSF NODE NODE1:	
DESCRIPTION - < PROTOCOL - A	APPC			
	LU NAME	- MF1AP001		
	TP PROFILE NAME	- MFIAPUUI - IRRRACF		
_	IODENAME	- IRRRACF - <not specified=""></not>		
	LISTENER STATUS			
PROTOCOL – T		- ACIIVE	1 st line indicates 'default' – not	
	ICF IOST ADDRESS	- 0.0.0.0		
	IP ADDRESS	- 9.57.1.243	specified on TARGET.	
	LISTENER PORT	- 18136	2 nd line is resolved address, if	
	LISTENER STATUS	- 18130 - ACTIVE	different than specified.	
TIME OF LAST TR		- <none></none>		
	RANSMISSION TO			
WORKSPACE FILE				
PREFIX	0100111011101	- "NODE1.WORK"		
WDSQUAL		- <not specified=""></not>	L]
FILESIZE		- 500		
VOLUME		- TEMP01		
FILE USAG	ΞF.			
	'NODE1.WORK.NODE1	l.INMSG"		
		- CONTAINS 0 RECORI)(S)	
		- OCCUPIES 1 EXTEN		
"	NODE1.WORK.NODE1			
		- CONTAINS 0 RECORI	D(S)	
	_	- OCCUPIES 1 EXTEN		
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RRSF: TARGET LIST(V2.1)

NODE1 <target list node(node1) NODE1 IRRM010I (<) RSWJ SUBSYSTEM PROPERTIES OF LOCAL RRSF NODE NODE1: STATE - OPERATIVE ACTIVE DESCRIPTION - <NOT SPECIFIED> PROTOCOL - APPC LU NAME - MF1AP001 TP PROFILE NAME - IRRRACF MODENAME - <NOT SPECIFIED> LISTENER STATUS - ACTIVE PROTOCOL - TCP HOST ADDRESS <<< IPv6 default - :: **-** ::FFFF:9.57.1.243 <<< IPv6 address IP ADDRESS LISTENER PORT - 18136 LISTENER STATUS - ACTIVE TIME OF LAST TRANSMISSION TO - <NONE> TIME OF LAST TRANSMISSION FROM - <NONE> WORKSPACE FILE SPECIFICATION PREFIX - "NODE1.WORK" If IPv6 is enabled, addresses WDSQUAL - <NOT SPECIFIED> Are displayed in IPv6 format - 500 FILESIZE VOLUME - TEMP01 FILE USAGE "NODE1.WORK.NODE1.INMSG" - CONTAINS 0 RECORD(S) - OCCUPIES 1 EXTENT(S) "NODE1.WORK.NODE1.OUTMSG" - CONTAINS 0 RECORD(S) - OCCUPIES 1 EXTENT(S)

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RRSF: Comments in Parameter Library

Prior to z/OS V2.1, blank lines or whole-line comments would result in an IRRC003I ("COMMAND xxxxx IS NOT VALID") error message

With z/OS V2.1, blank lines and whole-line comments are allowed

- A whole-line comment begins with "//" in any column
 - Continuation characters at the end of a whole-line comment does not continue the comment
 - Whole-line comments or blank lines may not be placed within a continued command
 - Down-level systems will continue to flag whole-line and blank lines as errors
- Examples of valid whole-line comments:
 - //This is a comment line
 - // This is a comment line
 - I/ define the local node with a socket listener



RRSF: TLS 1.2 Cipher Suite Support

- RRSF uses Application Transparent Transport Layer Security (AT-TLS) to encrypt data between RRSF nodes
 - AT-TLS supports more cryptography suites in z/OS V2.1
 - Certificates are used in AT-TLS to provide secure connections between RRSF systems using TCP/IP
 - In z/OS V2R1, ECC certificates with stronger encryption may be used
 - All cryptography suites in Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2 are supported
- When a connection is established between 2 RRSF systems, here is an example of the informational message issued by RACF:
 - IRRI0271 (>) RACF COMMUNICATION WITH TCP NODE NODE1 HAS BEEN SUCCESSFULLY ESTABLISHED USING CIPHER ALGORITHM C026 TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384.



Health Check Updates

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Health Checks: New and Updated Checks

- There are seven new RACF Health Checks in z/OS V2.1:
 - RACF_AIM_STAGE
 - RACF_UNIX_ID
 - RACF_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRATION
 - RACF_CSFKEYS_ACTIVE (with APAR OA44696, rolled back to z/OS V1.12)
 - RACF_CSFSERV_ACTIVE (with APAR OA44696, rolled back to z/OS V1.12)
 - RACF_PASSWORD_CONTROLS (with APAR OA45608, rolled back to z/OS V1.12)
 - RACF_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM (with APAR OA45608, rolled back to z/OS V1.12)
- RACF_AIM_STAGE and RACF_UNIX_ID are intended to assist you in migrating from BPX.DEFAULT.USER, which, as announced, is being withdrawn with z/OS V2.1
 - These two checks rolled back to z/OS V1.12 and z/OS V1.13 with OA37164

RACF_SENSITIVE_RESOURCES has been updated to examine

- Additional general resources
- ICSF CKDS, TKDS, and PKDS data sets (with APAR OA44696, rolled back to z/OS V1.12)

Automatic start for the Health Checker address space at IPL time

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Health Checks: RACF_AIM_STAGE

- The RACF_AIM_STAGE Health Check examines your application identity mapping (AIM) setting and flags as an exception if you are at a stage less than stage 3.
 - Stage 0: No AIM support; only mapping profiles are used
 - Stage 1: Mapping profiles are used; alternate index created and managed, but not used
 - Stage 2: Alternate index create, managed, and used; mapping profiles maintained.
 - Stage 3: Only alternate index maintained and used. Mapping profiles deleted.
- Moving from each stage requires the execution of the IRRIRA00 utility.
- AIM stage 2 or stage 3 is needed for certain RACF functions



Health Checks: RACF_AIM_STAGE (OK)

IRRH500I The RACF database is at the suggested stage of application identity mapping (AIM). The database is at AIM stage 03.



Health Checks: RACF_AIM_STAGE (Exception)

* Medium Severity Exception *

IRRH501E The RACF database is not at the suggested stage of application identity mapping (AIM). The database is at AIM stage 00.

Explanation: The RACF_AIM_STAGE check has determined that the RACF database is not at the suggested stage of application identity mapping (AIM). Your system programmer can convert your RACF database using the IRRIRA00 conversion utility. See z/OS Security Server RACF System Programmer's Guide for information about running the IRRIRA00 conversion utility.

F1=HELP	F2=SPLIT	F3=END	F4=RETURN	F5=IFIND	F6=BOOK
F7=UP	F8=DOWN	F9=SWAP	F10=LEFT	F11=RIGHT	F12=RETRIEVE



Health Checks: RACF_UNIX_ID

- The RACF_UNIX_ID Health Check determines whether RACF will automatically assign unique z/OS UNIX System Services identities when users without OMVS segments use certain UNIX services
 - If you are not relying on RACF to assign UIDs and GIDs, the check informs you that you must continue to assign z/OS UNIX identities
 - If you are relying on the BPX.DEFAULT.USER support, the check issues an exception
 - If you are relying on the BPX.UNIQUE.USER support, the check will verify requirements and indicate if any exceptions are found
 - FACILITY class profile BPX.UNIQUE.USER must exist
 - RACF database must be at Application Identity Mapping (AIM) stage 3
 - UNIXPRIV class profile SHARED.IDS must be defined
 - UNIXPRIV class must be active and RACLISTed
 - FACILITY class profile BPX.NEXT.USER must be defined and its APPLDATA field must contain valid ID values or ranges
 - Note: The check only lists the APPLDATA content, it does not validate it.



Health Checks: RACF_UNIX_ID (OK)

IRRH504I RACF is not enabled to assign UNIX IDs when users or groups that do not have OMVS segments use certain z/OS UNIX services. If you choose not to define UNIX IDs for each user of UNIX functions, you can enable RACF to automatically generate unique UNIX UIDs and GIDs for you.

F1=HELPF2=SPLITF3=ENDF4=RETURNF5=IFINDF6=BOOKF7=UPF8=DOWNF9=SWAPF10=LEFTF11=RIGHTF12=RETRIEVE



Health Checks: RACF_UNIX_ID (OK)

IRRH502I RACF attempts to assign unique UNIX IDs when users or groups that do not have OMVS segments use certain z/OS UNIX services.

IRRH506I The RACF UNIX identity check has detected no exceptions.

END TIME: 05/18/2012 14:12:18.921241 STATUS: SUCCESSFUL



Health Checks: RACF_UNIX_ID (Exception)

IRRH502I RACF attempts to assign unique UNIX IDs when users or groups that do not have OMVS segments use certain z/OS UNIX services.

Requirements for this support:

S Requirement

- -----

FACILITY class profile BPX.UNIQUE.USER is defined E RACF database is not at the required AIM stage: AIM stage = 00 E UNIXPRIV class profile SHARED.IDS is not defined E UNIXPRIV class is not active E UNIXPRIV class is not RACLISTEd E FACILITY class profile BPX.NEXT.USER is not defined

* Medium Severity Exception *

IRRH503E RACF cannot assign unique UNIX IDs when users or groups that do not have OMVS segments use certain z/OS UNIX services. One or more requirements are not satisfied.

Explanation: The RACF UNIX identity check has determined that you want RACF to assign unique UNIX IDs when users or groups without OMVS segments use certain z/OS UNIX services. However, RACF is not able to assign unique UNIX identities for z/OS UNIX services because one or more of the following requirements are not satisfied:



Health Checks: RACF_UNIX_ID (Exception)

* Medium Severity Exception *

IRRH505E The BPX.DEFAULT.USER profile in the FACILITY class indicates that you want RACF to assign shared default UNIX IDs when users or groups that do not have OMVS segments use certain z/OS UNIX services.

Explanation: The RACF UNIX identity check has found the BPX.DEFAULT.USER profile in the FACILITY class. The presence of this profile indicates an intent to have RACF assign shared default UNIX UIDs and GIDs when users without OMVS segments access the system to use certain UNIX services.

Reference Documentation:

z/OS Security Server RACF Security Administrator's Guide

Automation: None.

Check Reason: Unique UNIX identities are recommended.

END TIME: 05/18/2012 14:22:52.067783 STATUS: EXCEPTION-MED

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z/OS V1.13: Health Check – Default UNIX ID

IRRH504I RACF is not enabled to assign UNIX IDs when users or groups that do not have OMVS segments use certain z/OS UNIX services. If you choose not to define UNIX IDs for each user of UNIX functions, you can enable RACF to automatically generate unique UNIX UIDs and GIDs for you.

This is a migration check!

- Note the name: ZOSMIGV2R1.....This check is to prepare you to identify issues when you migrate to z/OS V2.1
- Shipped INACTIVE; you activate when you start your V2.1 migration planning



Health Checks: RACF_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRATION

- The RACF_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRATION health check finds the certificates in the RACF database expired or about to expire
 - Expiration window is an installation-defined value with a default of 60 days.
 - Valid expiration window values are 0-366 days

For each certificate, the check displays:

- The certificate "owner" ('SITE', 'CERTAUTH', or 'ID(user_id)')
- The certificate label
- The end date
- The trust status
- The number of rings to which the certificate is connected

The check only flags as exceptions those certificates which are TRUSTED.

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Health Checks: RACF_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRATION (OK)

CHECK(IBMRACF,RACF_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRATION) START TIME: 01/23/2012 08:10:01.603497 CHECK DATE: 20111010 CHECK SEVERITY: MEDIUM

Certificates Expiring in 60 Days

S Cert Owner Certificate Label End Date Trust Rings

IRRH277I No exceptions are detected. Expired certificates that are not trusted or are associated with only a virtual key ring are not exceptions.

END TIME: 01/23/2012 08:10:01.643285 STATUS: SUCCESSFUL

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Health Checks: RACF_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRATION (Exception)

CHECK(IBMRACF,RACF_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRATION) START TIME: 02/28/2013 09:23:37.747549 CHECK DATE: 20111010 CHECK SEVERITY: MEDIUM

Certificates Expiring within 60 Days

S	Cert Owner	Certificate Label	End Date	Trust	Rings
Ē	0211110111	VERISIGN CLASS 1 INDIVIDUAL	2008-05-12		0
Ε	ID (MARKN)	MARK-001	2012-11-11	Yes	0
Ε	ID (MARKN)	MARK0001	2012-11-05	Yes	0
	ID(CERTAUTH)	START OFF M001 END OFF M001	2012-01-25	No	0
	ID (MARKN)	START OFF M001 END OFF M001	2012-01-25	No	0
	ID(SITE)	START_OFF_M001END_OFF_M001	2012-01-25	No	0
	CERTAUTH	START OFF M365 END OFF M001	2012-01-25	No	0
	ID(CERTAUTH)	START OFF M365 END OFF M001	2012-01-25	No	0
	CERTAUTH	ICP-Brasil CA	2011-11-30	No	0
	CERTAUTH	MICROSOFT ROOT AUTHORITY - 01	2002-12-31	No	0
	CERTAUTH	VERISIGN CLASS 3 PUBLIC	2004-01-07	No	0
	CERTAUTH	VERISIGN CLASS 2 PUBLIC	2004-01-06	No	0

* Medium Severity Exception *

IRRH276E One or more certificates expired or are expiring within the warning period.

Explanation: The RACF_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRATION check found one or more certificates that expired or are expiring within the warning period.



Health Checks: RACF_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRATION (Exception)

The RACF_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRATION check lists each certificate that has an ending date prior to the current date or that has an ending date that is prior to the current date adjusted by the warning period that the installation has specified as a parameter to the RACF_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRATION check. If a parameter is not specified, a default warning period of 60 days is used.

Only certificates that are marked as trusted result in exceptions. These certificates have an "E" in the "S" (Status) column. The trust status of the certificate is shown in the "Trust" column. The number of key rings to which the certificate is connected (other than the virtual key ring) is shown in the "Rings" column.

Use the RACDCERT LIST command to list complete information about any certificate. The RACDCERT command syntax is:

RACDCERT CERTAUTH RACDCERT SITE RACDCERT SITE RACDCERT ID (user-id) LIST (LABEL ('label-name')) or LIST (LABEL ('label-name'))

See z/OS Security Server RACF Security Administrator's Guide and the z/OS Security Server RACF Command Language Reference for more information about digital certificates.

System Action: The check continues processing. There is no effect on the system.



Health Checks: RACF_SENSITIVE_RESOURCES

- The RACF_SENSITIVE_RESOURCES check has been updated to check these new "static" resources names:
 - BPX.DEBUG/FACILITY
 - BPX.WLMSERVER/FACILITY
 - IEAABD.DMPAKEY/FACILITY
 - MVS.SLIP/OPERCMDS
 - SUPERUSER.PROCESS.GETPSENT/UNIXPRIV
 - SUPERUSER.PROCESS.KILL/UNIXPRIV
 - SUPERUSER.PROCESS.PTRACE/UNIXPRIV



Health Checks: RACF_SENSITIVE_RESOURCES...

- RACF is updating the RACF_SENSITIVE_RESOURCES to check these new "dynamic" resources names:
 - CSVAPF.data_set_name/FACILITY, excluding
 - CSVAPF.MVS.SETPROG.FORMAT.DYNAMIC
 - CSVDYLPA.ADD.module_name/FACILITY
 - CSVDYNEX.exit_name.function.modname/FACILITY, excluding
 - CSVDYNEX.LIST
 - CSVDYNEX.exit_name.RECOVER
 - CSVDYNEX.exit_name.CALL
 - CSVDYNL.Inklstname. Function/FACILITYexcluding
 - CSVDYNL.Inklstname.DEFINE CSVDYNL.Inklstname.UNDEFINE)
- No validation is performed on the dynamic portion of these resource names (for example data_set_ name, module_name,Inklstname)



Health Checks: RACF_SENSITIVE_RESOURCES...

Sensitive General Resources Report

s	Resource Name	Class	UACC	Warn	ID*	User
-						
	<existing resources=""></existing>					
	BPX.WLMSERVER	FACILITY	Updt	No	****	
	CSVAPF.RACFDEV.DISCRETE.NONE.LOAD	FACILITY	None	No	****	
	CSVAPF.RACFDEV.DISCRETE.READ.LOAD	FACILITY	Read	No	****	
E	CSVAPF.RACFDEV.DISCRETE.UPDATE.LOAD	FACILITY	Updt	No	****	
	CSVAPF.RACFDEV.**.NONE.LOAD	FACILITY	None	No	****	
	CSVAPF.RACFDEV.**.READ.LOAD	FACILITY	Read	No	****	
Ε	CSVAPF.RACFDEV.**.UPDATE.LOAD	FACILITY	Updt	No	****	
Е	CSVDYLPA.ADD.MODULE001	FACILITY	Updt	No	****	
Е	CSVDYLPA.DELETE.MODULE01	FACILITY	Updt	No	****	
Е	CSVDYLPA.ADD.*	FACILITY	Updt	No	****	
Е	CSVDYLPA.DELETE.*	FACILITY	Updt	No	****	
	CSVDYNEX.EXITNAME_READ.MODNAME01	FACILITY	Read	No	****	
Е	CSVDYNEX.EXITNAME UPDATE.DEFINE	FACILITY	Updt	No	****	
Ε	CSVDYNEX.EXITNAME UPDATE.MODNAME01	FACILITY	Updt	No	****	
Е	CSVDYNEX.*.DEFINE	FACILITY	Updt	No	****	
Е	CSVDYNEX.*.MODNAME01	FACILITY	Updt	No	****	
Е	CSVDYNEX.*	FACILITY	Updt	No	****	
Ε	IEAABD.DMPAKEY	FACILITY	Read	No	****	
Е	IEAABD.DMPAUTH	FACILITY	Read	No	****	



Health Checks: RACF_SENSITIVE_RESOURCES...

- With APAR OA45608I, RACF updated the RACF_SENSITIVE_RESOURCES to check for the ICSF CKDS, PKDS, and TKDS data sets.
- If ICSF has not been started, informational message "IRRH242I: ICSF has not been started on this system" is issued and the check continues processing.

		System Rexx Dataset 3	Report				
s	Data Set Name		Vol	UACC	Warn	ID*	User
	SYS1.SAXREXEC		ZDR22B	Read	No	****	
		ICSF Dataset Re	port				
s -	Data Set Name		Vol	UACC	Warn	ID*	User
	RACFTEST.CLC.PKDS2 RACFTEST.CLC.CKDS						



Certificate Distinguished Names in IRRDBU00 Output

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IRRDBU00: Additional Certificate Information

- The RACF Database Unload Utility (IRRDBU00) unloads basic information about digital certificates into the 0560 ("General Resource Certificate Data Record"). This record contains:
 - The record type ("0560")
 - The name of the general resource profile which contains the certificate
 - The class ("DIGTCERT")
 - The date and time from which the certificate is valid
 - The date and time from which the certificate is no longer valid
 - The type of key associated with the certificate
 - The key size
 - The last eight bytes of the last certificate signed with this key
 - A sequence number for certificates within a ring
- What's missing? The issuer's distinguished name (IDN) and the subject's DN (SDN)of the certificate!
 - This information is encoded within the certificate
 - Maps/mungs to the profile name, but given the profile name, you can't get the IDN or SDN

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IRRDBU00: Additional Certificate Information...

The new record type ("1560") contains:

- The issuer's distinguished name
- The subject's distinguished name
- The hashing algorithm used for the signing the certificate

The "1560" record links to the "0560" record using the profile name

DFSORT's JOINKEY operator can be used when processing IRRDBU00 output

The Mapping of the1560 Record is:

Position

Field Name	Туре	Start	End	Comments
CERTN_RECORD_TYPE	Int	1	4	Record type of the certificate information record (1560).
CERTN_NAME	Char	6	251	General resource name as taken from the profile name.
CERTN_CLASS_NAME	Char	253	260	Name of the class to which the general resource profile belongs.
CERTN_ISSUER_DN	Char	262	1285	Issuer's distinguished name. (1024 characters)
CERTN_SUBJECT_DN	Char	1287	2310	Subject's distinguished name. (1024 characters)
CERTN_SIG_ALG	Char	2312	2327	Certificate signature algorithm. Valid values are md2RSA, md5RSA, sha1RSA, sha1DSA, sha256RSA, sha224RSA, sha384RSA, sha512RSA, sha1ECDSA, sha256ECDSA, sha224ECDSA, sha384ECDSA, sha512ECDSA, and UNKNOWN.

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RACDCERT Enhancements

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RACDCERT ADD Enhancement

- Prior to z/OS V2.1, if you used RACDCERT ADD to add a PKCS#12 or PKCS#7 certificate chain using the RACDCERT ADD command, only the end entity certificate can be named using a specified label.
 - RACDCERT generates labels for the rest of the certificates in the chain, but previously did not display what labels had been added.
- Starting in V2R1, RACDCERT will display the generated labels of any certificates in the chain that were added.

RACDCERT ID (COOPER) ADD ('COOPER.CERTS.MYPKCS12') WITHLABEL('MyCert') Certificate with label 'MyCert' is added under ID COOPER Certificate with label 'LABEL0000002' is added under CERTAUTH Certificate with label 'LABEL0000003' is added under CERTAUTH

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RACDCERT LISTCHAIN Enhancement

- Starting in V2R1 RACF is adding the ability to list a certificate chain with the introduction of the RACDCERT LISTCHAIN command.
- RACDCERT LISTCHAIN Syntax:

RACDCERT [ID(certificate-owner)| SITE | CERTAUTH] LISTCHAIN (LABEL('label-name'))

- Information provided:
 - Certificate details for the specified certificate
 - Details for each issuing certificate which is in RACF
 - Summary of the Chain:
 - Number of certificates in the chain
 - Whether RACF contains the complete chain
 - chain is complete
 - chain is incomplete
 - Indication of expired certificate(s), if any
 - chain contains expired certificate(s)

List of rings that all certificates in chain share http://tyc.gse.org.uk/feedback/DA



RACDCERT LISTCHAIN Sample Output

RACDCERT LISTCHAIN(LABEL('samplecert'))

```
Certificate 1:
  Digital certificate information for user CHOI:
  Label: samplecert
  ...
  Ring Associations:
    Ring Owner: COOPER
    Ring:
        >testring
Certificate 2:
  Digital certificate information for CERTAUTH:
  Label: sampleCA
  ...
  Ring Associations:
  Ring Owner: COOPER
  Ring:
        >testring
```

Certificate 3: Digital certificate information for CERTAUTH: Label: MasterCA

Ring Associations: Ring Owner: COOPER Ring: >testring<

Chain information:

Chain contains 3 certificate(s), chain is complete Chain contains ring in common: COOPER/testring



RACDCERT GENREQ Enhancement

 Generating a Certificate Request (CSR) from RACDCERT GENREQ requires an existing certificate in RACF with a private key (usually a self signed certificate created with GENCERT).

Don't delete that cert!

- A common issue encountered by RACDCERT users, is deleting the original certificate from RACF after the CSR has been generated... erroneously concluding that the certificate had no use.
- If the original certificate is deleted from RACF after the CSR is created, the private key is also deleted, rendering any signed certificate based on this CSR useless (oops!).
- Starting in V2R1 RACDCERT will prevent the deletion of a certificate that has been used for generating a request with GENREQ.
 - Force override mechanism is provided to delete this certificate when needed



RACDCERT CHECKCERT Enhancement

RACDCERT CHECKCERT enhancement:

- LISTCHAIN is used to list certificates in RACF, while CHECKCERT is to list certificates in a dataset (which is going to be an input to the RACDCERT ADD)
- Enhancements similar to LISTCHAIN were added to the display text of RACDCERT CHECKCERT, when displaying information on a certificate in a dataset.



RACDCERT Support for Secure TKDS

- Unlike the keys stored in the Public Key Data Set (PKDS), the keys stored in the Token Key Data Set (TKDS) are clear keys, not secure keys.
 - "Secure Key" means that sensitive key material is always wrapped under a master key.
- In Web Deliverable #12, ICSF supports secure key in TKDS.
- To enable the applications to use the secure key in TKDS, RACF, PKI Services and System SSL need to be updated accordingly.
- RACDCERT can create a secure key on a specified PKCS#11 token on TKDS during certificate creation. This new support allows RACDCERT to issue and use of certificates with hardware-protected keys in a PKCS#11 TKDS token.
- The new sub-keyword TOKEN is added to RACDCERT GENCERT / REKEY



&RACUID and BPX.UNIQUE.USER

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&RACUID in BPX.UNIQUE.USER

- Clients who are using BPX.UNIQUE.USER to assign z/OS UNIX information to user IDs will be able to specify of &racuid in the home directory field of the model user's OMVS segment.
 - ALTUSER BPXMODEL OMVS(HOME(/u/&racuid))
- The appropriate user ID will be substituted for &racuid when a new OMVS segment is created for a user using BPX.UNIQUE.USER
 - In upper case if "&RACUID" is specified
 - In lower case if any lower case characters are specified

Notes

- Only the first occurrence of &racuid is substituted
- If the substitution would result in a path name exceeding the 1023 character maximum then substitution is not performed.
- If sharing the RACF database with a downlevel system, substitution will not be performed on the downlevel system



JES2/JES3 SAF Check for Job Input Class

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JES2/JES3: SAF Check for Job Input Class

- JES2 and JES3 now perform a SAF check to verity a user's ability to use a job class
 - Applies to both the "traditional" 36 single character classes as well as theup-toeight character job classes
 - Does not apply to the "special" job classes STC and TSU
- The resource name that is checked is:
 - JOBCLASS.nodename.jobclass.jobname in the JESJOBS class
- Controlled by these profiles:
 - JES.JOBCLASS.OWNER in the FACILITY class
 - If this profile is defined, then authorization checks are performed for job owners
 - JES.JOBCLASS.SUBMITTER in the FACILITY class
 - If this profile is defined, then authorization checks are performed for job submitters



PKI Services Enhancements

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PKI Services Enhancements in z/OS V2.1

- Support for Extended Validation Certificates
- Granular Access Control
- Certificate Authority Path Length
- CRL Notification
- DB2 Custom Columns
- Secure TKDS Support



RACF Statement of Direction

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
z/OS V2.1 RACF Statement of General Direction

Enhanced RACF password encryption algorithm:

In the future, an enhanced RACF password encryption algorithm is planned. This support will be designed to provide improved cryptographic strength in RACF password algorithm processing. This will be intended to help protect RACF password data in the event that a copy of a RACF database becomes inadvertently accessible.



Helpful Publications





Helpful Publications


- SA23-2290 z/OS Security Server RACF Callable Services
- SA23-2292 z/OS Security Server RACF Command Language Reference
- GA32-0885 z/OS Security Server RACF Data Areas
- SA23-2288 z/OS Security Server RACF Macros and Interfaces
- SA23-2291 z/OS Security Server RACF Messages and Codes
- SA23-2289 z/OS Security Server RACF Security Administrator's Guide
- SA23-2287 z/OS Security Server RACF System Programmer's Guide
- SA23-2294 z/OS Security Server RACROUTE Macro Reference
- GA32-0886 z/OS Security Server RACF Diagnosis Guide
- SA23-2286 z/OS Cryptographic Services PKI Services Guide and Reference
- SC14-7495 z/OS Cryptographic Services System Secure Sockets Layer Programming
- SA23-2231 z/OS ICSF Writing PKCS #11 Applications
- SA23-2284 z/OS UNIX System Services: Messages and Codes
- SA23-2281 z/OS UNIX System Services Programming: Assembler Callable Services Reference
- SC27-3651 z/OS Communication Server: IP Configuration Guide
- GC27-2652 z/OS Communication Server: IP Diagnosis Guide
- SC27-3661 z/OS Communication Server: IP System Administrator's Commands
- SA23-6843 IBM Health Checker for z/OS User's Guide



Session Feedback

Please submit your feedback attyc.gse.org.uk/feedback

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z/OS[®],RACF[®] V2.1 Update

Mark Nelson, CISSP[®], CSSLP[®] IBM

4 November 2014 Session DA



