

MY EXPERIENCES IN WORLD WAR II

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Introduction

My job in World War II was Civil Affairs in the Philippines. Until World War II the job of management of civilians, enemy and friendly, in combat areas and after combat, so far as I can find out, had been done by combat officers and enlisted men and their military logistic supporters. In World War II the British tried a new method. They recruited and commissioned from civil life a number of combat over-age officer personnel with governmental, medical, legal, financial and other appropriate civilian experience and gave them, with supporting enlisted men, the major share of responsibility for civilians in theatres of operations with consequent relief of combat and logistic personnel from this task.

Generally the term "civil affairs" was used in friendly countries and the term "military government" in enemy countries. The purpose in both cases was fundamentally the same for the combat and post-combat stages, i.e., to keep the civilian population from interfering with military operations. This was accomplished by reestablishing local governmental authority as far as possible and by furnishing necessary food, clothing and medical supplies for civilians.

There were two other purposes: (1) Reestablishment of the economy; (2) Prevention of human suffering from a purely humanitarian point of view.

Reestablishment of government and the economy during actual combat was, of course, impossible. During post-combat periods something could be done, but at first of the simplest character only, such as reestablishing government at municipal levels, supplying seeds and fertilizer, and helping, for example, to restore rice mills in the Philippines to try to make the people more self-sufficient in food and thus relieve the strain on our procurement and shipping. Later the Army gave the government advice and aid on longer range governmental and economic programs.

The prevention of human suffering from a purely humanitarian point of view presented a difficult problem. Army critics of the Civil Affairs program in the Philippines charged that the Civil Affairs organization was composed mainly of "do gooders". In this connection I believe that the War Department made a mistake in calling our supplies "civilian relief supplies". This was a misnomer at least in the Philippines because civilians purchased the bulk of these supplies shortly after the end of combat. Only relatively small amounts were given away. Also, this activity in the Philippines was limited to areas where there had been combat.

The United States Army used earlier British experience in planning the Sicilian campaign. The planning was joint with the British Army. It was good, but the operation showed deficiencies. One of the principal ones, as frank reports on the Sicilian operation revealed, was the failure to make the operating military government units into self-contained and self-sustaining units with their own transportation, tentage and messing facilities. The Sicilian reports enabled us to avoid this error in the Philippines.

War Department Briefing

In June 1944 I got a telephone call from my old friend, William Chanler, then a Colonel in the Army and deputy to Major General John Hildring who was Chief of the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department, telling me that I had been accepted for civil affairs work for the Army in the Philippines, where I had been Colonel Stimson's legal advisor when he was Governor General in 1928 and 1929. I was commissioned a Lieutenant Colonel on June 30th and ordered to report July 6th. Willie was most considerate of my July 4th week-end, having served himself in the North African, Sicilian and Italian campaigns and knowing what a 7-day week meant in a theatre of operations. It was my last long week-end until after V-J day.

I reported in Washington July 6th and was immediately filled with most debilitating shots. Living conditions were wonderful due to the kindness of my partner Colonel George Brownell, Bob Lovett's executive and battle-tried hero of General Spaat's plane's bad trip over Naples where another partner Chuck Spofford was wounded by German flack, and the other passengers including Brigadier General Ted Curtis somewhat disturbed. I was put to work by General Hildring and Colonel Mickie Marcus (later killed in action in Jerusalem in the Israeli-Arab war) to read all available literature, which consisted principally of the excellent Sicilian military government directives and reports on that operation. I also was called to sit in on the proposed Joint Chiefs of Staff Philippine civil affairs directive to General MacArthur. This document was written by an ad hoc committee representing State, Treasury, War, Navy and Interior. I don't believe that the Philippine government in exile, composed principally of the dying President Quezon and Vice-President Osmena ever saw it. But it wasn't too bad.

It finally (about July 20) reached the stage where it was considered good enough to send to MacArthur for comment. I had hoped to take it myself, but was told that Colonel Burnett had been selected for the job. I tried to go along, but was told that I needed some more

weeks of briefing. I was lucky. Poor Burnett's plane crashed at Tulagi and all aboard were killed. His brief case, however, was thrown clear. I opened it later in Australia, practically undamaged.

General Hildring told me that when I had learned something about supply I could go. I discussed this matter with Lieutenant Colonel Davis of the Civil Affairs Division, who had spent a short time with MacArthur's staff, and said, "What shall I say if Hildring asks me how to go about getting civilian supplies to the Philippines?" Davis said, "Ask Joe Rauh". I didn't know Joe Rauh and didn't think that this answer would satisfy the General. Later, however, in Australia, New Guinea and the Philippines, I found out that Davis had the right answer. Hildring finally called me in early in August but asked me no embarrassing questions. He said that I could go if MacArthur wanted me. Mickie Marcus made up a flattering radio about me. I had known MacArthur fairly well when he was in command of the Philippine Department in 1928 and 1929 when I was working for Governor General Stimson. Back came the hardly enthusiastic but nevertheless adequate answer, "No objection to Crossman MacArthur".

Hi and the kids came to Washington to see me off. It was a steaming week-end and I had to take several

showers while packing. George and his two guests Willie Chanler and DeForest Van Slyck waved good-bye and each I believe would have liked to go along. Hi and the kids went to the airport where we had supper and I was off.

Australia

Nineteen hours later I lit in San Francisco and put up at the Pacific Union Club, a wonderful place. The next day I reported at Hamilton Field, the airport of embarkation for the Southwest Pacific Area. It was a beautiful post but very salute conscious and my arm soon was practically worn off. We were briefed extensively on overseas flying and ditching. I thumbed my way into San Francisco a couple of times and finally four days later my name was called and I started.

Overnight to Hickam Field in Hawaii was icy cold. Bucket seats are wonderful. They give you room to stretch out on the deck. I got three blankets - two under, one over - and a Mae West for a pillow and got maybe four hours sleep. Hickam showed no vestige of the Pearl Harbor attack. My brother-in-law Brigadier General W.G. Farrell, U.S.M.C. flew over from his field at Eva and I had a chance to talk to him for about an hour. Our next stop was Canton Island.

It was so dark while we were there that there was no chance to see its famous one tree. The next stop was Nandi in the Fijis. What tantalization to be in the Fiji Islands, which had seemed glamorous to me as a small boy studying geography and to be able to see nothing but the airstrip. Tantouti, New Caledonia, was next and Amberley Airport 18 miles outside of Brisbane, Australia was the terminal.

We got to Brisbane about dark and the Army billeting section assigned me to a hotel. Lieutenant Colonel Hartshorne F.A. was with me. We turned in, too tired even to eat.

Next day, 21 August, I reported to the A.G. and was turned over to Lieutenant Colonel Joe Rauh, whom Colonel Davis had mentioned to me, and Colonel Larry Bunker, who had left our law office to join the Army early in the war. Joe said, "You're a partner in Davis Polk and here to do civil affairs. I couldn't be gladder to see you if you were my own brother. What do you think we need?" I said, "About 100 trained civil affairs officers*." Bunker said, "You had better not promote that idea around here unless you want to be sent home on the next plane."

*There were plenty of these in the States at various training schools.

Next I reported to Brigadier General Bonner Fellers - then Assistant Chief of Staff G-1, but slated to head civil affairs. His civil affairs assistants were Joe Rauh and Dr. Joseph Hayden, civilian, ex-Vice Governor of the Philippines under Murphy. Fellers was more interested in psychological warfare than in civil affairs. Rauh was keen, interested in the job and a tireless worker. Dr. Hayden's broad knowledge of the Philippines was most useful.

At Feller's suggestion I reported to Major General Richard Marshall - deputy chief of staff. He was far from cordial and said in somewhat minatory tones that he expected to have a lot to do with civil affairs in the Philippines. I then went to report to General MacArthur. He astonished me by his active support of Philippine independence. I knew that our law provided for it in 1946. I had come to believe that the Filipinos should have it if they wanted it, but had decided that as an army officer the matter was none of my business. MacArthur made it plain that he not only believed in it but he was going to promote it and expedite it if possible. He eulogized the late President Quezon who had died early in August describing Quezon's brilliance as to which I had no doubt, having known him fairly well myself. MacArthur's

guiding political principle for the coming Philippine campaign was apparently epitomized by a telegram he sent to Quezon in 1944 saying "We will go in as we came out". By this he meant that the Philippine Government in exile would take over and govern immediately and effectively as soon as we went in. I told him of what I had seen of that government in Washington, consisting only of President Osmena and one or two other able men, and raised a question of whether they could do quite the job he visualized. I said "It would be fine if they could, but can they?". MacArthur said "I see, you think the Army should be prepared to do the job if the Philippine government can't". I said "Exactly". He said "I should like to think that over. You may be right".

General MacArthur made some very derogatory remarks about General Eisenhower's backbone and said that he expected that Eisenhower would do just what the British wanted.

I then told him that I had been given two jobs - one, to stay and help on Philippine civil affairs and, two, to explain the proposed civil affairs directive. He said that he had not yet read the proposed directive as he had maybe an old-fashioned aversion to touching a dead man's effects. I told him that unfortunately he would have to

as I had brought no copy, having been informed by radio that Burnett's papers had been recovered intact. That terminated the interview.

I spent the next few days working with Fellers, Rauh and Hayden on the organization of the civil affairs part of the Philippine operation. During this period Rauh was directed by Major General Richard Marshall to draw up a civil affairs theatre directive which decentralized the work to such an extent as to make it almost hopeless. Fellers, Hayden and I wrote a memorandum criticizing this decentralization. Rauh was wholly sympathetic to us, but was in a terrible box having been directed in detail to write the object of our criticism.

During this period no one asked me about the Joint Chiefs of Staff draft directive to MacArthur. Finally Fellers, on August 30, brought to me a copy of a letter from MacArthur to the War Department ripping the directive into shreds as an insult to the Philippine people. It was a most intemperate letter, the signed original of which was already on its way to Washington in the hands of Marshall who was flying there. Fellers and Hayden at first seemed to like it. Rauh and I disagreed strongly and told them why. They were finally convinced. Fellers talked to MacArthur that evening at about 8:30 P.M. giving him our criticism of the letter. MacArthur blew his top and said that when he felt tough he talked tough.

Fellers apologized for wasting MacArthur's time and left. About 10:30 that evening MacArthur called Fellers and Hayden back again, said that maybe there was something in their criticism of the letter and told them to redraft it for purposes of discussion. The next day we redrafted it and Fellers and Hayden took me along to see the boss. We went over the letter. MacArthur had a few points but was generally satisfied with the revision. He then said to me, "What do you think we need?" I said, "100 to 150 civil affairs officers from the States." He said "O.K. You go to Washington with the revised letter and get all the civil affairs officers you can up to 250." Hayden said that he would like to go along with me. MacArthur said he would consider that.

Next day MacArthur looked over the further revise of the letter and approved, but told me that Bunker, who was going to assist Marshall in Washington, could handle the directive and the recruiting and that he had decided not to send me.

Next day, after thinking it over, I went to MacArthur alone - Fellers was unwilling to go because of the previous "command decision" - and told him that I really thought that I ought to go back with the directive and do the recruiting job because Bunker wasn't at all sympathetic with civil affairs. Instantly MacArthur said "All right,

you don't need to argue. The only reason I said yesterday that I wasn't sending you was for fear Hayden would be hurt if he couldn't go too and I don't want to send him." I assured the General that I didn't think that it would bother Hayden much.

MacArthur then said that he wished that he had time to brief me to talk to Mr. Stimson on the subject of the next operation after Leyte. He told me that the alternatives were Luzon, Formosa or Kyushu for late 1944 or early 1945. MacArthur was for Luzon, tactically, as to which I couldn't help, and politically because of what he believed to be our obligation to liberate the Filipinos as soon as possible. I told him that I felt that I could discuss the political reason adequately with Mr. Stimson. He told me to do so, if there was an opportunity.

Temporary Duty in the United States

On Tuesday September 5, I was called at 3:00 A.M. and driven to Amberley Field in a staff car. It was cold and foggy. The Red Cross canteen had a nice open fire going with a few G.I.s drying their feet in front of it. A pleasant Red Cross girl with a southern accent was putting out coffee and doughnuts. Having been brought up in New England, I was somewhat suspicious of doughnuts cooked by a gal from the

deep South, but they turned out to be as good as if she had come from New Hampshire.

We had to wait for our take-off because of a heavy fog. Finally, at 9:20 we were airborne.

Passengers were Brigadier Koli, Commodore Davis, Colonels Cole and Bunker and Lieutenant Colonel Kendall, Dean of Wabash College and great friend of our former partner Lee McCandliss.

We landed at New Caledonia at 1:30 P.M. On the take-off we circled Noumea which looked interesting.

We landed at Nandi, Fiji Islands at 7:15 P.M. and took off at 8:50 P.M. after a good dinner at the officers' club. The next stop was Canton Island, landing at 4:15 A.M. and take-off at 5:26 A.M. Again I could not see the famous lone tree.

We arrived at Hickam at 4:40 P.M. Great met me there with his plane and flew me over Pearl Harbor to Eva, where I had a shave and shower and the luxury of having an orderly shine my shoes. We then went to dine with Major General Rusty Rowell and staff of marines. They were exceptionally polite considering that I was working for MacArthur who was not popular with the Marine Corps.

We took off from Hickam at 9:15 P.M. and landed at Hamilton Field at 12:15 P.M. the next day. Transportation

was quickly arranged to Washington by TWA. In San Francisco the very efficient Army Hotel service got me a nice room in a fine old hotel, the Bellevue. After a shave and shower and futile attempt to sleep I caught the plane for Washington at 12:05 A.M. We had to change at Pittsburgh to Penn Central Airline. The plane was late out of Chicago, but when the pilot was told that there were four S.W.P.A. officers aboard who were tired from their long flight and had a close connection at Pittsburgh, he really opened it up and we made it by five minutes.

When I reached Washington at 10:20 P.M., September 7, I called George's house. He had found out that I was en-route and had Hi there waiting. It was a wonderful surprise. I had radioed her cryptically, which I had to, from Brisbane, suggesting she spend the week-end in Washington with George. She told me that before she received this radio she had sent me a very doleful letter and when she got my radio had thought that I had received the letter and was suggesting that she needed a change. It had never occurred to her that I was coming home until George called her. I had not been able to reach her in New York from San Francisco by telephone.

The next day I reported to Dick Marshall and told him of the MacArthur verbal order for recruiting civil affairs officers. He didn't seem pleased. I told him that I was there to recruit, to work on the directive and to talk

to Mr. Stimson about Luzon. I went to work with Hildring on the subject of the directive and told him of MacArthur's strong desire not to have a High Commissioner along on the Leyte operation. MacArthur had apparently had trouble with Sayre in 1941 and wanted no possibility of divided authority or of any direct communication to Washington.* He was willing to accept a representative of the High Commissioner and named an individual whom we were both sure he could control. Later I heard that Ickes was planning to go to the President to insist that a High Commissioner accompany MacArthur into the Philippines. I rushed to Jack McCloy, who knew of MacArthur's feelings. No High Commissioner was appointed. My hunch is McCloy got there first. I've never asked him so I don't know whether my efforts had anything to do with this result.

I talked a lot about the directive to various and sundry interested persons, including Mickie Marcus who was head of the ad hoc working group on the directive.

*Under normal army procedure all official communications from a theatre of operations are signed with the name of the theatre commander and cannot be sent unless approved by him or someone on his behalf, usually the chief of staff. One of the main reasons OSS never operated in our theatre was because they insisted on the privilege of direct communication with Washington, i.e., not through MacArthur, and MacArthur wouldn't have them on that basis. A high commissioner doubtless would have insisted on the privilege of direct communication, thus opening the possibility that criticism of MacArthur might get to Washington.

I did get a chance to present MacArthur's views on the Luzon operation to Mr. Stimson who invited me to lunch with him on September 12th. He indicated that his most trusted military advisers felt that it would prolong the war not to by-pass Luzon. I never have known what decided the issue in favor of Luzon, but have always thought it was the fact that only 250,000 troops were estimated as needed as against the then estimate of 500,000 each for Formosa or Kyushu. Samuel Eliot Morison explains the choice of Luzon over Formosa on the basis of troop availability. He does not mention the Kyushu alternative. "The Liberation of the Philippines" [p. 5].

The job which took most of my time was recruiting civil affairs officers. I went over long lists of prospects. Before I had finished this, Fellers called from Brisbane on the scrambler radio telephone to learn what progress was being made. He told me to hurry up and finish as plans had changed and to find out from R. Marshall what they were. I did and he told me that the Sarangani Bay operation (Southern Mindanao, planned for October 20) was out and the Leyte landing stepped up from December 20 to October 20. In a subsequent talk Fellers told me to hurry back as I was slated for the first echelon to Leyte. I then decided to make quick trips to Harvard, Yale, Chicago University, Northwestern and Fort Orde to interview a few officers of

possible staff calibre. At all of these places officers were being trained for Japanese military government. I was to return not to Brisbane, but to Hollandia, New Guinea, meeting Fellers and Joe Rauh, who would be there at work on the theatre civil affairs directive. The recruiting of the 200-250 officers, outside of the few for General Headquarters and Sixth Army Staff, was left to my friends in the Civil Affairs Division. I flew to the points named above. Most of the officers I interviewed were being taught Japanese and otherwise instructed for the eventual Japanese invasion, but almost without exception were delighted with the prospect of more immediate action in the Philippines.

Trip to New Guinea

On my flight from Chicago to San Francisco I ran into Lieutenant Commander Henry Cobb, whose name I had picked on his previous record - Groton and Harvard, Phi Beta Kappa. He turned out better even than I had hoped and we have been good friends ever since.

My Number 1 Theatre air priority got me out of San Francisco sooner than I had expected, but I had time for one good party with Johnny Jayne at a Chinese night club and I was off the next morning at 4:55 A.M. from

Hamilton in a converted B-24 bomber.

I landed at Hickam at 1:55 P.M. and saw Great for a few minutes only. After Canton I was presented with a certificate to the effect that I had crossed the equator and international date line the same day.

Guadalcanal was hot, sultry and muddy, breakfast was cold and otherwise terrible and I nearly lost my brief case. We flew over Savo Gulf and Island on our way to Nadzab, New Guinea. Dinner at Nadzab was O.K., but no breakfast was available there in the morning between 3:00 A.M. when called and 7:00 A.M. when we took off for Hollandia. I finally got doughnuts and coffee in a Red Cross shack in Hollandia at 10:00 A.M. and they tasted good.

New Guinea

I got to General Headquarters at noon on October 2 and went to work after lunch. Fellers, Rauh and Andres Soriano, who had been assigned to G-5, the new general staff section set up to handle civil affairs, were hard at work on Standing Operating Procedure for the Philippine Operation. Dr. Hayden was helpful as a result of his wide knowledge of the Philippines, but would take no responsibility and was so slow in reading the papers that we finally took them away from him. Fellers and I submitted the Standing Operating

Procedure to Sutherland who insisted that we break it into two parts: (1) the Standing Operating Procedure which covered the main heads and had the force of an order and, (2) Instructional Notes which went more into the details, but had no force as orders. If I were doing it again I should try harder than I did to get the whole thing into the form of an order. Much of what we thought was detail in the Instructional Notes turned out to be very important. Sixth Army, whose civil affairs section was hard to deal with, paid little or no attention to the Instructional Notes because they didn't have to.

Soriano took a most sensible view on the question of wages to be paid by the Army to civilian labor. Pre-war wages in Manila had a legal minimum of 1 peso* per hour, observed for the most part only by large corporations. He successfully advocated 1.25 pesos for the entire Philippines. That later turned out to be too low, particularly in Manila, but it was his doing to get it even that high. Both as to wages and the prices at which Army imported civilian supplies would be sold, we had nothing but pre-war standards to go on. With the inflation which war and its aftermath always bring, these standards were too low, but we were able to hold them fairly well when we first went in. I am convinced that the inflation would have been much worse if we had based our prices and wages much higher on a guess as to what the actual

*The peso was worth 50 cents U.S.

level might be.

We decided that it would be necessary in order to meet pre-war prices to sell some items imported by the Army at less than landed cost. I suggested getting authority for this from the War Department. Sutherland said that he wouldn't do that, but would take the responsibility himself, on the probably sound theory that authority to give these supplies away included authority to sell below cost. The quartermaster had given us a landed cost on rice, the principal food item, only one or two centavos above pre-war cost, the price which we fixed. Much later we found that the quartermaster had made a big mistake and that the landed cost was three or four times our fixed price. I firmly believe, however, and think that at one point I could have proved, that this mistake didn't cost our government anything because this subsidization allowed the Army to employ labor at 1.25 pesos instead of the much higher wage which would have been necessary if rice had been sold at landed cost. The saving in wages was probably much greater in amount than the cost of the subsidy.

Following the example of Sicily, I had drawn up provisions for military courts to try civilian offenders against military law and to administer Philippine law until Philippine courts could be reestablished. Sutherland refused to authorize this without the O.K. of MacArthur who

was still in Brisbane.

Some of my recruits began to come in. We kept a few, sent a few to Sixth Army Staff and the rest to PCAUs attached to Sixth Army.

PCAU (pronounced "Pea-Cow") is the abbreviation for Philippine Civil Affairs Unit, the operational unit set up for the job. They were organized as follows:

Nine or ten officers and thirty-nine enlisted men. The officers consisted of a Unit Commander, Medical Officer, Labor Officer, Supply Officer, Transportation Officer, Relief and Welfare Officer, Finance Officer, Public Safety Officer and Engineer Officer. Experience showed that greater economy of man power could have been achieved by having some of the units about half this size. In practice many PCAU Commanders split up their units where they were covering a large area. This worked fairly well, except that the split-ups caused a shortage of equipment, especially transportation equipment*. It would have been simple to have obtained this additional equipment for the smaller units before the operation started. After the operation started this was practically impossible.

The Hollandia General Headquarters was a beautiful installation on top of a hill more than a thousand feet high overlooking a big lake (Lake Sentani) studded with green

*Each PCAU was equipped with 6 jeeps, 3 trucks and 3 trailers.

islands. The story went that some engineer officers working on the expensive switchback road necessary to reach the top of the hill announced their intention of turning in their war bonds if this was the way the proceeds were being used. Maybe it was a little too fancy considering the short time it was used intensively. But the war moved faster than expected and the officers' mess was wonderful.

MacArthur was most anxious to have Osmena along with him on the initial landing. It was rumored in Washington that Ickes advised Osmena against going unless accompanied by a High Commissioner to protect him against the military. I discussed this with Osmena in Washington and told him of General MacArthur's wishes which no doubt R. Marshall did more officially. I have already mentioned Ickes' rumored activities on this subject. Early in October Osmena arrived in Hollandia with a small staff of Filipino officials whose advice we sought from time to time as to various policy points of the Standing Operating Procedure. Dr. Hayden, who was very close to Osmena, reported that Osmena felt that his reception was not quite as cordial as it should have been. I believe that the principal trouble was that MacArthur had remained in Brisbane. MacArthur went directly from Brisbane on the cruiser Nashville to join the Leyte convoy. No doubt MacArthur had good and sufficient reasons for not coming to Hollandia. His absence and real

or fancied lack of attention to Osmena was, however, somewhat resented.

We drew items of field equipment, including a .45, a tin hat, jungle hammock, blankets, G.I. shoes, etc.

Leyte Landing

On Friday, October 13, I embarked with Fellers and Soriano on the U.S.S. Blue Ridge, which was specially fitted up as an amphibious command ship and bristled with radar. Rear Admiral Daniel Barbey was in command of the amphibious landing near Tacloban, Leyte and the Blue Ridge was his ship. We were told over the loud speaker that the ship would sail at 1500 hours. I had my natural New England doubts that this would happen. However, at about 1400 hours various destroyers got up anchor and began to circle around outside the harbor. To my amazement the Blue Ridge took off at exactly 1500 hours as advertised.

As we left the beautiful tropical shores I wondered how many Jap coast watchers there might be sending word ahead. Later events seemed to prove that there probably weren't any. Before sundown the whole convoy had formed up. There was a destroyer screen all over the horizon. The Blue Ridge was in the center at the head of the convoy. To port were the heavy cruisers Australia and Shropshire and to starboard the Boise and another United States light cruiser.

In line behind the cruisers were two little boats that looked like fishing boats along for the ride. I was told that they had extra good submarine detecting devices and depth charges. The transports, L.S.T.s, etc. followed and just on the horizon at the rear of the convoy could be seen some aircraft carriers. The sea was calm all the way and the weather beautiful. Major Stearns of the G-2 Section, Sixth Army Staff, and I shared a very comfortable cabin with two naval lieutenant commanders, ship's officers on the Blue Ridge. The food was excellent. One naval officer apologized to me for lack of variety as the Blue Ridge had been at sea for 12 or 13 months. Compared to Army mess, the variety was amazing. The only repetition was steak every other night and that wasn't hard to take.

On the 14th, Admiral Barbey invited Fellers, Soriano and me for iced coffee and explained the situation to us in some detail. He told us among other things that Halsey had knocked out some 500 Jap planes in the Philippines by carrier air strikes.

On board was Major General Ralph Mitchell, Marine Air observer. In 1942 I had tried to get into the Marine Air, but Mitchell turned me down as too old. I had fun kidding him about this - two years older and just as close to the war as he was.

I met Fellers' friend, Navy Captain Ray Tarbuck, Barbey's executive. His clear explanation of naval tactics

was most interesting. Navy ships are supposed to be dry, but they don't apply their rules to visiting Army officers. We had a little whiskey, and a couple of drinks in Feller's room every evening before dinner added to the pleasure of the voyage, which was almost as quiet as a vacation winter cruise with flying fish, etc. until we reached Leyte Gulf.

Admiral Barbey, as soon as we left Hollandia, announced over the ship's loud speaker to all aboard that our destination was Leyte and the landing there set for 20 October at 1000 hours.

On the 15th he announced over the loud speaker that Halsey had intercepted a Jap message indicating that the main Jap fleet had been ordered to attack Halsey and that therefore Halsey couldn't support our landing. Later I heard that MacArthur had sent red hot messages to Washington and Nimitz and got at least part of Halsey's force back to his primary objective of supporting the Leyte landing.

After two or three days sail, Rear Admiral Wilkinson's convoy from Manus joined us and was in line at the announced minute. Our convoy then included some 700 ships and was a beautiful sight on the blue southwest Pacific.

On 17 October there was some confusion around one of our destroyers. Apparently a Jap submarine was

suspected. Depth charges were dropped, but no results were apparent.

The same day Admiral Barbey announced over the loud speaker that we were now within range of Jap medium bombers and might expect raids particularly at dawn and dusk. The anti-aircraft batteries were busy drilling. Among them were the colored mess attendants who passed ammunition as expertly as steak. The Blue Ridge, in spite of her 13 months at sea, had never been in action and some tenseness was apparent.

We had had in our cabin two illegal blackout porthole gadgets which let a little air in at night. About the 17th we were discovered and the gadgets removed. After that with battle ports tight shut we sweltered all night. The best sleeping time was 6:00 to 7:00 A.M. after the ports had been opened.

On the morning of 20 October breakfast was served early and we all were on deck before dawn. Preliminary landings had been made on the 17th at Dinagat Island and other points at the entrance to Leyte Gulf and mine sweepers had been at work. Heavy firing could be heard to the northwest as we went into the Gulf. Just at dawn one Jap plane flew over the convoy from the northwest, circling and going northeast toward Samar. Our ack ack cut loose, but didn't hit the Jap who was about 12,000 feet. He finally disappeared over the mountains of Samar. He didn't drop anything and

was apparently only an observer.

When we got into the Gulf we could see our battleships pounding the beaches. It was thrilling to watch, particularly as some of them had been dug up and reconditioned after Pearl Harbor. The battleships pulled out and the cruisers took over. In turn the destroyers succeeded the cruisers. Then came naval dive bombers and finally rocket ships just before the landing. Their fire was so fast that it sounded like machine guns. The Blue Ridge anchored some three miles off shore. We could see the white wakes from the landing craft as they shoved off from the transports. We were told that the first wave hit the beaches at exactly 1000 hours as planned. The destroyers stayed in place to furnish artillery support as called for by the divisions ashore. I was on the bridge near Admiral Barbey when a call for artillery came from the 24th Division. At the moment the Admiral was being informed I could hear the first shot from the destroyer selected for the job.

X Corps consisting of 1st Cavalry Division and 24th Division landed on White and Red Beaches, respectively, south of Tacloban, 1st Cavalry on the right to take the airstrip and Tacloban, 24th Division on the left to circle the low hills to the east of the central Leyte Valley and proceed

up that valley. The southernmost of this range was Hill 522 which commanded the road from Tacloban into Palo where the road up the Leyte Valley commenced. Hill 522 was taken the first day. That night the Navy kept star shells over it all night, thus lighting it to prevent the Japs from sneaking up in the dark and recapturing it.

On the 21st, Soriano and I got Admiral Barbey to let us go ashore. We went in a landing craft with Navy Captain Adair. Adair and some other naval officers had hired a schooner in Manila in early 1942 to head for Java. The Japs got there first so they changed course to Australia, reported for duty and Adair had been in the theatre ever since.

We went to 24th Division and Xth Corps headquarters which were near together. Civilians of all ages were coming through the lines and it was touching to see soldiers carrying old people and children across carabao wallows. One baby was born on the beach that night. Major General Sibert, X Corps Commander, asked Soriano and me where Fellers was. The civilians were getting in his hair and he thought correctly that they were Feller's job. Fellers had been unwilling to come ashore because Lieutenant General George Kreuger, Sixth Army Commander, had warned him not to interfere with any Sixth Army operation. Sixth Army civil affairs

staff and units were not yet there, however and even if they had been it would have done no harm for Fellers to observe what they were doing. At least one unit per division should have landed on A or A + 1, but not much harm was done except that the combat and service troops overfed the refugees with army rations.

I saw some corps artillery(105 howitzers) firing at the ridge north of Hill 522. This battery was right beside Sibert's headquarters, which was somewhat ahead of 24th Division's headquarters.

I asked a young artillery major near the beach how he was coming. He said "Fine, except for these Jap pillboxes, but now we know what to do. At first we used hand grenades and flame throwers. They still kept shooting. Then we brought up a couple of bulldozers and buried the pillboxes. That quieted them".

Soriano and I were standing on a temporary dock waiting for Adair, who was conferring with some officers from the 24th Division, when a Jap sniper in a tree started popping. A few soldiers threw hand grenades in his general direction, but he still popped. We could hear his bullets overhead. Adair got into a dugout on the beach and continued his conference, but Andres and I had no dugout on the pier. A six-by-six truck afforded some cover for a while but it drove off and I was finally very pleased when

Adair came along and we shoved off in his boat, the Jap still popping. We went from Red Beach to White Beach where the 1st Cavalry had landed the day before. There Andres and I walked the naval officers (against some protest) a couple of miles to the air strip which the 1st Cavalry had taken the day before. We picked up a Jeep and rode over a good part of the strip looking for someone to hire Filipino labor from Samar, rumors of the availability of which, we had learned from a guerrilla who came aboard the Blue Ridge that morning.

On the way back to the Blue Ridge several ships were making smoke. Jap planes were beginning to appear. The beautiful sunset over the Leyte mountains reminded me of the ones Hi and I had watched in 1928 and 1929 from the Manila Polo Club over Mariveles Mountain on southern Bataan.

Either on the morning of the 22nd or 23rd a Jap plane hit the cruiser Australia anchored near the Blue Ridge. I was getting my 6:00 to 7:00 A.M. sleep so didn't see it, but Fellers did and said the Jap apparently lost control and crashed on the Australia's deck. There were topside casualties. I believe that it must have been the first Kamikaze or certainly one of the first of them.

On the morning of the 22nd Sutherland sent for Fellers to come to the Nashville and I went along. Sutherland said MacArthur didn't want any military courts whatsoever,

that the Filipinos were 99% loyal and that he wanted no part in administering Philippine criminal or civil law. I think MacArthur was about 80% right on this, but it would have been a help in the early days to have had inferior military courts to try minor profiteers and offenders who could not be tried because the Justice of the Peace courts were not functioning for the most part. I finally got Osmena to order the old Justice of the Peace incumbents to get to work after a Counter Intelligence Corps screening for loyalty, but he was naturally reluctant to appoint new justices in a hurry because they held office for life. We couldn't recognize those who had been appointed by the puppet republic.

There were several General Quarters during these days and nights on the Blue Ridge in Leyte Gulf, but as Army officers we didn't have to attend and therefore got some extra sleep which came in handy after we went ashore to stay in Tacloban.

On the 22nd Fellers, Soriano, Captain Tarbuck and I went ashore together. Civilians were still coming through the lines and the soldiers were taking care of them. No PCAUs had landed yet. The 1st Cavalry had taken Tacloban but we hadn't time to go there. We watched the Xth Corps 105 howitzers shelling ridges north of Hill 522 and also saw the Navy planes dive bombing the same target - Jap pillboxes in the ridge which the 24th Division was trying to take.

On the 23rd MacArthur went ashore for a formal flag raising and turn-over of the government to Osmena at the provincial capitol. Fellers and I got there early and were greeted by Joe Rauh in a terrible rage. Apparently MacArthur had given Mudge, C.G. 1st Cavalry Division, a fight talk the day before about the dangers of rape of Filipino girls by the 1st Cavalry. Mudge's simple method of handling this was to withdraw all troops including M.P.s from Tacloban that night. The result was that the capitol building was looted and the interior wrecked (including two bank branches) and that large stores of Japanese rice and other food were being happily carted away from warehouses by civilians. The civil affairs directive to Sixth Army had ordered the guarding of all warehouses and public buildings, but there was no Sixth Army Civil Affairs officer around and MacArthur's verbal order, as interpreted by Mudge, overrode the civil affairs directive. Numerous Army 6 x 6 trucks were being used enthusiastically by service troops to help Filipinos cart this stolen food home. As a practical matter it probably got distributed fairly well, but not the way it should have been. There were never enough M.P.s, but a few could have handled these warehouses. If the PCAUs had followed combat troops closely into this important town the damage might have been prevented and we wouldn't have had to feed civilians with Army rations to the extent that proved

necessary. Civil affairs operations should be more closely coordinated with combat operations as a real aid to combat.

Shortly before noon all the brass assembled on the steps of the provincial capitol whence a broadcast to the States was to be made. Each general officer had a chalk marked place on the steps, except Ralph Mitchell. This omission was soon corrected. Mudge had rolling kitchens with free food for Filipinos and a guard of honor from the 1st Cavalry which he drilled personally to be sure they were O.K., which they definitely were. At noon the broadcaster solemnly announced to the world "In the presence of thousands of wildly cheering Filipinos, General MacArthur will now turn over the Philippine Government to President Osmena." The Filipinos present consisted of two or three old men and a few small boys. There had been a blunder. The mayor of the town had been told that the ceremony would be at 3:00 and hadn't been told that it had been moved up to noon. MacArthur later told me that he suspected that Torres, puppet governor under the Japs, had told the townspeople to stay away. I am sure that was not the reason. No collaborator could have kept the Filipinos away from free food and a look at MacArthur and Osmena on such an occasion if they had known about it.

Civil Affairs Work in Leyte

On the 24th we went ashore to stay. Fellers, Dr. Hayden, Soriano and I were billeted in the very comfortable

house of Mr. Manuel Abesamis, Soriano and I sharing a room. My air mattress came in handy. One Army blanket served as a pillow. The other I put over me on occasion but slept on it most of the time.

We were assigned as offices the very spacious room of the Court of First Instance on the second floor of the provincial capitol. It was large and cool and we kept it, with some arguments, until I went to Luzon in February. We had a perfect view of Tacloban harbor and in the first few days watched Jap air raiders trying unsuccessfully to bomb our three Liberty ships tied up at the docks about two or three hundred yards away. We never could understand why the Japs hadn't blown up these flimsy docks before they left Tacloban. It was a great help to us to have them as it reduced substantially the much slower supply lift over the beaches. The Japs came close to hitting the Libertys several times, but never got one. Our ack ack didn't get any Japs there either. They came in very low which made them difficult targets, but watching the shooting was painful. Our ack ack never seemed to lead enough and consequently the bursts were almost always behind the fast Japs. Ascom's* two PCAUs came in this day and one of our Filipino PCAU sergeants was killed in front of a warehouse across from the docks by a Jap bomb.

*Short for Army Service Command, the service organization of Sixth Army.

That afternoon I went to see MacArthur to be sure that I had understood him correctly through Sutherland about the military courts. He confirmed this. I also asked him about two proclamations which I had prepared for him, one closing all banks and one declaring a debt moratorium. He said he would have nothing to do with either of them. We had two bank branches under control, but he said "If I signed an order closing banks when we had only 500 yards of beach, it would sound like Hollywood stuff. Drew Pearson would love it". I then suggested that he let me ask Osmena to take these steps which were very important first, to avoid possibly insolvent banks from doing business and second, to avoid the injustices that might result from debt collections and even mortgage foreclosures under the disrupted conditions of combat and post-combat. He told me to come along with him to talk to Osmena on the subject. On the way to the Provincial Capitol in his staff car, I told him that I had recruited some good civil affairs officers for him in the States. I was met with stony silence. My guess is that Dick Marshall who went back to Brisbane from Washington had repoisoned MacArthur's mind about the whole civil affairs operation. Marshall had always thought it really nothing but a supply function and was sure the Philippine Government could handle everything else.

Osmena readily agreed to take the proposed bank closing and debt moratorium actions in the form of Executive Orders of the Philippine Government. I think that that was a better way to do it. I never had any disagreement with MacArthur on the general proposition that the Filipinos should be made to do as much as possible themselves. I did differ with him from time to time as to how much they could do themselves.

Soriano, Rauh and I went that evening to talk to Colonel Barnett who had been charged by Major General Hugh (Pat) Casey with civil affairs responsibility for Ascom. Barnett had set his two PCAUs to recruiting labor and nothing else, which was a small part of their duties as we had outlined them in the Civil Affairs Standing Operating Procedure. Our conversation was carried on in the second story of a warehouse during a complete blackout and considerable bombing. We didn't at this point argue that labor recruiting wasn't the principal job of PCAUs. Instead we tried to find out how Barnett proposed to hire the labor and what provisions he planned to make for the workers. He was a complete defeatist and thought that almost everything was impossible. We suggested that he put some of his labor to work building labor camps. This he said couldn't be done. We suggested that he try it first in a small way, but he wasn't interested. Then we asked how soon his PCAUs could start their principal

functions of distribution of food and medical supplies. He still maintained that his PCAUs were only supposed to recruit labor.

Actually labor recruiting by civil affairs units should be done only by those units attached to divisions in combat situations. Service of Supply can do it much better in rear areas and that is the way we finally worked it out in the directives.

During the day of the 24th we heard rumors of naval battles. That night the bombing, ack ack and a very scared young puppy whining on the roof above my cot made sleep fitful to say the least.

On 25 October Soriano, Rauh and I started off in a jeep to explore. We went first to Palo, five miles south of Tacloban, where we met Lieutenant Pearlman in command of PCAU-5 attached to the 24th Division. The day before some Japs posing as guerrillas had managed to get a machine gun in the plaza away from our soldiers and had sprayed the place, killing and wounding a lot of soldiers and civilians. The Filipino Bishop invited the Army to put our wounded into the beautiful old Palo cathedral, worship going on as usual between the cots. A little army cemetery began to grow outside the cathedral. Pearlman recruited a number of school teachers as nurses, got a good man going as mayor after throwing out the puppet incumbent and had everything well under control in a very hot spot.

We went on down the coast to Tanauan, ten miles south of Tacloban, where we heard that a junction had been made between patrols of the 96th Division XXIVth Corps, which had landed at Dulag, fifteen miles south of Tacloban, and the 24th Division. A 24th Division platoon was billeted in a Filipino house just north of Tanauan. Lieutenant Kilgore, a young southerner in command told us that his platoon had taken Hill 522 on the 20th. He said that after our barrage lifted they started up the hill and got to the top just about one minute ahead of the Japs coming up the otherside. He said that if the Japs had got there first it would have been too bad as their machine gun emplacements on top had been barely injured by our barrage. This platoon's patrol duty in Tanauan was a well-earned vacation.

Soriano, Joe and I went looking without success for rumored Jap rice stores near Palo.

We stopped off at the Tacloban strip and saw some 25 Navy fighters, probably from one or more of the jeep carriers sunk off Samar, all smashed up. The strip was still soft and not enough matting had been laid, but it was quite a transformation from the little Jap grass strip with bamboo control tower which we saw on the first day after the landing.

We went down and called on Ralph Mitchell who was well set up just south of the strip. He had a good air raid hole in back and asked me how I was fixed in Tacloban, which

he referred to as a very hot spot. When I told him I had no hole, he said "O.K. if you want to be tough, but sometimes there's no future in it". MacArthur never took cover and so there was a sort of loose tradition that no one else in General Headquarters should.

Mitch said that he almost got it from a Jap land mine on the strip that morning. He said that a total of about 50 people had been killed by them. As I have said, Andres and I had jeeped blithely all over the place on the 21st. If we had thought of land mines we probably would have hit one.

Mitch confirmed the rumor we had heard that the Navy had given an order that no Navy planes should go up. That meant no air cover, for no Army planes had as yet arrived. He said he couldn't understand the order but (with obvious sarcasm) "If the U.S. Navy makes an order, it must be right".

We had no air cover all day of the 26th and Jap planes were having a field day. They confined most of their attention to the docked Liberties (with no success) and to the Tacloban strip, where we were told the Navy fighter pilots were raging because they couldn't go up. That night the Japs got a hit on a war correspondent's house in Tacloban, killing one and wounding two. One or maybe both of those died of wounds. This, of course, got in the papers and made rather

futile my attempts to reassure Hi in my letters that Tacloban was a peaceful place.

In the morning of the 27th, some Army P-38s arrived and circled Tacloban, to the intense joy of all concerned. No football game cheering was ever so enthusiastic as the yells that went up from soldiers and civilians alike as these beautiful planes went over the town before landing on the strip.

On the 25th we had called at Sixth Army with Fellers and met Kreuger. While MacArthur, Fellers and Kreuger were conferring, Lieutenant Colonel Roger Egeberg, one of MacArthur's aides and his physician, told us in bare outline the story of the Naval battles including Halsey's futile trip north of Luzon making it impossible for him to give further support to the landing. I don't remember whether Roger told us how close the Jap main fleet had come to turning the corner of Samar and sinking all our shipping in Leyte Gulf. I do remember that he was most critical of Halsey (undoubtedly reflecting MacArthur's views). Everything I have read since "The Battle for Leyte Gulf", "The Japs at Leyte Gulf", Morison's "Leyte" and Halsey's own attempt to justify his tactics, have only confirmed this judgment. Roger said that the Navy would never let Halsey

down publicly but that he would never again get an important command. I guess this was right and believe that he was the last of the top-flight admirals to get his fifth star.

Soriano wanted to try to go to Dulag by jeep. Dulag, about fifteen miles south of Tacloban is where the 7th and 96th Divisions of the XXIVth Corps had landed on 20 October. One of the Sixth Army staff officers said he couldn't order us not to, but seriously urged us not to try it, unless we had some urgent business (which we hadn't) as the road was still likely to be infested with Japs. No really effective junction had been made between the XXIVth Corps and Xth Corps. So we gave up the jeep trip.

We went to Dulag by L.C.M. on the 29th. On the way down we could see our artillery near Dulag shelling the road we would have been on if we had jeeped it on the 25th. The Japs were thick in the Catmon Hills just west of this road and north of Dulag and it took several days to clean them out.

Dulag was an unholy mess. A day or two before a Jap bomb got a lucky hit on a gas dump which was too near an ammunition dump. The ammunition dump popped off all night, completely wrecking the town and the old Spanish church there and forcing all present to hole up and spend a sleepless night.

We inspected PCAU-7 under Major Hopson. They were assisted by a Naval civil affairs unit which XXIVth

Corps had procured in Hawaii when their objective was Yap. XXIVth Corps brought them along when their objective was changed to Leyte. Both PCAU-7 and the Naval unit were doing a good job. A large number of civilians was camped on the beach in great discomfort. PCAU-7 and XXIVth Corps Civil Affairs Officer, Colonel Warner, had ideas of building a new town south of Dulag to take care of these people. This was wholly unnecessary, which we didn't know at the time. All of these people returned to their own homes as soon as combat moved on. If their houses were destroyed, it didn't take long to rebuild them as I should have remembered from 1928 typhoon days.

That night we were billeted in a large hospital tent. The Filipino PCAU doctor was very proud of his dispensary layout which he had just finished arranging. We had looked forward to a good night's sleep because there was little or no Jap air over Dulag. Just before we went to bed the wind began to come up and I suggested to the doctor that maybe he had better pack up his pills and equipment. He couldn't bear to do that. Just about the time we got to sleep the rain started and then down went our tent. I had taken great care to put my shirt, pants and underdrawers in my sleeping bag, which proved to be a great mistake. When the tent went down, six inches of water came into the sleeping bag and I didn't get dried out until noon the

next day when the sun came out. Soriano and I took turns holding the tent up a bit with our feet to get a little air. Finally the wind subsided enough so that we propped the tent up partially with a pole, but we were so soaked that we got little sleep. The poor doctor's dispensary was fairly well ruined to his great sorrow. Soriano and I had thought of sleeping in an ambulance outside. It's just as well we didn't, for a big coconut tree blew over and broke the body of the ambulance in two.

The next day we inspected PCAU-8 which didn't seem as well organized as 7. We made a few suggestions to them, which were fairly well received. We rode all around Dulag in a Dukw (an amphibious truck) both in and out of the water looking for a ride back to Tacloban. It was quite an experience. Finally we found our ride in an L.C.M. partially beached on the beach. With the aid of a couple of 6 x 6 trucks with winches she got off and plodded her way back to Tacloban arriving just before sundown. That night there was no Jap air and I had my first real sleep since leaving the Blue Ridge.

The next few nights were bad for sleeping. We became used to the three ack ack shots announcing a raid and the one shot meaning all clear. Usually Soriano and I got up and watched proceedings. Even if

no bombs came near, it was impossible to sleep because of the din of our ack ack. November 3 was our worst night. One bomb hit near a house occupied by Colonel Finlay, the headquarters commandant but buried itself in soft ground before exploding. Otherwise they would have caught it. That was on one side of MacArthur's house. A little later one hit near our house on the other side of MacArthur's. The dirt flew all over our room. Another hit on a ridge near MacArthur's house and took a leg off a boy making for a hole. Certain wiseacres began spotting on a map where these bombs had dropped, claiming the pattern showed a deliberate attempt to get MacArthur who, as far as I know, never even bothered to get out of bed. A chandelier in his bedroom was cut by a 50 calibre bullet (of ours) and fell with a terrible crash. His aides rushed in very worried, but he was all right and wouldn't even get up. The next morning I couldn't get any water for a shower so went out and started working the hand pump with no success. I discovered that the trouble was a 50 calibre machine gun bullet which had put a neat hole in the lead pipe up to the tank. The 50 had hit about ten feet from where Dr. Hayden was sleeping and about on the same level as his head.

When these raids got really bad Halsey would put on a strike on Luzon and other Jap fields and as a result we would get two or three nights of relief. After bad bombing

nights I had real trouble in keeping awake at my desk the next day.

My work during this period was varied. One of our problems was the proposed redemption of currency issued during the occupation by loyal authorities, most of them currency boards set up by Quezon's express orders. A substantial part of this money had been used to support the guerrillas. In Brisbane Colonel Courtney Whitney who had chief responsibility for the guerrilla effort had shown me with pride a map of the Philippines with red dots indicating guerrilla radio stations. There were so many that the map looked like a kid with the measles. He then explained the valuable information which these stations had produced, particularly as to Jap fleet movements at the time of the Saipan operation. He told me about the guerrilla currency which had had an essential part in the maintenance of the guerrillas and expressed the hope that the United States would be generous in redemption of this currency.

When we got to Leyte MacArthur appointed a board under Whitney's chairmanship to consider the redemption of this money. Soriano was on the board. An immediate row started. Whitney claimed that Kangleon, the Leyte guerrilla leader whom MacArthur had decorated with a D.S.C. and whom Osmena had appointed Governor of Leyte, was lying when he

said that Quezon had established the Leyte currency board during the occupation. Whitney could find no evidence in his files that Quezon had done so. Soriano and I had no trouble in getting from G-2 the two or three relevant messages from Quezon appointing the board. They of course had been transmitted through MacArthur's headquarters in Australia. Soriano was convinced that Whitney, who now had completely reversed his position and opposed any redemption of emergency currency by the Army, had deliberately concealed these cables. My later acquaintance with his files and with him convinces me that it was much more reasonable to assume that he had lost them or mislaid them. I can only explain Whitney's reversal of position as to this currency by his intense loyalty to MacArthur. He knew redemption would be difficult, particularly in Panay where there had been issues greatly in excess of authorized amounts. I think that he felt that it would be better for MacArthur to avoid the whole matter and let it be cleaned up later by civilians, the Commonwealth Government or anybody rather than MacArthur.

Kangleon told us that he had complete records of the Leyte issue in south Leyte, which he would get for the board if we could furnish transportation for him. Accordingly we arranged with the Navy for 2 PT boats to take us

to Malitbog in southern Leyte where an agent was to meet Kangleon with the records. The PTs at first wanted to go at night or to have air cover by day (which we couldn't arrange). We finally persuaded them to go by day without air cover. Like most small craft they travelled in pairs so that if one broke down or got hit the other could help.

It developed that Kangleon, in true Filipino fashion, wanted to take his whole family along (about 12 people). Also in character, they were about an hour late in assembling the passengers. We had a beautiful trip south. The PT boys had been in the Surigao Straits action and showed us about where one Jap battleship had been sunk in water so deep she was invisible.

Malitbog is on the west shore of a bay to the west of Leyte Gulf. The island of Panaon forms part of the east shore of this bay with a very narrow strait with crystal clear water at its northern end separating Panaon and Leyte. As we cautiously approached this strait we could see soldiers ashore, but didn't know whether they were Americans or Japs. Finally we spotted a jeep through field glasses and were able to proceed with more confidence.

Malitbog was a charming old Philippine town. The Escano house there was magnificent, part of a compound as big as a city block, but it and the old Spanish watch tower against Moro pirates had been badly damaged by our Navy

shelling when the Japs were driven back to be killed en masse, we were told, by Kangleon's guerrillas. As I had anticipated, the people with the records didn't meet Kangleon. He and his family stayed over. We went back to Tacloban on the PTs. Kangleon returned some days later with the records.

After a considerable battle between Whitney and Soriano, it was decided to redeem the Leyte emergency currency in full. The Commonwealth Government paid 2/3 and the Army 1/3, that being a rough estimate of the portion used for civilian and military expenditures respectively. Whitney, however, apparently prevailed on MacArthur to have nothing to do with any redemptions in other areas. This decision I consider most unfortunate. It would not have been difficult for the Army to supervise the whole job adequately immediately after liberation. As time passed, the danger of counterfeiting of this simply printed and easily forgeable currency became greater. Finally, in 1946 the War Department settled its obligation in the premises by an agreement with the Philippine Government whereby the United States paid 25 million dollars and turned over 37 million dollars agreed value of surplus property to cover the estimated military expenditures during occupation. Even though the Philippine Government almost certainly didn't realize 37 million dollars from the sale of the surplus, the settlement was probably more than fair to the Philippine Government. President Quirino (Message on

the State of the Nation, delivered to the Philippine Congress, January 24, 1949) set the amount of duly authorized emergency and guerrilla currency, as found by the Emergency Currency Board at about P113,000,000 or \$56,500,000. This agreement, however, contained no stipulation as to what the Philippine Government would do with the money and up to June 1947 no further redemptions had taken place. This has caused a great deal of resentment among the holders of this currency, particularly guerrilla troops who were paid with it and patriotic civilians who took it for services and supplies furnished the guerrillas. The Philippine Government was talking in June 1947 of redemption of only a percentage of this currency on the theory that a lot of it was in the hands of speculators who shouldn't be allowed to profit. This theory seems fallacious to me. Where an over-issue could be shown a percentage payment might have been the only practical way of handling the matter. Where no over-issue was involved, redemption in full is the only fair solution.

At any rate the United States Government has ended up by probably making more than full monetary payment of its obligations but without discharging its moral obligation of seeing to the payment to the holders of this currency which was essential to the support of the resistance movement. This I believe could have been avoided by prompt redemption immediately after liberation. What the Philippine Government

has done with the matter I don't know.

Early in November, Captain Sam Yorty, a very energetic young Californian PCAU officer at Tanañ told me that in accordance with our civil affairs directive he proposed to open the schools in Tanañ on the following Monday with considerable ceremony and newspaper publicity. I heartily approved this suggestion. Philippine schools had traditionally been a mutual American-Philippine source of good will since the days of the Insurrection right after the Spanish American War. Joe Rauh suggested that I ask Romulo to make a speech on this occasion. I thought well of that also and, all unsuspecting the hornet's nest I was getting into, breezed into Rommie's office, which like ours was in the provincial capitol, to ask him to ply his favorite trade at our fiesta. He was indignant. He told me that as Minister of Education he was officially opening the schools in Tacloban on the following Wednesday and who was this Captain Yorty and what did he know about schools and how could such an untutored fellow be sure that the proper courses would be taught, proper credits given, etc. His nose was so out of joint at the thought that Yorty would steal his thunder that I got nowhere with him and retired as gracefully as possible, but decided to let Yorty proceed as planned. I understand that Yorty succeeded in getting the desired publicity for himself in the Los Angeles papers.

He later became a member of Congress and Mayor of Los Angeles and I can't see that Yorty's jumping the gun has hurt Rommie's public relations appreciably.

Romulo turned up one morning with a big bandage over his head and face and told me he had been wounded the night before by a bomb fragment. He hauled out of his pocket a little piece of steel about the size of a thumb-nail paring and showed it to me saying "See, this is what hit me". He wore the bandage until he got to the United States Congress to make his maiden speech as Resident Commissioner after which I am reliably informed that the bandage came off and no scar was visible.

I was told that someone asked Romulo if he would get a purple heart for his wound. He said "I shall get an oak leaf cluster for the purple heart I got on Bataan". Rumor had it that his Bataan purple heart was for a sprained ankle jumping into a foxhole.

About this time our G-5 Section began to run into trouble. Fellers, at Rauh's suggestion, wrote a memorandum criticizing Ascom's previously mentioned misuse of its two PCAUs solely as labor recruiting agencies. The memorandum was properly critical of Colonel Barnett, who had civil affairs responsibility for Ascom. General Pat Casey came back with a blistering defense of Barnett and attack on Fellers. The Casey memo was full of inaccuracies, but

Fellers refused to let Rauh and me prepare an answer to it for him to send to MacArthur.

Next I discovered that Colonel Ballantine of G-4 had been detailed by General Dick Marshall to investigate in a very critical manner the workings of the supply part of our civil affairs directive. I urged Fellers to let me or Rauh go to Ballantine to set him straight on what I had discovered from talking to Ballantine were his serious misconceptions of how our supply set up was working. Fellers absolutely refused to let Rauh or me do anything about it and the result was without doubt that Ballantine submitted a wrong and most unfavorable report about our section.

Next and most important was the matter of our first monthly report to the War Department. Rauh and I wrote it up stating as fairly as we could the mistakes as well as the accomplishments of the first month of civil affairs operations. This was along the lines of other civil affairs reports, particularly those dealing with the Sicilian campaign, which I had read in the War Department and which had been of great help in avoiding some mistakes. Fellers objected to any admission of error in this report. We talked him out of it. I am sure that we were right from the point of view of what a useful report should contain. Later events proved that he was right in his appraisal of the unfavorable

effect the report would have on MacArthur, who constitutionally could brook no criticism of this theatre no matter how true or how insignificant it might be.

These three episodes had a lot to do with Fellers' later relief as chief of the civil affairs section.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff Civil Affairs Directive ordered MacArthur to remove collaborators from any position of political or economic influence over the Filipino people. MacArthur told me that he interpreted this as requiring him to jail them and the Leyte Provincial Jail was soon full to bursting with suspects. At MacArthur's suggestion, Osmena appointed a board of Filipinos to investigate Leyte collaborators. MacArthur appointed me his personal observer at these investigations and told me to report to him directly. I told Osmena that I thought it a mistake to appoint a public prosecutor for this board, because if that were done, each suspect would insist on his own lawyer and the cases would go on interminably. Osmena agreed with me. The first case called was that of Torres, ex-provincial governor under the Japs. There were other much clearer cases, notably Salazar, the puppet governor at the time of the landing. Later events showed that the board made a mistake in taking up a close case first. The Torres case was called and Torres made a very eloquent opening speech in his own defense. I told Fellers about this and he told MacArthur. MacArthur immediately sent for me to hear about it first hand. He ranted for several minutes about what a scoundrel Torres was, how he had secret

evidence that he had procured Filipino women for Jap officers, that he believed Torres had been responsible for keeping the Filipinos away from the ceremony on 23 October, etc. He ordered me to tell Osmena to appoint a prosecutor. I argued against this, but unsuccessfully. The result was that the public prosecutor was appointed, of course, Torres got his own lawyer and the case dragged on for weeks. No other case was even heard and as far as I know the Torres case was never decided.

At this conference I pointed out to MacArthur the crowded condition of the Leyte jail and suggested that some of the inmates be released and put under house arrest. He was unwilling to do this. I asked him just how he defined "collaborator". Did he think anyone serving under the Japs was one? He made an odd legalistic distinction. Anyone serving under the Japs prior to the puppet republic was only doing what he had to under the Hague and Geneva conventions. Anyone serving under the puppet republic was a collaborator. This didn't make any sense to me then and doesn't now. I then asked him what he was going to do with Roxas* under this theory. He got quite angry and said "Roxas is a special case".

*Roxas was the pre-war No. 3 politico, ranking only after Quezon and Osmena. He became a Brigadier General in the Philippine Army on Corregidor, finally surrendering to the Japs in Mindanao. By virtue of real or feigned ill health, he took no office under the Jap military government or the puppet republic until 1944. He was a member of the Committee which drafted the puppet constitution in 1943 and a signer of the completed document. He finally accepted a job as food administrator under the puppet republic in 1944 and was a close personal friend and advisor of puppet President Laurel.

I told him that I thought treating anyone as a special case might have unfortunate results, but he didn't want any advice from me on that subject. This was my first contact with the Roxas problem about which I heard much more later.

Early in November Soriano and I were asked to interview Captain Cinco, a guerrilla leader, who had been brought to headquarters on Kangleon's orders. Rumors had come in that Cinco was not turning captive collaborators over to the United States Army Counter Intelligence Corps promptly as ordered, but was holding some of them prisoner for undue periods. He was a typical badman bandit type, but under our not particularly severe questioning assumed a docile and almost demure pose. He appeared much hurt when told the rumor that the civilians were afraid of him. He first denied the charge of holding prisoners too long, but finally admitted that he had held a couple of women, reputedly attractive, for about three weeks. The next day I saw him delivering an impromptu address to an admiring throng outside one of our offices. The docile mien was gone. Although I couldn't understand a word of his Visayan, it was plain that he was a vigorous and even fiery orator. We sent him back on his promise to be good which I can't believe he kept. However, we never heard any more complaints about him during the war. Two and a half years later I heard on fairly good authority that he was furnishing protection for a price to bus companies in

Leyte. If they didn't pay the price he robbed the buses.

Another interesting guerrilla who came in was a Mrs. Boncillo. She was carrying a carbine. I asked her if she had killed any Japs. She said "So many I can't count them". She then expressed a wish to become a welfare worker.

Soriano introduced me to Major Charlie Smith who had been a mining engineer employed by one of Soriano's enterprises before the war. He had sailed in a small boat from Mindanao to Australia, avoiding capture by the Japs in several close calls. Later he returned to join the guerrilla movement and had ended up in command of it on Samar. He was preparing to equip a guerrilla force to clear the east-west road across the island from Taft to Wright, which he accomplished shortly thereafter with a few hundred guerrillas and in a very short time. He told me that in his guerrilla work the poor taos (peasants) in the hills had done everything for him, fed him, clothed him, housed him and hid him, sometimes at the risk of their lives. He said that it was only in the towns on the coast and with the well-to-do Filipinos that he ever had any fear that he might be betrayed to the Japs.

The first ten days after the landing were fairly dry, which was a great help to our campaign. Then it rained and the roads, built for light cars, disintegrated under the heavy military traffic of tanks, half tracks, 6 x 6 trucks, etc.

Originally there was only one Jap division, the 16th, on the island. Total Jap troops were estimated at 24,000. Shortly after the landing the Japs began reinforcing principally through the port of Ormoc on the northwest coast of Leyte.

In spite of the Air Force's fine efforts in sinking Jap transports and escorting naval vessels, the Japs succeeded in landing at Ormoc substantial reinforcements including their crack 1st Division. They had decided to stake their best troops on the defense of Leyte. As a consequence of these reinforcements and of the terrible mud and rain, the going was slow for our troops who had gone north up the Leyte valley to Carigara rather quickly, but ran into trouble on their way south down the parallel Ormoc valley to the west, particularly at a mountainous switchback near Limon.

The 7th Division which had easily crossed the mountain road from Abuyog to Baybay, which road had been cleared by Kangleon's guerrillas, ran into tough resistance in their progress up the narrow west coast from Baybay. On December 7, 1944, MacArthur landed the 77th Division near Ormoc. This cut the Japs in two and broke their back and also closed Ormoc as their port for reinforcement. The 77th did a beautiful job according to Fellers. Soon afterwards the Leyte campaign was over except for the miserable job of mopping up,

which was finally finished by the Americal Division, relieving the 77th, which went back to the east coast beaches of Leyte to rest and refit for Okinawa.

Late in November Joe Rauh who had been exiled to the Sixth Army Staff by Fellers, was allowed to return to General Headquarters. He immediately dug up a rumor that the G-5 Section was about to be abolished. Before he had gone to Sixth Army we had started on a revision of the civil affairs S.O.P. and Instructional Notes to clear up ambiguities and take advantage of experience gained in the Leyte operation. I had worked on these during Joe's absence. Incidentally, Colonel Sears, head of Sixth Army civil affairs section, who hated Joe, wouldn't give him anything to do and he spent his ten days with Sixth Army reading a history of the United States. Upon his return and particularly in view of the rumor, we intensified our work to try to get the new S.O.P. signed before any changes went into effect. We just made it. On November 26 we heard definitely that the G-5 Section of General Headquarters was abolished and that we were to become a special staff section of USAFFE*.

*USAFFE (United States Armed Forces Far East) was MacArthur's original command in the Philippines before the Japanese attacked in 1941. Later it became a sort of housekeeping headquarters in Australia. It was rumored that it was blown up there so as to make places for the promotion of numerous officers to the rank of full Colonel. Later then officers from the War Department came to Manila to study the organization of headquarters for the Japanese invasion nobody was able to explain USAFFE except that certain War Department appropriations depended on its existence. It was then deflated to the smallest skeleton possible to continue as beneficiary of these appropriations.

Fellers was relieved and Colonel Courtney Whitney put at the head of the section. Whitney asked me to act as his executive and after some doubts, occasioned mainly by Soriano's and Fellers' great hatred of Whitney, I agreed. I really hadn't much choice in the matter as I had joined the Army for civil affairs work and it seemed only sensible to continue at it, after my short but intensive experience.

About this time in November the Japs made an airborne landing at the Buri air strip back in the hills a short distance from Dulag. They held the strip for several days and it took a battalion of the 96th Division to dislodge them. Consequently, our Adjutant General circulated a memorandum ordering all officers and men in Tacloban to go armed and with tin hats ready to defend themselves to the death in billets or offices in case of an air drop in Tacloban. I carried a .45 for a day, but found it too heavy, so discontinued the practice. We had, however, a lot of top secret documents in our office so I felt that I had to make our enlisted men bring carbines to work for some time. This memorandum was sort of funny, so much so that no copies were obtainable after a day or two. The sequel, however, was not so funny. The service troops in Tacloban were delighted to tote guns all over town and amused themselves by a little playful shooting every night.

This undisciplined behavior bothered me so much that I prepared and submitted to the deputy chief of staff a memorandum suggesting strongly that these men be disarmed while in the town as I feared the effect of their wild fire more than that of any few Japs who might float down on us. I suggested the establishment of a perimeter defense around the town if there was any real fear of a Jap air drop. This latter measure I was told was adopted. The disarming was not, and on New Year's Eve a disgraceful fusillade occurred. Rumor had it that one Filipino boy was killed. Certainly many were scared almost to death. Brigadier General Baker, in command of the Tacloban base section and his staff rushed around inspecting pistols and other firearms for evidence of recent firing and rumor again had it they arrested some 300 officers and enlisted men whose barrels were fouled up. I never heard that any of them were tried. Baker was a competent officer, however, and the shooting stopped.

Whitney's advent as chief of section was accompanied by a period of examination, revision and almost inquisition into all of our activities. On 9 December I had a long conference with MacArthur which furnishes an explanation for what had happened to us. As I have said, I had direct access to him on collaborator matters. I suggested to him on this

occasion that he turn the whole collaborator question over to the Counter Intelligence Corps who were better equipped to handle it than the civil affairs section. He later followed my suggestion.

After we had finished on the collaborator questions I asked him why Fellers had been relieved and the G-5 (General Staff) Section in effect demoted to a special staff section of USAFFE. He said the reason for Fellers' relief was that he obviously couldn't control his section. He said that members of his staff had been telling him for some time that the section consisted of a bunch of empire building new dealers from Washington who were more interested in getting power than in helping the Army. He said that he had been unconvinced by these charges, including a complaint from General Kreuger that we were interfering with his civil affairs operations, until Fellers submitted the draft report to the War Department on our first month's operations. He said with great heat "That was a disloyal report. If it had gone to the War Department, Drew Pearson would have got it and would have published it as a serious criticism of me. When I read that report my first impulse was to send your whole section, except you, right back to Washington". I told him that I was probably more responsible for the report than anyone else, that I had been able to make good use of similar

self-critical reports from Sicily and elsewhere, that I didn't believe that there was much danger of such a report getting out of the War Department and finally that I was unable to understand his characterization of it as a "disloyal report", that certainly there had been no such intention by its authors of whom I was one. I think that he was willing to give me personally the benefit of the doubt, but still suspected that there was some sinister new deal purpose to undermine him behind it all. I then told him that I felt that he had been fed a lot of lies about our section by persons whom he had quoted, not by name. Obviously they were Marshall and Kreuger and probably Casey and Ballantine. MacArthur said: "Kreuger served for years in the Philippines (I believe it was as an enlisted man in the early 1900's) and has forgotten more about civil affairs here than your section will ever know." I was in no position to argue how much he ever knew or had forgotten, but I did tell MacArthur that Colonel Sears, Kreuger's civil affairs officer, was incompetent. MacArthur said "Why don't you remove him?" I explained that he wasn't one of our recruits or assigned to our section but apparently a life-long friend of Kreuger assigned to Sixth Army and that I had no authority to remove him. He promised to speak to Kreuger about it. I don't know whether he did or not, but nothing happened. Sears stayed and got lazier and more unreliable as time went on. I ended up by telling

MacArthur that if he expected a yes-man in me he had the wrong man and if I was no use to him on my own basis of telling him the truth why not let me go home where I had a good law practice and happy family. He said "It will be a long time before you see them. I have important work for you here, my boy, much more important than civil affairs". What that work was I never found out. I kept on with civil affairs, but endeavored thereafter to operate with the "passion for anonymity" which President Roosevelt desired in certain of his assistants. I must have talked half an hour in an hour and a half conference, which was good going for a MacArthur conference.

The following episode is illustrative of Colonel Sears' unreliability. Sixth Army had eight PCAUs attached for the Leyte operation. As the Luzon operation was approaching in which Sixth Army had the main job, I went to Sears and proposed that he take these eight experienced units along as a nucleus, replacing them in Leyte by eight new units then training at Oro Bay, New Guinea, on condition that Sixth Army would furnish transportation to bring the new units forward from Oro Bay to Leyte in time to relieve the old units before they started for Luzon. This was an idea I had gotten from reports on the Sicilian and Italian campaigns, where the experienced units were left in Sicily and new green ones sent to Italy with not so good results. Sears was delighted with

the idea. He had been expecting that he would have to use new units on Luzon and had never considered the possibility of taking the experienced ones along. Having what I considered a promise from Sears as to the transportation of the new units I took the necessary steps for attaching the old units to Sixth Army for Luzon. Joe Rauh, who missed nothing, told me that no Sixth Army shipping had been set up for the new units. We went down to Sixth Army to see Sears and I asked him if this was true. He said "No". Rauh stepped around the corner to the Sixth Army transportation officer and came back to say that no such shipping had been set up according to that officer. Sears' face was somewhat red, but he said he could do nothing about it, apparently not much bothered about his broken promise or his lie.

I then took the matter up with Dick Marshall who agreed with me that Sixth Army must either bring the new units to Leyte or get along with the new units in Luzon and leave the old units in Leyte. Marshall promised to take this up with Brigadier General Decker, Kreuger's chief of staff and finally the new units arrived in Leyte either before or only shortly after the old units had been relieved.

On one very controversial point Sears agreed with me, I believe mainly because of his natural laziness. This was the issue of territorial control as against chain of command control of civil affairs. It is my understanding

that the Sicilian civil affairs operation was under territorial control, that is, all civil affairs units other than those actually attached to divisions in combat were controlled directly by the top headquarters staff (Eisenhower's). This allowed a degree of uniform supervision and implementation of civil affairs policy which was impossible under chain of command control. Under chain of command control (certainly the conventional U.S. Army method) each Army Commander had absolute control of all military units in his area including civil affairs units. All that the top staff section of civil affairs could do under the chain of command control was to prepare directives from the theatre Commander to the Army Commander, try to see to some extent how well these were carried out and report any serious deviation. Our top Commander MacArthur was uninterested in civil affairs and unwilling to interfere with Kreuger's management of what MacArthur considered a most unimportant activity. Our staff section's attempts to make Sears carry out MacArthur's orders were interpreted by Kreuger as improper staff interference and his complaint to MacArthur on the subject hurt us greatly. After the Sicilian operation the territorial control of civil affairs was given up by the United States Army in Europe in favor of chain of command control and, of course, MacArthur would never at the time of the Leyte operation have dreamed of any other method. To my amazement Sears sent up a memo to

the civil affairs section of General Headquarters urging civil affairs direct territorial control by General Headquarters in Sixth Army areas where there was no actual combat. As I have said, I believe that this was because he wanted to avoid work. I wasn't interested in the motive, but immediately tried to sell Fellers on the idea, without success. He was afraid of being accused of "empire building". Later, much to my amazement, Dick Marshall himself gave our top staff section direct territorial operational control of civil affairs in Manila instead of putting it under the base section which had military responsibility for everything else in the area and a little later even suggested extending our jurisdiction all over the Philippines.

During this period there were some pleasant diversions. One night a pretty blond flight nurse was sent to be billeted at the Abesamis house. Her C-54 from Saipan, evacuating wounded from Leyte, blew a tire on the Tacloban strip and she had to stay over until a new tire was flown in. She was the first white girl in Tacloban since the landing. The whistles and wolf calls were deafening when we took her to our mess in a jeep. It was dark and raining, but even so she was visible.

The Abesamis family was quite musical and loved parties. We had a few dances there and one daughter-in-law who had formerly been on the radio in Manila sang very well.

Dr. Hayden, the oldest member of our club, was the most active dancer and physical disabilities which kept him confined to quarters at times during the day never interfered with his dancing at night.

Abuyog was a fair-sized town about 15 miles south of Dulag. There was a PCAU there. I had been urging the Commonwealth Government officials to get around and see for themselves the restoration of local governments. I finally persuaded Mr. Mathey, Under Secretary of Finance, to go to Abuyog with me to observe. We took a jeep and got to Dulag (10 miles) in about 5 hours. South of that, the bridges were washed out and we had to go back to Tacloban. While we were stalled in traffic north of Dulag near the Catmon Hills, there was a good deal of firing in a swamp inland and a few bullets whistled over our heads, but no one got hit that I could see. The mud and heavy military traffic were such that 2 miles an hour was a good average.

On Thanksgiving Day the Japs got an unlucky bomb hit on General Headquarters enlisted men's mess hall and killed 7 and wounded 35. The men were there in the evening at an unusually late hour preparing a belated turkey dinner for the next day.

Soriano told me that Osmena was planning to return to the States for an operation and to attend President Roosevelt's fourth inaugural. It seemed to me a great mistake.

He wasn't getting along well with MacArthur, but his place was in the Philippines and particularly I thought that he should be along on the Luzon landing, now planned for early January. Only by active participation in the liberation campaign could he counteract the propaganda against a government in exile living comfortably in Washington while those in the Philippines underwent the difficulties of Jap occupation. I expressed these sentiments to Hayden who didn't appear to disagree. Later Soriano told me that Hayden himself had advised Osmena to go. I imagine Soriano was right. He was very close to Osmena who was continually urging him (unsuccessfully) to go back into his cabinet. Soriano had been Secretary of Finance under Quezon, but before Quezon died, resigned to reenter the Army. Soriano also told me that Osmena had asked MacArthur for permission to take me to the States with him. My feelings on this were mingled. Naturally I wanted to go home but was afraid the Civil Affairs Section, whose morale had been badly hurt by the events described above, would fall apart if I did because I was the only officer left in it who really felt that we might have a future. MacArthur settled it by telling Osmena I couldn't go for fear the War Department would think MacArthur had sent me as a spy.

About this time MacArthur either urged or permitted Osmena to put out an order giving Philippine Army troops the

same pay as United States Army troops. MacArthur had no authority from the War Department for this and the Philippine Government had no funds to make up the difference. The later necessary rescission of this order caused Osmena great political trouble.

Joe Rauh took an inspection trip to the west coast of Leyte the middle of December and wired me that a new PCAU was needed at Ormoc. I called Sears who said he had the whole situation under control. I don't know how he knew because he never went anywhere himself nor allowed any of his staff section to go anywhere away from Sixth Army headquarters. PCAU commanders under Sixth Army went to Sears, but got no help. So they started coming to us for help which they got until Sears found out about it and stopped them.

Christmas like all holidays was celebrated by some Jap bombing. A good chorus of WACs and EM serenaded our quarters with carols from a truck in the moonlight, but had to cut their singing short because of air raid alerts.

Just after Christmas General Valdez, a doctor in civil life, who was Secretary of Defense in the Philippine cabinet, asked me to go with him to Catbalogan, the capitol of Samar, to help him in the investigation of candidates for the office of provincial governor. Brigadier General Hoffman in command of the 2nd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, with headquarters at Catbalogan invited us to go up on his boat.

We went up through the narrow San Juanico Straits and arrived in the early afternoon. There we found a guard of honor drawn up and a celebration planned with a Filipino principal speaker. Colonel Bradley, in command of the 8th Cavalry Regiment, told me that the principal speaker had said he expected to talk about an hour and a half, but that Bradley had told him to limit himself to five minutes. I asked Bradley if he had ever been in the Philippines before. He said "No". I made no further comment, but awaited results. The principal speaker made a very eloquent address of welcome to the United States troops in English - total 45 minutes. He then translated the speech into Visayan - total 45 minutes. Grand Total one hour and a half as he had originally planned it. I had a lot of fun with Bradley afterwards about the five minute speech, which he had ordered.

The 1st Cavalry, being very cavalry, had hired a lot of labor to clean up the town square, cut the grass and weed the edges. They had only been there about two weeks, but it was already the neatest looking provincial capitol I saw in the Philippines during the war. Headquarters was in a provincial school and very comfortable. Before dinner we were given the great treat of a bottle of warm Budweiser in lieu of a cocktail. It was the first beer I had had in months and tasted delicious. The young West Pointers Lieutenant Colonels Polk and Cole at headquarters were fine

fellows. I think that they were as glad to see two or three new faces as we were to talk to them. There was a certain amount of Jap activity in the hills a mile or so away, but nothing which they weren't able to handle that evening by field telephone.

We slept on General Hoffman's boat tied up to the dock. For the first time since the Leyte landing no mosquito nets were needed. We heard a few Jap planes overhead and more United States planes, but neither side bothered us and I had a good sleep.

That afternoon and the next morning Valdez, the PCAU officer in town and I interviewed candidates for the office of provincial governor for the purpose of screening collaborators. Results were inconclusive.

General Hoffman, Colonel Bradley and Lieutenant Colonels Cole and Polk spoke well of the efforts of the one PCAU officer in Catbalogan. The nearer one got to the fighting the more the Army appreciated civil affairs.

On the way back to Tacloban we saw some flares at a little Samar barrio. We went ashore and found that the flares were being fired from a Vary pistol which we were told had been taken from a B-25 plane which had gone down in the water the night before. We went over to where the plane was and saw it sunk in about twenty feet of water. Some Filipinos were around it in bancas. At our request they dove into each

compartment of the plane to look for bodies. After we were convinced that there were none we headed on down. General Hoffman was very anxious for us to see his headquarters at the head of San Juanico Straits. We went up there with him and had a fine meal of chicken. The whole camp had the characteristic cavalry look of neatness.

We went through the San Juanico Straits after dark. We had a few tense moments after we were challenged by a PT boat until we were sure that they recognized our return signals. The thought of a whiff from one of their 50 calibre machine guns was not pleasant.

During December the United States Government sent a mission of four civilians to Leyte to try to get out some abaca (hemp), the fibre from which Manila rope is made. This fibre was in short world supply. Substitutes such as sisal were not as good and efforts to grow abaca elsewhere had not been very successful. My friend Bill Knight was among the four. They had not thought of getting assimilated military rank before leaving the States. I fixed them up as Lieutenant Colonels so that they could eat and sleep with some comfort in Army installations. I put them in touch with Escano, a Filipino who knew the hemp business and whose almost feudal family house I had seen at Malitbog. It soon appeared that abaca would not be forthcoming for money

except at most exorbitant prices. Money was not much use in the abaca producing regions because there was little or nothing to buy with it. I tried to get them some trade goods for the purpose of barter from our civil affairs supply but Dick Marshall wouldn't stand for it although the amount was trifling (less than 1%), the need for abaca pressing and the price reasonable in terms of trade goods. I fixed them up with two landing craft for a trip around Leyte. They came back with a small amount of hemp and a pretty good idea of what could be done a little later.

All during December, I had been trying to get assurances that some of our section would go along on the approaching Lingayen landing. MacArthur had told me it was up to Marshall. Whitney said the same, but never tried much to help us. He was going anyway with MacArthur. Marshall was adamant and we didn't go. This bothered me a lot because of Sears' incompetence. I was sure that he needed some of us to needle him or nothing would be done. Later events proved me correct but what we were able to accomplish in Leyte to assure supplies for Manila was more important.

On 4 January the convoy started. Fellers and Soriano, who now constituted MacArthur's military

secretariat, left our billets and our radio was removed as we no longer had a general officer in residence. On 9 January the landings took place successfully. That morning the sky over Tacloban was almost black with the air support leaving the Leyte strips - fighters, bombers and transports, many of which towed gliders.

Joe Rauh was in the dumps. He felt that the decision not to take any of our section along on the Lingayen landing meant that we had no future and he had told Dick Marshall that he wanted to transfer to the G-4 section. About this time I began to get worried as to civilian supplies for Manila. Dick Marshall had indicated that this was not our responsibility but that of G-4. I discussed this with Major General Stivers, acting chief of staff, USAFFE, and with Sutherland who had also been left behind. Both agreed that I had better look into the problem. I kept needling Joe Rauh to get the facts. He sulked a bit and answered that no one could get them. I told him that a report to that effect was better than nothing. He finally came back with the alarming news that only one ship was set up for Luzon for January, maybe one for February and nothing after that. We put this in the form of a report to the acting chief of staff with a recommendation that shipping be set up for February and March. This started something. An extra ship

was set up for January and two each for February and March. These were from the States. Major General Frink, C.G.U.S.A. S.O.S. was so alarmed at the memorandum that he set up an additional ship on his own from Australia.

The result of this activity was that the civilian population in Manila got fed after we captured it. If we had done nothing I am convinced that there would have been starvation or at best a serious diversion of army rations of which I doubt if there were enough to feed over a million people.

I spent about a third of my time during December and January battling the finance officers on the subject of the Army paying civilian officials and school teachers. MacArthur had got Osmena to agree orally that the Commonwealth Government would reimburse the Army for these outlays. It was impossible to get anything in writing in Osmena's absence. Finally Stivers signed two clarifying orders which allowed the PCAUs to continue to pay government officials and teachers without which local governments and schools would have collapsed. The collapse of local government would of course have undone what civil affairs had accomplished in their establishment. The collapse of the schools would have impaired morale to a serious extent.

During January and early February I went to Eighth Army headquarters frequently for conferences with Colonel

Donovan Vance, Eighth Army Civil Affairs Officer. Eighth Army was responsible for operations in the many Visayan Islands and had a widespread civil affairs job. They had taken over Leyte from Sixth Army except that part in and around Tacloban for which Base K had become responsible. Vance and his section were as good as Sears and his section were bad. Vance was as amusing as he was efficient and was able to wangle almost anything. He even got an L-5 plane which he really needed to check up on his widely spread operations. And he checked up on them. An officer from his staff section visited every PCAU in Eighth Army territory at least twice each month.

I finally got to Abuyog on one of these Eighth Army trips and spent the night with PCAU-27 which was doing effective work. As usual the neighboring towns wanted PCAUs on account of their resemblance to Santa Claus, but in Leyte and afterwards we stuck fairly closely to our principle of sending them only where there had been combat with its inevitable disruption.

I arranged a trip for General Valdez and me to Mindoro. We left January 21 in a B-25 bomber, fully equipped with machine guns which were loaded and ready for action. We landed at San Jose, Mindoro where we lunched with Brigadier General William Dunkel and staff. He was deeply interested in the Filipinos and was insistent that the A.A.F. furnish

housing for all civilians whom they had displaced for air strip installation. He seemed to understand the people better and to have more interest in them than any other regular officer I met during the war. He had been badly wounded in the head when a Kamikaze hit the Nashville on the way to the Mindoro landing. He stayed in command, however, and completed a very successful operation. The two strips which were built promptly in Mindoro, which was having its dry season, contributed greatly, I am told, to the success of the Luzon operation. Mindoro is just south of southwest Luzon and of course much nearer Manila than Leyte. On our flight back to Tacloban that afternoon our pilot flew just over the water. The waist gunner explained that the only vulnerable part of a B-25 was its belly and the low flying was to prevent any Jap fighter attacking from below. He said that they could handle any single Jap fighter except underneath. Fortunately, we didn't see any Japs, although careful watch was kept by all, including the passengers.

There were a number of officers on MacArthur's staff, in Sixth Army headquarters and other headquarters and in tactical units who had relatives interned at Santo Tomas, the largest civilian internment camp, which was in Manila. These men were much concerned to know what plans, if any, had been made for care of their relatives after liberation from the Japs. A delegation of them had waited on General MacArthur

before the Lingayen operation started and discovered that there were no plans. I suggested to Whitney that our section undertake the task, but he didn't want to do it and nothing had been done that I know of when he left for the Lingayen operation. After that, at Stivers' suggestion, our section got up two or three alternative plans and sent them to Marshall, but he told us to forget it. None of the plans would have worked as they counted on no such destruction as actually occurred in Manila.

MacArthur later allowed those officers with relatives to go in right after or with the 1st Cavalry detachment which liberated Santo Tomas. Colonel Peter Grimm took command and PCAU-5 was installed to do odd jobs. It was decided to take care of them right where they were which was a wise decision. The job was pretty well done except for lack of supervision of the feeding of the half-starved internees. Most of them ate too much at first with unpleasant and in some cases serious results.

Planning for the large civilian population of Manila was another subject which seemed to me to be the normal responsibility of the civil affairs section and we did some preliminary work. Marshall had told us to do nothing about it, that it was Sixth Army's problem. Here also Stivers and Sutherland urged me to go ahead. I wrote Whitney asking him to be sure Sixth Army fully understood that Manila was its

official problem, but we continued our work.

On 29 January I started off for an inspection trip to the West Coast of Leyte via XXIV Corps headquarters. There I stayed with Lieutenant Colonel Gaylord whom we had sent from our staff section for attachment to XXIV Corps. I saw Lieutenant Colonel George Comstock from New York, an old friend. He was special service officer and was doing a fine job of providing entertainment for the troops. I had seen him in Tacloban a couple of times before.

The next day Gaylord and I started off in a XXIV Corps jeep for the West Coast via Abuyog. The mountain road between Abuyog on the East Coast and Baybay on the West was in good shape and the views spectacular. The 7th Division couldn't have had much opposition to get over it as fast as they did because it was full of highly defensible positions. Baybay was undamaged and it was pleasant to see a normal looking Filipino town. The church there is large and beautiful. We inspected Major Steig's PCAU in Baybay which was doing a good job and then started north for Valencia, but had to turn back because it was raining hard and the combination of high tide and flooded streams made it impossible to negotiate the many fords on the beach road. The regular road a little bit inland had been ruined in the fighting and the bridges knocked out had not been replaced. I spent the night in a nice house which a PCAU captain was occupying by himself.

The next day we planned our starting time to get low tide and successfully crossed about 20 fords. We went first to PCAU-14 at Valencia. They were taking their turn in a perimeter defense. Lieutenant Colonel Senate, their commanding officer, claimed that they had killed 36 Japs including a first lieutenant. The road between Ormoc and Valencia was covered on both sides by Filipino families who were living under nipa lean-tos. They had left their farms for fear of the numerous Japs who were by no means completely mopped up. Colonel Senate gave me a Jap rifle which I selected from a rather battered collection which they had picked up. He told me some of the details of the death in action of Lieutenant Colonel Morgan, commander of PCAU-17 at Palompon, who had been killed by a Jap machine gun when the convoy he was in was ambushed between Valencia and Palompon. On the way back from Valencia to Ormoc we stopped and saw Colonel Morgan's grave in the military cemetery south of Valencia. Like all such cemeteries which I saw, it was beautifully cared for although desultory fighting was going on near it.

We arrived at Ipil south of Ormoc to spend the night with PCAU-15 commanded by Major Pete Scott, a most attractive young combat officer who had been shoved into civil affairs when the Philippine battalion which he had been training was broken up. There were a lot of Japs up in the

hills and another perimeter defense in which PCAU-15 participated. There were so many Japs around that Gaylord and I were advised to sleep with our 45s at hand, which we did, but nothing happened, except that a stray carabao hit a trip wire in the perimeter which set off a flare with some temporary excitement.

Gaylord and I wanted to go to Palompon to inspect PCAU-17. One way was by jeep over the same mountain road where Morgan had been ambushed. We heard, however, that two LCVs were available and decided that the boat trip was healthier. When we got to Palompon we heard that the motor convoy, in which we would have been if we had gone by land, had been badly shot up again and two men seriously wounded.

Palompon had been almost totally destroyed when captured by the 77th Division. The individual whose name was most frequently mentioned by the Filipinos was that of Major Winthrop Rockefeller, supply officer of the 305th Regimental Combat Team. It appeared that he had much more to do with reestablishing civilian life than our PCAU commander. I heard reports of Clarence Bartow, who was in a mean position with one enlisted man north at Villaba. Major Plaenert, the PCAU commander, said that Bartow was asking for too much help. Bartow complained that he got none and that Plaenert wouldn't even come up to what was a tough spot to see for himself. I suggested to Plaenert

that Bartow and his sergeant be brought back as they apparently weren't able to do enough civil affairs work to be worth the risk they were running. This worked itself out when our combat troops pulled out of Villaba a few days later.

I managed to arrange a ride from Palompon to Valencia by a XXIVth Corps artillery cub plane. The rest of the party returned by the LCVs to Ipil. The cub flew at about 1000 feet and I was able to see a good deal of the road where poor Colonel Morgan had been ambushed. It was in horrible shape with deep gullies, making it a setup for surprise attack. I heard later that its use was discontinued a day or two after I flew over it.

At Valencia I had to change planes to go back to XXIVth Corps Headquarters on the East Coast. While waiting a sergeant told me the following story: A Jap battalion attacked their cub strip about a week before. All the cubs took off and dive bombed the Japs with rifle grenades. They did a lot of damage to the Japs. All the cubs were badly riddled by Jap machine gun and rifle fire, but none was shot down and no one hurt. After about an hour and a half the 77th Division had enough infantry collected to chase off the attackers and Major General Bruce, Commander of the Division, ordered the cub pilots down saying "You've had fun and have done a great job, but it's all over now".

Another cub took me north up the Ormoc valley and then south down the Leyte valley, thus avoiding crossing the high mountains in the middle of Leyte. My jeep was waiting for me at XXIVth Corps and I got back to Tacloban in time for dinner. The flight up to Caragara on the North Coast gave me a pretty good bird's-eye view of the terrain around Limon and of the difficulties which the Xth Corps had had in fighting its way from Caragara south to the Ormoc valley.

This trip and others which I took before and afterwards were of great use. I could see first hand what the PCAU problems were. This was worth much more than receiving written reports. I was able to find out many things of importance which a PCAU commander would have hesitated to put into a written report. In this way our staff section had information upon which to base corrective suggestions and to give help in supply and other problems to the personnel actually engaged in doing the job.

Base K civil affairs had taken over a considerable area around Tacloban from Eighth Army and had operated it successfully. I began to explore the possibility of turning this whole area back to the Philippine Government as conditions there were getting fairly near normal. Colonel Shattuck, the Base K civil affairs officer, had done a fine job and was sympathetic to the idea of getting the Filipinos wholly on

their own except for the limited supply which the Army would continue to furnish to be administered under Commonwealth Government authority. This turnover, while it did not take place as rapidly as we had hoped, served as a pattern for the later turnovers in Luzon and the other fought-over areas of the Philippines. We had put into our Instructional Notes that a PCAU commander's efficiency would be judged in large measure by the rapidity with which he was able to get local officials to run their own show. Plans for the turnover showed the PCAU commanders that we had meant this.

Early in February Colonel Ray Laux, Executive of the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department, whom I had known in Washington, arrived as an observer. I arranged to take him on a trip to Palompon because I thought it was the most interesting civil affairs operation for him to see as it was so close to combat and also because I wanted to look further into the rather unsatisfactory situation of the PCAU there. We had an interesting trip. Our jeep bogged down in the fords and we had to walk several miles to get a 6 x 6 truck to pull it out. Except for confirmation of my doubts as to Major Plaenert's fitness to command his PCAU, the trip was largely duplication as far as I was concerned. Units of the Americal Division had replaced the 305th RCT and mopping up operations were proceeding.

The day after I got back to Tacloban I was ordered to General Headquarters at Luzon for a conference. I packed

all my few belongings as I doubted if I should return. This proved correct.

Civil Affairs Work in Luzon in February 1945

On 11 February 1945 I took off by C-47 for Luzon. We landed at Mindoro and then flew directly over Corregidor, still held by the Japs, but smoking from our bombing. Colonel Steve Melnick, who had been captured on Corregidor and escaped from a Jap prison camp, got up in the co-pilot's seat to take movies of his "old home". We landed at San Marcelino in Zambales province near Olongapo and then headed for Lingayen. I hadn't had any breakfast except a cup of coffee because of our early take-off from Leyte. I managed to find a Red Cross hut at Lingayen and got a cup of coffee, but there were no doughnuts or cookies. I got aboard a recon car headed for General Headquarters which was then at San Miguel, Tarlac.

The trip south was most interesting. The fighting had gone so fast that there wasn't much destruction except in spots. The Filipinos looked well clothed and fed. It was a pleasant contrast to Leyte.

General Headquarters was set up at the very well-appointed Tabacalera sugar central at San Miguel. The offices and houses were all intact. There even was a swimming pool which unhappily went out of commission the day after I

arrived because of water shortage.

Tabacalera is a large Spanish-owned tobacco company with sugar and other holdings. It has always been a powerful economic factor in the Philippines and I judge well run. The facilities it furnished for its employees were excellent. The offices and houses were on a small hill which afforded a good breeze and comfortable sleeping at night. I was billeted in a tent near the mess hall. Dinner tasted particularly good after only two cups of coffee all day. I went to sleep counting the number of times the gekko lizards could make their characteristic call of "gehk". One of them made it twelve times in a row.

I reported to Whitney and Marshall and was astonished to learn that Marshall wanted our staff section to have direct area civil affairs control of Manila as soon as the fighting stopped and Sixth Army responsibility ended. I had assumed that Base X (the Manila base section) would have this job. Brigadier General Baker, Base X Commander, had assumed the same thing and had a staff section headed by Colonels Ginsberg and Shattuck, all briefed and ready. I was delighted, however, with this unorthodox decision because it gave our section a real job and wired Rauh to come up immediately to work out the planning with me.

MacArthur had agreed with Osmena that the Commonwealth Government would take over all political responsibility

in Manila leaving the Army the job of feeding and health. Later, at Osmena's request, the police force was turned over to General Dunkel who had been appointed Provost Marshal General of the entire Philippines and the fire department was turned over to our staff section. The city department of public works was also turned over to our section, but the Army engineers really ran it and did the work. I never was able to find out exactly what our responsibility was in this connection, but it never mattered because the engineers went ahead and did the necessary in fine style.

Tomas Confesor, Secretary of the Interior of the Commonwealth Government, became in effect Mayor of Manila and my contacts with him were constant, friendly and productive. I could remember him in 1928 and 1929 as the stormy petrel of the House of Representatives. He had had a chequered political career. When war came, however, he was one of the few important politicians who never surrendered to the Japs. He went to the hills in his native island of Panay and lived the hard way. His letter to the puppet governor of Iloilo explaining why he wouldn't surrender to the Japs is one of the classic documents of the war. I have in my files a signed copy of it which he gave me. His energy and power of decision were outstanding. His judgment was usually good, but he was vindictive against political opponents,

especially if they had been collaborators with the Japs. This led to his downfall when the collaborators gained political control of the Philippines later in the year. Whatever else he may have done or omitted, he would not compromise with principle on the collaborator issue. He is now dead, but I am proud to have had him as my friend.

I saw Soriano and Fellers who were incensed about what they maintained was wretched civil affairs work in Manila. Sears as usual was doing nothing and Whitney, without any civil affairs staff and busy on other things for MacArthur, had no time to make Sears do anything which was impossible anyway.

I went to Manila by jeep on 13 February to see what went on. I stopped to call on Sears where he was comfortably ensconced in a house near the Bonafacio Monument at the northernmost point of Manila, well away from the fighting. He was doing crossword puzzles and taking sun baths. He had eight PCAUs in or ready to go into Manila. Only one was south of the Pasig where the fighting (and civilian suffering) was going on. I asked him why he didn't move more units south of the river. His response was that that was a XIVth Corps responsibility and not up to him. He had not been across the river himself. I went to XIVth Corps headquarters, but couldn't find their chief civil affairs officer who was also the Corps Judge Advocate.

I then proceeded to Santo Tomas, which was at that time the meeting place for all U.S. officers. Among the internees I saw Jim and Anne Rockwell whom Hi and I had known in 1928 and 1929. They were horribly thin and looked badly. We went to Jack Irwin's* billets in a house near Bilibid prison and ate our sandwich lunch there. A Jap shell had hit the house the night before, but fortunately no one was sleeping in the room it wrecked.

I took back with me to San Miguel Major Lee, one of our oldest civil affairs officers, who had been painfully wounded in the eye with a piece of Jap shell. He eventually recovered the complete use of his eye after hospitalization, I believe, in Leyte.

I went back to Manila again the next day. Traveling was best in the very early morning to avoid the heaviest military traffic going into the city, so I left at 5:30 A.M. I took another look at Santo Tomas. The only really healthy looking internees were the children, who were having a wonderful time riding around in jeeps which were still a novelty to them. This day I had my sandwich on my old desk in the Malacanan office building and I was able to inform Hi by letter where I was by mentioning eating at my old desk without violating censorship by mentioning Manila.

*Executive of G.H.Q. Counter Intelligence Section whom I had met and liked in Brisbane and Leyte.

While I was out on the lawn by the Pasig River, a couple of bullets whizzed by. I heard later that they came from a Jap sniper in San Miguel Brewery, who was caught a few minutes later.

The civilian supply problem in Manila was serious. Not much food was coming in from the countryside and the people looked starved. One civilian supply Liberty Ship of 10,000 tons capacity had arrived at Lingayen Gulf and was being unloaded, but everything had to be trucked 120 miles to Manila over roads crowded with military traffic. Also Sears let his trucks get taken away from him from time to time without much argument. One PCAU captain and two enlisted men had done a good job quelling an incipient food riot at a warehouse near the Manila North Railroad Station which Sixth Army was using for the scanty civilian supplies available. The railroad from Lingayen Gulf to Manila was out because of destroyed bridges. The Army engineers did a splendid job of repairing these and got the railroad running to Manila in about a month.

Victor Buencamino, who had worked under the Japs on food procurement, was advising Sixth Army on a program of procurement of rice in the central Luzon Valley. Lieutenant Colonel Chiooco who was an ex-constabulary officer and friend of Confesor's expressed much doubt to me as to Buencamino's usefulness in view of his Jap collaboration record and I was

inclined to agree. Chico thought that a substantial amount of rice could be purchased in Pangasinan and Nueva Ecija under proper auspices. There was, however, no use in trying to interfere with Sixth Army's activities because it would not be long before we ourselves took over the job of feeding Manila.

The next day, 15 January, Joe Rauh arrived at San Miguel and we discussed our future operation.

One of the main questions was whether we should recommend that our section take over procurement, transportation and warehousing of locally-grown food for purposes of feeding Manila. We decided that, while it was a big job, we had better undertake it so as not to have to rely on someone else and maybe be disappointed. Marshall first decided to have USASOS do the procurement and transportation, but let us do the warehousing in Manila. Later he changed his mind and turned over procurement to the Commonwealth Government. We worked out transportation of locally procured food mainly on the railroad then it got going. We retained warehousing, which was a blessing, because it gave us complete control of the imported supplies and no one could divert them to country regions to satisfy some supposedly urgent demand. We allowed such diversions from the pressing needs of Manila only after real evidence of necessity. For example, Sears told me later that thousands were starving

on Polillo Island off the East Coast of Luzon. We asked if he had sent anyone there to check personally. He had not. An apparently responsible Filipino from Polillo just happened to come in to see us about that time and told us there was no starvation there. We told Sears he would get nothing for the place without sending one of his officers there to report. We heard no more of it.

During most of the rest of February Joe Rauh and I went to Manila on alternate days. The horrible Jap massacres of defenseless civilians affected us both at first, but we had to get hardened as much as possible to horrible sights or we couldn't do our work. The best residential district south of the Pasig was burned for the most part and civilian bodies were lying all over the place. There was nothing left of the Polo Club but the swimming pool and a corner of the kitchen. One day just east of Taft Avenue and near the University of the Philippines campus, I saw a 75 and a 50 calibre machine gun lined up side by side firing point blank down the street at some Japs. Old Fort San Antonio Abad, which had been a Spanish strong point in 1898, had been used by the Japs as a pillbox, but had been captured without much damage.

On 24 February, the day after the release of the internees from Los Banos, I went with Andres Soriano to New Bilibid prison at Muntinlupa to see them. There I

met for the first time A.D. Calhoun, the National City Bank No. 1 man, who had done a fine job as head of the American camp committee. He told me afterwards that in his dealings with the Japs he always felt like a poker player bluffing with a pair of deuces. It was dangerous poker. Some of the Santo Tomas camp leaders were executed by the Japs on one pretext or another. Calhoun told me that in his job of trying to get decent treatment for his fellow internees he was able to play off to some advantage the mutual distrust between the Jap Army and Foreign Office representatives. He had known several of the latter before the war and they were sometimes willing to help him. These internees were in much better shape than the Santo Tomas group. One reason was that Los Banos is in the country and food was easier to get than at Santo Tomas in Manila. Another reason was that the Jap guards had completely abandoned the camp for several days in early February. This gave the internees a good chance to buy food in the surrounding countryside before the guards returned.

From Muntinlupa, Soriano and I went to the Army and Navy Club in Manila, which was a First Cavalry brigade command post. The club was badly shot up. The C.P. was in the basement on the Southwest side. Major Hutchinson of our staff section started up a bank to look at the swimming pool

but Soriano hauled him back as the bank was exposed to Jap fire. Soriano told me that the room-to-room fighting in the Manila Hotel across the Lunetta from the club had ended and the hotel was in our hands. Most of the Japs had been driven into the Walled City and 8" howitzers were used to breach the walls on the South. The 37th Division had previously established a position within the walls on the North. House-to-house fighting was going on inside and the civilian casualties in the slum areas were severe.

I had previously observed our artillery fire on the Walled City from our artillery observation post on the Santo Tomas tower. One General Headquarters communique had damned the Japs for shelling Santo Tomas and killing some of the internees there, but I couldn't agree. Our military use of the tower made Santo Tomas a perfectly legitimate military target.

We went to the so-called Doctor's Emergency Hospital where one Filipino doctor and two or three Filipino nurses were doing their best with very little. The place was full of civilians, most of them seriously wounded. There were no cots or beds. A few of the worst wounded were on the litters which had been used to bring them there. The others were on the floor. Only a few of these even had a blanket. We got a PCAU ambulance and moved two badly wounded

young girls, friends of Soriano's children, out to a better-equipped hospital on the outskirts of Manila.

We went to another hospital where Marcial Lichauco and his wife were doing a wonderful job on their own. He was the joint author with Moorfield Storey of "The Conquest of the Philippines by the United States", a book published in 1926 in behalf of Philippine independence. As president of the joint Harvard-Yale Club, he had arranged a very pleasant bachelor dinner for me at the Casino Espanol a couple of days before Hi and I were married in 1929.

The next day, a Sunday, I went by jeep with Confesor and Chico from San Miguel, Tarlac, to Nueva Ecija, one of the rice centers of the Philippines and also one of the centers of the Hukbalahap movement, which was Communist led. "Hukbalahap" means "People's Army against Japan" and the Huks, as they were called for short, had reputedly done effective guerrilla work against the Japs. They were composed for the most part of poor tenant farmers and had waged war also against the Filipino landlords and guerrillas supported by the landlords. The principal object of Confesor's trip was to persuade the people to sell rice to the Commonwealth Government. He made a rousing speech to a group of leading citizens in Cabanatuan. The results of this speech and later efforts were disappointing. Most of the rice went into the black market. We attended a couple of local celebrations and a very good and, as usual in

the Philippines, more than ample luncheon. No Huks bothered us. Nobody except Japs bothered anyone in the United States uniform during the liberation.

In my travels I noticed certain interesting changes from 1929. The roads were vastly improved. A new two-strip concrete highway extended from Manila to the Lingayen Gulf and beyond. Most of the women, particularly the young ones, were dressed in American style clothing rather than the very attractive native costume prevalent in 1929. The English accent of the Filipinos who spoke English had improved greatly. This I was told was a result of sound movies.

On the way back to San Miguel we dined with the Cojuangeo family at Paniqui, Tarlac, in a house near their sugar central. The house still had sand bag fortifications around it. Confesor later put Mr. Cojuangeo in charge of the Government's rice procurement plan. His wife was the daughter of the late Senator Juan Sumulong who had long been prominent in Philippine politics. She had a good working knowledge of the rice business and modestly made some valuable suggestions.

There was a serious water shortage in Manila. The Japs had cut some water lines twice. The Filipinos began to

dig shallow wells which were almost certain to be polluted. Colonel Maurice Pincoffs from Baltimore and Johns Hopkins, who had been watching this situation for Brigadier General Denit, Theatre Surgeon, came to San Miguel to report about it. Shortly thereafter on Denit's recommendation, Pincoffs was put in charge of public health in Manila under our staff section. This was a great disappointment to Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Dy, a young and accomplished Filipino malarialogist in our section. Dy was a friend of Joe's and mine and we were also disappointed. The reason given for by-passing Dy was probably a good one. Dy had studied under some of the Filipino doctors who would have to carry on the health program in Manila and they would have resented having their former student over them. I was afraid Pincoffs would be difficult to work with because he ranked me and took Army procedure very seriously. My fears were entirely unfounded. He did a magnificent job and we got along beautifully.

On 27 February MacArthur again turned over the government to Osmena. This time it was done indoors at Malacanan Palace with a ceremony at which MacArthur and Osmena spoke, with a broadcast to the States. Machine-gun fire could be heard across the river. There were still a lot of Japs left in the Walled City.

I had short talks with Brigadier General Baker, Commanding Officer of Base X and Brigadier General Decker,

Chief of Staff, Sixth Army, about details of the turnover of Manila civil affairs to our section. I then returned to San Miguel. The next day orders were signed for the turnover at 0001 hours 2 March. Joe had gone to Manila to stay, discuss operations with the PCAU commanders there and be on hand to help when we took over.

I had a long talk with President Osmena at San Miguel. He was worried about MacArthur's insistence that he call the Philippine Congress together. This Congress had been elected in 1941 and many of its members had had extensive dealings with the Japs. Many of them had held office in the puppet republic. Many were accused of being collaborators. Osmena told me that he feared that the collaborators would control this Congress. That fear proved well founded. I have been told that the political machine which Roxas was able to build up with the aid of this Congress was what led to Osmena's defeat by Roxas in the presidential election of 1946.

Osmena told me that he was going back to the States soon for the surgical operation which he had delayed so as to return to Luzon before the entry into Manila. He said that he would again ask MacArthur to let me go with him. I thanked him, but told him that I thought I ought to stay in the Philippines at least until we got things going well in Manila.

Manila Civil Affairs

On 4 March General MacArthur's headquarters moved to Manila and I went there to stay. Joe Rauh and I were billeted at the Avenue Hotel on Rizal Avenue. It was all right except for the water shortage and the elevator breakdowns which meant climbing eight flights. But in the next two days they moved three more officers one by one into our double bedroom. Thereupon we took advantage of Major General Valdez' kind offer to stay in his house near Malacanan and there we stayed until late in May.

We set up our offices on the seventh floor of the Trade & Commerce Building in the Manila financial district north of the Pasig River. At first Joe and I were alone with the loyal help of Staff Sergeant Chuck Stoddard who came back after supper every evening without our even asking him to do so. Later we got him promoted to Second Lieutenant which he deserved. The rest of our staff section began to arrive from Tacloban in about a week.

When we took over there were eight PCAUs in Manila each responsible for a substantial area. We kept this arrangement which was one thing that Sixth Army had worked out very well, but changed the areas somewhat so as to divide the work more evenly.

Our next problem was warehousing. We were thrown out of one after another. Finally we got hold of the Philippine

Army Quartermaster Depot in the North Port Area and defended our possession of that as long as we were responsible for feeding Manila. We used that warehouse almost wholly for food. We had another smaller one for clothing and medical supplies which was adequate and which no one else seemed to want. We were ordered out of the Quartermaster Depot at least three times, but as the saying in the theatre went "The order didn't say 'positively' and didn't say 'when' so we stayed.

Corregidor had been captured a few days before with a very effective air drop. This opened Manila harbor. One of the first ships in was our half-unloaded Liberty with civil affairs supplies from Lingayen Gulf. This was great luck. It gave us 5000 tons of supplies that didn't have to be trucked from Lingayen.

The PCAUs main job in Manila was distribution of supplies. USASOS was responsible for delivery from beach or dock to the warehouse. Rauh didn't trust them too much and spent night after night on the beaches and docks particularly engaged in salvaging our medical supplies, which were specially marked, from various medical officers trying to steal them for their own installations. We had enlisted men from our staff section posted at strategic points for this purpose at all times, night and day. Sometimes, however, it took some rank

to handle it and Rauh and I, to a lesser degree, supplied this need. I had to have more sleep than he did. We assigned to each PCAU in Manila extra trucks imported by the Army for civilian use. The PCAUs drew supplies from our two central warehouses. Each PCAU had its own small warehouse in or near its headquarters. Food and clothing were then either handed out free or sold for cash to selected stores, called PCAU stores, which were required to resell at fixed prices with a modest mark-up.

Medical supplies were distributed by Colonel Pincoffs' organization except for the small amount needed in the individual PCAU dispensaries which Pincoffs supervised and coordinated. All PCAU doctors were put under Pincoffs for the Manila operation.

We directed the PCAUs to take a census and establish a simple rationing system. Each PCAU hired numbers of Filipino civilians to aid it in these tasks. Ration cards, which we had ordered printed months before in Brisbane, had gone astray so we had to improvise and print them in Manila, which then had most limited printing facilities. We took several censuses. They showed a population of 1,000,000 to 1,300,000. The population was obviously shifting considerably as some people left and others came in. Lieutenant General Griswold, C.G. XIVth Corps, originally tried to stop Filipinos from entering Manila during the fighting. I was told that MacArthur, hearing

of this, reprimanded him severely for violating his policy of no interference with civilians. I sympathized with General Griswold. However, the ration in Manila was never so attractive as to cause any great influx, as we understood had happened during the Jap occupation, and so not much harm was done.

During the period from 2 March to 10 June when we turned the whole Manila feeding job over to the Commonwealth Government we were able to feed about 1600 calories or a little less than a pound a day a person. Our supply memo in Tacloban in January had paid off.

The ratio of food given away to total distribution decreased from 38%, 14 to 21 March, to 5%, 31 May to 6 June. This was partially due to very careful checking of relief clients by the PCAUs. Chief credit, however, must be given to the individual Filipino spirit of independence. The people just didn't want charity if they could avoid it. The Army employed large numbers of laborers who consequently had cash to pay for their food and clothing. This helped to reduce the relief rolls.

Brigadier General Baker, C.G. Base X, was extremely helpful to us in many ways. One outstanding example was his furnishing a large number of trucks to the Department of Health which were used principally for sewage removal in the extensive parts of Manila which had no sewers.

Our staff section was responsible for the Fire Department. The slum districts of Tondo north of the Pasig were practically intact, teeming with poor people and notorious fire hazards, particularly in the approaching dry season of April and May. During that season the much too prevalent nipa roofs would become like tinder and the already low water pressure would get lower. Any bad fire there would add seriously to our already troublesome problem of homeless civilians.

The Manila Fire Department was in a bad way in March. Much of its equipment had been damaged by Jap fire directed against it while during the fighting the Fire Department was trying to put out fires set by the Japanese. A substantial number of its personnel had been killed or wounded at that time. Morale was low.

I put Lieutenant Wallace Smith in charge, promoting him to Captain. He was a man of about 40 whom I had selected at the Harvard military government school, mainly because of his great desire to see some action. He was an ex-marine enlisted man and ex-State policeman. He had proved helpful in Leyte on various police problems.

With what help we could give him, he did a fine job of resupplying the fire department. He made friends with some Navy fire fighters, ex-firemen from South Boston, and got a good deal of up-to-date equipment from the Navy together with

their very advanced methods of fire fighting. He was energetic and resourceful and deserves great praise for a job well done.

He firmly supported the Filipino Fire Chief who was able, but accused of collaboration. I backed him up on this with Confesor. He got uniforms for the firemen from the Army. He got their pay raised. He even started a school for recruit firemen which was a great success. We had no serious fires, but every time I heard a fire engine siren at night it gave me a bad turn.

One episode illustrates the fine cooperation we had from the Army engineers. Parts of the city were most inadequately served by fire hydrants or the water pressure was so low as to make the hydrants useless. These areas were mostly near the Pasig River or the esteros (estuaries) running into the river. At first the engineers suggested pumping river water back into the water supply pipes in case of fire. The medicos properly objected to this for sanitary reasons. Then Colonel Brown, a civilian engineer in peace time, hit upon the answer. He suggested laying so-called "invasion pipe", a light pipe, up from the river and esteros and covering it with planks where it had to cross streets. In case of fire, water could then be pumped up through the invasion pipe which was promptly installed in all the dangerous areas.

Part of our job was coordinating our work with the Police Department. This was a real pleasure as long as

Major General Dunkel was in charge and was entirely satisfactory afterwards when Colonel Purdy succeeded Dunkel, who was invalided home. I don't believe that Dunkel had ever recovered fully from the head wound he got on the way to the Mindoro landing.

Joe and I, or both of us, met almost daily after breakfast with Confesor in his house on the Malacanan grounds. His cabinet job of Secretary of the Interior was the senior cabinet position. During Osmena's visit to the States for his operation, Confesor was acting President. One of our principal objectives was to help the Filipinos to take over all of the work we were doing as rapidly as possible. All kinds of problems had to be worked out with Confesor. There was the domestic rice buying program for which he was responsible. We furnished his deputy Cojuangco with some transportation and one or two civil affairs officers to help him. Confesor thought that the PCAU stores should comply with municipal ordinances as to licensing and payment of fees. We got him to withhold enforcement of these ordinances which would have badly disrupted our food distribution. Extra pay for policemen and firemen had to be worked out. The policemen's pre-war pay was almost an open invitation to bribery under inflationary post-war conditions.

One of my most difficult problems was that of Chinese operation of public market stalls. In August 1941

a Manila municipal ordinance had been passed prohibiting foreigners from operating these stalls. It was directed squarely at the Chinese who were excellent merchants and had most of the stalls. The ordinance gave the foreigners three years to get out. That time limit had expired in August 1944. The matter was a real political issue. Confesor issued a decree throwing the Chinese out at an early date. This not only raised an ugly issue with the Chinese, but hampered an important facility for food distribution. I took the matter up with our consul general newly arrived. He could do nothing, because the State Department in 1941 had ruled that, as these stalls were the property of the City of Manila, they could do what they pleased with them and the State Department would not interfere in spite of the vigorous protests of the Chinese Government. The Chinese consul general in 1945 again objected to Confesor and to me. Obviously the three-year period of grace had done the Chinese no good as it had been all during Jap occupation. Finally, Confesor, practically as a personal favor to me, agreed to recommend to Osmena a suspension of the ordinance to 31 December 1945. This was done. The Chinese consul general was so grateful that he wanted to give Joe Rauh and me a Chinese decoration, but found he couldn't because MacArthur had never received one and he couldn't

decorate subordinates first. Shortly thereafter China decorated MacArthur, but ours was evidently forgotten.

We had weekly meetings of the PCAU commanders in Manila. At these meetings we put up on a big black-board the figures about population and feeding. Questions of general policy were discussed and individual problems stated. These meetings I believe were useful.

As time elapsed and the Manila PCAUs had reduced food and clothing distribution to a routine operation, they didn't have enough to do and some got lazy. I had to say a few unpleasant words about certain over strenuous parties I had heard about, but no real trouble developed in this direction.

These officers were handling supplies of considerable value. A dishonest officer or more likely two or three of them working together could have made substantial illicit profits in the black market. Colonel Purdy, the Manila Provost Marshal, told me one day that he was about to spring a trap on one of our PCAU officers alleged to be in on a crooked deal of some \$200,000. I asked him who it was, but he wouldn't tell me and said that he probably shouldn't have told me as much as he had. I had intended for some time to have an audit of the PCAUs. I got Hank Cobb, who was a CPA and told him to find some auditors and start an audit. He explained to me how impossible it was to run a real audit

I told him that I agreed, but that most PCAU officers wouldn't know that and it might deter someone who might be on the verge of doing something dishonest. He got hold of three or four enlisted men with auditing experience and put them to work. The results were somewhat fantastic, but no crookedness turned up and if Purdy sprang his trap I never heard of it and no scandal ensued.

I know that we lost a certain amount of supplies on the way to our warehouses. USASOS couldn't get any guards for their trucks except Filipino M.P.s who were terribly underpaid and who felt that stealing a sack of rice for their family was their highest duty. We had one bad episode in our food warehouse when the officer in charge got drunk and the Filipino laborers, taking prompt advantage of his inert condition, pilfered an unimportant amount of food. I know of no serious losses or dishonesty and I believe that if any of our officers had been in business for himself, it would have been discovered. No doubt there was petty pilfering by Filipinos, but I do not believe that the aggregate loss of supplies under PCAU control was important.

About the middle of March Confesor impulsively suggested to me that we let the Commonwealth Government take over all food distribution in Manila. I told him we would do that whenever they were ready, but that I was certain he had no organization capable of replacing overnight all eight

PCAU's with their approximately eighty officers, over 300 enlisted men and transportation which we couldn't yet turn over to the Commonwealth Government as the PCAU's when released from Manila might be needed in other operations. I suggested that they get ready instead to take over from one PCAU and build their own organization from experience in this one area. A few days later we turned over the PCAU No. 8 district to the Commonwealth Government, releasing that PCAU for an operation in the Bicol Peninsula 26 March. The poor Filipinos who took over had a bad time. Instead of jeeps they had to ride bicycles. The organizational transportation had to go with PCAU-8. We were able to leave for the Filipinos only the extra civilian trucks which we had turned over to the PCAU's in Manila and these were inadequate. Gradually we got the Emergency Control Administration Unit (ECAU), as the government unit was called, more or less equipped, but it was a long time before the government took on any more areas and then they did it somewhat reluctantly. In charge of the ECAU was Miguel Cuaderno, later Finance Minister, Co-chairman with me of the Joint American Philippine Finance Commission and Governor of the Central Bank.

I then discovered that Confesor had no funds with which to operate his ECAU and proposed to pay for it by selling supplies at a profit to the government. Of course we couldn't allow any profit on supplies which the Army was

subsidizing except the moderate retail mark-up which the PCAU stores had been allowed to charge. Confesor, therefore, got Osmena to appropriate by executive decree one million pesos for ECAU operations.

We had been so busy getting Manila organized that there had been no time until the middle of March for our supervisory trips to combat areas. Confesor had decided to appoint certain officials in Mindanao, Panay and Negros and asked to have Joe Rauh go along to help his deputy Guingona, former Commissioner for Mindanao and Sulu. This also gave Joe a chance to do some inspecting in the Eighth Army area and he took off 17 March. During March I was able to look over some PCAU activity north and east of Manila in Sixth Army territory.

Confesor's great friend Dr. Canizares' father-in-law had a pleasant house in Malolos, the capital of the old Philippine Insurrection Republic just after the Spanish American War. Malolos is a lovely old Spanish town about 25 miles north of Manila and was untouched by combat. I went there several times with Confesor and enjoyed it thoroughly.

The Canizares hospitable treatment of Confesor's Corporal-driver who was invited to dine at the family table showed how little the Filipinos cared about Army rank. I have always thought that my having served in the Philippines with Mr. Stimson, whom the Filipinos trusted and respected,

was more useful to me in my dealing with them than two stars on each shoulder would have been.

During March we finally got in writing the Commonwealth Government's agreement to reimburse the Army for the pay of government officials and school teachers. This was a great relief to the finance officers and in turn to me because it got the finance officers off my neck.

Late in March Confesor and I went up to Paniqui to discuss the rice buying program with Cojuangco. It wasn't going well, mainly because of the high black market prices, secondarily because to be effective it should have been started in late January or early February, right after the harvest, and there was too much war going on then to do much rice buying. Nevertheless enough rice was bought so that in a period of emergency later we were able to ship by rail some 700 tons into Manila from Cojuangco's warehouse in Paniqui.

As more normal life returned to Manila, the need for banking facilities began to be felt. As I have said, Osmena had closed all banks in liberated areas by executive order in Leyte. The Philippine Government wanted to open the government-owned Philippine National Bank, but it was clearly insolvent until later when the Government subordinated some of its deposits. Meanwhile the Army was anxious to have the National City Bank's branch opened and our section helped out Calhoun and others in obtaining materials to renovate their

burned out premises. We also helped in requests to send out new personnel from the States, as Calhoun and others of his staff who had been interned badly needed to go home for rest and recuperation. I also did what I could to help get a replacement for Jim Rockwell to run the Manila Electric Company. Pat Jollye, a former executive, was sent out and did a fine job.

Late in March the United States Treasury requested permission of MacArthur to send their foreign funds control experts to Manila. Marshall told me to find some legal reason why they couldn't come. I reported to him that I could find none, unless MacArthur wanted to forbid them to come, which was his right as theatre commander. I asked Marshall why he objected to their coming. He said "Don't you realize that it is the policy of this theatre to buck Washington". I told him that I did, but saw no point in it when what Washington wanted would help us. Nevertheless, Marshall prepared and MacArthur approved the stock radio for refusal of undesired personnel (including the Surgeon General of the Army earlier), i.e. lack of housing, messing and transportation facilities. This was dispatched and I forgot about the matter. Shortly after this various additional messages were sent to the War Department urging the sending of National City Bank personnel to open up the branch in Manila. The answer to these messages finally came back signed "Stimson", which was unusual as

most messages from the War Department were signed "Marshall". This message said in effect "Don't bother me with requests to send out representatives of a private bank so long as you are unwilling to accept financial representatives of your own government". This gave Joe Rauh and me a big laugh. Willie Chanler told me afterwards that he had written the radio. The Treasury foreign funds control men were then allowed in, followed closely by National City Bank representatives.

Between one and two hundred thousand people were homeless in Manila after the fighting. So-called "refugee homes" were established under PCAU supervision accomodating about sixty thousand on 1 March. The balance had moved in with relatives in Manila or had joined relatives in the country. Maintenance of adequate sanitation in these temporary quarters was extremely difficult. We made every effort to get the refugees to join relatives in the provinces and furnished transportation for that purpose. Various suggestions were made for building adequate refugee camps just outside of Manila. Whitney resisted all such suggestions, for fear of creating a permanent pauper situation. He believed that eventually all of these people would take care of themselves. His judgment turned out to be correct. By 1 June only 6000 of these refugees still remained in Manila. The problem had solved itself largely by the unusual degree of family loyalty in the Philippines. Families feel an obligation to relatives of much more distant degrees

of relationship than is the case with us.

Supervision of Civil Affairs In and Out of Manila

Joe and I alternated our more extended inspection trips so that one of us could be in Manila most of the time. When he returned from his Visayan trip late in March, I started north. I flew by C-57 to Lingayen to inspect the PCAUs in the neighborhood. I stayed at Base M headquarters at San Fabian, Pangasinan. I had a very satisfactory talk with Brigadier General Brown, Commander of Base M, and his civil affairs officer, Lieutenant Colonel Grimes. Grimes took me around in his jeep.

The first day we went up the coast to San Fernando, La Union, looked over the new Base M headquarters site south of that town and had a good swim. We called on PCAU-7 which had done an excellent job in Leyte, and apparently was doing well in Luzon also, still under command of Lieutenant Colonel Hopson.

Operations for the capture of Baguio were proceeding rapidly. We started to go up the Kennon Road towards Baguio, which the 33rd Division was approaching, but did not get far. The 33rd Division Commander, Major General Clarkson, had given strict orders to the M.P.s not to let anyone go up the road without legitimate business. There was no civil affairs activity on this mountain road, only fighting, so the

M.P. would not let us proceed. On our way down, the General passed us in his jeep so it's just as well we obeyed the M.P. I had met the General earlier at Hopson's headquarters and from hearing him question Hopson learned that he had a very inquiring mind.

The next day Colonel Grimes took me to Rosales where Hi and I had stopped for dinner on our way to Baguio in times of peace. We visited I Corps headquarters near there. Lieutenant Colonel Erickson, one of the officers I had recruited in the States, was acting very successfully as I Corps civil affairs officer. He seemed to be coping adequately with all of his problems.

I found that the C-47 to Manila the next day was full, but was offered a ride on a B-25 which I was told was part of a formation to bomb Baguio the next day, but would take me to Manila after dropping its bombs. This sounded fine, but when I looked for the formation on the strip, nobody had heard of it. There was a formation set up to bomb Hong Kong, but that was in the opposite direction from Manila. Finally, I discovered that there was a B-25 "fat cat", i.e. no guns, which was going to drop some of Fellers' psychological warfare material on Baguio and would then take me to Manila. Before we started the pilot decided that the ceiling was too low over Baguio and so gave that up. Instead he dropped his papers over Jap installations in the Marakina Valley Northeast of Manila, keeping well up for

fear of ack ack. Then he went over a town East of the Laguna de Bay at about 300 feet. I could see Jap soldiers and trucks in the street but they didn't bother us and we landed safely at Nichols Field a few minutes later.

Shortly after this trip, Captain Smith took me on a personally conducted tour of his fire department. He had improved things greatly since my last inspection two weeks before. Everything went well until we got to a small fire station in the outskirts of Manila. I asked to have the old pre-war fire engine there run out to see how it worked. The crew could not start the motor and poor Smith was most embarrassed. He told me the next day that it was running and would stay running which I believed.

We had prepared and on 9 April submitted to Marshall a memorandum outlining a program for complete turnover of civil affairs activities in the Philippines to the Commonwealth Government by 1 July. He liked the program but, correctly as it turned out, doubted if we could accomplish it that soon. He had become educated about our difficulties and no longer believed that Army civil affairs was unnecessary in the Philippines. Then he made what to me was an amazing suggestion for him, that our staff section take over direct operational control of all Philippine civil affairs until the turnover could be accomplished. This revolutionary and complimentary suggestion I would have welcomed six months earlier,

but it seemed unwise now for several reasons. First, the short time left for the operation hardly justified increasing our section to the extent necessary for adequate supervision. Second, Eighth Army was doing such a good civil affairs job in the Visayans and Mindanao that I didn't want to relieve them. Third, Eighth Army was destined shortly to take over from Sixth Army in Luzon. What I did recommend was that our section should take over operational control of civil affairs in Sixth Army territory north of Manila to Lingayen Gulf. Marshall agreed with this and it was done some time in advance of the final turnover to the Commonwealth Government.

I was convinced that most of the civilian supplies which the Army distributed were sold to the first purchaser at our official prices. There was, however, a market in local products the volume of which it was impossible even to estimate. I suspected that it was thinner than was generally assumed. I knew for instance that a lot of the local rice brought into Manila by individuals never reached this market because it consisted of gifts from country cousins to city cousins. Therefore the observed private flow of rice into Manila was no basis for estimating the volume of this market. From stories I heard it seemed to me possible that a good deal of food was hoarded due to the fear that the imported supply would stop. I heard numerous tales of Filipinos who were

getting a fairly adequate ration from the Army, but who would go into the market to buy a surplus stock which they enjoyed looking at with almost miserly eyes. Many of these people had been so close to starvation during the Jap occupation that it was hard for them to believe that the danger of hunger was over. I discussed this fear element with Colonel Ken Dyke, chief of the Information and Education Section, at lunch one day. He made the interesting suggestion that we try to counteract this fear by an educational program, using sound trucks and interspersing the education with the amusement programs. He said that the Japs had used such methods with good success in large Chinese cities and that he believed it was the only effective propaganda method in the Orient where few people could read newspapers and even fewer owned radios. In spite of our efforts, however, we were never able to get sound trucks for this purpose.

Between 10 and 12 April I made an inspection trip which took me through Pampanga province to Olongapo on Subic Bay and down Bataan peninsula to Corregidor. Lieutenant Commander Stilly Taylor, son of my friends, Henry and Jeanette, had lunched with me in Manila a few days before. He was in command of the P.T. boats in Subic Bay and invited me to come to see him. He was away from Olongapo when I got there, but his friends invited me out to dinner on the P.T. mother ship. I had learned never to miss an opportunity to eat Navy food,

so I accepted promptly and had a delicious meal prefaced by a couple of illegal beers with Stilly's P.T. officer friends.

I spent the night with the local PCAU officers at Subic and started for Bataan the next morning. Part of a PCAU had headquarters at Abucay on Bataan. One of the officers took me over the East-West road to the little fishing village of Bagac on the West Coast of Bataan. On the way we had a couple of carbine shots at some beautiful wild chickens. We missed them. They look like domestic Rhode Island reds except that they are much more brightly colored and the cocks have long sweeping tails. The road was in bad shape and many of the bridges were out, but the streams were easily fordable in the then dry season. The people of the isolated barrier of Bagac were greatly worried about food for the ensuing rainy season. I decided to furnish as much stockpile as possible. If this was insufficient these people would have to be supplied by boat from Olongapo.

We returned to the East Coast by the same road and then went on down the Bataan peninsula on the east road. It was April 10, close to the anniversary of the "Death March" after the Bataan surrender. The heat was terrific and it wasn't hard to imagine the sufferings of those poor men forced to march to the prison camp at Camp O'Donnell far to the north, many without food or water. Many Filipinos who tried to give them water were shot in cold blood by the Jap

guards.

We went over from Mariveles to Corregidor on a water boat. There were still a lot of parachutes hanging in trees in the gullies on the west of the rock where some paratroopers had overshoot their landing place on top. There were still a lot of Japs in various caves on the island. Our troops were gradually digging them out. I read in the paper at home later that a number of Japs surrendered there as late as November 1945 and seemed to be well fed by the rice they had been able to store in their cave.

As a result of the Jap bombing in 1941 and 1942 and our bombing in 1945, very few structures were left at all intact. Japanese helmets could be had as souvenirs by digging Jap skulls out, but I didn't want souvenirs that badly. There were bales of Jap occupation currency around. Some of our soldiers were at work digging Jap "Q" boats out of caves on the beach to the south of the island. These fast little boats were mounted on carriages which ran into the water on marine railways from the caves where they were hidden. Each boat had a heavy TNT charge in the bow. The one operator was supposed to do a suicide job by running the boat into a United States ship. I was told that only one of them ever succeeded in doing any damage in Manila Bay.

On the way back up the very rough road on the East of Bataan my PCAU officer friend began driving his jeep at an

alarming rate of speed. He explained that he was going that fast because it was getting dark and some of the several hundred Japs still on Bataan were apt to come down to the road about that time of day. I had no further objection to his speeding.

On 15 April a most impressive memorial service for President Roosevelt was held on the roof of the Trade and Commerce Building. There was still a lot of fighting going on in the hills and mountains east and northeast of Manila and the sounds of artillery fire could be heard throughout the service.

Irving Berlin brought the show "This is the Army" to the southwest Pacific and put on performances in various places in the Philippines. I went to the Manila show. It was excellently done, and particularly appreciated after a long time away from such things.

Later in April Joe Rauh wrote me from Panay, Confesor's native island and political bailiwick where Joe had gone to inspect PCAUs. He was much disturbed by the situation there as it affected Confesor. Confesor had been at sword's point with Colonel Peralta, head of the Panay guerrillas. Confesor was appointing Mayors and other officials on a purely personal basis and without regard to the popularity or political strength of the appointees. Rauh predicted accurately that Confesor was building up real political trouble for himself which might be serious enough

to eliminate him from his high national position where he was needed. After Joe returned we told Confesor our fears, but he laughed at us as novices in Philippine politics, which we were. Whether a more moderate policy of appointments in Panay would have saved him when the collaborationist Congress finally refused to confirm him as Secretary of the Interior, I believe is doubtful. Certainly, however, the powerful enemies he made in his own home island didn't help him any at the crucial point.

While Joe was away I took a trip with Lieutenant Colonel Davis, XIth Corps civil affairs officer, and Mr. Richards of the United States consulate to see what we could of the fighting going on Northeast of Manila. On our way we stopped at the Manila leprosarium which had been badly shot up. Most of the lepers had fled, but a few were still there.

There was a lot of air activity over the hills in the distance. We didn't know exactly where to go. Colonel Davis told us that he had been particularly warned to avoid one crossroad known as the "hot corner". When we finally arrived at a 112th RCT battalion command post we learned that we had passed the so-called "hot corner" innocently and without incident. The young officers in this command post seemed to be glad to see us and explained the tactical situation to us in detail. They were near the Ipo Dam, one of the most

important sources of the Manila water supply, which was reportedly held by about 6000 Japs. The 112th RCT consisted then of three battalions of about 350 each, half under strength. There were persistent rumors of a Jap counter-attack which would have been hard for the 112th to cope with. I don't believe that the counter-attack ever developed, but the 43rd Division was thrown in before we took Ipo Dam.

Down in a valley north of this command post, a battery of 105 howitzers was firing. I wore artillery crossed cannon insignia so when I stopped, the battery commander thought that I was inspecting him. I didn't know enough about modern artillery to ask him any more technical question than what he was shooting at. This was a safe question and brought out the clear answer "Jap caves near Ipo Dam". I thanked him for the information and moved on to our mutual relief. I had been afraid that he might ask me some embarrassing technical artillery question.

The Roxas Problem

In the evening, 22 April, Colonel Bob Kreuter, who was also living in Valdez' house, came back with an astounding story of a dinner which he, Fellers and Soriano had had with Roxas, who with various other politicians had recently come through the Jap lines around Baguio. The others had all been jailed as collaborators, but MacArthur had put Roxas, who was

a Brigadier General, on his staff. Kreuter said that Roxas at dinner had told them the story of the Philippine puppet republic's declaration of war on the United States and United Kingdom in September 1944, as follows: Laurel, the puppet President, called Roxas to Malacanan Palace at about 1 o'clock one morning and told him that Tokyo had ordered him to declare war on the United States and United Kingdom. Laurel said that he would rather be shot than do it. Roxas advised him to stall Tokyo while they thought it over. The next day Roxas returned and advised Laurel to obey the Tokyo order on two grounds: (1) if Laurel didn't obey, he would be replaced by someone who would be much worse for the Filipinos; (2) the declaration of war was legally invalid without Congressional ratification and Roxas guaranteed that the Philippine Congress would not ratify it.

Bob Kreuter told me that Roxas in answer to a question had said that he had told the substance of this story to MacArthur. I was much disturbed, even if MacArthur knew all about it, to have Roxas while on MacArthur's staff, admitting even to good friends that he had given such advice. I told the story to Whitney the first thing the next morning. Whitney said that he must tell it to MacArthur, with which I fully agreed, but I asked him to wait a short time so that I could talk to Soriano and urge him to tell it to MacArthur himself so as to avoid MacArthur's criticizing Soriano and

Fellers for failure to advise him of this important conversation.

I went down immediately to see Soriano, who started to tell me the story himself in strict confidence. I told him that was no use, that I knew it already and strongly urged him to tell it to MacArthur immediately before Whitney reported about it.

Soriano and Fellers did tell the story to MacArthur who, Soriano told me, instructed them to go to Roxas and tell him not to mention the episode again while he was on MacArthur's staff. So far as I know MacArthur never took any other action on the subject.

There has been much criticism of General MacArthur for his special treatment of Roxas. As I have said, when most of the politicians who had followed Yamashita to Baguio when he left Manila in December 1944 came through the Jap lines before we captured Baguio, all but Roxas were jailed as collaborators. Brigadier General Thorpe, Chief of MacArthur's C.I.C. section, told me that he put Roxas under house arrest in Manila, but was ordered by Sutherland, almost certainly upon MacArthur's instructions, to discontinue this arrest. MacArthur then, as I have said, put Roxas on his staff where he served for several weeks. Later MacArthur vouched completely for his loyalty and indicated that Roxas had been his principal agent in the Philippines during the Jap occupation. Major

Ramsay, an American guerrilla leader on Luzon, told me that when he came into Manila in disguise during the occupation, he always saw Roxas who gave him much assistance. I also knew that there was a good deal of talk in Tacloban about trying to get Roxas out of Luzon while it was still in Jap hands, but understood that it was concluded to be too dangerous to Roxas' life, as he was under careful observation by the Japs. There was a rumor that he had made one attempt to escape from Manila, but was brought back by the Japs.

What I have set down above is all that I know of the facts on Roxas' loyalty. It seems to me most likely that he was loyal to the United States at heart and in most of his actions, but it is hard to condone his advice to Laurel to declare war. I can understand Laurel or anyone else making the declaration under duress, but Roxas' advice seems to me worse because it was not given under any duress. The best that can be said of it is that it was wrongheaded. The worst construction is that Roxas was trying to make character with the Japs in case they won. I am inclined to the former theory. I don't see how as intelligent a man as Roxas could have believed in September 1944 that the Japs could win, but I don't know how much outside information was available to him at that time.

MacArthur has been charged with handling affairs in the Philippines so as to promote deliberately the election

of Roxas and the defeat of Osmena as President in 1946. The principal steps which he took which contributed to this result were: (1) allowing or urging Osmena to issue the equal pay order for Philippine Army troops in November 1944; when this had to be rescinded it hurt Osmena greatly politically; (2) urging Osmena to call the collaborator Congress in 1945 and seeing that a quorum was present even though it consisted of some individuals who had not been screened for loyalty by the C.I.C.; (3) dissuading Osmena from dissolving the Congress on sound but technical legal grounds (i.e. that the term of 1/3 of the Senators had expired) when its collaborationist complexion had become clear; (4) giving Roxas the special treatment mentioned above and not putting him in jail as a collaborator. It was the combination of Roxas and the collaborationist Congress, of which Roxas was the undisputed leader and hero, which built the political machine which defeated Osmena. I was present at the opening session of this Congress and saw myself the wild enthusiasm with which its members greeted Roxas.

MacArthur obviously sincerely believed in Roxas' fundamental loyalty in spite of the declaration of war episode and therefore could not have put him in jail. I can also see how MacArthur felt that the democratic thing to do was to call the Congress and keep it in session thus putting an end to legislation by emergency executive decrees.

I cannot believe that MacArthur consciously tried to interfere with the election. That would have been contrary to his often stated purpose to let the Filipinos run their own show. I am sure that MacArthur considered Roxas the better man for the Presidency, but I cannot believe that he followed a deliberate course of action designed to injure Osmena and help Roxas, although I believe that what he did contributed to that result.

More Civil Affairs Work

The need for public transportation service became pressing. Our section wanted it mainly for transportation of food into Manila, but the transportation of passengers within Manila was important. The companies which operated before the war had turned over their trucks and buses to the Army at the time of the Jap invasion. Almost all of the pre-war motor transportation still left in the Philippines in 1945 was in very bad condition. We had imported as part of the civil affairs program a large number of trucks and we decided to turn most of these over to the companies which had operated pre-war, pro rata on the basis of their pre-war fleets. Due to the many difficulties and delays involved in selling Army property to the companies on credit, which was essential in this case because most of the companies didn't have enough cash, we decided to turn them over to the Philippine Government against receipts which was entirely legal and worked out an arrangement by which the Philippine

Government would then sell these trucks to the companies on an instalment payment basis. Confesor insisted that his government be allowed to retain a small proportion of these trucks to start a government operated bus line in Manila. A large part of the trucks were ingeniously and rapidly converted into buses using locally available material and the transportation system was soon functioning. The buses were equipped to carry passengers and freight.

Early in May, Joe and I went to call on Mr. Guingona, Commissioner for Mindanao and Sulu, whom Joe had met on his first Visayan trip in March. Guingona had part of a plane propellor in his back yard. He told us that it had come from a Navy plane which was shot down in his garden during one of Halsey's raids while the Japs still held Manila. Five Navy fliers were killed and buried in his garden. He told us that Filipino women put flowers on these graves every night. The Japs removed them every morning and finally posted a guard there at night.

We thought we had merely gone for a call, but discovered that we were expected to stay for a high tea. This eliminated very effectively the Saturday evening work which we had planned, which was just as well for a change.

On 6 May I started by jeep for Batangas, Batangas to inspect the PCAU there. On the way I stopped off at XIVth Corps Headquarters and had a satisfactory talk with

Colonel Hottenstein, the Corps Civil Affairs Officer. Further down the line I had an interesting talk with Colonel Milton, Corps Chief of Staff, whom I had met before when his Corps headquarters was just north of Manila. Colonel Milton's interest in the civil affairs problems was very helpful.

The PCAU at Batangas was comfortably lodged in a big house belonging to the Villanueva family. They gave a dance the evening I was there in honor of the birthday of one of the family and a good time was enjoyed by all.

The next day I looked over the provincial buildings which were quite elaborate and pleasantly situated on a hill above the town. Batangas had been badly damaged, Lipa, a few miles to the north was worse. I remembered Lipa in pre-war days as one of the most substantially built old Spanish towns in Luzon. It had been a center of the Philippine coffee industry and a very wealthy town until the coffee blight practically ruined the industry in the latter part of the 19th century. The Dutch in the East Indies apparently found an answer to a similar blight, but the Spaniards were not so successful. Lipa had been a favorite shopping place for antique Spanish furniture.

Just after I returned to Manila news came of the German surrender. I made a 1 to 10 bet with Colonel Ray Kramer on 8 May that Japan would surrender within three

months and only lost it by a few days.

On 9 May the Manila symphony orchestra staged its first post-liberation concert. Dr. Zipper, a Viennese refugee, was the conductor. He and his wife had left Vienna to avoid the Nazis and had landed in Manila which the Japs soon converted into a most troubled haven for refugees. He and his wife, not being enemy aliens, were not interned by the Japs, but had had a very uncomfortable time. It had been impossible to keep the orchestra up during the Jap occupation. As soon as Manila was liberated, however, Zipper went to work with his musicians. The Army cleaned up the ruins of the old Santa Cruz church on the north side of the Pasig for the first concert. All of the walls were intact, but there was no roof. Zipper put on a very creditable concert, the principal number being Beethoven's Eroica. It was quite an achievement so soon after the fighting in Manila.

When I first went to Malacanan in February, I had run into Appolonio who was the receptionist outside Mr. Stimson's office when he was Governor General. We greeted each other as old friends. I asked him about Ramon Atienza, our favorite house boy in 1929. Appolonio said "Oh, sir, he has been in the province for many months". I told Appolonio that I should like to hire him to work for me. Apparently word went out on the bamboo telegraph and about the middle

of May Ramon turned up in my office ready to go to work for me, but not at the wages we paid in 1929. He told me that he had gone to the States for a while as valet for Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. after he had finished as Governor General. Ramon fitted well into our mess at General Valdez' house and took beautiful care of my few personal belongings.

On 14 May I started out for Eighth Army Headquarters for an inspection trip. I flew from Nichols Field to Tacloban, where it was still raining, and I got well soaked in my ride down to Tolosa where Vance met me. I spent the night there. The next day Vance and I took off in a Navy PB4 for Mindanao. We landed in the bay at Parang and got a jeep from X Corps to take us down to inspect Lieutenant Colonel Senate's PCAU at Cotobato where we spent the night. His PCAU was the one which I had seen at Valencia in northwest Leyte in January. Senate had bought one of the most beautiful Moro daggers I had ever seen. I tried to buy it from him, but he stuck to his misguided idea of giving it to some college in the States.

The next day Vance and I met Lieutenant Colonel Fertig at X Corps Headquarters. Fertig was a mining engineer who had headed the guerrilla movement in Mindanao during most of the occupation and had performed superbly. He was extremely interesting.

Vance and I wanted to go to Zamboanga where there was a PCAU. We couldn't seem to arrange a plane trip, but heard that a Navy tanker in Parang harbor was headed that way. We went out on a landing craft to inquire and the skipper, a young Lieutenant, told us to climb aboard. He had two empty officers' berths. The tanker had been manufactured somewhere on the upper Mississippi River and floated down to the Gulf in two pieces. She was spic and span. The mess was up to usual Navy standards, but the great feature was hot showers. I had my first hot bath for many months and stayed under the shower about an hour. We also slept in beds with sheets which was an unaccustomed luxury. The next morning we reached Zamboanga and thanked our new Navy friends for a most pleasant ride.

The PCAU in Zamboanga was the only one I saw which did not get along well with the Division, the 41st, to which it was attached. I think that this was largely the fault of the PCAU Commander, who was quite tactless. He started out wrong by moving into the best house at Pettit Barracks, the Army post there. He was promptly and properly run out by the Division Commander when the latter came ashore. That started him off badly and from the complaints about him by the 41st Division Chief of Staff, it appeared that he hadn't recovered much ground since. Vance and I lectured him somewhat and it did not become necessary to remove him.

Vance and I went out to see the San Ramon penal colony, of which the Filipinos were justly proud. It was built along the lines of individual houses where the prisoners could live with their wives and avoided the conventional prison atmosphere almost entirely. Apparently the experiment had been highly successful. On the way back we had a good swim on a beach covered with signs warning of land mines, which signs we correctly assumed were out of date. It was strange that this, my most southerly swim, was also the coolest I had in the Philippines.

We called on Colonel Jerry Jerome (a close friend of Great's) in command of the 13th and 14th Marine Air Groups, which were supporting the 41st Division in North Central Mindanao and also at Davao. I tried to get him to let me go on a bombing mission over Davao. He practically promised to send me, but finally didn't do it. I couldn't make out whether he was most scared of regulations, Hi or Great in case I got hurt. I had been on the receiving end of Jap bombs so long in Tacloban that I was disappointed not to be on the sending end for once.

Jerry fixed Vance and me up with a ride on a Marine C-47 to Guian a big naval base on the south tip of Samar. We lunched with the Naval Commander there and also inspected the PCAU which was having great trouble moving civilians. The Navy had expanded its plans so often that

some families had been moved three or four times to make room for Navy installations.

The Guian church is one of the oldest, if not the oldest, in the Philippines. We called on the priests who proudly showed us their beautiful old altar silver which they had hidden successfully from the Japs.

On 20 May Vance and I flew up from Samar to Eighth Army Headquarters in Leyte. I spent a day in Tacloban looking over Base K civil affairs activities which then consisted principally of delivering supplies to the Leyte provincial officials for distribution. I had a pleasant luncheon with the Abesamis family. The next day I returned to Manila in an Eighth Army C-47.

Joe Rauh met me at Nichols Field and told me that he had arranged for us to move with Ray Kramer into a nice apartment in the "Gomez Mansions", an apartment house just off Taft Avenue south of the Rizal Stadium. There we had a kitchen, dining room and large living room and the luxury of a bedroom apiece. Joe and I shared a bathroom. Kramer had one to himself. The water pressure was too low to reach us, so an Army water wagon filled up our bath tubs and several G.I. cans daily. Bathing was largely accomplished by use of tin hats until some of our enlisted men fixed up a shower in the garage, the water supply being a fifty gallon gasoline drum in the garage loft which the water wagon also

filled daily. We set up a good mess with Ramon, another houseboy and a Chinese cook. We lived there in great comfort for the rest of my tour of duty in Manila.

Whitney told me that MacArthur had asked the War Department to furnish him a general officer as his chief of military government for the Japanese operation, saying that he had no general officer in the theatre available for this duty. I think that Whitney, who had become a Brigadier General, felt somewhat hurt by this, but he did not say so.

On 22 May a large mission from Washington arrived in Manila headed by Senator Millard Tydings. Their object was to survey war damage and make recommendations to Congress as to aid for the Philippines. They went nowhere outside of Manila and stayed, I believe, less than a week. Kramer was put in charge of them and for a while they were kept strictly away from our civil affairs section, the logical place for them to get information. Ed Hester was a member of the mission. I had known him quite well when I was with the Civil Affairs Division in the Pentagon in July and August 1944. He was the representative of the Department of the Interior on the Philippine Civil Affairs ad hoc committee. Joe Rauh knew Professor Elliott of Harvard, another member of the mission, quite well. From talks with these two and others, it became plain that Kramer was giving

the impression that he was the chief civil affairs officer of the theatre. I told Whitney this, but he wisely decided to do nothing about it. Hester and Elliott told Tydings that Whitney was head of civil affairs, with the result that Tydings called Whitney, Joe Rauh and me in for a two hour session just before the mission left. The conference didn't accomplish much. Tydings' chief interest seemed to be the percentage of destruction in Manila which was hard to estimate and did not seem too important. Anyone could see that it was very extensive.

Tydings, upon invitation, attended a session of the Philippine cabinet. Confesor told me that he asked Tydings what the reaction of the United States Congress would be if the Philippine Government asked for a postponement or reconsideration of independence. Tydings instantly replied that the United States Congress would pay no attention to such a request and that independence on July 4, 1946 was a settled matter. It seems to me that he thus improperly assumed a great burden of responsibility. I am inclined to think that he was wrong in his judgment of how the United States Congress would have received such a request. I cannot say whether the Philippine Government would ever have made such a request, but Tydings' reply may well have put an effective damper on the desire for delay or reconsideration of independence in view of the then rather prevalent fear of the responsibilities of

independence in 1946 because of the almost total disruption of Philippine economy by the war. I had personally believed for a long time that the Filipinos were entitled to their independence if they really wanted it, but I had never thought that it should be forced on them. Tydings' reply indicated that our Congress would do just that. I can never believe that the pressure groups - Cuban sugar interests, labor lobby and farm lobby, who had a good deal to do with Philippine independence because of fear of Philippine competition - would have been strong enough in Congress in 1945 to cause to be rejected any serious Filipino request for reconsideration or postponement of independence.

On 28 May, Osmena had a large reception for the Tydings mission on the eve of its return to the States. I saw Roxas there for the first time since 1929 and had a talk with him about the Philippine law designed to enable the government to purchase large farms and resell to tenants on easy terms. He told me that he was the author of this law and had great hopes for its future. Admiral Barbey was there and we had a talk about the Leyte convoy days of the the Blue Ridge. Colonel Ijams, a member of the Tydings mission, had been in the Veterans Bureau when my father was its medical director. I had a pleasant talk with him about my father.

Ray Kramer, who had done a fine job trouble-shooting logistic problems for Dick Marshall, was running out of work

and looking for more. He got Marshall to put him in charge of long-range Philippine rehabilitation. This task was certain to overlap to some extent our civil affairs short-range job of rehabilitation. Rauh and I discussed this with Kramer and reached a reasonable understanding that we would tell Kramer generally what we were doing and that he would reciprocate. Thus we hoped to avoid duplication or conflicts.

Our first doubt as to his reciprocation came when we learned that he had given the Tydings mission the impression that he was in charge of civil affairs.

The next episode occurred the day after the Tydings mission reception at Malacanan. Kramer asked Joe and me to go to a large meeting convened to discuss the local labor situation facing the Army. Kramer and representatives of USASOS did most of the talking and urged the necessity of giving rice bonuses to laborers and probably raising wages. The civil affairs section had consistently resisted all such suggestions because of their generally inflationary effect on the economy. We had felt that these measures could be avoided by a little more effort and imagination on the part of officers charged with the duty of hiring Filipino labor. From our questioning of the USASOS officers it appeared that the three officers in the theatre with the widest pre-war experience with Filipino labor had not even been consulted. At our insistence, it was agreed that these

officers would be asked for suggestions before wage raises and bonuses were discussed again, which they never were while I was in Manila.

The next day Kramer held a meeting of Manila business men and some Commonwealth Government officials including Confesor. I was there at Kramer's invitation. He took over completely and outlined a proposal for a so-called "Supply Council" modelled on a similar organization which had worked in Australia. The idea was to increase Philippine production with a view to aiding the forthcoming Japanese campaign and incidentally the rehabilitation of the Philippine economy. I had serious doubts as to its workability. It appeared to me too grandiose. Conditions in the Philippines were so different from those in Australia that the plan didn't seem to me well adapted to the situation with which we were confronted. In fact I thought that it was half-baked and that it would do more harm than good. Worst of all, the whole proposal raised in Confesor's mind the question which he put to me as to who was running civil affairs, Whitney, Rauh and I or Kramer.

I said nothing at the meeting, but Joe and I afterwards prepared and Whitney approved and signed a check sheet for Marshall criticizing the Supply Council Plan in some detail and objecting to Kramer's interference with our excellent relationship with the Commonwealth Government.

officials. We had a rather bitter argument with Kramer about this in our billets, in which Joe told Kramer that we had carried out our agreement with him to tell him everything we were doing, but that he had failed entirely to consult us as to his proposals.

The next day Marshall called Kramer, Whitney, Rauh and me in and we threshed the whole thing out in an argument which was frank and unpleasant. Marshall said that he had had no idea that Kramer was interfering with us and that it must stop. From then on I had no real trouble with Kramer. The Supply Council was forgotten and we were able to continue our work as before with the Commonwealth Government officials. Kramer was so upset that he had to go up to Baguio for about two weeks of complete rest.

In talking over the future with Marshall, I suggested that the Army's job would now be much easier if a United States High Commissioner were on the job. He agreed and said that he believed MacArthur would now also agree. McNutt, who had been a peacetime High Commissioner, came out late in July to look the situation over and returned in the Fall as High Commissioner.

"Oklahoma" with a second-string cast, arrived in Manila. Hank Cobb and I went to it and enjoyed it thoroughly.

Colonel Herb Wheeler let me in on the information that the War Department had picked Brigadier General Crist,

who had been 10th Army's military government chief on Okinawa, to head military government for Japan on MacArthur's staff.

With the imminent turnover of civil affairs activities to the Filipinos, we had arranged for a staging area where the personnel of the deactivated PCAUs could be prepared for military government work on the Japanese operation. We had found a good place for this area at San Esteban, Ilocos Sur, on the northwest coast of Luzon near Vigan. I had sent an excellent young officer, Lieutenant Colonel Parker, Commander of an already deactivated PCAU to start preparing this staging area. We named it "Camp Morgan" in honor of the PCAU Commander who had been ambushed and killed between Valencia and Palompon in Leyte.

On 6 June I started off to inspect this area accompanied by Ed Hester, who had stayed in the Philippines after Tydings' departure, and Major Dick Hopper of the G-4 Section. Hester, who had handled Philippine affairs in the Department of the Interior, had been in the islands upwards of eighteen years and was full of interesting information and anecdotes about the Philippines. Hopper had worked for a large United States oil company in the Netherlands East Indies for years and made interesting comparisons between conditions there and what we were seeing in the Philippines. They were both pleasant and stimulating companions.

The first day we reached Baguio by the Nargulian Trail. Kennon Road, shorter by several miles, was impassable because of war damage. We stayed with our old friends PCAU-7, still under Hopson. They were delighted with Baguio and wanted to be allowed to stay there indefinitely. The rainy season had started and the climate then is not ideal, but it was cool and a welcome change from the lowlands. The 33rd Division was fighting to the north on the road to Bontoc. This road had replaced the trail which Hi and I had travelled over on horseback and afoot on our wedding trip in 1929. Our artillery could be heard most of the time just a short distance north of Baguio. The golf course was covered with tents and tanks. 33rd Division headquarters was in the country club and the Commanding General Clarkson had the little cottage which Hi and I had occupied.

Baguio had been Yamashita's headquarters from December 1944 until shortly before we took it in April 1945. On the Nargulian Trail the Japs had dug many caves out of the soft rock and it was easy to imagine the difficulties our troops must have had fighting their way up the mountain. Our air force had bombed Baguio extensively. The most concentrated damage was in the small business district which was a mess. Most of the houses have a good deal of land around them. Not many were badly bombed, but the gardens and lawns had been long neglected with a resulting down-at-

the-heel look. It was a sad contrast to the beautiful Baguio of 1929, but it didn't look like too hard a job to bring it back. The Mansion House, former residence of the Governors General and later of Quezon as President, was a wreck, but I was told that the Philippine Government had started pulling it down before the war to make way for a more elaborate structure. A grilled iron fence surrounds the grounds, with an ornate wrought iron gateway. A story was prevalent that Quezon sent an architect to London to copy the Buckingham Palace gates for the Mansion House. When the architect returned with his drawings and specifications Quezon told him it was all right except to make it three feet bigger in all dimensions. If Quezon had lived to return to the Philippines, he never would have adopted the self-effacing attitude of Osmena.

The next day we started north on the coast road to look over San Esteban. On the way we called at Colonel Volkmann's headquarters. He was a young West Pointer who had escaped from the Japs after our surrender on Bataan and had become an effective guerrilla leader in northern Luzon. His headquarters looked as neat and efficient as any United States Army installation. Under Sixth Army he was conducting the assault from the coast on Cervantes and Bontoc with his guerrilla troops helped by some United States Artillery. He was most anxious to have one or two PCAUs attached to him

or at least a substantial quantity of civilian supplies made available. I was unwilling to agree to this at this late date, when we were trying to go out of business all over the Philippines.

On our trip from Volkmann's headquarters north to San Esteban, we saw nothing of the suffering of the people which Volkmann had described to us. Most of the Filipinos looked well-fed and clothed. We passed Candon which Hester told me had been the town which supplied the Spanish Royal Family with its mountain grown coffee until about 1910, but which after that had deteriorated because of blight.

We looked over Camp Morgan, which was pleasantly situated in a large coconut grove on a bay equipped with a good pier. This we decided would be useful as the rainy season progressed and the place might have to be supplied from the base at San Fernando, La Union, by water. We got well soaked coming and going and some of the fords were getting hard to negotiate. Parker seemed to be doing a good job and was getting things set up with help from Base M at San Fernando.

We went back to Baguio in the late afternoon. I dined with Kramer, who was staying at the house of Mr. Sordo, a Tabacalera official. Kramer was having a good rest and seemed greatly improved in health and spirits.

On 8 June we started back to Manila by way of the old road via Rosales, Guimba, Cabantuan and Baliwag. This

road was winding and lined with old trees and was therefore much prettier than the straight modern two-strip concrete highway which we had taken on our way north. I spent a lot of time buying a baliwag hat for Hi, not realizing that women now have no use for these Panama-type straw hats.

On 10 June we released all PCAUs from Manila. The Commonwealth Government took over distribution of food and clothing through its Emergency Control Administration. Emergency Control Administration Units (ECAUs), set up somewhat on the lines of the PCAUs, took over the PCAU areas and headquarters and we were now able to furnish them with a good share of the transportation and other organic equipment of those PCAUs which were to be deactivated.

We turned the warehouses over to USASOS. Sixth Army immediately took advantage of this opportunity to draw what were probably unneeded supplies out of Manila for country areas. We finally had to settle that by an order from Mac Arthur to Commanding General USASOS setting up certain priorities for Manila. Until these priorities were satisfied, nothing could be released for Sixth Army areas. This was the only time, so far as I remember, during our whole civil affairs operation that I had to ask for an order to take care of a particular situation. Usually we worked things out by compromise on so-called technical levels. This meant that the staff officer's suggestion would be followed by the operating

officer. That worked to perfection with Eighth Army but not as well with Sixth Army.

The Philippine Congress convened 9 June 1945. Roxas, who had taken off his uniform, was elected President of the Senate. Zulueta was elected Speaker of the House. The collaborators, as Osmena had predicted, soon were in full control of the Congress. Roxas was their hero and they demanded that Confesor and Tomas Cabili, Secretary of Defense, a Mindanao guerrilla and strong anti-collaborator, be removed from office. Confesor had to resign the latter part of June, because this Congress would not confirm him.

On 14 June, Osmena told Joe Rauh and me of his difficulties with the Congress. He told us that he was prepared to adjourn Congress sine die on the technical ground that the term of one-third of the Senate having expired, there was no quorum of the Senate. We were pleased to see him in a fighting mood, but it didn't last long. Soriano told me later that MacArthur had talked him out of this step and there it seems to me ended Osmena's political career. He was unable to cope with the machine which this collaborator Congress built up and with which Roxas defeated him for President in 1946.

In June, representatives of the United States Foreign Economic Administration arrived in Manila to discuss economic problems for the future. Before their arrival

the Commonwealth Government was the only agency we knew of which could take over the Army's function of importation and distribution of necessary supplies for civilian use. ECA soon suggested a program of private civilian importation and distribution and indicated that this was none of the Army's business. That was clearly wrong. The Army had a vital interest in keeping the Philippines orderly as they were to be an important base for operations against Japan. I emphasized this to the ECA officials and asked them to review their plans for civilian importation and distribution. These plans at first seemed to me rather superficial and badly thought out. The ECA officials tested them by conferences with business interests involved and strengthened them by the practical suggestions thus received to such an extent that I was finally satisfied that they would work well enough so that there would be no disruption of our base.

On a hot Sunday, 24 June, I started on the first trip not connected with work which I had had since leaving for Hollandia in September 1944. After lunch Hank Cobb and I got into a jeep and drive to Tagaytay Ridge, south of Manila. The two-strip concrete road had been renamed "11th Airborne Drive" in honor of that division which had landed in Nasugbu, Batangas, taken Tagaytay Ridge from the Japs and fought their way into the southern suburbs of Manila over this road. We

had started out for Cavite, but fortunately missed our turn and were well rewarded. I had heard of this place, but had never been there before. It is quite high, about 2000 feet, and cool. From the ridge one can see Manila Bay to the north, Laguna de Bay to the east, Batangas Bay to the far south, the China Sea to the west and just below the ridge to the south the beautiful island studded Lake Taal. One of those islands contains quite a nasty little volcano, which at present is inactive. It would be an ideal place for a new capitol for the Philippine Government, but I understand has been passed over for fear of further eruptions from the volcano. Hank and I got cooled off, bought some mangoes and had a good afternoon's rest and complete change.

Johnny Sullivan, a friend of mine since he was ten years old, arrived in Manila 29 June and tried to find me the day he got there. He had just been appointed Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air. There was no telephone in our billet and he couldn't reach me, but the next morning I went out to Nichols Field where he was taking off and had a few minutes chat with him there.

On 1 July 1945 we turned over the Manila Fire Department and on 11 August the Health Department to the Commonwealth.

On 5 July, Brigadier General Crist arrived from Okinawa. He called on Whitney. Rauh and I were detailed to

tell him anything he wanted to know. He spent about 20 minutes telling us what he had done in Okinawa, but didn't seem even curious about our theatre and its set-up, which was what he had to know if he was going to work for MacArthur. He seemed to me to be full of misdirected energy. He rushed off to Sixth Army and came back supporting their request, which we had heard of earlier, to raid some of our best officers for Sixth Army Civil Affairs Staff. Sixth Army had the first operation against Japan, Kyushu in November, and was entitled to an able staff. My experience with Sears, however, had convinced me that any good man detailed to his staff section was wasted. I told Crist that and urged that we keep most of the best officers for Crist's section and the matter was left in abeyance, which was where I wanted it.

Marshall had told me that he wanted me and maybe Joe to go to the States with Crist to help him with his Japanese Military Government planning, which Crist proposed to do in the War Department. This suited me, as our work was about over in Manila and it had been a long time since I had seen Hi and the kids. Also I hoped that with my knowledge of our theatre I could help Crist. He left, however, on 8 July without asking for either Rauh or me.

My last job with the Army in the Philippines was to help the Navy move civilians for the development of a big air base on Mactan Island. Mactan Island lies just south of Cebu City, the second largest in the Philippines. Magellan, in

his voyage around the world, was killed on Mactan by the Filipino chief Lapu Lapu, whose name has since been given to one of the most delicious of Philippine salt water fish. There is a monument to Magellan on the island.

Captain Baker of the Navy was referred to me for help on his problem. The Navy had ample authority under theatre directives to move and compensate civilians if they agreed, which they almost always did. Baker, however, wanted to be sure that he wasn't getting into any trouble with MacArthur's policy of not pushing Filipinos around, and so sought Army help. As Mactan was in Osmena's home province of Cebu, I decided to work the matter out on a high level and got up an exchange of letters between MacArthur and Osmena on the subject, which letters were duly signed and delivered. I got three deactivated PCAU officers lined up for the job and decided to make a good show of it by taking along Cabuhog, Secretary of Public Works, whose brother was Governor of Cebu. Cabuhog was delighted to go along on the Navy PBY which Baker provided and we all set forth. Cabuhog had sent a wire to his brother to have lunch for our party (about twelve) in Cebu on arrival. The wire wasn't delivered, but we went to lunch nevertheless. How Mrs. Cabuhog ever arranged it on no notice at all I don't know. We had to wait only half an hour. She was most apologetic about the delay and the lunch (which was ample and delicious). She

insisted that we all return the next day for what she said would be a real meal.

After lunch we went by boat to Mactan and looked the situation over. Two young Navy Lieutenants had been doing the job perfectly well and didn't need any help at all, but I left my officers for what I suspect was quite a long rest. They deserved it as they had been doing hard and effective PCAU work for months before this.

The Navy, as usual, had set itself up beautifully ashore. I slept that night on a porch over the water, which was so thoroughly screened that I didn't need a mosquito bar. Unless you have slept under one for months as I had, you don't know what a pleasant change that was.

The next day we went to the "real lunch". One of Osmena's sons, whom I had known in Tacloban, was there and a good time was enjoyed by all. I was glad to see Lieutenant Colonel Pete Scott, whom I had first seen in Ipil, Leyte, and whose PCAU was now in Cebu, a much pleasanter and healthier spot. After lunch we flew back to Manila, each of us with a present of a box of Cebu mangoes, which are reputed to be exceptionally fine and which our mess enjoyed greatly.

Vance arrived in Manila on his way back to Leyte from a rest cure in Baguio, which had been prescribed after

a bad bout with yellow jaundice. He was as amusing as ever and was beginning to plan military government for the Honshu operation, which was to be Eighth Army's.

On 15 July a radio arrived from Crist asking for Rauh and me to come to Washington to help him there. It was decided by Whitney, Joe and me that both of us shouldn't go. Joe was about to go home on points anyway, having been in the Pacific with only one temporary duty at home for about four years. He therefore didn't expect to go on the Japanese invasion as I did. We agreed that Joe should stay to wind up Philippine civil affairs and that I should go home on temporary duty to help Crist.

The final report of Brigadier General Courtney Whitney, Chief of the Civil Affairs Section to General MacArthur concludes with regard to the Manila operation as follows:

In conclusion it should be pointed out that the effort to relieve the embattled City of Manila was in the discharge of an emergency responsibility of the United States which finds little precedent in our country's history. However debatable may be some of the methods employed to meet this emergency, the fact remains that the responsibility was fully discharged - without incidence of starvation, without food riots or other disorders, and without serious threat of epidemic - from the time our forces entered the City to fight street by street for its occupation until normalcy had been restored and the responsibility transferred to the civil authorities.

Back Home

Joe Rauh drove me out to Nichols Field in the pouring rain on the afternoon of 16 July 1945. Our plane the A.T.C. C-54 "Bataan" took off at 5 P.M., which I afterwards learned was almost the exact time the first atomic bomb was detonated in New Mexico. We circled Manila two or three times to get altitude over the clouds to clear the Luzon mountains and then headed for Guam. There we had to wait for another plane to be set up as ours had developed some engine trouble.

We flew within sight of, by-passed Wotje, full of hungry Japs and landed at Kwajelein about noon. There I discussed the situation with a pleasant looking fellow passenger, Lieutenant Commander Northam Griggs, USNR. He thought it likely that we could get a cold beer in the transient officer's mess and turned out to be right. Over the beers we discovered that we had both graduated from Yale and had both belonged to Wolf's Head, which were bonds in common.

San Francisco looked even more beautiful than ever to me as it was the first unbombed city I had seen for many months. There Griggs again proved resourceful. We needed a hotel room to shave, bathe and do some telephoning. At the St. Francis Hotel we watched them turn away about ten officers. Griggs waited and then began to

talk to the clerk. He first said that we were veterans of Okinawa, where the campaign had just finished. Though of course there was not a word of truth in this, he made it sound convincing and we both looked tired and disheveled enough to make it plausible. Next he said that the last time he had been at the St. Francis they had taken wonderful care of him and had promised that they would always do so again if he came back. In no time we were in and had much needed shaves and baths. I got Hi on the telephone, but we both had so much to say that neither of us said much of anything.

I left that night by plane and arrived in Washington the next evening at 6 P.M. Hi and George Brownell met me. George had a drink with us at the Sulgrave Club where Hi had wangled a room and then she and I had a delicious dinner at the Shoreham. It was wonderful to be home. The only drawback was that I had to wear a necktie but that was a slight price to pay for the joy of being with Hi and talking to the kids on the long distance to Litchfield. Ed and Pat had both developed unfamiliar bass voices.

I reported to General Crist at 8 the next morning, 20 July and he put me to work on O.P.D.'s version of the Japanese military government directive. It was, I believe, almost a Chinese copy of the German military government directive. It wholly lost sight of the fact that Japan would

have a going government when she surrendered, which of course Germany had not. The two high points were that MacArthur was to keep the Emperor in seclusion (practically under arrest and probably a violation of what had been decided at Potsdam) and abolish the privy council and cabinet. All were utterly idiotic provisions.

Hi and I moved from the Sulgrave Club to a nice air-conditioned house on Massachusetts Avenue temporarily in possession of my friend Lieutenant Colonel De Forest Van Slyck, one of George Brownell's original guests. After Hi left for Litchfield, Van and I discussed the directive a good deal. It seemed to both of us that we certainly should use whatever Japanese governmental machinery we found and take full advantage of the prestige of the Emperor. If the privy council and cabinet were abolished, it would mean that Army officers would have to take over and run each department of the government, a task for which none of them was at all fitted. Our idea was to make the Japs do the work of governing as directed and to replace individuals if they didn't prove satisfactory. Van, who had taught at Yale for a while and could write very well, agreed to write up these ideas, which he finished and gave to me on a day (July 31) that Mr. Stimson had asked Willie Chanler and me to dine with him and Mrs. Stimson. I read over Van's two or three excellently written pages while driving back with him to change for dinner.

After dinner Mr. Stimson asked me how I was getting on. I told him "Terribly. The O.P.D. directive is awful. If you want something along the right lines I have it in my pocket". I gave him Van's memorandum which he apparently read that night. It was on my desk in the morning with a pencilled comment "This is a remarkably good paper. See that it is sent to the proper places. H.L.S." Willie Chanler, who was acting head of the Civil Affairs Division, and Miss Nearey, Mr. Stimson's secretary, undertook to do this.

Apparently, however, Willie forgot to send it to General Handy, head of O.P.D. A couple of days later General George Marshall, who had never heard of the Van Slyck memorandum gave Mr. Stimson a copy of the old directive to read over the week-end at Highhold. When Mr. Stimson read it he hit the ceiling and called General Marshall on the telephone asking why in the "blankety blank he had been supplied with such drivel. Colonel Van Slyck has written how it should be done. What has happened to that?" General Marshall got Handy on the carpet. Handy had never heard of Van Slyck's memo so he got hold of Willie and started to give him hell. Willie was all right from a military point of view because with Hildring away he had a right to go directly to the Secretary of War. Handy finally calmed down and admitted this, but grinned and said that Willie would have saved him an awful skinning if he had told him about the Van Slyck memo.

This episode is a remarkable example of how an unusual chain of circumstances got a very important matter on the right track. I am certain that Mr. Stimson would never have let the original O.P.D. directive get by him. Nevertheless, the fact that Willie and I knew him so well and had the advantage of Van's excellent writing on the subject together with my knowledge of our theatre and its personnel saved a lot of time in getting the directive headed the right way.

There was an amusing sequel to this. Shortly afterwards, Van was called to Mr. Stimson's office where he found Mr. Stimson, McCloy, Lovett and several Generals. Mr. Stimson said "Colonel Van Slyck, we have a question as to the interpretation of the Japanese Constitution on which we should like your expert help". Poor Van, who is inclined to be jittery, had never read the Japanese Constitution. The erroneous assumption that he was an expert on all things Japanese nearly made him faint, but he pulled himself together and managed to name a couple of A-2 or G-2 officers who were informed on the subject. They were promptly called in and Van, to his great relief, let out.

Mr. Stimson sent for me and said "What are your plans?" I said "Finish my work here and return to Manila for the Kyushu operation, scheduled for November". He told

me that that was out, that he had decided to keep me in the War Department to advise him personally with regard to our theatre and its personnel. I asked if I could state my case for going back. He said "Of course". I explained to him that I thought with my knowledge of the theatre I could be of help to General Crist who knew nobody there and that anyway I had a feeling that I ought to see the finish of the job along with the rest of MacArthur's staff. He said "What you say is wholly unimportant. You are going to stay here". I guess that I must have looked disappointed for he added "Eddie, I'm not doing this just because I think that you ought to be nearer Hi and the boys, although I do think that. I have tried to do what little I could for my country over a long period of years, as you know. My final judgment is that you can now do more for your country by staying here to advise me as to a situation about which you know a good deal than you can by going back to your theatre of operations".

During this whole conversation I got a queer impression that he thought that the war was almost over. I told George Brownell this and he said that he had gotten the same feeling in recent talks which he had had with Lovett and others.

Neither of us knew anything about the atom bomb. Mr. Stimson had called Miss Nearey in and told her to let me see everything he had concerning Japan to help me in my

work. She gave me one memo from Mr. Stimson to President Truman written at Potsdam in which Mr. Stimson had outlined the difficulties of the Japanese campaign and had urged one more public message to the Japanese Government urging them to surrender. In this memo he said "Whether in this message we should make any reference to the new weapon is something which I should like to discuss with you". That was the nearest I got to knowing of the bomb until it was dropped.

One day in early August I got a cable from Joe Rauh saying "Forbidden to mention rank, but you can now have your laundry done at the Admiral Apartments". Only full Colonels had this privilege so I went downstairs in the Pentagon to buy some eagles. When I got back Willie Chanler had heard of the message, called me in to his office, took off my silver oak leaf and pinned on me one of his own eagles. Van and I celebrated that evening. I wired Hi, who replied "We can hear those eagles screaming all the way up here in Litchfield".

General Crist had left on 1 August for a quick trip to Germany to observe military government there and confer with Hildring. He left me in charge of his skeleton staff. He had announced this before I was promoted, although there were several full Colonels on it. Before he left he had told me to forward the draft directive to MacArthur. So on

7 August I sent it along. There had not been time to get O.P.D. to incorporate the Van Slyck ideas so I wrote a check sheet to MacArthur to accompany the directive, explaining the major changes which I was sure would eventually be made in it. Crist returned on 8 August, the day the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. Everybody thought that the war was about over. Crist very much wanted me to go along with him to Manila and Japan for at least three months. I told him that Dick Marshall had promised me a two-weeks' leave which I felt that I really needed and that I would think it over while on leave.

On 13 August I started my leave. I talked with Mr. Davis in New York about the possibility of going on to Japan. He urged against it, fearing that it might result in an extended tour of duty after the imminent Jap surrender. I decided to take his advice and get out of the Army as soon as possible if the war really did end. If not, I decided to have one more try at Mr. Stimson to let me go back to the theatre. If I had gone along with Crist I probably should have been able to get home by Christmas or shortly thereafter. On the other hand I doubt if I could have done much to help him. His period of real authority in Japan lasted only two or three weeks. As I had feared, Kramer and others got him down. From what I saw of Crist I doubt if he would have let me stage the necessary rough and tumble with Kramer to put

him in his place as we had been able to do in Manila.

Hi and I drove up to Litchfield 14 August. We heard various rumors that the Japs had surrendered. Finally after dinner I called my old friend Sam Fisher and he confirmed that it was so.

After a delightful trip to visit Sag and Janie Sewall in Maine, I went back to Washington and was a civilian again on 14 September 1945.

PROVINCES
(55 Provinces)

Abra, 87	E-4
Agusan, 126	J-8
Albay, 395	E-6
Antique, 234	D-5
Bataan, 33	D-3
Batanes, 11	A-1
Batangas, 510	D-4
Bebu, 553	G-6
Bukidnon, 613	J-7
Bulacan, 431	D-4
Cagayan, 311	A-5
Camarinan Norte, 104	D-5
Camarinan Sur, 554	D-6
Capiz, 442	F-5
Cardenasas, 112	D-5
Cavite, 263	D-3
Cebu, 1,123	D-3
Cotabato, 440	J-7
Covos, 355	K-4
Icosan Norte, 231	L-4
Ilocos Sur, 275	B-3
Iloilo, 816	D-5
Ishiko, 264	D-5
Izapa, 321	B-4
Izapa, 344	C-6
La Union, 237	B-3
Leyte, 1,047	G-7
Makila, 184	D-4
Marikina, 86	D-5
Masbato, 211	D-6
Minoro, 158	F-4
Minoro Occidental (See Mindoro)	F-4
Minoro Oriental (See Mindoro)	E-4
Misamis Occ, 208	J-6
Misamis Sur, 201	H-7
Mountain, 278	B-4
Moorea Oct, 1,036	G-6
Mugua Oct, 443	H-5
Mueva Vizcaya, 33	C-4
Palawan, 108	G-3
Pangasinan, 417	D-3
Pangasinan, 520	D-3
Quezon, 417	D-4
Rizal, 673	D-4
Rosillon, 100	K-5
Samar, 757	F-7
Samarang, 201	D-6
Sulu, 141	K-3
Tarigan, 265	H-6
Tarino, 327	C-6
Zambales, 138	C-3
Zamboanga, 527	F-5
Zamboanga del Norte (See Zamboanga)	F-5
Zamboanga del Sur (See Zamboanga)	J-5
Total PHILIPPINES 19,234	
CITIES	
Name of city followed by population in thousands, to nearest thousand, then location on map.	
Abayog, 6	A-7
Abayog, 6	G-7
Alila, 3	F-6
Angat, 4	A-7
Angeles, 7	A-7
Apari, 10	A-4
Arayat, 1	C-4
Ariga, 4	G-5
Arizao, 2	C-4
Aroroy, 2	A-5
Bacarra, 7	F-6
Bacolod, 101	G-5
Baidar, 3	H-6
Begabog, 2	H-4
Bepic, 3	A-6
Bopanga, 3	J-8
Bupic, 29	H-4
Bulanga, 5	D-3
Bulungay, 5	G-7
Buluyan, 6	D-4
Buler, 3	C-4
Bulungay, 1	H-6
Bulungay, 1	I-3
Bulungay, 4	A-7
Bugay, 1	B-3
Bugay, 6	B-4
Bugay, 3	A-4
Buras, 1	E-6
Busco, 3	E-2
Busey, 6	F-7
Basilan City, 110	K-5
Batane, 5	A-1

Abra, 87	E-4
Agusan, 126	J-8
Albay, 395	E-6
Antique, 234	D-5
Bataan, 33	D-3
Batanes, 11	A-1
Batangas, 510	D-4
Bebu, 553	G-6
Bukidnon, 613	J-7
Bulacan, 431	D-4
Cagayan, 311	A-5
Camarinan Norte, 104	D-5
Camarinan Sur, 554	D-6
Capiz, 442	F-5
Cardenasas, 112	D-5
Cavite, 263	D-3
Cebu, 1,123	D-3
Cotabato, 440	J-7
Covos, 355	K-4
Icosan Norte, 231	L-4
Ilocos Sur, 275	B-3
Iloilo, 816	D-5
Ishiko, 264	D-5
Izapa, 321	B-4
Izapa, 344	C-6
La Union, 237	B-3
Leyte, 1,047	G-7
Makila, 184	D-4
Marikina, 86	D-5
Masbato, 211	D-6
Minoro, 158	F-4
Minoro Occidental (See Mindoro)	F-4
Minoro Oriental (See Mindoro)	E-4
Misamis Occ, 208	J-6
Misamis Sur, 201	H-7
Mountain, 278	B-4
Moorea Oct, 1,036	G-6
Mugua Oct, 443	H-5
Mueva Vizcaya, 33	C-4
Palawan, 106	G-3
Pangasinan, 417	D-3
Pangasinan, 520	D-3
Quezon, 417	D-4
Rizal, 673	D-4
Rosillon, 100	K-5
Samar, 757	F-7
Samarang, 201	D-6
Sulu, 141	K-3
Tarigan, 265	H-6
Tarino, 327	C-6
Zambales, 138	C-3
Zamboanga, 527	F-5
Zamboanga del Norte (See Zamboanga)	F-5
Zamboanga del Sur (See Zamboanga)	J-5
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Abaygo, 6	G-7
Alles, 3	F-6
Angat, 4	A-7
Angeles, 7	A-7
Apari, 10	A-4
Arayat, 1	C-4
Ariga, 4	G-5
Arizao, 2	C-4
Arroyo, 2	A-5
Bacarra, 7	F-6
Bacolod, 101	G-5
Badila, 3	H-6
Bugabog, 2	H-4
Bugic, 3	A-6
Bopanga, 3	J-8
Bucic, 29	H-4
Bulanga, 5	D-3
Bulanga, 5	D-7
Bulayan, 6	G-4
Buler, 3	C-4
Bulungan, 1	H-6
Bulungan, 1	I-3
Bulungan, 4	A-7
Bugay, 1	B-3
Bugay, 6	B-4
Bugay, 3	A-4
Buras, 1	E-6
Busco, 3	E-2
Busey, 6	F-7
Basilan City, 110	K-5
Batane, 5	A-1

after 100

Abasco, 6	A-7
Abasco, 6	D-7
Allen, 3	F-6
Angu, 4	A-7
Angeles, 7	A-7
Apur, 10	A-7
Aray, 1	C-4
Argas, 4	C-5
Artisan, 2	C-4
Arroyo, 2	F-5
Bacarra, 7	A-4
Bacolon, 101	G-5
Badian, 3	H-6
Bogobito, 2	H-4
Bopie, 3	A-6
Bopopaga, 3	J-8
Brazis, 50	H-4
Bulaga, 5	D-3
Bulaga, 5	G-7
Bulaga, 6	D-6
Buler, 3	C-4
Bulaga, 1	H-6
Bulaga, 1	I-3
Bulaga, 4	A-7
Buglar, 1	B-3
Buglar, 4	B-4
Buglar, 1	A-4
Buras, 1	E-5
Busco, 3	B-2
Buco, 6	F-7
Bustan City, 110	K-5
Butas, 5	A-4

Abasco, 6	A-7
Abasco, 6	D-7
Allen, 3	F-6
Angu, 4	A-7
Angeles, 7	A-7
Apur, 10	A-7
Aray, 1	C-4
Argas, 4	C-5
Artisan, 2	C-4
Arroyo, 2	F-5
Bacarra, 7	A-4
Bacolon, 101	G-5
Badian, 3	H-6
Bogobito, 2	H-4
Bopie, 3	A-6
Bopopaga, 3	J-8
Brazis, 50	H-4
Bulaga, 5	D-3
Bulaga, 5	G-7
Bulaga, 6	D-6
Buler, 3	C-4
Bulaga, 1	H-6
Bulaga, 1	I-3
Bulaga, 4	A-7
Buglar, 1	B-3
Buglar, 4	B-4
Buglar, 1	A-4
Buras, 1	E-5
Busco, 3	B-2
Buco, 6	F-7
Bustan City, 110	K-5
Butas, 5	A-4

Bayabas, 10.	H-4	Kalanbagan, 1.	J-6	San Juan de Buenavista,	
Benzales, 1.	G-7	Koronado (Warbell), 10.	K-7	5.	H-5
Besant, 3.	C-6	La Cerdosa, 7.	G-5	San Narciso, Quezon,	
Bawang, 3.	H-3	La Candelaria, 10.	G-6	1.	H-5
Bayog, 1.	A-4	Leroux, 3.	H-8	San Narciso, Zambales,	
Baybay, 10.	G-7	Loag, 22.	A-4	10.	D-3
Bayombong, 7.	H-4	Lebak,	K-6	San Nicolas, 9.	A-4
Beac, 3.	E-5	Legopio, 79.	K-6	San Pablo, 50.	D-4
Bogo, 6.	G-6	Lingao, 5.	H-8	San Pascual, 1.	H-5
Bolnag, 2.	C-3	Lingapen, 6.	C-3	San Quintin, 3.	C-4
Bongabon, 5.	C-4	Lipa, 50.	D-4	Santa Catalina, 4.	H-5
Bontoc, 5.	B-4	Lobo, 1.	C-8	Santa Cruz, Davao, 1.	K-7
Borongan, 3.	F-7	Looc, Araditan, 2.	F-5	Santa Cruz, Zambales,	
Brooke's Pt., 2.	H-1	Looc, Mindoro Occ., 2.	G-6	2.	C-3
Buayan, 4.	K-7	Lorata, 7.	G-7	Santa Cruz, Marikinaque,	
Bupitang, 3.	G-5	Lubao, 2.	A-7	4.	E-5
Bulabacan, 2.	F-4	Lubayan, 2.	H-4	Santa Cruz, Laguna, 1.	D-7
Bulan, 15.	H-6	Luchon, 10.	H-8	Santa Cruz, Ilocos Sur,	
Bulan, 3.	K-7	Lucena, 18.	D-4	3.	H-5
Bulan, 5.	H-5	Lupat, 1.	K-8	Santa Fe, 4.	F-5
Bulan, 32.	H-7	Maslin, 5.	G-7	Santa Maria, 3.	A-7
Cabanatuan, 55.	C-4	Mabini, 2.	H-7	Santander, 1.	H-6
Caburan, 1.	L-8	Magdalena, 2.	H-8	Santiago, 6.	H-4
Cadiz, 10.	G-6	Malabang, 2.	J-6	Sio, Tomas, 1.	C-3
Cagayan, 45.	J-7	Malaybalay, 2.	J-7	Sison, 4.	D-4
Cagayanville, 2.	H-4	Malita, 5.	K-7	Sison, 2.	H-5
Cajipitcan, 1.	F-5	Malolos, 3.	D-4	Slake, 2.	J-5
Calabanga, 6.	B-8	Maluku, 2.	J-7	Sinali, 1.	A-3
Calagang, 6.	E-4	Manabuan, 1.	E-3	Sinabangan, 6.	J-5
Calatagan, 2.	C-7	Manila, 984.	D-4	Sinca, 3.	J-5
Calinag, 5.	D-5	Manayao, 7.	H-5	Special, 2.	E-5
Calitayog, 79.	F-7	Mangalay, 1.	E-4	Sintra,	D-6
Camilang, 8.	C-3	Marang, 2.	J-7	Sogod, 3.	G-7
Candelaria, 1.	C-3	Margosatung, 12.	J-6	Solano, 10.	H-4
Candon, 3.	H-3	Matresales, 7.	D-3	Sorsogon, 10.	H-6
Capalonga, 1.	D-5	Maunabo, 4.	F-6	Subic, 2.	A-6
Capas, 4.	C-4	Mali, 3.	K-8	Surigao, 13.	H-7
Caraga, 1.	J-8	Maxim, 5.	D-4	Surigao, 1.	H-6
Cararmon, 5.	H-5	Milagres, 1.	F-6	Taal, 5.	C-7
Carcar, 5.	C-6	Minalabun, 2.	A-8	Talaba, K.	H-6
Caridad (Carmel City),		Naga, 56.	E-4	Talaba, 7.	H-4
18.	D-4	Namphi, 5.	D-4	Tachibana, 45.	F-7
Carigara, 7.	F-7	Naruto, 4.	A-7	Taft, 2.	F-7
Carmon, 1.	H-6	Natunora, 1.	F-5	Tugaylay, 5.	D-4
Carmona, 3.	H-8	Oas, 17.	H-6	Tuguegarao, 6.	H-6
Casiguran, 1.	C-5	Odongon, 2.	F-5	Tuguegarao, 2.	H-7
Catagan, 5.	F-6	Olongapo, 15.	A-6	Tugay, 4.	J-8
Catagan, 11.	H-7	Orani, 11.	A-7	Tumogon, 3.	J-8
Cathalogon, 11.	H-7	Oras, 5.	F-7	Turkey, 1.	G-6
Catuel, 2.	J-8	Orin, 7.	A-7	Tutuyan, 11.	H-7
Catmon, 2.	H-6	Oron, 73.	H-7	Tutuyan, 4.	H-8
Cawayan, Isabela, 1.	H-4	Oroquieta, 7.	J-6	Tutuyan, 8.	H-8
Cawayan, Negros, 1.	D-5	Oron, 35.	J-6	Tutuyan, 7.	H-8
Cavite, 20.	D-4	Pagadian, 10.	J-6	Tutuyan, 13.	H-5
Cebu, 108.	G-6	Palaos, 1.	D-5	Tutuyan, 21.	C-4
Cervantes, 1.	D-4	Palaos, 8.	E-7	Tutuyan, 4.	H-6
Clavonia, 5.	A-4	Palaos, 5.	C-7	Tutuyan, 1.	H-7
Coron, 3.	F-3	Palaos, 2.	E-3	Tutuyan, 3.	C-6
Corobato, 9.	K-6	Palaos, Antiquio, 3.	F-5	Tutuyan, 7.	H-6
Cove, 2.	C-4	Palaos, Catanduanes,		Tutuyan, 1.	H-7
Cot, 11.	D-5	3.	D-6	Tutuyan, 1.	H-7
Cuyayan, 44.	C-3	Pangasinan, 4.	D-6	Tutuyan, 1.	H-7
Cuyayan, 3.	G-8	Pangasinan, 1.	K-3	Tutuyan, 1.	H-7
Danabalan, 20.	J-6	Pangasinan, 5.	C-4	Tutuyan, 1.	H-7
Dapo, 5.	H-8	Pantaban (Kingsville), 5.	K-6	Tutuyan, 13.	J-6
Dapitan, 4.	H-8	Pasay, 3.	A-4	Tutuyan, 4.	C-6
Davao, 111.	K-7	Parang, 79.	H-7	Tuguegarao, 12.	H-4
Digo, 21.	H-7	Parang, Combalal, 1.	J-6	Tuguegarao, 1.	G-7
Dilagat, 3.	H-7	Parang, Sulu, 4.	K-4	Tuguegarao, 1.	G-7
Dinapigan, 7.	A-7	Parang, 1.	K-5	Tuguegarao, 1.	G-7
Dingalan, 9.	H-5	Parang, 2.	D-4	Tuguegarao, 1.	G-7
Duro, 1.	H-6	Parang, 3.	C-5	Tuguegarao, 1.	G-7
Dulawan, 5.	K-7	Pennsylvania, 3.	E-4	Tuguegarao, 1.	G-7
Dumaguete, 25.	H-6	Pennsylvania, 1.	C-7	Tuguegarao, 1.	G-7
Escalante, 6.	G-6	Pitago, 2.	E-5	Tuguegarao, 1.	G-7
Famy, 1.	B-8	Placer, 5.	H-7	Tuguegarao, 1.	G-7
Fapan, 3.	C-4	Polangui, 3.	E-6	Tuguegarao, 1.	G-7
Gen. Friso, 7.	B-7	Polillo, 2.	D-5	Tuguegarao, 1.	G-7
gingog, 5.	J-7	Portatan, 5.	G-5	Tuguegarao, 1.	G-7
Glan, 4.	L-7	Puerto Princesa, 3.	H-2	Tuguegarao, 1.	G-7
Gonzaga, 2.	A-5	Quezon City, 104.	D-4	Tuguegarao, 1.	G-7
Guthalagan, 7.	G-6	Rizal, 8.	C-4	Tuguegarao, 1.	G-7
Gumbao, 6.	C-4	Rizal City, 88.	D-4	Tuguegarao, 1.	G-7
Guluan, 7.	G-8	Romblon, 4.	E-5	Tuguegarao, 1.	G-7
Hicogon, 4.	G-7	Rosario, 3.	C-8	Tuguegarao, 1.	G-7
Hinatuan, 3.	J-8	Roxas (Davao), 12.	F-5	Tuguegarao, 1.	G-7
Iba, 3.	C-3	Sablayan, 1.	E-4	Tuguegarao, 1.	G-7
Ilagan, 7.	H-5	Sagay, 3.	H-7	Tuguegarao, 1.	G-7
Iligan, 4.	J-7	Salay, 3.	H-7	Tuguegarao, 1.	G-7
Iloilo, 110.	G-5	San Antonio, 7.	D-3	Tuguegarao, 1.	G-7
Irigay, 3.	H-7	San Carlos, Negros Occ.,		Tuguegarao, 1.	G-7
Itefite, 2.	H-4	15.	G-6	Tuguegarao, 1.	G-7
Itrah, 7.	H-6	San Carlos, Pangasinan,		Tuguegarao, 1.	G-7
Isabela, 5.	G-5	10.	C-3	Tuguegarao, 1.	G-7
Jagna, 1.	H-6	San Fernando, La Union,		Tuguegarao, 1.	G-7
Jale, 18.	K-4	5.	H-3	Tuguegarao, 1.	G-7
Jane Pangasinan, 3.	D-5	San Fernando, Masbate,		Tuguegarao, 1.	G-7
Kabakan, 1.	K-7	3.	J-6	Tuguegarao, 1.	G-7
Kabankalan, 7.	C-5	San Fernando, Pangasinan,		Tuguegarao, 1.	G-7
Kabosalan, 5.	J-5	7.	D-4	Tuguegarao, 1.	G-7
Kahagao, 4.	A-4	San Isidro, 12.	H-6	Tuguegarao, 1.	G-7
Kalibo, 5.	F-5	San Jose, Mindoro Occ.,		Tuguegarao, 1.	G-7
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