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**The documents in this
folder continue from the
previous folder.**

Tuesday, October 21, 1975





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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Vice Premier of the State Council,
 People's Republic of China
 Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Minister of Foreign Affairs
 Amb. Huang Chen, Chief of PRCLO, Washington
 Wang Hai-jung, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
 Lin P'ing, Director of American & Oceanic
 Affairs, MFA
 T'ang Wen-sheng, Deputy Director of American &
 Oceanic Affairs, MFA, (Interpreter)
 Chien Ta-yung, Counselor, PRCLO, Washington
 Ting Yüan-hung, Director for U. S. Affairs,
 American & Oceanic Affairs, MFA
 Chao Chi-hua, Deputy Director for U. S. Affairs,
 American & Oceanic Affairs, MFA
 Mrs. Shih Yen-hua, MFA, (Interpreter)
 (plus two notetakers)

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
 and Assistant to the President
 for National Security Affairs
 Amb. George H. W. Bush, Chief of USLO, Peking
 Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department
 Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff
 Amb. Philip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary
 for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
 William H. Gleysteen, Jr., Deputy Assistant
 Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
 Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff **PWR**
 Miss Anne Boddicker, White House (notetaker)

DATE AND TIME:

Tuesday - October 21, 1975
 5:07 - 6:08 p. m.

PLACE:

The Great Hall of the People
 Peking

SUBJECT:

Southern Flank of Europe



DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
 NBC MEMO, 11/19/88, STATE DEPT. DECLASSIFIED, State v. cas 9/16/03
 BY , NARA, DATE 11/3/03

[The press takes photos while the group is seated.]

Kissinger: Not all of us have recovered from the luncheon yet.

Teng: Yes, it seemed very arduous.

As you know, you cannot have a hot pot except in a very relaxed atmosphere because that will take a half hour.

Kissinger: I have not walked so much since I was in the infantry during the war. [Laughter] To me this is a Great March. [Laughter].

Teng: Yes, and when I was on the Long March I walked half the 25,000 li on foot; the other half was on the back of some kind of animal, a horse or such. At that time the highest luxury was to have one horse for each man.

Kissinger: I can imagine.

[The press leaves.]

Teng: So today we still have a bit of time left. Although it isn't very great, we still have the opportunity to have an exchange of views. Yesterday we had the opportunity to exchange opinions with you on questions pertaining to the international situation, policy and strategic. We think the exchange of views was frank, and we feel that such an exchange is beneficial for mutual understanding and also to the further development of possible cooperation between our two sides.

Kissinger: I agree.

Teng: So as for the questions pertaining to strategy, we don't have anything new to say on our side. And if you have nothing new to say on your side, then we can perhaps stop right here on that issue and turn to something else. But if you wish to tell us anything on that or any other position, you can tell us that.

Kissinger: I agree we have covered the issue of strategy and stated the various approaches. I have listed the possible topics yesterday and it is up to the Vice Premier what he thinks is most suitable.

Teng: And you have travelled the world several times in the past year and we are willing to listen to whatever you would like to say to us or whatever you think necessary to tell us, or whatever you find interesting to have an



exchange of views on. If you are interested, you might begin with the southern flank of Europe.

Kissinger: All right. Mr. Habib would like me to try to convince you to vote with us on the Korean question, but I don't think I can do that in one hour. [Laughter] He has approached everyone except the Pope on that. [Laughter]

Well, on the southern flank of Europe, we have Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece and Turkey. Each presenting a different situation.

In the case of Portugal, we find a situation where as a result of forty years of authoritarian rule, the democratic forces are not well organized, and where the political structure is very weak. The military have adopted some of the philosophy of African liberation movements, which they fought for 25 years. And the Communist Party of Cunhal, who spent his exile in Czechoslovakia -- which is a curious place as a choice of exile -- is very much under the influence of the Soviet Union. [Teng leans down beneath the table and spits into the spittoon beside his chair.]

In this vacuum, the Communist Party that I described achieved disproportionate influence, and for a while it seemed on the verge of dominating the situation. I think this trend has been arrested. And we are working with our West European friends to strengthen the forces that are opposed to Cunhal. Some of these forces unfortunately are better at rhetoric than at organization. But we think that the situation has improved, and we will continue to improve it.

Teng: We heard recent news that some of the military officers formerly under...


Chiao: ...Gonçaves.

Teng: ...are prepared to stage a coup.

Kissinger: Yes. We had a report this morning they refused to turn over their weapons.

Teng: The news goes that they are preparing to do something on the 11th of November which is the date of the independence of Angola. News so specific as this can't be reliable.

Kissinger: No, I don't believe this. We have the report that there is one military unit that refuses to turn over its weapons. And there is no question



Gonçalves is on the side of the Soviet Union. But we hope... We have been in touch with a number of other military leaders and we would certainly not approve such a coup and we will certainly oppose it.

Teng: But it is in our view that Portugal will see many reversals.

Kissinger: I agree.

Teng: And many trials of strength.

We are not in a position to do anything else in that part of the world. There is one thing that we have done. They have approached us many times for the establishment of diplomatic relations, which we have not agreed to. Our point of departure is very simple: That is, we do not want to do anything that would be helpful to any Soviet forces gaining the upper hand.

Kissinger: I think that is a very wise policy. We support Antunes and Soares. [Teng leans down and spits again.] Antunes was in Washington a few weeks ago and we are cooperating with him. But I agree with you that there will be many trials of strength. And the difficulty of our West European friends is they relax after a temporary success.


When we come back here in December, we will see the situation more clearly. But we are determined to resist a Soviet takeover there, even if it leads to armed conflict. It will not go easily. I mean, if they are planning a coup it will not be easy for them.

Now in Spain, the situation is more complicated. We have on the one hand a regime on its last legs, because Franco is very old. But on the other hand we do not want to repeat the situation of Portugal in Spain.

We have been approached on a number of occasions by the Spanish Communist Party, but we consider it is controlled from Moscow. What is your assessment?

Teng: There are contradictions between the Spanish Communist Party and the Soviet Union. Among the revisionist Communist parties in Europe it can be said that the contradictions between the Spanish Communist Party and the Dutch Communist Party and the Soviet Union are comparatively deeper.

Kissinger: We have been negotiating a continuation of our base agreement with Spain, as you know. We will probably conclude this agreement within the next six weeks. We do this because we do not believe a shrinkage of American



security interests in the Mediterranean is in the security interest of the world. [Teng spits again] Together with this, we are planning to set up a number of committees in the cultural and economic fields so that in the case of a new situation we have organic contacts with many levels of Spanish life.

Ch'iao: You mean after the regime is handed over to [Juan] Carlos?

Kissinger: Yes. We are setting up committees now in connection with the base agreement so that when Franco leaves we will not have to start, as we did in Portugal, looking around for contacts. We will have this infrastructure.

Teng: It is our impression that the influence of the Spanish revisionist party is not so deep as that of the Portuguese in the armed forces. I don't know whether your understanding would be the same.

Kissinger: One reason we need this base agreement is to stay in contact with the Spanish military. Our assessment is at the higher levels there is very little impact of what you call this revisionist party. At the lower levels, we have had some reports they are doing some recruiting.

Teng: The lowest levels do not play such a great role.

Kissinger: We have heard at the level of Captains. But at the commanding levels their influence can't be compared with the Portuguese situation.

Teng: But a captain is a very important man in African forces [Laughter] but perhaps not so in Europe.

Kissinger: Not quite so in Europe. [Laughter]

Teng: What is your impression of the Spanish Prince?

Ch'iao: Carlos.

Kissinger: He is a nice man. Naive. He doesn't understand revolution and doesn't understand what he will face. He thinks he can do it with good will. But his intentions are good. He's a nice man. I don't think he is strong enough to manage events by himself.



Teng: We heard that Franco was going to hand over power to him.

Kissinger: We hear that every six months. But Mrs. Franco likes the palace too much to leave. [Laughter]

Teng: He must be in his 80's by now.

Kissinger: Yes, and not very active. In fact, he has a tendency to fall asleep while you are talking to him. [Laughter] I've been there with two Presidents, and he has fallen asleep both times. In fact, he had -- when I was there with President Nixon -- a hypnotic effect. I saw him falling asleep, so I fell asleep. So the only two people awake were President Nixon and the Spanish Foreign Minister. [Laughter]

No, it would be better if he handed over the power.

Yeng: What do you think of Yugoslavia?

Kissinger: We are concerned about Yugoslavia. We are concerned that a number of things could happen after Tito's death. There could be a separatist movement from some of the provinces. There could be a split within the Yugoslav Communist Party. Both of these could be supported by the Soviet Union. And there could be Soviet military intervention.

Teng: During the recent visit of the Yugoslav Prime Minister Mr. Bijedic, we gained from what he said, although in different words, that they are also quite worried about such matters themselves.

Kissinger: In Montenegro -- you know this -- they discovered Soviet activities within the country.

Teng: Yes, but then they were able to find out about all these espionage activities and do something to end these activities.

Kissinger: Yes, but it shows the tendency of Soviet policy.

Teng: Indeed.

Kissinger: We are very interested in the independence and independent policy of Yugoslavia. And you have noticed that in the last year both the President and I have paid separate visits to Yugoslavia. And we are going to begin selling them military equipment within the next few weeks.



Teng: That will be very good. You must know that this nation is a very militant one. Although there are some contradictions among the various nationalities. And it seems to me that one of their relatively strong points is that they are comparatively clear-minded about the situation they face.

Kissinger: Yes. They will certainly fight if there is an invasion.

Teng: We have also posed this question to our European friends. That is, if there occurs a Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia, what will happen? And they felt that this was a difficult issue. And perhaps a similar question will confront you. Of course I do not ask you for an answer now. [They laugh.]

Kissinger: No, I can give you an answer. It is a difficult question. It is politically a difficult question and it's strategically a difficult question. We are now doing some military planning for this contingency. I can tell you this -- you can keep secrets; I am not so convinced about all of my colleagues [laughter] -- we have asked General Haig, in his capacity as American Commander, to do some planning.

T'ang: About Yugoslavia?

Kissinger: Yes. [There is some commotion on the Chinese side.]

Teng: The Chairman will be prepared to meet you at 6:30. [The Secretary and Ambassador Bush exchange glances.] So, what... you are in a dilemma about your program [because of Ambassador Bush's reception for the Secretary scheduled for the International Club.]

Kissinger: No. He [Bush] has a dilemma. I would be delighted.

T'ang: How many people would you be prepared to take with you?

Kissinger: The Ambassador, Mr. Lord...

Wang: Would your wife be going?

Kissinger: Has she been invited?

Wang: It is up to you.

Teng: We are willing to listen to your request or your opinion. It is up to you to suggest whom you would like to take on your side and whom you would like



participating in the meeting and whom you would like to have shake hands.

Kissinger: Then I think... Can everyone here shake hands, and my wife? And then for the meeting Ambassador Bush, Mr. Lord, and Mr. Habib.

Teng: You mean all those seated here and your wife?

Kissinger: Yes, if you can find my wife. [Laughter] She's probably out shopping.

T'ang: We will try to find her.

Kissinger: If you can find her, it will save me a lot of money. [Laughter]

T'ang: So she is in the shops now?

[The Secretary discusses with Sonnenfeldt where she might be or whether she will have departed for the reception.]

Kissinger: Maybe we can still catch her.

[Wang Hai-jung goes out.]

Teng: So perhaps we can continue for about 15 minutes, and then perhaps you can make various preparations. [He spits into his spittoon.]

Kissinger: What I have said to you about military preparations with respect to Yugoslavia is known only to the top leaders of three European governments. Schmidt knows about it, of course. But it is a very complicated problem logistically. Because our best means of entering is through Italy and that is logistically very difficult. We can perhaps talk about this again when we come back in a few weeks.

Teng: Yes, and recently Italy has returned the B Zone of Trieste to Yugoslavia. We believe this is quite good.

Kissinger: Yes.

[Nancy T'ang gets up to leave. Mrs. Shih moves to the table.]

Shih: She is going to make some preparations. I will take her place.



Teng: So long as they have weapons in their hands, the Yugoslavs will fight.

Kissinger: We think so too. But as I said, we are starting in a few weeks to sell them some anti-tank weapons, and some other equipment.

Teng: We are thinking that in that area the main problem is conventional weapons and not nuclear weapons.

Kissinger: That is correct. Though any conflict that involves us and the Soviet Union is very complicated. It is bound to involve nuclear threats anyway. But the weapons we are selling to Yugoslavia are conventional weapons.

Teng: If the Soviet Union can control Yugoslavia, then the chessboard of Soviet strategy in Europe will become alive. The next will be Romania and Albania.

Kissinger: If the Soviet Union can get away with a military move on Yugoslavia, we will face a very grave situation. [Teng nods emphatically in agreement.] Which will require serious countermeasures.

Teng: For that not only involves military strategy; it will also have a very serious political influence. Its impact at least will spread to the whole of the southern flank.

Kissinger: I think that is correct. It will affect Italy and Germany, and France.


Teng: Also the Mediterranean. And the Middle East.

Kissinger: If this happens, whatever we do in Yugoslavia -- which depends on the circumstances in which things develop -- will lead to a very serious situation. We would not accept it. It will lead at least to serious countermeasures. It will not be like Czechoslovakia.

[Teng glances at his watch.]

What is your view on the Italian situation?

Teng: Well, one can hardly see the trend of the development of the situation in Italy. To us, it is all blank. We don't know how to look at the situation. Perhaps you know more clearly.



Kissinger: Perhaps the Foreign Minister should stop on the way back from the UN to call on the Pope. Gromyko was there a few weeks ago. [Laughter]

Teng: Really?

Kissinger: Actually you could be helpful in Italy, we think. At least with some of the Socialists. The Christian Democratic Party has very weak leadership. [They nod in agreement.] Their Prime Minister, Moro, also has a tendency to fall asleep when you meet him. [Laughter]

Teng: They change their Prime Ministers several times in a year. I don't know how many times since the War.

Kissinger: Yes, but it's always the same group. But the ruling group of the Christian Democratic Party is not very disciplined.

We totally oppose what is called in Italy the "historic compromise." We do not give visas to Italian Communists to come to the United States.

[Secretary Kissinger and Mr. Sonnenfeldt confer.]

Teng: In my view the so-called "historic compromise" cannot succeed.

Kissinger: Well, it can succeed, but it will lead to a disaster for the non-Communist parties.

I've just been handed a telegram that they have put a Communist into an Italian Parliamentary delegation that is coming to Washington, that we didn't select.

But that is a secondary issue. We will totally oppose it.

Teng: We think, with regard to the situation in Italy, where our two sides differ is that we don't attach so much importance to whether the Communist Party of Italy gets the power. It is not significant.

Kissinger: No, it is of importance because it will have an effect on France and even in the Federal Republic. And it is of significance to the support that America can give to NATO if there is a government there with a large Communist Party in the government.

Teng: [Laughs] Such a so-called "historic compromise" was once effected by the French. That was shortly after the War, when deGaulle was in power. He let the Communist Party of France take part in the government, and Thorez was in power.



Kissinger: But that was in a totally different situation. At that time they were declining, and not increasing.

Teng: The French Communist Party got several seats in the French Cabinet. One of them was the Minister of the Air Force, who was a Communist. [He laughs.] The decision to bomb Algeria was made by this man exactly. This we call their "performance on the stage."

Shall we end our talk here today? And prepare to meet the Chairman?

Kissinger: Can we leave from here?

Teng: Yes. We can take a short rest.

Kissinger: Okay.

Teng: But we will leave from here directly and meet you there.

[The meeting ended. The American party moved to another room to await Mrs. Kissinger, who arrived shortly, and then to depart for Changnanhai for the meeting with Chairman Mao Tsetung.]



Mao/PAK
evening





DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Chairman Mao Tse-tung
 Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Vice Premier of the State
 Council of the People's Republic of China
 Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Minister of Foreign Affairs
 Amb. Huang Chen, Chief of PRC Liaison Office,
 Washington
 Wang Hai-jung, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
 T'ang Wen-sheng, Deputy Director, Department
 of American and Oceanic Affairs and interprete
 Chang Han-chih, Deputy Director, Department of
 American and Oceanic Affairs

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
 and Assistant to the President for
 National Security Affairs
 Ambassador George Bush, Chief of U.S. Liaison
 Office, Peking
 Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff,
 Department of State

DATE AND TIME: Tuesday, October 21, 1975
 6:25 - 8:05 p.m.

PLACE: Chairman Mao's Residence, Peking

At 5:45 p.m. during a meeting with Vice Premier
 Teng Hsiao-ping, Secretary Kissinger was informed that
 Chairman Mao would like to see him at 6:30. He was
 asked to name those members of his party, including
 his wife, whom he would like to have greeted by the
 Chairman, as well as those two officials who would
 accompany him to the talks themselves. The meeting
 with Teng lasted another 15 minutes. Then Dr. Kissinger
 and his party rested until 6:15, when they went from
 the Great Hall of the People to the Chairman's
 residence.

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
 STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, Sub Review 9/16/03
 BY ll, NARA, DATE 11/2/03



~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ BY Henry A. Kissinger
 EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
 SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
 EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 B (3)
 AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON 2/11/03

Each of the following were introduced to the Chairman in turn and exchanged brief greetings while photographs and movies were taken: Secretary Kissinger, Mrs. Kissinger, Amb. Bush, Counselor Sonnenfeldt, Assistant Secretary Habib, Director Winston Lord, Mr. William Gleysteen, Mr. Peter Rodman (NSC), and Ms. Anne Boddicker (NSC). The Chairman stood and talked with considerable difficulty. When he saw Mrs. Kissinger, he sat down and asked for a note pad and wrote out the comment that she towered over Secretary Kissinger. He then got up again and greeted the rest of the party. Then the guests were escorted out of the room except for Secretary Kissinger, Ambassador Bush and Mr. Lord.

The participants sat in arm chairs in a semi-circle. Throughout the conversation the Chairman would either speak with great difficulty, with Miss Tang and Miss Wang repeating what he said for confirmation and then translating, or he would write out his remarks on a note pad held by his nurse. Throughout the conversation the Chairman gestured vigorously with his hands and fingers in order to underline his point.

Chairman Mao: You know I have various ailments all over me. I am going to heaven soon.

Secretary Kissinger: Not soon.

Chairman Mao: Soon. I've already received an invitation from God.


Secretary Kissinger: I hope you won't accept it for a long while.

Chairman Mao: I accept the orders of the Doctor.

Secretary Kissinger: Thank you. The President is looking forward very much to a visit to China and the opportunity to meet the Chairman.

Chairman Mao: He will be very welcome.

Secretary Kissinger: We attach very great significance to our relationship with the People's Republic.



Chairman Mao: There is some significance, not so very great. (Gesturing with his fingers) You are this (wide space between two fingers) and we are this (small space). Because you have the atom bombs, and we don't.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but the Chairman has often said that military power is not the only decisive factor.

Chairman Mao: As Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping has said, millet plus rifles.

Secretary Kissinger: And we have some common opponents.

Chairman Mao: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: You said that in English and wrote it. Can I have it?

Chairman Mao: Yes. (He hands over the note he had written out.)

Secretary Kissinger: I see the Chairman is progressing in learning English.

Chairman Mao: No (holding two fingers close together). So you have quarreled with him (pointing toward Vice Premier Teng).

Secretary Kissinger: Only about the means for a common objective.

Chairman Mao: Yesterday, during your quarrel with the Vice Premier, you said the US asked nothing of China and China asked nothing of the US. As I see it, this is partially right and partially wrong. The small issue is Taiwan, the big issue is the world. (He begins coughing and the nurse comes in to help him.) If neither side had anything to ask from the other, why would you be coming to Peking? If neither side had anything to ask, then why did you want to come to Peking, and why would we want to receive you and the President?

Secretary Kissinger: We come to Peking because we have a common opponent and because we think your perception of the world situation is the clearest of any country we deal with and with which we agree on some . . . many points.



Chairman Mao: That's not reliable. Those words are not reliable. Those words are not reliable because according to your priorities the first is the Soviet Union, the second is Europe and the third is Japan.

Secretary Kissinger: That is not correct.

Chairman Mao: It is in my view. (Counting with his fingers.) America, the Soviet Union, Europe, Japan, China. You see, five (holding up his five fingers).

Secretary Kissinger: That's not correct.

Chairman Mao: So then we quarrel.

Secretary Kissinger: We quarrel. The Soviet Union is a great danger for us, but not a high priority.

Chairman Mao: That's not correct. It is a superpower. There are only two superpowers in the world (counting on his fingers). We are backward (counting on his fingers). America, the Soviet Union, Europe, Japan, China. We come last. America, Soviet Union, Europe, Japan, China -- look.

Secretary Kissinger: I know I almost never disagree with the Chairman, but he is not correct on this point -- only because it is a matter of our priority.

Chairman Mao: (Tapping both his shoulders) We see that what you are doing is leaping to Moscow by way of our shoulders, and these shoulders are now useless. You see, we are the fifth. We are the small finger.

Secretary Kissinger: We have nothing to gain in Moscow.

Chairman Mao: But you can gain Taiwan in China.

Secretary Kissinger: We can gain Taiwan in China?

Chairman Mao: But you now have the Taiwan of China.

Secretary Kissinger: But we will settle that between us.

Chairman Mao: In a hundred years.



Secretary Kissinger: That's what the Chairman said the last time I was here.

Chairman Mao: Exactly.

Secretary Kissinger: It won't take a hundred years. Much less.

Chairman Mao: It's better for it to be in your hands. And if you were to send it back to me now, I would not want it, because it's not wantable. There are a huge bunch of counter-revolutionaries there. A hundred years hence we will want it (gesturing with his hand), and we are going to fight for it.

Secretary Kissinger: Not a hundred years.

Chairman Mao: (Gesturing with his hand, counting) It is hard to say. Five years, ten, twenty, a hundred years. It's hard to say. (Points toward the ceiling) And when I go to heaven to see God, I'll tell him it's better to have Taiwan under the care of the United States now.

Secretary Kissinger: He'll be very astonished to hear that from the Chairman.


Chairman Mao: No, because God blesses you, not us. God does not like us (waves his hands) because I am a militant warlord, also a communist. That's why he doesn't like me. (Pointing to the three Americans) He likes you and you and you.

Secretary Kissinger: I've never had the pleasure of meeting him, so I'm not sure.

Chairman Mao: I'm sure. I'm 82 years old now. (Points toward Secretary Kissinger) And how old are you? 50 maybe.

Secretary Kissinger: 51.

Chairman Mao: (Pointing toward Vice Premier Teng) He's 71. (Waving his hands) And after we're all dead, myself, him (Teng), Chou En-lai, and Yeh Chien-ying, you will still be alive. See? We old ones will not do. We are not going to make it out.



Secretary Kissinger: If I may say one thing about what the Chairman said earlier about our relative priorities.

Chairman Mao: All right.

Secretary Kissinger: Because the Soviet Union is a superpower it is inevitable that it has much priority, and we have to deal with it very frequently. But in terms of strategy we are trying to contain Soviet expansionism, and this is why in strategy China has priority for us. But we don't want to use China to jump to Moscow because that would be suicidal.

Chairman Mao: You've already jumped there, but you no longer need our shoulders.

Secretary Kissinger: We haven't jumped there. It's a tactical phase which the President will also affirm to you.

Chairman Mao: And please convey my regards to your President.

Secretary Kissinger: I will do this.

Chairman Mao: We welcome his visit.

Do you have any way to assist me in curing my present inability to speak clearly?

Secretary Kissinger: You make yourself very well understood even so.

Chairman Mao: This part (pointing to his brain) is working well, and I can eat and sleep. (Patting his knees) These parts are not good. They do not ache, but they are not firm when I walk. I also have some trouble with my lungs. And in one word, I am not well, and majorally (sic) unwell.

Secretary Kissinger: It's always a great joy to see the Chairman.

Chairman Mao: You know I'm a showcase exhibit for visitors.



Secretary Kissinger: I've read over our conversation two years ago, Mr. Chairman. I think it was one of the most profound expositions of international affairs, and we take it very seriously.

Chairman Mao: But there's still some things which we must wait to observe. Some of the assessments I made still have to be moved by the objective situation.

Secretary Kissinger: But I think the basic assessment the Chairman made at that time insofar as the situation has developed has proven correct, and we basically agree with it. We've had a difficult period because of the resignation of President Nixon, and we've had to do more maneuvering than we would have liked.

Chairman Mao: I think that can be done. Maneuvering is allowable.

Secretary Kissinger: It was essential, but we are putting that situation behind us.

Chairman Mao: Europe is too soft now.

Secretary Kissinger: We agree with the Chairman -- Europe is too soft.

Chairman Mao: They are afraid of the Soviet Union.

Secretary Kissinger: They are afraid of the Soviet Union and their domestic situation.

Chairman Mao: Japan is seeking hegemony.

Secretary Kissinger: Japan is not yet ready to seek hegemony. That will require one more change in leadership. But potentially Japan has the potential for seeking hegemony.

Chairman Mao: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: I think the next generation of leaders, my student Nakasone, he was a student of mine when I was a professor.... That generation will be more ready to use the power of Japan.



Chairman Mao: Europe is too scattered, too loose.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. We prefer Europe to be unified and stronger.

Chairman Mao: That is also our preference. But it is too loose and spread out, and it is difficult for it to achieve unity.

Secretary Kissinger: Also it does not have too many strong leaders.

Chairman Mao: Oh, yes.

Secretary Kissinger: But Schmidt, who comes here next week, is the strongest of the leaders in Europe today.

Chairman Mao: France is afraid of Germany (counting on his fingers). They are afraid of the reunification of West Germany and East Germany, which would result in a fist.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, France prefers to keep Germany divided.

Chairman Mao: (Nodding yes) That's not good.

Secretary Kissinger: But they may unite on a nationalistic basis, East and West Germany.

Chairman Mao: Yes, we are in favor of reunification.

Secretary Kissinger: It depends under whom.

Chairman Mao: West Germany has a population of 50 million while East Germany has a population of 18 million.

Secretary Kissinger: West Germany is the strongest side materially.

Chairman Mao: But the reunification of Germany now would not be dangerous.

Secretary Kissinger: We favor the reunification of Germany, but right now it would be prevented militarily by the Soviet Union. But the US supports the reunification of Germany.



Chairman Mao: We agree on that, you and we.

Secretary Kissinger: And we are not afraid of a unified Germany, but Soviet power in Europe must be weakened before it can happen.

Chairman Mao: Without a fight the Soviet Union cannot be weakened.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but it is important for us to pick the right moment for this, and during the period of Watergate we were in no position to do it. And that is why we had to maneuver.

Chairman Mao: And it seems it was not necessary to conduct the Watergate affair in that manner.

Secretary Kissinger: It was inexcusable. Inexcusable. (Miss Tang indicates puzzlement.) It was inexcusable to conduct it in that manner. It was a minor event that was played into a national and international tragedy by a group of very shortsighted people. President Nixon was a good President (Chairman Mao nods affirmatively) and I'm still in very frequent contact with him.

Chairman Mao: Please convey my regards to Mr. Nixon.

Secretary Kissinger: I'll call him when I return.

Chairman Mao: So please first of all send my regards to President Ford and secondly my regards to Mr. Nixon.

Secretary Kissinger: I'll do both of these with great pleasure.

Chairman Mao: You're too busy.

Secretary Kissinger: You think I travel too much?

Chairman Mao: I was saying that you are too busy, and it seems that it won't do if you're not so busy. You cannot keep from being so busy. When the wind and rain are coming, the swallows are busy.

Secretary Kissinger: That will take me several days to understand the full significance of that.



Chairman Mao: This world is not tranquil, and a storm -- the wind and rain -- are coming. And at the approach of the rain and wind the swallows are busy.

Miss Tang: He (the Chairman) asks me how one says "swallow" in English and what is "sparrow". Then I said it is a different kind of bird.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but I hope we have a little more effect on the storm than the swallows do on the wind and rain.

Chairman Mao: It is possible to postpone the arrival of the wind and rain, but it's difficult to obstruct the coming.

Secretary Kissinger: But it's important to be in the best position to deal with it when it does come, and that is not a trivial matter. We agree with you that the wind and rain are coming or may come, and we try to put ourselves in the best possible position, not to avoid it but to overcome it.

Chairman Mao: Dunkirk.

Secretary Kissinger: Not for us.

Chairman Mao: That is not reliable. You can see that that is not the case for you now.


Secretary Kissinger: That will not be the case for us in the future.

Chairman Mao: That is not reliable. A military correspondent for the New York Times put out a book in August.

Secretary Kissinger: Who is he?

Miss Tang: (After consultations among the Chinese) We'll look it up and tell you.

Chairman Mao: Do you think that the 300,000 troops the US has in Europe at the present time are able to resist a Soviet attack?



Secretary Kissinger: The weakness in Europe is not our troops but European troops. I think with nuclear weapons we can resist the attack.

Chairman Mao: That correspondent did not believe the US would use nuclear weapons.

Secretary Kissinger: The New York Times has had a vested interest in American defeats the last ten years. If there's a substantial attack in Western Europe, we'll certainly use nuclear weapons. We have 7,000 weapons in Europe, and they are not there to be captured. That is in Europe. In the US we have many more.

Chairman Mao: But there is a considerable portion of Americans who do not believe you'll use them. They do not believe Americans will be willing to die for Europe.


Secretary Kissinger: Mr. Chairman, we've come through a very difficult domestic period, partly caused by Indochina, partly caused by Watergate, in which many defeatist elements have been public. But if you watch what we've done the last five years, we always confront the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union always backs down. And I can assure you, as the President will reassure you, if the Soviet Union attacks Europe, we'll certainly use nuclear weapons. And the Soviet Union must never believe otherwise -- it's too dangerous.

Chairman Mao: You have confidence, you believe in, nuclear weapons. You do not have confidence in your own army.

Secretary Kissinger: We have to face the reality that we will not have so large an army as the Soviet Union. That is a fact. And the most important fact is that no European country will build a large army. If they did, then there would not be a problem. And, therefore, we must build a strategy which is suited to that reality.

Chairman Mao: The Dunkirk strategy is not undesirable either.

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. Chairman, finally we have to have a minimum confidence in each other's statements.



There will be no Dunkirk strategy, either in the West or in the East. And if there is an attack, once we have stopped the attack, after we have mobilized, we are certain to win a war against the Soviet Union.

Chairman Mao: (Gesturing with his fingers) We adopt the Dunkirk strategy, that is we will allow them to occupy Peking, Tientsin, Wuhan, and Shanghai, and in that way through such tactics we will become victorious and the enemy will be defeated. Both world wars, the first and the second, were conducted in that way and victory was obtained only later.

Secretary Kissinger: It is my belief that if there is a massive Soviet attack anywhere in the world, the US will become involved very quickly. And it is also my conviction that the US will never withdraw from Europe without a nuclear war.

Chairman Mao: There are two possibilities. One is your possibility, the other is that of the New York Times. That is also reflected in Senator Goldwater's speech of June 3 in the Senate.

Secretary Kissinger: What did he say?

Miss Tang: We will send you a copy. It was during the foreign policy debate in the Senate on June 3.

Secretary Kissinger: But what was the main point?


Chairman Mao: His disbelief in Europe.

Secretary Kissinger: You have to understand, Mr. Chairman, that it is the year before the election and much of what is said is said for domestic effect. The New York Times has had a certain position for 20 years and it has an unparalleled record for being wrong.

Chairman Mao: It is said that the New York Times is controlled by a Jewish family.

Secretary Kissinger: That is true.

Chairman Mao: And also the Washington Post.



Secretary Kissinger: The Washington Post -- it is no longer true. (He then conferred with Ambassador Bush who pointed out that Mrs. Graham was Jewish, the daughter of Mr. Meyer.) You are right.

Chairman Mao: The propriety is Jewish.

This Ambassador (looking toward Bush) is in a dire plight in Peking. Why don't you come and look me up?

Ambassador Bush: I am very honored to be here tonight. I think you are busy and don't have the time to see a plain Chief of the Liaison Office.

Chairman Mao: I am not busy, because I do not have to look over all the routine affairs. I only read the international news.

Secretary Kissinger: But the Chairman knows more about what is being written in America than I do. I didn't know about the book by the New York Times man or Senator Goldwater's speech.

Chairman Mao: You don't have the time. You are too busy.

(To Lord) Mr. Lord, you have now been promoted.

Mr. Lord: Yes, Mr. Chairman.


Chairman Mao: (To Bush and Lord) You have both been promoted.

Secretary Kissinger: He (Bush) not yet. He will be in 1980.

Chairman Mao: He can be President.

Secretary Kissinger: In 1980.

Chairman Mao: You don't know my temperament. I like people to curse me (raising his voice and hitting his chair with his hand). You must say that Chairman Mao is an old bureaucrat and in that case I will speed up and meet you. In such a case I will make haste to see you. If you don't curse me, I won't see you, and I will just sleep peacefully.



Secretary Kissinger: That is difficult for us to do, particularly to call you a bureaucrat.

Chairman Mao: I ratify that (slamming his chair with his hand). I will only be happy when all foreigners slam on tables and curse me.

Secretary Kissinger: We will think about it, but it will not come naturally to us. If we call the Chairman a bureaucrat, it will be a tactical maneuver separate from strategy.

Chairman Mao: But I am a bureaucrat. Moreover I am also a warlord. That was the title I was given by the Soviet Union and the title "bureaucrat" was given me by the Soviet Union.

Secretary Kissinger: But I haven't seen any Soviet visitors here lately.

Chairman Mao: They are cursing us every day. Every day.

Secretary Kissinger: But we don't share the Soviet assessment of China.

Chairman Mao: (Before Secretary Kissinger's sentence is translated) Therefore, I have accepted these two titles, "warlord" and "bureaucrat". No honor could be greater. And you have said that I am a warmonger and an aggressor.

Secretary Kissinger: I?

Chairman Mao: The United States in the UN. The UN passed a resolution which was sponsored by the US in which it was declared that China committed aggression against Korea.

Secretary Kissinger: That was 25 years ago.

Chairman Mao: Yes. So it is not directly linked to you. That was during Truman's time.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. That was a long time ago, and our perception has changed.



Chairman Mao: (Touching the top of his head) But the resolution has not yet been cancelled. I am still wearing this hat "aggressor". I equally consider that the greatest honor which no other honor could excel. It is good, very good.

Secretary Kissinger: But then we shouldn't change the UN resolution?

Chairman Mao: No, don't do that. We have never put forward that request. We prefer to wear this cap of honor. Chaing kai-shek is saying that we have committed aggression against China. We have no way to deny that. We have indeed committed aggression against China, and also in Korea. Will you please assist me on making that statement public, perhaps in one of your briefings? That is, the Soviet Union has conferred upon me the title of "warlord and bureaucrat", and the United States has conferred upon me "warmonger and aggressor".

Secretary Kissinger: I think I will let you make that public. I might not get the historically correct statement.

Chairman Mao: I have already made it public before you. I have also said this to many visiting foreigners, including Europeans. Don't you have freedom of speech?

Secretary Kissinger: Absolutely.

Chairman Mao: I also have freedom of speech, and the cannons I have fired exceed the cannons they have fired.

Secretary Kissinger: That I have noticed.

Miss Tang: You have noticed....

Secretary Kissinger: The Chairman's cannons.

Chairman Mao: Please send my regards to your Secretary of Defense.

Secretary Kissinger: I will do that.



Chairman Mao: I am dissatisfied that he went to Japan without coming to Peking. We want to invite him here for the Soviets to see, but you are too miserly. The US is so rich but on this you are too miserly.

Secretary Kissinger: We can discuss it when the President is here.

Chairman Mao: Bring him along. You can bring a civilian and a military member, with your President, both a civilian and a military man.

Secretary Kissinger: Me as the civilian and Schlesinger as the military?

Chairman Mao: Yes. But I won't interfere in your internal affairs. It is up to your side to decide whom you will send.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, he will not come with the President. Maybe later.

Chairman Mao: We would like to invite him to pay a visit to the northeast of our country, Mongolia and Sinkang. He perhaps will not go, nor would you have the courage.

Secretary Kissinger: I would go.

Chairman Mao: (Looking toward Bush) He has been.


Secretary Kissinger: I would certainly go.

Chairman Mao: Good.

Secretary Kissinger: And we have tried to suggest to you that we are prepared to advise or help in some of these problems.

Chairman Mao: As for military aspects we should not discuss that now. Such matters should wait until the war breaks out before we consider them.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but you should know that we would be prepared then to consider them.



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Chairman Mao: So, shall we call that the end?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger, Ambassador Bush, and Mr. Lord then said goodbye to Chairman Mao. Secretary Kissinger confirmed with Vice Premier Teng that the Chinese would put out a public statement on the meeting and would send the text to the US side immediately. (The Chinese statement is at TAB A.) The Americans then said goodbye to the other Chinese officials and drove away in their cars.

Attachment

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Meets Chairman Mao


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[Text] Peking, October 21, 1975 (HSINHUA)--Chairman Mao Tsetung this evening met with Dr Henry A. Kissinger, U.S. secretary of state and assistant to the President for national security affairs, his wife Nancy M. Kissinger, and his party.

American guests at the meeting were George H.W. Bush, chief of the U.S. Liaison Office in China; Helmut Sonnenfeldt, counsellor of the State Department; Philip C. Habib, assistant secretary of state for East Asian affairs; Winston Lord, director of the Office of Policy Planning of the State Department; William H. Gleysteen, deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian affairs; Peter W. Rodman, White House staff member; and Anne Boddicker, secretary.

Chairman Mao shook hands with all the American guests and had a conversation in a friendly atmosphere with Dr Kissinger, George Bush and Winston Lord on a wide range of questions. Chairman Mao asked Dr Kissinger to convey his regards to President Ford.

Present on the occasion were Vice-Premier Teng Hsiao-ping, Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua, chief of the Chinese Liaison Office in the U.S.A. Huang Chen, Vice-Foreign Minister Wang Hai-jung and deputy departmental directors of the Foreign Ministry Tang Wen-sheng and Chang Han-chih.



Report to the
President



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

October 21, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

Bo *GRY*

Following is report of Secretary Kissinger's meeting with Chairman Mao:

"I met with Chairman Mao for one and a half hours starting at 1830 Tuesday on the usual short notice. He sent his personal greetings to you and looks forward to your visit. As in all previous conversations the dominant topic was the international situation, particularly the Soviet Union.

"The discussion was friendly and wide-ranging, as the Chinese Communique says, but frankly it was also disturbing. I think it best to give you a firsthand rundown and appraisal upon my return, but in essence the Chairman stressed the themes that Vice Premier Teng presented on Monday as I reported them to you, only with more pungent emphasis. Clearly he sees our domestic problems as emasculating our staying power in the world, thinks we are floundering largely as a result of domestic weaknesses, and believes China must rely on itself. He sees Europe as being particularly soft and Japan as potentially aggressive. Once again he was very relaxed about Taiwan, spending only a few sentences on an issue he labelled as clearly subsidiary to the global situation. He said that the PRC could wait for some time to solve the problem, while suggesting that forceful means would probably be required.

"I spent an hour with Teng before the Mao meeting during which he invited my views on the southern flank of NATO. This is of concern to them, and their analysis and preferences are very close to ours. We had passed the morning strolling around the Fragrant Hills, which are outside of Peking, tinged with autumn red and dotted with temples. Teng hosted a cordial and sumptuous lunch.

"I meet again with Teng Wednesday afternoon at which time we should get their reaction to our draft Communique for your trip."

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MR 97-7, #16; NSC Letter 12/5/97

By Ut NARA, Date 1/20/98



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