

Scowcroft

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

The President
Secretary Henry A. Kissinger

Senator Mike Mansfield
Senator Hugh Scott
Senator William Fulbright
Senator George Aiken
Senator Hubert Humphrey

Congressman Thomas O'Neill
Congressman John Rhodes
Congressman Thomas Morgan
Congressman Peter Frelinghuysen

L/General Brent Scowcroft
Mr. William Timmons

DATE AND TIME:

Wednesday, September 26, 1974

PLACE:

Family Dining Room, The Residence

SUBJECT:

Bipartisan Leadership Breakfast with the President

The President: I appreciate Mike's holding the Foreign Assistance Bill so we could talk over Turkish aid, the Foreign Assistance Bill and the Trade Bill.

Doc, you approved the modified Turkish language.

Congressman Morgan: It passed by a vote of 19 to 11.

The President: I hope we can make it stick on the floor. Then, Mike helped get the same into the Senate aid bill. Henry, would you explain the situation we are in.

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CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER



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NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY ldj, NARA, DATE 5/5/04
State Dev. Sec 3/9/04



Secretary Kissinger: Let me do two things -- explain the diplomacy and then the legal situation.

The Greek domestic situation is extremely complex. Karamanlis is caught between anti-US forces on the left and right. There is Papadopoulos on the left (who was strong enough in '67 to stimulate a coup); and on the right are the military types from the junta.

Karamanlis and Mavros are personally pro-US. They talk differently, however, for public consumption.

Congressman O'Neill: How did the junta judge so wrong on Cyprus?

Secretary Kissinger: We got no high-level warning of the coup. Neither did Makarios. We earlier had had some rumors which we passed to him.

The junta made a basic wrong judgment. They thought in terms of the 1964 situation. But in 1964 there was a strong Cyprus government and a popular Greek government. And as a result of '64, the Turks vowed never would they let it happen again. The junta was living in a dream world -- in the early days after the coup it wouldn't give concessions to keep the Turks from invading.

Karamanlis is trying to steal support from the left and the right before the November elections. Take his actions with respect to NATO -- Karamanlis is trying to steal the thunder from the left. He has really done a minimum. Mavros was upset because he was the only foreign minister called on in New York. He thought it wouldn't look good back home.

The Greeks know the outcome will be worse than on July 15. Any conceivable outcome before the elections would have to be of a character which would hurt them. They hope in a negotiation to wrap in other issues with Turkey. It was our judgment that there was nothing we could have done which would have stopped the second Turkish offensive.

Immediately after the second attack began, we invited both Prime Ministers here or offered to send Ambassador Bruce to meet with them. These were all rejected.

We told Karamanlis that we understood the need for some anti-US propaganda, but there was danger it would prevent us from helping them. He quieted it down thereafter. Then Karamanlis asked for a private emissary. We sent Tyler. Karamanlis told him that in direct negotiations, he would have to ask far too much. He gave us a list of what he would need in direct negotiations and then gave us a smaller list of demands which he said he could get by with

in direct negotiations. Then he said he would rather not be involved at all -- so he wouldn't have to accept the responsibility. He could accept a communal talks outcome which he couldn't accept if he were directly involved.

At the same time, we took the foreign assistance legal interpretation to the Turks and told them we would have to implement it if there were no progress in the negotiations and on poppies. (They have now agreed on the straw process.) The Turks have now agreed that when the Greeks give the signal, they will make some concessions. That would be used to elicit a statement of principles and would permit communal talks, plus some refugee returns. This would be in October. Then, after the November elections, the talks would be broadened.

The Greek problem is presentational. Mavros was very friendly with me and asked for economic and military aid -- but publicly he has had to make some troublesome statements. He told me he would get Makarios under control. He asked privately that I go to Turkey to bring back a concession, but they are reluctant to ask me publicly. But all this is tactics. Both the Greeks and Turks substantially agree on this general process.

In Turkey, Ecevit has a government problem because his coalition wanted annexation in Cyprus. He is looking for a partner who would be willing to negotiate with Greece.

Greece is willing to give Turkey 20% of the island, and the Turks are willing to reduce their holdings to 33%. Somewhere in between will work.

We are ready to use leverage on Turkey (whatever you think of our policy), but if we cut off aid ahead of time we will lose that leverage. If we are tough beforehand, the Greeks -- who will be tough negotiators anyway -- would have leverage over us. With an aid cutoff, the Greeks would expect concessions no one could get them. These restrictions would lose us the Turks without helping the Greeks and destroy this process I have been describing. It is going pretty well really -- but it will move in fits and starts. Cutting off aid doesn't help the Greek moderates because it cuts their maneuvering room -- they can't point to objective necessities for compromise.

The legal provisions are such that we can and probably should cut off aid. We could avoid the cutoff by the following (read from talking paper):

- Find the Turks not in substantial violation
- Self-defense
- Treaty of 1960 creates doubt
- Law applies to future, not past action



The President felt we should not make a strained legal interpretation without talking with you. Even if we cut off, does it apply to pipeline, and how about the \$50 million grant exception? A cutoff without the pipeline cutoff would infuriate the Turks without leaving any effect for a year.

The negotiations timetable can't be speeded. All of this represents the nature of our problem and why we don't want an automatic cutoff but rather to use the threat of it for leverage.

The President: This is why the amendment of yesterday is good.

Senator Fulbright: What is it?

Secretary Kissinger: The CR Amendment required "substantial progress." This gives the Greeks the opportunity to say at any time there isn't any. The language in yesterday's amendments call for "good faith efforts by the Turks."

Congressman Morgan: You saw the POST editorial?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. It is not accurate. I haven't done anything about the legal opinions.

Senator Aiken: How do we respond to our Greek friends?

Secretary Kissinger: I spoke with AHEPA a while back and while they were good in private, they went right out to lobby for a cutoff.

Congressman Frelinghuysen: The fight isn't over. Brademas will continue to fight. His argument is the amendment was designed to get some troops moved off Cyprus.

Secretary Kissinger: We could make a shyster interpretation -- pull out 5,000 troops and declare substantial progress. We don't want to do it that way.

Congressman Frelinghuysen: The whole thing is a PR move to pacify feelings.

Secretary Kissinger: Once the Turks know we are playing games like pulling out a few troops, we will lose our leverage with them.

Congressman Frelinghuysen: How do we get out of complying with the act?



Secretary Kissinger: The minimum compliance would be to cut off credit and all grants above \$50 million, and have the pipeline alone. But this would force the Turks to a nationalistic posture in which no Turk could give concessions -- and the Greeks wouldn't want to make concessions in such a situation because they would want to wait to see what effect the cutoff was having.

Congressman Frelinghuysen: But we don't have an ideal solution and the House vote shows clearly what the sentiment is.

Congressman Rhodes: Brademas told me not to make him roll us again -- because he can and will. What we need is a Senate action on CR first so we can bring something in conference.

Secretary Kissinger: Our lawyers say the House Committee action would override the language in the Foreign Assistance Act.

We should have some action going by the time the recess is over.

Congressman O'Neill: Could you talk with the Greek Congressmen?

Senator Mansfield: We have the amendment now and will try to hold it as is for conference.

Congressman Rhodes: That is what we need.

Secretary Kissinger: If we had the House language on the CRA there would be daily arguments about what was "substantial" progress and the Greeks would gain great leverage.

Congressman Rhodes: How about stressing the effect on NATO. We need both Greece and Turkey.

President Ford: Sure. Turkey could take the same NATO action as the Greeks.

Secretary Kissinger: The potential for the Turks getting out of NATO is greater than Greece. There is no sympathy with Americans in Turkey and there is always the possibility of a Qaddafi-type coup. If the Turks should throw in with the Arabs, we would be in trouble.

Senator Humphrey: We have a problem of cosmetics: There must be some action showing something is going on that we can point to. We can make a case if we have something to point to. Remember, there is a US election in November, too.



Secretary Kissinger: Our dilemma is that the Turks are willing to grant some concessions, but the Greeks have asked that we don't do it now because they want it close to their election and not so far in front they have to deliver something else by November.

Senator Humphrey: Can we say within 30 days?

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Senator Mansfield: I would be prepared to go with the Brooke Amendment.

Senator Fulbright: I prefer to put the amendment on the authorization rather than the CRA. Of course I am opposed to the whole bill. This Cyprus negotiation is a British problem. These amendments would get us into another dispute where we don't belong. Let the UN handle it. They can't do any worse than we.

Senator Humphrey: It's not a UN problem. It's a NATO problem.

Senator Fulbright: The problem is we are using foreign aid to get us involved in every dispute around the world.

Senator Mansfield: Our policy in Cyprus has been good. There are all sorts of dangerous possibilities in this situation. I oppose aid but I want to support our diplomacy.

Senator Fulbright: I oppose doing it through the CRA. After all, the bill has more money, but it does have a number of restrictive amendments.

Congressman Rhodes: Hubert has identified the immediate problem. Can we tell the Turks the law is such, and that we will have to comply by a certain time.

Congressman Frelinghuysen: I don't think the Brooke-Hamilton approach will be accepted unless we do something with the Turks.



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Secretary Kissinger: Our dilemma is the Greeks don't want it now.

Senator Scott: It will be as much trouble after the election as now.

The President: There are two bills: the authorization tomorrow and the CRA Monday.

Senator Fulbright: Why not take it to the UN. Then we wouldn't have all of the responsibility.

The President: The Greeks and the Turks both trust us.

Secretary Kissinger: Giving it to the UN is a pro-Turk move because the UN can't do anything and the situation would freeze as it is. If we move away from the Turks, the Soviet Union will probably move toward them. Turkey is more important to the Soviet Union than Greece.

Senator Fulbright: Turkey has always been afraid of the Soviet Union. They wouldn't turn to them.

Senator Mansfield: No, you are wrong. They would turn to the Soviet Union and the Arabs.

The President: The Greek government won't publicly acknowledge to the US Greeks they don't want movement now. We both have elections and they must understand if they don't call off the US Greeks, it will hurt the Greek position.

Senator Mansfield: How about a token Turk reduction of 2,000-3,000 now and another nearer election?

Senator Humphrey: Maybe we could dump all the bad stuff on the Authorization to let people vent their spleen and then negotiate it out of the CRA.

Senator Mansfield: We will probably take up the Authorization Tuesday.

Senator Humphrey: The House has a mild amendment on the Authorization and if the Senate puts a tough amendment on the Authorization, but not on the CRA, then we can negotiate a good CRA.

The President: Then, by the time the recess is over, there may be some progress and we could take care of it in the Authorization.

Senator Aiken: To summarize -- all this maneuvering must be kept from the public.

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Congressman Rhodes: How is the US Greek Community divided?

Secretary Kissinger: The responsible ones are for Karamanlis and the demonstrators are for Papadopoulos.

Congressman Rhodes: Suppose Iakovos met with the President and then made a good statement.

Congressman O'Neill: Before the coup the Greek Congressmen were out of touch with the US-Greeks -- who supported the junta. Now they want to get back in touch with their constituents by being tough.

The President: We will put tough language in the Senate Authorization and keep the Senate CRA with the Brooke Amendment. Then after the recess, progress would get us off the hook.

So it's crucial to get to Iakovos.

Congressman Rhodes: I think it would add to our problems to put a tough amendment on the Senate bill.

The President: Let's spend just a minute on Jackson-Vanik. I met with Scoop last Saturday. My position is to have a waiver. If, at the end of the year the Soviet Union hasn't performed, I would kill MFN. The Soviet Union has agreed they wouldn't interfere with applications and any applicant could leave, except for security cases.

Secretary Kissinger: That's about 1 or 1-1/2% of the total.

The President: And no harassment. If they stick by that, I would so certify and MFN would continue. We propose to Scoop a procedure like we had on the pay bill. Scoop wants affirmative action by the Congress under a complicated system he says will ensure the Congress will act.


Senator Fulbright: That won't work.

Senator Scott: No, it won't.

The President: Scoop has worked out a complicated procedure, but you know it can be circumvented.

Why we would even be willing to let it be a one-House veto.

Senator Humphrey: What has Javits said about all this.





Secretary Kissinger: What the President described is what the Soviets have told us. But they won't guarantee a specific figure and they claim emigration is down because of the Middle East situation. There is probably something to that (described Belgian action on re-emigrators). We would communicate all these understandings in a letter to Scoop and he would answer back with his clarifications.

Senator Humphrey: To Scoop? And how about the rest of us?

Secretary Kissinger: Scoop would write back and say he understands 60,000 is what we could expect as an adequate figure. The Soviets will not agree to that. And you know there is no way for the Soviet Union to live up to every detail of these requirements, so Jackson could use every isolated example to scream bad faith. (Described how we couldn't require typed applications.)

No government could or should live up to this intrusion.

Senator Fulbright: We certainly wouldn't.

Secretary Kissinger: But we would certainly know through the Jewish network of systematic violations. And Brezhnev sort of has promised personal attention individual cases. But the Soviet Union has not agreed to 60,000 and Jackson at the end of the waiver period could scream trickery. We do not accept his specific number.

[The President mentioned the Kudirka case to show Soviet cooperation.]

Senator Humphrey: I'm glad to hear they are human. If you think the Greeks have pressure, we have more from the Jews. You've got to get the top Jewish leaders in and tell them what has been done. The President has an ironclad case on this.

Senator Scott: We have made these points to the Jewish Community. The Israeli Government has to . . . (interrupted).

The President: If the Jackson-Vanik Amendment comes up, we can't buy it. So there would be no trade bill and probably no Jewish emigration. The way to go is our way so we can get a trade bill and emigration.

Senator Mansfield: I couldn't vote for the bill as Henry has described the process.

Congressman Frelinghuysen: Would you leave Scoop's letter unanswered?

Secretary Kissinger: We would reply saying we understand this is your view -- a waffle. But he would always claim trickery.



Senator Humphrey: Why not spell out this to the leadership? Why to Scoop? I am mean too. We know the President won't let non-compliance turn into a political football. It is absolutely safe. Democratic politics will be wild in 1976. The President should spell out the understandings -- or Henry, but not to Scoop.

Senator Scott: If sentiment here is opposed, just tell Scoop what the leaders think.

Secretary Kissinger: We could put in a letter from me what I have described.

Senator Humphrey: Someone should spell it out to the committees, not to Scoop.

Senator Scott: Tell Scoop there should not be a private treaty.

Secretary Kissinger: There are two choices -- if we write a letter to the leadership and he replies, he is just one Senator. But if we write him and he replies, it is part of the legislative record.

Congressman Rhodes: A letter should go to Senator Long.

Senator Humphrey: A letter should go to Long. Then, anyone can send a letter back who wants to. If Scoop gets a letter, others who may have certain ambitions will want one.

The President: We brought this up because we are here working hard on this problem and I wanted the leadership to know the precise situation. I hope Scoop won't feel we undercut him.

Secretary Kissinger: The Soviet Union says they can't accept MFN if affirmative action is needed every year.

The President: Tell them about the Camp David meeting, Henry.

Secretary Kissinger: Based on our oil speeches, we have called a Big Five meeting.

What we are seeing is one of the largest transfers of economic and therefore political power in history. Italy, for example, can't meet its deficit. Recycling gives the Arabs life and death control over the industrial world -- by pulling out the investment they could cause economic chaos. Some have said let the Arabs take over the foreign aid programs from the developed countries. If the Arabs take over foreign aid -- they haven't shown that inclination yet -- they could buy up the whole Third World. Libya, for example, literally buys up countries.

We have no brilliant answers but we want to put this problem to them and some possible approaches:

- (1) Consumer restraint.
- (2) Explore a fund which would equalize the burden -- maybe a tax.
- (3) Build on emergency sharing agreement -- from selective to general boycott.

We must realize we face a serious change in world political structure.

Senator Scott: The industrialized world won't tolerate strangulation at the hands of a few Arabs. It never has happened before in history.

Secretary Kissinger: There has never been this kind of power transfer without war. European attitudes are now changing.

If this trend continues, Japan, for example, will build a military force to take action.

Senator Humphrey: Your conference should agree on joint R&D. You need to announce something. We need really to get going.

No one knows how to deal with this shift in capital.

We should tell the Arabs we will pay \$7 a barrel and no more.

We don't have a concerted effort. The people will respond if we tell them cold turkey.

Senator Fulbright: Why don't we ask the Jews to settle Jerusalem as part of the package?

Senator Humphrey: You keep looking at me when you say things like that. I have talked more cold turkey, or Humphrey that you have.

The President: You have been great to come and take all this time. Thank you very much.



MEMORANDUM

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Bipartisan Leadership Breakfast with the
President -- Wednesday, September 26, 1974

ATTENDEES: President Ford
Secretary Kissinger

Senator Mike Mansfield
Senator Hugh Scott
Senator William Fulbright
Senator George Aiken
Senator Hubert Humphrey

Congressman Thomas O'Neill
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Congressman Thomas Morgan
Congressman Peter Frelinghuysen

Lt. General Brent Scowcroft
Mr. William Timmons

SUBJECTS: Turkish Aid; Jackson Amendment; Energy
Cooperation

Turkish Aid

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Bill so we could talk over Turkish aid, the Foreign Assistance Bill
and the Trade Bill.

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Morgan: It passed by a vote of 19 to 11.

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Karamanlis and Mavros are personally pro-American. They talk differently, however, for public consumption.

Congressman O'Neill: How did the junta judge so wrong on Cyprus?

Secretary Kissinger: In spite of what you may read, we got no high-level warning of the coup. Neither did Makarios. We earlier had heard some rumors, which we passed to him.

The junta made a basic wrong judgment. They thought in terms of the 1964 situation. But in '64 there was a strong Cyprus Government and a popular Greek Government. And as a result of '64, the Turks vowed that never would they let it happen again. The junta was living in a dream world; in the early days after the coup, they wouldn't give concessions to keep the Turks from invading.

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The legal provisions are such that we can and probably should cut off aid. We could avoid the cutoff by the following [reading from the talking paper]: we could find the Turks not in substantial violation, on the basis that it was a kind of self-defense of the Turkish Cypriotes; that the Treaty of 1960 gives them the status of guarantor, which at least creates doubt that their action was illegal; and that the law applies to future, not past action.

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
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
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Senator Mansfield: No, you are wrong. They would turn to the Soviet Union and the Arabs.

The President: The Greek Government won't publicly acknowledge to the American Greeks that they don't want movement now. We have both elections. They must understand that if they don't call off the American Greeks, it will hurt the Greek position.

Senator Mansfield: How about a token Turkish reduction of 2,000-3,000 now and another nearer election?

Senator Humphrey: Maybe we could dump all the bad stuff on the Authorization to let people vent their spleen and then negotiate it out of the CRA.

Senator Mansfield: We will probably take up the Authorization Tuesday.

Senator Humphrey: The House has a mild amendment on the Authorization and if the Senate puts a tough amendment on the Authorization, but not on the CRA, then we can negotiate a good CRA.

The President: Then, by the time the recess is over, there may be some progress and we could take care of it in the Authorization.

Senator Aiken: To summarize -- all this maneuvering must be kept from the public.

Congressman Rhodes: How is the American Greek Community divided?



Secretary Kissinger: The responsible ones are for Karamanlis and the demonstrators are for Papandreou.

Congressman Rhodes: Suppose Iakovos met with the President and then made a good statement?

Congressman O'Neill: Before the coup the Greek Congressmen were out of touch with the American Greeks -- who supported the junta. Now they want to get back in touch with their constituents by being tough.

The President: We will put tough language in the Senate Authorization and keep the Senate CRA with the Brooke Amendment. Then after the recess, progress would get us off the hook.

So it's crucial to get to Iakovos.

Congressman Rhodes: I think it would add to our problems to put a tough amendment on the Senate bill.

Jackson Amendment

The President: Let's spend just a minute on Jackson-Vanik. I met with Scoop last Saturday. My position is to have a waiver. If, at the end of the year the Soviet Union hasn't performed, I would kill MFN. The Soviet Union has agreed they wouldn't interfere with applications and that any applicant could leave, except for security cases.

Secretary Kissinger: That's about 1 or 1-1/2% of the total.

The President: And no harassment. If they stick by that, I would so certify and MFN would continue. We proposed to Scoop a procedure like we had on the pay bill. Scoop wants affirmative action by the Congress. Under a complicated system he says will ensure that Congress will act.

Senator Fulbright: That won't work.

Senator Scott: No, it won't.

The President: Scoop has worked out a complicated procedure, but you know it can be circumvented.



Why, we would even be willing to let it be a one-House veto.

Senator Humphrey: What has Javits said about all this?

Secretary Kissinger: What the President described is what the Soviets have told us. But they won't guarantee a specific figure and they also claim that emigration is down because of the Middle East situation. There is probably something to that. There is a problem in Western Europe already with people wanting to go back. We would communicate all these understandings in a letter to Scoop and he would answer back with his clarifications.

Senator Humphrey: To Scoop? And how about the rest of us?

Secretary Kissinger: Scoop would write back and say he understands that 60,000 is what we could expect as an adequate figure. The Soviets will not agree to that. And you know there is no way for the Soviet Union to live up to every detail of these requirements, so Jackson could use every isolated example to scream bad faith. The Soviets could ask for typed applications. No government could or should live up to this sort of intrusion.

Senator Fulbright: We certainly wouldn't.

Secretary Kissinger: But we would certainly know through the Jewish network about systematic violations if there are any. And Brezhnev has promised to give his personal attention to individual cases. But the Soviet Union has not agreed to 60,000, and Jackson at the end of the waiver period could scream trickery. We do not accept his specific number.

[The President mentioned the Kudirka case to show Soviet cooperation.]

Senator Humphrey: I'm glad to hear they are human. If you think the Greeks have pressure, we have more from the Jews. You've got to get the top Jewish leaders in and tell them what has been done. The President has an ironclad case on this.

Senator Scott: We have made these points to the Jewish Community. The Israeli Government has to . . . (interrupted).



The President: If the Jackson-Vanik Amendment comes up, we can't buy it. So there would be no trade bill and probably no Jewish emigration. The way to go is our way so we can get a trade bill and emigration.

Senator Mansfield: I couldn't vote for the bill as Henry has described the process.

Congressman Frelinghuysen: Would you leave Scoop's letter unanswered?

Secretary Kissinger: We would reply saying we understand this is your view -- which is a waffle. But he could always claim trickery.

Senator Humphrey: Why not spell out this to the leadership? Why to Scoop? I am mean too. We know the President won't let non-compliance turn into a political football. It is absolutely safe. Democratic politics will be wild in '76. The President should spell out the understandings -- or Henry -- but not to Scoop.

Senator Scott: If sentiment here is opposed, just tell Scoop what the leaders think.

Secretary Kissinger: We could put in a letter from me what I have described.

Senator Humphrey: Someone should spell it out to the committees, not to Scoop.

Senator Scott: Tell Scoop there should not be a private treaty.

Secretary Kissinger: There are two choices: If we write a letter to the leadership and he replies, he is just one Senator. But if we write him and he replies, it is part of the legislative record.

Congressman Rhodes: A letter should go to Senator Long.

Senator Humphrey: A letter should go to Long. Then anyone can send a letter back who wants to. If Scoop gets a letter, others who may have certain ambitions will want one.

The President: We brought this up because we are here working hard on this problem and I wanted the leadership to know the precise situation. I hope Scoop won't feel we undercut him.



Secretary Kissinger: The Soviet Union says they can't accept MFN if affirmative action is needed every year.

Energy Cooperation

The President: Tell them about the Camp David meeting, Henry.

Secretary Kissinger: Based on what the President and I have said in our oil speeches, we have called a meeting of the Big Five to concert our policy.

What we are seeing is one of the largest transfers of economic power and therefore political power in history. Italy, for example, can't meet its deficit. Recycling gives the Arabs life and death control over the industrial world. By pulling out investment, they could cause economic chaos. Some have said, "Let the Arabs take over the foreign aid programs from the developed countries." If the Arabs take over foreign aid -- they haven't shown that inclination yet -- they could buy up the whole Third World. Libya, for example, literally buys up countries.

We have no brilliant answers but we want to put this problem to them and discuss some possible approaches: One element would be consumer restraint, or conservation. Second, we would explore establishing a fund which would equalize the burden -- maybe a tax. Third, we would build on the emergency sharing agreement and strengthen it for the range of threats, from selective to a general boycott.

But basically we must realize that we face a serious change in the world political structure.

Senator Scott: The industrialized world won't tolerate strangulation at the hands of a few Arabs. It never has happened before in history.

Secretary Kissinger: There has never been this kind of power transfer without war. European attitudes are now changing. If this trend continues, Japan, for example, will build a military force to take action.

Senator Humphrey: Your conference should agree on joint R&D. You need to announce something. We need really to get going.



No one knows how to deal with this shift in capital.

We should tell the Arabs we will pay \$7 a barrel and no more. We don't have a concerted effort. The people will respond if we tell it to them cold turkey.

Senator Fulbright: Why don't we ask the Jews to sell Jerusalem as part of the package?

Senator Humphrey: You keep looking at me when you say things like that. I have talked more cold turkey, or Humphrey, than you have.

The President: You have been great to come and take all this time. Thank you very much.



Leadership Breakfast
26 Sept.

THE WHITE HOUSE
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Chitchat about China

O'Neill, Roberts, Albert only one who
hasn't gone

Hump - I can see why Camp liked it. He
looks like a close command.

Doc - Day was same to him, we had just
cut off Communist bombing.

What about Ray's trial?

K - Korea said 1/3 of world's uranium here w/in
500 miles of Italy

S - 1/5 of pop of Middle East have eyes crossed --
there is a genetic prob.

P - Hope you don't mind eating here.
Here dinner last night

Hump - Spent a lot of time trying to get here

P - Appreciate Nixon holding FA bill so
we could talk to Congress on Trade and
FA Bill, + Trade bill

Doc you approved unilateral trade
exchange

Doc - 19-11

P I hope we can make it stick on the


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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/90, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, State Review 3/9/04

BY WLR, NARA, DATE 5/5/04

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P - How likely helped get a name into
Senate and bill. K, would you explain

K - Let me do 2 things - explain explanation
then legal situation.

Great domestic set + transaction complex.
Korea great receipt but 2 anti-US
forces. Paper law (who strong enough
in 67 to stimulate a war). Other
etc. joint.

Korea to increase presence per US.

They say other things for pub. consumption.

Taj - How did junta go wrong on Cyprus?

K - We got ~~in~~ ^{involved} in ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~business~~ ^{business} of Camp. Junta
did mistakes.

Junta made basic wrong judgment.

~~In February~~ In 64 there was a strong
Cyprus govt + popular Greek govt. Since
64 Turkey would never again
Junta was living in a dream world -
wouldn't give concessions to keep
Turks from invading.

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Kara is trying to stall request from
L & R before Nov elections. Take NATO -
Kara is trying to stall through from left.
They have really done a minimum.
Mansour was upset because he only
one I called on in 44.

Greeks know conference will be worse than
July 15. Any conference before elections would
be such as to frustrate them. They hope
to wrap in other issues w/ Turkey.

It was a case judge - nothing we could have
done would have stopped a 2nd Turkish
move.

Immediately after 2nd invasion began
we wanted both P.M.'s here or to send
Bruce - all rejected.

We told Kara that we understood some
anti-US propaganda but too much would prevent
us helping them. It quieted down
thereafter. Then Kara asked for private
embassy - Tyler. Kara said that
then direct negot. he would have

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to ask for too much. He gave us
a smaller list of demands which he
needed in indirect negot. Then he
said he rather not be involved at all -
so wouldn't have to accept us. He
could accept a communal talks
conference which he couldn't if he
directly involved.

At some time, we took FA legal inter-
pretation to the Turks & told them we would
do what we could to implement it if no progress
in negotiations + our people. (They
have now agreed on a status process).

Turks have now agreed that when
Greeks give signal, they will make
some concessions. That be used
for statement of principle & permit
political communal talks, plus some
refugee return. This in
Oct. Then after Nov election, the

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Talks would be broad-based.
Greek part is presidential. Mavros
was very friendly w/ me & asked for
econ + mil aid - but publicly he
has been fairly cold. He told me he
would get Makarios under control. He
asked that I go to Turkey to bring back
a commission, but they reluctant to work
me publicly. But this is tactics. Both
Greeks + Turks substantially agree on this
genl process.

In Turk, ~~not~~ E. civit has part prob
because his constitution would annex.
He's looking for partner who would ~~negotiate~~
Greece.

Greece willing to give T 20% of island +
Turks willing to reduce to 33%. Some-
where in bet will work.

US ready to use leverage on Turk (whatever
you think of our policy) but if we

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Cut off ahead we lose leverage. We
through restrictions & Greeks - who will
be tough anyway - would have leverage
over us. We did not off, Greeks would
expect concessions no one could get.
These restrictions will lose us & Turks
w/o helping & Greeks + destroy their process.
It going pretty well - will be fit &
starts. Cutting off aid doesn't help &
Greek mechanics because it ~~gives~~
cuts their maneuvering - even
legal provisions - can + prob should cut
off aid. We could avoid cutoff by
following:

Not in substantial violation
Self defense
Treaty of 1960 creates doubt
have options to further not part
action

Pres felt we should not work a

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Should legal interpretation w/o talking w/ you. E even if we sort of, does it apply to pipeline, + how about 50 mil grant exception. Cutoff w/o pipeline cutoff would implicate w/o effect for a year.

Negotiations can't be speeded. All this is one part + why we don't want an auto. cutoff don't use it for damage.

P This is why comment of yesterday is good.

Fuk. What is it?

K Tell required subs. progress + Gueiss would say there isn't any. We're merely said good faith efforts by Turk.

Doc You saw Post edit.

K Yes. I haven't done anything w/ legal opinion

Askin How do we respond to our Greek

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friends.

K I spoke w/ Akpa + they feel in private, but still lobbying for cutoff.

Fishing. Fight isn't over. Brachman will fight. Argument is council was designed to move things off.

K We can get a stronger interpretation, pull out 5000 + decline progress.

Fishing - It is a PR move to pacify fishing.

K O and I make know me playing games we will lose damage

Fishing - How do we get out of complying.

K - If minimum would be to cut off credit + all above 50 mil

This would force Turks to negotiate posture in which no Turk could give concessions - + Greeks wouldn't want to concede because they would want to want to see what effect - cutoff was having.

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Felix - Don't we don't have ideal solution + the House with strong sentiment.

Rhodes - DeLoach told me don't make we call you again cause we will. What we need to Senate action on 12th so we can bring some-thing in conference.

K One language in a House bill which would overrule the FPA we should have some action by the time 12th is over.

Tig - Could you talk w/ Greek lang.

Wick - We have a Council + will try to hold it as is for Conference

Rhodes - That's what we want.

K* If we ~~use~~ had ^{two} House lang. There would be daily argument about progress + would give Greek leverage.

Rhodes How about effect on NATO. We

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would both Greece + Turkey.

P Sure. Turkey could take some NATO action as back.

K Potential for Turkey getting out of NATO is greater than Greece. The symp. population + possibility of a coup. If Turkey threw in w/ Arabs, not in trouble

Hog - We have a prob of cosmetics. There must be some action showing something is going on so that we can point to - we can make a case if we have something to point to.

There is a US election in Nov too.

K One dilemma is Turkey will give a concession but Greeks asked that we don't do it cause they want it close to their election + not so far in front they have to deliver

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something else by Mrs.

Henry. Can we say w/in 30 days.

K If Greeks think we would pressure
they may back off.

Rhodes - But Turks are mad - If they
make concession now, it looks
like they are caving under pressure.

Henry. We have gone thru period where
we signed a law. If first would
work. We need something.

Mike - I would be prepared to go w/
Bunker around.

Fred I prefer to ~~put out~~ ^{put} out on anything other
rather than CRA.

This report ~~gets~~ is a big prob. This
would get us into another dispute
~~where~~ we don't bill any. but a
UN handle it. Can't do any more
than we

Henry. but a UN prob. a NATO prob.

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Fred - The prob is rising for aid to
get us involved in every
dispute around world.

Mike - ~~but~~ On going in Cyprus has
been good. There are all sorts
of dangers & possibilities. I ~~oppose~~
aid but want to see program ~~developing~~.

Fred I oppose CRA. ~~but~~ The bill has
more money, but does have ~~value~~
Rhodes - Henry put a mixed prob. Can
we tell a Turks the law is such that
we will have to empty by such
a time.

Fred. I don't think Park-Hamilton
approach will be accepted unless
we do something w/c Turks.

K Aunclerman is the Greeks don't
want it now

Scott too much trouble if the election
occurs

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- P Two bills - Greek transition +
CRB Monday
- Fred - Why not take it to UN. Then
we wouldn't have all responsibility.
- P - Greeks + Turks trust - us
- H - bringing it to UN is pro-Turk
most cause UN can't do anything
& sit would freeze as it is. If we
break away from Turk, SO probably
move toward them. Turkey is
more important to SO
- Fred - Turkey always afraid of SO
- Brake - No. They would turn to SO +
Arabs.
- A. Guba would want all US Greeks they
don't want movement now we
both have elections & they must
understand if they don't call off
the US Greeks, it will hurt Greeks

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- Brake - How about a three Turk
reduction 2-3 now now and
another week electric.
- Hamp - Maybe we could change all
the bad stuff on the Greek side to
vent their spleen & then negotiate
it out of CIRA
- Mike - Push take up with Turks.
- Hamp - France has build around on
Greek & if Soviets put tough on on
Greek, & then negotiate a good CIRA.
- P I hope, by a time recess is over,
maybe some prog.
- Archie - Summary - All this morning
must be kept from public.
- Rhodes ~~How~~ How is US Greek un-
divided?
- R The rep. are for Kase & a
demonstrations are for Papandreu

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Rhodes - Suggest Jackson meet w/ P & then make good statement

Tap - Greek Congressmen concerned of touch w/ US Greeks - who try to get a joint. Then they want to get back in touch.

P - We put tough language in Smith Act. + keep Smith CRA w/ House around. Then after news we prop would get no off a back.


* So it crucial to get to Jackson

Rhodes I think it would avoid problems to put a tough around on Smith bill.

P Just a minute on Jackson - Vanick. Meet w/ S Corp last Saturday. My position is written at end of year - if SU doesn't perform we

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would bill MFCI SU agreed they wouldn't interfere w/ operations + any could have except for security cases

K That about 1 or 1 1/2%

P and no harassment. Then

I would verify + MFCI would continue. We propose procedure like pay bill. S Corp wants to force operations within

Ford. Will work

S with No it would

P S Corp has made a lot of explicit procedure, but you know it can be recommended.

Who would be willing to let it be the same way.

Henry what has Justice said.

K What P described is what Smiths have told us. But they won't

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Government or specific figures &
other claim immigration is down
because of ME sub. Probably
something in it (Belgian).
Jackson says we could comment
that understanding in a letter
to Scoop & he would answer back.

Hump - How about us?

K Scoop would write back & say
he understood 60,000 is
adequate figure. No way for
SO to link up for to every detail
detail ~~that~~ so Jackson could serve
bad faith (typewriter). No Govt
could or should link up to ~~any~~ ^{this} the
intrusion. But we would know
of systematic motives - And Bez
has promised personal attention
to individual cases.

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But SO has not agreed to
60,000 & Jackson could serve
Turkey. We do not accept his
specific #.

P mentioned Kinkadee to SO. He
is here except for wife in bed
Harry. Glad to hear they human.
* If you think Greeks have pressure,
we have more. You got to get
top Jewish business in & tell
them what has happened. P has
concluded on this.
Scott We have much other points ...
Israeli govt has to ...
P If Varick amendment comes up, we
could buy it. So no trade bill
& probably no Jewish immigration.
The way to go is our way to get
a trade bill & immigration

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Worke - I could not write for bill
as K described it.

Freeling - Would you have Scarp
letter involvement?

K-W I could only say you
understand this is your view -
a waffle. Then he ^{should} say
tricky.

Harvey - Why not spell out the KC
handshake. Why to Scarp. I
mean to. Permit let non-
compliance turn into political
football. D. More politics will
be spilled in 76. P should spell
out a workable trip to K.

Scott - If sentiment here is good,
tell Scarp what the hawks think.

K - We could put in a letter from
me about ~~what~~ I said.

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Harvey - Someone ^{should} spell out
the matter, not to Scarp.

Scott - Tell Scarp should not be
a private treaty.

K - 2 choices - If we write letter
to Madhubing & he replies, to just
one source. But if ~~we~~ we write
him & he replies, it is part of
Dyio work.

Rhodes - A letter should go to Scarping.

Harvey - Letter should go to Long. Then
anyone can send a letter back.
If Scarp gets a letter, others will
want one.

P. We thought this - my ~~work~~ we
have working hard & wanted
handshake to be a ~~parha~~
set. I hope Scarp must

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feel we ~~are~~ must have

K SO say they can't accept
MFM of opinion action is
needed.

P Tell them about Camp David.

K - Based on our oil speeches, we have
called big 5 out.

What we doing is one of longest
time transfers of land & oil power
in history. Italy, for example, could
next & difficult. Regarding first

Arabs by & death control over
industrial world - by pushing out
investment of Arabs who own
foreign oil - they haven't - they
could buy up the 3rd world.

Italy actually buys up
countries.

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WE have no brilliant answers
but we want to put this first to
them + some possible approaches:

- (1) Concurrence - restraint -
- (2) Explore a fund which would
equalize & burden - maybe a
tax.
- (3) Build on emergency showing
agreement from selective to goal
action on boycott.

WE must make sure we face a serious
change in world power & attention.

Scott - The industrial world would
for a transformation at hands of a
few Arabs. There has happened
in history.

K Unless this kind of power transfer
w/ a war. Even attitudes are now
changing.

If this trends continue, Iraq will

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build a unit free A into action.
Hamp. You try to get some
joint R+D. You need to
~~some~~ something - we
need really a get going.

We are having to deal with this
shift in capital.

We should talk about we will pay
\$7 a barrel or more. We
don't have a concerted effort.
The people will respond if we
tell them real turkey.

Fed - why don't we ask Jews to settle
Jerusalem as part of a package.

Hamp - you keep looking at me &
have talked more Turkey
(Hamp) than you have.

P You have been great to come
& take all this time. we will