




DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09360



JTF GTMO-CG

25 March 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue,
Miami, FL 33172.

SUBJECT: Update Recommendation to Transfer to the Control of Another Country for
Continued Detention (TRCD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9SU-000940P (S)

JTF GTMO Detainee Assessment

1. (FOUO) Personal Information:

- JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Adel Hassan
- Aliases and Current/True Name: Abu Dujana, Hasan Hamd 'Abd-
Al Muttalib, and Adel Hassen
- Place of Birth: Port Sudan, Sudan (SU)
- Date of Birth: 1958
- Citizenship: Sudan (SU)
- Internment Serial Number: US9SU-000940DP



2. (FOUO) Health: Detainee is in good health and has no known drug allergies. He has bilateral Haglund's deformities (prominent bumps on his heels) that make it painful for him to walk with shoes that cover his heels. He has severe bilateral Achilles tendon tendonitis. There is no psychiatric history for this individual. Detainee has no travel requirements.

3. (S//NF) JTF GTMO Assessment:

a. (S) Recommendation: JTF GTMO recommends detainee be Transferred to the Control of Another Country for Continued Detention (TRCD)

b. (S//NF) Summary: JTF GTMO previously assessed detainee Retain in DoD (DoD) on 2 August 2003. Based upon information obtained since detainee's previous assessment, it is

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now recommended he be Transferred to the Control of Another Country for Continued Detention (TRCD).

For this update recommendation, detainee is assessed to be a possible member of Al-Qaida's global terrorist network. Detainee was likely using his employment in Non Governmental Organizations (NGO) to facilitate funds and/or personnel for Al-Qaida and/or its global terrorist network. Detainee was always employed by organizations that espoused radical Islamic views and/or assisted individuals who were part of Al-Qaida or were associated with Usama Bin Laden (UBL). Detainee was always associated with Islamic radicals, yet claimed to have avoided any participation in jihad or terrorist related activities. It has been determined this detainee is a MEDIUM risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.

4. (S//NF) Detainee Background Summary: Unless otherwise noted, the following paragraphs are based solely on the detainee's statements.

a. (S//NF) Prior History: Following high school graduation in Sudan in 1981, detainee attended a technical school in Alexandria, Egypt (EG), (1981 to 1983) where he obtained an air conditioning degree. After his return to Sudan, detainee held a series of odd jobs. He received a job offer with Lajnat Al Dawa Al Islamiyaa (LDI) through an acquaintance that was teaching within LDI in Pakistan (PK). (Analyst Note: LDI is listed as a Tier 3 NGO. Tier 3 NGOs are defined as having available resources and are in a position to support terrorist organizations willing to attack US persons or interests.) Around 1986, detainee took a teaching job and soon left for Pakistan. He was placed as a teacher in an orphanage in the Jalozai Afghan Refugee Camp in Pakistan. The orphanage was known as The Hira Institute, but it was run by the LDI's main office in Peshawar, PK. The director of the LDI office was Zahid Al Sheikh Mohammed. (Analyst note: Zahid Al Sheikh Mohammed is the brother of Kalidh Sheikh Mohammed (KSM). KSM was the military head of UBL's Al-Qaida organization.) Detainee worked at the Hira Institute until 1996. He transferred to the LDI office in Peshawar where he worked until late August 1999. At that time he was fired due to lack of funding. Between jobs, in late 1999 and early 2000, detainee made a couple of trips to Urumchi, China (CH), to purchase various items for resale in Peshawar, PK, to make a living. Sometime in 2000, detainee got a job with the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) (Analyst note: WAMY is listed as a Tier 1 NGO. Tier 1 NGOs are defined as having demonstrated sustained and active support for terrorist organizations willing to attack US persons or interests.)

b. (S) Capture Information: The Pakistani Inter Service Intelligence Directorate (ISID) captured detainee in 18 July 2002. The ISID conducted a raid against his house on the suspicion that it was an Al-Qaida safehouse. Detainee along, with an Algerian (ISN US9TS-

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000939DP), was detained. Various notebooks and other documentation were obtained from detainee's house during the arrest, to include a letter from the Muslim Brotherhood. The Pakistani authorities held detainee until about January 2003, at which time he was then transferred to US custody in Bagram. He was detained at Bagram until being transferred to JTF GTMO.

c. (S) Transferred to JTF GTMO: 23 January 2003

d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF GTMO: It is not documented in detainee's file why he was sent to JTF GTMO.

5. (S//NF) Detainee Threat:

a. (S) Assessment: It has been determined that detainee MAY pose a HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies. Based upon a lack of specific direct participation in hostile acts JTF GTMO has assessed detainee as a MEDIUM risk.

b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention:

- (S//NF) It has been assessed detainee is not telling the full details of his involvement with the Muslim brotherhood. From 1981 to 1983 he attended a technical school in Alexandria, Egypt (EG). There was a lot of violent terrorist activity during that time period in Egypt as well as political unrest in Sudan. Detainee joined the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Sudan prior to his trip to Egypt. Due to his education level, it is likely that detainee was aware of the Al Gama'a al Islamiyya (Islamic Group) and their radical views and activities.
 - (S//NF) Detainee has admitted he was a member of the MB during the time period he was in Egypt. The Al Gama'a al Islamiyya was a militant offshoot of the MB in Egypt. During the 1970s and 1980s the group gained momentum and support among university populations in Cairo and Alexandria. The group is credited with the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981. Following that, the Egyptian government started a campaign against militant groups in Egypt.
 - (S) Detainee admitted he joined the MB in Sudan right before going to Egypt. He even named the leader of the MB as Dr. Hasan Turabi, and felt the group was a good group with an agenda to develop good Muslims. (Analyst note: Dr. Hasan Turabi advocated a Taliban like government in Sudan and espoused those ideals during the time detainee claims Dr. Turabi was head of the MB. Dr. Turabi was considered the defacto leader of Sudan in spite of serving under LT General Ahmad al-Bashir after Sudan's Military Coupe in 1989. Eventually, Dr. Turabi embraced UBL after his exile from Saudi Arabia in 1996 and allowed UBL to run his terrorist camps in Sudan

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over the course of three years until UBL either left on his own accord to Afghanistan or was expelled.)

- (S) Detainee was captured with a letter from the MB. At first he stated it was not his, but in a later interview with a Law Enforcement Agency, he admitted to the letter being his and went into detail on the MB. He claims to no longer associate with the organization due to their radical views. (Analyst note: The MB is an extremist militant group that became the foundation for all jihad groups, and focused their efforts mainly on changing what they referred to as the “Westernized Government of Egypt” into a pure Islamic state.)
- (S//NF) Detainee was likely using his employment in NGOs to facilitate funds and/or personnel for Al-Qaida and/or its global terrorist network. Detainee has consistently associated with groups that espoused radical violent views, or with groups that assisted or had close dealings with Al-Qaida, UBL and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. It has been assessed that detainee is using an Al-Qaida counter interrogation cover story.
- (S//NF) Detainee was employed with LDI holding various positions for a period of about 10 years. Due to his placement and access, detainee was likely facilitating the use of funds and possibly personnel towards Al-Qaida and/or the Taliban.
 - (S//NF) Immediately after returning from Egypt to Sudan, he obtained a job with LDI through an acquaintance that was teaching within LDI in Pakistan. During his 10-year tenure at LDI, he worked at the Jalozai and Shamshatoo refugee camps just outside of Peshawar. He taught at an orphanage within the Jalozai camp known as the Hira Institute. The Jalozai Camp refugees were later transferred to the Shamshatoo Refugee Camp due to overcrowding.
 - (S) Detainee admitted that Kalid Sheikh Mohammed sponsored an education center within the camp. This center recruited and indoctrinated 18-30 year old men into the jihad. The center was staffed with experienced Mujahideen. The attendees of the center were referred to as “The Death Squad”.
 - (S//NF) The Shamshatoo Refugee Camp was known to be operated by Gulbudin Hekmatyar (head of the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG)) behind the scenes. Reporting indicates that the camp served as a known refuge for Islamic radicals seeking to hide. There is also reporting of a HIG and Al-Qaida meeting occurring at the camp. Furthermore, there is reporting of an Al-Qaida ran training camp just outside of the refugee camp. (Analyst note: Detainee is once again surrounded by Islamic radicals, but claims he had nothing to do with them.)
 - (S) Other JTF-GTMO detainees with radical links have transited through the Jalozai Refugee Camp, specifically the Hira Institute.
 - (S) Lakhdar Boumediene, ISN US4AG-010005 (ISN 10005), also claimed to have worked in the Hira Institute and recognized the detainee as Abu Dujana, an accountant of the Hira Institute. (Analyst note: Abu Dujana is one of detainee’s aliases). ISN 10005 is part of the Algerian Six, a group of detainees currently

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held at JTF GTMO who were arrested in Bosnia (BO) for involvement in a terrorist plot against the U.S. embassy in Sarajevo, BO. ISN 10005 is also close friends with assessed Al-Qaida facilitator and North African Extreme Network member Bensayah Belkacem ISN US4AG-010001. (The North African Extreme Network is classified as a Tier 1 target. Tier 1 Targets are defined as terrorist groups, especially those with state support, that have demonstrated the intention and the capability to attack US persons or interests.)

- (S) Another detainee who has been linked with terrorist affiliated NGOs also claimed to work for the HIRA institute. Hussein Muhammed Abdullah, US9SO-000704 (ISN 704), also worked in the Hira Institute from 1986-1988. ISN 704 was also associated with the Revival Islamic Heritage Society (RIHS) while in Pakistan. ISN 704 is the father-in-law of Mohammed Sulaymon Barre, US9SO-000567 (ISN 567), who has links to NGOs with radical ties. ISN 567 has been assessed as an operator for a terrorist affiliated money transfer office in Pakistan. (Analyst note: RIHS is a Tier 1 NGO. A tier 1 NGO is defined as having demonstrated sustained and active support for terrorist organizations willing to attack US persons or interests.)

- (S//NF) He eventually transferred to Peshawar to take various administrative roles within LDI. He held positions as an accountant and then Head of the Department of Public Relations. During the late 1990 time frame, LDI received funding from UBL, it is very likely he was aware of such transactions considering his accounting and public relations access.

- (S) The LDI is currently listed as a tier 3 NGO. However, at the time the detainee was employed, LDI was categorized as a Tier 2 NGO. Tier 2 NGOs have demonstrated the intent and willingness to support terrorist organizations willing to attack US persons or interests. (Analyst Note: The prior rating indicated the organization was considered more dangerous at the time detainee was employed with the organization. The LDI was assessed a lesser threat on 3 March 2004.)

- (S//NF) In June 1997, LDI officials and various other NGOs met with UBL in Kandahar, Afghanistan (AF) to discuss monetary contributions and possible relocation of UBL to Mali from Afghanistan for his safety. UBL agreed to donate \$6 million US dollars and two vehicles to be used as ambulances to the Pakistani and Afghan NGOs represented in the meeting. (Analyst note: The Pakistani LDI representative at the meeting with UBL was Ahmed Barakat. Detainee has recognized this individual as a coworker for up to six years. Also in 1996 UBL had declared jihad against US military targets in Arab countries. In 1998 UBL extended the jihad to any US civilian targets. Detainee interacted with individuals that met with UBL through the course of his employment. Due to his associations

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and placement within LDI, it is very likely detainee had knowledge of LDI's close relationship with UBL.)

- (S) Detainee was promoted to an accountant position to Peshawar, PK in 1996. In 1997 he held the position of Head of Public Relations Division of LDI in Peshawar. Due to his position as an accountant and head of a division, it is very likely he was aware of the funding received from UBL by the LDI.
- (S) There is also reporting on LDI vehicles and warehouses used to store and transfer weapons and supplies to the Taliban front lines and mujahideen from Peshawar, PK during the late 1990s. Due to his various roles and tenure within the organization, it is very likely detainee knew of these activities and quite possibly was an active participant.
- (S//NF) It has been assessed detainee has not disclosed the true intentions for his trip to China. Detainee traveled to Urumchi, China in late 1999 from Islamabad, PK. During that time, there was a lot of activity within the Muslim population in Urumchi, primarily in the areas of people smuggling from China to Pakistan and Afghanistan. There was also smuggling through Pakistan and Afghanistan enroute to Europe. Reporting also shows that Urumchi was part of a drug, weapons and mujahideen smuggling network.
 - (S//NF) When traveling to Urumchi, he claims he used a guide by the name of Shakeel Ahmed. Detainee claims the purpose for his trips to Urumchi was strictly to purchase items for resale while he was in between jobs.
 - (S//NF) Reporting shows that Urumchi was populated by radical Muslims and had a large Uigher concentration.
 - (S//NF) There was also reporting of a possible terrorist related car bombing around the time frame detainee made his business travels within Urumchi, China. (Analyst Note: It was possibly aimed as a protest to ongoing NATO exercises, even though the Chinese government tried to downplay the event.)
 - (S//NF) There is reporting as early as 1996, former Ariana Airlines Deputy (Abdul Rahman) was running a UBL drugs, arms, weapons and mujahideen smuggling network. This network included Russia, England, India, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Urumchi, China.
- (S) Detainee was employed with the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) from 2000 until the day of his arrest in late 2002.
 - (S) Detainee worked for a WAMY hospital in Afghanistan as an administrator. Detainee used one of WAMY's ambulances while making his runs to Pakistan to pick up supplies and pay salaries for employees.
 - (S) As mentioned above, reporting has stated that NGO (LDI) vehicles and warehouses were used to store and transfer weapons and supplies to the Taliban front lines and mujahideen from Peshawar, PK, during the late 1990s. It is very possible, that due to his access to the various NGOs and tenure within these

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entities, the same activities were carried out within this NGO. It is very likely detainee knew of these activities and quite possibly was an active participant.

- (S) Detainee also claimed that while making his runs between Afghanistan and Pakistan, he would stay at the LDI office area in the Wazir Akbar Khan neighborhood in Kabul, Afghanistan. (Analyst note: According to reporting, the LDI offices, specifically the offices in Peshawar, PK and in Wazir Akbar Kahn, were listed as having possible connections with Al-Qaida. Through reporting, it has been assessed that Al-Qaida and Taliban operatives heavily populated the Wazir Akbar Kahn region.) The region was taken over by Al-Qaida and the Taliban and was used as a hub for offices and safehouses. Many NGOs that are known to support Al-Qaida and the Taliban were housed in the district as well.
- (S) Detainee was captured with Mammur Ameer ISN US9AG-000939DP. ISN 939 was also affiliated with radical NGOs and had traveled extensively throughout the Middle East. He was assessed as an Al-Qaida facilitator due to his associations and employment with WAMY, who has ties to extremist organizations.
- (S//NF) Detainee's alias (Abu Dujana Al-Sudani) also appears on a recent report given by Abdirashid Aidid Ahmed. Ahmed is a known Somali Al-Qaida courier, who was employed with Al Haramayn and was operating out of Pakistan around the same time frame detainee was working with WAMY.
- (S) Detainee has also claimed to be acquainted with a large number of individuals who had ties or were employed by NGOs with associations to terrorist organizations. Some of the following relationships briefly acknowledged by detainee are:
 - (S) Salim Mahmoud Adem Mohammed, US9SU-000710DP (ISN 710), according to detainee was employed in the education section of RIHS. (Analyst note: JTF GTMO assessed ISN 710 as an extremist facilitator.)
 - (S) Former detainee, Shid Hassan Ahmed Abdul Rahim, US9SU-000714DP (ISN 714), was employed by RIHS as director of a school.
 - (S) Abdul Muhsin Al Libi, according to detainee, was the former RIHS director and a known UBL associate.

c. (S//NF) Detainee's Conduct: Detainee has a history of passive resistant behavior. Detainee has no recorded major discipline acts or violent behavior. Detainee has refused to obey guards on occasion by not following instructions.

6. (S//NF) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:

a. (S) Assessment: JTF GTMO has determined detainee is of MEDIUM intelligence value.

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
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- (S) Detainee is an Islamic extremist with ties to LDI, WAMY, the Muslim Brotherhood and likely Al Gamaat Al Islamiyaa (a radical offshoot from the Muslim Brotherhood), and possibly Al-Qaida and or the Taliban. Although the detainee has not admitted to it, it is suspected that he assisted extremists entering and exiting Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is suspected that the detainee also assisted in the facilitation of money and supplies between Al-Qaida and fighters based on the various positions he held during his 20-year employment tenure within the NGOs.

b. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:

- Proliferation of Islamic NGOs providing financial and logistical support to terrorist organizations.
 - Methods of operations for money funneling from legitimate NGOs to terrorist organizations, specifically LDI, WAMY and RIHS NGOs.
 - Use of employment with NGOs as an operational cover for supplying and recruitment of mujahideen to ongoing conflicts, specific to this detainee.
- Knowledge of terrorist activity due to his association and proximity to numerous individuals and places.

7. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 27 November 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant.


JAY W. HOOD
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding