REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL .... National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL ........ Memorandum of Conversation

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CREATION DATE ........... 03/05/1975
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COLLECTION TITLE ....... National Security Adviser. Memoranda of Conversations
BOX NUMBER ............. 9
FOLDER TITLE ........... March 5, 1975 - Ford, Kissinger
DATE WITHDRAWN ........ 05/28/2004
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST .. GG
MEMORANDUM

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE & TIME:
Wednesday - March 5, 1975
9:17 - 10:02 a.m.

PLACE:
The Oval Office

President: The Iranian deal played well.

Kissinger: It was so screwed up -- but it did appear well.

State thinks it is a mistake, on the ground that the risk is out of proportion to gain. I don't see a hell of a lot to gain. We could wind up with the worst possible situation. Colby indicated he wouldn't spend it. What do you think, Brent?

Scowcroft: The advantage is the press is Communist-controlled and the press of the moderate party is asking for the money.

President: How can any one object to helping a democratic press?

Kissinger: That is what we did in Chile.

President: If it is defensible, why shouldn't we?

Kissinger: It will leak and hurt the parties.

President: That is a different case.
Kissinger: I would tell Colby to do what he can in the package without spending the money.

President: Should I talk to Church?

Kissinger: I would tell him the dangers are that our intelligence will be paralysed; we have to protect sensitive data. Colby is now blackmailing me on the assassination stories. Nixon and I asked Helms to look into possibilities of a coup in Chile in 1970. Helms said it wouldn't work. Then later the people who it was discussed with tried to kidnap Schneider and killed him.

The OPEC summit came out interestingly. He said OPEC had to behave responsibly and Algeria would agree to a price cut if its development budget was protected. Our policy is working. They are no longer jumping at the consumer-producer conference.

President: What is happening in IEA?

Kissinger: We are telling the British and Dutch we won't accept an invitation to a preparatory conference until we get alternative sources nailed down. I think the OPEC evolution is very encouraging.

President: Some of the smart people in Europe must see we are making the producers need income.

Kissinger: That is right. One way would be raise the price. But to do that, they would have to cut production. They can't agree on how to allocate the cuts. If we were free with the Saudis, we could get at least a deal not to cut production. That is why this discrimination campaign of the Jews is outrageous.

Ethiopia: My recommendation is to send them $7 million and encourage negotiations. Kenya has asked for military assistance.

President: What do they want? What kind of attitude do they have to us?

Kissinger: I favor it. They are friendly and they have some neighbors who are disturbing.

I am uneasy about the Israelis. They haven't asked for compensation for the oil fields, but there has not been even a study group.
If necessary, I would like a letter from you saying you can't accept a stalemate, and if we go to Geneva you will put forward a modification of the Rogers Plan -- which means the 1967 borders. I think we just can't go to Geneva as the lawyer for Israel.

President: The toughest position needed to get them to act is what I favor.

Kissinger: Asad has even indicated he would take a limited agreement and would sign a peace treaty; he was willing to dump the PLO. Now he is enlisting the PLO to stymie things. We can't bring Asad in -- even though if I tried, he would be so obnoxious that it would go slower than Egypt -- and then we could move it to Geneva after Egypt settled. But that is too tricky. I would rather tell him the truth privately -- that we would make an effort as soon as an Egypt-Israel deal is finished.

President: That is my preference.

Kissinger: The big issue is will you take on Israel for another Syrian move.

President: If we are honest with him and go through Geneva -- which will fail -- then Asad would come to us.

Kissinger: I think Asad will want something before Geneva. The other would be ideal.

President: Can't you tell him we will try to get something before Geneva?

Kissinger: Yes, but you have to know that would be bloody with the Israelis. If we could get five or ten kilometers on the Golan, we would be in good shape. Israel will claim it destroys their defensive capability.

It is important whether I can tell Asad we will make a major effort. We will have to move into open opposition to the Israelis.

President: If you think that is the best way to get progress, I am for it.

Kissinger: We will be driven to a Syrian move, either before or after.

President: Suppose the Israelis say let's go to Geneva, the Soviet Union does...
Kissinger: We can go to Geneva. What happens will depend on Syria. Sadat won't want Geneva. He will want to rest, and come here for a big triumph. Israel will want to avoid a Syrian negotiation so Syria won't want to. So only Israel and the Soviet Union will want to go to Geneva.

President: Can't we commit ourselves to a good faith effort?

Kissinger: A good faith effort is bound to fail. It won't even get off the ground. Israel won't look at it.

President: A good faith effort to me is one where we put the screws on.

Kissinger: Okay. If I see an opening to get us to Geneva -- maybe the Soviet Union will carry the can to get everyone to Geneva -- that would be fine.

I have given you the Schmidt letter.
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL: National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL: Note
DESCRIPTION: Brent Scowcroft's handwritten notes for memcon
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Signed: 11/28/10
DECLASSIFIED with portions redacted
NARA date 11/28/00  By
d ж

PK
5-Mar?5

P: The Javins had played cards.
K: It wasn't so farmed up - but it appeared

We couldn't
up as a card party with the Caddy mandates. We
didn't suspect it. What do you think, Bent?
The advantage is the press is worth consider-
and a moderate party will do it. I'm thinking of

P: How can anyone object to helpingкажь

K: That is what we did in Child.
P: It is illegal to help, why should we?
K: It will hurt to hurt parties.
K: That is a difficult.
K: I would tell Cathy to do what he can in Child

PK: spending a money.
P: Should I talk to Child?
K: I would tell him to apologize and that must be

in your name. I know to protect sensitive data.
Cathy will be assured I mean a sense that
Not I asked Halton to look into possibilities for any

in Child in [redacted]. Halton said it wouldn't work

The other senator went out interesting. He said

A few days to be some say. Offered and agreed to

said his alleged affidavit was filled. Our

party is looking. They are no longer working at

I: What happening in FEN.
K: The thing isn't, what we want - a negation

PHOTO COPIED FROM
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From Victor "What's the line?" Can't get too close to the thing so can't

1. Make a new notation in my [illegible]
2. Some of smart people in E can't see an
   arc making a portico with windows
3. That's right. One way would be to come into
   that sort of situation and decide what to do.
   They could either
4. One does not have to eat people. They can't afford
   one home & allocates quota. If we have free space.
   We could get it done. Did not do not eat people. That is
   why this discrimination campaign is just starting
   in Europe. My reason in it to read them a mild
   + reasonable note. Daniel has asked for
   mild农业. That

P: What do you want? What kind of situation is it in?
K: From it. They friendly and have some neighbors
   who are distinguishing.
   
   [illegible] about it. They haven't asked for anything
   for a mail for a letter. Between a study pump.
   
   [illegible] a bit beyond your saying
   you cannot accept a statement if we just know
   you will put favorites. Modify, if you know, [illegible]?
   
   I think we just can't go to Germany - longer flat
   
   The longest period to get time to eat in what
   is final.

[Handwritten section cut out]

We can't bring [illegible] to where it is. If it is
   it would lessen them & then
   we could move the [illegible] & settled - but
   that too much. I would rather tell him a truth.
   Quickly that we would make an effort as soon
   as E - I finish.
P. That is my preference.
K. The big issue is will you take me to another Syrian town.

P. Second visit to him in Lydda Town which will fail, then as of tomorrow.

K. I think And will want something bigger than this, the other would be ideal.

P. Could you take Ted here and whatever is not really useful.

K. Yes, but you have to know that would be very risky with us. I think we could get 5-10 km an hour and we would be in good shape. I will claim it that day in defensive way.

It is important whether I can talk and we will make a major effort. We will have to move into Zangrath tomorrow.

P. If you think that is the best thing to do, you can do it.

K. We will be closer to a Syrian town, either Yerevan or of such.

P. Suppose we stay here and get a car, a 50 km.

K. We can go to Gemara, what happens will depend on Syria. Subot won't want Gemara, he will want Tanta, once here for big things, I will want to visit Gemara first, so Syria won't want.

P. Only Tanta will want to go to Gemara.

P. Can't we commit to good faith effort?

K. A good faith effort is bound to fail. It won't even get off ground - I won't attempt.

P. A good faith effort is one in which we put a

K. OK. So I am open to getting a camera - bright

PHOTO COPY
FROM
Romer R 1355 Library
So would many a care & yet everyone & whom that
would be fine.

& I have given you - Schmidt advice.