#### S E C R E T // NOFORN // 20330616



#### **DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA APO AE 09360



JTF-GTMO-CDR 16 June 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 9lst Avenue, Miami, FL 33172

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9AF-000762DP (S)

### **JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment**

### 1. (S) Personal Information:

- JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: <u>Baidullah/Bertola</u> Obaydullah
- Current/True Name and Aliases: <u>Ubaydallah, Biadullah</u> <u>Abajdullah, Haneef</u>
- Place of Birth: <u>Dusarak Haiderkheil Village, Khowst,</u> <u>Afghanistan (AF)</u>
- Date of Birth: 1980
- Citizenship: Afghanistan
- Internment Serial Number (ISN): <u>US9AF-000762DP</u>
- 2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in overall good health.

# 3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment:

- **a. (S) Recommendation:** JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) on 3 August 2007.
- **b.** (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is assessed to be a member of al-Qaida. Detainee is assessed to be an explosives expert for an improvised explosive devices (IED) cell in Khowst, AF subordinate to senior al-Qaida operative Abu Layth al-Libi (deceased). As a member of the cell, detainee directly assisted the planning and implementing of attacks against US and Coalition forces in Afghanistan. Detainee is assessed to have used his

**CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES** 

REASON: E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C)

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membership in Jamaat Tablighi (JT) to facilitate his activities within this cell. <sup>1</sup> JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be:

- A **HIGH** risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies
- A **MEDIUM** threat from a detention perspective
- Of **HIGH** intelligence value
- **c.** (S//NF) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee's assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be annotated by ➤ next to the footnote.)
  - Added alias Haneef<sup>2</sup>

### 4. (U) Detainee's Account of Events:

The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.

- **a.** (S//NF) **Prior History:** Detainee has an eleventh grade education and some English language skills. Approximately 1983, detainee and his family moved to Pakistan (PK) after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Sometime during 1990, detainee and his family returned to Khowst. While detainee's family resided in Pakistan, a local communist commander, Ali Jan, lived in their Khowst home. Detainee stated when Ali Jan departed detainee's residence, he left behind mines and explosives. In 2000, detainee joined the JT in Khowst and met Bostan Karim, ISN US9AF-000975DP (AF-975). Detainee spent approximately 40 days traveling, teaching and studying the Koran as a member of the JT. Detainee visited the Markez Tablighi (Tablighi Center) in Lahore, PK, as well as *markezes* (central mosques) in Miram Shah and Bannu, PK.<sup>3</sup>
- **b.** (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: In August 2001, detainee was forced to join the Taliban Army. The Taliban sent him to a technical school in Khowst where he learned about mines and explosives.<sup>4</sup>

4 000762 SIR 10-APR-2003

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Analyst Note: JT is a National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF) Counterterrorism (CT) Priority 3 terrorist support entities (TSE). Priority 3 TSE have demonstrated intent and willingness to provide financial support to terrorist organizations willing to attack US persons or interests, or provide witting operational support to Priority 1-2 terrorist groups.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> ➤GUAN-2007-B04649, Analyst Note: Detainee's reference name appears to be a combination of his name and variant spellings. Baidullah, Bertola, and Obaydullah are probably all variants of the same name, Ubaydallah.

<sup>3</sup> 000762 FM40 28-OCT-2002, 000762 MFR 10-JUL-2003, 000762 302 12-AUG-2003, 000762 302 05-AUG-2003

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**c.** (S//NF) Training and Activities: Detainee only attended the technical school for two days, realized the training was dangerous, and decided to leave. Detainee moved from place to place in order to avoid the Taliban. In November 2001, detainee began working with AF-975 at his (AF-975's) grocery store where they split the profits. AF-975 later gave detainee 23 landmines with instructions on how to detonate them remotely. AF-975 promised to pay detainee approximately 15,000 rupees to plant the mines. On 2 July 2002, detainee hid the land mines in his compound in Khowst.

### 5. (U) Capture Information:

**a.** (S//NF) US forces were informed that detainee was an Afghan al-Qaida member working with a second al-Qaida member, AF-975, and that the two were planning mine attacks against US forces operating in the Khowst area. Based on this reporting, US forces raided detainee's compound in Khowst Province on 21 July 2002. The raid netted 23 active anti-tank mines of both Italian and Russian manufacture, seven empty mine shells with explosives removed, and three individuals: detainee and his two cousins Muhammad Osman, ISN US9AF-000763DP (AF-763, Bagram detainee, released), and Shir Ali Khan, ISN US9AF-000764DP (AF-764, Bagram detainee, released). All mines were plastic-shelled to defeat mine detectors. A notebook recovered from detainee included detailed written instructions and schematics on preparing and activating command-detonated explosives. Detainee was taken to Bagram Detention Center.<sup>8</sup>

### b. (S) Property Held:

- 1,235 Pakistani rupees<sup>9</sup>
- Personal items including an Omax brand watch, clothing, five hydrochloric tablets and prayer beads
- c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 28 October 2002
- **d.** (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide information on the following:
  - Al-Qaida recruiting

<sup>5</sup> 000762 SIR 10-APR-2003, 000762 302 12-AUG-2003, 000762 FM40 28-Oct-2002, 000762 T-244 SPOT REPORT - LANDMINES 02-JUL-2002

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Analyst Note: Probably referring to Pakistani rupees (PKR). 15,000 PKR is approximately equivalent to \$250 US. <sup>7</sup> 000762 MFR 10-Jul-2003; Analyst Note: Detainee's compound is described as being in Mulani Village, aka (Dusarak Village), Ismail Kheil District, aka (Mandozi District), Khowst Province.

<sup>§</sup> TD-314/30081-02, TD-314/30140-02, 000762 INTSUM 02-Aug-2002

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Analyst Note: Approximately equivalent to \$20 US.

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- Terrorism related facilities
- Electronic devices
- Anti-tank land mines

**6.** (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee's Account: Detainee's personal account is assessed to be mostly fabricated and only partially truthful. Detainee's statements change with each debriefing. Detainee admitted planting land mines, then stated that everything he said during his detention in Bagram was a lie. Detainee appears to be truthful about his history, up to the point of his membership in JT. Detainee is evasive in his answers regarding his relationship with AF-975. Detainee has made statements that show he is afraid of AF-975 and AF-975 has stated that it is detainee's fault that he (AF-975) is in GTMO. Detainee's desire to distance himself from previous incriminating statements may be the reason he recanted the earlier Bagram reporting. There are multiple sources reporting detainee was involved with AF-975 in an al-Qaida sponsored operation. The physical evidence, such as the 23 land mines found at his compound and the notebook with a schematic for assembling a detonator, further indicate detainee's involvement.

# 7. (U) Detainee Threat:

- **a.** (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies.
- **b.** (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: Detainee is assessed to be a member of an al-Oaida IED cell in Khowst who was involved in planning and implementing attacks against US and Coalition forces. Detainee is reportedly linked to senior al-Qaida operative Abu Layth al-Libi. Detainee is assessed to have used his membership in the JT to facilitate cross border travels and hide his involvement with al-Qaida members operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan
  - (S//NF) Detainee is assessed to be a member of al-Qaida directly involved in planning and implementing IED attacks against US and Coalition forces.
    - o (S//NF) Detainee stated 20-25 days prior to his capture, AF-975 recruited detainee to join AF-975's al-Qaida cell. Detainee and AF-975 held meetings at which they developed plans to attack US and Coalition forces with landmines. 10
      - (S//NF) An unidentified source whose information led to detainee's capture, reported 18 IEDs had been prepared to be used for attacks against US and Coalition forces in the Khowst region. Two of these IEDs were stored in a house belonging to an individual identified as Karim. 11 (Analyst Note: Karim is

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> 000762 INTSUM 02-Aug-2002 <sup>11</sup> TD-314/29558-02

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assessed to be detainee's cell leader, AF-975. The location of the other 16 IEDs was not further identified. However, detainee was captured in a raid that netted a total of 23 active anti-tank mines of both Italian and Russian manufacture, and seven empty mine shells with explosives removed. All mines had plastic shells to defeat mine detectors. The mines were found buried beneath three feet of dirt. <sup>12</sup>)

- (S//NF) Detainee claimed approximately 20-30 mines had been left at his home by a communist commander, Ali Jan, while detainee and his family were in Pakistan in the 1980s. Detainee stated he and his uncle buried the mines and that the mines did not contain any explosives. (Analyst Note: Detainee's later story only explains the existence of the seven empty mines and does not account for the mines that were active.)
- (S//NF) Detainee reported AF-975 was planning to use a suicide bomber to drive a large truck loaded with hidden landmines to a designated area in Kabul, AF. The truck was prepared for the attack as of 10 July 2002. Detainee claimed AF-975 had asked detainee to drive the truck to Kabul and noted another individual would drive the truck to the attack site.<sup>14</sup>
- o (S//NF) Detainee is assessed to be an explosives expert. In addition to the mines, at the time of his capture, detainee possessed a notebook containing detailed written instructions and schematics on preparing and activating command-detonated explosives. Detainee claimed these were notes he took during his two days of Taliban training, which took place in August 2001. 15
  - (S//NF) Analyst Note: Detainee has consistently stated the Taliban forced him to take the training; a claim which is assessed to be false. Detainee also claimed he does not understand most of the notes he wrote. However, even after detainee reportedly escaped the training and avoided the Taliban, detainee still retained his notes almost a year after the training. It is unlikely that detainee would have been given this level of advanced training in only two days. It is equally unlikely detainee would be accepted into an explosives class for which he was ill prepared to understand and put into practical application at the end of training.
- o (S//NF) According to Adel Zamel Abd al-Mahsen al-Zamel, ISN US9KU-000568 (KU-568, transferred), detainee stated he was tasked by Abu Layth al-Libi, who commanded al-Qaida cells in the southern region in Afghanistan, to conduct various operations against US and Coalition Forces. <sup>16</sup>

<sup>13</sup> 000762 MFR 10-JUL-2003

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> TD-314/30140-02

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> 000762 T-244 SPOT REPORT - KABUL ATTACK 10-JUL-2002, 000762 INTSUM 07-Aug-2002

<sup>15</sup> TD-314/30140-02, 000762 SIR 09-AUG-2004

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> 000568 SIR 26-OCT-2005

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- (S//NF) Detainee stated Abu Layth al-Libi directed detainee and Omar Ahmed Khadr, ISN US9CA-000766DP (CA-766), survey the airport in Khowst for future attacks against US troops. After surveying the airport, al-Libi ordered his group to plant 30 mines on the road leading to the airport in order to set up an ambush attack. The group consisted of detainee, CA-766, AF-975, Abdullah Wazir, ISN US9AF-000976DP (AF-976, transferred), Abdul Zahir, ISN US9AF-000753DP (AF-753), and others. KU-568 also related that detainee had suggested using a Stinger missile to shoot down an airplane, but al-Libi rejected the idea. 17
- (S//NF) A walk-in source reported an al-Qaida Arab in Pakistan directed detainee to carry out command detonated mine attacks against US forces operating in the Khowst area. (Analyst Note: This source corroborates KU-568's second-hand reporting. The unidentified al-Qaida Arab is probably Abu Layth al-Libi or an associate.)
- (C//REL TO USA, ISAF) On 19 August 2002, an IED was remotely detonated as a US convoy traveled from Gardez, AF to the Khowst airport. The IEDs consisted of land mines, circuit boards, 12-volt car batteries, and 9-volt batteries. 18
- (S//NF) Mohammad Kamin, ISN US9AF-001045DP (AF-1045), provided information about Abu Lavth al-Libi and his activities in Khowst. AF-1045 cautioned he did not want detainee to know AF-1045 had provided information about al-Libi. 19 (Analyst Note: Due to AF-1045's caution, he is likely aware of detainee's relationship to al-Libi. AF-1045 is an admitted al-Qaida member in a cell directed by Abu Lavth al-Libi.<sup>20</sup>)
- (S//NF) Detainee's story about traveling to Pakistan under JT auspices is assessed to be a cover story, which is commonly used to facilitate Islamic extremist activities and travels throughout the Middle East.<sup>21</sup>
  - o (S//NF) Detainee claimed to be a member of the JT and traveled to various mosques in Pakistan.<sup>22</sup>
  - o (S/NF) Shamsullah, ISN US9AF-000783DP (AF-783, transferred), stated detainee was a member of JT at the same time as AF-975, who is AF-783's uncle. 23 AF-783 states that AF-975 is a known al-Qaida terrorist cell leader. 24

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> 000568 SIR 20-OCT-2005, 000568 SIR 30-OCT-2005, 000568 SIR 26-OCT-2005

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> IIR 6 044 7042 02

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> >001045 SIR 07-NOV-2005

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Analyst Note: See JTF-GTMO's detainee recommendation for AF-1045 for additional information.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Analyst Note: Affiliation with the JT, a proselytizing organization, is a common al-Qaida cover story. Al-Qaida used the JT to facilitate and fund the international travels of its members. For additional information see IIR 2 227 0131 03, Jamaat Tabligh Provides Cover as of 20051228, JITFCT Special Analysis US Jamaat Tabligh, AFOSI Report on Jamaat Tabligh 27-OCT-2004, Jamaat Al Tabligh (JT) Members - TRRS-04-03-1083 10-MAR-2004 <sup>22</sup> IIR 6 034 0706 03, 000762 302 05-Aug-2003

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c. (S/NF) Detainee's Conduct: Detainee is assessed to be a MEDIUM threat from a detention perspective. His overall behavior has been mostly compliant and non-hostile to the guard force and staff. He currently has 31 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS with the most recent occurring on 4 June 2008, when he damaged government property. He has no Reports of Disciplinary Infraction for assault. Other incidents for which he has been disciplined include inciting and participating in mass disturbances, failure to follow guard instructions/camp rules, inappropriate use of bodily fluids, attempted assaults and possession of food and non-weapon type contraband. On 10 July 2006, detainee was in possession of a potential weapon in the form of metal from spit mask wrapped in toilet paper. In 2007, he had a total of ten Reports of Disciplinary Infraction and seven so far in 2008.

## 8. (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:

- **a.** (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of **HIGH** intelligence value. Detainee's most recent interrogation session occurred on 22 April 2008.
- **b.** (S//NF) Placement and Access: Detainee attended a Taliban technical school and lived in Khowst. Detainee is assessed to be a member of Abu Layth al-Libi's al-Qaida cell in Khowst and traveled widely in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Detainee maintained a close relationship with AF-975, with whom he was reported to have been involved in IED attacks against US and Coalition forces. Detainee was captured with IED material.
- **c.** (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee is assessed to have knowledge of al-Qaida activities, to include the procurement and employment of IEDs. Detainee probably has information on Abu Layth al-Libi's operations in the Khowst region. Detainee may be able to provide information on groups, such as JT, and terrorist leadership that supported operations against the US and Coalition forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Detainee had reported significant information on AF-975 before detainee's transfer to JTF-GTMO. However, since arriving at JTF-GTMO, detainee has continually denied any al-Qaida affiliations or association with AF-975, likely due to fear of retaliation by AF-975.

### d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:

- Al-Oaida
  - o Khowst IED cell including members who may remain at large
  - o Logistics, operations, and planning
  - o Personnel including Abu Layth al-Libi

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> 000783 SIR 13-OCT-2005

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> 000762 KARIM ASSOCIATIONS 08-MAY-2002

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- JT
  - o Support to al-Qaida
  - o Use of the JT for extremist travel
- Other detainees including AF-975, AF-976, CA-766, AF-753, and AF-1045
- 9. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 18 September 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant.

D. M. THOMAS, JR Rear Admiral, US Navy Commanding

\* Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessment can be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College October 2001 guide *Intelligence Warning Terminology*.