




S E C R E T // N O F O R N // 20310825

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09360**



JTF-GTMO-CC

25 August 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue,
Miami, FL 33172

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9SA-000230DP (S)

JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

1. (S//NF) Personal Information:

- JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Hamud Dakhil Hamud
- Aliases and Current/True Name: Talut al-Jeddawi, Humud Dakhil Humud Said al-Jadani, Hamud Sultan, Nag Mohammad, Safwan the Afghan
- Place of Birth: Jeddah, Saudi Arabia (SA)
- Date of Birth: 22 May 1973
- Citizenship: Saudi Arabia
- Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9SA-000230DP



2. (FOUO) Health: Detainee is in good health.

3. (S//NF) JTF-GTMO Assessment:

a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously assessed detainee as Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) on 5 September 2005.

b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is assessed to be a member of al-Qaida with an extensive history of militant jihad. Detainee is an admitted leader of armed fighters in Tora Bora during hostilities against US forces and associated with several senior al-Qaida members. He received basic and advanced training in Chechnya and Afghanistan (AF)

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REASON: E.O. 12958 SECTION 1.5(C)
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S E C R E T // N O F O R N // 20310825

JTF-GTMO-CC

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9SA-000230DP (S)

including training on small arms, explosives, mortars, and anti-aircraft weaponry. JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be:

- A **HIGH** risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.
- A **MEDIUM** threat from a detention perspective.
- Of **HIGH** intelligence value.

4. (S//NF) Detainee's Account of Events:

The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.

a. (S//NF) Prior History: Detainee is a Sunni Muslim who left school after the tenth grade. From approximately 1997 to 1999, detainee was employed as a flight attendant for Saudi Arabian Airlines. Prior to 1999, detainee frequently used illegal drugs. Turning to religion, detainee freed himself from the influence of drugs and felt financially secure enough to participate in his first militant jihad.¹ After detainee's brother, Ismat Hammud al-Juddawi,² returned from the fighting in Ethiopia, he showed detainee videotapes depicting attacks against Muslim women, children, and the elderly in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BK) and Chechnya. Ismat convinced detainee to accompany him to Chechnya.³ In September or October 1999, detainee and his brother traveled from Saudi Arabia, to Serzhen Yurt, Chechnya via Istanbul, Turkey (TU) and T'bilisi, Georgia (GG).⁴ When detainee and his brother arrived in Chechnya, they both attended an unidentified camp in Serzhen Yurt for training in physical fitness, weapons and guerrilla operations.⁵ Detainee left the camp in June 2000, after nine months in the Chechen region and returned to Saudi Arabia via an unknown route.⁶

¹ IIR 6 034 0160 05

² Analyst Note: Ismat Hammud al-Juddawi variant Esmath Hamud al-Jedani aka (Abu Yasir variant Abu Zasser), Ismat Hammud al-Juddawi variant. Ismat is a jihad fighter, and as of May 2006 was in Chechnya, was not married and was 27 years old. (NFI)

³ IIR 6 034 1111 04, IIR 6 034 0222 05

⁴ IIR 6 034 1445 03, IIR 6 034 0222 05, TD-314/27540-02, Analyst Note: According to the Saudi Ministry of Interior, General Directorate of Investigations (Mabahith), the Saudi Government issued detainee a passport on 14 September 1999. This confirms the detainee's claimed travel period to Chechnya, indicating detainee probably obtained his passport specifically to undertake this travel.

⁵ IIR 6 034 0222 05

⁶ IIR 6 034 0604 02, , IIR 6 034 0878 03, IIR 6 034 1445 03, IIR 6 034 0222 05

JTF-GTMO-CC

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9SA-000230DP (S)

b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: Detainee listened to Sheikh Hamad al-Aqila speak at the al-Aqila Mosque in Riyadh, SA.⁷ Al-Aqila issued a fatwa (religious ruling) encouraging young men to travel to Afghanistan and fight against Massoud (the Northern Alliance commander), who al-Aqila claimed was killing Muslims. Al-Aqila told his audience that if they did not follow this fatwa, they would go to hell.⁸ Around July 2000,⁹ detainee traveled from Jeddah to Kandahar, AF via Damascus, Syria (SY) and Tehran, Iran (IR).¹⁰

c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: Detainee traveled from Kandahar to the al-Faruq Training Camp.¹¹ At the camp, detainee received two weeks of small arms training; one week of explosive training; ten days of camouflage, movement and tactics; eight to nine days of topography, map and compass training; and physical fitness training.¹² After an unspecified period of time, detainee departed Afghanistan and returned to Saudi Arabia. On 28 March 2001, detainee again left Jeddah and returned to Kandahar via Kuwait (KU), Lahore, Pakistan (PK); Quetta, PK; and Spin Buldak, AF.¹³ In approximately June 2001, he traveled to the Malik Training Camp where he received three weeks of anti-aircraft and mortar training.¹⁴ Detainee then went to the second fighting line near Bagram, AF and remained there until the month of Ramadan 2001.¹⁵ Detainee then traveled to Jalalabad, AF, and then to Tora Bora, AF where he held a position as a cook.¹⁶ Detainee admitted that after the death of his Tora Bora camp leader, Abu Mahjin, detainee assumed the leadership position.¹⁷

⁷ Analyst note: See Reasons for Continued Detention for additional information on Shaykh al-Aqila.

⁸ IIR 6 034 0268 02, 000230 302 31-MAY-02.

⁹ IIR 6 034 0160 05, IIR 6 034 0250 05, Analyst Note: Detainee also stated that he went in either September or October 2000. The conflict in time frames could be due to confusion between the Gregorian and Islamic Hijri calendars.

¹⁰ IIR 6 034 0268 02, IIR 6 034 0005 06

¹¹ IIR 6 034 0268 02, IIR 6 034 1017 03, IIR 6 034 0160 05

¹² IIR 6 034 0269 02, IIR 6 034 1017 03

¹³ IIR 6 034 0160 05, IIR 6 034 0005 06, TD-314/27540-02, Analyst Note: In TD-314/27540-02, the Mabathith states that detainee left Saudi Arabia on 28 March 2001. A variant of Spin Buldak is Spin Boldak.

¹⁴ IIR 2 340 6231 02, IIR 6 034 0160 05, IIR 6 034 0269 02, Analyst Note: A variant of Malik is Malek. The Malik Training Camp is aka (Malik Military Center) aka (Sabr/Sabir Camp).

¹⁵ IIR 6 034 0160 05, Analyst Note: Ramadan 2001 occurred from 17 November 2001 to 16 December 2001.

¹⁶ IIR 6 034 0160 05

¹⁷ IIR 6 034 0564 03, Analyst Note: Variants of Mahjin include Mehjin, Mahgen, and Mehjen. Abu Mahjin, is assessed to be Abu Mahjin al-Taifi aka (Salih Husayn Ali Ahmad) aka (Marwan Muhammad Naman Mujahid). Abu Mahjin was a known al-Qaida leader who died during hostilities in Tora Bora as reported in TD-314/33185-03, and possibly the individual identified as a close associate and bodyguard for UBL as reported in IIR 6 034 0412 04 and CIR 316/07159-04. Abu Mahjin probably died prior to the attack on the 65 which occurred on approximately 15 December 2001.

JTF-GTMO-CC

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9SA-000230DP (S)

5. (S//NF) Capture Information:

a. (S//NF) In an attempt to escape Tora Bora, detainee claimed he paid an unknown Afghan guide to take him to Pakistan. Detainee stated he arrived in Pakistan, after several days, where Pakistani authorities arrested him.¹⁸ While basically accurate, the detainee omitted key details of his capture. Detainee's departure from Afghanistan was, in fact, orchestrated by Usama Bin Laden (UBL)-appointed commander Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi. During a cease fire, al-Libi directed a group of approximately 65 fighters to depart Tora Bora. US military helicopters are believed to have attacked the group killing many of them. Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi then led the remainder of the group and the other fighters in Tora Bora, numbering about 150, to Pakistan where they were subsequently arrested by Pakistani forces.¹⁹ Lists of those captured with Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi include the detainee's name or alias.²⁰ Pakistani authorities transferred detainee to US custody on 2 January 2002.²¹

b. (S) Property Held:

- F-91W Casio watch
- Money:
 - 59,500 Afghanis
 - 12,200 Pakistani Rupees
 - 1,000 Saudi Riyals
 - \$21 USD
- Other personal items including a piece of paper with Arabic writing, a Saudi Arabian driver's license, and a set of Toyota vehicle keys²²

c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 11 February 2002.

d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide information on the following:

- Terrorism related facilities, training conducted, methods of training and trainers

¹⁸ IIR 6 034 0270 02

¹⁹ Withdrawal from Tora Bora Analysis (DAB analysis paper), IIR 2 340 6244 02, TD-314/14605-04, IIR 6 034 0118 04

²⁰ Analyst Note: Detainee is identified as Talout in IIR 7 739 3396 02. Detainee is identified as Mehmood Bin Dakhil in TD-314/50490-01.

²¹ TD-314/00845-02

²² IIR 6 034 1255 04, Analyst Note: Reference document notes that MO-244 was in charge of five to six pickup trucks full of weapons and people who were retreating. It is possible that since detainee was directly subordinate to MO-244 that the set of Toyota keys were to one of these vehicles.

JTF-GTMO-CC

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9SA-000230DP (S)

- Taliban air defense systems
- Arab fighting elements in Afghanistan

6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee's Account: Detainee has provided reasonably consistent and accurate information with some discrepancies, such as denying he has any explosives training and serving as a simple cook in Tora Bora. Detainee is relatively truthful and has provided extensive information about other detainees and individuals of interest. However, detainee is not as forthcoming with information related to his leadership position and duties at Tora Bora.

7. (S//NF) Detainee Threat:

a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a HIGH risk as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.

b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: Detainee is assessed to be a member of al-Qaida who served as a commander in Tora Bora. Detainee has received basic and advance militant training. Detainee admitted traveling to Chechnya and Afghanistan to participate in jihad. Detainee has acknowledged second hand information relating to the USS COLE bombing and the possible procurement of portable nuclear bombs by Chechen mujahideen leaders.

- (S//NF) Detainee is assessed to be an al-Qaida member who admitted to commanding al-Qaida-affiliated forces in Tora Bora and participating in hostilities.
 - (S//NF) Detainee admitted that after the death of his Tora Bora commander, Abu Mahjin, detainee assumed Mahjin's position.²³
 - (S//NF) Tariq Mahmood Ahmad, ISN US9EG-000535DP, stated Abu Mahjin served as the verbal conduit between UBL and the commanders in Tora Bora.²⁴ (Analyst Note: As detainee has acknowledged, he assumed Abu Mahjin's duties when he died, therefore it is probable that detainee also served as UBL's messenger and would have additional information on the Tora Bora leadership.)
 - (S//NF) Jabd-al-Rahman Ma'ath Thafir al-Umari, ISN US9SA-000199DP (SA-199), identified detainee as the emir (leader) of SA-199's 12-man group of fighters.²⁵ Both detainee and SA-199 are included on a list of personnel assessed to be captured with Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi.²⁶

²³ IIR 6 034 0564 03

²⁴ IIR 6 034 0265 05

²⁵ IIR 6 034 0283 02, IIR 6 034 0293 06

²⁶ Withdrawal from Tora Bora - INTSUM 01-MAY-2006

JTF-GTMO-CC

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9SA-000230DP (S)

- (S//NF) Abdallah Yahya Yusif al-Shibli, ISN US9YM-000240DP (YM-240), identified detainee as Talat, a leader of a group in Tora Bora.²⁷
- (S//NF) Moazzam Begg, ISN US9UK-000558DP (UK-558, transferred), stated that he spent three days at a camp in Tora Bora commanded by detainee.²⁸
- (S//NF) Abdullatif Nasser, ISN US9MO-000244DP (MO-244), identified detainee as his subordinate in Tora Bora. MO-244 stated that detainee was in charge of the Talat Center.²⁹ (Analyst Note: This claim places detainee subordinate to two individuals in Tora Bora: MO-244 and Abu Mahjin. However, MO-244's statement reflects approximately a late-November timeline. Detainee's claims reflect an early-to mid-December timeline indicating detainee may have been subordinate to both individuals at different times. The actual positions MO-244 and Abu Mahjin held relating to each other are unknown.)
- (S//NF) Detainee acknowledged traveling to the second fighting line near Bagram and remaining there until Ramadan 2001.³⁰
- (S//NF) Detainee's association to al-Qaida is also evident in the inclusion of his name and / or alias on al-Qaida associated documents.
 - (S//NF) Computer media recovered during raids against al-Qaida associated safe houses in Rawalpindi, PK and Karachi contained a variant of detainee's name, Humud Dakhil al-Jadani. The media listed al-Qaida mujahideen and their trust accounts.³¹ (Analyst Note: Such lists are indicative of an individual's residence within al-Qaida, Taliban, and other extremist guesthouses, often for the purpose of training or coordination prior to travel to the front lines or abroad. Trust accounts were simply storage compartments or boxes used to secure the individual's personal valuables until completion of training or other activity.)
 - (S//NF) A variant of detainee's name, Hammoud Dokheil al-Jadani, was found in a document listing 324 Arabic names, aliases and nationalities recovered from raids on safe houses associated with suspected al-Qaida in Karachi. Hammoud Dokheil al-Jadani was associated with the statement "has possession of a Saudi passport."³²
- (S//NF) Detainee's recruitment through acceptance of a fatwa from Saudi religious leader Shayk Hamad al-Aqla was similar to that of other al-Qaida detainees.³³

²⁷ IIR 2 340 6464 02

²⁸ IIR 6 034 1135 03

²⁹ IIR 6 034 1300 03, Analyst Note: Variants of Talat are Talut and Taloot.

³⁰ IIR 6 034 0160 05

³¹ TD-314/42895-02, TD-314/47683-03, Analyst Note: Detainee is number 55 on the list.

³² TD-314/40693-02, Analyst Note: Detainee is #59 on the list.

³³ IIR 6 034 1109 04, IIR 6 034 0604 02, Analyst Note: Shaykh Hamud Bin Uqla was one of the first radical religious leaders to issue fatwas (religious rulings or edicts) calling on Muslims to support the mujahideen who

JTF-GTMO-CC

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9SA-000230DP (S)

- (S//NF) Detainee received basic and advanced training in Afghanistan as well as guerrilla training in Chechnya.
 - (S//NF) Detainee admitted attending training at al-Faruq.³⁴ While at al-Faruq detainee received small arms, tactics, and explosive training.³⁵ (Analyst Note: In separate reporting detainee has denied having any explosives expertise.³⁶)
 - (S//NF) Senior al-Qaida operative Walid Muhammad Salih Bin Attash aka (Khallad) aka (Silver) described detainee as a veteran of the Chechen Jihad who arrived at the al-Faruq Training Camp already trained.³⁷
 - (S//NF) Detainee was captured with a Casio F-91W wrist watch.³⁸ (Analyst Note: This Casio model is linked to al-Qaida and radical Islamic terrorist improvised explosive devices. Reports indicate that Al-Qaida distributed Casio watches to students in the watch timer course included in explosives training.)³⁹
 - (S//NF) Detainee admitted attending advanced training at the Malik Military Center near Kabul.⁴⁰ While at Malik, detainee received three weeks of anti-aircraft and mortar training.⁴¹ (Analyst Note: Malik Military Center aka (Malik Training Camp) aka (Sabr Camp) offered training on anti-aircraft, artillery, heavy artillery and the SA-7 Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) system.)
 - (S//NF) Prior to his Afghanistan jihad participation, detainee admittedly traveled to Chechnya for jihad and received basic training while there.
 - (S//NF) Detainee's name is included on a list of 215 applicants for an unspecified terrorist training camp. This list was provided by the Cypriot Central Intelligence Service (KYP).⁴² (Analyst Note: The training camp in question is unknown, but is possibly related to the detainee's participation in the Chechen jihad.)

were assisting the Afghans fight the Soviets. In 1995, he was among several clerics arrested for criticizing the Saudi royal family's pro-Western policies. After the 9/11 attacks on the US, he issued fatwas declaring that those supporting the US and coalition forces against Muslims were themselves nonbelievers. His fatwas have justified the 9/11 attacks and instructed Muslims to defend the Taliban. Until his death in Saudi Arabia in 2001, Uqla helped raise money for UBL.)

³⁴ IIR 6 034 0269 02

³⁵ IIR 6 034 0269 02, IIR 6 034 1017 03

³⁶ 000230 SIR 02-Nov-2004

³⁷ TD-314/37598-03

³⁸ 000002 MFR 24-APR-2002

³⁹ Casio Watch MFR, 000002 MFR 24-APR-2002, Casio Watch Electronic Analysis Report (Federal Bureau of Investigation Investigative Technology Division, Casio Watch 18 Stage Intervalometer Electronic Analysis Report), Casio Watches and relationship to detainees.

⁴⁰ IIR 2 340 6231 02

⁴¹ IIR 2 340 6231 02, IIR 6 034 0160 05, IIR 6 034 0269 02, Analyst Note: Malik variant Malek.

⁴² TD-314/47588-02, Analyst Note: Detainee is #26 on the list.

JTF-GTMO-CC

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9SA-000230DP (S)

- (S//NF) Detainee has provided information related to potential future and past terrorist acts.
 - (C//REL USA AND GCTF) In July 2000, at the al-Faruq Camp in Afghanistan, detainee heard from Chechens attending the camp that Chechnya acquired seven black briefcases containing uranium material from the Russian army (NFI). Detainee was told that the briefcases went to the head of the mujahideen in Chechnya.⁴³
 - (C//REL USA AND GCTF) In 2001, detainee was present at the al-Qaida guesthouse in Kandahar (NFI) when the commander of al-Qaida's maritime operations, Mallah Bilal aka (Abd al-Rahim Hussein Muhammad al-Nashiri), visited. (Analyst Note: Bilal was the planner and strategist behind the USS COLE bombing in Yemen in October 2000. Detainee's close proximity to Bilal may have provided him with insight to the planning of the attack.)⁴⁴
- (S//NF) The Saudi Ministry of Interior, General Directorate of Investigations (Mabahith) provided information on 37 detainees designated as high priority. Detainee was the fifth name on that list.⁴⁵ (Analyst Note: Detainee's name on this list is probably due, in part, to his long-term ties to militant jihad.)

c. (FOUO) Detainee's Conduct: The detainee is assessed as a MODERATE threat from a detention perspective. The detainee's overall behavior has been highly compliant and seldom hostile to the guard force and staff. The detainee currently has 25 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS, with the most recent occurring on 07 June 2006 when a guard found a plastic bag in the Bay 1 latrine with a residual amount of chewing tobacco in it, the detainee voluntarily claimed it was his. Other incidents for which the detainee has been disciplined include inciting a disturbance, threatening cadre, damage to property, possession of weapon and non-weapon type contraband, failure to follow instructions and unauthorized communications. The detainee has no Reports of Disciplinary Infraction for assault. Other behavior notes show that on 02 November 2003, he threatened to throw urine in the face of the Block NCO for not putting his clothes out in the sun to dry.

8. (S//NF) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:

a. (S) Assessment: JTF-GTMO determined this detainee is of HIGH intelligence value. Detainee's most recent interrogation session occurred on 21 July 2006.

b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Detainee traveled from Saudi Arabia to participate in three jihads in Chechnya and Afghanistan. Detainee is associated with numerous al-Qaida

⁴³ IIR 6 034 0250 05

⁴⁴ IIR 6 034 0323 05, Analyst Note: Mallah variant Mullah.

⁴⁵ TD-314/27540-02

JTF-GTMO-CC

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9SA-000230DP (S)

leaders, recruiters, and trainers. Detainee was a leader at Tora Bora and received militant training at three different training camps.

c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee has knowledge of militant recruiting and facilitation in Saudi Arabia. Detainee can discuss training locations, methods, curriculum, and instructors, including accelerated al-Qaida training programs. Detainee has knowledge of al-Qaida leaders and operatives including those involved in the USS COLE attack, those possibly involved in the procurement of a nuclear device, and potentially other planned operations.

d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:

- Saudi Arabia-based recruiters, recruiting methods, and use of religious facilities
- Terrorist operations (USS COLE and other planned operations)
- Al-Qaida leadership in Afghanistan and those still at large

9. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 15 October 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant.


HARRY B. HARRIS, JR.
Rear Admiral, USN
Commanding