The documents in this folder continue from the previous folder.
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:
Ch'iao Kuan-hua, PRC Minister of Foreign Affairs
Lin P'ing, Director, Department of American and
Oceanic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
T'ang Wen-sheng, Deputy Director, Department of
American and Oceanic Affairs, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs
T'ang Yuan-hung, Director, United States Office,
Department of American and Oceanic Affairs,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Chao Chi-hua, Deputy Director, United States
Office, Department of American and Oceanic
Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Shih Yen-hua (Interpreter)
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs
Philip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary of State for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff,
Department of State
William H. Gleysteen, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Richard H. Solomon, Senior Staff Member,
National Security Council
Karlene Knieps (Notetaker)

DATE AND TIME: Thursday, October 23, 1975
12:35 to 2:30 a.m.

PLACE: Guest House #5
Peking, People's Republic of China

SUBJECT: Discussion of the Draft Communique
for the President's Visit

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, I thought I might give you
our reaction to the PRC draft communique (attached at the end of this
memcon) and in the very brief time left before our departure, you might
think about it if you want to make a response.
Foreign Minister Ch’iao: I will first listen to your reaction and then I will tell you our reaction to your draft.

Secretary Kissinger: We received your draft near midnight. This does not permit serious consideration.

There is no point in discussing procedural matters that are now beyond repair. Let me therefore deal with substance.

The purpose of the communique is to explain to the world and to our people why the President of the United States visited China. We do not agree that just coming to China can be the purpose of a political move; there must be some substantive reason for it.

Now -- going through your draft. I find it, quite frankly, difficult to find a reason [for the President’s visit]. The draft follows the outline of the Shanghai Communique, but in almost every significant category it represents a step back from the Shanghai Communique. In no category is there a step forward.

In the Shanghai Communique, it was the first contact that the United States and the People’s Republic had had in over 20 years. In rather abstracted ideas the two sides stated their diametrically opposite views at the beginning [of the document].

I would like to remind the Foreign Minister that at that time the Prime Minister was generous enough to take out of the Chinese section language that we considered particularly offensive -- although these words later appeared in the Foreign Minister’s public statements [at the United Nations]. However, it was your speech, it was not a document signed jointly with the United States.

In all frankness, the American people will ask why the President came here to sign a document which says, “The peoples of the third world countries have won a series of significant victories in their struggle against colonialism, imperialism and hegemonism.” We are of that “imperialist” school I suppose. “The contention between the superpowers for world hegemony has become ever more intense.” That seems inconsistent with us selling out to the Soviets. One of those two propositions cannot be correct. You can’t do both a Munich and a world war simultaneously.

Above all, we cannot sign a document which accuses us of this, even if it is stated by just one party.

Two paragraphs state some positive things, but they are better stated in the Shanghai Communique. They just repeat the Shanghai Communique in a shortened version.
Then, the Taiwan issue. We understand that the Chinese side repeats its Shanghai Communique position. It presents no problem, but the Foreign Minister knows very well that several sentences, several clauses, have been added which sharpen the Chinese position. These sentences will greatly complicate our efforts to move to full normalization -- which we have said we would do.

And what your draft says regarding bilateral matters is insignificant.

So then, we have enormous difficulties with such a document. In fact, quite candidly, it presents an impossibility of explaining to our people what we were doing here. I hate to do this in so short a time before my departure, but we did not have the document so I had no opportunity. This document is completely unacceptable, even as a basis for discussion.

Let's leave aside the document. Let me make several general statements. We gave you a document, but we did not expect you to accept it in its initial form. We allowed three days for discussions. We were prepared to discuss it, change it, negotiate it. That opportunity did not present itself. But we made a very serious effort to show serious movement on issues of great concern to the Chinese side, such as the issue of hegemony, on world positions, as well as some other negotiations that you are conducting with Japan.

And what we said about the principle of one China in the Taiwan section of our communique -- stating it twice and affirmatively -- was a serious attempt on our part to indicate movement on an issue that is leading to inevitable consequences over a measurable period of time.

So, that was our intention. Underlying this present situation, however may be a more profound understanding. That is, you may think we want to come here to use the shoulders of China to reach Moscow, or that we want something here.

Our assessment here, which has to be our policy, is to prevent Soviet expansionism. This we will do with or without China. It is also in China's interest to prevent Soviet expansionism for your own reasons. So we have parallel objectives here. We have refused all overtures from the Soviet Union that could have been used against the People's Republic, and I explained very frankly to Chairman Mao yesterday that we have a domestic situation which requires us to put more emphasis on tactics and maneuvers than we like.

But we have dealt openly with you and you have always known what we did -- especially regarding the Soviets, because we thought we had a parallel conception with you on world affairs. But if that is misunderstood, then we cannot be in a position of being supplicants, and of giving the impression that we need this relationship more than you do.
So I have spoken very frankly, because the foreign policy measure I have been most proud of has been our relations with China. We cannot accept either the position or the substance of this communique.

Therefore, I ask the Foreign Minister's opinion on where we go from here.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Okay, now I will give you my impressions. First, our reaction to your draft: As you had time to prepare when you handed it to us on the 20th, we studied it seriously. We also think that your document as a whole is unacceptable to us. The spirit of the Shanghai Communique is that neither side should conceal its views or policy. So, at the outset of the Shanghai Communique, each side stated its differences from the other so that the world knows both the differences and the common points.

But your draft has concealed the real views of our two sides on international affairs. This does not conform to reality. Since you have dealt with us for a long time you know that we speak facts. Our words count. The main defect in your draft is it is contrary to what you have said. Your draft has failed to include the views of our two sides on the international issues. In other words, the two sides have not stated the differences between us in your draft.

If one expects to go beyond the Shanghai Communique, it is necessary for the two sides to state their respective views. Because time is progressing, and the world is changing, and, of course, the views of the two sides may also change from the Shanghai Communique. This is the first point I would like to make.

(Ambassador Bush comes in. The Secretary says to him, "I asked you to come in to be a mediator. We have a little difference of opinion on the two sides." (Laughter))

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: A second point, on the Taiwan issue: The Taiwan section in your draft shows no substantial progress from the Shanghai Communique and what is more, there is a contradiction in logic.

Secretary Kissinger: I'll accept the first criticism, but for a Kantian the second is a little bit hard to take.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: I will not go into details.
Secretary Kissinger: But you will give us a hint that we can think about.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: As a matter of fact, there is nothing new in your draft on the Taiwan section apart from repeating the Shanghai Communique. The only change is in the word "does not challenge" to "agree." One phrase is active, the other one passive, but it doesn't change the meaning.

As for our draft, there are many ideas in our draft which go beyond the Shanghai Communique.

Secretary Kissinger: In the wrong direction.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: In the correct direction. We speak facts. Yesterday you met with Chairman Mao. You said that we had a common opponent. With respect to our views on the third world, the position of the superpowers, we have stated our views on many occasions. We do not conceal our views.

These are our views on the current world situation. They also conform to the current realities more than the Shanghai Communique. According to the tradition of the Shanghai Communique, each side can state its views. The U.S. side can state anything it wishes to state. We have no objection. This is not rhetoric.

I do not agree with what Mr. Secretary said that almost every paragraph in the Chinese draft is a step backwards from the Shanghai Communique. We have reaffirmed all the principles agreed upon by our two sides in the Shanghai Communique, we have reaffirmed the Shanghai Communique and stressed opposition to world hegemony.

As for the Taiwan issue, we have put our views in a nutshell in two sentences and we have added two sentences. I think our position is also very clear to you. We are not being honest if we do not state our views like this.

As I said just now, there is nothing new in the Taiwan section except a repetition of the views of the Shanghai Communique.
As for our present bilateral relations, we also stated the present position in very brief words which also conform to present reality. In other words, what is said in this draft is more brief than what was said in the Shanghai Communique, and the substance is the same.

Secretary Kissinger: On bilateral relations?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Yes.

I would like to repeat that the Chinese draft was presented to you after full consideration in a short period of time. We are not rash.

Mr. Secretary of State, you raised a fundamental question just now that the purpose of the communique is to explain why your President should visit China and I remember your saying that his visit was unconditional. I remember discussing this matter in another building in this compound during your last visit to Peking. I suggested a visit by your Secretary of Defense, and you replied with the suggestion of a visit by the President. We expressed welcome to the President. Thereafter, on many occasions we said it would be all right if they did not meet. Anyway, we express our welcome to your President's visit. Our Vice Premier has said that a visit by your President is itself a political move. In our opinion, a communique is not important. Who invented this communique form?

Secretary Kissinger: It must be a Chinese invention. They have long had diplomacy. (Laughter)

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: There is no such thing in Chinese history. If we have a communique we don't object. If there is no communique, that is not of much significance.

I have very frankly and very briefly presented our views. In such a short period of time it was impossible for us to discuss our two draft communiques word-by-word as we did in 1972. So I suggest that you leave your draft with us, and take our draft with you and continue to consider our draft.

Secretary Kissinger: I can tell you now we can consider your draft for two more months and we will not change our position. We will not change our fundamental opinion. It is an impossibility for the President to agree to such a communique both for international and domestic reasons. It
would be suicide for him to do it. Sometimes a situation is created where there are no decisions to make.

His opponents on the right would absolutely destroy him. This is a reality. Even from a foreign policy point of view, with respect to hegemony, what we would do is meet your point of view. This is not a Japanese situation. We want to go forward. We are prepared to find a formula which will help your Japanese problem, not complicate it.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Judging from your draft, you have confused the original ideas in the Shanghai Communique on hegemony. If this is what you mean by strengthening the statement on hegemony, we don't need it.

As for your relations with Japan, we know how to handle them. It is evident that they are bowing to pressure at home and abroad. The Japanese are making trouble. It does not matter to us. We are not in a hurry.

Secretary Kissinger: We do not consider our hegemony clause essential. We don't have any problem with yours as it is in the Shanghai Communique. It only raises the question of what is the necessity of saying it again. We have no objection to it. We can say it again.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: In our opinion, in our draft we have reaffirmed all the principles in the Shanghai Communique, and we have stressed two points. One is our bilateral relations, the other is opposition to hegemony in world affairs, because they constitute the main common points between us.

Secretary Kissinger: We have no problem reaffirming the Shanghai Communique statement on hegemony; this is not a problem.

On Taiwan, our impression is that we made a step forward. That certainly was our intention.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: On the Taiwan issue, yesterday Chairman Mao very thoroughly stated what our views are. You owe us a debt. This is your responsibility, not ours.

As we have discussed this problem many times, we are not constrained to tell you what our views are.
On the sentence on hegemony, I have said that you have confused the conception. The section in your draft has different implications which we are opposed to, such as the words "whatever the source, whether in the East or the West." And I think our Vice Premier has discussed this with you.

Secretary Kissinger: Do you think that hegemony should be resisted only in the West? We do not consider this an important...

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Look at our draft. "Each side is opposed to..." We stated that neither side should seek hegemony in any part of the world.

Secretary Kissinger: We can accept your language. We sincerely thought that you would find that interesting. We can drop that clause. The hegemony clause is not a problem. Our views are substantially the same.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: In the first place this was raised by you.

Secretary Kissinger: This is quite true, but we thought that we were meeting your concerns. We are not gaining anything for ourselves. We don't need it. It makes no difference to us. We will drop that clause or go back to your clause.

What do you think should be done now?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: We have stated our views very thoroughly. It is very good if we have a communiqué; we have no objection to having one. But if our two sides cannot agree, what will we do?

Secretary Kissinger: If we can't agree on the language, then there is no common position.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: We have a common point on hegemony. You stressed this to the Chairman yesterday.

Secretary Kissinger: It does not seem to have been taken very seriously. But your communiqué is 98 percent disagreement, and only 2 percent agreement which is already in the other communiqué.
Foreign Minister Ch'iao: This is the reality, the problem of first priority at the moment. Why do the two sides have to come together? Why can't we speak it out?

Secretary Kissinger: We have no trouble with this. It is the five pages of disagreement you have to state before you can state one sentence of agreement.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: There are only four pages.

Secretary Kissinger: We will do it on our typewriter. (Laughter)

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Last year you said that our draft was too short. This year you say that our side's is too long.

Secretary Kissinger: But you have not included the U.S. position [which will expand the length considerably].

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: You are free to express your views. We won't object.

Secretary Kissinger (with irony): Thank you. I appreciate that very much, but my point is that the impression [created by the Chinese draft] is that the President of the United States travelled 8,000 miles to express 98 percent disagreement in order to express one sentence of agreement and this after his Secretary of State already spent considerable time discussing these issues in October.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: The importance [of the document] should not be weighed by the number of words.

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, I am always astonished by how well informed you are. You saw what our press did on the first evening with your toast. What will they do with this document? It will damage our relationship! Therefore, both sides must consider the psychology of the other side.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: We don't think it beneficial to cover up our differences. This will lead people astray. Indeed, as everyone knows, we really have great differences, but we have common points as well.
Secrectary Kissinger: But it is simply a different situation when the President comes a second time, when there has been no return visit to the United States by a Chinese leader for understandable reasons, to restate these differences.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: This is a reality. We have so many common points, and so many differences.

Secretary Kissinger: We have stated only one common point.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: We are not discussing these documents in detail, but discussing the growth in exchanges and in friendship.

Secretary Kissinger: We can accept your point on social imperialism.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: I would suggest that you consider our draft. It is not possible for us to have detailed discussions today.

Secretary Kissinger: We cannot accept this draft. I can't leave you in any doubt about this point. What modifications are possible we are willing to explore. There is no possibility of accepting this draft no matter how long we negotiate it.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: We won't moderate it.

Secretary Kissinger: Basically are you saying either no communique or this?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: In our draft we have basically stated our views, but you have not put in your views yet.

Secretary Kissinger: Let me understand you correctly. We can add our views. This is unchallenged. Are you saying that this communique with American views added, or no communique at all? Is this your position?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: In substance. Our draft was drawn up after serious discussion.

Secretary Kissinger: So was ours.
Foreign Minister Ch’iao: I repeat what the Vice Premier said. I suggest you take back our draft and have a more serious consideration of it.

Secretary Kissinger: I want to understand your position. Are you saying either your draft or no communique or are you prepared to consider middle ground?

Foreign Minister Ch’iao: Basically this is our position. Of course, this is a document prepared by our two sides. We can discuss it, but we won’t change its substance.

We are used to calling a spade a spade. Since 1972 there has been no basic change in our relations. This is reality. The communique should reflect this. As for concrete wording, we can discuss this.

Secretary Kissinger: How shall we proceed since the opportunity for direct exchanges is no longer practical?

Foreign Minister Ch’iao: What are your ideas?

Secretary Kissinger: I was not prepared to be this far apart on the last evening. I thought that as in October, 1971 we would have a basic document by now.

Foreign Minister Ch’iao: Shall we discuss this when you come again next time with the President?

Secretary Kissinger: I will have to discuss with the President what he wants to do.

Foreign Minister Ch’iao: There are two questions. One is the general pattern of the communique. There are two points here. The two sides can state their own views, and then their common points. The second question is concrete wording of the communique. We can discuss this later.

We cannot agree that we cannot state our differences. This is only to deceive people. This is no good. Our people won’t accept it.

Secretary Kissinger: Neither will ours.
Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Actually what we need is to state the differences. This is objective reality. Of course, you have your problems and you cannot say we do not understand it fully.

For instance in the period before the Shanghai Communique was signed, was your press so used to our words? They were not so used to them. So we say that you admit that the Shanghai Communique was a new example of a diplomatic document.

Secretary Kissinger: I have stated many times in public in the United States that the way the Shanghai Communique was drafted was a tribute to the wisdom of the Chinese side, and a new way of negotiating. But that was a different occasion. It was the first contact at a top level between the U.S. and Chinese sides. That in itself was an historic event.

If we add as much as you have written in your draft, this document will be six pages long.

I do not exclude stating some disagreement, but I think the balance between the two is not appropriate at this moment.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: You are too much used to counting the words. Why not weigh the value of a document? As you have often said, you have often read many communiques full of rhetoric. They are long, but people don't want to read them as they do not conform to reality.

Secretary Kissinger: Well -- we will take into account your desire to state opposing views. We can send you what we think is an appropriate balance, maybe through Ambassador Bush, or your Ambassador. Then if we can agree in principle, we can work out the wording when we are here, as we did the last time.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao (with alacrity): Yes, we agree to your suggestion.

Secretary Kissinger: I think the Foreign Minister understands that what we will propose is a shortening of some key paragraphs. But he can give us his reaction later.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Three lines like mine? (Laughter)
Secretary Kissinger: Three lines.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Because you want to shorten the key paragraph.

Secretary Kissinger: Two - three lines each. Yes. I will do to you what you did to me last year.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Last year you complained we gave you too short a draft, so this year we gave you more.

Secretary Kissinger: You can be sure the statement about social imperialism will be in it.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: I agree to your suggestion.

Secretary Kissinger: Let's ... we will have Ambassador Bush give further drafts to you.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Okay.

Secretary Kissinger: And after that we can make a decision after we receive it.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: This is not a big problem, the communique. The importance is the substance.

Secretary Kissinger: Given our domestic situation, if we have to spend the next two months defending ourselves on why we went to China, it will be of no help to you or the policy we are attempting to pursue and it will be totally counterproductive. And it will liberate all those political forces that have been contained since 1971.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Merely because we have stated our views in this manner?

Secretary Kissinger: No, not because you have stated your views. It depends on the whole context, on the balance between the agreements and disagreements and overall tone. And I think the Foreign Minister, who is more subtle than I am, understands what I am talking about.
Foreign Minister Ch'iao: You are too polite. Okay. We accept your suggestion that you will give instructions to your Ambassador. Is there anything further you would like to say?

Secretary Kissinger: No. I assume in the meantime we will both consider each other's views. We will say to the press that we have had preliminary discussions about a communique but we will not discuss our disagreements or any substance.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: It is not necessary to go into details. You can tell your press that we have had discussions about the communique but we will not tell them the substance.

Secretary Kissinger: That will be our position.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Your press is really a problem. What if we cannot reach an agreement on the communique? What if there is no communique at all? What will we tell them?

Secretary Kissinger: That is why it is impossible. Even if I agree with you, no one will remember all of the communique I have worked on since I became one of the key figures in our foreign policy. I remember only two. One of them is the Shanghai Communique.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: And the other one?

Secretary Kissinger: I knew you were going to ask that! It was the visit of the Swiss President to the United States. (Laughter)

It is not possible, unfortunately, for us to have no communique. We face a practical problem, not to turn this into a crisis -- because you are quite right, the essence of our relationship is not dependent on one sentence. We do not delude ourselves and neither do you. But for the essence -- what to me -- quite frankly, I consider the matters Habib discussed with your associate Lin P'ing of secondary importance. But for our public, unless there is some progress in tone we cannot rely on it to give impetus to the essence of the relationship, which is the hegemony problem.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Some questions cannot be settled at the moment.
Secretary Kissinger: I understand this. The fact of the matter is this: There are certain kinds of hegemonic moves which may now appear quite improbable, but if they ever arise it will require -- it is necessary to prepare a more or less psychological framework. They [the hegemonic moves] may never arise. But apart from this purpose, the President's and my interest in these bilateral matters end. You notice I never raise them with you. But they will be used by our public to judge the degree of our relationship, and they give us the possibility to enlist support for political issues rather than economic and technical issues.

Foreign Minister Ch’iao: But there must be something practical. But if there is nothing practical in our bilateral relations, but only things of a symbolic nature, there is no reason for these things.

Secretary Kissinger: We agree, but we hope we will have things of both a symbolic as well as a practical significance.

Foreign Minister Ch’iao: That is a problem that confronts us both.

Secretary Kissinger: That is correct, and that is why I believe that with the talent available to both of us we should be able to produce something. I would be glad to assign Habib from tormenting me to doing something constructive. (Laughter)

Foreign Minister Ch’iao: What I mean is that if in our bilateral relations we could put in the draft something substantial, that would be good; but at the moment we do not have such things. No talent can create things like this, including Mr. Habib. They tried this morning.

Secretary Kissinger: The Chairman gave me this yesterday (the Secretary hands a small piece of paper to Ch’iao with the word “yes” written on it) and if you teach Lin P’ing to say this, you can make rapid progress. (Laughter)

Foreign Minister Ch’iao: This was given by the Chairman to you, so you should learn this.

Secretary Kissinger: I have learned. Maybe we can give it to him (Lin P’ing). I think we understand each other’s necessities.
Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Okay. Is there anything left for us to discuss?

Secretary Kissinger: Did I see you show something to the Vice
Premier -- an announcement of the President's visit that you had in mind?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: A very brief announcement. Only stating
the date. (A copy is handed to Secretary Kissinger.)

Secretary Kissinger: This is the style that I am used to. It has been a
great tradition since you became Foreign Minister.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: It has been the tradition since I started out.

Secretary Kissinger: What did we say when President Nixon's visit
was announced? The same thing? Can we state our view on this
matter separately?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: It never hurts to listen to other views.

Secretary Kissinger: Can we have a Chinese and an American version?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Here is the Chinese version.

Secretary Kissinger: It is a good translation. (Laughter) If we have
any views, which I doubt, we will let you know. And we will settle on
this after we have had the next exchange -- after Mr. Bush has talked
to you next week. It is not an official visit unless we have one late
night meeting.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: It is better not to have a communique. We did
the same last time when President Nixon was here.

Secretary Kissinger: I remember. Several nights. If we agree on
the framework, we will probably have to do the final discussion when
President Ford is here.

The meeting ended at 2:25 a.m.
公告

经商定，美利坚合众国总统卡尔·唐纳德·特朗普将于一九七五年十二月一日对中华人民共和国进行国事访问。
ANNOUNCEMENT

It has been agreed that President Gerald R. Ford of the United States of America will visit the People's Republic of China from December 1 through December 6, 1975.
JOINT COMMUNIQUE (DRAFT)

President Gerald R. Ford of the United States of America visited the People's Republic of China at the invitation of Premier Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of China from December 1 through December 6, 1975. Accompanying the President were Mrs. Ford, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, and other American officials.

During the visit, the leaders of China and the United States held a serious review of the turbulent international situation and expounded their respective positions and views. The two sides also had a frank exchange of views on Sino-U.S. relations and other subjects of common interest.

The Chinese side stated: The current international situation is characterized by great disorder under heaven, and the situation is excellent. All the basic contradictions in the world are sharpening. The factors for revolution and war are both increasing. Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want revolution - this torrential tide of our time is rising ever higher. The peoples of the third world countries have won a series of significant victories in their struggle against colonialism, imperialism and hegemonism. The contention between the superpowers for world hegemony has become ever more intense.

CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER
There is no lasting peace in the world. There definitely does not exist an irreversible process of detente; instead, the danger of a new world war is mounting. This has been borne out ever more clearly by objective reality. The danger of war comes mainly from social-imperialism. People of all countries must get prepared against war. Without preparations one will suffer. It is China's fundamental policy to dig tunnels deep, store grain everywhere and never seek hegemony, and to persist in independence and self-reliance. As always, the Chinese Government and people will firmly support the revolutionary struggles of the people of all countries.

The U.S. side stated ............

Both the Chinese and U.S. sides reaffirmed the principles agreed upon in the Shanghai Communique. They maintained that they should conduct the relations between China and the United States on the five principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence. In particular, they stated that neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or any other part of the world and that each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.
Both the Chinese and U.S. sides pointed out that since the Shanghai Communique, there has been a growth in the exchanges and friendship between the two peoples and an improvement in the relations between the two countries. It conforms to the common desire of the peoples of China and the United States to realize the normalization of the relations between the two countries.

The Chinese side reaffirmed: The Taiwan issue is the crucial issue obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States; the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the Chinese people are determined to liberate Taiwan, and when and how the Chinese people liberate Taiwan is entirely China's internal affair in which no country has the right to interfere. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of "one China, one Taiwan", "one China, two governments", "two Chinas", an "independent Taiwan", or advocate that "the status of Taiwan remains to be determined". The Chinese side emphasized that the normalization of relations between China and the United States can be realized only when the U.S. Government severs its so-called diplomatic relations with the Taiwan "regime", withdraws
all U.S. armed forces and military installations from Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait area, and abrogates the U.S.-Chiang "joint defence treaty".

The United States side stated: .............

The two sides agreed that the contacts and exchanges between the peoples of China and the United States in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports and journalism will contribute to the enhancement of mutual understanding and friendship. Both sides will facilitate the further development of such contacts and exchanges.

Both sides maintained that it is in the interest of the two peoples to develop bilateral trade step by step on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. The two sides agreed to continue to facilitate such trade.

President Ford and his party expressed their appreciation to the Government and people of the People's Republic of China for the hospitality extended to them.
联合公报（草案）

应中华人民共和国总理周恩来的邀请，美利坚合众国总统杰拉尔德·福特于一九七五年十二月一日至六日访问了中华人民共和国。陪同总统访问的有福特夫人、国务卿亨利·基辛格和其他美国官员。

......

访问期间，中美两国领导人认真地回顾了急剧动荡的国际形势，阐述了各自的立场和观点。双方还就中美关系以及共同关心的其他问题坦率地交换了意见。

中国方面声明：当前国际形势的特点是，天下大乱，形势大好。世界各国基本矛盾都在激化。革命和战争的因素都在增长。国家要独立，民族要解放，人民要革命的时代洪流更加高涨。第三世界各国人民反对殖民主义、帝国主义和霸权主义的斗争，取得了一系列重大胜利。超级大国争夺世界霸权愈演愈烈。世界上没有什么持久和平。客观现实愈益表明，决不是什么缓和不可逆转，而是新的世界战争的危险正在加剧。战争的危险主要来自社会帝国主义。各国人民要准备打仗，不准备则要吃亏。中国的根本
方针是深挖洞、广积粮、不称霸，坚持独立自主、自力更生。中国政府和人民将一如既往，坚决支持世界各国人民的革命斗争。

美国方面声明：……

中美双方重申上海公报中一致同意的各项原则。双方表示应根据互相尊重主权和领土完整、互不侵犯、互不干涉内政、平等互利、和平共处五项原则来处理中美两国关系。双方特别声明：任何一方都不应该在亚洲——太平洋地区或世界的任何其他地区谋求霸权，每一方都反对任何其他国家或国家集团建立这种霸权的努力。

中美双方指出，自上海公报发表以来，两国人民之间的来往和友谊有了增进，两国关系有所改善，实现两国关系正常化符合中美两国人民的共同愿望。

中国方面声明：台湾问题是阻碍中美两国关系正常化的关键问题。中华人民共和国政府是中华人民共和国政府，台湾是中国的一个省，早已归还祖国。中国人民一定要解放台湾，中国人民什么时候采取什么方式解放台湾完全是中国内政，别国无权干涉。中国政府坚决反对任何旨在制造“一中一台”、“一个中国、两个政府”、“两个中国”、“台湾独立”和鼓吹“台湾地位未定”的活动。中国方面强
调，只有美国政府断绝同台湾“政权”的所谓外交关系，从
台湾和台湾海峡地区撤走全部美国武装力量和军事设施，
废除美蒋“共同防御条约”，中美两国关系正常化才能得
到实现。

美国方面声明：……

双方认为，中美两国人民之间在科学、技术、文化、
体育和新闻等方面的联系和交流，对加深相互了解和友谊
是有益的。双方将对进一步发展这种联系和交流提供便
利。

双方认为，在平等互利的基础上逐步发展双边贸易符合
两国人民的利益。双方同意继续为此提供便利。

福特总统及其一行对中华人民共和国政府和人民给予
的款待表示感谢。
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Secretary's talks with Chinese Officials

Secretary Kissinger asked that I pass to you the following report of his talks with Chinese Officials.

"On Wednesday, after sightseeing in the morning, a desultory hour and a quarter meeting with Teng Hsiao-ping in the afternoon, and our return banquet with mutually brief, bland toasts, we finally were given the Chinese reaction to our draft communique for your visit. They submitted their counterdraft which bears absolutely no resemblance to our version and is totally unacceptable. The full text is attached at the end of this cable.

The draft we gave them contained several common principles concerning the international situation: A half step forward on normalization confirming the principle of one China; and considerable progress in various fields of bilateral relations, such as trade, exchange, branch liaison offices, and a hot line. We expect them to whittle down the areas of agreement and insert some unacceptable language concerning international principles. What they have given us, however, constitutes not only no forward movement, but retrogression from the Shanghai communique. A document of this sort would be torn apart by our critics and confuse our friends. I believe it would be domestically and internationally impossible for you to come here to sign a document along the lines of their draft.

In addition to the unacceptability of their draft was the fact that they waited until the very last moment to give it to us. We gave them our version on Monday and they responded at 11:30 P.M. on the eve of my departure on Wednesday night. This gave us no time for meaningful exchange on the documents even though they knew their draft would be unacceptable to us, and we had forewarned them weeks in advance that we wished to essentially complete the drafting of the communique on my visit.

[Attachment: Full text of Chinese counterdraft]
Therefore, I immediately called a meeting with the foreign minister Wednesday night to tell them that their communique, and the manner in which they presented it to us, was unacceptable, and that we expected them to come up with a more reasonable basis for your visit if we were to proceed. I emphasized that their approach was heavily over-weighted with contentious language and disagreements, and was very light on progress and common views. Such a document was in neither sides interest. In any event the American people would never understand why a U.S. president had traveled 8000 miles for such an outcome.

Chiao at first took a very firm line, saying that our draft was equally unacceptable to them. I covered up our differences in international affairs; represented only infinitesimal progress on Taiwan; and was unrealistically ambitious on bilateral agreements given the nature of our relationship. He at first said that we had to accept their draft or do without a communique. In any event they didn't think a communique was important and would be ready to dispense with one.

I made clear that there had to be a communique and that it could not look anything like theirs. After further exchanges, during which I questioned the purpose of you coming, Chiao swung around to the position that while they absolutely must maintain their structure, i.e. each side stating their different perspectives followed by areas of commonality, the actual wording and balance of the document was open to change. I emphasized that the great imbalance between differences and agreements in their draft had to be righted. We agreed that we would submit a counter-draft through Ambassador Bush early next week and meanwhile would hold the announcement of the dates of your visit in abeyance. I clearly foreshadowed what we will do to their document -- boil down the quantity and aggressiveness of their positions; add the U.S. viewpoints; and beef up the area of consensus and bilateral movement.

I have no illusions that we are in for anything but a tough process in order to get what at best will be a minimum communique. I believe we should use our counterdraft next week to determine whether they are willing to settle for something that will justify your trip. Despite inevitable public speculation, I don't believe we should announce the dates of your trip until we are clear on the basic outlines of the communique. At best there will still be some hard bargaining here during your visit. You may
even be forced to consider postponing your trip if the Chinese do not improve the communiqué. We can decide this after seeing their response to our next draft.

Working in favor is the fact that it cannot be in the Chinese interest to have our relationship go publicly sour. This would only expose them further to the Soviet Union, about which they are genuinely concerned. They have continually made it clear, and repeated tonight, that you are welcome whether or not there is a meeting of the minds or communiqué. Working against us is their perception that our domestic weakness have us floundering and we are therefore less useful as a balance in the world; their own domestic pre-succession immobility; the fact that Teng doesn’t have the scope or flexibility of Chou; their political and ideological constraints when we are at this stage of our bilateral relations; and their apparent failure to understand that we must show some concrete progress if we are to maintain domestic support for our China policy.

We will work on our counterdraft on the way home, and I look forward to discussing our strategy with you upon my return.”

Begin Text:

Joint Communiqué: President Gerald R. Ford of the United States of America visited the People’s Republic of China at the invitation of Premier Chou En-lai of the People’s Republic of China from December 1 through December 6, 1975. Accompanying the President were Mrs. Ford, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, and other American officials.

During the visit, the leaders of China and the United States held a serious review of the turbulent international situation and expounded their respective positions and views. The two sides also had a frank exchange of views on Sino-U.S. relations and other subjects of common interest. The Chinese side stated: The current international situation is characterized by great disorder under heaven, and the situation is excellent. All the basic contradictions in the world are sharpening. The factors for revolution and war are both increasing. Countries want independence. Nations want liberation and the people want revolution — this torrential tide of our time is rising ever higher. The peoples of the third world countries have won a series of significant victories in their struggle against colonialism, imperialism, and hegemonism. The contention between the superpowers for world hegemony has become ever
more intense. There is no lasting peace in the world. There definitely does not exist an irreversible process of detente; instead, the danger of a new world war is mounting. This has been borne out ever more clearly by objective reality. The danger of war comes mainly from social-imperialism. People of all countries must get prepared against war. Without preparation one will suffer. It is China's fundamental policy to dig tunnels deep, store grain everywhere and never seek hegemony, and to persist in independence and self-reliance. As always, the Chinese government and people will firmly support the revolutionary struggles of the people of all countries.

The U.S. side stated: Both the Chinese and U.S. sides reaffirmed the principles agreed upon in the Shanghai communique. They maintained that they should conduct the relations between China and the U.S. on the five principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. In particular, they stated that neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or any other part of the world and that each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.

Both the Chinese and U.S. sides pointed out that since the Shanghai communique, there has been a growth in the exchanges and friendship between the two peoples and an improvement in the relations between the two countries. It conforms to the common desire of the peoples of China and the U.S. to realize the normalization of the relations between the two countries.

The Chinese side reaffirmed: The Taiwan issue is the crucial issue obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the U.S.: The government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the Chinese people are determined to liberate Taiwan. And when and how the Chinese people liberate Taiwan is entirely China's internal affair in
which no country has the right to interfere. The Chinese government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of "one China, one Taiwan," "one China, two governments," "two Chinas," or "independent Taiwan," or advocate that "the status of Taiwan remains to be determined." The Chinese side emphasized that the normalization of relations between China and the U.S. can be realized only when the U.S. government severs its so-called diplomatic relations with the Taiwan "regime," withdraws all U.S. armed forces and military installations from Taiwan and the Taiwan strait area, and abrogates the U.S.-Chiang "joint defense treaty."

The United States side stated: ... The two sides agreed that the contacts and exchanges between the peoples of China and the United States in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports and journalism will contribute to the enhancement of mutual understanding and friendship. Both sides will facilitate the further development of such contacts and exchanges. Both sides maintained that it is in the interest of the two peoples to develop bilateral trade step by step on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. The two sides agreed to continue to facilitate such trade. President Ford and his party expressed their appreciation to the government and people of the People's Republic of China for the hospitality extended to them.
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: China Trip

October 24, 1975

The Secretary asked that I pass the following message to you regarding the press play on his meetings with the Chinese.

"I am disturbed at the continuing flood of press reports that the Chinese and we quarrelled vigorously about detente. The impetus for most of these stories appears to be a single fabricated version of my meeting with Mao Tuesday night, on top of Chiao's toast the first night. Other press agencies have picked up and magnified this theme.

As you know from my summary reports of my conversations with the Chinese, we did not have bitter arguments over detente. Obviously, the Chinese would like detente to fall apart; our moving into confrontation with Moscow would ease many of Peking's problems. In any event they want to warn the West about Soviet aggressive design and play up the line that war is probable. But our talks were friendly and we did not have the brawl the press suggests. At the same time there were disturbing elements and we do indeed have some problems with the Chinese. As I said in my earlier reports, I think they derive mainly from the Chinese assessment that we have been weakened over the past few years. Their major concern is that what they perceive as our domestic weakness will be translated into irresolution in the international arena. And they fear that American weakness abroad will encourage Soviet adventurism.

I will make some more precise proposals as to the schedule of your Asian trip when I get back. However, my preliminary view now is that it might be better to resurrect the idea of you visiting the Phillipines and Indonesia and if necessary cut a day off your China trip."