



S E C R E T // N O F O R N // 20331023

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09360



JTF-GTMO-CDR

23 October 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue,
Miami, FL 33172

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9AF-000560DP (S)

JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

1. (S//NF) Personal Information:

- JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Hajawali Mohmad
- Current/True Name and Aliases: Haji Wali Mohammed, Hadji Wali Mohammed Saraf, Yarkin Mohammed, Abd Manan
- Place of Birth: Wazirabad, Puli Khumri District, Baghlan Province, Afghanistan (AF)
- Date of Birth: 15 February 1966
- Citizenship: Afghanistan
- Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9AF-000560DP



2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in good health.

3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment:

a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention under DOD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee for recommends Continued Detention under DOD Control (CD) on 16 August 2007.

b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: *If released without rehabilitation, close supervision, and means to successfully reintegrate into his society as a law-abiding citizen, it is assessed detainee would probably seek out prior associates and reengage in extremist support activities at home and abroad. Since transfer to JTF-GTMO, detainee has been compliant with guard force personnel and debriefers. He has made statements indicating his intentions not to rejoin the fight as a member of the Taliban and/or insurgent groups. He appears to*

CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES
REASON: E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 20331013

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withhold information of intelligence value during debriefings. Detainee is reported to be a primary financier for al-Qaida and the Taliban. Detainee facilitated money transfers for al-Qaida weapons purchases and terrorist operations, including those supporting the 1998 East Africa US Embassy bombings. Some of these purchases were done with support from the Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence Directorate (ISID). Detainee is associated with Jamaat Tablighi (JT) and Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG).¹ Detainee was involved in the narcotics trade in Pakistan (PK) and Afghanistan. JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be:

- A **HIGH** risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies
- A **LOW** threat from a detention perspective
- Of **HIGH** intelligence value

c. (S//NF) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee's assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be annotated by ➤ next to the footnote.)

- Detainee's correspondence with family members and former detainee's

4. (U) Detainee's Account of Events:

The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.

a. (S//NF) Prior History: During the Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989), detainee and his family were displaced in Afghanistan, then to the Barki refugee camp in Sawaby, PK. Detainee and his brothers operated a cloth business within the camp. While at the refugee camp, detainee observed a man who displayed wares in a case, which had a separate compartment that contained money to exchange Afghan currency for Pakistani rupees. Detainee believed this would be a good way to earn a living, so during the next six or seven years, detainee's family ran a cloth and currency exchange business.²

¹ Analyst Note: JT is a National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF) Counterterrorism (CT) Priority 3 terrorist support entities (TSE). Priority 3 TSE have demonstrated intent and willingness to provide financial support to terrorist organizations willing to attack US persons or interests, or provide witting operational support to Priority 1-2 terrorist groups. The HIG is a NIPF-CT Priority 2 target. Priority 2 targets are defined as issues, opportunities, or threats that rise to, or are expected to rise to, the level of interest of the Combatant Commanders or DNI EXCOM Principals, not already identified as Priority 1. This includes terrorist groups, especially those with state support, countries that sponsor terrorism or countries that have state organizations involved in terrorism that have demonstrated both intention and capability to attack U.S. persons or interests.

² IIR 6 034 0583 03

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b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: Detainee, his uncle, and his brothers traveled between Pakistan and Afghanistan to earn a profit in the currency exchange business. In 1988-89, detainee contacted an individual named Aqbal who operated an established currency exchange in Peshawar, PK.³

c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: Detainee and Aqbal were business partners for two years at a currency exchange store located in the Azad building, Shop Number Four in Peshawar. Detainee then opened his own store in the Azad building, Shop Number Two. Detainee and his brothers dissolved the business when the Taliban gained control of Afghanistan. Detainee then opened an exchange business in Kabul with Muhammad Rafi.⁴ In 1996, detainee obtained a \$1.5 million US business loan from an individual named Abdul Rahman Zahid, then director of the Bank of Afghanistan. Detainee agreed to use the money to purchase gold in Dubai and bring it back to Afghanistan to sell, taking 25 percent of the profits for himself and turning over the remaining 75 percent to the Taliban. On his way to Dubai to buy the gold, detainee changed the money into Pakistani rupees and then into UAE dirhams (AED), losing a total of \$500,000 US in exchange fees. Detainee then used the remaining money to buy gold, which he transported back to Afghanistan. When detainee returned to Afghanistan, Zahid was angry at detainee for losing so much of the money and took all the gold. Detainee insisted this was the only deal he did with the Taliban, and that he never had any dealings with al-Qaida.⁵

5. (U) Capture Information:

a. (S//NF) Pakistani intelligence officers captured detainee at his home in Peshawar on 26 January 2002. Pakistani forces transferred detainee to US forces control in February 2002 and they arrived at JTF-GTMO on or about 30 April 2002..⁶

b. (S) Property Held:

- Republic of Afghanistan business passport issued in Kandahar, AF⁷
- Airline ticket for 26 January 2002 flight from Peshawar to Dubai
- Notebook with Arabic writing (translated)
- Miscellaneous personal items, including Koran, jewelry, and medicinal items

c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 1 May 2002

³ IIR 6 034 0583 03, Analyst Note: A variant of Aqbal is Iqbal.

⁴ IIR 6 034 0583 03

⁵ 000560 302 27-JUN-2002

⁶ TD-314/06141-02, 000560 SIR 12-AUG-2004, Multiple ISNs DMO MANIFEST TO GTMO 28-APR-2002

⁷ IIR 6 034 0265 08

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d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide information on the following:

- Funding of Taliban Government or possibly the al-Qaida terrorist organization by use of currency exchange investments in precious metals and money transfers
- Banking apparatus of the former Taliban government
- Location of Taliban officials

6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee's Account: Detainee shows signs of deception and the use of counter-interrogation techniques. Detainee has maintained a consistent cover story: that he worked with the Taliban only as a money exchanger. However, detainee has denied contact with, or providing support for, al-Qaida. Detainee facilitated the transfers of large sums of money, which he has yet to describe.

7. (U) Detainee Threat:

a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a **HIGH** risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies.

b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: *If released without rehabilitation, close supervision, and means to successfully reintegrate into his society as a law-abiding citizen, it is assessed detainee would probably seek out prior associates and reengage in extremist support activities at home and abroad. Since transfer to JTF-GTMO, detainee has been compliant with guard force personnel and debriefers. He has made statements indicating his intentions not to rejoin the fight as a member of the Taliban and/or insurgent groups. He appears to withhold information of intelligence value during debriefings.* Detainee has been identified as a top financial manager for both al-Qaida and the Taliban. Detainee acted as a facilitator for al-Qaida in the procurement of weapons and financing for terrorist attacks. Detainee has ties to the Taliban, HIG, and JT. Detainee was involved in trafficking narcotics, which was possibly related to Taliban and al-Qaida financing.

- (S//NF) Detainee provided financial services for the Taliban and served as al-Qaida's primary financial manager.
 - (S//NF) Detainee admitted that for 18 months, from early 1996 until June 1997, Taliban Vice President Mullah Muhammad Rabbani (deceased) used detainee as a conduit for exchanging money to raise money for the Taliban. However, detainee claimed that after he lost \$500,000 US of the Taliban's money in June 1997 due to currency devaluation, he fell out of favor with the Taliban. Detainee claims Pakistani authorities arrested detainee's cousin, Hajji Lall Muhammad, due to his connection

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with the detainee and the loss of \$500,000 US.⁸ (Analyst Note: Other sources contradict detainee's assertion that he stopped cooperating with the Taliban in 1997.)

- (S//NF) According to the Pakistani Intelligence Bureau (PIB), detainee was a wealthy Afghan "*Saraf*" (money changer) who was affiliated with the HIG. They reported that the detainee was very close to Taliban supreme leader Mullah Mohammad Omar and to Mullah Mohammad Rabbani. The PIB reported that the detainee traveled often between Kandahar, Dubai, United Arab emirates (UAE) and Peshawar, PK.⁹

- (S//NF) According to a foreign government service, detainee was an associate of Usama Bin Ladin (UBL) who did business with the Taliban. As of April 2000, Mullah Mohammad Omar had reportedly given detainee \$1 million US to manage.¹⁰

- (S//NF) According to Jordanian intelligence, detainee was al-Qaida's primary financial manager, replacing Abu Hajer al-Iraqi, aka (Mamdouh Mahmud Salim), who was arrested in Germany in September 1998.¹¹

- (S//NF) Qari Hasan Ulla Peerzai, ISN US9AF-000562DP (AF-562, transferred) reported detainee was a financial manager for UBL. Detainee reportedly traveled to Japan, Europe, and the UAE with UBL's money.¹²

- (S//NF) Detainee claimed he transported gold from Dubai to Afghanistan on Ariana Airlines, and that he trusted the airline employees because the Taliban ran the airline.¹³ Detainee stated he knew Hajji Farid, the manager of the Ariana Airlines office in Dubai, and that Hajji Farid also personally moved money from Afghanistan to the UAE for al-Qaida. Detainee stated Hajji Farid carried gold and currency to Mullah Muhammad Omar.¹⁴

- (S//REL TO USA, AUS, GBR) Hajji Zabbi, an FBI contact, stated Arabs often sent money to Afghanistan through the Taliban-controlled Ariana Airlines. Hajji Zabbi reported the Taliban and al-Qaida operated together. Al-Qaida received the majority of their funding through Pakistan via Ariana Airways.¹⁵

- (S//NF) A trade passport issued to detainee on 15 February 1996 by the Republic of Afghanistan showed a high level of travel to and from the UAE between November 1997 and June 2001.¹⁶

⁸ IIR 2 340 6534 02

⁹ TD-314/24628-99

¹⁰ TD-314/13244-00

¹¹ TD-314/20068-00, Analyst Note: Abu Hajer al-Iraqi was extradited to the US and subsequently convicted for his role in the 1998 East Africa Embassy bombings.

¹² 000562 SIR 12-JUN-2006 (Analyst Note: AF-562 was told this information by Muhammad Sharif, ISN US9AF-000562DP (AF-532, transferred)

¹³ 000560 302 27-JUN-2002

¹⁴ TD-314/06141-02

¹⁵ IIR 4 201 1988 05

¹⁶ >IIR 6 034 0265 08

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- (S//REL TO USA, AUS, GBR) Hajji Zabbi stated detainee was the most important member of detainee's *hawala* group (banking system external of established international systems), which also included Sher Khan Saraf and Hajji Obaidullah.¹⁷
 - ◆ (S//REL TO USA, AUS, GBR) According to detainee, detainee's sister is married to HIG leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's nephew Obaidullah. Detainee stated Obaidullah was a money exchanger in Dubai with Sher Khan. Detainee stated he was a business partner with Obaidullah until 2000, when they broke relations because the business was not profitable.¹⁸ (Analyst Note: These are the same Hajji Obaidullah and Sher Khan Saraf noted by Hajji Zabbi as detainee's business partners. It is common for powerful families in Afghanistan to solidify their ties by intermarrying, as in the case of Obaidullah. Detainee also stated his brother, Hajji Wakil, is married to Hekmatyar's niece, and an Afghan source of unknown reliability reported that six of detainee's nephews are related to Hekmatyar.¹⁹ Pakistani ISID confirmed detainee was previously tied to the HIG.²⁰)
 - (C) Detainee admitted being acquainted with Hajji Muhammad Kandahar, aka (Muhammad Saraf), ISN US9AF-001098DP (AF-1098, released), who was arrested by US Forces in Kandahar in June 2003 under suspicion of being a Taliban financier and funding anti-US activities. Detainee considered Muhammad Saraf to be one of the most prominent money changers in Afghanistan. Detainee claimed to have met Muhammad Saraf four times; twice during flights on Ariana Airlines, and twice in Kabul.²¹
- (S//NF) Detainee facilitated the movement of funds that supported al-Qaida terrorist operations.
 - (S//NF) Jordanian intelligence reported detainee financed the 7 August 1998 East Africa US Embassy bombings, which killed and wounded over 200 civilians. Detainee also financed an al-Qaida cell in Jordan led by Khadr Abu Hawshar, which planned to conduct terrorist operations in Jordan in conjunction with the Millennium celebrations.²²
 - (S//NF) In March 2000, at the direction of UBL and with ISID's assistance, detainee facilitated the financing for the purchase of shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) through Muhammad Rahim, according to sensitive reporting. Al-Qaida reportedly purchased the SAMs for fighters in Chechnya.²³

¹⁷ IIR 4 201 1988 05, Analyst Note: The title "saraf" indicates a money exchange businessman.

¹⁸ IIR 4 201 3494 05

¹⁹ IIR 6 044 6018 03

²⁰ TD-314/24628-99

²¹ >IIR 6 034 1257 04, Analyst Note: AF-1098 was held at the Bagram detention facility.

²² TD-314/20068-00

²³ TD-314/10425-00

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- (S//NF) Detainee and his business partner, Hajji Gulla Jan, facilitated the transfers and exchanges of funds from UBL-controlled accounts for the SAM purchases arranged by Rahim. Two ISID officers, Colonel Muhammad Shoaib and Colonel Muhammad Wahid Jan, were in contact with Rahim and supported his efforts to purchase SAM systems for al-Qaida. The ISID support included providing a subsidy of \$4,000 US for each SAM purchased from suppliers in Afghanistan and Pakistan.²⁴
- (S//NF) The SAMs purchased in the deal included both Russian and Chinese versions of the SA-7 and SA-16, which were priced from \$1,600 to \$7,000 US.²⁵ Rahim had previously purchased over 180 weapons for al-Qaida with the assistance of the ISID.²⁶
- (S//NF) Detainee admitted having license plates on his vehicle from 1999-2000 that allowed him to cross the Afghanistan-Pakistan border without being searched or impeded. Detainee stated the plates could be purchased from the ISID for \$350 US. Detainee referred to the money paid for the plates as “corruption money.”²⁷
- (S//NF) During 2001, detainee was involved in several large money transfers possibly related to terrorist activities. According to a cooperative source, the transfers were suspicious because of their unusual size and connection to individuals possibly involved in terrorist activity. In each case of the following; detainee was to pick up the transferred money in Peshawar.²⁸
 - (S//NF) On 26 April 2001, 188,557 AED was transmitted from Mahmud Muhammad Ibrahim Juman through the al-Yousef exchange in Dubai.²⁹
 - (S//NF) On 29 April 2001, 174,353 AED was transmitted from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia-based Salah Muhammad al-Faraib to Dubai-based Abbas Darwish Abdallah Abd al-Razzaq.³⁰
 - (S//NF) On 1 May 2001, 253,887 AED was transmitted from an unidentified party at the al-Yousef exchange in Dubai.³¹
- (S//NF) Detainee was involved in narcotics smuggling.
 - (S//NF) Detainee was reportedly a well-known narcotics smuggler and business partner of Muhammad Karimi. Detainee was identified as trafficking large shipments of hashish and heroin to Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Europe, and the United States.³²

²⁴ TD-314/10425-00

²⁵ TD-314/10425-00

²⁶ TD-314/10425-00, Analyst Note: The SA-7 is a man-portable, heat seeking missile system with an approximate range of 5 km and a maximum altitude of 4 km. The SA-16 is a lighter and updated version of the SA-7.

²⁷ IIR 6 034 0585 04

²⁸ TD-314/35993-01

²⁹ Analyst Note: Approximately equivalent to \$51,300 US.

³⁰ Analyst Note: Approximately equivalent to \$47,500 US.

³¹ Analyst Note: Approximately equivalent to \$69,100 US.

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- (S//NF) Muhammad Karimi was one of the owners of the Rahim Karimi Corporation, an import/export business in Peshawar. Karimi was an opium producer and heroin smuggler in Afghanistan. An individual named Muhammad Rahim was also a shareholder in the Rahim Karimi Corporation as of mid-1999.³³ (Analyst Note: Although the name Mohammad Rahim is common, this Mohammad Rahim may be the individual through whom detainee purchased SAMs in March 2000³⁴)
- (S//NF) Detainee admitted having ties to the JT. (Analyst Note: Al-Qaida is known to have used the JT to facilitate and fund the international travels of its members.)³⁵
 - (S//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR) Detainee attended a three-day JT conference in a mosque in Peshawar in the early 1990s. Detainee later attended a meeting in Lahore, PK at the JT headquarters. During the summer of 2001, Muhammad Sharif, detainee's friend and a well-known preacher, introduced detainee to an elderly Arab named Shaykh al-Rasheed. Rasheed donated 250,000 AED to build a mosque in Kandahar.³⁶ (Analyst Note: There is no further information available regarding the disposition of these funds. However, during the summer of 2001, numerous foreign fighters were traveling to Afghanistan, using missionary work under JT auspices as a cover story. Many stayed in al-Qaida guesthouses and trained in al-Qaida facilities in the Kandahar area, usually for free. Money from JT may have been used to cover their costs.)

c. (S//NF) Detainee's Conduct: Detainee is assessed as a **LOW** threat from a detention perspective. His overall behavior has been compliant and non-hostile to the guard force and staff. Detainee currently has 20 reports of disciplinary infraction listed in DIMS with the most recent occurring on 27 July 2007, when he was reported refusing to come out of the recreation yard. He has five reports of disciplinary infraction for assault with the most recent occurring on 22 April 2006, when he was reported elbowing a guard in the chest. Other incidents for which he has been disciplined include inciting and participating in mass disturbances, damage to government property, assaults, and possession of food and non-weapon type contraband. In 2007, detainee had a total of three reports of disciplinary infraction and none so far in 2008.

³² TD-314/16299-99

³³ TD-314/16299-99, TD-314/24628-99

³⁴ TD-314/10425-00

³⁵ IR 2 227 0131 03; Jamaat Tabligh Provides Cover 28-DEC-2005; JITFCT Special Analysis US Jamaat Tabligh; AFOSI Report on Jamaat Tabligh 27-OCT-2004; Jamaat Al Tabligh (JT) Members - TRRS-04-03-1083 10-MAR-2004

³⁶ IIR 4 201 3536 05, IIR 6 034 1187 04, Analyst Note: In January 2001, 250,000 AED was approximately equivalent to \$68,000 US.

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8. (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:

a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of **HIGH** intelligence value. Detainee's most recent interrogation session occurred on 22 February 2007.

b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Detainee is associated with the highest leaders in al-Qaida and the Taliban. He was the primary financial advisor for al-Qaida and was involved in financial transactions and purchases leading directly to acts of terrorism, including the 1998 East Africa US Embassy bombings. Detainee has ties to several members of terrorist organizations, including familial ties to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the leader of the HIG.

c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee should be able to provide information on al-Qaida and Taliban financial operations, including personal financial information about UBL and Mullah Muhammad Omar. He can also provide information on weapons purchases on behalf of al-Qaida and the Taliban. Detainee is likely to know how terrorist-related money transfers are conducted. He may possess knowledge involving the financial operations of the HIG and JT. Detainee possibly knows how and where money derived from the narcotics trade has been dispersed.


d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:

- Al-Qaida
 - UBL and other al-Qaida personnel, including financiers
 - Bank accounts and financing of al-Qaida terrorist operations and weapon purchases
- Taliban
 - Mullah Muhammad Omar
 - Bank accounts and finances of the Taliban and Taliban weapon purchases
- HIG
 - Gulbuddin Hekmatyar
 - Relatives involved in terrorist activities
 - Finances and personnel involved in HIG cells in Afghanistan
- Finances and terrorist affiliated with the JT
- Narcotics financing and distribution
- Terrorist connections in Dubai, including hawalas
- Detainee's intentions after release from US custody
- Terrorist operations in CENTCOM AOR
- Means of communications in Afghanistan and Pakistan between extremists, terrorists, and their associated organizations

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9. (S) **EC Status:** Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 18 June 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant.



D. M. THOMAS, JR.
Rear Admiral, US Navy
Commanding

* Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessment can be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College October 2001 guide *Intelligence Warning Terminology*.