




S E C R E T // N O F O R N // 20300513

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO  
GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA  
APO AE 09360



JTF GTMO-CG

13 May 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue, Miami, FL 33172.

SUBJECT: Update Recommendation to Transfer to the Control of Another Country for Continued Detention (TRCD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9SA-000064DP (S)

## JTF GTMO Detainee Assessment

### 1. (FOUO) Personal Information:

- JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Adl Al Hadi M Al Subay
- Aliases and Current/True Name: Abdel Hadi Mohammed Badan Al Sebairi Sebairi, Abu Muhammad, Adl Al Hadi Muhamad Badan Al Sabay, Abd Al-Hadi Muhammad Badan Falih Al-Subay'I, and Al-Subi'
- Place of Birth: El Kharg, Saudi Arabia (SA)
- Date of Birth: 21 August 1971
- Citizenship: Saudi Arabia
- Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9SA-000064DP



**2. (FOUO) Health:** Detainee is in good health, he has no known drug allergies and currently is not on any medications. He has food allergies to include: wheat, peanut and potato-based products. He has no travel restrictions.

### 3. (S//NF) JTF GTMO Assessment:

**a. (S) Recommendation:** JTF GTMO recommends detainee be Transferred to the Control of Another Country for Continued Detention (TRCD).

**b. (S//NF) Summary:** JTF GTMO previously assessed detainee as Retain in DoD (DoD) on 10 January 2004. Based upon information obtained since detainee's previous assessment, it is now recommended he be Transferred to the Control of Another Country for Continued Detention (TRCD).

CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES  
REASON: E.O. 12958 SECTION 1.5(C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 20300513

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For this update recommendation, detainee is assessed as a low-level member of Al-Qaida's terrorist network. In response to a fatwa, detainee traveled along a known jihadist route to Afghanistan for jihad. Detainee used the cover story of traveling to Afghanistan to help build mosques. Detainee admitted to being in Kabul, Afghanistan (AF). He had pocket litter supporting the theory he had also been in Tora Bora. Detainee has committed a number of aggressive acts against the guard force while in detention. It is assessed this detainee is a MEDIUM risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.

**4. (S//NF) Detainee Background Summary:** Unless otherwise noted, the following paragraphs are based solely on the detainee's statements.

**a. (S//NF) Prior History:** Detainee has a sixth grade education. With the help of his father, he obtained a position as a rescue worker with the police department's rescue squad for the town of El Kharg, Saudi Arabia (SA). Detainee attended a five-month course with the police department in Riyadh, SA. During this course, he received training on firearms, guard duty, and patrol functions. Approximately six years later, he was promoted to a supervisor, received the rank of sergeant, and attended a two-month training course in crime scene investigation. Detainee admitted that he traveled to Kuwait approximately 5-7 years ago for approximately six days to visit family. He admitted traveling to Sudan for approximately 20 days in 1998/1999 to help flood victims under the auspices of the Al-Haramayn non-governmental organization (NGO). (Analyst Note: Al-Haramayn is a Tier 1 NGO target. It has demonstrated sustained and active support for terrorist organizations willing to attack US persons or interests.)

**b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel:** Detainee read a lot about the events in Afghanistan, felt Afghanistan was beautiful, and made the decision to go and help. His intention was to build a small mosque. (Analyst Note: This is one of three reasons he gave for traveling to Afghanistan.) He felt that with \$2,500 USD he could build a small high-rise in Afghanistan. At this time, detainee earned 5,000 SR, approximately \$1,333 USD, per month. Detainee took leave from his position to go to Afghanistan in August of 2001. Detainee claims he is still employed by the Saudi Arabian government. Detainee flew from Riyadh via Qatar and Bahrain to Karachi, Pakistan (PK). Detainee took a bus from Karachi to Quetta and then a taxi to Khandahar, AF. When detainee arrived in Afghanistan, he had \$2,700 USD in his possession.

**c. (S//NF) Training and Activities:** Detainee met Mohammed Al Afghani while looking for lodging in Afghanistan and told him that he wanted to help the poor. Nine days later, detainee and Al-Afghani traveled to the home of one of Al-Afghani's relatives, Abd Al-Hakiem located in Kabul. Three days later, detainee, Al-Afghani, and Al-Hakiem traveled to an area just outside of Kabul where the mosque needing repair was located. After seeing the mosque, detainee agreed to help fund the building of a new mosque instead of repairing the

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old one. The three returned to Al-Hakiem's residence. Detainee gave Al-Afghani \$900 USD for the new mosque. Detainee stated he would stay in Kabul until the new mosque was built. However, after the bombing started in Kabul, detainee made the decision to leave Afghanistan immediately and return to Saudi Arabia. Detainee felt that traveling through Pakistan and Iran would be the best route. Al-Afghani informed detainee to remain inside the house until he could make arrangements to get detainee safe passage to Pakistan.

**d. (S//NF) Capture Information:** A few days before Ramadan, the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (UIFSA) took control of Kabul. Detainee left with his passport, an airline ticket and \$200 USD. It took the whole month of Ramadan (16 November to 15 December 2001) to travel from Kabul, AF, to the border of Pakistan. Along the way, detainee met up with Omar Rajab Amin, ISN US9KU-000065DP (ISN 065) and Abdullah a Al Wida, ISN US9BA-000060DP (ISN 060), who were traveling together. Detainee spent five weeks in their company. Detainee was captured by Pakistani authorities on 20 December 2001 and detained in the Peshawar prison. Detainee was transferred to US custody on 27 December 2001.

**e. (S) Transferred to JTF GTMO:** 14 January 2002

**f. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF GTMO:** Bagram processing documents indicate detainee was transferred to JTF GTMO to provide information on the training and tactics of the Saudi Governmental Police Department; however, detainee may be able to provide information on facilitators that aided him in his travels to Afghanistan and Al-Qaida terrorist connections.

**5. (S//NF) Detainee Threat:**

**a. (S) Assessment:** It is assessed the detainee poses a MEDIUM risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.

**b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention:**

- (S//NF) Detainee is assessed to be a low-level member of Al-Qaida's terrorist network and may have knowledge of UBL's escape from the Tora Bora mountains of Afghanistan.
  - (S//NF) Detainee claims that he stayed inside Mohammed Al Afghani's house until he was informed he could safely leave. It is assessed that this individual was actually Majid Bin Muhammad Bin Sulayman Abal Khayil aka Arsala Khan, a known Al-Qaida and Taliban facilitator that was captured and is being held in US custody. This assessment is made from information contained in detainee's pocket

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litter at time of capture which included the names of individuals, villages, and phones numbers.

- (S//NF) Arsala Khan is referred to as uncle in detainee's pocket litter. Khan lived in Merkenkhiel Village in Tora Bora and his name followed the notation "Tora Bora Mirkhani Village" in detainee's pocket litter. Khan is identified from reporting, to be a tribal chief closely affiliated with UBL and Al-Qaida's terrorist network.
    - ◆ (S//NF) During a raid between 26 and 28 May 2003 of senior Al-Qaida operative Yusif Salih Fahd Al-'Iyari, a harddrive was recovered and two letters were found on this harddrive. In one letter, Al-'Iyari expressed his thanks for Arsala Khan's financial support and protection. In a second letter, Sulayman Jasim Abu Ghayth expressed his thanks to Arsala Khan for a different financial contribution.
    - ◆ (S//NF) Arsala Khan facilitated safehouses in the Tora Bora Mountains for individuals including Usama Bin Laden (UBL).
    - ◆ (S//NF) Arsala Khan is believed to have assisted in the escape of Taliban and Al-Qaida members during military operations in the Tora Bora area.
  - (S//NF) Akram Khan, whose name was contained in detainee's pocket litter, is an individual who has been known to hide Al-Qaida and Taliban personalities.
  - (S//NF) Mohammad Ibn Abdul Wakil, whose name was contained in detainee's pocket litter, possibly refers to Mohammad Ibn Abd Al Wakil, an Egyptian Line Commander in Kabul, AF.
  - (S//NF) Sharafat Mulla Khalis Anwar, whose name was contained in detainee's pocket litter, was an official of the Islamic Party and a member of the Al-Badr Mujahideen, known Islamic extremists.
- (S//NF) It is assessed detainee traveled to Afghanistan in support of jihad in response to a fatwa issued by extremist Imams.
    - (S) Detainee's route of travel is typical of individuals traveling to Afghanistan for jihad. Detainee traveled via Doha, Qatar; Bahrain; Karachi, PK; and then Kandahar; AF. Saud Al Shaibani, US9SA-000346DP (ISN 346), assessed to be a member of Al-Qaida and/or its global terrorist network, traveled this same route according to entries in his passport. ISN 346 also claims he went to Saudi Arabia in support of jihad after listening to radio promotions in Saudi Arabia that solicited young men.
      - (S) There are indications detainee's passport may have been fraudulently issued, which is also typical of jihadist travel.
  - (S//NF) Detainee may have been involved in extremist activities.
    - (S//NF) The Saudi Ministry of Interior, General Directorate of Investigations (Mabahith), placed detainee on their watchlist as of 21 February 2002. This watchlist is to denote individuals that have traveled to Afghanistan or Pakistan for possible terrorist/extremist activities such as attending jihadist camps.

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- (S//NF) Detainee is a subject of memo number "12331 SH M" dated 19 November 1998. The memo details Intelligence Operations carried on by some groups in Saudi Arabia (memo from the Mabahith head in Riyadh). (Analyst Note: It is unknown what the memo number "12331 SH M" signifies or references.)
- (S//NF) Detainee may have obtained a new passport to avoid scrutiny by Saudi authorities and allow him to quickly leave the country. It is assessed detainee used methods known to Taliban and Al-Qaida recruiters to deface or degrade a passport making it invalid. He then obtained a new "clean" passport that would not attract attention to his travel. His new passport was received on 23 August and he left the country three days later.
  - (S//NF) According to US9SA-000516DP (ISN 516), Saudi Arabia had travel restrictions in place; however, Taliban and Al-Qaida recruits were aware of methods to circumvent scrutiny by Saudi immigration and border personnel.
  - (S//NF) Ahmed Muhammed Haza Al Darbi, US9SA-000768DP (ISN 768), assessed to be a mid-to-high level Al-Qaida operative, provided the following information about passports:
    - (S//NF) ISN 768 was told by Hussein Hakimi, Abdel Al-Wahab and Abdullah Al-Makki to damage his first Saudi passport because the passport contained Croatian and Pakistani visas and the Saudi authorities would be very suspicious of detainee upon subsequent travel due to the visas. ISN 768 was told to wash his passport several times in the washing machine to fade and erase the visas.
    - (S//NF) ISN 768 said, "If the Saudi Arabia government noticed a Pakistani visa in his passport, they would believe he was a terrorist."

**c. (S) Detainee's Conduct:** Detainee has a past history of aggressive behavior towards military personnel. He was forcefully extracted from his cell on one occasion. Detainee has threatened the guards on numerous occasions.

**6. (S//NF) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:**

**a. (S) Assessment:** JTF GTMO determined this detainee is of MEDIUM intelligence value.

- (S) Due to the number of places detainee has admittedly traveled to and his work for a Tier 1 NGO, detainee may be able to provide information on facilitators that aided him in his travels. Detainee received a new passport to travel to Afghanistan and to hide any previous suspicious travel to other countries which. Detainee departed Saudi Arabia during a time when other detainees have remarked that Saudi Arabia had travel restrictions in place.


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**b. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:**

- Detainee's involvement with Al-Haramayn and personalities in this NGO
- Individuals captured with detainee (i.e., ISN 60 and ISN 65)
- Individual that provided him instructions on traveling to Afghanistan
- Names of Imams that convinced detainee to travel to Afghanistan
- Unknown personalities found in detainee's pocket litter
- Villages listed in detainee's pocket litter

**7. (S) EC Status:** Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 18 October 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant.

  
JAY W. HOOD  
Brigadier General, USA  
Commanding