

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 010685

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL Memorandum of Conversation
CREATOR'S NAME Kissinger/Schlesinger/Scowcroft/Wickham

CREATION DATE 02/01/1974
VOLUME 6 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 036600065
COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. MEORANDA OF
CONVERSATIONS
BOX NUMBER 3
FOLDER TITLE February 1, 1974 - Kissinger,
Schlesinger

DATE WITHDRAWN 01/31/2000
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST LET

REDACTED

1/29/10

5/14/12

REDACTED

REDACTED

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

E.O. 13526

Authority NLF 01-105, #16
NARA PMH Date 05/14/2012

(B)

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs
Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs
Major General John Wickham, Military Assistant
to the Secretary of Defense

DATE AND TIME: Friday, February 1, 1974
8:00 a.m.

PLACE: Secretary Schlesinger's Office
The Pentagon

Schlesinger: Ten quick subjects.

You talked to Clements about a visit to the Saudis.

Kissinger: No, no.

Schlesinger: [REDACTED] We shouldn't cater
to them.

Kissinger: [REDACTED] They think they can ship oil through
the back door and still maintain the embargo. But I turned Clements off.
Get a scorcher off to the Kuwaitis.

Schlesinger: We have been too easy on the Kuwaitis. We should tell
them the next time they get a problem with the Iraqis, forget it.

Kissinger: The conservative Arabs have decided they can kick us
around and get credit with the radicals and not suffer.

Get a cable out on Korea -- keep Habib off their back on their
domestic problems.

CLASSIFIED BY HENRY A. KISSINGER
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (b) (1,3)

~~TOP SECRET~~/NODIS/XGDS

TICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to det.



Schlesinger: Larry told Nick Thimmesch that you were outraged about my tough comment on the Arabs.

We are slipping Hugh Scott on how you and I overlap.

Clements wants to tell the Saudis we are mad.

Kissinger: Nuts. We can't be afraid of the Saudis.

Schlesinger: I want Rumsfeld for Secretary of the Navy. I would recommend Bruce Clark or Strausz-Hupe.

The Spratleys. Sullivan says we are obligated to the Philippines on the Spratleys.

Kissinger: I think the Philippines are withdrawing those forces.

Schlesinger: Maybe you should talk to the Chinese?

Kissinger: They are having internal problems, but they reacted quickly.

I have to testify on the JCS spying business. Symington is pushing. He wants to know why I was uncharacteristically unenergetic about finding out what was taken.

Schlesinger: Admiral Robinson did the same, but he didn't take papers -- he just briefed on the material. You should testify after March -- after the recess. I don't know what the Laird/Buzhardt angle is, but the Buzhardt report says that it was a two-way spying operation designed to bypass Laird.

Kissinger: They passed the JCS documents to us as part of official business. The President ordered it -- because it was a different relationship than we have. We couldn't find out what Laird was doing. Were DOD documents taken?

Schlesinger: I gather so.

Kissinger: It is a morally different position whether the JCS steals from the President or whether the President steals from the JCS.



Schlesinger: It may come out that this was a Kissinger-military conspiracy. Mel and Fred have the fish to fry in this. Moorer is getting a bum deal.

Kissinger: I have read the Young report. It is a report of a failure trying to make himself important. It is sick.

Schlesinger: The Buzhardt report is not sick -- it may be dirty, but not sick.

Kissinger: [Described discussion with Laird on his press conference.]

Schlesinger: Mel has a big set of documents which weave a web which he says shows the evolution of the statutory role of the Secretary of Defense. The documents don't show Moorer set it up but that he was knowledgeable. The report indicates you were getting material to which you were not entitled.

If it weren't for the climate, we would just say that Welander was working too hard to please.

How about Diego Garcia?

Kissinger: I haven't heard.

Schlesinger: How about the Carrier into the Indian Ocean?

Kissinger: I would like to have a gap of about two or three weeks.

Schlesinger: I may have a Japanese problem. We are thinking of using the Midway, home-ported in Japan.


Kissinger: Let me check on that.

Schlesinger: If we are going to have problems on home-porting and put conditions on it, we should know sooner than later.

What about the Paracels?

Kissinger: There is an internal debate going on. Either the leftists did it or Chou did it to show he was vigilant against Imperialists.

But North Vietnam is upset and thus it is not entirely to our disadvantage.



Schlesinger: I don't think there will be an offensive in Vietnam.

Kissinger: The Soviet Union and Chinese have said that, but we should still give them what they need.

Schlesinger: We are giving them TOW's, but they are loaded.

Kissinger: Well, we need to use this time to look after their defenses.

Schlesinger: The Hill is afraid about the embargo. They are asking me if we are giving our fuel to anyone -- especially the GVN. They have stopped us from giving fuel directly -- the next move will be to cut off AID funds which are being used now.

I think we can take out one A-1 squadron from Thailand earlier than April -- since there will be no attack.

Kissinger: I don't want to trigger an offensive. Let's wait until April.

Schlesinger: My idea is to signal the DRV that if they behave, we will continue their withdrawals.

Kissinger: Their strategy is simple. They will attack when they think it is right. They don't understand good behavior. They understand only power. A concession is a sign of weakness. When you sell the same concession five times, you are on their level.

Schlesinger: We need to keep some B-52s in Thailand and why don't we move some units out and put some back in -- to show it is a two-way street?

I would like to see Dobrynin after the SALT delegation leaves. I will tell him we support SALT and detente but we must have equity.

Kissinger: On SALT, your figures are your program.

Schlesinger: I believe in essential equivalents.

Kissinger: If you have 4.8, you have to have subceilings or no inspection. So either they have to build 3.5 SLBM which is ridiculous, or they have more ICBM throw-weight.



Schlesinger: SLBM MIRV's are not counterforce.

Kissinger: That is my point.

Schlesinger: We must propose equivalents.

Kissinger: We are looking at a formula for reducing non-MIRV units.

Another ridiculous idea is the block approach. We are better having cheating of 50-100 than to have all the SS-11's MIRVed.

Schlesinger: I agree. I earlier proposed to cut back Trident.

Can we have only Egyptian warships transit the Canal?

Kissinger: I will talk to Sadat. Contrary to our conversation, Sadat wants to build a new Canal.

We should freeze Yamani if he comes here again. We should deal with Saqqaf.

Schlesinger: I am not afraid to have Soviet warships in the Indian Ocean. It might scare the Arabs.

Kissinger: Yes. Sadat is prepared to open the Canal at the pace we want.

Schlesinger: I like the Canal open. It gives Egypt revenues and lessens their dependence on the other Arabs.

Kissinger: What about Georges Guay in Cairo? [Discussion]
Brent, check with Guay.

Schlesinger: Let Porter finish out on the Iceland deal.

Kissinger: Yes. Brent, put in my talker about Iceland and Soviets cutting off fuel. Put the evidence in my Dobrynin talker.

Can you do a study on how we can help if Egypt breaks with the Soviet Union and what we can do in electronic warfare?

Schlesinger: We have to get the SR-71 pictures to Cairo.



Kissinger: A carrier.

Schlesinger: We will talk to Walters and Colby. Helms destroyed all his tapes and Colby is getting blamed.

Kissinger: Hold on Galley until we see if Jobert comes over here for the energy conference.



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
HAR/Schwinger

①

Texas ~~Insider~~

1 Feb 74

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



S - 10 pinch subjects

⊗ You talked to Clements about
a visit to Sanchez

K - No, No.

S - [redacted] we
shouldn't cater to them

K - [redacted] They think
they can ship oil back down & still
maintain a embargo. But I turned
Clements off.

→ Get a search off to Clements

S - we have been too busy on K markets
we should tell them left time they
get a problem w/ Iraqis, forget it.

K - The Conservative Arabs ~~that~~ have
decided they can back us around

→ Get a Cable out on Korea - help Habib
off his back on domestic problems
and get credit w/c subsidies &
not sugar.

S - Harry told Mike T, that you were
outraged about my tough comment



DECLASSIFIED w/ portions exempted

AUTHORITY appeal letter 5/3/12

BY dae NARA, DATE 7/26/12

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

on Arabs.
We slipping things & with our honor
you & overlap.
Choments wants to tell Sanchez we
inval

K - Mts, we can't be afraid of
Sancho

S - want Remsfield for Sec. War.
I would recommend Basil Clarke
or Shurz-Nape

S - ~~we are~~ Sportings, ~~the~~ Smithsonian
says we are doing about the Philippines
on Sportings.

K - I think Phils. are w/ churning those
fears.

S - Maybe you should talk to PRC

K - They having internal problems, but
they needed quickly on work.

I have to testify on JCS spy.
Lyons is pushing. Wants to know
why I was so characteristically



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

convergent about finishing out what
were taken.

S- Robinson did a summary, but he didn't
take papers - he just briefed on a
material.

You should testify after Moore - after
a recess

Don't know what kind / Bayharedt angle
is, but Bayharedt report says that
it was a 2-way spying operation
designed to bypass Laird.

R- They passed JCS documents to
us as part of official business. The
Pres criticized it - cause different
relationship than we have. We
couldn't find out what Laird was
doing.

~~It is~~ Were DD documents taken?

S- I gather so.

R- Morally different position whether
JCS steal from Pres or whether
Pres steals from JCS



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

S - It may come out that this was a HAK - ^{military} ~~military~~ conspiracy to ~~drop~~ help Ford from job to pay in Ohio. Would getting a team check.

R - I have read Young report. It is report of a failure trying to make himself important. It is sick.

S - Bayh report is not sick - it may be dirty, but not sick.


R - (disrespectful discussion w/ hand on his press conf.)

~~S - We got article on Harry Brown~~

S - Ford has big set of documents which indicate what he may show evolution of - statutory role of Sec. Def.

Documents don't show answer set it up but that he was knowledgeable.

Report indicates you were getting antithetical to which you were not entitled.



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

S - If it weren't for Chinatti, we would first say that W. Sherman was making too hard to please
How about Dugg?

K - Haven't heard.

S - How about carrier into Jackson (can)

K - Would like to have a gap about 2 or 3 weeks.

S - Very hard gap problem. We thinking of using Whiskey, brandy, brandy
in Japan

→ K - let me check on that

S - If you going to have problems on home-
posting (conclusions on), we should
know sooner than later
What about Parcels

K - Just want about going on. Either
leftists did it or E. how did it
show he was vehement against
Priggenakts.
Best NVA report & does not



(3)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



entirely to our disadvantage

S- I don't think there will be a
offensive in VN

R- ~~The~~ SV & PRC have said that but
we should still give them what
they need

S- Giving them TOW's, but they are
loaded.

R- Well, we need to use this time
to look after their defenses

S- Hill is afraid about surpluses. They
asking me if we are giving our
fuel to anyone - esp GVN. They
have stopped us from giving
fuel directly - what more will
be to cut off AID funds which
are being used now.

I think we can take out an A-7
Kahn from Thailand earlier

(6)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

through April - if not no attack.

K - I don't want to trigger an offensive - let's wait until April.

S - My idea is to signal DRV if they believe we will continue their w/ draws.

K - Their strategy is simple. They will attack when they think it right. They ~~will~~ don't understand good behavior. They understand only power. A concession is a sign of weakness. When you ask a demand concession 5 times, you are on their level.

~~For this~~
S - we need to keep some B-52's in Thailand and why don't we ~~with~~ move some units out & put some back in - to show it



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

a 2-way street.

S- I would like to see Duty of the SALT delegation done. I will bring our support. SALT + efforts but must have equity

K- On SALT, your figures are your program.

S- I believe in essential agreements

K- If you have 408, you have to have something or we ~~are~~ inspection. So when they have to give up full S.S. S.B.N. which includes, or they have since ICBM transmission

S- S.B.N-MIRV's are not counterforce

K- That is my point.

S- We must propose agreements

K- We are looking at formula for



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

advising von - M. R. V. ~~Chair~~
visit.


- N. Another so rich in ideas is the block approach. We better having quantity of 50-100 than to have all the SS-11 ~~in~~ ~~mind~~.
- S- Agree. (I ^{enjoy} proposal to not back Trident)

S- Can we brand only Egyptian warships transit Canal.

N. I talk to Sadat. Contrary to expectation - Sadat wants to build new canal + new convention.

We should freeze Y now if he comes back again. We should deal w/ Sadat

S- I not afraid to have 50 warships in Indian Ocean. might be one



Get within 1000s to 10000s of ~~the~~ ~~the~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~the~~
Middle East

ends.

K- Yes. Sadat is paying the price
and at pace we want.

S- I like Canal zone - it gives
E ~~revenue~~ revenues + lessons
difficulties on other fronts.

R- Discussion on George Amoy.


→ Check w/ Amoy.

S- Let Porter finish out on the

R- Iceland check

→ Put in my father about
the Iceland + SV cutting
off fuel. (Put evidence
in my Duty Table).

K- Can you do a study ~~on~~ how
we can help if E breaks w/ SU.
And what we can do in electronic
warfare.



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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

S - Hang get SR-71 pictures to CIA.

R - Carnice

S - we will talk to Walters / Cobby.
Helms destroyed all his tapes
& Cobby getting Hammel.

R - Hold on Cobby until we all
if Robert comes over here for
impry.

