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folder continue from the  
previous folder.**

March 11



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel  
Yigal Allon, Deputy Prime Minister and  
Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Shimon Peres, Minister of Defense  
Shimcha Dinitz, Ambassador to the United States  
Lt. General Mordechai Gur, Chief of Staff  
Avraham Kidron, Director General, Ministry  
of Foreign Affairs

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State  
and Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs

Amb. Kenneth Keating, U.S. Ambassador to  
Israel

Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for  
Political Affairs

Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary of  
State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

Harold H. Saunders, Deputy Assistant Secretary  
of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

Ambassador Robert Anderson, Special Assistant to  
the Secretary for Press Relations

Robert B. Oakley, NSC Staff


Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff *PWR*

DATE AND TIME:

Tuesday, March 11, 1975  
10:10 - 11:40 p.m.

PLACE:

Prime Minister's Office  
Jerusalem, Israel



Kissinger: I've found another country that doesn't take yes for an answer!

[Photographers are admitted briefly and then dismissed.]

We've made some progress with Turkey. They have a political system that makes yours look simple. They have a Cabinet with no one in it who has any political following. So then we had to go around to the

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

CLASSIFIED BY HENRY A. KISSINGER  
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (B) (1, 3)  
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to Det.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 State Dept Review  
NSC MEMO, 11/24/99, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES 5F 9/15/03  
BY *HR*, NARA, DATE *9/24/03*

various political groups and talk to them all.

Rabin: Do you have anything from any of the Arab countries?

Kissinger: I have nothing from the Egyptians. There is one message from Fahmy saying there is an Arab Foreign Ministers' meeting on March 24 in Cairo, and if it's at all possible to have it done by then... not as a threat.

Rabin: What's the purpose of Vinogradov's visit to Amman?


Keating: He is going to various Arab capitals.

Kissinger: I guess it's to get the Geneva Conference started. They haven't told us. There is no change in policy, but Russian communications to us have a tone which is very different. I repeat, it is not yet reflected in their actions. It's preparatory -- but it's partly our weakness.

Our Ambassador in Saudi Arabia had a conversation with Faisal, not on the subject of the negotiations, but rather a review of Saudi-U.S. relations. [Tab A, Jidda 1684]. Faisal said to him he'd had reports we were making a separate arrangement between Egypt and Israel but he knew it wasn't true because we'd heard their advice and he had confidence that we wouldn't do it.

Rabin: There seems to be an improvement in relations between Syria and Saudia.

Kissinger: I had a cable from our Ambassador in Damascus [Tab B, Damascus 9241]. It may be wrong, but if it is even 10% right... I asked him for his assessment of my talk with Asad the other day. He lists a number of things. "Yesterday we heard an alarming amount of talk about pride and dignity from a government we have generally considered one prone to weigh carefully the political and military factors inherent in so major a policy decision as resumption of hostilities." Our impression is this is a serious possibility. My associates don't agree. While you had your private conversation with Asad at the end of the meeting, I sat with Shihabi in the next room. He was very gloomy. He said Syria considers itself facing an extremely dangerous situation. Now for the first time since the October War, it is facing a practical step, other than purely military disengagement, about to be taken between Cairo and Jerusalem. He said flatly, "We cannot allow Egypt to take this step. We would even go to war to prevent it. I tried to draw him out." The rest is details. "When the Syrians start talking about right being on their side,



their obligation to fight, of their pride and honor, and the desirability of martyrdom, I think we must take seriously the thesis that they are rapidly painting themselves into a very dangerous psychological corner."

I repeat, my colleagues don't share this analysis. But while I'm in the area we should discuss what steps we might take if this proves correct.

[Tea is served]

Our Ambassador is an excellent man, a thoughtful man. His description of the mood is certainly correct. What is not necessarily correct is his conclusion this is their real strategy.

Rabin: You told me this.

Kissinger: What I hadn't considered is his thesis they may do something more imminently if there is an agreement. Faisal's attitude is more worrisome.

Rabin: Sadat has no freedom of maneuver, not to get back territory, but to give something in return?

Kissinger: This remains to be seen.

Rabin: Any more news about Russian ships to Egypt?

Kissinger: No.

Rabin: The traffic to Alexandria in the last few weeks is something to look at.

Kissinger: Do you have the figures? [to Saunders]: Will you check with Colby?

Saunders: I will.

Kissinger: I'm interested. Vinogradov simply showed up in Jordan?

Rabin: He's on a tour.

Kissinger: When was it announced?



Atherton: It was on the news.

Kissinger: He made a tour without prior notification with us, let alone discussion? I'm not worried about Vinogradov, who's a fool. But it is an interesting phenomenon that they're not pressing us on a meeting with Gromyko.

Rabin: He was announced as head of the Soviet delegation to the Geneva Peace Conference.

Kissinger: It is one thing for them to have official visits -- they don't owe us anything. But their permanent representative to Geneva, which is supposed to be a joint effort, coupled with other things, is worrisome. Also, Gromyko's sort of indifference...

Rabin: What we discussed yesterday is that we will prepare something which is a little bit of elaboration of the seven points which I mentioned the other evening. I showed to my colleagues something you showed to me yesterday morning [Fahmy paper, Tab C]. I can't say it caused a certain encouragement. Therefore we decided, since we are in a process of a beginning of talking business to do this. I can read it, or you can read it. [He hands over Tab D to the Secretary]. The best way is to transmit it in general terms, not to pass any paper in writing.

Kissinger: I agree. I won't hand over anything. [He reads it.] "The agreement will be bi-lateral between Egypt and Israel. It is not linked to an agreement with other Arab countries ... Neither are there any prior conditions attached..."

"The proposed agreement is not the final settlement between Egypt and Israel, but further settlements are not an element or an implied condition to the execution or continued validity of this agreement until superseded by a new agreement."

Rabin: It is valid as long as it is not superseded by other agreements, or violated.

Kissinger: Can I give a reaction now? These are ideas, not necessarily things you want in an agreement. Because the first point is something the U.S. side has no problem with, but the best thing may not be to say anything in the agreement. You can explain anything to your Parliament. If there is no reference to any Arab country in the agreement, that should be enough. Although there can be an understanding between us.



The second point -- the element of non-finality can be in the agreement, together with a statement that it is a political step towards peace.

Rabin: The point is that it's interim, but regardless, it's valid in all its components unless it is superseded by another agreement.

Kissinger: Fine. It can be discussed. The exclusivity part -- "further agreements are not a condition..." -- may not be a good idea, but the other part can be in the agreement.

Let me just go through it here.

"Progress towards peace...."

[The Secretary continues reading it through to himself.]

Rabin: Number (a) [of Point 2, "Progress towards peace"] can be put in the context of how it's done in Jordan. Open boundaries. Arabs will live in areas that were once Egypt. This is how it is understood. It goes far beyond it. Ships used to go as far as Abn Zanimah.

Peres: Still students go.

Rabin: This can be done.

Kissinger: You want all this in the agreement?

Rabin: Yes. But secret or open -- that's a different thing.

Kissinger: I'll discuss it with Sadat, preferably in the absence of Fahmy, and I'll tell him "these are points to which Israel attaches importance and what do you have to say about it?" My personal belief, except for point (a) and probably (b), they are probably achievable, and possibly elements of (a).

Peres: The Egyptians approached us for permission to send food to the Bedouins in Sinai.

Kissinger: He asked us to raise it.

Peres: This could lead to practical arrangements on the ground. Food, students. They asked for dresses for the priests of the Coptic Church.





Rabin: The Red Crescent.

Peres: Visits of relatives from Gaza, by the way -- they are as interested in it as we are, maybe more. It carries with it some meaning, some winds of change.

Kissinger: I've not seen anything yet here that isn't something that Israel has the right to discuss. Nothing here would lead to an explosion -- particularly if I can use them as impressions.

I want to discuss it with my colleagues.

[Point 3:] Non-use of force. The second paragraph of this will be impossible. Renunciation of belligerency is also impossible.

"The agreement will be made public." It may be also impossible, but not inconceivable.

"A formal guarantee ...."

The first sentence [on non-use of force] is concurred with. The last sentence of the first paragraph may be, I don't know. At any rate, it's reasonable.

Rabin: Try your best then.

Kissinger: All right.

Rabin: From our point of view, this is our basic problem.

Allon: This is the basic problem.

Kissinger: There should be no illusion -- he's as firmly committed not to renounce belligerency as you are to ask him to do it. Because to him, it's equivalent to making peace.

Allon: If his lawyers, or third party lawyers he trusts, could determine that the termination of belligerency is not peace, would he accept?

Kissinger: He has two problems -- one is it's legal meaning, the second is how it's perceived in the Arab world. I have had personal experience of what he's up against. The Syrians, who have been told nothing, see it as a political agreement. Shihabi said: "For the first time, it's a step



beyond a purely military agreement, between Cairo and Jerusalem." That is how it's perceived.

Rabin: Mr. Secretary, you will have some trips.

Kissinger: Yes.

[He resumes reading from the Israeli paper at Tab D. Point 4: Arrangements on the Ground:]

"The area evacuated by Israel will be ... a buffer zone between the forces." It should be possible. But after seeing Gamasy, you shouldn't close your mind to letting him extend his zone through the UN zone. What is it? Eight kilometers? We don't have to decide now. It doesn't change the topography, does it?

"A defined area of limited armaments..." It will be a problem but it hasn't been challenged yet.

[Resumes reading:] Point (e) will be rejected.

[Point (f)], aerial reconnaissance -- where, in the buffer zone?

Gur: We should have mixed patrols, on the ground and in the air.

Rabin: Mixed crews in the air? [Laughter]

Gur: You could have mixed crews.

Kissinger: Incidentally, he told me their pilots have to be much better than yours, because they get no electronic equipment from the Soviets. He said they're trying to purchase electronic equipment from France to put on Russian planes but have not solved the problem.

Rabin: What the Chief of Staff prefers is, if the buffer zone is wide, then our capability, if it is limited to the outer limit, is limited in what we have to cover, to know the preparations. Therefore, there has to be a pattern on the ground, and perhaps some pattern of coverage in the buffer zone, with prior notice, and so on.

Gur: Today you do it. If it is made wider, why you? Both sides can do it.



Kissinger: I'm assuming you're saying U.S. reconnaissance is suitable only for small zones. [Laughter]

Rabin: We get your photos in days; here we work in a matter of hours. You're not at our disposal.

Kissinger: Both sides may want us to do it, to check on it.

Rabin: In addition.

Kissinger: It is not unreasonable, though it may not be accepted.

Rabin: Anything we propose is reasonable....

Kissinger: Surprisingly, yes. [He resumes reading with Point 5, on duration:]

Point (b) [no demands for an agreed period] -- impossible.

Every Minister gets one point? [Laughter]

"The mandate of the supervisory organ" -- impossible.

"An agreed timetable." Manageable. Staging....

Rabin: That's the waiting period. You proposed it: six to nine months.

Kissinger: Of no withdrawal?

Rabin: Thinning-out, but no withdrawal.

Kissinger: I may have said the complete implementation might extend six to nine months, but not that nothing would happen. Out of the question. If the oil goes quickly, maybe the passes could go later. It could be worked out. But for nothing at all to happen -- that I don't think should even be proposed by me. Some things are arguable, but other things shouldn't be proposed.

His interest is to go relatively quickly, but for that he needs something of tangible significance. If he has to wait six to nine months before he can show anything, it will be seen as total insensitivity.



Peres: There is an Arab expression -- mukharm -- changing apartments. To move to a new line, we need time to prepare a new line.

Kissinger: This is the first point I've reached that I would really ask you to reconsider. If you ask me to make it, I'll do it.

Rabin: We'd like you to make it and explain it on the basis of military preparations.

Kissinger: It will have an unfortunate impact.

Rabin: If there is some industrial development in the area, you can have mixed groups there in three months, for the purposes of changing hands, without changing the military line.

Kissinger: I understand your point.

Rabin: I'm not saying we'll agree to that, but if we agree, turning over for certain purposes can be separated from changing the military line.

Kissinger: That's a helpful explanation. And I understand there is no Cabinet decision.

Rabin: Yes, it is still 30-50 kilometers.

[Point 6] "Relation to Geneva."

Kissinger: Let me handle this with him. I know what you want.

Rabin: There is no purpose to go to an agreement if in one month, five months, we're in Geneva and he takes a practical decision that means violation or getting rid of the whole agreement.

Kissinger: What are you thinking of concretely?

Rabin: Say, an argument about Palestinian participation.

Kissinger: That's no excuse for violating.

Rabin: Second, the Syrians; third, a final settlement. They can create a stalemate about the final boundaries and the agreement doesn't stand.



Kissinger: There are two problems: Is a stalemate at Geneva an excuse to bar implementation of the agreement? The answer should be no. The second question is: Should there be a coordinated strategy that he can't make demands? He'll make his demands.

Allon: In fact, he can't break the agreement for any other reason, either, if we don't break it.

Rabin: But Geneva is a special case.

Kissinger: He already accepted point 6, so you added a 6(b). I think I understand what you're after. I'll see what I can elicit and I'll report. Let me understand: You don't have in mind a joint strategy at Geneva; each side can take what position it wants. You want to prevent what happens at Geneva from being an excuse to break this.

Rabin: Yes.

Dinitz: Coordinated strategy -- that's for you and us to discuss.

Kissinger: For you and us, not for Egypt and you.

Rabin: It's not a precondition.

Kissinger: Amazingly conciliatory!


Rabin: And [Point 7], the lines, you know what we discussed.

As in the past, there are certain issues to be discussed on a bilateral level between the U.S. and Israel. We have not entered it, except on points on which agreement is to be reached between Egypt and Israel.

If there is another meeting tomorrow, there will be expectations. We reported to the Cabinet that there were slight moves, practically no change, so no need to make new positions. There was a question: "Why do you need to have a meeting tonight? The Americans know your position."

Peres: We told them that nonbelligerency was discussed between the U.S. and Israel.

Kissinger: I have the opposite problem. I was already accused by Fahmy of stalling. If I go to Aswan tomorrow afternoon, what am I doing here in the morning?



Allon: Can't we say we didn't finish tonight because it got too late?

Rabin: Yigal, we've met at 11:00. [To the Secretary:] Can you reschedule to leave at 10:00? Because it will raise expectations.

Peres: We can somehow manage it.

[They confer in Hebrew]

Kissinger: I personally think my life would not be incomplete without another meeting. We'll see enough of each other. But we should understand what's going to happen. I think there would be some substantive merit if I can get the views of my colleagues, think about it, and I'll tell you what I'm going to say. At some point this has to be brought in range of a concrete negotiation; I can't spend too much time here.

Peres: This paper doesn't exist.

Kissinger: Of course. I consider this a talking paper. But I can't go around with both sides waiting for a miracle to happen -- which I'm afraid may be the frame of mind of both sides.

Allon: Let's sit again for a half hour, and meet again in the late morning. I don't want you to leave for Aswan before you hear our reaction to your judgment.

Kissinger: I agree. It would be a mistake to change the time I gave the Egyptians because whichever way I change it they'll attach significance to it. If we leave early, Fahmy already thinks it's worked out.


Rabin: Can we also consider a schedule for the next move?

Kissinger: I don't know what frame of mind Sadat is in. At some point I expect him to give me some sort of ultimatum -- some very sharp reaction. I expect it. But if it works normally, if it is like the last disengagement agreement....

Rabin: This is more complicated.

Kissinger: I know. I should then be back by Thursday night. Because he doesn't consult with that many people.

Allon: He already had a meeting.



Rabin: You have seen news reports that are very discouraging.

Allon: He went back to the old slogans -- Palestinians, refugees -- just like before the October war.

Rabin: "We'll never change the Egyptian position."

Kissinger: He's obviously elaborating the distinction between a peace settlement and some other agreement. He's assured old Faisal, who doesn't have the most precise mind, that there won't be a separate peace agreement. To Faisal a peace agreement, an agreement and disengagement, all run together.

Peres: A peace agreement and nonbelligerency are not just different-color paper. Peace means an exchange of Ambassadors, etc. What we're talking about is non-use of force.

Allon: But Sadat concludes with an optimistic tone.

Kissinger: It's my impression he's preparing the ground for a separate agreement in his complex way. Face the fact he has an enormous problem. Now Vinogradov is traveling around.

Rabin: Everybody has massive problems.

Kissinger: But the fact that you have doesn't make his problems less.

Rabin: He has 39 million people.

Kissinger: I'll point that out to him.

Allon: Thursday night you will be back?

Kissinger: If it proceeds normally, yes. If he calls in his advisers, no.

Allon: Then?

Kissinger: I would try to get back Friday night.

Rabin: That's a problem. Because it is better not to have a special Cabinet meeting -- it would create expectations.

Kissinger: But we've got to speed up this leisurely pace. I can't spend all my time in the Middle East, and it's actively dangerous. Once the Syrians see it's a negotiation, we've got a problem.



Allon: Stay over the weekend there.

Kissinger: There is nothing to do there for me between Wednesday and the weekend.

Dinitz: If you come here Thursday night.

Kissinger: I can use Saturday to see my friends in Syria and Amman.

Allon: And Sunday there is a meeting of the regular Cabinet.

Rabin: But you have to come here Thursday night or Friday morning, and come back Sunday morning.

Kissinger: Now, am I to assume the idea of a letter was rejected?

Rabin: It is not rejected. Frankly, we have a draft. I thought it advisable if you consider it tomorrow.

Sisco: That's another reason for a meeting tomorrow.

Rabin: But no one knows it.

Sisco: No one has to know about it. They're all non-papers.

[Rabin hands Secretary Kissinger the draft letter at Tab E.  
The Secretary reads it.]

Kissinger: I know I drive you to fury by agreeing with you. It's got a good tone.

Rabin: General Harkabi said it would be a mistake to offer a meeting in the first letter. It would be seen as an insult.

Kissinger: He's right.

Rabin: He said it would be good to talk about Providence -- the idea that both are equally guilty.

Kissinger: I think it's a good letter. Really. If I can show it to my colleagues -- for a word here and there. But it's the tone I was looking for and it will ease this discussion here. It will either help me, or if the negotiations fail, it will help you.





Rabin: We considered it, too.

Kissinger: You know what would help me? If your Chief of Staff would give us a ten-minute briefing on the Syrian deployments and the situation. As he did on the Egyptian side. And run through once again the Egyptian deployment. Because if the context is right, I might raise it again.

Rabin: It might take more than ten minutes.

Kissinger: So, we shall meet at 10:00?

Rabin: You need to fill the time.

Kissinger: No, we need a meeting for the Egyptians and we need a meeting for ourselves.

I must say the way you're conducting yourselves internally is... you're not playing around. But it would be helpful when I'm there if we understand each other. So I'm reflecting your real views. And we have to discuss how it's going to move once we're through this exploratory phase.

Rabin: So, 10:00?

Kissinger: Yes.

Rabin: We'll do it here.

[A press report is brought in and given to him]

According to a special MENA report, 1625 hours Cairo: Sadat met 9 March with War Minister and Commander-in-Chief Gamasy, and with Commander of the Air Force General Mubarak who returned from Iran two days ago. "Sadat met also on the 9th with the editor of Al Ahram..." -- that has nothing to do with it. This isn't the paper.

Kissinger: I've not heard from Sadat. I have had a number of grumblings from Fahmy which could mean any number of things -- including that he's excluded from the meetings.

Rabin: [reading from another report:] Pravda attacks me and you. "The Western press tries to create a mood of restrained optimism. The Arab peoples..."



Kissinger: [to Sisco] I'd like Sonnenfeldt and Hyland to do an analysis of the series of Soviet moves -- the SALT [CSCE] reply, Vinogradov.

Allon: What shall we say to the press?

Kissinger: That I gave a full report on my meetings in Ankara. [Laughter]

We continued the discussions.

Allon: Which is true.

Kissinger: And I said this is a long negotiation and we can't account for every day, and I'd like to add that we've encountered no unanticipated problems between us.

Rabin: And we will meet tomorrow.

Kissinger: And we will meet tomorrow. We continued our review of the elements. Why don't you say it? And I don't need to say anything.

We meet tomorrow at 10:00?

Rabin: Yes.

Allon: We should discuss the letter first, so we can get it typed.

Kissinger: I don't think I'll have any problem with it. I didn't want to tell you before!

I frankly don't have any idea how to get it from here to there. Seriously, There is not inconsiderable danger that Sadat might at some point just decide to go the other way....

Rabin: We're aware of this.

Kissinger: ... during the course of this agreement. This is a delicate situation. In both prior negotiations we just had to put together terms that were reasonable. Here there are so many intangibles. I have never been so uneasy about the Soviet Union since I've been in Washington in 1969. I have an uneasy feeling. To send Vinogradov around, their permanent representative to Geneva, without informing us. Which we never do. And the tone of communications on totally unrelated subjects shows great disrespect. Which is unrelated to you.



Allon: You could send Bunker around. [Laughter]

Kissinger: If this thing begins to move, we should consider the possibility raised by our Ambassador in Syria. We should consider what if the agreement on the Egyptian side is followed immediately after by resumption of hostilities on the Syrian side. We should at least discuss it.

So, 10:00?

Allon: On this happy note!

[The group got up from the table.]

Kissinger: Let me express a concern I have. You gentlemen will probably be consulting yourselves before we meet tomorrow.

The letter is fine; the points I think are manageable. But I'm afraid if Sadat concludes we're playing with him -- we've been doing this since August; he can't afford to enter a negotiation he thinks will fail -- he'll move ruthlessly to try to get on the right side again. We have to show soon that it's going somewhere. I won't show him this paper -- that's clear. But we have to discuss how I can present these points in a way that makes movement possible.

Rabin: Even though there is no Cabinet decision....

Kissinger: I know.

Rabin: You can say we are interested in a big agreement, and by a big agreement I mean that therefore there are risks for Israel and we are interested in something in return.

Kissinger: You've made that clear.

Rabin: With all frankness, I'm not saying an agreement is attainable. With all the pressures and risks, it will be difficult.

Kissinger: That's a general statement; we need to get from the realm of philosophy to some practical steps.

Maybe you gentlemen will consult before we meet.

[The conversation ended and the Secretary departed.]



Akins delivered the President's message to King Faisal. A report broken down by subject is attached.

12

(A)

# NODIS

# SECRET

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FOLLOWING REPEAT JIDDA 1684 ACTION SECSTATE 09 MAR 75

QTE

~~SECRET~~ JIDDA 1684

NODIS

E.O.: 11652: GDS  
 TAGS:  
 SUBJ: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT FOR KING FAISAL

REF : A. STATE 48765; B. JIDDA 1481; C. JIDDA 1469; D. JIDDA 1590

1. I DELIVERED THE PRESIDENT'S ORAL MESSAGE PERSONALLY TO KING FAISAL LATE YESTERDAY (MARCH 8) EVENING. HE WAS LIVELY AND WE DISCUSSED EVERY PARAGRAPH.

2. ECONOMIC AID TO ISRAEL:

THE KING WAS GRATIFIED TO LEARN THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS NOT PROPOSING NEW OR INCREASED ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL. HE ASKED WHY THE STORY THAT AID HAD BEEN DOUBLED BY THE NEW REQUESTS WAS ALLOW TO STAND. HE SAID HE HAD HEARD THIS ON BOTH BBC AND THE VOICE OF AMERICA. IT WOULD SERVE AMERICA'S INTEREST TO HAVE IT CORRECTED. HE ALSO ASKED WHY AID WAS BEING GIVEN TO ISREAL EVEN IF CONGRESS HAD APPROPRIATED IT; HE ASKED IF THE AID COULD NOT BE WITHHELD UNTIL ISRAEL PROVED MORE FLEXIBLE? (I TOLD HIM I THOUGHT MOST HAD ALREADY BEEN DISBURSED.) HE REPEATED HIS STATEMENTS THAT UNITED STATES SHOULD DEVOTE ITS MONEY TO ITS OWN POOR AND THAT EVERY DOLLAR GIVEN TO ISREAL MAKES IT MORE INTERANSIGENT.

3. SEPARATE EGYPTIAN PEACE OR PEACE ARRANGEMENTS WITH ISRAEL:

# SECRET

HR 9/24/03



NOV 15

HE WAS PLEASED TO HEAR OUR REASSURANCES THAT WE WERE NOT FOLLOWING A POLICY OF DIVIDING THE ARAB NATIONS. HE HAD HEARD REPORTS THAT EGYPT WAS ABOUT TO CONCLUDE ITS SPECIAL ARRANGEMENT WITH ISRAEL AND THAT SYRIA WOULD THEN HAVE TO FOLLOW SOMETIME LATER. THIS, OF COURSE, WAS QUITE UNTRUE. HE HAD DISCUSSED THE MATTER BOTH WITH PRESIDENTS ASAD AND SADAT AND THEY HAD AGREED, AS HE HAD TOLD SECRETARY KISSINGER TWO WEEKS AGO, THAT THERE COULD BE NO SEPARATE PEACE MOVEMENTS ON TWO FRONTS; THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS COULD BE HELD SEPARATELY OR CONCURRENTLY, BUT ACTUAL MOVEMENT WOULD NOT TAKE PLACE IN SINAI UNTIL ISRAELIS WERE READY TO WITHDRAW ON GOLAN.

4. U.S. PEACE EFFORTS IN GENERAL:

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~~SECRET~~



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Murphy's assessment of your meeting with Asad.

(B)

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FOLLOWING REPEAT JIDDA 1684 ACTION SECSTATE 09 MAR 75

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~~S E C R E T~~ JIDDA 1684

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E.O.: 11652: GDS  
 TAGS:  
 SUBJ: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT FOR KING FAISAL

REF: A. STATE 48765; B. JIDDA 1481; C. JIDDA 1469; D. JIDDA 1598

1. I DELIVERED THE PRESIDENT'S ORAL MESSAGE PERSONALLY TO KING FAISAL LATE YESTERDAY (MARCH 8) EVENING. HE WAS LIVELY AND WE DISCUSSED EVERY PARAGRAPH.

2. ECONOMIC AID TO ISRAEL:

THE KING WAS GRATIFIED TO LEARN THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS NOT PROPOSING NEW OR INCREASED ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL. HE ASKED WHY THE STORY THAT AID HAD BEEN DOUBLED BY THE NEW REQUESTS WAS ALLOW TO STAND. HE SAID HE HAD HEARD THISON BOTH BBC AND THE VOICE OF AMERICA. IT WOULD SERVE AMERICA'S INTEREST TO HAVE IT CORRECTED. HE ALSO ASKED WHY AID WAS BEING GIVEN TO ISREAL EVEN IF CONGRESS HAD APPROPRIATED IT; HE ASKED IF THE AID COULD NOT BE WITHHELD UNTIL ISRAEL PROVED MORE FLEXIBLE? (I TOLD HIM I THOUGHT MOST HAD ALREADY BEEN DISBURSED.) HE REPEATED HIS STATEMENTS THAT UNITED STATES SHOULD DEVOTE ITS MONEY TO ITS OWN POOR AND THAT EVERY DOLLAR GIVEN TO ISREAL MAKES IT MORE INTERANSIGENT.

3. SEPARATE EGYPTIAN PEACE OR PEACE ARRANGEMENTS WITH ISRAEL:

# SECRET

HR 9/24/03



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~~SECRET~~

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Fahmy paper  
given by HK to Robin


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(C) 1D

SALIENT POINTS RELATED TO A SECOND DISENGAGEMENT  
AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL

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- 1- The agreement should include total withdrawal of Israeli forces to the east of the passes and from all the oilfields including the town of El Tor.
  
- 2- The Israeli withdrawal will be implemented in such a manner as to indicate the willingness of the Israelis to demonstrate their desire for peace namely that no roads nor installations or equipment of the oilfields be destroyed or transferred from their present location either to Israel or the remaining occupied part of Sinai.
  
- 3- The United Nations Zone will be subject of agreement.
  
- 4- The thinning of forces and their strength will be the subject of mutual agreement.
  
- 5- The agreement should have as an annex a fixed time-table indicating the various phases of the implementation of the agreement bearing in mind that the full implementation should




be terminated within two months of the signature of the agreement and that Egypt receives all oilfields within two weeks of the signing.

6- Egypt, on its part, is willing to accept a formula by which the mandate of UNEF will be extended annually as long as this agreement is valid and efforts towards a just and peaceful settlement continue.

7- Egypt and Israel are ready to reactivate the Egyptian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Agreement and they agree that the Mixed Armistice Commission resume its work to consider alleged violations by the parties to the present disengagement agreement.

8- Should Israel give a formal guarantee or assurance in writing to the United States that it will not undertake military or paramilitary operations against Syria and Egypt, during the duration of this agreement. Egypt on its part is ready to give to the United States Government a similar guarantee or assurance that it will not initiate military or paramilitary operations against Israel. However, should Israel attack Syria, Egypt will not be bound by this



agreement but will fulfill its obligation towards Syria. In addition, Egypt if attacked by Israel will exercise its right of self-defence under article 51 of the UN Charter.

9- Moreover, Egypt is prepared to go to Geneva to discuss with the parties concerned the conditions for a final, just and durable peaceful solution provided that the Palestinian representatives be invited to take part in the discussions at the proper time.

10- Egypt would respect its commitment so far as the passage of Israeli cargo through the Suez Canal is concerned.

11- Furthermore, and as a demonstration of its continuing efforts towards a peaceful settlement, Egypt would continue the process of the reconstruction of the Suez Canal area and would open the Suez Canal upon the final implementation of the present Disengagement Agreement.

12- Egypt would be prepared to consider lifting restrictions on some American firms - and that on a selective basis - so that they could resume their activities in Egypt. This commitment would be given in the form of an oral understanding between Egypt and the United States Government.



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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

From Rabin  
3/11/75

(D)<sup>14</sup>

PROPOSED MAIN ELEMENTS OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL

(1) Agreement to stand on its own two feet

- (1) The agreement will be bi-lateral between Egypt and Israel. It is not linked to an agreement with other Arab countries and does not create a pattern for other discussions or settlements. Neither are there any prior conditions attached to its acceptance.

The proposed agreement is not the final settlement between Egypt and Israel, but further settlements are not an element or an implied condition to the execution and continued validity of this agreement until superseded by a new agreement.


(2) Progress towards peace

The approach to peace and the further development of elements of peaceful relations, will find its expression in suitable formulation and in concrete and practical arrangements.

It is proposed that the agreement refer to its declared aim of the furtherance of peace between the parties and to its being a significant step towards the establishment of a just and lasting peace between Egypt and Israel.

Furthermore, the concrete arrangements based on the agreement which will express and reflect this progress towards peace will, inter alia, be as follows :

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5  
STATE DEPT. LIAISON OFFICE  
BY WJR DATE 9/24/03



- (a) Open bridges for tourists, family visits, goods etc.
- (b) Non-restriction on ships, planes or travellers because of call or visit to the territory of the other party.
- (c) Abstention from hostile propaganda.
- (d) Suspension of economic warfare and boycott practices.
- (e) Cessation of anti-Israel diplomatic pressures in third countries and international bodies.
- (f) Freedom of navigation on high seas, straits and waterways and freedom of flight over them.
- (g) Right of passage through the Canal.
- (h) Establishment of Joint Committees with supervision teams to oversee execution of agreement.

(3) Non-use of force

The agreement will express the resolve of the parties to refrain from any further threat or use of force against each other and the decision to settle all disputes between themselves by negotiations and other peaceful means. The document will contain the undertaking of the renunciation of belligerency, clearly and in its appropriate legal wording. The agreement will be made public.

Both parties will add a formal guarantee that they will not participate, directly or indirectly, in any hostilities between the other party and any other state or forces or provide assistance of any kind to states or forces involved in such hostilities.

(4) Arrangements on the ground

- (a) The area evacuated by Israel will be established as a buffer zone between the forces.
- (b) A defined area of limited armaments and forces east of the new line will be established.
- (c) The present area of limited armaments and forces west of Line A, established by the agreement of January 1974, remains unchanged.





- (d) Supervision will be carried out by the UN and by the Joint Committees and Supervision teams established (see 2(h)).
- (e) Alert systems of each party in the vacated zone to prevent surprise attack is proposed.
- (f) There will be aerial reconnaissance missions by aircraft of both sides.
- (g) The arrangements will be contained in a Protocol attached to the agreement.

(5) Duration

- (a) The agreement will be in force until superseded by a new agreement; no time-limit to the present agreement will be set.
- (b) Egypt will give an undertaking via the USG that it will not demand a new agreement or a further withdrawal for an agreed period.
- (c) The mandate of the supervisory organ will be for an indefinite period.
- (d) There will be an agreed timetable for the implementation of the agreement. Stage one will be a preparatory one.

(6) Relation to Geneva

The agreement should find its expression in the position of the parties, if and when the Geneva Conference is renewed. The intention of the parties expressed in the agreement, generally and in its detailed provisions, has to find its continued effect in the approaches and attitudes taken in Geneva, in a way to be agreed upon.

(7) Lines

The question of the lines will be developed subsequently , after the consideration and discussion of the six points mentioned above and on their basis.

11.3.75



DRAFT

From Rabin  
3/11/75

14  
(E)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 11, 1975

Your Excellency,

As I address this letter to you I am fully aware of the extraordinary nature of the act. However, the fact that I can entrust it to our mutual friend, Dr. Henry Kissinger, ensures its confidentiality.

The long conflict between our two countries has brought much suffering to our peoples. Both our nations have been victim of tragic historical circumstances and I now express the sincere hope that Providence will extricate us from the vortex of warfare and enmity.

It has always been my firm conviction that Egypt, by virtue of its cultural heritage, its strength, its size and its influence, carries a leading voice with respect to the peace-making effort in our region. From what Dr. Kissinger has conveyed to me, as well as from your public statements, I feel assured that you are determined to make strenuous efforts to exhaust the prospect of a settlement.


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STATE DEPT. RECORDS  
BY HR DATE 9/24/03



I, on my part, am determined to make all efforts to promote peace between us, and it is in this spirit that I express the aspiration that we shall yet succeed in reaching an agreement that will do honor to our two peoples. Please know that, though I am on the other side, I am endeavoring to understand your problems and to see things from your perspective. I know that no agreement is possible without difficult decisions but I am ready to grapple with them for the sake of the cause of peace between our countries.

With this in mind, permit me, Mr. President, to bring to your attention a concern which we in Israel consider of crucial importance.

The step-by-step approach, as I understand it is intended to bring our countries closer to peace. Hence, my people have to know that through the process of withdrawal to a new agreed line we have reached a turning point and that the danger of war between our two countries is over. As Prime Minister, I must be able to convince both people and Government in Israel that in surrendering physical strategic positions we shall not be exposing ourselves to increased hardships created by lengthier and inferior lines. This can be possible only if it is visibly shown that the act of withdrawal marks the real beginning of progress towards peace by deeds and words that demonstrate the intention of peace.



These, Mr. President, are some thoughts I thought worthy of bringing to your attention. They, together with the suggestions and ideas I have asked Dr. Kissinger to convey have the single purpose of contributing to an understanding of our respective problems. You will, no doubt, want to react and comment on the proposals received through Dr. Kissinger. This will enable the negotiations to develop further.

I conclude with the hope that we shall be able to advance understanding on the important matters that engage our two Governments.

With expressions of highest esteem.



Report to the  
President

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATIONSECRET/SENSITIVE

March 11, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS**DRY*

Secretary Kissinger asked that I pass you the following report of the second round of talks he has had with Prime Minister Rabin and his Cabinet colleagues.

"I have just completed another round of talks with Prime Minister Rabin and his Cabinet colleagues. I can report no decisive change in the Israeli position, because Rabin at this point does not want to put decisions to the Cabinet because he is not confident of their reaction. Rabin himself seems flexible. They have, however, given me some ideas to take back to Sadat -- enough to keep the negotiations going. Rabin has a delicate domestic situation, and he is trying to handle it in such a way that when he recommends Israeli withdrawal from passes and the oil fields, he will have enough from Sadat in return to get the agreement through the Cabinet and the Parliament.

"My strategy will be to try to present the Israeli ideas to Sadat in the most positive way and then to return to Israel to see whether we can begin to reflect some of the key points in a document which I then would try out on Sadat in the next round.

"As our discussions become more specific, it is becoming clear that the two most difficult issues that will have to be reconciled in an Israeli-Egyptian agreement are:

"(A) Israeli insistence that Sadat commit himself publicly in some way that he will never again resort to military action against Israel, which Sadat says he cannot do so long as Israel remains in occupation of Egyptian territory, and


"(B) Israel's desire for an interim agreement to specify a longer duration than Sadat considers politically possible. In addition, the Israeli-Egyptian negotiating process is taking place against a background of uncertainty as to what Asad of Syria may try to do to prevent Sadat from concluding a separate agreement plus King Faisal's support for simultaneous Egyptian and Syrian agreements.

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NCC MEMO, 11/24/99, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY *BSR* , NARA DATE *9/24/03*

"We had a military briefing this morning which shows that the Egyptian dispositions are such that they could launch a limited military operation aimed at the passes if a decision were taken. General Ghur, the Israeli Chief of Staff, also gave us a military evaluation of the Syrian capacity, and it is clear that the Israelis feel that the situation there potentially is more dangerous and that the most likely alternative they would face in circumstances of an unsuccessful negotiation would be a war of attrition designed to bleed Israel for an extended period.

"I also plan on making stops in Damascus and Jordan sometime this coming weekend, largely to try to keep everybody calm."





March 12



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~~SECRET/NODIS~~

MEETING WITH ISRAELIS - 10:00 AM - WEDNESDAY - MARCH 12, 1975

SUGGESTED POINTS TO MAKE IN COMMENTING

ON ISRAELI LETTER AND PAPER

1. Letter to Sadat

-- Confirm first impression - it is excellent.

-- One suggestion for Israelis to consider -- expand first sentence of third paragraph on page 2 to read: "The step-by-step approach, as I understand it is intended to bring our countries closer to peace and, in so doing, provide leadership and momentum toward peace for our region as a whole - (underlined language added).

-- This addition would reinforce the earlier point about Egypt's leadership role and avoid the possible interpretation that Israel is not interested in peace with its other neighbors.

2. Paper on Main Elements of an Agreement


It is important, in order to avoid future misunderstandings, to establish with the Israelis (a) that their paper still represents Rabin's original view that this is what they want the agreement to accomplish and not language or points that need necessarily be explicitly incorporated in the agreement, and (b) what points you feel it would be a mistake to present to Sadat. With this in mind, you might comment as follows:

Point (1) - Agreement to stand on its own feet:

-- You agree with the concept expressed here, which would be accomplished if the agreement were silent on the questions of (a) linkage to agreements with other countries, and (b) conditions for further settlements with Egypt. Sadat has not pressed either point, and any attempt to inject them explicitly into the negotiation could create issues where none may exist. You will work on Sadat as necessary to try and keep any linkage or conditionality out of the agreement.

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STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY HR, NARA, DATE 9/24/03



Point (2) - Progress toward peace:

-- As you said last night, all of these specific points may not be attainable to the extent and in the form suggested in the Israeli paper, but you will make a serious effort to sell them to the maximum extent possible.

-- You shall seek additional clarification of just what sort of actions Israel has in mind and whether they will be satisfied with limited or symbolic measures.

Point (3) - Non-use of force:

-- You understand that this is a crucial point for Israel.

-- You think some commitment on the non-use of force is attainable, but not in the absolute and formal sense of the language in the Israeli paper - e.g., renunciation of belligerency in legal wording incorporated in a published agreement between Israel and Egypt.

-- If you presented Israel's position in these terms, you would risk a serious reversal in the favorable evolution you have achieved in Sadat's thinking.

-- You can try to probe for Israeli flexibility in wording or using a reinforcing Egyptian-U.S. agreement in addition to the Egypt-Israel agreement.

-- You will see what you can get from Sadat, without committing Israel, and report the results for Israel's consideration.

Point (4) - Arrangements on the ground:

-- You will try these ideas out on Sadat, but knowing what you do of Sadat's problems with his military, you urge Israel to be considering whether it would really cause any serious problem if Egypt extended its forward line to the eastern edge of the present UN zone; or, alternatively, a very limited and agreed number of unarmed Egyptian military personnel were to be allowed in the buffer zone for symbolic purposes.



Point (5) - Duration:

-- You think an open-ended agreement is possible, and you will try out the idea of specifying that it will remain in effect until superseded by a new agreement.

-- You strongly urge that Israel be prepared to drop the idea of an agreed period before Egypt seeks a new agreement, and of an indefinite mandate for UNEF. Even if Sadat were to accept the latter, it would need to get Security Council approval. At most, you will put them to Sadat as alternatives to the idea of the agreement remaining in force until superseded by a new agreement. If Sadat accepts one, the other is superfluous.

Point (6) - Relation to Geneva:

-- As you explained last night, you understand Israel's objective -- that a stalemate at Geneva not be used as grounds for breaking the agreement -- and you will discuss this seriously with Sadat. Also, if Sadat accepts the idea of the agreement remaining in force until superseded by a new agreement, the Israeli concern over Geneva has already been met.

\* \* \* \* \*

There are two additional points it would be useful to raise:

(1) If you could take with you to Aswan today Israeli agreement to let the Red Crescent provide relief to the Sinai flood victims, it would have a helpful psychological impact and give you an additional argument to use in seeking Egyptian agreement to the Israeli body search (which would in turn have a positive psychological impact in Israel).

(2) With Rabin privately, you might ask whether it would be useful to arrange another "seminar" with key Cabinet members, like the lunch at Rabin's residence on your last trip, at a time that would be most helpful to Rabin in dealing with the problem of selling changes in the present Cabinet-approved position to his Government.





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