



S E C R E T // N O F O R N // 20330103

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09360



JTF-GTMO-CDR

3 January 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue,
Miami, FL 33172

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Transfer Out of DoD Control (TRO) for Guantanamo
Detainee, ISN US9YM-000224DP (S)

JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

1. (S) Personal Information:

- JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Abd al-Rahman Abdullah Ali Muhammad
- Current/True Name and Aliases: Abdul Rahaman Atah Allah Ali Mahmood Shubatti, Al-Mundhir al-Saani, Munzir al-Sanani
- Place of Birth: Sanaa, Yemen (YM)
- Date of Birth: 1982
- Citizenship: Yemen
- Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9YM-000224DP



2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in overall good health.

3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment:

a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Transfer Out of DoD Control (TRO). JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee for TRO on 14 January 2007.

b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is assessed to be a member of al-Qaida. Detainee is assessed to have participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces as a fighter in Usama Bin Laden's (UBL) 55th Arab Brigade and then in Tora Bora. Detainee was recruited in Yemen and traveled to Afghanistan (AF) using a false passport facilitated by the al-Qaida associated Jama'at Tablighi (JT). Detainee is assessed to have received militant

CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES
REASON: E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 20330103

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training and used al-Qaida associated facilities. JTF-GTMO has determined this detainee to be:

- A **MEDIUM** risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies
- A **HIGH** threat from a detention perspective
- Of **MEDIUM** intelligence value

c. (S//NF) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee's assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be annotated by ➤ next to the footnote.)

- Added details to detainee's prior history
- Expanded evaluation of detainee's account
- Provided additional analysis of detainee's risk
- Updated Placement and Access section

4. (U) Detainee's Account of Events:

The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.

a. (S//NF) Prior History: Detainee attended high school in the al-Salfiah area near the city of Dhawran, YM where he graduated in 1999.¹ Following high school, detainee taught the Koran to children at the village mosque in Akaba, YM and also worked on the family's khat farm.² While at the local market, he met a man named Khalid Ubayd from Hadramout, YM and they became friends.³ Detainee told Ubayd that the khat business was slowing down and he needed to look for work elsewhere.⁴ Detainee and his father, Abdullah Ali Mahmoud al-Shabati, were both members of the al-Islah political party.⁵ Detainee's father was also a member of the JT.⁶ Both detainee's father and his friend, Hatim Mutawakil,

¹ ➤ 000224 KB 13-FEB-2002, 000224 302 21-MAY-2002, 000224 MFR 14-MAY-2002

² 000224 302 21-MAY-2002, Analyst Note: Khat (also kat or qat) is an evergreen shrub (*Catha edulis*) native to the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. Khat is a narcotic leaf.

³ ➤ 000224 SIR 12-APR-2002, TD-314/29318-02, Analyst Note: A variant of Ubayd is Obeid.

⁴ 000224 MFR 12-APR-2002

⁵ TD-314/29318-02, 000224 302-01-JUN-2002, Analyst Note: The al-Islah Party is a National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF) Priority 2A Terrorist Supporting Entity (TSE). Priority 2A TSEs have demonstrated the intent and willingness to support terrorist organizations willing to attack US persons or interests, or provide witting operational support to Priority 2 terrorist groups

⁶ 000224 302 01-JUN-2002, Analyst Note: JT is an NIPF Priority 2A TSE.

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attended the annual JT meetings at the al-Huda Mosque in al-Hudaydah, YM.⁷ Detainee had no military experience, but had fired a Kalashnikov (AK-47) rifle in Yemen.⁸

b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: Muhammad Omar from detainee's village, as well as members of the JT, told detainee of opportunities to teach the Koran in Pakistan.⁹ Mutawakil loaned detainee 40,000 Yemeni riyals for detainee's travel to Karachi, PK.¹⁰ Combined with money saved from the sale of khat, detainee took 100,000 Yemeni riyals with him on the trip.¹¹ Detainee obtained his passport about March 2001, and his visa for Pakistan in April.¹² Detainee departed Sanaa for Karachi, via Dubai, United Arab Emirates between 15 and 20 April 2001.¹³

c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: Upon his arrival in Karachi, detainee went to the Hotel al-Sharak where detainee called his friend Khalid Ubayd.¹⁴ Detainee stated Ubayd was now a student at an unknown university in Pakistan, and he supported his family by buying perfume and leather goods. Khalid transported detainee to his house in the Gulshan Iqbal district of Karachi where detainee stayed approximately three months.¹⁵ During this time, detainee applied for teaching positions at five or six different schools, including the Abu Hanifa and Abu al-Hassan schools, but did not meet the educational requirements to teach in Pakistan. Unable to find a job, some of the individuals at the schools told him there were teaching positions available in Afghanistan, where the requirements were lower. He was directed to the Taliban office in Quetta, PK to enquire about these positions.¹⁶ There he met Muhammad Saken, who informed detainee there was a need for Koranic teachers in Afghanistan, but he could not offer detainee a steady job or salary.

(S//NF) Detainee returned to Ubayd's house in Karachi, and stayed another twenty days before returning to the Taliban office in Quetta. Saken provided detainee with 1,000 rupees

⁷ > IIR 6 034 0338 02, 000193 302 08-SEP-2002, 000224-SIR 12-APR-2002

⁸ 000224 302 21-MAY-2002, IIR 7 739 3189 02, Analyst Note: Detainee's Recruitment Postponement Certificate was recovered in Afghanistan. The certificate postponed detainee's military service from January 1998 until January 2000. It is unlikely detainee returned to the appropriate authorities in 2000 given the two year conscription in Yemen and detainee's 2001 travels, unless he went AWOL. The certificate identified detainee's date of birth as 1978. See AFGP-2002-800850

⁹ 000224 302 21-MAY-2002, IIR 6 034 0039 02, Analyst Note: Detainee identified Muhammad Omar as a religious leader from the Masjid al-Akhbar Mosque in Sanaa.

¹⁰ 000224 302 01-JUN-2002

¹¹ In 2001, 40,000 Yemeni riyals was equivalent to \$264 USD; 100,000 Yemeni riyals was equivalent to \$662 USD.

¹² 000224 302 21-MAY-2002

¹³ 000224 302 01-JUN-2002

¹⁴ 000224 KB 13-FEB-2002

¹⁵ 000224 302 01-JUN-2002, Analyst Note: A variant of Gulshan Iqbal is Kenshin Ikbal.

¹⁶ > 000224 302 01-JUN-2002

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and sent detainee to an unidentified school in Kandahar, AF.¹⁷ Detainee was tested on his religious knowledge for ten days at the school. During this time, the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks occurred and detainee was told to travel to Kabul, AF, because it would be safer there. The school provided detainee and three Afghans with transportation to Kabul. Detainee was taken to the house of Taliban member Kari Bilal in the outskirts of the city where detainee was told to wait for an unidentified individual who would help detainee travel to Pakistan.¹⁸ At any given time, there were five to twenty personnel armed with AK-47s at the house. Detainee and three Afghans then fled toward Towr Kham, AF. After 20 days at an unidentified location, detainee decided to travel to Towr Kham by himself. Detainee located a driver willing to take him to the boarder, and two hours later they came upon a crowd of people. The driver told detainee to get out of the car and left detainee in front of the crowd. An unidentified individual from the crowd took detainee's luggage, passport, and jacket. Detainee traveled on foot from village to village until he found a guide at the fourth village. Detainee paid the guide 2,000 rupees to take him to Pakistan.¹⁹

5. (U) Capture Information:

a. (S//NF) Detainee claimed he left the village the next morning with his guide and three other unidentified individuals, and was subsequently apprehended at the border.²⁰ It is assessed detainee fled Afghanistan with a group of al-Qaida and Taliban fighters led by UBL appointed military commander in Tora Bora, Ali Muhammad Abdul Aziz al-Fakhri aka (Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi), ISN US9LY-000212DP (LY-212). The group crossed the Afghani-Pakistani border in the Nangarhar region in mid-December 2001. Their Pakistani contact convinced them to surrender their weapons and gathered the group in a mosque where Pakistani forces immediately arrested them.²¹ Pakistan authorities transferred detainee from Kohat, PK to US custody at the Kandahar Detention Facility, AF on 2 January 2002.²²

b. (S) Property Held:

- 247 Pakistani rupees²³
- Cloth bag

c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 9 February 2002

¹⁷ 000224 302 01-JUN-2002, Analyst Note: 1,000 rupees is the equivalent of \$15.67 USD.

¹⁸ 000224 302 01-JUN-2002, 000224 KB 13-FEB-2002, 000221 SIR 21-FEB-2002,

¹⁹ 000224 302 01-JUN-2002, Analyst Note: In 2001, 2,000 rupees was the equivalent of \$31.34 USD.

²⁰ 000224 302 01-JUN-2002, IIR 6 034 0338 02

²¹ IIR 7 739 3396 02, Withdrawal from Tora Bora

²² TD-314/00845-02, paragraph E14

²³ In 2002, 247 Pakistani Rupees was the equivalent of \$4.30 USD.

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d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide information on the following:

- Regional unemployment
- Detainee was also probably transferred to provide information on the following:
 - Al-Qaida operations in Tora Bora
 - Al-Qaida fighters captured in Pakistan

6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee's Account: Detainee is assessed to be withholding information. Detainee's prior history with the al-Islah party and the JT reflect his early exposure to extremist ideology which support detainee's assessed jihadist activities in Afghanistan.²⁴ Detainee's claim of travel to teach is assessed to be false based on his lack of adequate education, narcotic affiliation and the haphazard manner in which he attempted to gain employment. Detainee has provided conflicting reporting such as his claim of memorizing the Koran, and later indicating he only needed to memorize key verses in preparation for a panel assessing his qualifications to teach in Afghanistan.²⁵ Detainee fails to account for his activities during four months he claimed he spent in Karachi at the home of a friend, the ten days he spent in Kandahar, and the twenty days he spent at the Qari Bilal center (a front line position) near Kabul. It is unlikely detainee would have been allowed to remain at the Bilal Center without performing some function related to combat or combat support, and it is unlikely he would have been allowed to travel to the center without prior training. Detainee denied he received training, but is listed on al-Qaida associated documents as a mujahid fighting in support of the Taliban. After numerous interrogations where detainee related his travels in Afghanistan, detainee told a Yemeni delegation in July 2005, that he had never been there.²⁶

7. (U) Detainee Threat:

a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a **MEDIUM** risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies.

b. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer for Continued Detention in Host Country: Detainee is assessed to be a member of al-Qaida. Detainee's name and alias were found on al-Qaida affiliated documents, he traveled on a false passport, and provided a common al-Qaida cover story. Detainee is assessed to have participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces

²⁴ > 000224 KB 13-FEB-2002, 000224 302 21-MAY-2002, 000224 MFR 14-MAY-2002

²⁵ 000224 302 21-MAY-2002

²⁶ 000224 SIR 28-JUL-2005, Detainee has changed his story regarding his travel to Kandahar. In IIR 6 034 0338 02, detainee contradicted previous statements by saying that he gave Sakhim (variant of Saken) 1,200 rupees for a guide to Kandahar.

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as a fighter in UBL's 55th Arab Brigade and then in Tora Bora. Detainee is assessed to have received militant training and used al-Qaida associated facilities.

- (S//NF) Detainee is assessed to be an al-Qaida member. Detainee's name and alias were found on al-Qaida affiliated documents and detainee has provided a common al-Qaida cover story.
 - (S//NF) Detainee's name and alias are included on al-Qaida affiliated documents recovered in raids against a suspected safe house Karachi, PK. The contents of detainee's trust account were reported as a [airline] ticket, identification, and his Saudi Passport.²⁷
 - (S//NF) Analyst Note: Such lists are indicative of an individual's residence within al-Qaida, Taliban, and other extremist guesthouses, often for the purpose of training or coordination prior to travel to the front lines or abroad. Trust accounts, also referred to as safety boxes or safety deposit boxes, were simply storage compartments, such as envelopes or folders, which guesthouse administrators used to secure the individual's personal valuables, such as passports and plane tickets. These items were entrusted to the guesthouse until completion of training or other activity.
 - (S//NF) Detainee implied he obtained a Yemeni passport in Yemen in early 2001.²⁸ When initially questioned about the Saudi passport in detainee's trust account, detainee adamantly denied having a Saudi passport; however, upon further questioning, detainee admitted he had lied.²⁹ (Analyst Note: Al-Qaida and other extremist organization members frequently use falsified travel documents to preclude their detention, apprehension or prohibition from traveling abroad.)
 - Analyst Note: Based on detainee's willingness to falsify information and analysis of the trust account reports, detainee is assessed to have traveled to Afghanistan in mid to late 2000, up to six months earlier than claimed. Detainee's trust account number was 276-134. The trust account number 264-125 is believed to belong to an earlier arrival than detainee, and trust 296-143 is believed to belong to a later arrival than detainee. Trust 264-125 belongs to Ali Husein Muhammad Shaaban, US9SY-000327DP, who traveled to Afghanistan approximately mid-2000.³⁰ Trust 296-143 belongs to Hani Said Muhammad Banan al-Khalaf al-Ghamidi, ISN US9SA-000438DP, who traveled to Afghanistan in November 2000.³¹

²⁷ TD-314/42895-02, Item No. 112, TD-314/40693-02, Item No. 157, TD-314/47683-03, Item No. 111,

²⁸ 000224 302 21-MAY-2002

²⁹ 000224 SIR 03-DEC-2004

³⁰ >000329 302 10-JUN-2002, 000329 302 10-JUN-2002

³¹ IIR 6 034 0539 02, IIR 2 340 6026 02, IIR 6 034 0318 02

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- (S//NF) Detainee acknowledged he and his father were members of the al-Islah Party and that his father was a member of the JT.³² Detainee also stated JT member Hatim Mutawakil loaned detainee money to travel to Pakistan,³³ and claimed members of the JT told detainee of opportunities to teach the Koran in Pakistan.³⁴
 - (S//NF) Affiliation with the JT, a proselytizing organization, has been identified as an al-Qaida cover story. Al-Qaida used the JT to facilitate and fund the international travels of its members.³⁵
 - (S//NF) Detainee stated his father attended annual JT meetings at the al-Huda Mosque in al-Hudaydah, YM.³⁶ (Analyst Note: Other detainees reported JT connections to the al-Huda Mosque in Hudaydah. Ali Salem al-Zarnuki, ISN US9YM-000691DP, reported he was recruited by the JT to travel to Pakistan. He stated he then met with Shaykh Salih Muqbil at the al-Huda Mosque.³⁷ Saad Bin Nasser Ibn Mukbil al-Azani, ISN US9YM-000575DP (YM-575), was recruited by the JT and facilitated through the al-Huda Mosque.³⁸ Detainee's possible association with these detainees in Yemen requires further investigation.)
 - (S//NF) The al-Islah party is affiliated with UBL and promotes terrorism to include organizing young mujahideen against the Yemeni government, US and Coalition interests in Afghanistan, Palestinian terrorism against Israel, and more recently, against US and Coalition forces in Iraq.³⁹
- (S//NF) Mussin Muhammad Mugible al-Askarry, ISN US9YM-000193DP (YM-193, transferred) photo-identified detainee as a member of JT.⁴⁰
- (S//NF) Detainee is assessed to have participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces with Taliban and al-Qaida fighters on the front lines and in Tora Bora.
 - (S//NF) As an Arab assigned to the Bilal Center, detainee is assessed to be a member of UBL's 55th Arab Brigade. Detainee claimed he stayed at Qari Bilal's house in Kabul for 20 days and was unwittingly recruited by the Taliban.⁴¹ (Analyst Note: Qari Bilal's house is assessed to be the Markez Bilal (Bilal Center) and was a

³² 000224 302 01-JUN-2002, TD-314/29318-02

³³ 000224 SIR 12-APR-2002, 000224 SIR 28-APR-2003, IIR 6 034 0338 02, Analyst Note: Detainee claimed two different amounts loaned to him by Mutawakil; 40,000, and 45,000 Yemeni riyals.

³⁴ 000224 302 21-MAY-2002, IIR 6 034 0039 02, Analyst Note: Detainee identified Muhammad Omar as a religious leader from the Masjid al-Akhbar Mosque in Sanaa.

³⁵ >For additional information see: IIR 2 227 0131 03, Jamaat Tabligh Provides Cover as of 20051228, JITFCT Special Analysis US Jamaat Tabligh, AFOSI Report on Jamaat Tabligh 27-OCT-2004, Jamaat Al Tabligh (JT) Members - TRRS-04-03-1083 10-MAR-2004

³⁶ IIR 6 034 0338 02, 000193 302 08-SEP-2002, 000224-SIR 12-APR-2002

³⁷ >000691 302 18-JUN-2002

³⁸ >IIR 6 034 0133 06

³⁹ TD-314/12546-01, DIA JITF-CT, "Yemen Terrorist Issues", 7 March 2005; DIA Campaign Analysis Report "Yemen: Tribal Affiliations." 1 February 2002.

⁴⁰ 000193 302 08-SEP-2002

⁴¹ IIR 6 034 0338 02, 000224 KB 13-FEB-2002, variants of Qari include Kari and Qali.

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front line position associated with the 55th Arab Brigade.⁴² Based on detainee's stated timeline, he occupied the Bilal Center as late as November 2001 during Operation Enduring Freedom.)

- (S//NF) Qari Bilal was a Taliban leader who fought on the front lines and assigned fighters to their positions. The Qari Bilal Center was one of several positions on the front lines opposing Northern Alliance forces in Bagram and later, when moved to Khwaja Ghar, AF, it was used as a rest area.⁴³ (Analyst Note: The actual facilities did not move. When front line leadership assumed control of a facility or location, it then took the name of the center which was often named for its commander.)
- (S//NF) According to Haji Mohammed Khan Achezkai, ISN US9AF-000104DP, (AF-104, transferred), the Moasqr Kari Bilal (Qari Bilal Camp) was a Taliban facility used to train soldiers for frontline fighting at Bagram.⁴⁴
- (S//NF) Detainee was captured with LY-212 and other Taliban and al-Qaida fighters after fleeing the hostilities in Tora Bora.⁴⁵
 - (S//NF) Detainee's name was included on lists of al-Qaida members incarcerated in Pakistan after the fled Tora Bora through Nangarhar Province, AF.⁴⁶ (Analyst Note: This is assessed to be the group led out of Tora Bora by senior al-Qaida leader LY-212, who was captured with the group. Although several senior al-Qaida members claim LY-212 was not a member of al-Qaida, LY-212 himself stated UBL personally appointed him as the military commander at Tora Bora.⁴⁷)
 - (S//NF) Detainee is probably depicted in a photograph taken with Abdullah Kamel Abdullah Kamel, ISN US9KU-000228DP (KU-228, transferred), in Tora Bora. The photograph was found with others including one of LY-212.⁴⁸ (Analyst Note: The photograph was probably taken in Tora Bora as it is the only known common location between the three detainees.)

⁴² Analyst Note: "Markez" means center and was often used to identify defensive positions and camps. See IIR 2 340 6432 02 for additional details about centers on the front lines.

⁴³ IIR 2 340 6151 02, IIR 2 340 6432 02

⁴⁴ IIR 2 340 6151 02

⁴⁵ TD-314/52609-05

⁴⁶ IIR 7 739 3268 02, paragraph 8; IIR 7 739 3245 02, paragraph 8; IIR 7 739 3396 02; TD-314/09853-02, Number 44; TD-314/13174-03; IIR 7 739 3396 02; TD-314/48336-03; Analyst Note: TD-314/48336-03 identified detainee's parents with the Saudi Arabia phone number 0096625739893.

⁴⁷ TD-314/14605-04

⁴⁸ >AFGP-2002-604008, Analyst Note: Detainee is found on page 8 in the bottom photograph. Detainee is the individual on the left, identified as Abu al-Mundhir from Yemen.

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- (S//NF) A foreign government service identified detainee as one of 38 individuals who were reportedly members of al-Qaida located in various Middle Eastern countries.⁴⁹
- (S//NF) A variation of detainee's name was found on a chat session log recovered from a hard drive believed to have belonged to al-Qaida operative Muhammad Asa al-Kandari, during a raid on a suspected al-Qaida cell responsible for the attack on US forces in Faylaka Island, Kuwait, during October 2002.⁵⁰ (Analyst Note: This chat session may simply have discussed those individuals who had been captured in Pakistan.)
- (S//NF) Detainee is assessed to have received militant training and stayed at al-Qaida associated facilities.
 - (S//NF) Detainee admitted staying in Qali Bilal house near Kabul. Due to the connection to front line fighting and jihadist training associated with the Bilal Center, detainee probably received training at this facility.⁵¹
 - (S//NF) Due to detainee's false timeline, detainee is assessed to have received training at the al-Qaida al-Faruq Training Camp no later than April 2001, the period he claimed to have stayed with Ubayd in Karachi.⁵² (Analyst Note: Inclusion of detainee's name and alias on the previously detailed trust account lists supports the assessment that detainee received training. Based on normal operations in Kandahar, detainee stayed at the al-Qaida al-Nibras Guesthouse where he entered his name in the ledger and surrendered his personal effects prior to attending training at al-Faruq.)

c. (S//NF) Detainee's Conduct: Detainee is assessed to be a **HIGH** threat from a detention perspective. Detainee's overall behavior has been noncompliant and hostile to the guard force and staff. Detainee currently has 62 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS with the most recent occurring on 28 November 2007, when he passed food to another detainee. Detainee has 13 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction for assault with the most recent occurring on 27 April 2007, when he pulled a guard's hand through the bean hole. Other incidents for which detainee has been disciplined include participating in mass disturbances, failure to follow instructions and camp rules, threatening guards, attempted assault, damage to government property, attempted assault, assault, and possession of food. In 2006, detainee had a total of 8 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction and 11 in 2007.

8. (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:

⁴⁹ TD-314/27689-02, paragraph H; Analyst Note: No information was available about why they believed these individuals were affiliated with al-Qaida. However; the report is similar to recovered al-Qaida documents listing the locations of relatives of captured fighters.

⁵⁰ TD 314/43361-02, Item no. 7C

⁵¹ 000224 302 01-JUN-2002, 000224 KB 13-FEB-2002, 000221 SIR 21-FEB-2002

⁵² 000224 302 01-JUN-2002

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a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of **MEDIUM** intelligence value. Detainee's most recent interrogation session occurred on 26 December 2007.

b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Detainee's membership in the al-Islah Party, and his affiliation with the JT afforded him with the motive, means, and ability to travel to Afghanistan and participate in jihad. Detainee's lengthy and unexplained tenure in Pakistan, and his movement within Afghanistan, provided detainee with knowledge of al-Qaida guesthouses, safe houses, and training. By virtue of detainee's location on the front lines, it is assessed that he is member of al-Qaida and UBL's 55th Arab Brigade. Membership in the 55th Arab Brigade provided detainee with battlefield intelligence including movement and tactics, and information on other al-Qaida fighters. Because of his route of his egress from Afghanistan, it is assessed that detainee was probably at Tora Bora and fled Afghanistan under the orders of LY-212.

c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee is an assessed al-Qaida member and a fighter on the front lines in Afghanistan for UBL's 55th Arab Brigade. Detainee is familiar with al-Qaida associated guesthouses and safe houses, and likely received militant training. Detainee was probably at Tora Bora, and has information on routes of egress from Afghanistan to Pakistan. Detainee was captured with a key al-Qaida commander, LY-212.


d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:

- JT recruitment and facilitation activities for al-Qaida in Yemen
- Detainee's relationship with Qari Bilal and activities within the 55th Arab Brigade
- Detainee's activities in Pakistan and Afghanistan, including militant training
- Terrorist Travel Facilitators
- Terrorist Biographical/Psychological information
- Terrorism Radicalization Factors
- Terrorist Recruitment of Juveniles

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9. (S) **EC Status:** Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 14 December 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant.

v/r,


MARK H. BUZBY
Rear Admiral, US Navy
Commanding

* Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessment can be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College October 2001 guide *Intelligence Warning Terminology*.