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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA APO AE 09360

JTF GTMO-CG

19 October 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue, Miami, FL 33172.

SUBJECT: Administrative Review Board Input for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9KU-000220DP (U)

1. (S//NF) JTF GTMO recommends to the Administrative Review Board (ARB) that this detainee be transferred to the control of another country for continued detention (TRCD).

2. (S//NF) Summary of Most Recent JTF GTMO Assessment, signed on 7 February 2004.

a. (S//NF) Most Recent JTF GTMO Recommendation: Transfer to the control of another country for continued detention (TRCD).

b. (S//NF) Threat Level in Most Recent JTF GTMO Assessment: Medium.

c. (S//NF) Intelligence Value in Most Recent JTF GTMO Assessment: Low.

d. (FOUO) Note: JTF GTMO's system of identifying detainees as High, Medium or Low threat has evolved over time. The threat and intelligence values listed above may have been adjusted to conform with the most recent standards.

3. (S//NF) Updated JTF GTMO Threat and Intelligence Value Since Most Recent Assessment.

a. (S//NF) Updated Threat Level. JTF GTMO has determined that detainee is a medium threat to the US and its allies based on the following facts.

(1) (S) Detainee is an admitted mujahadeen fighter. Circa September 2001, he joined a Taliban fighting group at Markez Aiubi (aka the Ayubi Center) on the Bagram, Afghanistan (AF), front line for eight months, where he acted as both a guard and a scout. He was issued an AK-47 and grenades and placed in a defensive position against the Northern Alliance.

CLASSIFIED BY: Multiple Sources REASON: E.O. 12958 Section 1.5(C) DECLASSIFY ON: 20291020

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(2) (S) Detainee denies receiving training in Afghanistan; however, JTF GTMO assesses this claim may be dishonest:

• Detainee states he avoided training by telling the Taliban he had fired a Kalashnikov as a small boy in Kuwait. He did not tell them of his prior military experience or demonstrate his marksmanship ability. (Analyst Note: This does not seem plausible, since at the time detainee arrived in Afghanistan, circa March 2001, it has been reported that everyone was required to attend a minimum of 7 to 8 weeks of basic training.)

• Detainee was captured with a F91-W black Casio wristwatch. (Analyst Note: This was a watch that was typically given to mujahideen who had received Al-Qaida training, and more specifically, who had received advanced explosives training at an Al-Qaida affiliated terrorist camp. This specific model has been used in bombings linked to Al-Qaida and radical Islamic terrorist improvised explosive devices.)

(3) (S//NF) Detainee was a trained soldier in the Kuwaiti military, but went absent without leave to fight jihad in Afghanistan. Detainee was initially deceptive and claimed Yemeni citizenship for fear of facing the Kuwaiti military court.

(4) (S//NF) Detainee has been forthright concerning his involvement as a fighter with the Taliban.

b. (S//NF) Updated Intelligence Value. JTF GTMO's determination that the detainee is of low intelligence value remains the same.

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JAY W. HOOD Brigadier General, US Army Commanding