

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

11 June 2006

TO: FARAJ, ABD AL HADI OMAR MAHMOUD

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF FARAJ, ABD AL HADI OMAR  
MAHMOUD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. A foreign intelligence organization has provided information that indicates that the detainee was a member of a terrorist cell disbanded by foreign authorities.

2. Originally from Syria, the detainee arrived in Afghanistan in 2000 after spending several months in Iran.

3. The detainee stayed in a house reserved for Syrians, which was located in Kabul, Afghanistan.

b. Training

1. The detainee attended training from a sheik while residing at the Syrian guesthouse in Kabul, Afghanistan.

2. The sheik, an Egyptian, was an Amir in the Egyptian Jihad Organization and was also the chief Mufti of al Qaida.

3. A foreign intelligence organization has provided information that indicates that the detainee joined an al Qaida training camp upon arriving in Afghanistan.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF FARAJ, ABD AL HADI OMAR MAHMOUD**

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee lived with three other detainees at the Syrian house in Kabul, Afghanistan.
2. The Syrian house was located in the al Qaida enclave area of Wazir Akhbar Khan in Kabul, Afghanistan.
3. The Syrian group guest house was associated with al Qaida and was used for money and document forgery operations.
4. A Yemeni detainee also stayed at the Syrian house on several occasions.
5. The detainee's name or alias appears on a document recovered from safe house raids on suspected al Qaida.

d. Other Relevant Data

The detainee was captured on 3 January 2002, on the Pakistani border.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

7 May 2006

TO: JUWAN, SHARGO SHIRZ

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF JUWAN, SHARGO SHIRZ

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. The detainee was a Syrian who trained in al Qaida camps in Afghanistan and was believed to be fighting with (or on behalf of) Usama bin Laden as of early December 2001.
    2. The detainee was a fighter in the Tora Bora region of Afghanistan.
  - b. Training
    1. In 1993, the detainee went to the Harrasta Police Training Facility in Damascus, Syria, where he trained for two years. His training at the school was mostly physical fitness and the use of the Kalashnikov rifle and a hand gun.
    2. The detainee also received advanced explosives training at an al Qaida training camp in Afghanistan and was very well connected with a number of powerful Syrian groups in Afghanistan.
  - c. Connections/Associations
    1. A senior al Qaida leader identified the subject detainee's photo as someone he met prior to 11 September 2001 in a Syrian guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan.
    2. The detainee attended religious training from Sheikh Issa while residing at the Syrian guest house in Kabul from December 2000 until January 2002.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF JUWAN, SHARGO SHIRZ**

3. Sheikh Issa, an Egyptian, was an emir in the Egyptian Jihad organization and was the chief mufti of al Qaida.

4. Al Jihad, a.k.a. Egyptian Islamic Jihad, merged with Usama bin Laden's al Qaida organization in June 2001, but may retain some capability to conduct independent operations. Its primary goals are to overthrow the Egyptian Government and replace it with an Islamic state and to attack U.S. and Israeli interests in Egypt and abroad.

5. The detainee stayed at a Syrian guest house in Kabul.

6. The Syrian house was located in the al Qaida enclave area of Wazir Akhbar Khan in Kabul, Afghanistan.

d. Other Relevant Data

The detainee stated that in June 2000 his roommate advised him to travel to Afghanistan to find a wife.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he never heard of "jihad" and could not explain what it meant. He believed "jihad" was the name of a soccer team.

b. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

c. The detainee advised he never attended any training camps, he never stayed at a safe-house throughout his travels, he denies ever meeting any al Qaida members, denies ever meeting any Taliban members, and states no one sponsored him to migrate to Afghanistan.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

13 July 2006

TO: MOHAMMED, AIYMAN MOHAMMED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMMED, AIYMAN MOHAMMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. While living in Gaza, the detainee was influenced by Hamas to become committed.
    2. The detainee traveled to Saudi Arabia where he was influenced by a Saudi national to go to Afghanistan to receive military training and prepare for jihad.
    3. The detainee responded to a fatwa issued by a Saudi sheikh.
    4. The detainee maintained his interest in jihad through conversations with a sheikh, reading the sheikh's book and a jihad internet website.
    5. The detainee received a letter and 2,000 Saudi Arabian Riyals from a sheikh. The letter gave the detainee instructions to fly to Karachi, Pakistan and who to contact when he arrived.
    6. The detainee traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan through Karachi and Quetta, Pakistan.
    7. Around July 2001, the detainee arrived in Kandahar, Afghanistan and stayed at a guest house.
    8. The detainee traveled to a guest house in Khost, Afghanistan. There, the detainee joined a group of 15 Arabs who were going to the Pakistan border.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMMED, AIYMAN MOHAMMED**

9. The detainee stated they moved to the mountains and stayed in caves. When the bombing started, they moved to higher mountains in the Tora Bora region of Afghanistan.

10. The detainee walked to the Pakistan border where he was arrested around Ramadan 2001.

b. Training

1. After staying at the guest house for one week the detainee attended the al Farouq training camp where he stayed for less than two months.

2. The detainee received training with the Kalashnikov rifle at al Farouq.

c. Intent

The detainee claimed that he received military training at al Farouq in hopes of conducting a suicide operation in the Palestinian territories.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee evacuated the al Farouq camp after 11 September 2001.

2. The detainee admitted to not telling the whole truth about why he went to Afghanistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee would like to live a normal life and have a family if he is released. The detainee's main concern is to join his family in Saudi Arabia.

b. The detainee has no military training and only shot a pistol once.

c. The detainee stated he was not a member of the Taliban or al Qaida and now realizes that the two are associated. However, when the detainee responded to the fatwa he wasn't aware of that fact. The detainee decided to join the jihad of his own free will but didn't realize at the time these groups may be associated with terrorism.

d. The detainee feels the 11 September 2001 attacks were against what his faith believes and many innocent people were killed. The people involved in the attacks should be punished.

e. The detainee would not be interested in any fatwa to fight against the United States. The detainee has no hostility against the United States.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMMED, AIYMAN  
MOHAMMED**

Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

8 March 2006

TO: AL TAYABI, ABDULLAH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL TAYABI, ABDULLAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee, a Saudi Arabian citizen, traveled by bus and plane from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan via Dubai, United Arab Emirates; Karachi, Pakistan; Quetta, Pakistan; and Kandahar, Afghanistan in August 2001.

2. The detainee was captured near the Pakistan border.

b. Training

1. The detainee took a one-month artillery course at Karghar in Kabul, Afghanistan.

2. The detainee attended the al Farouq training camp for two weeks.

3. The detainee traveled to another training camp near Jalalabad, Afghanistan, after al Farouq but the training was cancelled due to the war.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee's name was on a list of captured Mujahedin found on a computer associated with a senior al Qaida member.

2. The detainee's name was on a list of al Qaida Mujahedin, and the contents of their trust accounts were found on computers recovered during raids against al Qaida-associated safe houses.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL TAYABI, ABDULLAH**

3. The detainee's name was found on a document listing Arabic names, aliases and nationalities recovered from safe house raids associated with suspected al Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan.

4. The detainee joined Abu Thabet's group that was crossing the mountains heading for the Pakistan border.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee applied to King Fahd military school for training, but they refused him because he looked weak. This is why he sought training in Afghanistan.

b. The detainee states that his captors forced him to say he trained at Camp Farouq so he could be sold to the American soldiers.

c. The detainee states that he has never been to al Farouq or received any training at any camp. He has never seen Usama bin Laden, nor has he ever given bayat to Usama bin Laden.

d. The detainee stated he went to Afghanistan during his vacation from school to obtain weapons training. He purchased a return ticket intending to only stay in Afghanistan for a month.

e. The detainee stated that he was in Kandahar when he first heard about the 11 September 2001 attacks in America.

f. The detainee stated that if he were released he would return to Saudi Arabia and would complete his studies if accepted back into his university. He had been studying engineering and had two years left before earning a degree.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

23 April 2006

TO: AL HARBI, MOHAMED ATIQ AWAYD

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HARBI, MOHAMED ATIQ AWAYD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. A source reported that the detainee was in Chechnya for approximately nine months in 1999.

2. The detainee traveled to Mecca to participate in the pilgrimage and it was at this time he decided to travel to Pakistan and provide assistance to Afghanistan refugees that were residing at camps in Pakistan.

3. The detainee says that on about the eighth day of Ramadan (24 November 2001) he traveled from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia to Karachi, Pakistan.

4. The detainee received his assignment via the "Servant of the Convent" and traveled to Quetta, Pakistan and then to a small Pakistani village approximately 45 minutes west of Quetta.

5. The detainee was arrested by Pakistani police and was in possession of 8,000 United States Dollars and 12,000 Saudi Riyals.

b. Training

1. A source reported that the detainee underwent basic training and physical training in Chechnya.

2. A source reported that at the al Farouq camp the detainee received hand grenade, machine gun, pistol, map reading and explosives training.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HARBI, MOHAMED ATIQ AWAYD**

## c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was identified as being a fighter in Kandahar, Afghanistan and a member of al Wafa and the Jamat-al-Tabligh.
2. The detainee was identified as being in the Tora Bora Mountains.
3. Al Wafa claimed to be a charitable organization, but it was common knowledge that al Wafa delivered weapons and supplies to Afghanistan fighters in Tora Bora.
4. Al Wafa provided money of all currencies, including United States Dollars, to those fighters who needed it. The detainee was identified as one of approximately 400 Arabs who claimed to be members of a subset of al Wafa called Irata. However, these were actually Mujahedin fighters in Afghanistan.
5. The Jamat-al-Tabligh is a legitimate Islamic missionary organization based in Pakistan and believed to be used as a cover for action by Islamic extremists.
6. A senior al Qaida lieutenant recognized the detainee as possibly being at his site, a guest house in Kabul, in 1998 or 1999.
7. The detainee's name was found on a document that was recovered by United States Coalition Forces from the former residence of Usama bin Laden in Kandahar, Afghanistan on or about 12 December 2001.

## d. Other Relevant Data

The detainee traveled to several other countries within the two and a half to three years prior to capture. The countries were Kuwait, Turkey, Georgia and Pakistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
  - a. The detainee says he loves Americans and stated he was against the killing of any innocent people. In fact, the detainee would be willing to work for American authorities once he was back in Saudi Arabia.
  - b. The detainee says he hears nothing of terrorist plots or terrorist activities from other detainees.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HARBI, MOHAMED ATIQ  
AWAYD**

unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

2 November 2006

TO: AL MARI, JARALAH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MARI, JARALAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

- a. Commitment

1. The detainee traveled to Saudi Arabia in late July or early August of 2001 and attended the al Harum Mosque. The detainee spent several hours a day over a period of a week with an individual he met at the mosque discussing Islam and jihad in Afghanistan. This individual gave the detainee a point of contact for jihad in Afghanistan.

2. The detainee met with the point of contact at a restaurant in Saudi Arabia to discuss traveling to Afghanistan. The detainee was told not to discuss this travel with anyone because other governments did not approve of people entering Afghanistan.

3. The detainee stated he understood that his activities in Afghanistan would include attending training camp, fighting and killing people who were killing Muslims.

4. Approximately one month after returning to Qatar, the detainee called his point of contact on two occasions to advise him of his decision to travel to Afghanistan. The point of contact instructed the detainee to purchase an airline ticket to Pakistan and to check into a hotel using a different name.

5. The detainee was told not to speak to anyone of jihad. The detainee told his family he was traveling to Pakistan to attend Tablique Dawa, an annual three day call to Islam. The detainee stated he did not tell his family about his true plans regarding his trip to Pakistan and Afghanistan because he felt they would not support him.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MARI, JARALAH**

6. On 6 September 2001, the detainee flew from Qatar to Pakistan on Qatar Airlines. The detainee checked into a hotel and called his point of contact, who advised him that another individual would be contacting the detainee at the hotel.

7. An individual arrived at the detainee's room and asked for 200 Riyals to pay for an airline ticket to Afghanistan, Pakistani clothing, shoes and a bag. On 7 September 2001, the individual returned to the hotel with a plane ticket, and the next day the detainee flew to Pakistan. The contact advised the detainee there would be three or four Arab males on the plane but not to acknowledge them or act like the detainee knew them.

8. Upon arrival in Pakistan, the detainee was transported to a mudaffa. The detainee was told that other individuals staying in the mudaffa were Taliban.

9. The detainee stated while at the mudaffa he heard about Usama bin Laden and al Qaida, which was described as a group of people who made it possible for others to go on jihad.

10. On 9 September 2001 the detainee was driven to the vicinity of the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The detainee was then driven around the border checkpoint on a motorcycle. On the other side of the border, the detainee met the original car and driver in Afghanistan and was driven to a mudaffa in Afghanistan.

### b. Training

1. On 10 September 2001 the detainee arrived at an encampment for new arrivals at the al Farouq Camp in Afghanistan. On the evening of 11 September 2001, the detainee was given a sleeping bag and moved away from al Farouq because it was believed the United States might start bombing the area.

2. The detainee stated he learned that al Farouq was owned by Usama bin Laden before 11 September 2001, prior to arriving at the camp.

3. The detainee stated there was discussion on 12 September 2001 regarding the attacks on the United States, specifically that the incidents occurred in New York City. On 13 September 2001 the detainee returned to al Farouq to await transportation to Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee re-entered the camp and noticed a large mosque, approximately ten to fifteen white tents and a one-story building with a sign indicating it was the Office.

4. The detainee stated he spent approximately 30 days at an abandoned village where he was issued an AK-47 rifle without ammunition. The detainee stated it was during this time that he learned of the United States retaliation for the 11 September 2001 attacks.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MARI, JARALAH**

c. Connections/Associations

1. A source stated the detainee's brother was in Afghanistan for 15 to 19 months and trained in Usama bin Laden's camps.

2. In May 2003, the detainee's brother was charged by a federal grand jury in Peoria, Illinois with making false statements to FBI agents during the investigation of 11 September 2001. The indictment alleges that the detainee's brother lied to agents about calling a named un-indicted, co-conspirator in the indictment charging Zacarias Moussaoui with crimes relating to the 11 September 2001 attacks.

3. The detainee stated he met with his brothers approximately six to ten days prior to leaving for Afghanistan. The detainee could not remember the content of their conversation.

d. Other Relevant Data:

1. The detainee was transported to another mudaffa in Afghanistan where he heard airplanes bombing in the distance.

2. The detainee stated an individual in Afghanistan arranged for the detainee to be smuggled across the border into Pakistan. The detainee crossed the border on a motorcycle, using a gate at which the smuggler seemed to know the guard. While taking a bus from one town to another in Pakistan, the detainee was apprehended after a guard boarded the bus and questioned the detainee on his nationality.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he traveled to Afghanistan to perform jihad, but claims he was misled. The detainee learned after his arrival in Afghanistan that the Taliban were not as good as he was told.

b. The detainee stated he had second thoughts and wanted to return to Qatar after learning that the al Farouq camp was owned by Usama bin Laden.

c. While at al Farouq, the detainee became sick and wanted to leave this Camp and return home. The detainee stated he wanted to leave before the bombing began and that he missed his wife and children.

d. The detainee stated he knows of no one who was or may have been members of al Qaida and did not hear of a group by the name of al Qaida until after his capture. The detainee stated al Qaida, along with all of the fighters and trainees, were called Mujahedin.

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# **UNCLASSIFIED**

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MARI, JARALAH**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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**000514**



# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

20 March 2006

TO: AL FRIH, MAJED HAMAD

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL FRIH, MAJED HAMAD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. A friend of the detainee persuaded him to travel to Karachi, Pakistan to attend a three-day conference held by Jamat-al-Tabligh. This friend arranged for the detainee's hotel in Karachi and the detainee's father purchased him a round trip airline ticket and also gave him 1,500 United States Dollars for the trip.

2. The detainee flew from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia to Karachi, Pakistan in mid to late September 2001. The main assistant to the deputy of Jamat-al-Tabligh in Karachi contacted the detainee at the hotel the day after his arrival. The assistant took the detainee to Quetta, Pakistan for sightseeing since the conference did not begin for another day. The detainee flew to Quetta, Pakistan and stayed for three weeks teaching rituals and Islam.

3. Jamat-al-Tabligh, a Pakistan based Islamic missionary organization, is being used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists including members of al Qaida.

4. The detainee was not busy enough in Quetta, so he traveled to Chamin, Pakistan alone. He stayed there for three to four weeks doing the same things he had been doing in Quetta. At the mosque, the detainee heard a Friday sermon about a refugee camp in Boldak, Afghanistan and decided to leave that same day for the camp. In the camp, the detainee spoke with a refugee and gave him 2000 Rupees as fulfillment of his religious obligation. The detainee left the refugee camp the same day and was arrested at the Afghan/Pakistani border when attempting to cross later that night.

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## **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL FRIH, MAJED HAMAD**

5. The detainee has given different stories as to why he traveled to Pakistan. He previously has stated he had gone for humanitarian reasons, and later stated it was for a dawa.

### b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was a supporter of Usama bin Laden and an al Wafa office.

2. The al Wafa Humanitarian Organization has been designated as an organization who assists in, sponsors, or provides financial, material, or technological support for, or financial or other services to, or in support of, acts of terrorism.

3. The detainee was identified by a senior al Qaida member as a possible Saudi national who stayed at a guest house.

4. The detainee was seen at an al Wafa office in Kabul, Afghanistan.

5. A source claims that the detainee is very knowledgeable and controlling. He claims that the detainee helped al Wafa people when the bombing started in Afghanistan.

6. On approximately 13 November 2001 a source claims that the detainee traveled with him from Kabul to Logar, Afghanistan and then to Ghazni, outside Khowst, where they separated.

### c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee refused to address why he was captured with approximately 1,200 United States Dollars after several weeks of travel, when he had previously stated he donated approximately 1,200 United States Dollars to the Afghan refugees.

2. The detainee stated he would continue to be uncooperative even if he were interrogated every day until Judgment Day.

3. The detainee was designated by a Foreign Government's Agency as a priority target. He was placed on a watch list by decree because of his travel to Chechnya.

4. A source stated that the detainee and his brother were with 11 other individuals from Mecca, Saudi Arabia. Al Wafa arranged for their transportation after the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001. The detainee and other individuals entered Afghanistan through Iran.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001. The detainee also denied having any knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

## **UNCLASSIFIED**

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL FRIH, MAJED HAMAD**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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**000517**

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

22 March 2006

TO: AL BIDNA, SA AD IBRAHAM SA AD

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL BIDNA, SA AD IBRAHAM SA AD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. When the detainee left Saudi Arabia he had six to seven thousand Saudi Riyals, which he had gotten from his family, like he always had done. He had two thousand Riyals in his pocket by the time he was detained in Pakistan.
    2. The detainee was questioned regarding why he was detained in Quetta, Pakistan. He indicated that he traveled from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia to Damascus, Syria for a vacation. He indicated that this travel happened in the summer months of 2001.
    3. The detainee stated that once he arrived in Damascus, a person asked him if he needed a room. The detainee indicated that he did and the person took him to an apartment in downtown Damascus near Al Maija Circle and arranged the rental of a one bedroom apartment.
    4. The detainee went from Damascus to Tehran, Iran. He indicated that he purchased the ticket in Damascus. The detainee spent three days in Tehran trying to figure out in which city temporary marriages were taking place.
    5. The detainee went from Mashhad, Iran to Quetta, Pakistan via taxi. He stated that because he was not able to sleep the night before this trip, he slept the entire way from Mashhad, Iran to Quetta, Pakistan. He estimated that the trip took approximately four hours.
    6. They went directly to Quetta without any stops that he was aware of. The detainee recalled that it was during Ramadan when he and an associate arrived in Quetta.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL BIDNA, SA AD IBRAHAM SAAD**

## b. Connections/Associations

1. An operative told the detainee that he was en route to Pakistan to deliver an unspecified amount of money to pay relief to an organization. The operative was going to donate money to a refugee organization in Pakistan. The detainee indicated that the operative did not disclose any more information about the organization.
2. The operative was associated with the al Wafa organization. The al Wafa organization provided military training to recruits in anticipation of the American strike on Afghanistan; however the organization operated under the cover of being a relief and humanitarian organization.
3. The detainee stated that when he told the man of his digestive problems, the man suggested that they travel together to Pakistan. The man told him that he would like the company and it would be good for the detainee to go to a Pakistani hospital for medical treatment, indicating that Pakistani hospitals were more medically advanced than Iranian hospitals.

## c. Intent

1. The detainee stated that he does not want to go home. In the same sarcastic tone, he said that he is a terrorist.

## d. Other Relevant Data

1. While in Mashhad, Iran, the detainee toured and had fun. He would pay the maid at his hotel to bring him homemade alcohol and hash for smoking. After two to three months of drinking and living this new lifestyle, he developed digestive problems.
2. The detainee was questioned regarding his travel from Mashhad, Iran to Quetta, Pakistan, which he estimated to have taken four hours, although he was asleep. The detainee was provided a chance to explain how this trip could have occurred in light of the fact that Mashhad and Quetta are over 600 miles apart via travel through Afghanistan. The detainee related that he did not believe the taxi went through Afghanistan, but that they traveled through Iran to Pakistan. The detainee was made aware that that trip would be over 1,000 miles, which could not be completed in a four hours. The detainee stated that perhaps he was mistaken and the trip took longer, however he maintained that he was sleeping the entire way, even if the trip took 24 hours.
3. The detainee went to Quetta, Pakistan to dry out from his excessive drinking. Pakistan Police arrested him on or about 2 December 2001 for being an Arab and transferred him to United States authorities in Afghanistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL BIDNA, SA AD IBRAHAM SAAD**

- a. A foreign government identified the detainee to be of low intelligence or law enforcement value to the United States, and who was also unlikely to pose a terrorist threat to the United States or its interests.
  - b. The detainee denies any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
  - c. The detainee was queried regarding any knowledge or planning of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo Detention Facility with negative results.
  - d. The detainee claims no association with the jihad, al Qaida, Taliban in Afghanistan, or refugees from Afghanistan.
  - e. The detainee indicated that he heard about temporary marriage season in Iran for the Shiite Muslims. He then decided that he would travel to Iran to find a temporary wife (even though he is Sunni Muslim) to keep him company on his vacation.
  - f. The detainee stayed at this hotel in Mashhad, Iran for approximately two or three months. He estimated that in that time, he engaged in 10 to 20 temporary marriages. He was not able to recall any of his temporary wives' names.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

6 April 2006

TO: WASIM, WASM AWWAD UMAR

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF WASIM, WASM AWWAD UMAR

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. The detainee arrived in Afghanistan in late 2001.
    2. The detainee departed Saudi Arabia and drove to Damascus, Syria. The detainee then flew to Tehran and on to Mashhad, Iran. The detainee took a taxi to the Iran-Afghanistan border and reached Kandahar, Afghanistan.
    3. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan to provide aid to refugees.
    4. The detainee volunteered to work with the Al-Haramain Charity, a non-governmental organization.
    5. The detainee advised that he provided money through Al-Haramain to help poor people in Saudi Arabia.
    6. Executive Order 13224, which blocks property and prohibits transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism, designates Al-Haramain as a global terrorist entity.

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## b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee traveled to Iran and Afghanistan with another detainee.
2. The other detainee who traveled with the detainee of interest into Afghanistan was named on a list of al Qaida Mujahedin and the contents of the other detainee's trust account was found on files recovered on computer media seized during raids against al Qaida associated safe houses.

## c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee decided that the only way out of Afghanistan was through Pakistan. The detainee took a taxi to Pakistan where he was arrested. The detainee spent two months in a Pakistani prison, after which he was handed over to the Americans and held in a jail in Kandahar. The detainee spent four months in Kandahar prior to being transported to Cuba.
2. The detainee is a Saudi citizen.
3. The detainee stated that he used to think of the United States as a friend. The detainee advised that had changed his opinion since his capture. The detainee stated he was angry that he had been brought to this prison.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
  - a. The detainee claimed he had supported the group Al-Haramain but was not an official member.
  - b. The detainee denied exchanging Ryals for any other currency. The detainee did not accept money from anyone to finance his travel.
  - c. The detainee did not know how or why his name might have been found in an al Qaida safe house, and stated that this was not true, that this was a lie.
  - d. The detainee stated the money he distributed to needy people in Afghanistan was only for food and medical treatment, not for military purposes.
  - e. The detainee said he did not associate with Taliban or al Qaida members. The detainee stated he would not have any desire to involve himself in any future activities hostile to the United States.
  - f. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.



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g. The detainee denied any knowledge or planning of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo Detention Facility.

h. The detainee claimed to have no affiliation with the al Qaida terrorist network, but indicated that he had provided funds to the non-governmental organization Al-Haramain in the past. The detainee claimed that the money was to support two Bangladeshi orphans.

i. The detainee denied having ever received military training.

j. The detainee advised that if released he would return to his family, farm and job.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

28 June 2006

TO: AL SIARI, ABDULLAH ALI SALIH AL DEBAKHA

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF  
AL SIARI, ABDULLAH ALI SALIH AL DEBAKHA

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. The detainee was a self-employed antiques dealer on a business trip to Singapore when he stopped in Pakistan to sell some rare books.
    2. The detainee was identified as being present at a guest house in Pakistan that was run by a known al Qaida member.
    3. In response to the ARB 1 Unclassified Summary, the detainee wrote that he was carrying 4,000 Kuwaiti Dinars, which is equivalent to \$13,000 United States Dollars. The detainee said that every business traveler must carry at least enough money to cover business, travel, and tourism expenses.
    4. The detainee flew to Islamabad, Pakistan on Pakistani Airlines. He stayed in Islamabad for five to six days.
    5. While in Pakistan the detainee met an older man who had \$27,000 United States Dollars to donate to the needy. The older man asked the detainee to travel with him to Red Crescent Camp in Pakistan to fulfill their obligation to help the poor.
    6. The detainee and an older man were stopped at a Pakistani checkpoint where authorities found some money on them.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SIARI, ABDULLAH ALI SALIH AL DEBAKHA**

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was arrested with a suspected member of al Wafa.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee admitted he has been using the name of his friend in order to hide his true identity.

2. The detainee admitted another man went to the passport office for the detainee, filled out the necessary paperwork and brought the detainee his passport.

3. A name closely resembling one of the detainee's known aliases, the year and place of the detainee's birth and the detainee's parents phone number was found on a military training camp application discovered in an office in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

4. The detainee admitted to having a satellite phone with him at time of capture. The satellite phone was for calling the detainee's family.

5. On 2 January 2006 the detainee said that when he returned from Pakistan to Saudi Arabia he was to contact supporters of Usama bin Laden and receive specific instructions on how, when, and where to smuggle weapons out of Yemen.

6. Usama bin Laden's supporters told the detainee the weapons were SAM-7's and possibly other missiles. Usama bin Laden's people would give the detainee a location for the pickup and drop off points once the detainee earned their trust.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a. The detainee denied knowing that his travel partner was the director of the al Wafa Office in Herat, Afghanistan or that his partner was giving money and supplies to al Qaida.

- b. The detainee swore that he had no relations with al Qaida, the Taliban, or al Wafa. The detainee reiterated that he had no knowledge of his travel partners connection to al Wafa.

- c. The detainee denied entering Pakistan illegally through Jordan, Syria, and Iran. He claimed that the only other countries he has visited besides Pakistan were Qatar, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates. The detainee denied entering Afghanistan.

- d. The detainee stated he used to suffer from multiple personalities and that is why he has provided so many different names.

## **UNCLASSIFIED**

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF  
AL SIARI, ABDULLAH ALI SALIH AL DEBAKHA**

e. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001. The detainee also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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**000526**

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

11 April 2006

TO: AL GHAMIDI, SAID ALI ABDALLAH AL FARHA

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL GHAMIDI, SAID ALI ABDALLAH  
AL FARHA

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. A source has identified the detainee as being a recruiter for al Qaida.

2. An al Qaida recruit said the detainee assisted him with travel to Afghanistan.

3. The detainee was reportedly designated as a high priority detainee.

4. The detainee claims he traveled to Pakistan to teach at the Kubbar Mosque, also known as the Masjid al Quba Mosque in Quetta, Pakistan, operated by the Tablighi Jama'at organization.

5. The detainee claims he left Saudi Arabia with 5,000 Saudi Riyals. The airline tickets cost him 2,000 Saudi Riyals and he was living on the remaining 3,000 Saudi Riyals. He stated that this was his own money which he saved for the trip.

6. In Lahore, Pakistan the detainee stayed at the Hotel Dubai for two days. The hotel stay cost him 3,000 Pakistani Rupees.

7. From the Hotel Dubai, the detainee made arrangements for an open round trip ticket from Lahore to Quetta, Pakistan. The arrangements cost a little more than 500 Pakistani Rupees.

b. Connections/Associations

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ISN 341

# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL GHAMIDI, SAID ALI ABDALLAH AL FARHA**

After two weeks in Quetta, Pakistan the detainee claims he was picked up and driven to the Masjid al Quba Mosque in Quetta, Pakistan. The detainee was assigned to teach there for one week. The detainee was to contact the administrator of the Tablighi Jama'at organization, who was also in charge of the Masjid al Quba Mosque.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

b. The detainee stated that he was never an al Qaida member nor did he have an association with Afghanistan.

c. The detainee stated that he was never a member of Jama'at al-Tabligh or any other group.

d. The detainee denies any ties to the Taliban.

e. The detainee claims he was a student of religion at the Baha College in Saudi Arabia. The detainee claims he taught at the Markaz Tablik and did not travel to other locations because he did not speak Urdu.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

5 May 2006

TO: AL QURBI, MUHAMMAD MUBARAK SALIM AL SHADAKH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF  
AL QURBI, MUHAMMAD MUBARAK SALIM AL SHADAKH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee traveled extensively during the period of December 2000 through November 2001. Multiple visits to Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and United Arab Emirates, a one-week stop in Syria, and a five-month stay in Malaysia are recorded in his passport.

2. The detainee was observed onboard a Taliban airplane ferrying fighters bound for northern Afghanistan.

3. The detainee was identified as an al Qaida member responsible for smuggling weapons, al Qaida personnel, and drugs into Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.

4. While in Afghanistan the detainee transported Mujahedin fighters from the Hamza al Ghamdi guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan to the front lines in Bagram, Afghanistan.

b. Training

1. The detainee was reported to have trained at the al Farouq training camp in tactics, weapons, and explosives in 2000.

2. The detainee's passport, seized during his arrest, contains forged entry/exit stamps for Malaysia. These forged stamps were often provided to al Qaida members who trained at the al Farouq camp.

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ISN 342

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL QURBI, MUHAMMAD MUBARAK SALIM AL SHADAKH**

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was identified as having worked directly for al Qaida under al Ghamdi.
2. A former bodyguard of Usama bin Laden identified the detainee as an al Qaida member.
3. The detainee was identified as being part of a security element associated with senior operative Abd al Rahman al Nashiri.
4. Al Nashiri is a key suspect in the U.S.S. Cole bombings and, according to Abu Zubaydah, was most recently planning retaliatory attacks against the United States government with Khalid Shaykh Mohammed.
5. The detainee attended a religious meeting of Jamat-al-Tabligh at a mosque in Leeward, Pakistan. During his stay at the mosque, the detainee talked to members of Jamat-al-Tabligh about the Koran and Al-Dawa.
6. The Jamat-al-Tabligh is a Pakistan-based Islamic missionary organization believed to be used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists, including members of al Qaida.

d. Intent

1. The detainee was identified as having fought in northern Afghanistan against General Dostum and other parties considered enemies of the Taliban.
  2. The detainee swore bayat to Usama bin Laden.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

The detainee claims to have no specific knowledge of the Taliban, al Qaida, or other extremist activities in the countries he visited. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or its interests.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.



# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

4 September 2006

TO: AL HAJ, SAMI MUHEIDINE MOHAMED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HAJ, SAMI MUHEIDINE  
MOHAMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he applied for a visa to come to the United States through the visa lottery program in 1993, 1996 and 1998. The detainee wanted to come to the United States to work in journalism. Once the detainee was hired by Al-Jazeera, the detainee stopped his attempts to travel to the United States to pursue a career in journalism.

2. The detainee stated that he found the job at Union Beverage Company through an advertisement in the newspaper. The detainee was hired for a three month probationary period as an executive secretary.

3. The detainee founded a company in Azerbaijan named Samico Services. The company was registered with the Azerbaijan government on 20 May 1999 with the stated purpose of producing, stockpiling and selling goods for national consumption as well as tourism and other activities.

4. The detainee stated that in order to register a new company, the authorities required a passport stating the registree was a businessman. The authorities also required that the registree have registered business in another country. Because the detainee did not have a business, he used another business' registration documents. The detainee additionally falsified the documents to show himself as a co-owner and show his passport to read businessman vice accountant.

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UNCLASSIFIED

ISN 345

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HAJ, SAMI MUHEIDINE MOHAMED**

5. The detainee stated that he delivered 120,000 United States Dollars to a business partner for a flour factory and 100,000 United States Dollars to the director of Al-Haramayn. The business partner was responsible for obtaining the proper registration for the flour factory from Azerbaijan authorities, so the 120,000 United States Dollars was supposed to get the land and the machines for the factory.

6. The detainee stated that he was arrested in Azerbaijan for the transport of 220,000 United States Dollars for what he was told was a humanitarian mission which instead was destined for Chechen rebels.

7. The detainee stated he had twenty-two 10,000 United States Dollar bills carried by his wife under her belly.

8. The detainee stated that in March or April 2000, he left the Union Beverage Company and went to work for Al-Jazeera Media in Doha, Qatar.

9. The detainee stated that he was hired at Al-Jazeera because he agreed to go to Chechnya to do a story.

10. The detainee stated that on 11 October 2001, he flew from Doha, Qatar to Quetta, Pakistan. On or about 13 October 2001, the detainee received a visa from the Afghanistan Embassy to enter their country. On or about 16 or 17 October 2001, the detainee and a co-worker went to Kandahar, Afghanistan.

11. The detainee stated that in early December 2001, while attempting to return to Afghanistan, he was stopped at the border by Pakistan security at Chaman, Pakistan and was unable to obtain exit visas. The detainee stated was told that Pakistani security received a facsimile that questioned his travel documents. The detainee stated according to Pakistan security, the passport he had in his possession did not agree with the Pakistan records.

### b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated that while he was working at Union Beverage Company, he interacted with the individual in charge of distribution of juice in Azerbaijan.

2. In March 2003, the individual who was in charge of juice distribution in Azerbaijan was under investigation for possible ties to terrorism.

3. The Union Beverage Company has been associated with known Bosnian and Chechen Mujahed.

4. The detainee stated he interacted with an individual who he heard was arrested in Germany in September 1998 and subsequently extradited to the United States.

# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HAJ, SAMI MUHEIDINE MOHAMED**

5. The detainee stated that he stayed in Kandahar, Afghanistan for 29 days. While there, the detainee and a co-worker interviewed the Treasury Minister of the Taliban, the Minister of Electricity, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

6. The detainee stated he interviewed a man who identified himself as a member of the al Qaida.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denies any involvement or membership in any Islamic extremist organization, including the Muslim Brotherhood and the Council of Shura. The detainee denies any knowledge of al Qaida operations in Chechnya. The detainee denies any knowledge that his former boss at the Union Beverage Company was involved with any al Qaida operations.

b. The detainee stated that he had no spiritual or financial bond with his employer. The detainee added that he thought of his job with Union Beverage as being a simple, non-significant position.

c. The detainee stated he wants to return to his family and resume his position as a father and provider. The detainee noted that he would exercise caution in future assignments with Al-Jazeera. The detainee hopes to return to Doha, Qatar, with his family. The detainee stated that he harbors no ill feelings against the United States.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

12 April 2006

TO: HAWSAWI, AMRAN BAQUR MOHAMMED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HAWSAWI, AMRAN BAQUR  
MOHAMMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee indicated knowledge of Sheikh Hamoud Shouib Ouqula. Sheikh Ouqula is well known in Saudi Arabia as a spiritual leader who issued religious fatwas for Muslims to go and fight for and with the Taliban in Afghanistan.

2. The detainee left his wife and family with his father in Saudi Arabia to travel to Afghanistan primarily to spread teachings of the Koran. The detainee felt obligated to fulfill religious principles and stated that he considered it a Dawa.

3. The detainee left Saudi Arabia in September 2001 for Afghanistan. The detainee traveled through Syria, Iran, and Pakistan. After arriving in a border area near Kandahar, Afghanistan, the detainee was wounded in an air raid.

b. Training

1. The detainee stated he traveled to Afghanistan to teach but then later stated that he went to Afghanistan for training.

2. The detainee has been in business for ten to eleven years. The detainee's business assisted companies in obtaining official documents, including passports, for employees who have transferred residences.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HAWSAWI, AMRAN BAQUR MOHAMMED**

## c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee traveled from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia to Damascus, Syria. The detainee proceeded to Tehran, Iran and then to Mashhad, Iran. Finally, the detainee illegally crossed the border into Afghanistan.

2. The detainee was an instructor in an Afghan refugee camp when the United States bombardment caused a shrapnel injury to the detainee.

3. The detainee was apprehended in possession of a passport from Saudi Arabia that appeared altered. There are concerns with regard to passport stamps being altered, as this may indicate a possible al Qaida connection.

## d. Other Relevant Data

The detainee can return to the passport and official documents business if released to Saudi Arabia.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee claims he was in Afghanistan for seven days looking for refugees to teach the Koran.

b. The detainee denied any knowledge of training camps in Afghanistan or of the al Qaida organization.

c. The detainee claims to have never met anyone associated with the Taliban or the al Qaida organization. The detainee claims that no one in Saudi Arabia has talked about those groups.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

29 March 2006

TO: AL HIZANI, ABD

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HIZANI, ABD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated that after reading an online newspaper he became intrigued by an advertisement recruiting Muslims to join the cause by going on jihad. The advertisement regarded topics such as war; the Taliban; the struggle against the Northern Alliance; Kabul, Afghanistan; and the struggle between the Afghans and the Russians. It was then that the detainee secretly decided that he wanted to become involved in this religious duty. The detainee also stated that his preference was to go on jihad to Chechnya.

2. The detainee's best source of information about jihad came from immigrant Afghans trying to find work in Saudi Arabia. The detainee met an Afghan male five times and discussed the situation in Afghanistan. The Afghan told the detainee that fighting was still going on in Afghanistan and that poor and needy Muslims struggled on a daily basis and needed help, and that many Saudis traveled to Afghanistan to join the jihad and assist the existing government of the Taliban against its enemies. The Afghan said the people of Afghanistan are extremely thankful to Saudis for this aid. The Afghan encouraged the detainee to volunteer and advised a travel route through Pakistan into Afghanistan.

3. Once in Afghanistan the detainee stayed at an Arab safe house and met an older man who was in charge of the house. The old man asked the detainee the reason for his travel. The detainee told the old man what he knew from the advertisements that the detainee had read. The old man asked the detainee if he was there to join the jihad, if he was there as an immigrant, or just a visitor. The detainee told the old man that he wished to join the jihad. The old man told the detainee that he could stay there and that in three days he would be taken to a training camp and be given training at no cost. The detainee stayed in the house for three days and then a small

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## **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HIZANI, ABD**

bus came to the house. The detainee and others loaded the bus and traveled for roughly 30 minutes until they arrived at the al Farouq camp.

4. While training at al Farouq, the detainee injured his back during a rock climbing exercise. Due to this injury and the increasing difficulty of the training, the detainee decided to volunteer to join the fight in Kabul.

5. Following training at al Farouq, the detainee said he was assigned to Bagram, Afghanistan where he spent more than two months.

6. The detainee said that following his time in Bagram, he was transferred to the front at Khvajeh Ghar, which the detainee described as a much larger front than at Bagram. The detainee remained at this front for about three months, serving with a different group of soldiers until the United States bombardment started in early October 2001. The detainee noted that he purchased his own weapon, a Kalashnikov rifle, for about 100 United States Dollars. The detainee also purchased his own ammunition.

7. In late 2001, the detainee was assigned to the rear echelon area of Kabul, Afghanistan in support of Taliban forces.

### b. Training

1. The detainee received weapons training at the al Farouq training camp for six weeks.

2. At al Farouq, the detainee received training on the Kalashnikov rifle and the pistol; physical training; classes in Islamic studies, such as jihad and how to be a martyr; and how to perform guard duties.

3. The detainee's name was on a document that lists over 150 al Qaida members scheduled for tactics, artillery, security, snipers, and anti-aircraft training dated March 2001 by the Office of Mujahideen Affairs. The detainee's name was listed under artillery class 2.

### c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee's name was found on a document listing 324 Arabic names, aliases, and nationalities recovered from safe house raids associated with suspected al Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan.

2. The detainee spent ten months with the Taliban prior to being captured.

3. A source identified the detainee and claimed that they were in the same group of twenty fighters. The detainee was briefly on the front lines in Kandahar. According to the source, the detainee was very sick and was lost during the retreat to Konduz when the source saw the

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HIZANI, ABD**

detainee drop to the ground and stop walking. Everyone assumed the detainee had been picked up and/or killed.

4. A source claims that the detainee came from the al Farouq camp with the Arabs and was from the north line group.

5. While assigned to the rear echelon area of Kabul, Afghanistan, the detainee served as a security guard under a member of al Qaida.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and the detainee also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

**Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

31 March 2006

TO: AL SHIHRI, SA ID ALI JABIR AL KHATHIM

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SHIHRI, SA ID ALI JABIR AL  
KHATHIM

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. The detainee is on a watch list for facilitating travel for Saudis willing to go to Afghanistan through Iran by providing fake passports to those unable to get one.
    2. Prior to this trip, the detainee and a committee traveled to a refugee camp in Chaman, located on the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan, to observe the relief work.
    3. According to a foreign government service, the detainee went to Afghanistan in 1421 (2000/2001) for two months.
    4. The detainee said he decided to do charity work in Pakistan after he heard a speech by Shaykh Abdullah al-Jibrin at the Al-Rajeh mosque in Saudi Arabia and saw videos of Afghan refugees.
    5. Several Arabs detained while crossing into Pakistan stated a fatwa by Shaykh Abdallah bin Jibrin influenced them to go to Afghanistan and fight alongside the Taliban.
    6. The detainee took 1900 United States Dollars with him, and he left Saudi Arabia in the month of Ramadan.
    7. The detainee left Saudi Arabia for Bahrain on 23 September 2001.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SHIHRI, SA ID ALI JABIR AL KHATHIM**

8. An individual stated that he traveled to Bahrain with the detainee and two others. The detainee gave this individual and another person 7000 Saudi Riyals for financial support to travel to Afghanistan.

9. The detainee met with a group of extremists in Mashad, Iran following the 11 September 2001 attacks and briefed them on entry procedures into Afghanistan via the Al-Tayyibat crossing.

10. The detainee traveled with an Afghan driver, another Saudi man who worked with the Red Crescent, and a member from the Saudi embassy in Pakistan, in a vehicle taking supplies to a camp in Afghanistan. The camp was about 5 kilometers from the border between Spin Buldak, Afghanistan and Quetta, Pakistan.

## b. Training

1. The detainee trained in urban warfare at the Libyan Camp north of Kabul, Afghanistan.
2. One of the detainee's aliases was among 100 names taken from Afghanistan-based military training camp applications located at an Arab office in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

## c. Connections/Associations

1. In Pakistan the detainee stated he met a Saudi diplomat from the consulate in Lahore, who advised the detainee go to the Red Crescent hospital in Quetta, Pakistan to offer his services. The person the detainee met was actually the director of the Herat, Afghanistan al Wafa office, not a Saudi diplomat.

2. Wafa al-Igatha al-Islamia is an Islamic extremist nongovernmental organization that claims to serve humanitarian purposes. However, Wafa has provided logistical support to Usama bin Laden's al Qaida organization, and many of the documents found at the Herat, Afghanistan al Wafa house pertained to military and terrorist training.

3. One of the detainee's aliases and phone number was found in the pocket litter of the Karachi, Pakistan manager of Wafa al-Igatha al-Islamia.

4. An individual stated that the detainee instigated him and another person to assassinate a writer based on a fatwa issued by Shaykh Hamud bin 'Uqla. The individual traveled with the detainee and another person from Kabul, Afghanistan to Iran, where they split up. The detainee and the other person left for Kuwait.

5. Sheikh Hamud al-Uqqla was a Saudi mufti who issued a fatwa calling for jihad in Afghanistan. Al-Uqqla condoned the 11 September 2001 attacks against the United States. He also helped raise money for Usama bin Laden until his death in Saudi Arabia in 2001.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SHIHRI, SA ID ALI JABIR AL KHATHIM**

6. Another individual was directed by Shaykh Hamud al-'Uqla to go to Afghanistan. 'Uqla provided the individual with money, an airline ticket to Syria, and the phone number of the detainee.

#### d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee's alias was on a list of Arabs apprehended at a Pakistani border crossing in December 2001. The detainee claimed to be Yemeni at this time and was taken to a civil hospital in Quetta, Pakistan.

2. The detainee was evacuated to the Red Crescent Hospital in Quetta, Pakistan and ultimately taken into custody by the Pakistan government. The hospital staff called the detainee by his alias while he was being treated, but the detainee does not know why.

3. The detainee was in the Saudi hospital for about a month and a half. He and four other men were awaiting a plane to come and take them back to Saudi Arabia. However, when they were moved from the hospital they were put on a plane and taken to Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee was there a total of about 10 days before being brought to Cuba.

4. The detainee heard about al Qaida quite a bit in Afghanistan and even watched Usama bin Laden on television. The detainee liked Usama bin Laden's message, and the detainee believed that Israel committed the attacks of 11 September 2001.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee claims that he traveled to Iran once to purchase carpets for his store in Riyadh.

b. The detainee denied any involvement or knowledge of assistance provided to jihadists traveling from Iran to Afghanistan.

c. The detainee stated he had no criminal background, or explanation why he may be on any type of watch list. The detainee did suggest that he may have had unpaid taxes and rent on his business that he had in Saudi Arabia. The detainee did not travel to Afghanistan at any time prior to the one travel during which he was captured and turned over to United States Forces.

d. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

e. The detainee denied knowledge of being with known or unknown terrorists.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SHIHRI, SA ID ALI JABIR AL KHATHIM**

f. The detainee denied knowledge of al Wafa or its objectives. Furthermore, he claimed to have never heard of al Wafa or al Qaida until he arrived at Camp Delta.

g. The detainee stated that he felt Usama bin Laden had no business representing Islam, nor did he think Usama bin Laden was alive any longer. The detainee believed Usama bin Laden separated himself from Islam, therefore Usama bin Laden separated himself from the people.

h. The detainee stated that he was just a Muslim, not a terrorist.

i. The detainee related that if released, he would like to return to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia wherein he would reunite with his family. The detainee stated he would attempt to work at his family's furniture store if it is still in business.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

5 September 2006

TO: JABAR, JOWAD

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF JABAR, JOWAD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee said he fled to Iran after committing a crime in Iraq. The detainee stayed in Iran for approximately 14 months. The detainee met an Iraqi smuggler that helped him and his family to a border town near Quetta, Pakistan. Then over a period of three months, the detainee lived in Karachi, Quetta, and Islamabad, Pakistan. While in Pakistan, the detainee contacted the United Nations for the purpose of requesting political asylum in Pakistan.

2. A source said that the detainee decided to create a fighting unit comprised predominantly of Iraqis and ethnic Arabs from within Afghanistan. The detainee intended to sell the unit's services to the highest bidding warlord. The detainee would promise them food, clothing, housing, transportation and documentation if they would join his unit. If they refused, the detainee turned them over to the Taliban as spies and subsequent imprisonment and torture.

3. A source said that the detainee assembled a group of fighters that he had recruited from the village of Koshilibad, Afghanistan. The detainee took his group of fighters to the front lines to fight against the Northern Alliance.

b. Training

1. A source said that the detainee was a low ranking member of the Iraqi Interior Ministry Police from approximately 1982 to 1986. In 1986, the detainee transferred to the Fourth Corps of the Iraqi Army and was a simple soldier who fought in the war against Iran.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

### SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF JABAR, JOWAD

2. The detainee said that from 1985 to 1991, he served in the Iraqi military's 702nd Brigade, a light infantry brigade, which utilized the Kalashnikov rifle and the Russian PK machine gun.

3. The detainee admits to knowing how to interrogate in Arabic.

#### c. Connections/Associations

1. A source said the detainee was a member of the Amin Emergency Response Group while in Iraq. This group was responsible for tracking down people opposed to Saddam Hussein and then torturing or killing them.

2. A source said that the detainee was an important military commander with the Taliban in Mazar-e-Sharif, and because of his prominence a bodyguard frequently accompanied the detainee.

3. A source said that the detainee worked as a recruiter for the Taliban and was an interrogator for the Taliban Police in Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan. The detainee's boss reported directly to Usama bin Laden, and the next person under his boss in the chain of command was the detainee.

4. A source said that the detainee worked with the Taliban Estakbarat and operated as a conduit between the Taliban Estakbarat in Mazar-e-Sharif and the former president of Iraq. The detainee traveled via a secret vehicular route between Iraq and Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan. The detainee made a trip to get supplies from Iraq. Upon his return, the detainee distributed the supplies to members of the Taliban.

5. A source said that the detainee was the chief of the Taliban's interrogation office at Mazar, Afghanistan. The detainee was responsible for overseeing and conducting interrogations. The detainee had approximately 10 to 15 interrogators working for him. Afghans that were interrogated were mostly just questioned and sometimes beaten. Uzbeks were often beaten or tortured. Shiites were almost always tortured.

6. A source said that the detainee was the Director of Intelligence for the Taliban at Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan.

7. A source said that a few months prior to 11 September 2001, the detainee sent an associate to Usama bin Laden's house in Khandahar, Afghanistan for money. At the meeting with Usama bin Laden, the associate received 11,000 United States Dollars. The detainee used this money to dig wells in the Mazar, Afghanistan. The associate also received 100,000 United States Dollars from al Wafa for the detainee to build a bridge, repair roads and buy a car.

8. Al Wafa is under sanction by United States Executive Order 13224 to block property and prohibiting transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF JABAR, JOWAD**

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee recalled that the Governor of Mazar-e-Sharif provided him with a permit to get his telephone turned on. The detainee explained that satellite telephone service require a permit and a setup fee of 300 United States Dollars. The detainee said he asked and received assistance from the Taliban because he had to feed his family.

2. The detainee said that several times between 1988 and 1990 he was absent without leave during his military service. As a result the detainee was imprisoned at a military prison for a one year and nine months in Amara, Iraq and then discharged.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee said that he never worked for the Taliban, but that members of the Taliban provided food and shelter for him and his family.

b. The detainee said that he was not the Director of Intelligence for the Taliban, and other detainees are saying he is because they do not like him.

c. The detainee said he is a Shiite Muslim and that the Taliban disliked his religion so why would they place him in charge.

d. The detainee said that he was arrested at his home. The detainee stated that a commander in the Northern Alliance asked him for a bribe to avoid turning him over to the American Forces.

e. The detainee said that he helped the Northern Alliance against the Taliban.

f. The detainee said that he knew nothing about the planned attack on the United States before 11 September 2001.

g. The detainee stated that he had never used a weapon against the United States or the Northern Alliance.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

**Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

1 August 2006

TO: AL-SHAMIRI, MUSTAFA ABDUL QOWI ABDUL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL-SHAMIRI, MUSTAFA ABDUL QOWI  
ABDUL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. The detainee fought in the 1994 Yemen revolution. The detainee served for two months at Hadramut, Yemen in the Eighth Saiqa Brigade.
    2. The detainee participated in the Bosnian jihad.
    3. A source identified the detainee as being at a house in Sanaa, Yemen that was an al Qaida group meeting place and used for planning the USS Cole bombing.
    4. The detainee decided to go to Afghanistan during Ramadan in January 2001 to follow a fatwa.
    5. The detainee flew alone from Yemen to Pakistan after buying a plane ticket with his own money and money from another individual. The detainee traveled by car from Pakistan to Afghanistan.
    6. According to a foreign government source, the individual who gave the detainee money for travel was an al Qaida member.

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ISN 434



# UNCLASSIFIED

## **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL-SHAMIRI, MUSTAFA ABDUL QOWI ABDUL**

7. The detainee served on the lines of the Omar Saif Center. The detainee remained at this position for six months. Shortly before leaving this position, the detainee attended a lecture by Usama bin Laden.

8. After six months at the Omar Saif Center, the detainee, along with the rest of his unit, moved up to Kunduz, Afghanistan. After spending six months fighting in Kunduz, the unit retreated to Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan.

9. The detainee was captured approximately 6 March 2002 in Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan while traveling with six others in an automobile.

### b. Training

1. The detainee received ten days of basic military training at Abyan Volunteer Camp in order to fight in the regional civil war. The detainee's training consisted of learning to shoot small arms including the Kalashnikov rifle, PK general purpose machine-gun, rocket-propelled grenades and DSHK heavy machine-gun.

2. The detainee claimed that because of his military training in Yemen, he did not have to go through any training in Afghanistan and that he could go directly to the lines.

3. The detainee stated that he was supposed to attend al Farouq Training Camp but was not mandated because of his previous training.

4. The detainee received specialized training in Kabul, Afghanistan.

5. A source stated that the detainee and four other students took a class on electronics to learn how to make a circuit to be used as a remote control for remote-controlled explosives.

### c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was a frequent visitor of a guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan.

2. The guest house was owned and operated by al Qaida. This was a safe house for Saudi Arabians and Yemeni al Qaida members.

3. A source stated that he remembered seeing the detainee at a hospital in Konduz, Afghanistan sometime before 11 September 2001.

4. While on the front lines, the detainee served under a leader who reported to the commander of the Omar Saif Center.

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## **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL-SHAMIRI, MUSTAFA ABDUL QOWI ABDUL**

5. According to a foreign government source, the individual that the detainee served under at the front lines was an al Qaida member.

6. The detainee's name was found on a document listing 324 Arabic names, aliases and nationalities recovered from safe house raids connected with suspected al Qaida in Pakistan.

### d. Intent

1. The detainee stated that the Koran strictly prohibits violence and acts of terrorism. However, the detainee believes that killing in the name of jihad is acceptable.

2. The detainee stated that if he were to ever witness anyone mishandling the Koran he would take care of it and retaliate.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee claimed that when the uprising at Mazar-e-Sharif occurred, he was outside the main compound in an interrogation facility and was not part of the attack.

b. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks.

c. The detainee stated that if he were to be released from United States custody, he would return home and get married. The detainee claimed that he has not heard of any plans to harm the guards or any plans to escape from Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The detainee stated that he would report any such information to United States personnel.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

# UNCLASSIFIED

**Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

8 February 2006

TO: AL USAYMI, NAYIF FAHD MUTLIQ

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL USAYMI, NAYIF FAHD MUTLIQ

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. In late 2000, the detainee read a fatwah which instructed young Muslim males to join the Jihad in Chechnya. The fatwah stated the Russians were slaughtering Muslim brothers in the region and fighting there was considered justified in accordance with the Koran, as well as meeting the status of Martyr if killed. The detainee felt inspired by the fatwah and began to seriously consider taking a break from college to perform his Muslim duties.

2. After watching a recruiting video made by the Taliban the detainee decided to go to Afghanistan to fulfill his religious obligation to fight the Jihad.

3. In early February 2001, the detainee met with an individual at a mosque in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia where the detainee expressed his desire to go to Chechnya.

4. On 9 February 2001 the detainee met with an individual and they discussed training in Afghanistan for a Jihad in Chechnya. The individual provided the detainee with specific instructions on obtaining a Pakistani Visa and what route to take.

5. The detainee traveled to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia and then to Manama, Bahrain. From there the detainee traveled to Karachi, Pakistan. On 7 March 2001 the detainee traveled to Quetta, Pakistan and stayed at a Taliban guesthouse.

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ISN 436

# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL USAYMI, NAYIF FAHD MUTLIQ**

6. On 11 March 2001 the detainee traveled through the town of Chaman, Pakistan, which lies on the border with Afghanistan. The detainee arrived in Kandahar, Afghanistan where he stayed at an unnamed Madafa.

7. While at the Madafa in Kandahar the detainee met two individuals. The detainee was provided with a briefing on the history and purpose of the Taliban. The detainee told these individuals he wanted to join the Taliban and could travel to Kabul.

8. The detainee spent approximately ten months in Afghanistan. The detainee traveled to Khowst, Konduz, Khawajaghar, Mazar-E-Sharif, and finally, Kandahar.

## b. Training

1. The detainee stated he did not receive training at a camp. Instead, the detainee received about one month of weapons training by the Taliban near the front line at Kabul.

2. The detainee trained in a small area near the front line at Khawajaghar, Afghanistan. The detainee trained with a Khalishnikov, a Beka, a rocket-propelled grenade launcher and a bolt-action rifle.

## c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was identified as a Saudi whose alias is 'Khabaab al Nejdi.' The detainee was identified as owning a pick-up truck. The detainee was identified to have gone to al Iraqi's office.

2. Al-Iraqi is one of Usama Bin Laden's closest Commanders and the person in charge of al Qaida fighters in the Afghani northern front.

## d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was identified as having trained at al Farouq.

2. The detainee was issued a Khalishnikov but never saw any fighting because he was stationed at the rear of the front line.

3. The detainee knows all of the Arabs who were fighting on the north line. The detainee was in Afghanistan for a long time and eventually escaped from Jenki castle.

4. The detainee was captured on 6 January 2002 at Mazar-E-Sharif.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL USAYMI, NAYIF FAHD MUTLIQ**

- a. The detainee stated he did not receive any explosives training.
  - b. The detainee was never approached to join al Qaida nor did he know anyone who was with al Qaida. The detainee never gave "Bayat" to Usama Bin Laden.
  - c. The detainee never saw anyone killed until the uprising at the prison camp at Mazar-E-Sharif where he was imprisoned after he surrendered to General Dolstrom's Forces.
  - d. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

4 July 2006

TO: AL NASIR, FAISAL SATTA

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL NASIR, FAISAL SATTA

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee was not recruited, but volunteered for jihad. The detainee, as a member of the Wahabi Muslim Sect, joined the Taliban, not al Qaida, to fight the Northern Alliance. The detainee stated that Allah and he controlled his fate.

2. The detainee stated he committed himself to jihad to fulfill his religious obligations. The detainee liked the idea of being a martyr for Islam and accepted the fact that he might die.

3. The detainee expected no benefits from joining jihad other than the opportunity to fulfill his Islamic duty. The detainee was willing to die for Islam and jihad was part of his religious education.

4. The detainee received money from his family, mainly his parents, to pay for the trip to Afghanistan. The detainee's father sold his car to fund the detainee's trip to Afghanistan.

5. The detainee's purpose for traveling to Afghanistan was to obtain training to fight in Chechnya.

6. The detainee's original intent was to travel to Chechnya for jihad.

7. The detainee departed via airplane from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia to Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and then from Karachi, Pakistan to Quetta, Pakistan. Once in Quetta, Pakistan the detainee met with an operative looking for people who were traveling for jihad in Afghanistan.

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## **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL NASIR, FAISAL SATTI**

The detainee traveled by vehicle from Quetta, Pakistan to the Pakistan/Afghanistan border enroute to the al Farouq training camp in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

8. During the detainee's stay in a Kandahar, Afghanistan safe house, the detainee and others viewed a motivational jihad videotape designed to motivate them for jihad in Afghanistan.

9. The detainee traveled to the al Farouq training camp in Kandahar, Afghanistan by bus with fifteen other men. After completing two weeks of training, the detainee departed al Farouq training camp enroute to Kabul, Afghanistan with a destination for the front line. The detainee was moved from Kabul, Afghanistan to the front line in an unidentified white airplane.

10. The detainee was assigned to the front lines and guarded against an invasion from the Northern Alliance.

11. The detainee spent approximately two months in the forward area pulling guard and fighting against the Northern Alliance. The wounded detainee was transported to Masar e Sharif, Afghanistan because of the advancing Northern Alliance Forces.

12. The detainee played no role other than that of a foot soldier jihadist.

### **b. Training**

The detainee completed two weeks of training at the al Farouq training camp in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee trained on the Kalashnikov rifle, PK machine gun, RPG, and pistol.

### **c. Connections/Associations**

1. The detainee's friend introduced him to a recruiter who recommended that the detainee should travel to Afghanistan to train with the Taliban. The recruiter claimed that training with the Taliban was a good way to get to jihad.

2. The detainee was identified as serving on the back and front lines.

3. The detainee's name was identified on documents recovered from al Qaida safe houses in Pakistan.

4. The detained stated he liked Usama bin Laden's message.

### **d. Detainee Actions and Statements**

The detainee stated that the enemy of Islam is any nonbeliever. The detainee stated that a Shite could not be friends of Wahibi Islam. The detainee felt this way before he joined jihad.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL NASIR, FAISAL SATTI**

The detainee stated that other than Islamic law, there is no other rule he is expected to follow while with the Taliban.

e. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated that Usama bin Laden was responsible for 11 September 2001.
2. The detainee was assigned with twelve to eighteen people and the detainee was not in charge of anyone.
3. The detainee surrendered to the Northern Alliance at Masar e Sharif, Afghanistan. He spent nearly fifty days in the Masar e Sharif prison, Afghanistan.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
  - a. The detainee never had a chance to fight and never killed anyone. The detainee fired two shots in the air to see the colors from the fired tracer rounds.
  - b. The detainee never pledged a Bayat to Usama bin Laden. The detainee only learned about al Qaida when interrogators began questioning him about their activities.
  - c. The detainee denied membership in al Qaida.
  - d. The detainee initially answered that he would leave Saudi Arabia with a friend for jihad, but changed his mind when the question was rephrased.
  - e. The detainee has no opinion, either good or bad, of Usama bin Laden.
  - f. The detainee wants to be released to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia near his family where he would get a good job.
  - g. A delegation from a foreign government identified the detainee to be of low intelligence or law enforcement value to the United States. The foreign delegation stated that they would take custody of the detainee for possible prosecution as soon as the United States released the detainee.
  - h. The detainee had no knowledge of any terrorist attacks and would never have wanted that to happen.
  - i. The detainee denied having any knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL NASIR, FAISAL SATTI**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

**Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

11 July 2006

TO: AL HALA, ALD MOHAMMAD

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HALA, ALD MOHAMMAD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. The detainee had been taught the doctrine of jihad in the mosque he attended, specifically that it was a Muslim's duty to wage jihad against anyone who killed Muslims. During the eighth month of Ramadan, in the Islamic year of 1421, the detainee decided to join the jihad.
    2. The detainee thought about fighting the jihad in Chechnya as it was considered a greater jihad than Afghanistan. The detainee considered Chechnya a greater jihad as the fight was not against other Muslims as in Afghanistan. The detainee could not arrange travel to Chechnya and settled on Afghanistan for his jihad.
    3. The detainee was not responding to any specific fatwa and had not been directed to go to Afghanistan by anyone. Rather, the detainee came to his own decision that it was his duty as a Muslim to join the jihad in defense of other Muslims. He left Riyadh with his Saudi passport, his Saudi national identification card and 7,000 Saudi Riyals.
    4. The detainee was aware that the best way into Afghanistan was through Iran. So, he and his friend went to Riyadh which took them through Jordan and on to Damascus, Syria. The detainee paid for his own travel with savings from his job at the Ministry of Islamic Affairs.
    5. After their travel was approved the detainee went from Damascus, Syria to Tehran, Iran.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HALA, ALD MOHAMMAD**

6. The next day, the detainee and his friend went to Mashed, Iran. They stayed in Mashed for two days then took a taxi to the Afghan border. The town located at the border crossing was Taibat, Iran. The detainee showed the Iranian border guards his passport, which they copied and then allowed him to cross on foot into Afghanistan.

7. The detainee and his friend were asked why they had come to Afghanistan, and they said that they were there to join the jihad. They stayed at the guest house for approximately one week during Ramadan in the winter of 2000, waiting for a large enough group to gather to be sent to training. After approximately eight or nine Arabs had gathered at the guest house, the group was taken to the al Farouq Base outside of Kandahar, Afghanistan.

8. At the conclusion of their training, the detainee and his friend were returned to the guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee purchased clothing at the market in Kandahar, Afghanistan and then went to Kabul, Afghanistan the next day to join the fighting.

9. The first two weeks in Kabul, the detainee was in the rear helping with the kitchen. He was then issued a Kalashnikov rifle and sent to the front lines where he fought for five to six months. After a month and a half as an infantryman, the detainee was given a basic refresher course on how to operate the rocket-propelled grenade and became a rocket-propelled grenade operator for his unit. During this time, he was assigned to the Marwan Artillery Center.

### b. Training

1. At age nineteen, the detainee enlisted in the Saudi Army. This was during the Gulf War with Iraq. He served as a marine amphibious tanker in the Saudi Army. According to the detainee, he was essentially a soldier who rode to the battlefield in the back of a tank. He trained at Rais al Gard and learned to use a 9 mm pistol and a Hechler & Koch G-3 assault rifle.

2. Basic training in the Saudi Army typically lasts nine months, but due to the Gulf War, the detainee's training period was reduced to 45 days. He was then deployed to an area approximately 45 kilometers southeast of Khafji, Saudi Arabia which was referred to as Rais Mi Shab. He served on the second line and did not see combat. While there, he trained with soldiers from the United States.

3. The detainee went to Jubail, Saudi Arabia where he became a military police officer. However, he stayed in Jubail, Saudi Arabia for only a short time, after which he left the army. The detainee was approximately 21 or 22 when he left the Saudi Army.

4. All students that take the basic training class at al Farouq get the same type of training no matter what class they are in. The training consists of weapons training, basic commando, topography and explosives. Each subject is taught in a two week time period. Following the basic training, students go back to their safe house in Kandahar where they are given the following choices of advanced training: guerrilla warfare, conventional warfare, and advanced explosives.

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5. A Yemeni ran the al Farouq camp. The detainee was trained to use a Kalashnikov rifle, a PK machine gun, a 9 mm pistol and a rocket-propelled grenade. The detainee also learned how to read maps, how to dig trenches and camouflaging techniques, as well as how to find and disarm land mines. The training also consisted of physical training. The detainee trained specifically to fight the Northern Alliance. There was no mention of fighting the United States during his time at al Farouq.

## c. Connections/Associations

1. After the detainee completed his training, the individuals he received training with were divided into different groups as they were being sent to the front lines. The smaller groups were usually divided into groups by their nationality such as Arab, Pakistani, or Afghani. The detainee was placed into a small group of all Arabs. The small groups of fighters fell under a larger command which was headed by an Afghan or Yemeni.

2. A senior al Qaida operative said that he recognized the detainee and knew him by another name. The al Qaida operative indicated that the detainee was a member of Abu Layth al Libi's group in Kabul, Afghanistan and told the detainee to find a Pakistani so that he could help the detainee to fix his Pakistani visa.

3. The detainee was in charge of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group also known as Groupe Islamique Combattant Libyan Logistics in Karachi, Pakistan.

4. Libyan Islamic Fighting Group is also known as Al Jam'a al Islamiyyah al Muqatilah, Fighting Islamic Group, Libyan Fighting Group, Libyan Islamic Group. The group emerged in 1995 among Libyans who had fought against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Some members maintain a strictly anti-Qadhafi focus and organize against Libyan Government interests but others are aligned with Usama bin Ladin's al Qaida organization or are active in the international Mujahedin network.

## d. Other Relevant Data

1. The United States bombing campaign began in the Konduz region during the last few days the detainee was there. His particular location, however, was not bombed. The detainee denied fighting against Americans, including specifically denying shooting at American planes. The detainee's unit withdrew from the front lines shortly after the American bombing in the region began. During the withdrawal, an Uzbek who was fighting on behalf of the Taliban shot the detainee. The detainee advised that this friendly fire incident occurred at night during a disorienting firefight with Northern Alliance soldiers.

2. Eventually, the detainee's unit was ordered to withdraw from Konduz, Afghanistan and to report to Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan where they were to surrender their weapons to General Dostum. They were told that if they surrendered their weapons to General Dostum, they would

# UNCLASSIFIED

## **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HALA, ALD MOHAMMAD**

be allowed to continue to Kandahar, Afghanistan and then leave Afghanistan to return to their countries. However, when they arrived at Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan, the detainee and the others were arrested and imprisoned.

### 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2006 and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
- b. The detainee was queried regarding any knowledge or planning of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo Detention Facility with negative results.
- c. The detainee denied any affiliation with al Qaida and denied knowing anyone who was affiliated with al Qaida. The detainee stated that he is simply Mujahedin, which he described as a follower of the beliefs as written in the Koran. Mujahedin are guardians over other Muslims.
- d. The detainee advised that if he were released from prison he would return to Riyadh to get married.
- e. The detainee denied that he received any weapons training during this three year period in Riyadh and denied involvement in terrorists organizations.
- f. The detainee heard about the attacks in the United States approximately five to seven days later. The detainee did not approve of the attacks in the United States because of the killing of women, children and the elderly. The Koran forbids such killings.
- g. The detainee did not consider the United States an enemy, although he acknowledged that he believes the United States policy regarding the conflict between Israel and Palestine is wrong.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

13 March 2006

TO: AL GHATANI, KHALID MALU SHIA

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL GHATANI, KHALID MALU SHIA

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. In the Ramadan season of 2000 he decided to travel to Mecca for the Uma.
    2. The detainee and another individual discussed a fatwa issued by Sheik Hamoud. The detainee understood this fatwa to mean that he had a duty to stand guard and defend Islam. The other individual suggested to the detainee that this fatwa could be performed by traveling to Afghanistan to fight the jihad with the Taliban in Afghanistan. The detainee took this advice and left for Afghanistan as soon as Uma ended. The other individual provided the detainee with instructions on how to travel to Afghanistan, as well as with financial support.
    3. The detainee stayed in a hotel in Karachi, Pakistan for four to five days with the money he had received.
    4. From Karachi, Pakistan the detainee took a bus to Quetta where he would stay at the Taliban House.
    5. The detainee remained in Kabul, Afghanistan for one day, at which time the detainee traveled to a camp that was named Pakistani Center #5.
    6. The detainee stayed at this camp approximately five to six months.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL GHATANI, KHALID MALU SHIA**

7. After a period of time the detainee was sent to Konduz, Afghanistan to a place known as Khawaja Ghar; this place was known as another front line. The detainee remained at this location for approximately six months.

8. The detainee guarded sleeping quarters/bunkers for Pakistani troops who fought at the front lines in Hawajager, Afghanistan.

## b. Training

The detainee received weapons training with the Kalashnikov rifle, the PK [machine gun], and the RPG [rocket propelled grenade launcher].

## c. Connections/Associations

The detainee's name was found among several floppy disks, with files listing the names, safety deposit boxes and contents, discovered during a joint raid at an alleged al Qaida residence.

## d. Intent

1. When asked why the detainee went to Afghanistan if the detainee did not intend to fight, the detainee repeated he wanted weapons training and that he wanted to stand guard for God's Way.

2. The detainee repeated he did not go to Afghanistan to fight for the Taliban, but to receive weapons training and stand guard. The detainee claims he received this weapons training and support at safe houses without any obligation of military service on the front lines with the Taliban. The detainee claims he was free to go his own way when his weapons training was completed.

## e. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was entering a secure location when the detainee was shot in the left arm by a sniper. The detainee was given medical treatment in Konduz.

2. The detainee spent approximately one week in a hospital, then moved to a clinic in Konduz because the hospital was full. The detainee said he was then on his way to Mazar-e-Sharif, because the detainee wanted to make his way back to Saudi Arabia. In Mazar-e-Sharif, the detainee was taken prisoner by the Dostum forces. The detainee said he was held in Kandahar for about one week, and then moved to Camp X-Ray.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL GHATANI, KHALID MALU SHIA**

a. The detainee had no prior knowledge of the attacks on the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001, or against the American people, or anywhere else in the United States or the world.

b. The detainee said he did not fire his weapon at any soldiers or persons.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

12 July 2006

TO: FOWZA, MOHAMMED ALI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF FOWZA, MOHAMMED ALI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee heard about Afghanistan from an individual. The two discussed Chechnya, but the individual told the detainee that he could not take the detainee to Chechnya because the detainee smoked and did not pray enough.

2. The individual suggested the detainee go to Afghanistan to receive religious instruction. The individual told the detainee he could provide the detainee with a passport and all the necessary travel documents.

3. The individual provided the detainee with a letter of introduction to the Khaldan Training Camp in Afghanistan.

4. Khaldan's program was a complete course about weapons. An entire six-month program at Khaldan consisted of light weapons, heavy weapons, explosives, topography, and a tactical course.

5. The detainee stayed at a Taliban house in Quetta, Pakistan on the way to Afghanistan.

6. The detainee, his travel partner, and four unidentified Afghan Taliban members departed in a vehicle for Kandahar, Afghanistan. They stayed at an Arab house in Kandahar across the street from the Hajji Habash Mosque.

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## **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF FOWZA, MOHAMMED ALI**

7. Yemeni Arabs mainly used the Hajji Habbash guest house. It was located in Kandahar, Afghanistan, close to the Hajji Habbash Mosque. People who were coming to or leaving Afghanistan used the guest house.

8. The detainee was told the Khaldan Camp was closed and his only option was to attend the al Farouq training camp. The detainee refused and decided he wanted to go home. The detainee's travel partner convinced him to stay until his training was complete, then return to Yemen.

9. The detainee left for al Farouq after staying in Kandahar for two days.

10. The detainee left the basic course after 15 days because he did not agree with the early morning schedule and the substandard food.

11. The detainee traveled to Kabul, Afghanistan with three Yemenis. They arrived in Kabul and went to a Taliban and Arab guest house for one night. They arrived after a major battle, and many people were wounded at the house.

12. The detainee stayed at the Said Center near Kabul, Afghanistan where his recruiter provided him with three fatwas. These fatwas convinced the detainee to assist the Taliban and to join the fighting against the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan.

13. The detainee traveled to the Bilal Center where he was issued a Kalashnikov and was subsequently wounded. After the detainee recovered, he was stationed at Khwaja Ghar for about seven months.

14. The detainee said he began fighting because the Koran says that when two parties of Muslims want to fight each other and reconciliation cannot be reached, a leader can give an order for them to fight.

15. The detainee was with his Afghan unit in the vicinity of Taloqan, Afghanistan when the United States bombing campaign in Afghanistan started on 7 October 2001.

16. The detainee stated that he knew the Taliban and liked them.

### b. Training

The detainee stated that while at al Farouq, he trained on rocket propelled grenades and the Kalashnikov, M-16, G-3, Bika and Garanov machine guns.

### c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was identified as being an al Qaida soldier seen at the Ashara Guesthouse.

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### SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF FOWZA, MOHAMMED ALI

2. The Ashara guest house was located in the Karta Par Wan area of Kabul, Afghanistan. A senior al Qaida member personally ran this guest house. This house acted as a transition point for Arabs going to and coming from either the training camps or front line areas. The house could hold between 20 to 50 personnel at any one time. A guard was required to keep a log of all visitors to the house.

3. An individual wrote a letter to the Amir of al Farouq of behalf of the detainee.

4. The individual who wrote the letter for the detainee was a religious teacher who fought in Bosnia. His primary job was to collect money for the jihad.

5. The detainee attended Usama bin Laden's daughters wedding in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

6. Usama bin Laden attended a funeral at al Farouq while the detainee was training there.

7. The detainee and about 100 other soldiers from the front line in Kabul, Afghanistan attended a speech given by Usama bin Laden.

#### d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee surrendered to General Dostum's forces near Mazar-E-Sharif, Afghanistan around the 24 November 2001 after hearing radio announcements that any Taliban who surrendered and gave up their weapons would be allowed to return to their homes.

2. The detainee said that he did not surrender himself at Mazar-E-Sharif. When Taloqan fell to the Northern Alliance they came and got him from his house.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee said that his passport was an official passport that he obtained officially and legally.

b. The detainee said that he never saw Usama bin Laden.

c. The detainee said he never attended al Farouq camp.

d. The detainee said he went to the Bilal Center just to visit the grave of his friend and he did not have any weapon.

e. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF FOWZA, MOHAMMED ALI**

f. The detainee said that he did not fight Americans before so he does not plan to fight the Americans if released.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

**Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

15 November 2006

TO: AHMED, ABDUL RAHMAN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AHMED, ABDUL RAHMAN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. The detainee purchased and viewed a jihad recruitment video.
    2. The detainee attended speeches about jihad in Yemen.
    3. The detainee stated that another individual normally provided money for tickets from Yemen to Afghanistan, but the detainee chose to travel at his own expense.
    4. The detainee stated he flew from Sanaa, Yemen to Dubai, United Arab Emirates to Karachi, Pakistan. The detainee then traveled by bus from Karachi, Pakistan to Kandahar, Afghanistan.
    5. After arrival in Kandahar, Afghanistan, the detainee stayed one week at the al Nibras Guest House.
    6. The detainee stated he traveled to the al Farouq Training Camp by bus.
    7. After attending al Farouq Training Camp, the detainee stated he traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan, where he stayed in a guest house for three weeks.
    8. The detainee traveled to the Arab House in Kabul, Afghanistan and waited there for two to three months.

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ISN 441

## UNCLASSIFIED

### **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AHMED, ABDUL RAHMAN**

9. The detainee stated he was injured during a United States bombing raid on the northern lines in Afghanistan.

10. The detainee spent two weeks in a hospital in Konduz, Afghanistan. The detainee then followed an order for all Arabs to proceed to Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan.

11. A source identified the detainee as someone from the front lines in Afghanistan and in Konduz, Afghanistan. The source said that the detainee claimed to have training videos with him that he had produced about mines and minefields, a video camera, a bag full of money from all countries and many passports from dead Arab fighters.

12. The detainee stated he would be honored to be an al Qaida member.

#### b. Training

1. The detainee stated he attended a 57 day training course at al Farouq Training Camp. Training included marksmanship and assembly and disassembly of numerous weapons.

2. While at al Farouq Training Camp, the detainee stated he received training on the AK-47, pistols, M16, Uzi, G-3, Kalaco rifle, RPG and land mine theory.

3. The detainee did well at al Farouq Training Camp and was given specialized training. The training included how to dress and act in an airport, a special way of talking, as well as how to resist interrogation and torture.

4. The detainee stated he was aware of 80 individuals who were pulled out of al Farouq for special operations. The detainee also stated the nineteen 11 September 2001 hijackers trained at al Farouq.

#### c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee heard about al Qaida training courses available in intelligence collection, mountain warfare, artillery, topography, land navigation, Stinger and SA-7 anti-aircraft missiles, military leadership, urban warfare, building and planting explosive devices, forgery and poisons.

2. During the detainee's stay at al Nibras Guest House, Usama bin Laden visited twice with senior al Qaida operatives, including Abu Hafsa.

3. The detainee stated Usama bin Laden was a great man and that he knew the detainee and sat with him.

4. Usama bin Laden visited al Farouq twice in late July, early August 2001.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

### SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AHMED, ABDUL RAHMAN

5. The detainee claimed Usama bin Laden told him al Qaida would set up a headquarters in Yemen after al Qaida was forced out of Afghanistan.

6. The detainee stated he attended a meeting prior to 11 September 2001; the attendees discussed an upcoming operation that was going to take place and whether the Americans would invade Afghanistan after the attack. Al Qaida decided if America did not respond, al Qaida would launch another operation until Americans did respond.

7. The detainee explained that every al Qaida operational team has a manager who makes decisions without having to consult Usama bin Laden.

8. The detainee stated he sat with Usama bin Laden more than ten times and that the detainee has information regarding future attacks planned against the United States.

9. The detainee stated he may have been on a mission for Usama bin Laden when he was caught or arrested, but he refused to be specific.

10. The detainee was selected at al Farouq to be taken to see the fighting at the front lines. There, the detainee had the opportunity to sit down with al Qaida leaders and talk to them.

11. The detainee's name appeared on a list of al Qaida Mujahedin trust accounts seized during raids of al Qaida associated safe houses.

12. The detainee's name appeared on a list of killed or wounded al Qaida martyrs recovered during the capture of a senior al Qaida operative.

#### d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated he was captured at Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan, spent 52 days in prison and was present during the uprising.

2. The detainee stated he knew Usama bin Laden was preparing a big strike and several smaller attacks on the United States. The detainee stated his sources of information were good and believed the attacks would happen.

3. The detainee stated he planned deception with personnel in the cell blocks with the goal of learning interviewing styles and approaches.

4. The detainee stated his mission was to collect information on our techniques and to waste our resources investigating his lies.

5. The detainee claimed he was a terrorist and that he would never give the United States information that would help them fight Muslims and terrorists.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

## **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AHMED, ABDUL RAHMAN**

6. The detainee remained imprisoned at Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan until shortly after it fell to Northern Alliance Forces.

7. The detainee attempted to escape from the prison at Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan with fifteen others. The detainee stated some of the others were killed; he was shot, wounded and recaptured.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee believes Usama bin Laden is a heretic who goes against the teachings of the Koran.

b. The detainee does not agree with al Qaida because they target the innocent, which the Koran forbids.

c. The detainee was against some of the policies of al Qaida, including suicide missions and killing innocent people.

d. The detainee stated he did not go to train to fight the United States Forces. The detainee went to fulfill his religious duty to protect himself and his honor, and did not consider his training to be offensive in nature.

e. The detainee claimed he was against the 11 September 2001 attacks and did not consider them jihad. The detainee believes jihad is man fighting man, not man fighting against innocent people.

f. The detainee denied having any knowledge regarding the World Trade Center attacks, the bombing of the USS Cole, the embassy bombings or any other terrorist attacks.

g. The detainee claimed he was not a part of al Qaida or the Taliban.

h. During an interview with the detainee in early 2003, the detainee stated the stories regarding his experiences with Usama bin Laden and al Qaida were fabricated.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

26 June 2006

TO: JANKO, ABD AL RAHIM ABDUL RAZA

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF JANKO, ABD AL RAHIM ABDUL  
RAZA

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee claimed that he stayed with an Imam for two to three days. During this time, the Imam gave the detainee money and suggested that he should direct his life toward jihad. The two discussed the jihad in Chechnya.

2. The detainee stated that he was deported from the United Arab Emirates to Afghanistan. The detainee flew from United Arab Emirates to Pakistan at the expense of the United Arab Emirates government.

3. While en route to Afghanistan, the detainee was convinced to go to the Taliban and tell them that their embassy in the United Arab Emirates had sent him. The detainee then traveled to the Kallu Urdu Camp.

4. The detainee claimed that in February 2000 he departed the Kallu Urdu Camp and was taken to the Ghulam Batsha Guest House. The detainee was given the name Dujana al Kurdi for security reasons.

5. The detainee stated that while at the guest house, he worked with the weapons supply officer. The detainee's duties included repairing and servicing heavy weapons.

6. The detainee stated that after one week, the detainee departed Ghulam Batsha and was taken to the al Farouq Training Camp.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF JANKO, ABD AL RAHIM ABDUL RAZA**

7. The detainee claimed that after eighteen days of training he requested to leave the al Farouq Training Camp. After submitting this request, the detainee claimed that he was suspected of spying for the United States or Israel.

8. The detainee stated that he was held for approximately two weeks at a guest house known as the College of Islamic and Arabic Studies where he was interrogated and tortured.

9. The detainee stated that he was then transferred to a second al Qaida guest house with several other Arabs where he was interrogated again.

10. The detainee stated that he was later transferred to a military camp where he was kept for approximately twenty days. The detainee claimed that he was then turned over to the Taliban and was transferred to the Taliban's intelligence headquarters for approximately five days.

11. The detainee stated that he was then transferred to Sarapooza, where he was held from May 2000 until being turned over to United States custody. The detainee said he was never interrogated while in Taliban custody.

12. Sarpuza was a political prison in Afghanistan.

13. In a video that was obtained from a senior member of al Qaida's residence, the detainee claims that he was recruited to join the jihad in Chechnya.

14. A source claimed that the detainee was possibly an agent for the United Arab Emirates.

15. Another source claimed that the detainee was recruited to be a spy while studying in United Arab Emirates and met with a western intelligence officer at a hotel.

### b. Training

1. The detainee stated that he attended the al Farouq Training Camp in Kabul, Afghanistan around January or February 2000.

2. The detainee stated that while at al Farouq, he was given training on the Kalashnikov rifle, G-3, M-16 and various other Russian/Saudi made weapons. The detainee stated that he also received training in mountain tactics, topography and jungle/guerilla-type warfare.

3. A source stated that the detainee claimed to have received military training in the United Arab Emirates.

### c. Connections/Associations

Usama bin Laden and a Taliban leader would hide at the prison complex.

# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF JANKO, ABD AL RAHIM ABDUL RAZA**

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee claimed that after a dispute with his father over a loan the detainee received from a friend, the detainee attempted to leave the United Arab Emirates.

2. The detainee stated he is concerned for his brothers since he owes a large amount of money for drugs in Syria.

3. A source claimed that the detainee was a frequent user of heroin and hashish and while in prison almost died of an overdose.

4. A source claimed that the primary problem with the detainee was his sexual indiscretions with other young men, resulting in a guest house leader talking to the detainee. During this discussion, the detainee admitted his espionage activities.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. A source stated that the Taliban tortured the detainee to the extent that he had little use of his right arm. As a result, the detainee spoke poorly of the Taliban.

b. The detainee claims that al Qaida tortured him until he admitted he was a spy.

c. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

e. The detainee said the he would like to go back to Syria but is afraid of what the Syrian government might do to him.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

29 August 2006

TO: BUKHARY, ABDUL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BUKHARY, ABDUL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee met a Saudi citizen at the Masjid Mosque who introduced the detainee to the Jama at al Tabligh in 1985 or 1986.

2. The detainee stated that before 11 September 2001 he went to Jordan and stayed with Jama at al Tabligh and after 11 September 2001 he went back to Saudi Arabia.

3. Jama at al Tabligh is a Pakistan based Islamic missionary organization used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists, including members of al Qaida.

4. The detainee stated that hearing that the Taliban had declared a jihad, he knew that he had to go defend his Muslim brothers. The detainee also stated that he went on his own without help.

b. Training

1. After the completion of his training, the detainee claimed to have stayed at the Sada Center Training Camp in Pakistan in support of military training being provided for others.

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ISN 493

## UNCLASSIFIED

### **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BUKHARY, ABDUL**

2. The detainee stated that his military training at al Farouq consisted of multiple training stations in the camp that provided instruction on physical fitness, hand to hand combat, the Kalashnikov assault rifle, the medium machine gun, the rocket-propelled grenade, hand grenades, Ganef and Doshka heavy machine guns, the Zikyak light cannon, and the SA-7 man portable shoulder fired air defense system. Training on explosives was done at another location because of safety considerations.

3. The detainee stated that he attended the Khalden Camp for three weeks. While at the Khalden Camp, the detainee received training on the 82 mm mortar, anti-aircraft guns, Uzi, M16, pistol, the Kalashnikov rifle and urban training.

4. The detainee answered the call to jihad in Afghanistan against the Soviets in 1987 or 1988 by traveling to the Sada Center in Pakistan for military training.

5. The detainee received weapons training for two months at the Sada Center's Training Camp.

#### c. Connections/Associations

1. In 1992, the detainee again went to the Towr Kham Center guest house in Afghanistan to support the Mujahedin combat operations by working in the guest house.

2. The detainee is a friend of a forger who was involved with modifying passports. The forger trained at a camp in southern Yemen and at Khaldan and al Farouq Camps in Afghanistan in the early to mid 1990's. The detainee believes that the forger is an al Qaida member.

3. The detainee stated that while in Peshawar, Pakistan, he had a meal with Usama bin Laden.

#### d. Intent

1. The detainee is a self-admitted jihadist, Mujahedin and member of Jama at al Tabligh, which is a Tier One Terrorist Group.

2. The detainee stated that if released he would again answer the call to jihad to fight anywhere, for any Muslim cause.

3. The detainee has been identified as being an Al Qaida member with the capability to continue to participate in future hostile acts.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BUKHARY, ABDUL**

e. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated that the Jama at al Tabligh ultimately led him to the jihad in Afghanistan.

2. The detainee admitted to have traveled five times to Afghanistan for jihad training or other activities.

3. The detainee stated that he had been in attendance at several speeches given by Usama bin Laden.

4. The detainee began training at al Farouq Training Camp, but could not finish due to hemorrhoids.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee claims to have no friends or relatives living in the United States and that he heard about the jihad in Afghanistan on television and newspaper articles. The detainee denied any personal involvement.

b. The detainee stated that he was only in Afghanistan ten days when the Arabs arrested him and accused him of being a spy. The detainee states that he was arrested and placed in an Afghan prison.

c. The detainee stated that he does not know that Jama at al Tabligh supported al Qaida or the Taliban.

d. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

e. The detainee acknowledges that the United States is superior in all military, cultural, and political aspects.

f. The detainee spoke about the small mind of the jihad fighters when they spoke of killing American male soldiers and capturing or kidnapping all female soldiers.

g. The detainee claims that answering the call for jihad issued by Usama bin Laden was a mistake and that he had reacted on emotion and not from an informed perspective.

UNCLASSIFIED

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# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BUKHARY, ABDUL**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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**000577**

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

12 June 2006

TO: ASUBAYI, NASIR MAZIYAD ABDALLAH AL QURAYSHI AL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ASUBAYI, NASIR MAZIYAD  
ABDALLAH AL QURAYSHI AL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee went to Afghanistan in response to a fatwa issued by Sheik Hammond al Ochla.

2. The detainee began to hear these callings a month prior to the 11 September 2001, terrorist attacks.

3. The detainee feels that being prepared to defend one's homeland or family is the duty of every Muslim and that such a fight would be a true jihad.

b. Training

The detainee received three weeks training at the al Farouq camp, Afghanistan. The training consisted of physical training and classroom instruction on the AK-47 (Kalashnikov rifle). The detainee stated he never fired the Kalashnikov rifle during the training.

c. Detainee Actions and Statements

1. After the Taliban were defeated in Kabul, Afghanistan, all the Arabs headed for the Tora Bora mountains. While in Tora Bora, the detainee received a weapon.

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000578

ISN 497



# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ASUBAYI, NASIR MAZIYAD ABDALLAH AL QURAYSHI AL**

2. In Tora Bora, the detainee lived in a small bunker dug out from the hills. Everyone in the area assembled at a hilltop outpost.

3. The detainee injured his left leg while in Tora Bora. He was not sure if the injury was due to a bullet or shrapnel.

4. The detainee was taken by an Afghani to a hospital in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. After five days in the hospital, he was captured by the Northern Alliance and turned over to the Americans.

#### d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee had submitted four visa applications to the Saudi Arabian Foreign Ministry's visa department. The detainee listed Pakistan as his citizenship on two of the applications, Yemeni on one and Sri Lankan on another.

2. The detainee reported links with the Maktab al-Khidmat Organization during an initial interview.

3. Makhtab al-Khidmat is listed on the Terrorist Exclusion List in the Department of Homeland Security Terrorist Organization Reference Guide.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he was not part of al Qaida or the Taliban and did not fight against the United States.

b. The detainee was shown a book depicting the attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001, and is concerned this attack gave people a bad image of Islam.

c. The detainee denies having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests. He said he had no anti-American sentiments.

d. The detainee denies having any knowledge or planning of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo detention facility.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

7 June 2006

To: SAID, MOHAMMED MOHAMMED AHMEN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SAID, MOHAMMED MOHAMMED  
AHMEN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. The detainee's recruiter has been involved in recruiting at least five other detainees.
    2. The detainee stated that his recruiter would lead jihad discussions at a mosque near his home. The recruiter would talk to others about Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Palestine. The detainee talked to his recruiter about the training camps in Afghanistan and about how they should travel to Palestine to fight the Jews.
    3. The detainee stated that he wanted to go to Afghanistan to prepare himself to fight because Jews were killing innocent Palestinians and that the same thing was happening in Afghanistan.
    4. The detainee stated that his recruiter assisted his travel to Afghanistan. The detainee flew to Karachi, Pakistan, where he stayed in a hotel for two or three days. Then he and five or six others, accompanied by the recruiter, took a bus to Queta, Pakistan. The detainee took another bus to Qandahar, Afghanistan where he stayed at an Arab guest house.
    5. The detainee confirmed that his recruiter supplied the funds for his documents and travel. The detained stated that his recruiter took possession of his passport once they arrived in Afghanistan.

DMO Exhibit 1  
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ISN 498

# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SAID, MOHAMMED MOHAMMED AHMEN**

6. The detainee stated that after training at al Farouq, he went to Qandahar, Afghanistan for two months. The detainee went to Kabul, Afghanistan and then on to the front lines to guard against the Northern forces. He stated that he spent a lot of time sitting around and guarding.

7. The detainee stated that the Northern forces were driving the fighters to the mountains, all the way to Jalalabad, Afghanistan. After walking through the mountains for nine days he went to Tora Bora, Afghanistan where he sat in a cave for fifteen days. The detainee left the cave and was injured by a bomb blast. After being captured by Northern forces he was taken to a prison in Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee was then taken to Bagram, Afghanistan where he was turned over to the Americans.

## b. Training

1. The detainee stated that he trained at the al Farouq camp for four months. He trained on mountain fighting, the Kalashnikov rifle, the Russian PK rifle and rocket-propelled grenades.

2. The detainee stated that after arriving at the al Farouq camp, he heard it was run by Usama bin Laden.

3. The detainee stated that he had trained on M-43 mortars and the SBG-9 while in the back lines. After the training, the detainee went to the front lines to fight with the Taliban against the Northern Alliance.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that Usama bin Laden did not visit the al Farouq camp while he was there and the detainee had never seen him.

b. The detainee denied receiving any type of explosive training while at the al Farouq camp.

c. The detainee stated that he wanted to leave Afghanistan after training at al Farouq but his passport was lost. The detainee was told to go to the front line until it was found and then he could leave.

d. The detainee stated that after he completed his training at the al Farouq camp, he was sent to the front lines where he guarded a position, but did not fight.

e. The detainee stated that while he was at the front line he knew other groups were there for Usama bin Laden, but the detainee was not in those groups.

f. The detainee stated that he does not know of any al Qaida members in Yemen and that he was unaware of the al Qaida presence there until he arrived in Afghanistan.

UNCLASSIFIED

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# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SAID, MOHAMMED MOHAMMED AHMEN**

g. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to 11 September 2001.

h. The detainee stated that he did not know of plans for attacks against United States interests and that he would not endorse such acts because it is not the Islamic way.

i. The detainee stated that he did not agree with the philosophies of Usama bin Laden and felt Usama bin Laden was not correct in his jihad. The detainee stated that Islam did not believe in the killing of women, children or the elderly.

j. The detainee insisted he was not affiliated with al Qaida.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

000582

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

21 July 2006

TO: OURGY, ABDUL BIN MOHAMMED ABIS

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF OURGY, ABDUL BIN MOHAMMED  
ABIS

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. In 1997, the detainee lived for three months with a man in Milan, Italy who persuaded the detainee to travel to Afghanistan to receive military training.

2. The man the detainee lived with asked the detainee if he would be interested in attending a training camp for jihad in Afghanistan, and the detainee said he was interested. The detainee said the overall plan was to go to Afghanistan for training, go to Sudan for more religious study and then go to Tunisia to fight against the government.

3. The detainee flew from Milan, Italy to Islamabad, Pakistan in September or October 1997. The detainee's recruiter took care of all arrangements, to include tickets and a visa, provided the detainee 800 United States Dollars and told the detainee that a man would meet him at the airport.

4. The detainee was met at the airport in Islamabad, Pakistan by a Tunisian.

5. The detainee was identified as an explosives trainer for al Qaida.

DMO Exhibit 1  
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UNCLASSIFIED

000583

ISN 502

# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF OURGY, ABDUL BIN MOHAMMED ABIS**

## b. Training

1. The detainee went to the al Qaida terrorist organization's Derunta Training Camp outside of Jalalabad, Afghanistan. A source stated that the only people that can get into the camp are members of al Qaida.

2. The Derunta Training Camp is considered to be the primary installation of Usama bin Laden in Afghanistan. The camp was considered crucial because of the training that was carried out there in the fields of explosives, manufacture of poisons and clandestine techniques, as well as the basic training it provided in the use of individual weapons such as rocket-propelled grenades.

3. The detainee spent 28 days at the Derunta Training Camp, where he participated in Kalashnikov rifle, pistol, grenade and rocket-propelled grenade training.

4. The detainee reportedly trained at Ebn Nashir's Camp in Jalalabad, Afghanistan and has knowledge in chemical explosives.

## c. Connections/Associations

1. The man the detainee met at the Islamabad, Pakistan airport played a major role within the group connected to the Chaabani Center. The Chaabani Center was activated and financed by Usama bin Laden.

2. The man who met the detainee at the Islamabad, Pakistan airport took him to a house in Peshawar, Pakistan, where several former Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin fighters were living. The detainee lived with the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin fighters for about one month.

3. Gulbuddin Hikmatyar founded Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin as a faction of the Hizb-I Islami party in 1977. Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin has long-established ties with Usama bin Laden. Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin has staged small attacks in its attempt to force United States troops to withdraw from Afghanistan, overthrow the Afghan Transitional Administration and establish a fundamentalist state.

4. The detainee was responsible for the finances of the Tunisian Combatant Group.

5. The Department of Homeland Security Terrorist Organization Reference Guide lists the Tunisian Combatant Group as seeking to establish an Islamic regime in Tunisia and targeting United States and Western interests. The group is connected to al Qaida.

6. A senior al Qaida operative said the detainee may have traveled with the Emir of the Tunisian Group to Tora Bora.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF OURGY, ABDUL BIN MOHAMMED ABIS**

7. The detainee was identified as being connected to an individual involved in credit card fraud, recruiting and forgery as methods of fund raising for al Qaida.

8. The detainee identified the location of Nejim al-Jihad, an al Qaida housing compound owned by Usama bin Laden.

9. The detainee is reported to have visited with the spokesman for al Qaida on more than one occasion. The spokesman reportedly stayed with the detainee in both Karachi, Pakistan and in Kabul, Afghanistan.

10. The detainee said an individual gave him a Kalashnikov and three magazines of ammunition during his retreat from Tora Bora.

11. The person who gave the detainee the Kalashnikov was an al Qaida commander who fought against United States Forces in Afghanistan in late 2001.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee claimed to have no involvement in the assassination of Commander Massoud of the Northern Alliance.

b. The detainee claimed he traveled to Afghanistan so that he could receive military training for the Bosnian or Chechnyan jihad.

c. The detainee claimed that he did not attend a meeting between the Tunisian Combat Group and Usama Bin Laden. The detainee claimed he had never heard of the Tunisian Combat Group.

d. The detainee denied that he trained at the Khalden Training Camp.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

30 March 2006

TO: AL DHUBY, KHALID MOHAMMED SALIH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL DHUBY, KHALID MOHAMMED  
SALIH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee wanted to go to Afghanistan to receive training and prepare for his duty as a muslim. The detainee met Ali al Yafi at a neighborhood mosque, Harat Abu Abd or al Betra, which was located in an unknown house. Al Yafi told the detainee of a camp in Afghanistan where he could receive training. Al Yafi showed the detainee pictures and films of fighting in Chechnya between Muslims and Russians. After viewing the films, the detainee wanted to train even more but did not want to fight.

2. Al Yafi did not include the detainee in the planning of their trip to Afghanistan. Al Yafi made all of the arrangements, and told the detainee he would take care of everything. Al Yafi did not give the detainee a salary, but told him that money would always be there if he needed it.

3. While at a guest house, al Yafi gave the detainee \$500 United States Dollars and told the detainee to keep the money.

4. The detainee saw many people come and go from the guest house, stating that he knew it was the place people went through to get to the al Farouq camp. Most people told the detainee they were there to train for fighting.

5. After fifteen days on a farm, the detainee was taken with his group to Tora Bora by pickup trucks. On the third day in Tora Bora, the detainee was given a Kalashnikov rifle even

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL DHUBY, KHALID MOHAMMED SALIH**

though no one mentioned a war was going on. The detainee was told that this was to defend himself from opposition forces. The detainee did not know who the opposition forces were. The detainee was issued one thirty round magazine of ammunition and more ammunition was available in boxes in the caves.

6. From Tora Bora the detainee was taken to a cave in the mountains above Tora Bora. At this time the detainee heard and saw the bombings going on. The detainee stayed in one of several caves large enough to fit three or four people.

7. The detainee left the mountains and traveled with his group through a valley. The detainee saw planes dropping bombs on their location and stated the bombing went on for one night. The detainee hid from the bombs until the next morning. Many men traveling with the detainee were killed and injured by the bombing.

8. The detainee was captured by the Northern Alliance unit Hajir al Qadir during the Allied offensive in the area. The detainee was then taken to prisons in Kabul, Bagram, and Kandahar, Afghanistan before being transferred to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

## b. Training

1. The detainee was at the al Farouq camp for about one and one half months. The detainee trained on how to dig trenches, protect one self from bombing, cover terrain, map reading, and use of a Kalashnikov rifle, PK machine gun and rocket propelled grenade. The detainee and his group of twenty men were trained using three old Kalashnikov rifles. There was a depot of weapons at the camp but only the trainers were allowed to obtain and return weapons.

2. About two to three weeks into training there was a day when the detainee and the rest of the trainees were searched and had their weapons taken from them by the trainers. The camp was expecting the arrival of Usama bin Laden sometime that day. Although the detainee heard Usama bin Laden had been to the camp before, this was the first time he was present for Usama bin Laden's arrival. The detainee thought everyone acted pretty normal about Usama bin Laden coming to the camp and stated everyone was informed while they were in formation. Usama bin Laden never showed up that day.

## c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee saw his brother, Saleh al Dhuby, at the guest house and was very surprised. The detainee did not know what happened to his brother in Afghanistan.

2. The detainee's brother is also a detainee at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL DHUBY, KHALID MOHAMMED SALIH**

3. When the detainee's group arrived in Jalalabad, the men were separated into different groups; the detainee was placed in Abu Thabit's group. The detainee eventually found out there was no camp and realized he was left at a big farm surrounded by a forest. The detainee inquired as to what was going on and was told that he would know at a later time why he was moved to the farm from the al Farouq camp.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. When the detainee went to the al Farouq camp, he was never told that he would have to be a fighter after he received training. The detainee never had to present any letter or give an oath to anyone.

b. The detainee heard Usama bin Laden was kicked out of Saudi Arabia, but claims he did not know Usama bin Laden was a terrorist. The detainee never thought about Usama bin Laden and hardly ever watched the news. The detainee claimed he never heard of al Qaida before he went to prison in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. The detainee claims that no one told him that the al Farouq training camp belonged to Usama bin Laden.

c. The detainee heard about the attacks on 11 September 2001 in America through Abu Thabit. Abu Thabit told him there was an explosion/bombing in America. The detainee did not hear anything about a war in Afghanistan because it was far away. Only when the bombing started did the detainee know there was fighting taking place in Afghanistan.

d. The detainee stated that he was not a fighter or a killer. The detainee just wanted to train to fight. The detainee wanted to train to protect himself and his family as well as defend his country. After training, the detainee wanted to return to Saudi Arabia.

e. The detainee did not see any United States troops fighting in Afghanistan.

f. The detainee stated that, if possible, he would go back to Saudi Arabia if he were set free. However, he would most likely have to find his sister in Yemen and live with her.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

23 July 2006

TO: AL ANAZI, SULTAN SARI SAYEL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ANAZI, SULTAN SARI SAYEL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee went to Afghanistan for training, but all of the camps were closed when he arrived.

2. In 2001, about four months before Ramadan, the detainee decided to depart Saudi Arabia. The detainee traveled to Pakistan because he wanted to try something different.

3. The detainee did not tell his family exactly where he was going because he did not know where he would end up.

4. The detainee traveled from Saudi Arabia, to Bahrain, to Karachi, Pakistan, to Quetta, Pakistan, to Kandahar, Afghanistan, to Jalalabad, Afghanistan and finally to Kabul Afghanistan.

5. The detainee met a member of the Islamic based organization, Jamaat al Tabligh, who convinced him to travel to Afghanistan.

6. The Jamaat al Tabligh, a Pakistan based Islamic missionary organization is being used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorist including members of al Qaida.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was identified among a translated list of al Qaida Mujahedin. The contents of their trust accounts were found on files recovered from various computer media seized during raids against al Qaida associated safe houses.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ANAZI, SULTAN SARI SAYEL**

2. The detainee stated that the person he met while traveling to Karachi, Pakistan was a member of the Islamic based organization, Jamaat al Tabligh.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee telephoned his family from a market in Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee's family was not happy about him being in Afghanistan.

2. The detainee heard about the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, from television and radio announcements. The detainee knew that Osama bin Laden was a key suspect in the 11 September 2001 attacks.

3. The detainee decided to leave Afghanistan after 11 September 2001. For two months, the detainee tried to depart Afghanistan. The Afghanistan / Pakistan border was closed and the detainee could not leave. The advancing Northern Alliance forced the detainee to leave Kandahar, Afghanistan for the Tora Bora Mountains of Afghanistan.

4. The leader of the detainees group, who had ties to Jamaat al Tabligh, was killed in the air strike they encountered while the detainee was surrendering from the Tora Bora Mountains of Afghanistan.

5. The detainee surrendered after twenty-eight days in the Tora Bora Mountains of Afghanistan. The detainee was wounded during an air strike. The detainee was taken to an Afghan village for medical attention and recovery.

6. Afghan Forces placed the detainee in Baghram Prison, Afghanistan after he recovered from his wounds. Following detention in Baghram Prison, Afghanistan the detainee was moved to a prison in Kandahar, Afghanistan with a final prison destination of Camp Delta, Guantanamo Bay Cuba.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that any comments he made regarding a Moslem's duty to Jihad and the desire to kill nonbelievers and Americans had been mistranslated. The detainee had simply repeated an Islamic hadith stating that Moslems should seek to rid the world of infidels and kill Jews. The detainee never advocated violence and would only kill Americans in self-defense. (FN16)

b. The detainee wishes no ill will to Americans, as they want peace all over the world.

c. The detainee stated that the killing of innocent people, especially women and children, is against the teachings of Islam. The detainee stated that if you have an enemy you fight the enemy and not make war against civilians.

## **UNCLASSIFIED**

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ANAZI, SULTAN SARI SAYEL**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

**UNCLASSIFIED**

**000591**

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

25 July 2006

TO: HASSAN, SALMAN YEHAH KASA

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HASSAN, SALMAN YEHAH KASA

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated that his brother constantly suggested that the detainee travel to Afghanistan to receive training and provided money for the detainee's travel expenses.

2. The detainee stated that he flew from Sanaa, Yemen to Karachi, Pakistan, where a person sent by his brother met him. The detainee stated that this person helped him reach the al Farouq Training Camp in Qandahar, Afghanistan while making stops at numerous guest houses.

3. The detainee stated that after the 11 September 2001 attacks, he and the other recruits were moved from al Farouq, went to Jalalabad, Afghanistan for approximately four weeks and then went to the Tora Bora mountains for approximately six weeks.

4. In a document recovered from a Taliban or al Qaida cave in the Tora Bora mountains, the detainee informed his brother of his readiness for possible al Qaida or Taliban operations.

5. The detainee stated that he traveled to Afghanistan because he could make more money in handouts from al Qaida than he could trying to earn an honest wage in Yemen. He stated that he intended to travel to Afghanistan, undergo training and then return to Yemen, but hostilities broke out and he was arrested.

b. Training

1. The detainee stated that he received training at Camp al Farouq.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

## **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HASSAN, SALMAN YEHAH KASA**

2. The detainee was at al Farouq for three weeks and received training on the Kalashnikov, pistol and PK machine gun.
3. The detainee attended the Malik Training Camp, commonly used for advanced military training.

### c. Connections/Associations

1. One of the detainee's brothers is an al Qaida operative. This brother and another of the detainee's brothers were known to frequent a Sana, Yemen safe house and may have lived there.
2. The detainee's brother had some one-on-one meetings with Usama bin Laden.
3. The detainee's name is on a list of captured Mujahedin found on a hard drive associated with a senior al Qaida operative. The information was found in March 2003 in Pakistan.
4. The detainee's name is on a list of al Qaida Mujahedin and the contents of their trust accounts found during raids of al Qaida-associated safe houses in Pakistan. The list states that the detainee's passport was in his trust account.

### d. Intent

The detainee stated that he should be considered a threat to the United States.

### e. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated that he was captured after coming out of the Tora Bora mountains.
  2. The detainee was captured on 16 December 2001 in Tora Bora after surrendering to Afghan forces.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee denied having prior knowledge of the 11 September 2001 attacks.
  - b. The detainee denied being a member of al Qaida.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

29 March 2006

TO: KHUSRUF, MOHAMMED NASIR YAHYA

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHUSRUF, MOHAMMED NASIR  
YAHYA

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. The detainee went to Afghanistan for jihad.
    2. The detainee was injured during the bombing in Afghanistan.
  - b. Training
    1. The detainee shot the Siminoff rifle, a Kalashnikov rifle, and a single shot rifle twelve times.
    2. The detainee trained for approximately 20 days on small arms at the al Farouq training camp.
    3. The detainee was given additional instruction on map and land navigation.
    4. A source claims that the detainee received training at al Farouq.
  - c. Connections/Associations
    1. The detainee's name was found on a document listing 324 Arabic names, aliases, and nationalities recovered from suspected al Qaida safe houses.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHUSRUF, MOHAMMED NASIR YAHYA**

2. The detainee's name was found on a computer associated with a senior al Qaida operative.
3. A source identified the detainee as Abu Abdul Rahman al Ta'izi, a light weapons trainer at the al Farouq training camp. He also claims that the detainee fought in Tora Bora.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
  - a. The detainee said he had tried to refuse training and leave but that the leadership would not give him back his passport.
  - b. The detainee claims he never fired a weapon during training, nor was he issued a weapon.
  - c. The detainee claimed that he was never issued a weapon following training and never fired any rounds outside of training.
  - d. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or its interests.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

4 August 2006

TO: NASSERI, RIYAD BIL MOHAMMMED TAHIR

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NASSERI, RIYAD BIL  
MOHAMMMED TAHIR

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. According to a foreign government, the detainee is considered one of the most dangerous Tunisian operatives.
    2. According to a foreign government the detainee left Italy in the mid-1990s for Bosnia where he received military training and participated in the war along side Bosnian Mujahedin.
    3. The detainee was condemned in Italy for making and passing counterfeit money; had a warrant order issued for terrorism related crimes and subversion and has an international arrest order on record.
    4. The detainee was sentenced in Tunisia to a ten year sentence for being a member of a terrorist organization operating abroad.
    5. A foreign government agency identified the detainee as a member of the Armed Islamic Group.
    6. The Armed Islamic Group is an Islamic extremist group that aims to overthrow the secular Algerian regime and replace it with an Islamic state.
    7. A source identified the detainee as being in command of an organizational cell in Afghanistan.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NASSERI, RIYAD BIL MOHAMMMED TAHIR**

8. A source identified the detainee as being involved in establishing the Tunisian Combat Group. The source stated that the detainee was originally in charge of information and preaching but, later became the Emir of the Tunisian Combat Group.

9. The Tunisian Combat Group reportedly is seeking to establish an Islamic regime in Tunisia and also targets United States and Western interests. The group has come to be associated with al Qaida and other North African extremist networks that have been implicated in terrorist plots.

10. A foreign government has identified the detainee as a known member of the Tunisian Islamic Front.

11. According to a foregin government agency, it is suspected that Tunisian Islamic Front is the armed wing of En-Nahda. Members of the Tunisian Islamic Front have a range of contacts within the Islamic movement and would be in close contact with other Islamic extremists.

### b. Training

1. The detainee stated that he received military training at the Derunta Camp in Jalalabad, Afghanistan where he learned to use automatic weapons.

2. Derunta was one of Usama bin Laden's most important bases in Afghanistan. The camp provided training in the use of explosives. Derunta also contained several secondary bases belonging to Usama bin Laden.

3. The detainee was identified by a senior al Qaida operative as having trained at Khalden Camp.

4. Khalden Camp training consisted primarily of tactics for escaping from rockets, the use of rocket launchers, the manufacture of explosives and training in destructive techniques. The camp was well known for bringing in volunteers recruited from North Africa, many of whom had been living in Europe and transferred to Afghanistan via Karachi, Pakistan.

### c. Connections/Associations

The detainee was identified by a senior al Qaida operative as eventually taking over as the Emir of the Tunisian Group in Afghanistan.

### d. Intent

The detainee stated that he has hated America since he was a baby because it always takes the side of Israel. The detainee stated that America will eventually receive justice for its crimes against Islam.

# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NASSERI, RIYAD BIL MOHAMMMED TAHIR**

e. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated that he fled from Jalalabad, Afghanistan to the Tora Bora region after the area fell to the Northern Alliance.

2. The detainee was injured in the Tora Bora region during the United States bombing.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied taking part in any explosive training. The detainee also denied knowing of any explosive type training being taught at the Duranta Camp.

b. The detainee stated he did not receive any training at or near Khowst, Afghanistan and had not heard of a terrorist training camp prior to an interview.

c. The detainee claimed not to have belonged to any Tunisian Islamist Group and has never tried to overthrow the Tunisian Government.

d. The detainee claimed that he was never the leader of any group.

e. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001.

f. The detainee denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests or the Guantanamo Detention Facility.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

000598