




S E C R E T // N O F O R N // 20301216

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09360



JTF GTMO-CG

16 December 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue,
Miami, FL 33172.

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9SA-000188DP (S)

JTF GTMO Detainee Assessment

1. (S//NF) Personal Information:

- JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Jabir Jubran Al-Fayfi
- Aliases and Current/True Name: Abu Ja Afar Al Ansari ,
Abu Jaafar Al Ansari , Al Gheifi Jabber Jobran , Abu Ibrahim
- Place of Birth: Taif, Saudi Arabia (SA)
- Date of Birth: 1975
- Citizenship: Saudi Arabia
- Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9SA-000188DP



2. (FOUO) Health: Detainee is in good medical health. He has a history of latent TB and refused therapy. He has a history of left foot sensory neuropathy and GERD. He went on hunger strike in June 2005. He is on no chronic medications. He has no known drug allergies.

3. (S//NF) JTF GTMO Assessment:

a. (S) Recommendation: JTF GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). **If a satisfactory agreement can be reached that ensures continued detention and allows access to detainee and/or to exploited intelligence, detainee can be Transferred Out of DoD Control (TRO).** A visiting Saudi delegation indicated that the Government of Saudi Arabia would be willing to take custody of detainee for possible prosecution. JTF GTMO previously assessed detainee as Retain in DoD Control (DoD) on 21 May 2004.

CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES
REASON: E.O. 12958 SECTION 1.5(C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 20301216

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(S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is a probable member of Al-Qaida who fought with the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) in Kashmir and the Taliban against US/Coalition Forces in Afghanistan during 2001. It is assessed this detainee is a MEDIUM risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies. JTF GTMO determined this detainee is of LOW intelligence value. **[THERE IS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AVAILABLE ABOUT THIS DETAINEE IN A SCI SUPPLEMENT]**

4. (S//NF) Detainees Account of Events:

The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.

a. (S//NF) Prior History: Detainee claimed to have completed nine years of formal education before dropping out of school. He began attending classes at a technical institute when he was approximately sixteen years old and continued for about two years. At the technical school, he concentrated in the construction trade. Sometime after the Gulf War, detainee joined the Saudi military and worked as a military policeman for two and a half years, attaining the rank of private.¹ During this period, he reportedly traveled to Jeddah, SA, for one month as a military prison guard before returning to Taif.² He was discharged from the military, and for the next three to four years earned a living as a taxi driver.³ (Analyst Note: Detainee claimed to have five brothers and one uncle who were serving in the Saudi military or police force at the time of his capture.)

b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: During late 2000, detainee attended a mosque named Bin Awad or Abu Usama. He reportedly met an individual there named Hamoud Al-Nafaii who discussed the jihad in Kashmir. (Analyst Note: Hamoud Al-Nafaii is a known recruiter based in Taif, SA, to have identified young men for jihad in Chechnya and Kashmir, Pakistan (PK).) Detainee was motivated to join the jihad by feelings of solidarity with his fellow Muslims and the reward of heaven. During February 2001, detainee traveled from Taif to Kashmir, PK, via Qatar and Karachi, PK.⁴

c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: When detainee arrived in Kashmir, a man named Assad Allah (aka Assadullah) took him to an unknown location where there were many

¹ 000188 KB 02-03-2002

² ISN 0188 302 05/01/2002

³ 000188 KB 02-03-2002

⁴ ISN 0188 302 05/01/2002, 0188 SIR 10/02/2005, (S//NF) (Analyst Note: Date of travel was derived from SIR, but in the 302, detainee states that he traveled on May of 2001. Detainee stayed in Karachi for seven to eight days before moving on to Kashmir.)

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Arabs. Allah trained detainee among a group of 20 to 25 on the use of the PK light machine gun. Training was conducted in tents, which were moved from one forest to another every few weeks because the military fronts were shifting rapidly. Detainee was unsure of the unit with which he fought, but noted that it was possibly the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM).⁵ He admitted to conducting at least three attacks on Indian forces while in Kashmir. Preferred targets were reportedly patrols and lightly defended outposts. Detainee denied meeting members of the Taliban or Al-Qaida while in Kashmir.⁶ Approximately in June of 2001, Allah reportedly asked the detainee if he wanted to travel to Afghanistan (AF). Detainee initially declined, but was convinced to fight alongside the Taliban after reading an article in which a Saudi named Sheik Hamoud Al Aglah issued a fatwa against the violators in Afghanistan.⁷ Four months after arriving in Pakistan, detainee reportedly traveled by bus to Kabul, AF, and further to the Said Arab Center in Bagram, AF, where he remained for approximately 20 days.⁸ Detainee then moved to the Souheil sector of the front lines, where he served under Abu Tahir for four months. Tahir's unit included approximately 25 other Arabs.⁹ During that time, detainee heard that United States had been attacked on 11 September 2001. Due to the increased intensity of the coalition bombing campaign, a retreat to the caves in Tora Bora, AF, was ordered in November of 2001. Once at Tora Bora, the detainee and three Pakistanis who were fighting alongside the Taliban evaded through the cave complex for seven to twelve days.¹⁰ Some of the caves contained all Arabs and detainee heard that others contained Al-Qaida. These individuals could be identified because they carried radios and served in various leadership roles.¹¹

5. (S//NF) Capture Information:

a. (S//NF) Detainee and his group surrendered to the Pakistani army on 19 December 2001 in the Tora Bora / Pakistani border region.¹² Detainee was arrested and imprisoned for two to three weeks and then delivered to US custody on 31 December 2001.¹³

b. (S) Property Held:

⁵ (S//NF) JEM is an IICT Tier 1 target. Tier 1 targets are defined as terrorist groups, especially those with state support, that have demonstrated both intention and capability to attack US persons or interests.

⁶ IIR 6 034 0085 02

⁷ 000188 SIR 19-AUG-2002, 000188 SIR 06-JAN-2005

⁸ 000188 MFR 19-AUG-2002

⁹ 000188 MFR 25-FEB-2002

¹⁰ 000188 MFR 03-JUL-2002

¹¹ ISN 0188 302 05/01/2002

¹² 000188 MFR 30-SEP-2003

¹³ ISN 0188 302 05/01/2002, TD-314/00845-02

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- Broken flash light
- Power Plus AA battery
- Energizer Photo AA battery

c. **(S) Transferred to JTF GTMO:** 16 January 2002

d. **(S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF GTMO:** To provide information on the following:

- The Jaish-e-Mohammed organization and information on weapons training, training camp locations, and camp instructors near Kandahar.

6. (S//NF) Evaluation Of Detainee's Account: Detainee has been forthcoming about his recruitment, initial training and operations in Kashmir, as well as his subsequent decision to travel to Afghanistan. His stated timeline places him in Afghanistan prior to the 11 September 2001 attacks, but this cannot be verified. While he admits to serving in a primarily Arab unit, he denies being a member of Al-Qaida. He has probably minimized any combat he may have seen against US or coalition troops in Bagram and Tora Bora.

7. (S//NF) Detainee Threat:

a. **(S) Assessment:** It is assessed the detainee poses a MEDIUM risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.

b. **(S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention:** Detainee is a probable member of Al-Qaida and a highly trained fighter. He has fought both in Kashmir and Afghanistan. Detainee has been identified on several recovered documents associated with Al-Qaida.

- (S//NF) Detainee fought with JEM in Kashmir in 2001. During this time detainee conducted many night raids against Indian military forces¹⁴
 - (S//NF) Detainee admitted that he was in Indian-occupied Kashmir and participated in at least three attacks against Indian forces. Detainee operated in groups of eight or nine men, harassing Indian forces at night to undermine enemy morale.¹⁵
- (S//NF) In mid-2001, detainee traveled to Afghanistan to support the Taliban against the Northern Alliance. He is assessed to have fought in an Al-Qaida unit.¹⁶

¹⁴ TD-314/00296-02

¹⁵ IIR 6 034 0106 02, 000188 302 01-MAY-2002

¹⁶ TD-314/00296-02

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- (S//NF) Detainee admitted that he served in a unit comprised of Arabs, not Afghans. He noted that everyone in the unit used aliases and lied about their countries of origin.¹⁷ (Analyst Note: This type of operational security suggests he probably served in an Al-Qaida affiliated unit.)
- (S//NF) Assessed Al-Qaida member Jabd Al Rahman Ma'ath Thafir Al Umari, ISN US9SA-000199DP (SA-199), identified detainee as a Saudi from the Fafi Tribe who withdrew from Salman Position in Bagram to Tora Bora. SA-199 identified Abu Obeida Al-Masri as detainee's leader.¹⁸
 - (S//NF) Detainee admitted that he saw Abu Obeida Al-Masri while at Bagram and in Tora Bora.¹⁹ Detainee stated that Al-Masri was a Taliban leader who commanded approximately 60 to 150 soldiers and in charge of all Arab soldiers in Bagram.²⁰ (Analyst Note: Abu Obeida Al-Masri was an instructor at the Al-Farouq training camp and commanded troops on the front lines. It is assessed that Abu Masri was part of the 55th Arab Brigade and the detainee served under him. The 55th Arab Brigade served as UBL's primary battle formation supporting Taliban objectives.)²¹
- (S) Detainee stated that he met the following Al-Qaida personnel:
 - (S) Abu Yiha, who was in charge of 20 suspected Al-Qaida members and was seen talking on a radio to unknown persons. Detainee met him while in the Tora Bora lowland area of Afghanistan.²²
 - (S) Abu Juheina, was in charge of undetermined number of Al-Qaida fighters and was seen talking communicating through a handheld radio. Detainee met him while in the Tora Bora highland region. (Analyst Note: Detainee stated that it was common knowledge that Al-Qaida fighters used radios to communicate with each other and that the current whereabouts of Abu Yiha and Abu Juheina are unknown.)²³
- (S//NF) Detainee's name and trust account was found on multiple lists of jihadists recovered from Al-Qaida affiliated safe houses. (Analyst note: Such lists are indicative of an individual's residence within Al-Qaida, Taliban, and other extremist guesthouses, often for the purpose of training or coordination prior to travel to the front lines or abroad. Trust accounts were simply storage compartments that were used to secure the individual's personal valuables, such as including passports and plane tickets, until completion of training or other activity.)

¹⁷ 000188 MFR 25-FEB-2002¹⁸ IIR 6 034 0393 02¹⁹ IIR 2 340 6150 02²⁰ IIR 2 340 6150 02, KB 150308Z FEB 02²¹ IIR 6 034 0328 05, 000050 55th Arab Brigade 01-Feb-1998²² IIR 6 034 0066 02²³ IIR 6 034 0066 02

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- (S//NF) A variant of detainee's name, Jabr Jubran 'Ali Al-Fifi, and alias, Abu Jafir Al-Ansari, was found on document entitled "Asra.doc," recovered on a hard drive associated with senior Al-Qaida operative Khalid Sheik Mohammed (KSM) and seized during joint raids with the Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence Directorate (ISID) on 01 March 2003.²⁴
- (S//NF) An electronic document titled "Al Jawzat.doc," (Analyst Note: Translates to passports.doc.) was found on a floppy disk located during an 11 September 2002 raid on a suspected Al-Qaida residence in Karachi. The file listed a variant of detainee's name, Jabir Jubran Al-Fifi, and alias, Jafar Al-Ansari. It gave his safety deposit box number as 27-61 and listed the contents as a passport, ticket, and wallet.²⁵
- (S//NF) A variant of detainee's name, Jabir Jubran Al-Fiqi, and alias, Ja'far Al-Ansari, was found on lists of Al-Qaida mujahideen recovered during raids on safe houses in Rawalpindi and Karachi, PK. The list notes that detainee had trust account number 61-27, and listed the contents of the trust as a passport, an ID card, a wallet, and a ticket.²⁶
- (C) A variant of detainee's name, 'Amer Jubran 'Ali Al-Fifi, and alias, Abu Ja'afar Al-Ansari, was in a handwritten letter listing Arabs detained in Pakistan. Allied personnel recovered the letter with other materials (NFI) linked to Al-Qaida.²⁷
 - (C) A variant of detainee's name, Jaber Jubran 'Ali Al-Fifi, and alias, Abu Ja'afar Al-Ansari, was also listed in a soft copy of the above letter found on a computer server hard drive recovered in a raid on a suspected Al-Qaida safe house in Islamabad, PK in early 2002.²⁸
- (C) A variant of detainee's name, Jabir bin Jobran bin Ali Al-Fifi, and alias, Abu-Jaafar Al-Ansari, was noted on a list of 84 captured Taliban and Al-Qaida fighters. Pakistani forces captured the fighters, who had crossed the AF/PK border in the Nangarhar Province, on 14 December 2001 after they had gathered in a mosque and surrendered their weapons to their Pakistani host.²⁹ (Analyst Note: This is assessed to be the group led out of Tora Bora by senior Al-Qaida commander Ibn Sheikh Al Libi, who was captured with the group.)³⁰
- (S//NF) In July 2002, a delegation from Saudi Arabia identified detainee as of low intelligence and law enforcement value to the US, and unlikely to pose a terrorist threat to the US or its interests. Further, the Saudi delegation indicated that the Government of

²⁴ TD-314/13174-03²⁵ TD-314/42895-02²⁶ TD-314/47683-03²⁷ IIR 7 739 3245 02 #40, Harmony document AFGP-2002-803956²⁸ IIR 7 739 3268 02 #40, Harmony document AFGP-2002-602073²⁹ IIR 7 739 3396 02³⁰ TD-314/14605-04

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Saudi Arabia would be willing to take custody of detainee for possible prosecution as soon as the US determined it no longer wanted to hold him.³¹

c. (FOUO) Detainee's Conduct: The detainee is assessed as a HIGH threat from a detention perspective. The detainee's overall behavior has become increasingly non-compliant and hostile to the guard force and staff. The detainee went from 1 Report of Disciplinary Infraction in 2003 to 4 in 2004 and has 14 so far in 2005, for a total of 19. The most recent Report of Disciplinary Infraction occurred on 10 August 2005 when the detainee participated in a block disturbance. His last assault was 8 August 2005 when he threw urine in the Block NCO's face. Other incidents for which the detainee has been disciplined include assault, failure to follow instructions, damage to property, possession of both weapon and non-weapon type contraband, and unauthorized communications. On 15 August 2005, the Forced Cell Extraction team had to be called in after the detainee refused to comply with instructions by the block NCO, SOG, PL, and CO to exit for a random cell search. On 5 July 2005, guards found on his cup drawings depicting the USS Cole attack and airplanes impacting the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

8. (S//NF) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:

a. (S) Assessment: JTF GTMO determined this detainee is of LOW intelligence value.

b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Detainee was in Indian-occupied Kashmir for four months in 2001 probably serving in a JEM combat unit. He served on the front lines of Bagram and Tora Bora in the 55th Arab Brigade.

c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee has already provided information regarding weapons and tactics used by JEM fighters in Kashmir and of Al-Qaida leadership in Afghanistan. Although his name and alias have been discovered on numerous Al-Qaida associated documents, the extent of detainee's affiliation and role within Al-Qaida remains undefined. Detainee has demonstrated a commitment to jihad.

d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:


- Operational knowledge of Kashmir
- Extremist groups working /traveling between Kashmir and Afghanistan
- Al-Qaida leaders and other extremists in Tora Bora

³¹ TD 314 30789 02

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9. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 06 October 2004 and he remains an enemy combatant.



JAY W. HOOD
Major General, USA
Commanding