

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford  
 Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State  
 and Assistant to the President for  
 National Security Affairs  
 Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy  
 Assistant to the President for National  
 Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, May 14, 1975  
 11:45 a. m. ?

PLACE: Oval Office  
 The White House

SUBJECT: Mayaguez

Kissinger: I think you will have to be clear you want a strong effort. I think you should take out the port. The airfields aren't so significant. You will take as much heat for a big strike as for a small strike.

President: As I recall, I asked Jones to come up with targets, planes, and strike plans.

Kissinger: But I have the sense the McNamara syndrome is so important that they will not be so ferocious. It may be the B-52 strike is too much. The Coral Sea may be better if they do it with vigor. It depends on the pilot's instructions. I think Gayler is disastrous -- McCain wouldn't give us these problems.

A pep talk by you to the Chairman in front of his DOD superiors will help get what we need.

Using B-52's may be paying too much of a price.

~~SECRET~~/NODIS/XGDS

CLASSIFIED BY HENRY A. KISSINGER  
 EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
 SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
 EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (b) (1, 3)  
 AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to det.

DECLASSIFIED  
 E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
 NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guideline 3  
 By 1/24/00, NARA, Date 1/24/00



President: We won't have carrier strikes unless they can convince me they are meaningful.

Kissinger: Luckily they have taken a Swedish ship.

President: I am disturbed at the lack of carrying out orders. I can give all the orders, but if they don't carry them out.... I was mad yesterday.

Kissinger: This is your first crisis. You should establish a reputation for being too tough to tackle. This is a replay of the EC-121. I see the argument against the B-52's.

President: I think I should say I favor the B-52's unless they can show they can do as much with tacair.

Kissinger: That is a good way to get at the problem. The price will be the same. If you use force it should be ferociously.

We have learned our naval deployments aren't very good.

President: Another thing we have learned is that the Naval forces aren't in as good condition as they should be.

Kissinger: On the world economic scene, I think we shouldn't push so hard on the philosophic "free market" pitch. We should deal pragmatically.

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Assistant to the President for National  
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DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, May 14, 1975  
9:15 a. m.

PLACE: The Oval Office  
The White House

Kissinger: The sponsors of my [Kansas City] speech included NAACP, Labor, and so on, so it just wasn't conservatives. They were up in arms over the CIA, and worried over Vietnam.

President: On the Middle East?

Kissinger: There was no great support for Israel. No great opposition either. But it is obvious that Israel is after me. [He discussed the Matti Golan book incident.] They must have known about the manuscript but they never told us. How did the documents leak?

President: As I read the articles, I thought we should demand a copy of the book.

Kissinger: Then we would have to confirm or deny it. We should demand a report of the issue. But not even the Soviets have leaked the substance of our discussions, however much it might have been to their advantage.

[The President takes a phone call.]

There is a total lack of confidentiality and Rabin should be told that. Also that they are proselytizing.

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NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines

By LLX, NAF Date 1/24/06

President: Sid Yates was in. He was reasonable but he is totally pro-Israel. He had obviously been briefed. He ticked off a number of things, including the Clements/Brown trip.

Kissinger: There is no massive support in the Midwest for either Israel or the Arabs.

The Greek and Turk Foreign Ministers are now going to meet.

President: Can we tell Mansfield and Scott?

Kissinger: Yes. Don't promise them too much in results from the negotiations. I would stress the threat to NATO and the danger of radicalizing the Turks.

The Syria-Iraq tension is serious.

I think the Israelis are after me. If they can get me, that will induce, they think, several months of confusion, and then we will be into the elections and they will be free until '77.

President: I told Sid Yates we would probably have to go to Geneva, and we have warned both of them about making military moves.

Kissinger: I think I have to tell Gromyko we are prepared to go to Geneva.

President: He asked about Jordan. I showed him what we have given Israel and I said we have no apologies.

Kissinger: Asad replied to your letter of six weeks ago. I'll send it in -- with my MemCon. It is very friendly. You flattered them out of their minds by offering to meet him in connection with CSCE. He will send the Foreign Minister here after Rabin's visit. We should hear him the end of June and announce the 1st of July.

I would tell Gromyko we wouldn't have any separate maneuvers before Geneva, but we are not ready to discuss the impact of it before your consultations. Geneva wouldn't be before late July or August.

President: Would that interfere with the Brezhnev summit?

Kissinger: Brezhnev seems in some trouble again. According to Congressman Bennett, he's going into the hospital again.



You can't cooperate with the Soviet Union on the Middle East beforehand or they will preempt us.

On SALT, we have to be careful not to drive the Soviets beyond a certain point. We are better off in coordinating a tough policy by keeping detente.

We would be better off if there was a right wing. Jackson is hurting us badly by going left. I think you are strong now -- once you get off the Eastern seaboard you are in good shape. There were 5,000 people standing in front of the Statehouse. These people want to be proud of their President. They want the Republican convention in Kansas City.

President: That's not a bad idea.

Kissinger: I will have a rocky session with Gromyko because he will want a commitment on the Middle East.

On den Uyl, there is no question of our commitment, but the Alliance needs to think about joint actions, not just words, like how to consult on energy, Middle East, etc. He has domestic problems.

There is one bilateral problem -- KLM. We haven't formally agreed.



✓ Pres. / HAK (? Wed, May 14 -  
after den Ughl mtg?)  
11:45 am ?

K I think you will have to be clear you want  
a strong effort. I think you should take out  
a part. The airfields aren't so sig. You will  
take as much heat for a big as a small strike.

P As I recall, I asked you to send some w/  
targets, planes & strike plans.

K But I have sense & Mr. Namora Lyndman  
is so important that they not so permissive.

P It may be B-52 strike is too much. The Central Sec  
may be better if they do it w/ us. It depends on  
pilots' instructions. I think Gayler is also there -  
Mr. Coen wouldn't give us that info.

A pep talk by you to Cham in front of his DOD  
superiors will help get what we need.

Using B-52's may be paying too much of a price

P We won't have carrier strikes unless they  
can convince me they are necessary.


K Heckily they have taken a Swedish ship.

P I am disturbed at the lack of carrying out orders.  
I can give all the orders, but if they don't carry  
them out - I was mad yesterday.

K This your first crisis. You should establish a reputation  
for being too tough to tackle. This a replay of CFC-101.  
I see an argument against B-52's.

P I think I should say I favor B-52's unless they can  
show they can do as much w/ terrain.

K That a general way to get at a prob. The price will  
be a source. If you use force it should be  
permissive.





## Utah - borders loaded.

- L. We have learned our naval deployments aren't very general.
- P. Another thing we have learned that naval forces aren't in as good condition as they should be.
- R. One would even say, I think we shouldn't push so hard on the philosophic "free market" pitch + deal pragmatically.

? -- E described - Sh's prop  
P/K 14 May '55 ✓ 9:15 am  
[ Map of Turkey w/ bases + explanation ]

K The sponsors of my speech included NAACP, labor, etc, so it just wasn't circumstances. They were in arms over C.A. worried over V.N.

P Middle East

" No great support for I. No great opposition either - But it shows they I after me. (Described book matter) They must have <sup>at</sup> some manuscript but never told us. How did documents leak?

P As I read articles, I think we should demand a copy of a book?

K Then we would have to confirm or deny. We should demand a report of a source. But not even the Soviets have leaked a ~~substance~~ substance of our discussions, however much it might have been to their advantage.

(Pus gets phone call)

There is a total lack of confidentiality + Kabin should be told that - also that they are probably trying.

P Sid Yates was in. He was plausible but he <sup>is</sup> ~~was~~ totally pro-I. He had obviously been briefed. He talked off the top of things, and a Clowds/Brown tip.

K There is no massive support in England for either I or Arabs.

B The Greek + Turkish FM are now going to meet

P Com as tall Wimpfield / S. etc

K Yes. Don't promise them too much in results from negot. I would stress a threat to NATO of re-energizing the Turks.

The Syria - Iraq tension is serious.





# Tell State Faked

I think I am after me. If they can get me, there will indeed, they think, several months of confusion, then we will be into elections & they will be free til 77.

P I told Yates we would just have to go to Geneva, and we have warned both about that, mil, mass

K I think I have to tell Gough we prepared to go to Geneva

P He asked about Jordan. I showed him what we have given I + D said we have no obligations

K Asad replied to your letter of 6 weeks ago. I'll send it in. <sup>(as/ his conversation)</sup> It was friendly. You flattered them out of their wits by offering to meet him in connection w/ CSCE. He will send FM here after Robin. We should hear him end of June + announce 1st of July.


I would tell Gough we wouldn't have any separate maneuvers before Geneva, but we not ready to discuss ~~any~~ report of it before your consultation. Geneva wouldn't be before late July or Aug.

P warned that interfere w/ Bay summit.

K Bay seems in some trouble again. Carry Bennett, going into bay again.

You can't compare/ SD on ME beforehand or they will preempt us.

On Salt, we have to be careful not to drive Sino beyond a certain point. We better off in conducting a tough policy by keeping details.



We would be better off if there was a right wing.  
Jackson is hurting us badly by going left.

I think you are strong now - does your jet off a  
Eastern seaboard you are in good shape. 5000  
stand in front of a Statehouse. These people want  
to be proud of their Pres. They want a Republican  
President in KC.

P Not a bad idea.

K I will have a rocky session w/ Congress cause he  
will want a contract on ME

On Don Key, no practice of contract, but at least  
needs to think about just actions, not just <sup>words,</sup> words,  
like how to consult on energy, ME, etc. He has  
domestic pros.

One bilateral prob - KLM. We haven't formally  
agreed