



Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library and Museum

www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov

Library: 1000 Beal Ave., Ann Arbor, MI 48109
Museum: 303 Pearl Street, NW, Grand Rapids, MI 49504

(734) 205-0555 fax (734) 205-0571
(616) 254-0400 fax (616) 254-0386

**The documents in this
folder continue from the
previous folder.**

Monday, August 25, 1975



EGYPT

CHECKLIST

Alexandria, Monday, August 25

I. Procedures

- A. Review main concepts of Agreement.
- B. Arrange to go over drafts of three documents:
 - Agreement
 - Letter on UNEF duration
 - Letter on non-use of force
- C. Try to crystallize "oral" Egyptian assurances three issues important to Israel:
 - Boycott
 - Political action
 - Propaganda
- D. To the extent possible, begin to see which of the bilateral assurances that Israel seeks Egypt can respond to helpfully.

II. Main Concepts of Agreement

- A. The Passes
 - Giddi (photo map)
 - Mitla
- B. Israeli and Egyptian Lines (map)
 - Israeli line north of the passes.
 - Israeli line south of the passes.
 - Alternative on Line B.



DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 1.5
STATE DEPT. CONTROL
K12

- C. Location of Egyptian Station (map)
- D. Number and Location of US Surveillance Sites

III. Documents


- A. Agreement. A new draft taking Fahmy's comments into account is at Tab A. Your objective is to come as close to this as possible. For your reference, Fahmy's Saturday comments on our earlier draft are at Tab B.
- B. Letter on UNEF duration. Our clean draft is at Tab C. Immediately under it at the same tab is a copy of the draft developed at Salzburg with later Israeli changes showing Fahmy's reaction to it.
- C. Letter on non-use of force (Tab D). Fahmy sees no need for this.
- D. In one of the documents, we will need Egyptian views on timing of implementation.
- E. You may want to mention the question of our Annex to the agreement.

IV. Egyptian "Oral" Assurances

As you know, the Israelis will ask you what Egyptian assurances are possible on the following:

-- Egyptian government-controlled media will reduce hostile propaganda and Egyptian officials will be restrained in official pronouncements (Israel agrees to the same). (Fahmy told Eilts we should leave this to Egyptian discretion).

-- Egypt agrees to "ease the boycott of American companies on a selective basis" and "will not discriminate against any American company that wants to do business in Egypt regardless of whether this company is on the boycott list." The U.S. will encourage Egypt to expand the above to include European and other companies. (Fahmy told Eilts (a) the last sentence is not possible but (b) companies prepared to do substantial business can do so in Egypt.)



-- Egypt will "refrain from all measures that might inhibit or obstruct the maintenance or resumption of diplomatic relations between Israel and any other state and that it will not raise objections with states considering establishment or resumption of diplomatic relations with Israel." (Fahmy said the most Egypt would do is not to take any initiative to prevent any state from resuming relations with Israel.)

-- Egypt will "refrain from initiating or supporting any measures directed against Israel or intended to bar, restrict, or suspend the participation of Israel or its membership, Israeli nationals or delegations at the UN, in UN bodies, in international forums and events." (Fahmy recalled Sadat's Khartoum statement. Maybe we could build around that.)

V. Other Points to Take Up

At some point, you will want to bear in mind that the present draft of the US-Israeli Memo of Understanding states we will seek Egyptian agreement to the following, although we know some of them will not prove possible for Egypt:

-- If UNEF mandate not renewed, Agreement remains in effect.

-- Withdrawal of UNEF will not alter the status of the buffer zone, including the warning stations.

-- U.S. aerial reconnaissance will continue, now at a frequency of one mission every 7-10 days.

-- Egypt "will not use lack of progress at the Geneva Peace Conference as a pretext to break the interim agreement."

-- In connection with the assurance to observe the ceasefire, Egypt additionally assures the U.S. that Egypt will not apply blockade measures, including interference with air flights.

-- Egypt will "permit passage through the Suez Canal of seamen of Israeli nationality who are included among the general crew, when on third-party vessels." Also,



similar assurance "with respect to Israeli nationals in transit through the Canal on third-party vessels."

-- "...ships and aircraft and their passengers and crews in distress will be given assistance and be permitted to continue on their route."

-- "...Israeli nationals on third-party vessels or aircraft that land at Egyptian airports and ports will be extended the same treatment given to all other foreign nationals."

-- Validity of Egyptian undertakings conveyed to Israel through the USG will not be affected by their becoming public knowledge. (Israel will do its best to keep them secret.)

-- "The implementation, validity and duration of the Agreement are not conditional upon any act or development between the other Arab states and Israel."

-- In event of Israeli counter-measures against terrorist acts across its borders, Egypt's commitment to refrain from the threat or use of force will remain binding.

-- The annual renewals of UNEF will begin after the redeployment of forces under the agreement is completed.

-- Egypt agrees that removal of UNEF, or change in its mandate and modus operandi requires the consent of both parties.

-- Abu Rodeis or other Sinai oil may be purchased by Israel through a third-party company and transported directly to Israel at present rate of supply.



August 24, 1975

~~SECRET~~

AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL

The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government of Israel:

Resolving that the conflict between them and in the Middle East will not be resolved by military force but by peaceful means;

Recalling that the Agreement concluded by the parties January 18, 1974, within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference, constituted a first step towards a just and durable peace according to the provisions of Security Council Resolution 338 of October 22, 1973; and

Desirous of reaching a final and just peace settlement by means of negotiations called for by Security Council Resolution 338 and as a significant step towards that end;

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

(1) The Parties hereby undertake not to resort to the threat or use of force against each other and to settle all disputes between them by negotiation or other peaceful means.

(2) The Parties have given a further written assurance to the Government of the United States of America to this effect.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, GRD, & S
STATE DEPT. COLLECTIONS
BY HR DATE 10/16/03



ARTICLE II

(1) The Parties reconfirm their obligation pursuant to the disengagement agreement of January 18, 1974, to scrupulously observe the ceasefire on land, sea and air and to refrain from all military or para-military actions against each other or blockades against each other directly or indirectly.

(2) The Parties also confirm that the obligations contained in the Annex and, when concluded, the Protocol shall be an integral part of this Agreement.

ARTICLE III

The military forces of the Parties shall be deployed in accordance with the following principles:

(1) All Egyptian forces shall be deployed west of the line designated as Line A on the attached map.

(2) All Israeli forces shall be deployed east of the line designated as Line B on the attached map.

(3) The area between the lines designated on the attached map as Lines A and D and the area between the lines designated on the attached map as Lines B and C shall be limited in armament and forces.

(4) The limitations on armament and forces in the areas described by paragraph (3) above shall be agreed as described in the attached annex.



(5) In the area between the lines designated on the attached map as Lines A and B, the United Nations Emergency Force will continue to perform its functions as under the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement of January 18, 1974.

(6) In the land connection between the city of Suez and the line terminating at the coast south of Abu Rodeis on the attached map, the following principles will apply:

(a) Egypt will conduct civilian activities, including normal civil police.

(b) There will be no military forces.


(c) The United Nations Emergency Force will assure that there are no military forces; it will establish check points and have freedom of movement necessary to perform this function in this area.

ARTICLE IV

This Agreement shall be implemented by both Parties in such a manner as to demonstrate their desire for peace. Roads, installations, or equipment of the oil fields, except for some military installations or equipment in the areas vacated, shall not be destroyed or transferred from those areas.

ARTICLE V

Egypt agrees that the United Nations Emergency Force is



essential and shall continue its function and that its mandate shall be extended annually.

ARTICLE VI

The Parties hereby establish a Joint Commission to be presided over by the Chief Coordinator of the United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in the Middle East for the duration of this Agreement, in order to consider any problem arising from this Agreement and to assist the United Nations Emergency Force in the execution of its mandate. The Joint Commission shall function in accordance with precepts established in the Annex.

ARTICLE VII

(1) All cargoes destined for or coming from Israel shall be permitted through the Suez Canal.

(2) The Parties regard the Red Sea, its approaches and straits leading to it, and the Straits of Bab el-Mandeb as an international waterway for ships of all flags. Neither Party shall interfere with the free and unimpeded transit of any ship or cargo through those Straits or with the flight of aircraft over those Straits and other areas mentioned above.



ARTICLE VIII

The details concerning the new demarcation lines, the redeployment of the forces and its timing, the limitation on armaments and forces, aerial reconnaissance, the operation of the early warning and surveillance installations, the UN functions and other arrangements will all be in accordance with the provisions of the Annex and map which are an integral part of this Agreement and of the Protocol which is to result from negotiations pursuant to the Annex and which, when concluded, shall become an integral part of this Agreement.

ARTICLE IX

(1) This Agreement is regarded by the Parties as a significant step toward a just and lasting peace. It is not a final peace agreement.

(2) The Parties shall continue their efforts to negotiate a final peace agreement within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference.

ARTICLE X

Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent either Party from exercising the right of self-defense, as recognized in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.



ARTICLE XI

This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature and remain in force until superseded by a new agreement between the Parties.

ARTICLE XII

This Agreement shall be deposited with the Secretary General of the United Nations in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the UN.

Done at _____ on the _____
1975, in four copies

For the Government of Israel

For the Government of the
Arab Republic of Egypt

WITNESS



~~SECRET~~

AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL

The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government of Israel:

Resolving that the conflict between them and in the Middle East will ~~should~~ not ultimately be resolved by military force but ~~only~~ by peaceful means;

Recalling that the Agreement concluded by the parties January 18, 1974, within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference, constituted a first step towards a just and durable peace according to the provisions of Security Council Resolution 338 of October 22, 1973; and

Desirous of reaching a final and just peace settlement by means of negotiations called for by Security Council Resolution 338 and as a significant step towards that end;

Have agreed as follows:


ARTICLE - I

~~The Preamble is an integral part of this Agreement.~~

ARTICLE II I

(1) The Parties hereby undertake not to resort to the ~~threat or~~ use of force against each other ~~and to settle~~ all ~~disputes between them by negotiation or other peaceful~~ means, as long as this agreement is valid.

~~SECRET~~



(2) The Parties have given a further written assurance to the Government of the United States of America to this effect.

ARTICLE III II

(1) The Parties reconfirm their obligation pursuant to the disengagement agreement of January 18, 1974, to scrupulously observe the ceasefire on land, sea and air and to refrain from ~~all~~ any military or para-military actions against each other ~~or blockades against each other directly or indirectly.~~

(2) The Parties also confirm that the obligations contained in the Annex and, when concluded, the Protocol shall be an integral part of this Agreement.

ARTICLE III

The new lines will be drawn on the following bases:

- A. The Israeli forces will withdraw from their present line to Line A as it will appear in the index;
- B. The Egyptian forces will move up to Line B as it will appear in the annex;
- C. The area between the Egyptian line and the Israeli line will be a zone of disengagement in which the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) will be stationed;
- D. The area between the new Israeli line and Line C as shown on the annex will be limited in armaments and forces;



E. The area between the new Egyptian line and the Suez Canal will be limited in armaments and forces.

ARTICLE IV

The Israeli withdrawal will be implemented in such a manner as to indicate the willingness of the Israelis to demonstrate their desire for peace, namely that no roads or installations or equipment of the oil fields be destroyed or transferred from their present location either to Israel or the remaining occupied territories.

ARTICLE IV V

~~The Parties~~ Egypt agrees that the United Nations Emergency Force is essential and shall continue its function and that its mandate shall be extended annually.

ARTICLE V VI

The Parties hereby establish a ~~Joint Commission in relation~~ to be presided over by the Commander of the United Nations for the duration of this Agreement, in order to consider any problem arising from this Agreement and to assist the United Nations Emergency Force in the execution of ~~its~~ this mandate.



The Joint Commission shall function in accordance with proceedures precepts established in the Annex. (Note: Fahmy said he would be willing to go back to his Aswan formulation: "A committee under the auspices of the United Nations on the chairmanship of the UN Chief of Staff will be established in order that military representatives of the parties discuss, in the zone of disengagement, problems arising from the implementation of this agreement.")


ARTICLE VI

(1) ~~All-cargoes-destined-for-er-coming-from-Israel shall-be-permitted-through-the-Suez-Canal.~~

(2) ~~The-Parties-regard-the-Red-Sea,-its-approaches-and straits-leading-to-it,-and-the-Straits-of-Bab-el-Mandeb-as an-international-waterway-for-ships-of-all-flags,--Neither Party-shall-interfere-with-the-free-and-unimpeded-transit of-any-ship-or-cargo-through-these-Straits-or-with-the-flight of-aircraft-over-these-Straits-and-other-areas-mentioned above.~~ (NOTE: Fahmy said this could be reaffirmed in another letter.)

ARTICLE VII

The details concerning the new demarcation lines, the redeployment of the forces and its timing, the limitation



on armaments and forces, aerial reconnaissance, the operation of the early warning and surveillance installations, the UN functions and other arrangements will all be in accordance with the provisions of the Annex and map which are an integral part of this Agreement and of the Protocol which is to result from negotiations pursuant to the Annex and which, when concluded, shall become an integral part of this Agreement.


ARTICLE VIII

(1) This Agreement is regarded by the Parties as a significant step toward a just and lasting peace. It is not a final peace agreement.

(2) The Parties shall continue ~~the-diplomatic~~ their efforts to negotiate a final peace agreement within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference.

ARTICLE IX

Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent ~~either-Party~~ Egypt from exercising the right of self-defense, as recognized in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.



ARTICLE X

This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature and remain in force until superseded by a new agreement between the Parties.

ARTICLE XI

~~This Agreement shall be deposited with the Secretary General of the United Nations in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the UN.~~

Done at _____ on the _____
1975, in four copies

For the Government of Israel

For the Government of the
Arab Republic of Egypt

WITNESS



August 24, 1975

Dear Mr. President:

I am writing you this letter to inform you of the position of Egypt on the question of the duration of the second Egyptian-Israeli agreement on the Sinai.

The agreement includes language that the 'agreement shall remain in force until is superseded by a new agreement between the Parties.' With respect to the duration of UNEF, I have informed Secretary Kissinger of Egypt's undertaking to make every effort to extend the United Nations Emergency Force annually for the duration of the agreement.

However, should the Security Council, because of the action of a third state, fail to renew the UNEF mandate to assure continuous operation, Egypt undertakes to concert actively with the U.S. to have the General Assembly take appropriate action to bring about annual renewals for at least two renewals after the first annual mandate goes into effect.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

In the event such affirmative General Assembly action did not prove possible, Egypt will request an augmented UNISO to continue the supervision responsibilities, and to have the joint Egyptian-Israeli Commission cooperate with it.

Sincerely yours,

Mohammed Anwar al-Sadat

His Excellency
Gerald R. Ford,
President of the United States,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.



Fahmy changes
August 21
(August 16, 1975)

Dear Mr. President:

~~[In accordance with the Agreement signed between
Egypt and Israel on _____]~~ I am Added
since
Salzburg

writing you this letter to inform you of the position
of Egypt on the question of the duration of the second
Egyptian-Israeli agreement on the Sinai.

~~[The agreement includes language that the agree-
ment shall remain in effect until it is superseded
by a new agreement. With respect to the duration
of UNEF,]~~ I have informed Secretary Kissinger of This
was in
Salzburg
draft
Egypt's undertaking to make every effort to extend
the United Nations Emergency Force annually for the
duration of the agreement.

However, should the Security Council, because
of the action of a third state, fail to renew the
UNEF mandate to assure continuous operation, Egypt
undertakes ~~[without prejudice to any obligation of
the parties under this Agreement]~~ to concert actively Added by
with the U.S. to have the General Assembly take
appropriate action to bring about annual renewals
for at least two renewals after the first annual
mandate goes into effect.




In the event such affirmative General Assembly
action did not prove possible, Egypt will request
an augmented UNTSO to continue the supervision
responsibilities, [~~and to have the joint Egyptian
Israeli Commission cooperate with it.~~]

Was in
Salzburg
draft

Sincerely yours,

Mohammed Anwar al-Sadat

His Excellency
Gerald R. Ford,
President of the United States,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.



August 24, 1975

LETTER TO PRESIDENT FORD ON NON-USE OF FORCE

Dear Mr. President,

In connection with the Agreement between Egypt and Israel of _____, and in accordance with the undertakings contained therein, we are herewith submitting the following assurance to you:

- A. Israel is resolved that the conflict between her and Egypt and in the Middle East will not be resolved by military force but by peaceful means.
- B. Israel undertakes not to resort to the threat or use of force against Egypt and to settle all disputes with Egypt by negotiations or other peaceful means.
- C. Israel reconfirms its obligation to scrupulously observe the ceasefire on land, sea and air and to refrain from all military or paramilitary actions against Egypt or blockades against Egypt directly or indirectly.

Yours sincerely,





CHECKLIST

ISRAEL

Monday evening, August 25, 1975

1. We suggest you open the meeting by referring to the bilateral talks and saying you are prepared to discuss this matter at the outset in order not to have these issues distract us from the negotiations.

2. On the main issues, you will want to report Sadat's views on the following:

- Giddi Pass: new line; must be straightened.
- Egyptian Stations location and relation to Giddi Pass line.
- Israeli line south of Mitla: Sadat will settle for original fallback.
- Egyptian line B: Sadat accepts advance in south.
- Number of U. S. sites.
- On the map the Israelis gave us last night, there are some suggestions you will want to make for presentation purposes on the final map (e.g. not use terms "buffer zone" or "UN zone").

3. Documents

You had an opportunity for serious discussion of the following documents:

- Agreement.
- Letter on UNEF duration.
- We have some of Gamasy's ideas on limitation of armaments and forces and operations in the coastal area.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEP. 85
STATE DEPT. COMPLIANCE

HR 10/16/03



- The Egyptians are proposing a three-month implementation period.
- The Egyptians have made suggestions for initialing, signing, implementation talks (Geneva next week) and accept the idea of one or two generals and a civilian official.

4. Other Issues

- You promised to raise fishing rights.
- If there is signature next week, we will have to deal somehow with the Israeli request that the agreement not become effective until the Congress has acted on the U.S. sites.

Attached:

Tab A: Agreement.

Tab B: Letter on UNEF duration.



August 25, 1975

~~SECRET~~

AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL

ARTICLE I

The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government of Israel:

Resolve that the conflict between them and in the Middle East should not be resolved by military force but by peaceful means;

Recall that the Agreement concluded by the Parties January 18, 1974, within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference, constituted a first step towards a just and durable peace according to the provisions of Security Council Resolution 338 of October 22, 1973; and

Are determined to reach a final and just peace settlement by means of negotiations called for by Security Council Resolution 338 [and as a significant step towards that end, have agreed as follows:]

ARTICLE II

(1) The Parties hereby undertake not to resort to the threat or use of force or armed blockade against each other.

[(2) The Parties have given a further written assurance to the Government of the United States of America to this effect.]

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SER. 3.5
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY HR, NARA, DATE 10/16/03

~~SECRET~~



ARTICLE III

(1) The Parties will scrupulously observe the ceasefire on land, sea and air and refrain from all military or paramilitary actions against each other.

(2) The Parties also confirm that the obligations contained in the Annex and, when concluded, the Protocol shall be an integral part of this Agreement.

ARTICLE IV

The military forces of the Parties shall be deployed in accordance with the following principles:

(1) All Egyptian forces shall be deployed west of the line designated as Line A on the attached map.

(2) All Israeli forces shall be deployed east of the line designated as Line B on the attached map.

(3) The area between the lines designated on the attached map as Lines A and D and the area between the lines designated on the attached map as Lines B and C shall be limited in armament and forces.

(4) The limitations on armament and forces in the areas described by paragraph (3) above shall be agreed as described in the attached annex.

(5) In the area between the lines designated on the attached map as Lines A and B, the United Nations Emergency



Force will continue to perform its functions as under the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement of January 18, 1974.

(6) In the land connection between the city of Suez and the line terminating at the coast south of Abu Rodeis on the attached map, the following principles will apply:

(a) There will be no military forces.

(b) The United Nations Emergency Force will assure that there are no military forces; it will establish check points and have freedom of movement necessary to perform this function in this area.

ARTICLE V

Egypt agrees that the United Nations Emergency Force is essential and shall continue its function and that its mandate shall be extended annually.

ARTICLE VI

The Parties hereby establish a Joint Commission to be presided over by the Chief Coordinator of the United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in the Middle East for the duration of this Agreement, in order to consider any problem arising from this Agreement and to assist the United Nations Emergency Force in the execution of its mandate. The Joint Commission



shall function in accordance with precepts established in the Annex.

ARTICLE VII

Cargoes of non-strategic nature destined for or coming from Israel shall be permitted through the Suez Canal.

ARTICLE VIII

The details concerning the new lines, the redeployment of the forces and its timing, the limitation on armaments and forces, aerial reconnaissance, the operation of the early warning and surveillance installations, the UN functions and other arrangements will all be in accordance with the provisions of the Annex and map which are an integral part of this Agreement and of the Protocol which is to result from negotiations pursuant to the Annex and which, when concluded, shall become an integral part of this Agreement.

ARTICLE IX

(1) This Agreement is regarded by the Parties as a significant step toward a just and lasting peace. It is not a final peace agreement.

(2) The Parties shall continue their efforts to negotiate a final peace agreement within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference.

ARTICLE X

Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice the right of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter.

ARTICLE XI


This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature and remain in force until superseded by a new agreement between the Parties in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 338.

Done at _____ on the _____
1975, in four copies.

For the Government of Israel

For the Government of the
Arab Republic of Egypt

WITNESS



August 24, 1975

Dear Mr. President:

I am writing you this letter to inform you of the position of Egypt on the question of the duration of the second Egyptian-Israeli agreement on the Sinai.

The agreement includes language that the agreement shall remain in force until it is superseded by a new agreement between the Parties. With respect to the duration of UNEF, I have informed Secretary Kissinger of Egypt's undertaking to make every effort to extend the United Nations Emergency Force annually for the duration of the agreement.

However, should the Security Council, because of the action of a third state, fail to renew the UNEF mandate to assure continuous operation, Egypt undertakes to concert actively with the U. S. to have the General Assembly take appropriate action to bring about annual renewals for two renewals after the first annual mandate goes into effect.

In the event such affirmative General Assembly action did not prove possible, Egypt will request an augmented UNTSO to continue the supervision responsibilities, and to have the joint Egyptian-Israeli Commission cooperate with it.

Sincerely yours,

Mohammed Anwar al-Sadat



His Excellency
Gerald R. Ford,
President of the United States,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 26, 1975

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

Secretary Kissinger asked that the following report of his August 25 meeting with Sadat be passed to you:

"It has been a long and difficult day, with some further progress, some new difficulties, though not necessarily unresolvable, and a seemingly never ending series of details on which to achieve common ground.

"With Sadat today we came a bit closer on a possible agreed line which would get the Israelis out of the Giddi pass. He accepted the additional slivers of territory Israel has given on both the Egyptian and Israeli lines, and we will try to get agreement from Israel tonight on the location of the Egyptian strategic early warning stations. Sadat has also accepted the American presence in the passes.

"We went over in detail with Fahmy and Gamassy a text of an agreement, a copy of which I am sending. Sadat went further in the direction of the Israeli position than expected. For example, he has not only lived up to his commitment to include in the agreement a non-resort to force clause, but also met the Israeli insistence that blockades be barred. Cargoes of a non-strategic character will be allowed to pass through the Suez Canal. The text also keeps the agreement open-ended as Israel wants, and Sadat confirmed he will give us a letter committing Egypt to three annual renewals of the UNEF. There are still difficulties ahead on the precise terms of the zone of limitation, and there is a fundamental difference between Egypt and Israel to resolve over the corridor area leading to the oil fields; Egypt wants sovereignty, Israel's position is that Egypt should exercise civil administration. We also need to work out a tripartite agreement governing our technical surveillance role in the passes.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, EXEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/00, UNCLAS. & GUIDELINES
BY *13R*, DATE 10/16/03



~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 2 -

"I expect a difficult session tonight with Rabin. The technical team I left behind in Israel to work with them on the memorandum of understanding incorporating the US bilateral assurances Israel seeks have reported continuing differences. The Israelis are still pushing to limit our future freedom of action politically on this issue."

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~





)

)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Israel

Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister
Yigal Allon, Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Shimon Peres, Minister of Defense
Simcha Dinitz, Israeli Ambassador to the U. S.
Lt. Gen. Mordechai Gur, Chief of Staff
Amos Eran, Director General,
Prime Minister's Office
Avraham Kidron, Director General,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

United States

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs
Malcolm Toon, Ambassador to Israel
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff
Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary
of State for Near Eastern & South Asian Affairs
Harold H. Saunders, Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Robert B. Oakley, NSC Staff
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff *PRM*


*DECLASSIFIED State Dept Review
E.O. 13526, DIS. BY SF 9/18/03
HRT, 10/16/03*

DATE AND TIME:

Monday, August 25, 1975
10:02 p. m. - 12:06 a. m.

PLACE:

Prime Minister's Office
Jerusalem



[Photographers were admitted.]

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

CLASSIFIED BY HENRY A. KISSINGER
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (b) (1, 3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to det.

Allon: You know, Henry, a good statement by you tomorrow, while the Lima Conference is going on, will have a good effect on the UN suspension.

Kissinger: We've done all we could. Our position is known. I think a statement now.

Sisco: would solidify them.

Peres: What does Sadat have there in Alexandria? A palace?

Kissinger: It's a guest house, not a palace.

Peres: He has lots of palaces left over from King Farouk.

Kissinger: The place I stayed for a night -- and where Nancy is now -- Ras el-Tin -- is a palace.

Peres: The lesson is, never start a country as a republic!

Rabin: After your short trip this morning, what do you have?


Kissinger: I appreciate your warm welcome, which is characteristic of the special relationship between our two countries. [Laughter.]

First of all, with respect to this memorandum of understanding, I am prepared to discuss it at any moment.

Rabin: Not today. We believe that first you would be able to report to us.

Kissinger: All right. I just wanted you to know I am prepared to discuss it, any time you want to.

Let me then report the meeting and let me do it in the sequence in which things happened. First, this time the meeting was attended by the Vice President, the Prime Minister, by Fahmy and Gamasy. I began reporting on the maps first, which was greeted, I have to tell you honestly, with disdain. Sadat's comment was "I thought I was making it easier for you."



But on the two options, they chose the one that Peres predicted they would, along the Gulf of Suez. With respect to the Giddi -- the Mitla and the Giddi -- they had made a careful analysis of it, and they took the position that neither was out of the passes. I then argued with them about the Mitla, saying that this was something which I would certify was out of the Pass, and then Sadat overruled Gamasy.

Peres: On the extended line?


Kissinger: No, on the Mitla. On the Giddi -- have we got a map of the Giddi? [He takes out a map]. Of course they take the position that the exit is here [indicating] and that everything else is total nonsense and that everyone knows it, and that you [Gur] know it and it is just playing games. That you can dominate the exit from here, that the idea that they can land helicopters in here with the line that you have is an insult to everyone's intelligence. They say you are building a road from the north towards Umm Khisheiba, or you have built it. They say Umm Khisheiba will be fortified during a war and will bottle up the Giddi, and therefore the idea that they will launch a helicopter operation into the Giddi with Umm Khisheiba behind them -- I am just trying to give you the flavor of the discussion and also the price that will be paid by this continuation.

At that point I pointed out the second position, and made clear that the line would be drawn this way [in the Mitla]. It hasn't yet finally been accepted, but I think he will.

But they are not happy about the Giddi. They feel it was misrepresented to them. I feel it was also. But I think they will finally accept it at the point at which you gave it.

I did not show them the exact curlicue yet because I was under a slightly different impression and I wanted to check that with you, whether it went over this way or whether it went exactly along the road. I wanted to check it with you. I didn't give them anything. I did make clear the line would go this way [indicating] keeping this hill in your hands.

They asked me whether there was any forward movement of your line. I told them no.



Then we talked about the stations. They had given us the correct coordinates, and we then discussed the two possibilities you gave us. And then I made a strong plea for moving the stations into the passes because that would permit everything to be combined, and put the whole warning system into the passes.

The atmosphere was extremely -- I have to say it was not a good atmosphere, to put it mildly, at that point. So I asked to see Sadat alone. And I spent about an hour with him. I gave him my analysis of the situation, of the pressures which I thought you were under, and the options that every side had for the foreseeable future. And I told him that we either made an agreement this week or we were going to have a prolonged stalemate, and everyone would have to decide whether that was in their interests. And I told him that if there was to be an agreement we had to wind up this haggling, and somebody had to stop it. Secondly, that there had to be something in the agreement that you could show as a quid pro quo, especially with respect to blockade and cargoes through the Suez Canal, and non-recourse to force.

And we had a rather extended discussion, at the end of which he said he agreed that it was the best thing to do, but he had to talk to his people and give them instruction. And he would then instruct Gamasy to produce some ideas as to warning stations in the pass area and Fahmy to work with me on the draft agreement in the afternoon to see whether we could come up with something.

So we went to that beach house while he was meeting, and an hour and a half later Fahmy and Gamasy came. And we went over first the warning stations and then the agreement, working from the text of the agreement that we had given.

Let me first talk about the warning stations that they are proposing. That is what Gamasy gave us first [He shows on a map.] I told him that was absolutely out of the question. This is his first choice.

Allon: Too close to our line.

Kissinger: I said I had the impression you were going to build something up there yourself.



Rabin: It is near Umm Khisheiba?

Kissinger: No, this is the Jebel Giddi. This is their second choice [indicating]. But if you give them this, they want the line moved back a bit, the forward line. They said they couldn't build it this close to your line. So then after much discussion, he produced the third map of a reluctant third position, which is here.

Gur: [looks it over.] It is okay because it is a little further from our line.

Kissinger: On this one, it is obvious why they can't do it. Then their preference is this, with the line straightening here. And this is their third.

[There is a brief discussion among the Israeli team]

Rabin: I think we can find a solution, but let's first analyze it. I prefer to defer it.

Kissinger: I am not asking for an answer now. I am just giving it.

Rabin: Can we have one to copy?

Kissinger: You can have these two. We have copies. They put this third one on a separate map because they wanted us to present this as a fall-back position and to fight for the other, but we can't do business this way. Not with them.

Rabin: On paper.

Kissinger: And then they would be prepared to have the American warning stations, but they were not prepared to accept more than two. We can place another one in relation to their warning station; maybe we can have one as a checkpoint to their warning station, and one as a checkpoint to yours, and then a third one. That is conceivable. So we can show them all as related to the two major stations.

Rabin: Six?

Kissinger: But six is out of the question. Plus the sensors at the other locations.



Rabin: That is to say three and three sensors?

Kissinger: I asked for six; they have said reluctantly they might go to two.

Rabin: I just want to understand.

Kissinger: And then when I got them to move the station into the pass area, I said maybe that under those conditions we could put another station there in order to check your traffic, and show it all as part of the same concept. And they didn't object; they didn't say yes and they didn't say no. From which I assumed it might be open to discussion. But that was also a moment when we were talking about their second choice, the one close to your line.

Gur: If I may ask, their preference is the one closest to our line?

Kissinger: Yes, but they would like you to move your line back a kilometer.

Gur: But the preference is close to our line.

Allon: Their preference is behind our line, the Jebel Giddi.


Kissinger: No, but I have explained that to them, and they are not insisting. They didn't understand where your line was. And Gamasy said it is total nonsense to say you are out of the passes when one analyzes this line, and Sadat then settled this after my talk with him.

[Supper is served.]

Rabin: What I wanted to discuss tonight is, first, two remarks on the maps. On the maps we are finished.

Kissinger: Yes.

Rabin: Then the open agreement. Then the letter about duration. And we'll see if we are able to agree on all the checkpoints. And we'll discuss the bilateral in the morning.



Kissinger: I told them I'd be back. . . . If I'm not there in the morning, there is no sense in my going back there before five o'clock. Because he takes a nap.

Rabin: If you want, we can work all night.

Kissinger: No, no. I'd like you to consider what we brought. We can plan to get there at six o'clock. It gives us the better part of the day here. Then we'll stay overnight there.

I can tell you one thing. The President of Egypt lives better than the Prime Minister of Israel. He has more.

Gur: Can I take it seriously that they will not land any helicopter operations on the passes?

Kissinger: Gamasy thought you were making fools of us.

Gur: I will show you the exercises he has done in an area like that.

Kissinger: I am trying to be as accurate as I can in reporting.

Gur: I just want you to be sure that he is playing a game and we cannot play. It is too serious.

Kissinger: Let me go back then. As I told you, I had discussed with Sadat that the agreement had to have something specific in it that Israel could show as an advance over the Disengagement Agreement. And I pointed out specifically Bab el-Mandeb, cargoes, non-recourse to force, and said I'd like to work from the basic document we had. He said Bab el-Mandeb he could not do as such but he could make a prohibition against military blockade and then reaffirm Bab el-Mandeb in a letter. Against armed blockade. And he would write something. After extensive talks on the passage of cargoes through the Suez Canal, which they feel they have to express as non-strategic cargoes -- but they will give us a letter explaining precisely what that means and which means in effect everything.

Allon: Is oil considered strategic or not?

Kissinger: No. And we may be able to soften that phraseology to say "civilian goods" rather than "non-strategic goods."



We then spent about two hours drafting an agreement, which is not an agreed document between them and us. I mean they understand this is for submission to you, which I think contains two-thirds or four-fifths of what we had, or five-sixths.

The major change is that Fahmy objected violently to the phrase in Article I saying the preamble is part of the agreement. He ascribed it to Rosenne again. He says it is totally idiotic to have the first article of the agreement say the preamble is part of the agreement. He says, "If they want this, why not call the preamble Article I? And then everyone knows it is part of the agreement. And then we can write at the end of each article that the article is part of the agreement." He says the best solution is to call the Preamble Article I and then it has the same status as anything else. I suggested to him if we do that, why not write it in operative language rather than preambular language, which has been done.

Rabin: Can you read it out to us?

Kissinger: The whole agreement?

Rabin: Let's go through it subject by subject.

Kissinger: [reading from the draft at Tab A:] "The Government of the Arab Republic and the Government of Israel:

"Resolve that the conflict between them and in the Middle East should not be resolved by military force but by peaceful means."

They are prepared to say "will" and not "should", but you can choose.

Peres: In the original it had the word "only."

Kissinger: "Recall that the Agreement concluded by the Parties January 18, 1974, within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference, constituted a first step towards a just and durable peace according to the provisions of Security Council Resolution 338 of October 22, 1973; and

"Are determined to reach a final and just peace settlement by means of negotiations called for by Security Council Resolution 338."



We should change that and stop here, after "338." Otherwise it will be different from the other articles. We didn't catch that. If you want it in [the phrase: "and as a significant step towards that end, have agreed as follows:"], you can keep it in, but in my judgment this is preambular language and I believe it should go out. And then the whole thing is Article I.

Article II reads, "(1) The Parties hereby undertake not to resort to the threat or use of force or armed blockade against each other." They are not willing to write the "peaceful means" twice, having already written it up there. The second part, (2), they say it's nonsense to write in an agreement between parties that they have given written assurances to a third party.

Rabin: Why not?

Kissinger: They leave the possibility that they will give the written assurances in addition, but to put it into the agreement.... They say if they are going to give written assurances, they should say, "have the intention of giving written assurances", and then not have it as obligations towards each other.

Rabin: Allow me to remind you that that is what we agreed to in March, you told me.

Kissinger: That's right, and they have not rejected the proposition that they will give a letter. They have said it makes no sense to have it in the agreement in addition.

Sisco: Because the obligations are already contained in the agreement.

Kissinger: What they have said was saying "the parties have the intention of giving," which would not make it an obligatory thing in the agreement, but simply a statement of what they will do. But I have kept it written in here.

Article III they think would be strengthened if one doesn't do it as a reconfirmation of the disengagement agreement but simply says, "the parties will scrupulously observe the ceasefire on land, sea and air and refrain from all military or paramilitary actions against each other."



I am sure if you insist on having it a reconfirmation, they will reconfirm. It is the exact wording. They think it is better.

"(2) The Parties also confirm that the obligations contained in the Annex, and, when concluded, the Protocol, shall be an integral part of this Agreement. "

Then they proposed an Article IV which I won't read because it is like the disengagement agreement, but which you will want to study.

Sisco: It is like in the disengagement agreement, a description of where they go -- line A, line B.

Allon: You mean they would prefer to have it here rather than in the Protocol?

Kissinger: I don't think it is a big deal if you would rather have it in the protocol.

Allon: Because they'd like to have this appear as another disengagement agreement.

Sisco: No, you look at it.

Rabin: We are just exploring; we are not making any judgments, now.

Kissinger: In Article V, for some reason not clear to me, they proposed a formulation which I have not yet contested because it seems to me there are advantages for you in it, which says "Egypt agrees that the United Nations Emergency Force is essential and shall continue its function and that its mandate shall be extended annually. "

Peres: Why just Egypt?

Rabin: Why not the parties?

Kissinger: I think that can be restored. I am just giving you their ideas here now. The reason I did not fight it is because there is a lot to be said for the proposition, I thought, from your point of view.

Peres: It's a fine point. If Egypt agrees, then Egypt can disagree. If it is a matter of just Egypt, they keep for themselves the right to disagree.



Rabin: It is an agreement between the two of us.

Kissinger: This is one of the points we shall then bring back to them.

Peres: By the way, do they agree to the title, "Agreement?"

Kissinger: Yes.

Rabin: Read it again.

Kissinger: [Reads it through again.] I thought there was something for you in it.

Article VI: "The Parties hereby establish a Joint Commission to be presided over by the Chief Coordinator of the United Nations Peace-keeping Mission in the Middle East...."

Sisco: That is Siilasvuo's new title.

Rabin: They know full well, "aegis."

Kissinger: They will also accept "aegis" or "chaired by" or "under the auspices of." They thought this formulation would have the minimum formal relationship to the UN. But if you prefer "under the auspices of," or under the chairmanship of this man....

Rabin: We understand.

Kissinger: My impression was that they were trying to be helpful here.

[He continues reading article VI]: "for the duration of this Agreement, in order to consider any problem arising from this Agreement and to assist the United Nations Emergency Force in the execution of its mandate. The Joint Commission shall function in accordance with precepts established in the Annex." That is essentially what you have.

Article VII: "Cargoes of non-strategic nature destined for or coming from Israel shall be permitted through the Suez Canal."

Allon: You said they would add a letter to you of its meaning.



Kissinger: To us. But we have to have a clearer understanding of what happens to assurances between us, because we cannot have this business that everything gets into the newspapers. We have to have a clear understanding on assurances that we can then transfer, whether the text is released or how it is leaked. The fact can be leaked but we have to have a clear understanding about it.

Then Article VIII: "The details concerning the new lines, the redeployment of the forces and its timing, the limitation on armaments" . . . I think this is essentially the Israeli text.

Sisco: It is the Israeli text. It is Article VII in yours.

Dinitz: This Article VII ends with the Suez.

Rabin: Nothing on blockade.

Kissinger: Blockade is in the beginning under the non-recourse to force. They are also willing to put the blockade, if you'd rather have it, where it says "shall observe the ceasefire."

Eran: It was there originally. In Article III.

Kissinger: In your draft, where it is not a paraphrase of the disengagement agreement. If you want it in Article III, you can have it in Article III. There was something to be said for making it stand out in relation to the threat or use of force.

Peres: Article IX.

Kissinger: Article IX is exactly the same wording. The Israeli text.

Article X is a new one: "Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice the right of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter."

Article XI is the old last article, but they don't want to deposit it with the UN: "This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature and remain in force until superseded by a new agreement" -- we'll have to make some change here because they have some ideas -- "between the Parties in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 338."



Peres: They crossed out "the Parties shall continue their efforts"

Sisco: He didn't read the articles that weren't changed. It's on the top of page 5.

Kissinger: Why don't we give you a copy? [He hands over a copy of Tab A.] My suggestion is if you want to get the benefit of this revision of Article I, delete the last statement.

Rabin: "Have agreed as follows."

Kissinger: Just stop after "338."

Rabin: May I ask, why don't they want to deposit it with the UN?

Sisco: Last time I gather we did, but it wasn't in the agreement, that's all.

Rabin: It was not in the Disengagement Agreement.

Sisco: If I recall, it was deposited.

Rabin: If it was in Geneva, the witness must be the UN.


Sisco: It will be deposited as a matter of course because the UN will witness it, and that is what happened last time, but I don't think we mentioned it specifically in the agreement.

Peres: Where it says here "superseded by a new agreement between the parties in accordance with 338" [in Article IX], what is your impression. Is that conditional, strong, negotiable, or what? Because this is a basic change in the wording as far as we are concerned.

Sisco: Read it.

Kissinger: All it says is that the new agreement will be in accordance with 338. "In accordance" doesn't qualify the "superseding," but only qualifies the new agreement.

We thought on at least two occasions this afternoon, for whatever it is worth to you when you make your assessment, that this was going to break up. First when we presented your counterproposals. And secondly, when Gamasy -- when Gamasy and Fahmy and we went through this -- Gamasy



said it is impossible to present to the Egyptians because this document contains only Egyptian obligations and no Israeli ones at all, and will as a published document look like a whole set of unilateral Egyptian concessions. And he took violent exception, for example, to the Joint Commission, which had already been agreed upon.

Sisco: [Who had been reading through the Disengagement Agreement:] I was right. There was no reference to the deposit with the UN, and it is as we have it, the Egyptians and the Israelis, and the UN as the witnesses.

Kissinger: What they suggest in the implementation of this is that assuming it is initialled on Friday, that then the day after the Knesset ratifies it. . . .

Rabin: Two days.


Kissinger: I am not saying the Knesset will ratify it the day after. The day after the ratification, the agreement should be signed. Then the protocols should be worked out, preferably in Geneva, by teams of Israelis and Egyptians, the way it was with the Disengagement Agreement. We would have to change the draft then that the implementation won't take place until the protocols are complete. And we would agree that they would be completed until the Congress has acted. I am just telling you their idea of what the process should be. This was done also in the Disengagement Agreement. There was no Congressional action needed but there was first a signature and then the protocols were worked out.

Rabin: Was it that way?

Kissinger: Yes. The agreement was signed at Kilometer 101, on a Friday. The following Sunday Elazar and Gamasy met and worked for about ten days to work out the protocols; and the implementation, by definition, could not start until the protocols could be worked out. That was the procedure, and also on the Syrian agreement. At any rate, that is their proposal on how it should be done. First initialling, then signature, then working out of the protocols.

Rabin: What about the letter of the President about duration?

Kissinger: We have it. Can I finish first?



And I talked to Sadat afterwards about the intialling. He said -- but I would not spread this too widely because I don't believe he can carry it through -- that he would let the Prime Minister initial it, and you should initial it. But I would not be sure that this would survive Fahmy's scrutiny. Initialled separately, of course. What we will do is carry it from one to the other.

Rabin: We know the initialling will be done separately. This is not the issue. But I think Sadat has to initial it.

Allon: I don't mind this will be signed by the politicians.

Kissinger: I would have thought it is a tremendous step forward to get a Prime Minister of Egypt to initial this thing.

Sisco: This is intended to meet your desires, to give it a governmental

Kissinger: I never heard of a President initialling an agreement.

Sisco: This is way above the level of the Disengagement Agreement.

Rabin: Let's leave it for the morning.

Kissinger: And they confirmed that their delegation at Geneva will have a military man and an ambassador, which was agreed to in March.

Dinitz: That is for the protocol, the technical discussions.

Kissinger: Yes. And they will also sign the final agreement.

Dinitz: The same ones who work out the protocol will sign the agreement? That's it.

Kissinger: Presumably, at any rate.

Rabin: Because I understand the process is first initialling. Before bringing it to our Knesset we have to initial it. There is no purpose in bringing it before it is initialled.

Kissinger: Right.



Rabin: Secondly, where will the signing be?

Kissinger: In Geneva.

Rabin: But he says he wants initialling, signing and only later working out the protocol.

Kissinger: That is right. And implementation upon the signature of the protocol. This is how it was done with the disengagement.

Sisco: A very normal procedure.

Allon: What happens if there is disagreement on the protocols?

Kissinger: Then there can be no implementation without the protocols.

Sisco: It was true with the Disengagement Agreement. It is true this time.

Kissinger: There has to be a clause that implementation will be defined by the protocols, which is the easiest because then there can't be any implementation if there is no protocol.

Rabin: Why then in addition to the initialling is there a need for signature?

Kissinger: Because initialling gives no legal force. It only says: "If I sign, this is the document I will sign."

Dinitz: Initialling freezes the language.

Kissinger: The initialling freezes the language but does not put it into effect. When you sign it, you are committed to the agreement. You can still hold it up by failing to agree to the protocol. But the agreement is then completed. This is normal practice; there is nothing tricky about it.


Peres: Did you try anything on the belligerency?

Kissinger: No, I thought we had agreed yesterday not to.

Rabin: That is all right.

Kissinger: If I explain it to him the wrong way, I think we can get it.

[Laughter]



This is the letter they are willing to do [on duration, Tab B]. Now, I am considering this as a confidential document.

Sisco: Let me write a "secret" classification on it. [He marks on the copy given to the Israelis.]

Rabin: I will read it here: "I am writing you this letter to inform you of the position of Israel [sic*] on the question of the duration of the second Egyptian-Israeli agreement on the Sinai.

"The agreement includes language that 'the agreement shall remain in force until it is superseded by a new agreement between the Parties.' With respect to the duration of UNEF, I have informed Secretary Kissinger of Israel's undertaking to make every effort to extend the United Nations Emergency Force annually for the duration of the agreement.

"However, should the Security Council, because of the action of a third state, fail to renew the UNEF mandate to assure continuous operation, Israel undertakes to concert actively with the U.S. to have the General Assembly take appropriate action to bring about annual renewals for two renewals after the first annual mandate goes into effect.

"In the event such an affirmative General Assembly action did not prove possible, Israel will request an augmented UNTSO to continue the supervision responsibility and to have the Joint Egyptian-Israeli Commission cooperate with it."

Kissinger: But this is from him to us. I don't think I can let you keep it.

Dinitz: But if we have a copy

Kissinger: It's for all practical purposes the same.

Sisco: Let's put a sticker on this [on the top and bottom].

Kissinger: I want to point out that the leakage of this letter is a serious matter.

* He read "Israel" in place of Egypt throughout this text, and it is so shown in the Israeli transcript of the meeting, in order not to show a Sadat letter to President Ford in Israeli records.



Allon: But this duration of three years of the UNEF has been spoken of for the last two months anyhow.

Kissinger: That is different from leaking a letter to our President by the Egyptian President. And he didn't deny today when a newsman asked him.

Peres: He said there won't be any secret agreements and they will try to renew it annually.

[The Israeli side reads it over.]

Gur: "Every effort."

Kissinger: That is nothing new. The only thing they took out was "without prejudice" to something ["without prejudice to any obligation of the parties under this agreement"].

Sisco: That is the only thing they dropped out. I think your lawyer put it in; we never knew why.

Peres: He was a member of the Cabinet [Attorney General Barak].

Kissinger: Just cut off the name. I can give you the same letter cutting off the name and the name of the country. It's just a matter of propriety.

Peres: There are some slight changes. In the proposed letter it was "at least two renewals" and here it says "two renewals." Here the accent is on "superseded."

Kissinger: First of all, "at least" isn't binding on anybody.

Rabin: First, it was in March.

Kissinger: No, there was nothing in March.

Allon: Let's everyone have some wine.

Kissinger: You have to understand. These are not all that easy to get, as you think here. They are not waiting to throw words about blockade into a document with Israel. But if you want to try to get "at least" back in, we can try. This is their version.



Peres: I think so. But we would like to study it anyway. "At least" is important.

Sisco: We will retype it.

Peres: But why is blockade so difficult for him? I just want to understand.

Kissinger: It's in there.

Rabin: It's in the agreement: the Suez [Canal] is in.

Kissinger: The Suez is in. He felt he can take a general undertaking about armed blockade. If he specifies Bab el-Mandeb, then he will have to explain to all the riparian states around Bab el-Mandeb. If it is an armed blockade, it has the same connotation, the same obligation, and he will give us a separate letter on Bab el-Mandeb. If we feel the old one isn't good enough, he will give us a new one on that in connection with this agreement. That was his explanation about this.

I must say from my travels in the Arab world, whatever you and Resenne may think of this agreement, he will catch hell in Syria, Libya and a lot of other places for putting some of these things in here.

Allon: Mention of the word "blockade" is very important. No question about it. Mention of the word "Suez" is very important.

Kissinger: And "to and from Israel."

Allon: And "civilian"

Kissinger: He hasn't agreed to that yet.

Allon: There are important points there, no question about it.

Peres: Just one point about lines. About the northern line, were you discussing it at all, the change in the northern line?

Kissinger: Yes. Compared to the fact that they had given up movement forward of the Beta Line, he did not think that was

Peres: You made quite a statement about this. Today over the radio and television the whole day they were hollering. A senior official in your party



announced that Israel will give up the Beta Line and the Egyptians will move beyond the Beta Line.

Kissinger: Total nonsense. You were sitting with me [to Sisco]. We didn't even discuss the Beta Line. When I walked in here, someone said: Can you explain the confusion on the Beta Line?

Dinitz: Because the wire services carried it all day.

Kissinger: That issue wasn't even raised. What could have happened is that someone said: are the Egyptians going to move into Israeli-held territory? And I probably gave the standard answer, which is that I am not going to go into the details of an agreement in which I act as a mediator.

Rabin: That is true.

Kissinger: And they might have concluded from that that they are going to advance into Israeli held territory.

Dinitz: I think you are absolutely right.

Kissinger: It is the only possibility. I didn't think I should announce on the way to Egypt that there were no changes in the Beta Line, so I didn't say anything.

Allon: It wouldn't help you anyway.

Peres: We had some problems with that, but never mind.

Kissinger: You can say it isn't so. You can straighten it out, that you asked me.

Peres: That we asked you and that we have agreed to move. No sense for us to deny it and we shouldn't deny it.

Rabin: We are not going to deny it.

Kissinger: That is up to you. But I have taken the position to our press people constantly that I would not -- so they ask all these leading questions. It was probably Bernie Kalb, for whom it is all true.



Dinitz: Even so, Mr. Secretary, a confusion could result exactly from what you now describe. Because when I came to escort you from the King David, Marilyn Berger said: "We are not clear on the Beta Line because our impression is that there is movement on the Beta Line." Of course, I didn't comment on it. But that is probably from the fact that you refused to give them details.

Kissinger: I refused to say there was no movement on the Beta Line. But I wouldn't have done it anyhow, because when I talked to them it was before I talked to Sadat and knew what he had chosen.

Peres: If we can say we learned from you that you were not specific on that issue.

Kissinger: You can say that. I didn't know what Marilyn was talking about, to tell you the truth. She said "the two sides are crossing each other." [To Sisco] Can you straighten Marilyn out?

Sisco: It's too late. She's long ago filed that.

Peres: We must have some agreement among senior officials. For example, could you straighten out in the meantime that the Egyptian station will be in the passes, or that the tendency is that both stations will be within the passes?

Kissinger: That is good. You can say "the tendency is." I'd leave that for 24 hours.

Peres: Whatever we can tell ahead, I feel it is much better. The best way to avoid leaking is to tell whatever we can.

Kissinger: I think you can say that.

Allon: We never said it wouldn't be there. But better make no reference to it. We haven't studied it yet, the heights and the hills.

Sisco: It is up to you, if you have doubts about it.

Allon: We'd better study it first.

Peres: We would like to hear your general impressions of the situation in Egypt. It is very helpful.



Kissinger: My general impression of Egypt is that Sadat's advisors, except Fahmy, are against the agreement. Fahmy is for the agreement, but Fahmy is concerned that Sadat is underestimating the difficulties diplomatically that are going to arise. I told you this morning we had Eilts present the text of the agreement, which had a very extremely negative reaction from Fahmy. And he did not cooperate in the redrafting until Sadat ordered him to do it on the basis of my discussion with him. We sent Eilts there again last night to Fahmy. So Fahmy is for the agreement.

The others -- the Vice President, I have the impression, is extremely negative. The Prime Minister I couldn't read all that well. Gamasy is extremely negative to the draft of the agreement and not enthusiastic about the whole thing, and is asking for a lot of military things which Sadat told me to let him say and he would take care of it later with me.

I think we can keep the limited zone within the context of what you and I have agreed to. I think we can get a letter from Fahmy on the boycott.

Joe and I concluded today that the tempers were so frayed by the end of going through this document that any additional demands might blow the thing up. Fahmy said at the end of the meeting to Joe and me, "there are some days I regret we don't have Nasser," and considering that he was treated extremely badly by Nasser -- I am just trying to give you a feeling for the mood. Then afterwards I talked to Sadat. I think he is sticking with the agreement and Fahmy is, on the whole. In fact, I don't want to give you the wrong impression; I think of all the Egyptian leaders that I know, Fahmy is the most pro-Western. And even though he may say extreme things from time to time, they are made necessary by his reputation of being the most pro-Western. Sadat, if he thinks that Egyptian interests require making drastic shifts of course, he will do them with the same self-discipline and self-control as he has executed other things. I would think if Egypt leaves its pro-Western orientation, the first victim professionally and maybe even personally will be

Rabin: . . . Fahmy.

Sisco: He is referred to as a member of NATO by other Arabs.

Kissinger: That is right. Asad says Fahmy can't go to Lima; he should go to Brussels. He says I have more right to go to an Arab League meeting than Fahmy, that I see Arabs more frequently than Fahmy does.



Rabin: What do you think is the main argument for which Sadat wants the agreement?

Kissinger: I think he wants it because first of all he cannot easily go back to the Russians. Because if he does, they may squeeze him into not just a change of policy but a change of personnel. Secondly, I think he has calculated that while a high state of tension can develop from the absence of an agreement, there are not that many options available to him. Third, he has never contradicted me when I told him that he has no military option, which I tell him when I see him privately. And I think he basically thinks this is the better way.

General Gur: And why doesn't Gamasy think so?

Kissinger: Gamasy basically thinks . . . he really has a sense of humiliation, quite honestly. And I really would urge you for the sake of the internal politics there to see if you could do a little more for Gamasy -- for instance, instead of saying 16 kilometers for the SAMs, say ten kilometers. What difference does the four kilometers make? They haven't made a formal proposal to us; I am not reflecting their views on this. I have the impression that he really has a sense of humiliation. He thinks he has 7,000 troops there that are totally defenseless. He showed me, for example, that mountain you showed me yesterday. He said: "Look at what they are doing, there is a road which dominates; they are clever, they want to have that mountain. They just don't want any Egyptians ever to be able to move without being under an Israeli gun." I am quoting Gamasy. You know, the mountain you showed me yesterday where you had a sliver and you bent it around that mountain.

Sisco: He said "Look at them, that is typically Israeli."

Peres: That is typically Egyptian!

Allon: Since he is not going to attack us, so it doesn't matter.

Kissinger: I consider Gamasy a very honorable man, an Egyptian nationalist, but basically an honorable man. Who I think is one is thinking of making peace with the Arabs sometime, one should at least think which types one can make peace with. I think Gamasy one can make peace with.

Sisco: I consider him the second most important man in Egypt.



Peres: How about Mubarek, does he take any part?

Kissinger: Very little. He oozes disdain for the whole process.

Rabin: He's an Air Force General?

Allon: Why is that?

Rabin: They don't have their feet on the ground.

Kissinger: Someone told me your press said this morning that Egypt had given up the demand for the move of the Beta Line.

Sisco: The Jerusalem Post.

Kissinger: So what is the problem?

General Gur: It was contradicted.

Rabin: That is the problem.

Kissinger: I didn't contradict it. I just said I didn't want to talk about Egyptian movement.

Peres: Tomorrow we will say Israel won't give up the Gamma Line. No one will know what it is.

Rabin: Let's leave it. As we said a few days ago, the more the process will be accelerated, the better.

Kissinger: I couldn't agree more.

Rabin: Now what else do we have to do?

Kissinger: My suggestion is that we first of all tell the Egyptians when we are coming so they can plan. Should we leave at five?

Rabin: I will tell you what we have to do. We have to study -- probably even tonight -- the agreement, the letter about the duration. Then of course, when it comes to the map, there is no problem.



Peres: The map is all right.

Kissinger: The map I think is finished. I want to talk to you about that wrinkle of the Giddi I haven't shown them yet. Whether it has to follow the road exactly or whether one could take it straight over.

Allon: We need the hill.

Kissinger: [To Gur] How will you lose the hill if you have the ridge line? You are talking about a few hundred yards.

Rabin: We will talk about that tomorrow.

Kissinger: I will show you on the map.

General Gur: I understand what you said.

Kissinger: From that point straight over.

Rabin: So we have the agreement, the letter, the site of the Egyptian station, the paper on the agreement of the warning stations. When it comes to Egyptian assurances, we haven't discussed it.

Kissinger: Frankly, we were going to do more of it today. He promised Eilts yesterday a letter of boycott.

Rabin: I am talking about Syria, terrorist activities.

Peres: Non-American companies.

Kissinger: No. But we really thought it was a mistake to go any further today.

Rabin: We understand. Then we have

Eran: The Israeli-American agreement.

Rabin: Then we have to decide about the timetable, procedures.

Peres: The agreement and protocols. Would you like us to write tomorrow?



Kissinger: The only chance we have with the military protocol I'd like to keep it away from Gamasy if I can. You mean the redeployment.

Peres: Yes, and the limitation of arms, the limitation of men. The thinning out.

Kissinger: I think the psychologically correct time to produce this -- I would like your advice -- is when we can say we have the agreement finished the way we have the lines finished. It is going to create problems with Gamasy.

What I would recommend to you if you can do it is this: you have agreed to a few more tanks in there. I know there are two things that will be on Gamasy's mind, because I remember them from the first disengagement. One is the location of the SAMs. If you tell him he can move four kilometers forward, he will consider it an insult; if you tell him ten kilometers forward, that at least is something he can put in his Secondly, if you can give him a token increase in numbers -- and I repeat he hasn't asked for it at this point. But I told Sadat when we were sitting there, "I have a feeling Gamasy is going to be difficult." He said "I can handle him but if you can get me some token things for him, it would be helpful."

Rabin: Then the bilateral agreement. We have not finished the President's letter, the question of the bilateral agreement. And what else is there on the agreement itself?

Kissinger: You talk about the annex, but I don't know what it will contain.

Sisco: Most of it we have in the agreement.

Rabin: Timetable.

Peres: Principles.

Sisco: I think you need two things. One, whatever brief reference one needs to make in terms of the zone of limitation. I don't mean a long, detailed protocol. And the timetable. We need a paragraph, Mr. Prime Minister, either in the agreement or in the annex which talks in terms of the detailed implementation, including the stations, that will be worked out by your people at Geneva, and some indication of a time frame.



Peres: Like guidelines.

Sisco: Yes, like we had in the disengagement agreement.

Rabin: If we can move it to the annex and have the map attached to it, and to have in it the frame of the timetable.

Sisco: Yes.

Kissinger: But, just a minute. I believe the reason the Egyptians wanted Article IV in the agreement

Rabin: Is to give it military significance.

Kissinger: No, to show that some movement is happening. Otherwise, all it will contain are things distasteful to them and nothing an Egyptian can read and say is any good.

Rabin: But the annex will be part of the open agreement, with the map.

Peres: We are giving them the map and they are giving us the words.

Kissinger: I don't think it is a huge problem whether Article IV is in the agreement or in the annex. Why don't you look at the agreement and then we will see where to move it. I would suggest that both sides, including mine, concentrate on strategic issues and not on technical improvements. By strategic, I mean if you can avoid esthetic and legalistic refinements of a text you find otherwise acceptable, you should accept it and make your suggestions on key points. So we can keep it down to three or four changes. Because if you now rewrite the whole thing and then we go to them, and then even if they accept 60 percent of that, we have to then come back here, and that alone can take forever. Because many articles are from the previously-agreed text.

So my suggestion is to see whether I can be put into a position after you study it that we can agree on the letter and the agreement on my next shuttle. If you can give me what you want in the annex, maybe we can bring back the annex on Wednesday in the same shape, so that that can be completed that night.



Peres: As I understand it, the annex includes the principles upon which the parties in Geneva will work, the major issues. We won't go into details.

Sisco: I don't know what you mean by principles.

Peres: The guiding lines.

Rabin: Strength, thinning out.

Sisco: Yes. Henry, the one thing I want to say is that the only thing basically we were able to accept today that Fahmy suggested was the notion of the inclusion of this deployment in the agreement itself. In Article IV. If we go back -- it is not a matter of substance -- but the one thing he suggested we now want to move from the agreement into the annex. I just wanted to say that.

Kissinger: The annex will be an elaboration of Article IV. In other words, it will specify where Line A is and so forth.

Peres: In the agreement we can have simply the lines of thinning out and in the annex we can have the details.


Kissinger: That is right. One other thing I tried out on Fahmy and Gamasy is the three-and six-month proposition. And Gamasy said -- I don't know what Fahmy said -- but Gamasy said absolutely he would never accept this. "To wait three months before anything at all happens is impossible." So I think we have to work out a timetable in which something begins to happen faster somewhere.

Allon: Than what?

Kissinger: Faster than three months. Originally they had asked for Abu Rudeis in one month. I remember in March we said two months; now we are at three months. And I recommend you work out a timetable.

Rabin: The problem is that we don't know how they think the handing over of Abu Rhudeis can be carried out. We cannot leave on one day and they come in on the next. We can have a month of transition, or two weeks. I don't know. I am not acquainted with the problem.

Kissinger: They say -- but I don't think they know how it will work -- to do it through the UNEF. But I don't know what that means.



Rabin: Someone has to operate the whole installation. It is a working installation. They left and it took us a few months or half a year to start operating it. If we leave it just like that, we will be accused

Kissinger: Let me make a suggestion. Let's get a cable off to Eilts.

Rabin: I want to check it.

Kissinger: to tell them they should think about the practical problem of how this can take place -- not the timing, just how they visualize it. They don't have to give us an answer; just so they have thought about it. How physically to change over from one administration to the other for the operation of the oil field.

Peres: I think we can be helped by the Italians.

Kissinger: But they should think about it because I don't think they have any concrete ideas. But I would suggest psychologically -- I haven't thought about it and probably you haven't -- if in this long stretch we are talking about, it would be helpful if something happened visibly at regular stated intervals. I mean I remember in the disengagement it was easier; over a six-week period you moved every week to a certain line.

General Gur: The trouble here is that we have only one road, and we have to evacuate Ras Sudr and then Abu Rodeis. We have to do all that on one road towards the north.

Kissinger: Can you leave Abu Rodeis first?


Gur: But then the road will not be open.

Kissinger: So it will have to be done by ships for a while.

Gur: It is not as it was in the past.

Rabin: But it doesn't have to be done the same way. We will try to find something.

Kissinger: I think if they could do something fairly quickly, it would take a lot of the steam out of it.



Joe has the idea that some Israelis move out and the UN moves in.

Sisco: There will be a point where some Israelis and some Egyptians have to work together.

Kissinger: I think the way to do it, and I think they know it, is not to write it into the agreement, but to have someone there whose job it is and then let it happen.

Rabin: I don't ask it to be put in the agreement whatsoever.

Kissinger: We will have one hell of a time getting this finished by Friday. We may have to leave some people there, but we have got to get them to think about it. They haven't got a clue and haven't thought any more about it than you have. But they won't wait months for it. I think they can live with going by ship for two months if necessary.

Allon: I understood that although Bab el-Mandeb will not be referred to in the written or published agreement, a letter will be sent by them to the Americans. Is that what you said?

Kissinger: Reaffirming it, yes.

Allon: The same applies to the Red Sea and all the overflights of civil aviation?

Kissinger: Yes.

Dinitz: And also you said about the "strategic."

Kissinger: Yes, that they will give me a letter saying that oil and raw materials will not be considered strategic. But I am going to try if you want "civilian" on them tomorrow. But it depends on the number of changes you make. If we reach the point where we can get three or four changes with which we can accept the document, that is one thing. If it is 20 changes, then it becomes more difficult.

Peres: "Non-strategic" means we can ship ammunition.

Kissinger: Only tactical!



Rodman: Conventional but not nuclear.

Allon: I understand you didn't check again about the possible passage of the vessel.

Kissinger: No, that is agreed to, that before the Knesset debate, they will.

Peres: Since the Knesset meets Sunday, it will have to move Friday, since on Saturday we don't sail.

Allon: Would it be advisable to keep this vessel in Eilat, without unloading?

Kissinger: No.

Allon: It comes from the Indian Ocean.

Kissinger: I think it would be a grave mistake to have the first ship going through from Eilat to Haifa.

Allon: It is a Liberian ship with no Israeli personnel.

Rabin: No, the ship is not coming from Eilat. It is supposed to come to Eilat and we want to divert it.

Kissinger: That is fine if you don't let it go to Eilat first but hold it somewhere.

Allon: Because I am not sure we will have this sort of ship very soon and it will block the whole thing.

Kissinger: Where is it coming from?

Allon: The Persian Gulf. It is already on its way. It was not planned.

Rabin: It is a genuine ship. Strange as it may seem! [Laughter]

Kissinger: But I would not send a ship from Eilat to Haifa.

Allon: Non-Israeli crew, non-strategic cargo.

Peres: Only light ammunition. [Laughter]



Allon: Can we send a ship from Haifa to Africa? Bananas from Ginossar [Allon's kibbutz] to Mombasa.

Kissinger: Yes. Okay, we will meet at 9:30?

Rabin: 9:30.

Eran: Can you give us the letter?

Rabin: Read it. We will type it.

Kissinger: I will read "Israel" instead of "Egypt." [He reads Tab B through again,] We can try "at least" again if you want it.

Sisco: I think you can tell where the paragraphs begin.

Peres: In Heikal's book Sadat was asked by a Russian, "What kind of President are you?" Sadat said: "A Stalin, not a Kalinin."

Kissinger: Heikal is not very reliable.

Sisco: I asked Gamasy about the first chapter. He said aside from blowing up his own role Heikal's account is substantially accurate.

Kissinger: Heikal is repeating the same fiction as some Israelis, that I tried to bring about a stalemate in the October War.


Rabin: Injust started reading it. He says you sent a message to Sadat in the early days of the war saying "we won't let the Egyptians be destroyed."

Kissinger: That was nonsense. We submitted UN resolutions, as your Ambassador knows, to keep everyone else from doing it.

We told the Egyptians they could be wiped out.

Peres: Golda's book is out today in America. They were reading passages from it on radio today. How after the 6th of October she will never be the same lady again. She never forgave herself for not mobilizing that day. For Israelis, who know the basic facts, it was still very moving.

[The meeting adjourned at 12:06 a.m. The Secretary's remarks to the press outside the Prime Minister's Office and at the King David Hotel are at Tab C.]





Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library and Museum

www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov

Library: 1000 Beal Ave., Ann Arbor, MI 48109
Museum: 303 Pearl Street, NW, Grand Rapids, MI 49504

(734) 205-0555 fax (734) 205-0571
(616) 254-0400 fax (616) 254-0386

**The documents in this
folder continue into the
next folder.**