DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA APO AE 09360



JTF-GTMO-CDR

9 January 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue, Miami, FL 33172

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000509DP (S)

JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

1. (S) Personal Information:

- JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: <u>Mohammed Nasir Yahya</u> <u>Kazaz</u>
- Current/True Name and Aliases: <u>Muhammad Nasir Yahya</u> <u>Khusruf, Abu Abdul Rahman al-Taizi, Abd al-Rahman al-</u> <u>Shamali, Muhammad Nasser Abdullah, The Northerner</u>
- Place of Birth: <u>Taiz, Yemen (YM)</u>
- Date of Birth: <u>February 1950</u>
- Citizenship: <u>Yemen</u>
- Internment Serial Number (ISN): <u>US9YM-000509DP</u>
- 2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in overall fair health.
- 3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment:

a. (S) **Recommendation:** JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) on 14 January 2007.

b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is assessed to be a member of al-Qaida. Detainee participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces and served as an al-Qaida sub-commander in Usama Bin Laden's (UBL) Tora Bora Mountain complex. Additionally, detainee admitted attending al-Faruq Training Camp, is assessed to have received advanced training and served as a small arms instructor for al-Qaida. Detainee's name was listed on an al-Qaida affiliated document and he admitted staying at al-Qaida supported guesthouses.

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[ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT THIS DETAINEE IS AVAILABLE IN AN SCI SUPPLEMENT.] JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be:

- A HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies
- A **MEDIUM** threat from a detention perspective
- Of **MEDIUM** intelligence value

c. (S//NF) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee's assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be annotated by \geq next to the footnote.)

- Added other JTF-GTMO detainee reporting identifying detainee at al-Faruq
- Added reporting associating detainee as a sub-commander in Tora Bora
- Added information regarding detainee's connection to Karachi safe houses

4. (U) Detainee's Account of Events:

The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.

a. (S//NF) **Prior History:** Detainee is a member of the Khawlan tribe in Saudi Arabia.¹ Detainee completed approximately one year of high school,² and worked a variety of jobs including working for a yogurt company and a company that made plastic bags, before becoming active in extremist activities.³ Detainee also used a stimulant called khat, which detainee's brothers sold for a living.⁴

b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: In the summer of 2001, while at the al-Mothaffar Mosque in Taiz, detainee met Abu Munther and they discussed traveling to Afghanistan (AF).⁵ Abu Munther informed detainee of a program where detainee could live on a fixed salary teaching the Koran in Afghanistan. Abu Munther gave detainee 3,000 Saudi riyals and

¹ Analyst Note: This probably explains why one of detainee's aliases is Abd al-Rahman al-Shamali. Shamali means "northerner" in Arabic. Saudi Arabia is north relative to Yemen.

² Analyst Note: It is unclear when detainee attended high school. In 000509 SIR 09-SEP-2003 detainee notes, "At the age of twenty one, the revolution occurred, and under the new republic, detainee was able to attend school for the first time...when he left high school at the age of twenty nine, he worked in a bakery." Detainee's hometown of Taiz is in the former Yemen Arab Republic (YAR), where Imam Badr was deposed in a 1962 revolution. ³ 000509 302 19-MAY-2002

⁴ 000509 302 06-JUN-2002, Analyst Note: Khat (also kat or qat) is an evergreen shrub (Catha edulis) native to the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. Khat is a narcotic leaf.

⁵ IIR 6 034 0049 03; Analyst Note: Abu Munther variants are Muntzer and Menzer. Abu Munther is assessed to be an al-Qaida or Taliban recruiter. Munther is possibly of Saudi Arabian descent.

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helped detainee obtain a passport.⁶ Detainee left Taiz and traveled to Sanaa, YM. At the airport in Sanaa, detainee met three individuals to include a Yemeni named Usaid, a Saudi named Abu Muad, and a man named Mufeed from an unknown country.⁷ Abu Muad gave detainee, Usaid, and Mufeed \$200 USD, collected their remaining riyals, and purchased detainee's airline ticket to Karachi, Pakistan (PK). Detainee, Mufeed, and Usaid traveled via Dubai, United Arab Emirates (AE) to Karachi, where they stayed at the al-Ansar Guesthouse, managed by Riyadh.⁸ Detainee, Riyadh, and Usaid traveled to Kandahar, AF, via Quetta, PK. Detainee stayed at the al-Ansar aka (al-Nibras) Guesthouse in Kandahar for seven to eight days. Abu Sakar was in charge of the al-Ansar Guesthouse and Abu Khaled was in charge when Abu Sakar was not present. Detainee departed the al-Ansar Guesthouse and stayed approximately twenty days at Abu Munther's residence. At Munther's house, detainee learned Afghans viewed Arabs as enemies and would not differentiate between an Arab who fought against Afghanis and one who was a teacher. Abu Munther repeatedly urged detainee to receive militant training as a means of self-defense. Detainee relented after several initial refusals.⁹

c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: Detainee went to the al-Faruq Training Camp, where Sabah al-Lail provided detainee with instruction on the AK-47 assault rifle and the Simonov single-shot rifle. Detainee trained for a period of eighteen to twenty days. Unexpectedly, the al-Faruq commander, Abd al-Qadus, took the trainees from al-Faruq to Kabul, AF for a couple of nights. Detainee stated they left al-Faruq to avoid air strikes by the US. Abd al-Qadus took the group to the Tor Ghar Mountain and the Tora Bora Mountains, where Abd al-Qadus remained in command.¹⁰ Detainee claimed during training, he neither was issued or fired a weapon. Detainee stayed at the Markaz Abu Thabit, because of detainee's bad knees and kidneys. At Tora Bora, detainee saw the overall commander, Ali Muhammad Abdul Aziz al-Fakhri aka (Ibn Sheikh al-Libi), ISN US9LY-000212DP (LY-212), but LY-212 did not speak with him. During detainee's time in the mountains, detainee complained of pain in his leg and was sent to Kandahar, where detainee received an ointment for his injury. From Kandahar, detainee went to Jalalabad, AF, where detainee stayed with Abu Hatib al-Libi

⁶ 000509 302 19-MAY-2002, Analyst Note: Approximately equivalent to \$800 US

⁷ Analyst Note: Usaid variant is Usayyad. Usaid is a possible member of al-Qaida and the Taliban. Usaid trained at al-Faruq and fought with the Taliban in Kabul, AF. Abu Muad is assessed to be an al-Qaida facilitator in Saudi Arabia. Abu Mufeed is a possible member of al-Qaida. Mufeed was traveling to Afghanistan for the first time to receive training. See IIR 2 340 6345 02

⁸ Analyst Note: A variant of Riyadh is Riad.

⁹ 000509 KB 17-MAY-2002, IIR 6 034 0049 03,000509 FM40 17-MAR-2005

¹⁰ Analyst Note: Tor Ghar variant is Toorgar.

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from 19 November to 15 December 2001.¹¹ Abu Hatib then told detainee Afghans had turned against the Taliban and were going to kill all Arabs.¹²

5. (U) Capture Information:

a. (S//NF) Detainee's account indicates he was with the first group of al-Qaida fighters who attempted to flee Tora Bora in mid-December 2001. The group was attacked by US aircraft which killed or injured most of the group.¹³ Detainee stated he left Jalalabad, returned to Tor Ghar, and traveled through UBL's Tora Bora Mountain complex. Detainee's group of approximately sixty-three people, led by Abd al-Qadus, fled Tora Bora towards Pakistan after the US and Coalition bombing campaign began. Detainee stated the group fleeing Tora Bora was un-armed. Due to the US and Coalition bombings, approximately forty-five members of the group were killed. The survivors stopped at a village near the border and a person from the Afghanistan Ministry of Defense met with the group. Detainee, with a group of fifteen Arabs, was taken to Kabul where US forces took custody of detainee and transferred him from Kabul to Kandahar on 15 December 2001. While in detention by Afghani forces, a Saudi named Abu Gudama, gave detainee \$300 USD.¹⁴

b. (S) Property Held:

• The following item, not held at JTF-GTMO, was noted by detainee as being in his possession when captured: 15

• \$300 USD

c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 3 May 2002

d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide information on the following:

- Abu Munther who is a possible al-Qaida or Taliban recruiter and travel facilitator
- Arab guesthouses in Karachi and Kandahar
- Al-Faruq Training Camp
- Caves in the Tor Ghar area

¹¹ Analyst Note: Abu Hatib al-Libi was in charge of a guesthouse in Jalalabad, where detainee stayed to receive treatment for knee pains. See IIR 6 034 0863 02

¹² IIR 6 034 0049 03, 000509 302 06-JUN-2002, 000509 ASSESSMENT 17-MAR-2005, 000509 SIR 20-JAN-2002, 000509 ASSESSMENT 27-JAN-2003, Analyst Note: The date reported is 3 to 29 Ramadan.

¹³ Withdrawal from Tora Bora Analysis

¹⁴ IIR 6 034 0049 03, 000509 SIR 20-JAN-2002, 000509 SIR 26-JAN-2002

¹⁵ 000509 SIR 20-JAN-2002, 000509 SIR 26-JAN-2002

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- Caves in the Tora Bora area
- Taliban and al-Qaida positions in the Tora Bora region
- Medical facilities in Jalalabad

6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee's Account: Detainee's story is inconsistent and assessed to be only partially truthful. Detainee downplays his significance and omits key details of his activities and involvement with al-Qaida in Afghanistan. Although detainee claimed he never fired a weapon in Afghanistan, he admitted receiving AK-47 and Simonov rifle training, and was identified as a small arms trainer at al-Faruq Training Camp.

7. (U) Detainee Threat:

a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a **HIGH** risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies.

b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: Detainee is assessed to be a member of al-Qaida. Detainee's name was listed on an al-Qaida affiliated document and he admitted he stayed at al-Qaida supported guesthouses. Detainee participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces and served as an al-Qaida sub-commander in Tora Bora. Detainee admitted attending al-Faruq Training Camp and is assessed to be a small arms instructor for al-Qaida.

• (S//NF) Detainee is assessed to be a member of al-Qaida. Detainee's name was found on al-Qaida affiliated documents and admitted he stayed at al-Qaida guesthouses.

• (S//NF) Detainee's name and alias were found on a list of 324 Arabic names, aliases, and nationalities recovered from safe house raids associated with suspected al-Qaida in Karachi. Detainee's trust account contained a Yemeni passport, [plane] ticket, and ID card.¹⁶ (Analyst Note: Such lists are indicative of an individual's residence within al-Qaida, Taliban, and other extremist guesthouses, often for the purpose of training or coordination prior to travel to the front lines or abroad. Trust accounts, also referred to as safety boxes or safety deposit boxes, were storage compartments such as envelopes or folders that guesthouse administrators used to secure the individual's personal valuables, such as passports and airplane tickets. These items were entrusted to the guesthouse until completion of training or other activity.)

(S//NF) Detainee acknowledged staying in several al-Qaida affiliated guesthouses including one operated by Abu Hatib al-Libi at a Taliban camp in Jalalabad.¹⁷ According to senior al-Qaida facilitator Zayn al-Abidin Muhammad Husayn, aka (Abu Zubaydah), ISN US9GZ-010016DP (GZ-10016), Abu Hatib al-

 ¹⁶ TD-314/40693-02, Analyst Note: Detainee is discussed in paragraph number 266.
¹⁷ 000509 302 06-JUN-2002, 000509 MFR 05-JUN-2002, IIR 6 034 0863 02

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Libi was in charge of the al-Qaida guesthouse in Jalalabad and used the guesthouse as a residential complex before moving to Kandahar. Later, the complex became the guesthouse for al-Qaida leaders, to include UBL.¹⁸

• (S//NF) Detainee stayed at a guesthouse in Karachi operated by Riyadh. Riyadh is assessed to be senior al-Qaida facilitators Sharqawi Abdu Ali al-Hajj, aka (Riyadh the Facilitator), ISN PK9YM-001457DP (YM-1457).¹⁹

• (S//NF) Saad Bin Nasser Ibn Mukbil al-Azani, ISN US9YM-000575DP (YM-575) stated detainee should have knowledge of guesthouses in Karachi.²⁰ (Analyst Note: This statement indicates detainee stayed in multiple guesthouses in Karachi.)

• (S//NF) Detainee also stated he stayed at the al-Ansar aka (al-Nibras) Guesthouse in Kandahar. The guesthouse was utilized as a stopover for Arabs before and after training at al-Faruq. Detainee also admitted to staying in other guesthouse, but did not identify them further.²¹

• (S//NF) Two of detainee's aliases, Muhammad Nasir Abdallah and Abu Abd al-Rahman al-Shamali, were found on a list of captured mujahideen recovered from a hard drive seized during joint raids on 1 March 2003 in Pakistan. The hard drive was associated with senior al-Qaida leader Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, aka (Mukhtar), ISN US9KU-010024DP (KU-10024).²²

• (S//NF) Detainee participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces and served as a sub-commander in Tora Bora.

• (S//NF) Detainee acknowledged he provided support to the former al-Faruq Training Camp commander, Abd al-Qadus, to set up fighting positions in Tora Bora.²³ Detainee verified LY-212 was the overall Tora Bora commander who oversaw Abd al-Qadus' activities, and stated he (detainee) was assigned to the Abu Thabit Center in Tora Bora.²⁴

(S//NF) Yasin Muhammad Salih Mazeeb Basardah, ISN US9YM-000252DP (YM-252), stated detainee was in charge of a group at Tora Bora.²⁵

• (S//NF) Abd al-Rahman Maadha Dhafir al-Hilala al-Umari, ISN US9SA-000199DP (deceased), reported Abd al-Rahman al-Taizi (assessed to be detainee) was in charge of the Taizi Center in Tora Bora.²⁶

¹⁸ TD-314/44313-02

¹⁹ IIR 6 034 0049 03

²⁰ ≥000575 MFR 22-DEC-2002

²¹ IIR 6 034 0049 03

²² TD-314/13174-03

²³ IIR 6 034 0049 03, 000509 FM40 17-MAR-2005

²⁴ 000509 SIR 20-JAN-2002, 000509 302 26-MAY-2002, IIR 6 034 0049 03

²⁵ 000252 FM40 15-MAR-2005, 000252 FM40 23-FEB-2005, 000252 SIR 02-JAN-2006

²⁶ >000199 SIR 19-Aug-2006, TD-314/00296-02

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• (S//NF) Detainee received militant training and then served as an instructor at the al-Qaida al-Faruq Training Camp.

• (S//NF) Detainee admitted receiving training at al-Faruq. Detainee trained on the AK-47 assault rifle and the Simonov single-shot rifle. Saba al-Lail was one of detainee's trainers. Abd al-Qadus was al-Faruq's overall commander.²⁷ (Analyst Note: The Simonov is a sniper rifle indicating detainee received advanced training.)

 (S//NF) JTF-GTMO detainees reported Saba al-Lail aka (Juhaina) was an AK-47 instructor who was killed in Tora Bora.²⁸

(S//NF) YM-252 identified detainee as Abu Abdul Rahman al-Taizi who trained at al-Faruq Training Camp and then served as a small arms trainer at al-Faruq. YM-252 further identified detainee as serving in the Yemen Army before going to Afghanistan.²⁹

• (S//NF) YM-252's statements were corroborated by other JTF-GTMO detainees who identified detainee as a small arms trainer at the al-Faruq Training Camp or reported he received training.³⁰

c. (S//NF) **Detainee's Conduct:** Detainee is assessed to be a **MEDUIM** threat from a detention perspective. Detainee's overall behavior has been mostly compliant and semi-hostile to the guard force and staff. Detainee currently has seven Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS with the most recent occurring on 17 October 2007, when he refused to follow guard's instruction. Detainee has three Reports of Disciplinary Infraction for assault with the most recent occurring on 25 July 2007, when he spit on a guard three times. Other incidents for which detainee has been disciplined include participating in mass disturbances, failure to follow guard instructions/camp rules, assaults, and non-weapon type contraband. In 2006, detainee had a total of two Reports of Disciplinary Infraction and three in 2007.

8. (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:

a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of **MEDIUM** intelligence value. Detainee's most recent interrogation session occurred on 29 May 2007.

b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Detainee's access to numerous al-Qaida-affiliated guesthouses and his possible position as a trainer make him more significant than previously assessed. However, reporting does not indicate detainee served in either a senior leadership or operational planning capacity.

²⁷ IIR 6 034 0049 03; Analyst Note: Variant of Abd al-Qadus includes Abdel Koddous

²⁸ >IIR 6 034 0508 03, TD-314/00296-02, IIR 6 034 0142 02

²⁹ 000252 FM40 15-MAR-2005, 000252 FM40 23-FEB-2005, 000252 SIR 02-JAN-2006

³⁰ >IIR 6 034 0420 05, 000511 302 07-AUG-2002, 000252 SIR 02-JAN-2006

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c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee possesses information on numerous midlevel al-Qaida members, to include the faculty at al-Faruq and the leadership in Tora Bora. In previous reporting, detainee has been forthcoming about the role of others in his recruitment, travel and has provided information on other JTF-GTMO detainees. Detainee continually changes information pertaining to his history and previous actions. Detainee has contradicted his own reporting and claims to forget information he has provided previously. This action taken into consideration show detainee is deceptive in his reporting.

d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:

- Al-Qaida guesthouses and members
- Al-Faruq Training Camp
- Tora Bora and Tor Ghar Mountains

9. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 25 October 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant.

MARK H. BUZBY J Rear Admiral, US Navy Commanding

^{*} Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessment can be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College October 2001 guide *Intelligence Warning Terminology*.