

SOUTHERN  
HISTORICAL SOCIETY  
PAPERS  
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PROPER  
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SOUTHERN

ANNUAL

REVIEWS

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VOL. 5.



very truly yours

Samuel H. May

# Southern Historical Society Papers.

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VOLUME V.

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JANUARY TO JUNE.

RICHMOND, VA.:  
Rev. J. WM. JONES, D. D.,  
SECRETARY SOUTHERN HISTORICAL SOCIETY.  
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# SOUTHERN HISTORICAL SOCIETY PAPERS.

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**Fifth Annual Meeting of the Southern Historical Society, October 31st,  
1877.**

The following splendid oration treats mainly of *post bellum* history; but this is a period of great importance as exhibiting the *fruits* of the doctrines of the Federal war-party. The distinguished orator has given a picture of the violation of the peace of '65, and the war upon the Constitution made by the Radical party, which should be widely read, and most carefully preserved as material for the future historian.

## **Address of General John T. Morgan, U. S. Senator from Alabama.**

The efforts of the Southern Historical Society have been most appropriately directed to the collection of facts relating to the period of actual and open war from 1861 to 1865.

That field is yet but slightly gleaned, and it is indispensable that this generation of Southern men should gather all its sad truths and preserve them until a later period, when, in a cloudless atmosphere, the patient and impartial philosopher shall be able to place facts and deductions side by side, and do justice to the people of the Confederacy.

In the future our historical records will probably abound with success and prosperity, which the world takes for the measure of high qualities and great deservings, and we shall not then need that any should vindicate us.

It is our duty, also, to consider well the turning point in our destiny which we have just past, so that the future—that now is dawning so auspiciously—shall not become darker than the past, through a mistake of the facts or principles on which our hopes are rested. The present is, perhaps, the most important period of our history. I have selected the events now occurring as the truest interpreters of the past, as they seem to furnish also the most certain indications of the future of our country.

The causes that have made it necessary to compile a separate history of the Southern States had their origin in differences of opinion reaching back to 1787. These differences seem to have ended in 1877. They were always political—relating to constructions of the Constitution as applied to different measures that have been proposed. They never resulted from natural causes, such as give rise to the quarrels of different nations or races of men, except so far as they related to African slavery. They only became sectional when the measures which excited the discussion happened to affect a particular section of the country. In 1812 to 1815 some of the States of the North strongly threatened to secede from the Union, which then implied a desire to return to their former allegiance to the British Crown. In 1830 to 1832 there was manifested an almost fatal purpose in some of the States to assert the right to remain in the Union and set at defiance some of the laws which, though constitutional in form, were alleged to be locally oppressive.

In 1861, the question of slavery furnished the occasion or provocation under which this ancient quarrel culminated in open war. While the question thus presented involved great political issues, it also included the dangerous element of race antagonism and race supremacy, and involved the accumulated wealth of two centuries invested by the South in slave property. It is scarcely conceivable that any free Government could have afforded a peaceful solution of such a question. Until the strife of contention over the powers and principles of our Federal Government connected itself with this question and threatened the extermination of slavery, there had been no occasion of sufficient magnitude to demand its solution with war. That question was local and sectional. It had hold of every sentiment and interest and prejudice, and involved every ground of former differences of opinion as to the construction of the Constitution that could excite, arouse, and make desperate the contending parties.

The absolute right of home rule as to slavery, in its ownership and control, was alleged by one party. The other party—the Abolitionists—denied this right, claiming that a law higher than the Constitution condemned slavery and everything that upheld it.

In the excitement of this controversy, and because of the political power this party embodied, others who denied the political propositions on which the Abolition party was based followed its lead, believing that it was safer to violate the Constitution than to lose power, and hoping that the expurgation of slavery from the country would condone their delinquency. They followed the lead of the Abolitionists, denying even their purpose to abolish slavery until after it was destroyed, and then they avowed it.

Their denials were merely protests against the doctrines of the "higher law" party. They really desired that slavery should be extirpated, but

could not admit that the Federal power reached the subject even in States that were in rebellion, as they saw fit to designate the Southern States. Still they kept in line with the dominant and aggressive power, and contented themselves with gentle protests against the destruction of the States. The old question, which in fact led to the war—the question of the right of local self-government in the States, which was the substantial political issue between the Abolitionists and the States of the South—was for a time silenced in the tempest of war. It slept until slavery was destroyed, and then arose again, when it was attempted to destroy the States.

Thousands of men engaged in the destruction of slavery, and, having that for the purpose of every blow they struck, were assisted by tens of thousands who fought to save the Union of the States, leaving the question of the rights and powers of the State and Federal governments, which led the South to secession, undecided by the results of the war. All these are free now as they were before the war to assert or to deny that the States have still the right of local self-government, and some of them deny it, while others admit the right. It may be safely said, in 1877, that this question will never again result in war. It has become impossible to excite the country to war upon sectional divisions, because there remain no questions of material interest upon which they can divide by lines of latitude or longitude. All sectional controversies being removed from the domain of discussion, whatever affects one State in like manner affects all the States. If one is wounded in its rights, all suffer alike, if not equally. The turning point in the destiny of the South that has been reached in 1877 is the final practical restoration to the States of the right of local self-government. It was for this that the people of the South fought in 1861; for this they suffered ten years of terrible persecution, from 1867 to 1877; and it is with this right firmly secured that they are content.

This is the end of a period of trials and suffering in which we have been exposed to the danger of the total subversion of our State governments, and with them to the loss of all substantial guaranties of our personal rights and liberties.

It is the beginning of an era of peace, which is the result of the failure of a pernicious effort to subordinate the States to the absolute will of Congress.

The political forces that have so long acted with repressive power upon the States have ceased, and they rise again with restorative and compensatory energy to their former dignity and influence.

In this year those institutions of government which we have been so proud to call American reached their lowest depression in the respect of mankind; and with quick and safe reaction they have regained their lost



ground and have become a pattern for the nations of the earth. Our people of all sections and all parties have shown that they are fully capable of exercising with wisdom and prudence the vast powers which reside in them under our free system of government, so that the most violent storms of popular excitement shall not destroy it, or defeat the ultimate power of the law.

When forty millions of people, with ten millions of voters, raise themselves above the atmosphere of hot and bitter recrimination engendered by a terrible civil war, and, forgetting party ties and prejudices, and overlooking insults and injuries which affect their keenest sensibilities, declare for the Constitution as the inviolable rule of government in all public administration and as the security of every private right, the world may again confidently believe that all enlightened races are capable of self-government.

Until 1867 it was supposed that it was impossible that there could be evolved through our political system a greater or more disastrous evil than our great civil war. But this opinion has been disproved by subsequent events.

When that war closed faith and confidence between the real belligerents was immediately restored, so that the soldiers of the Confederacy were disbanded on the field of battle and discharged from every restraint that did not apply to every citizen of the United States. But one right, which had been the subject of controversy before and during the war, was destroyed—the right of property in slaves. This was not destroyed by actual agreement, but was left to a tacit understanding, which was afterwards confirmed by the formal consent of the Southern States and people, acting as a free people, under the forms of law and through solemn constitutional ordinances. In this action several of the States even anticipated the propositions of Congress to add the thirteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States. This is all that we yielded. Of course the Government of the Confederate States perished in the war, but the government of the States that composed the Confederation remained as if the war had never been waged, as to their rights and powers of home-rule.

It was not through the magnanimity of the Federal Government that the Southern States were restored to these rights and powers. This is a common but most mistaken view of the matter. The United States Government has always held that we could neither forfeit nor abandon the rights and duties of the States—that ours is an imperishable union of indestructible States. It was the only avowed purpose of the war to restore the seceding States to the Union. This could not be done by destroying their autonomy as States of the Union—States like the others, and with equal powers and privileges. There can be no conquered States

in the American Union. When conquered they become provinces. If we had come back by compulsion as conquered States, the Union of States could not have been restored. It was a result of the war, as binding on the Federal Government as on the seceding States, that when they returned to the Union they should come back to the same position they had attempted to resign.

When this result was achieved, and the Union was re-established by war, and was found to be perfect in every respect, as it had been before the war, without a State missing or destroyed, or impaired in its rights, a great pledge was maintained, a great victory had been gained. A restoration had been accomplished which aroused the triumphant enthusiasm of those who believed that they had saved the Union, and left a lighter burden of regret upon the hearts of the vanquished. The States came forth from the hideous night of civil war, as the stars appear after the storms have swept the heavens.

The admiration of the civilized nations of the world was excited to the highest degree at the inherent power and indestructibility of our free constitutional Government. When it was rent with the secession of nearly half of its entire territory, strained to the uttermost in every possible resource, with more dead and wounded fallen from the ranks of its armies than the entire number of its armed foes, the monarchical powers recalled a jeering prophecy of a hundred years ago. But when peace was restored, and they saw it readjusting the nice and delicate relations between States and people, so that not a flaw or blemish or imperfection was discernible, not a scar was seen on the body politic, they felt that their prophecy had been unjust towards the millions of our race, who have for so many centuries aspired to the blessings of liberty regulated by constitutional law. And when they saw it at last rising proudly from the struggle, strengthened by its trials and ennobled and purified by its efforts to preserve its organism in the exact form and proportions in which our fathers had given it to the people, they realized a fact, that was not too dearly established even through the horrors of civil war, that constitutional liberty based on the sovereignty of the people, is a stronger and more enduring power than any royal dynasty, or any form of monarchical government.

Those who were vanquished had always believed that this form of government was the best. When they separated from the other States they adopted the Constitution of the United States, without any essential change of its form or principles, as their plan of government.

Although they had seceded from the Union they proved, by their adoption of this form of government, that their quarrel had not been with the Constitution or the form of our Government, but with a system of constructions which they believed were subversive of them. Measures had

been enacted and others had been forecast in the final decrees of the ballot-box, which the Southern people believed to be wholly unjust and unconstitutional.

When these measures were carried by force of arms, and had become by tacit or express recognition the law of the land, and when the States of the South were again restored to the Union, the people still believed that the old Constitution, as it was at the close of the war, was fully adequate to the protection of every remaining right.

This was an honest and hearty belief. They realized the fact that slavery had met its fated hour in the united judgment of the civilized nations of the white race, and that it was necessary and even better to yield it.

They felt that they could not afford to remain in relations with the white people of the earth which involved their censure, however unmerited, and kept them always embroiled, even with their kindred in their own country, in defending their rights.

They returned with alacrity, and not with the sullen reluctance of a conquered people, to their allegiance to a restored constitutional Union.

The Constitution remained in its full unbroken efficiency to protect every right except that one which had perished in the conflict of arms. So the matter was received and understood by the people of the South.

After they had done all that required by duty and honor to defend the right which they at last yielded; when they felt that greater sacrifices were not required for that cause, even though it involved more than half of all their property, their reunion with the States of the North, under the flag and Constitution of a common country, was a grateful result to them.

For a period of nearly three years the peace of 1865 remained almost unbroken. So far as the South was concerned, it was kept in good faith. They considered it as a real and faithful peace.

It is true that unconstitutional taxes were levied upon their productions; confiscators and plunderers took their property by force, and after having consumed the greater part in their charges for the robbery, paid the residue into the United States treasury, where it has been set aside by subsequent laws as a conscience fund.

Many wrongs that sorely tried the people were inflicted upon them merely because they were powerless; but these things did not drive them from the line of duty. They kept faith with the entire country; they kept peace within their own borders; they respected, obeyed, and enforced the laws; they amended their constitutions so as to make them conform to the results of the war; and a prosperity attended their labors which proved that no calamity and no misrule could deprive the beautiful land of the South of its sceptre as the queen of the commerce of this hemisphere.

But this peace was afterwards rudely and unnecessarily broken through the wicked ambition of men who had no honorable agency in the great war, and great capitulation, which had resulted in peace in 1865.

In 1867 Congress broke the treaty made by the armies at the surrender, without just cause or reasonable excuse.

The peace of 1865 was not made by treaty between belligerent nations. The Confederate States Government was destroyed. It was not made between the States because, under the Constitution they could not be recognized individually, and as to each other, as belligerents, or in any respect as powers foreign to the Government of the United States.

The treaty, if it may be called such, was made by terms of capitulation between the two armies in the field, and was ratified in the parole of every Confederate soldier. Thus the most sacred of all the engagements of public faith was made a matter of personal agreement between the Government of the United States and the soldiers of the Confederacy. When General Lee and General Johnston surrendered their armies they did not consent to impose upon them conditions of civil inferiority when they should return to their homes. They would never have surrendered upon such terms.

Never was the honor of a country more bound up in any treaty, and never was public faith more unjustly disregarded, than it was when the government that received these paroles afterwards disregarded them.

The Congress of the United States, under its power to make war, and with the army under its control—made subject to its command by a flagrant invasion of the prerogatives of the President—resumed hostilities against the people of the States that had been engaged in the war of 1861.

The President refused to give the sanction of his authority to this unjust war, and his powers as Commander-in-Chief were virtually usurped by a joint committee of the two Houses that commanded Generals who undertook to command the President.

While the President was extending the pardoning power to the relief of almost every person in the South from all the consequences of the alleged rebellion of 1861, Congress was engaged in a new declaration of war based upon these pardoned offences.

The war of 1861 had been a war of restoration of the Union and of the supremacy of the Federal laws. The war of 1867 was waged for conquest, subjugation, and spoils.

Congress was enraged that the President, by his free use of the pardoning power and his recognition of the rights of the States, should impede the work of the reconstruction of the States by military coercion.

The President was impeached because he chose to follow the Constitution rather than obey the behest of a party that derided its injunctions and spurned its authority.

The history of this country was only saved from the foulest disgrace that ever threatened a nation by the heroic moral courage of a few great spirits, who periled all—and, for a season, appeared to have lost everything—to prevent such a calamity.

It is a pleasing and grateful duty to render honor to the purity and courage of these saviours of the country, who voted down the articles of impeachment.

Do I pass the boundaries of actual legal and historic truth in defining the reconstruction of the States in 1867–8, and the enforcement of the measures and policy of this movement down to 1877, as being a state of war maintained by acts of warfare?

There was no rebellion, insurrection, or domestic violence in any of the Southern States to require the President to send armies into them.

No requisition for such forces were made either by the Governors or the Legislatures of any of these States.

The forces of the United States that remained in the Southern States were not in any way disturbed, or molested, or threatened by the States or the people. No war was made upon the Federal armies in the South.

Notwithstanding this state of entire pacification, and that there was no disputed authority as between contending claimants for power or office in any of the States, and no quarrel with the Federal Government, the States were, by military orders, grouped into military districts and placed under the command of officers of the army of the United States.

These military commandants, having no more rightful power than they have now, took command in every department of civil and military law, and ruled without responsibility over everything and everybody.

Their armies were stationed at strategic points to sustain their authority. At their own will and pleasure they removed the officers lawfully chosen in each of these States from their offices, from the highest to the lowest grades, and in every department of the several States; and in their places installed their own appointees.

The highest exercise of autocratic power never exceeded the reach of their authority. The President could not exercise over the menials of his household a more absolute and irresponsible power than those satraps (the word is the only one that is historically a true definition of the office) exerted over governors, legislatures, judges, and magistrates, and all in authority in the States.

Resistance to such authority was met only by force. No court or judicial power, not even a court-martial was required to give its judicial sanction to the order, or to aid in its execution.

Arms in the hands of the soldiery were the forces which executed the decrees that were flashed upon the eyes of a helpless people from the swords of their masters.

They had the power to arrest without warrant or complaint; to imprison without a hearing; to deny the writ of *habeas corpus*; to release without trial such as were accused of crime; and to seize and confiscate estates without asking the aid of a court of justice.

Such governments were called military governments; but what shall we call that condition of public affairs in which such a government is sustained within and over a State—nay, three or more States—of the American Union, grouped under the sword of one satrap, like slaves bound to a single chain. If it was not a state of war, what was it?

In Russia or Persia this might aptly be called a state of siege, but our Constitution has not provided for a state of siege against the sovereign parties to the Union.

It has gone no further than to permit the law-making power of the land to enable the Executive, on certain conditions, to deny to individuals the writ of *habeas corpus*.

Provinces may be outlawed in despotic governments, but States in the American Union cannot be coerced except by actual war. In our Constitution the civil power is placed above the military. When this organic law is reversed, so that the military power becomes the law-making and the ruling power, then war exists.

The Constitution provides the means by which the military power may be called in to aid in upholding the civil power, but none through which it may supplant the latter, except in actual war.

The only difficulty in defining the period of the reconstruction of the Southern States as a time of actual war is that the United States Government, or, more properly, Congress was the only belligerent party. The other parties were helpless citizens and soldiers who were disarmed and held under paroles. They could not resist; they could only suffer wrong. They were like prison-ships anchored within range of the guns of a beleaguered fortress to receive the fire of their friends if they should attempt to resist the invader.

The friends of the Constitution did not dare to array themselves against this military usurpation, lest they should destroy the States that were doomed to suffer its aggressions and wrongs.

The whole country felt that it was at war. It is not true that this was a period in which peace was prevented only by the angry passions and lingering resentment of the people.

Peace had come; the dove had found a footing in the land and it was a welcome visitor. But new hostilities were begun, and for new causes; the chief of which was that the helpless condition of the South invited

a hoard of plunderers to the assault, under a cry for the reconstruction of the States, after the restoration of the Union had been completed.

It was not a state of war maintained, after the conclusion of actual hostilities in 1865, as a means of adjusting finally the results of that struggle.

It was a war begun after each of the belligerent States had resumed its normal relations to the other States; after they had conducted civil government for nearly three years as States of the Union, and under and in accordance with the Constitution.

These States had abolished slavery; had accepted and ratified an amendment to the Federal Constitution submitted to them by a vote of Congress; had remodeled their own constitutions so as to conform them to the results of the war; had paid taxes; had been recognized as States by every other State in the Union, and by the President, and by the Supreme Court; had elected Representatives in Congress; and had performed every office and duty, both Federal and local, which in any way appertained to them.

It was in this condition that they were found when the armies of reconstruction invaded them, overthrew the civil law, and supplanted the civil power with the military by force of arms.

Not only were these States at peace, but they were so helpless in every military sense, that they could not even threaten the peace of the country.

Then began the nine years war of reconstruction, that was separated from the four years war of restoration by nearly three years of peace. A peace which was only interrupted by the complainings of the people, mingled with the beastly exultations of the plunderers—as the great and silent deserts are sometimes awakened in the night by the cries of the jackalls mingled with the plaintive calls of their victims that have wandered from the caravans.

It is true that in the South, as in the North, there was a strong sense of antagonism and resentment between the people after the war, but it was less aggravated from 1865 to 1867, than it was from thence to 1877. The war of reconstruction was a dishonorable oppression for an unworthy cause; and it was condemned accordingly in the hearts of good men of all sections. I will not say that none of its advocates thought it necessary or just. Those who advocated the higher law prior to 1861, and forced the shedding of blood to meet that heresy, probably felt that it was just, or even generous, to employ the army again rather than the halter to secure the destruction of the State Governments, which had always been offering obstruction to the realization of their radical schemes. But those who fought to preserve the Union and not to destroy the States have, for the ten years past, been cast down with shame and grief because

the condition of the country had made it possible that such a war could be waged for such a cause and against a people so helpless and unoffending.

The real purpose of the war of 1867 was to secure a presidential election. The immobility of President Johnson, like a rock in the sea, had caused a reactionary movement among the people to save the Constitution as well as the Union.

Those who wanted the Union without the Constitution—who wanted an oligarchy instead of a republic—at once discerned that nothing but a state of war in the South could justify the exercise of the power necessary to stop the reflux tide which the resistance of the President had set in motion; and so they levied war against the State governments, and marshalled an army to enforce the movement.

It was the right of local self-government in the States that stood in the way of the marplots who intended to control the presidency at every hazard. The encounter with Andrew Johnson caused them to dread a President who regarded his oath to support the Constitution, and they intended that nothing should be left to chance in the election of his successor. This purpose could only be accomplished by taking the government of the Southern States out of the hands of the people, and that could only be accomplished by war. The power to make war was the only power possessed by Congress that could touch the States in this vital point.

The war of reconstruction was waged to secure the permanent ascendancy of a political party. If the Southern States had been Republican instead of Democratic in their party associations, this war would have been spared us, and the country would have escaped a lasting disgrace.

No Democrat, North or South, engaged in this war except as he was drawn beneath the chariot wheels as a bloody victim of its cruelties.

Not all the Republicans engaged in this war. Many of those who had fought for the flag and the Union did not desire to see the proud ensign of the country floating over States that were enslaved, and a Union of States that included eleven members that were so enthralled that they could not, in any way, act without the permission of the army.

Congress at first raised this issue with the Southern States by refusing to them representation in either house. They did not neglect, however, to tax the people to whom they refused representation.

It soon became apparent that the rights and powers of home rule comprised nearly everything valuable in government, so far as it related to the personal welfare of the masses of the people. They did not repine at the neglect of Congress, or even at its aversion towards them.

At the end of three years the ostracised States had fully established the fact that their people could live and prosper for a century without



feeling the want of representation in Congress. They could have the protection of the flag of the Union such as the Territories enjoyed; they were entitled to exemption from taxation as the Indians are, because they had no representation in Congress; they had the sympathy and respect of their sister States, and could trust to their interested guardianship of the equal rights of all the States. What more could they really need, besides the power of local self-government, to make their people safe and prosperous?

Such a condition would not, of course, meet the demands of a great and proud people, but it would be preferable to that low condition in which a despised minority should be compelled to submit to insult and injustice continually at the hands of those in power.

It was this demonstration of the great fact that the States are the real repositories of the essential powers of the Federal Government in money, in men, and in military resources, in the election of Presidents and Representatives in Congress in both Houses; and that, by withholding these things, the States can at any moment paralyze the Federal Government; that alarmed the higher law people, and they struck home, at the root of the tree, when they, in the war of reconstruction, struck at the great rights of home rule. The struggle for these rights has been long and painful. We could only meet military force with patient suffering. In the beginning, a vast number of men in the South were disfranchised who had given long and attentive study to our peculiar and nicely-adjusted system of government. In their places, those were put who were in no sense qualified for free and independent suffrage, to say nothing of the intelligent exercise of this important privilege.

Then came military intimidation, arrests, imprisonments, the espionage of brutal spies and detectives in the private and sacred sanctuaries of home. Then hired "traitors to the blood that coursed in their veins" were licensed, by nominal elections to office, to steal and plunder at will. But no one pen will ever enumerate these crimes, and no tongue will ever be able to portray them in their horrid enormity.

This struggle has ended, I believe, forever. The revolution of 1867 has at last failed of its purpose; ballot after ballot has expressed the decree of the popular will against the revolution; there seems to be no remaining cause which can lead to a renewal of the struggle, and it is ended. In this struggle the people of the South have won a great moral victory. It was the cherished and abiding hope of the peace-breakers that we should be goaded into armed resistance. They sought this occasion against us to destroy us. Our friends in the North, who witnessed with the deepest concern the whole movement, stood close at our sides and bade us be still and to quietly endure every persecution until a recurring sense of justice amongst the people should deprive the destructives of power.

Faithfully and honestly they stood by us in every trial, and under the influence of their counsels and example we took courage and resolved to outlive the revolution, and finally to vote it down. This we have done.

We of the South, in concert with the people of the North and West, elected a statesman to the Presidency who was pledged to put an end to this war against the States.

His opponent, who became President, had declared his opinions in favor of the principles on which the Southern States have so long stood united, but it was supposed by some who supported him that those declarations were only meant to deceive. They did not rightly appreciate him. They were true words from an honest heart, uttered in harmony with the expressed will of the people, and maintained in acts which prove that his conscience is alert and guides him in an earnest effort to support and obey the Constitution of the United States. How insignificant the prospect that those who have so greatly harmed the country through the evil times of the war of reconstruction will ever be able to undo the work now completely finished.

The two statesmen who opposed each other for the Presidency agree that the States must be left to govern themselves, in all matters of home rule, without civil or military interference by Congress. Their followers sustain them, and the covenant of peace is sealed by the authentic act of both the great political parties of the country.

The States have regained the dignity with which they clothed themselves, and the immortal honors with which they were crowned by the nations of the earth when, after having achieved their independence, the thirteen States were each received into the circle of the great ruling powers with earnest congratulations, and sat in council together to create the Government of the United States of America.

Had Virginia, Georgia, and the Carolinas then foreseen the abuses that have found shelter in the wreck of the Constitution during the last ten years, it is beyond question that this Federal Government would never have been created.

But, looking back over that period, and seeing how they in fact "builded wiser than they knew," and finding in the hearts of the people of the country an honest and abiding faith in the true principles of the Government they ordained, which can save it and has saved it from perversion and ruin, they enter again the triumphant progress of the States and the people towards a destiny, which now seems to be assured, higher than any country has ever accomplished.

The restoration to the people of those constitutional rights which they have never agreed to surrender—which remain to them after four years of open warfare and nearly ten years of misrule and persecution—has removed the last obstacle to perfect reconciliation.

Peace is the fruit of reconciliation.

The peace of 1877 relieves the anguish and heals the heart-burnings of two wars—the open and honorable struggle of the war of 1861, and the military persecution of the war of 1867.

Its reconciliation reaches back to 1820, when the slavery question began to agitate the country; nay, it goes back to the birth-day of the Constitution, “with healing in its wings,” and cures the grief and bitter memories of the past.

Honest and patriotic people on all sides are prepared for this benediction of Heaven’s good will to man.

They desire that every human being shall be included in this blessing.

Those who conquered in the war of 1861 turn with confidence and affection to the people of the South, and welcome them as victors in the war of reconstruction.

They esteem us as men who fought honorably and in open warfare for what we believed to be our rights, and afterwards showed our devotion to the Constitution with constancy and long-suffering, when the mailed hand of oppression was laid heavily upon the Southern States.

They looked on in helpless grief and shame when they saw that those who avoided the fierce struggle of the war of 1861, and had followed the armies only to speculate upon the necessities of the country, had seized their victorious banners, and, followed by pillagers and no less heartless politicians, led on in a new war of reconstruction and conquest. In the darkest times they stood by us and spoke to us in words of encouragement, and conjured us to forbear to shed blood in the defence of our rights and liberties. We listened and suffered, and withheld our hands, and waited for the hour of deliverance; and, now, that it has come, we rejoice with them in fraternal peace and unity over the restoration of constitutional rule to our beloved country.

The desire of the people for peace and reconciliation existed, and was a controlling sentiment for years, during which the politicians kept them apart and seemingly in bitter antagonism.

Few of this class of rulers have been present on occasions, so credible to humanity, when the people have given sad but genuine expression to their reconciliation. During the last spring, and on many previous occasions, the people met in true sympathy, and those who had only met in battle before knelt around the graves of friends and foes alike, and scattered flowers over the ashes of their heroic dead, whose glory has at last become the equal heritage of pride to the whole American family.

This reconciliation is not on either side the result of humiliating confession of wrongs done to the country or to posterity. It has not followed the pardoning of offences.

It has been reached through the only means that were possible to men who have any self-respect, the manly recognition of the fact that the war was not on either side a crime.

Criminals, whether pardoned or punished to the satisfaction of the law, cannot "dwell together in unity" and as brethren with those who are virtuous and good.

When the people unite with those who are denounced as criminals and traitors, it proves either that the good have become demoralized or that they do not believe the accusation.

The latter is the true proposition. The people reject a denunciation that they feel to be unjust, and will some day expunge it from the laws.

The war of 1861 was not on either side a crime. It was the necessary result of a conflict of interests and convictions which were too deep-seated and too important to be yielded to anything but overpowering force.

What nation or race of people has ever become great without struggles and bloodshed? It has been so frequently necessary that it has almost become a rule of national progress and elevation to use the sword in cutting loose from the clogs and incumbrances that gather in the form of influence, wealth, and prejudice around effete institutions.

This fact has had a great influence in reconciling the South to the fate of slavery. Whether it was right or wrong, it had passed under condemnation.

The sword was necessary, and would have been necessary under any circumstances to execute the sentence of the enlightened nations, as we esteem them, against African slavery in the South.

The South would never have tolerated slavery as a means of darkening the barbarism of the African. They believed, and still believe, that they have done more for his civilization and enlightenment than he can ever do for himself in this country or in his native land, with all the assistance of all the nations of the earth.

The "sin of slavery" they never felt. If this is moral obliquity, they are still blind.

But whether they were right or wrong in these opinions and sentiments, they were not criminal in defending with arms a right which had the express sanction and protection of the Constitution. This was their only remedy, or else the whole North was criminal in boasting of their purpose to abolish slavery by any means that might be found necessary. Our great doubt was as to the honesty of this declaration; but those who revile us as rebels and traitors cannot now deprive us of the defense that we believed that their declarations were the true expression of their designs.

When thirty millions of people of the same blood, having the same government, go to war for opinion's sake, for principle, for personal and

political rights, or to preserve their institutions or constitutions, or to defeat usurpation, or for honor's sake—and not for dominion or conquest, or subjugation, or the spoils of war—it is a presumptuous abuse of language and a perversion of the truth that any should characterize either party with degrading epithets, or impute to either a criminal purpose in sustaining a cause upon which they bestow the highest and best proofs of honest devotion.

More conspicuous is the injustice of such recrimination, when, in a free government like ours, the people first express their opinions through the ballot-box on the morality, justice, policy, and constitutionality of every measure affecting the general welfare.

The American people were neither seduced, surprised, nor betrayed into the war of 1861. After a vain search, the conquerors failed to find a vicarious sufferer who could personate the alleged treason of the people. The truth was, there was no head to the rebellion against the Union in the South, or to the rebellion against the Constitution in the North. The people on both sides, in their entire body, were the offenders.

Mr. Lincoln, who was not an Abolitionist before the war, was forced by the pressure of popular clamor and a supposed military necessity, to declare the emancipation of the negroes, and Mr. Davis, who was a pronounced friend of the Union, was compelled to draw the sword against it to avoid the crime of treason in defending the rights of the States, assailed through the institution of slavery, with arms within the Union. His jailor, while he was a prisoner, punished him for treason in a manner befitting the Inquisition, but his judges never took heart to hear a demurrer to the indictment.

There was no treason in the war. There was no traitor of any note to either flag during the war. The causes of the war had such deep hold on the convictions of the people that every man fought as he would have fought for his family or his religion.

For more than forty years the people had warned and admonished each other in every solemn form that warring opinions and angry debates were steadily approaching a crisis that would compel hostile conclusions between warring States. Every test of the ballot during that period had developed a growing determination on both sides to yield nothing that was involved in the issues that were then agitating the country. Many compromises were devised by generous and patriotic men, who set high examples of personal sacrifice before the people, but their counsels were rejected. Compromise was as fuel to the flame. Advice and warning were lost on the people.

Within a few years before the war America was, in rapid succession, bereft of the three men who have added to her fame the chief glory of the 19th century. Twenty centuries may not produce the equal of either

Clay, Webster, or Calhoun. They had all, through lives of long public service, participated in the great discussions which involved every phase of this question of slavery, and had weighed all considerations affecting it in any degree. They did not in all things agree; in one they did, that slavery was under the express protection of the Constitution of the United States. In another matter, they also agreed. As death summoned each of them to his departure from earth, he turned his thoughts to his country. In the throes of dissolution he was reminded of its sad impending fate and, intensifying his plea by the solemnity of his situation, almost in his last breath, he warned his countrymen of the danger, and plead with them for forbearance towards each other.

They had anchors of hope cast within the vail to save them when death should prove conqueror; and, reminded by these of the necessity of a steadfast anchorage for their beloved country, they pointed the people to the Constitution, and implored them to hold to it, and trust it.

The people quoted their great arguments in the Senate to support their convictions and strengthen their resolves, but left their dying admonitions unheeded.

If the war was a crime, it was a crime of the people of both sections infatuated by a zeal that incriminated every man who voted his honest opinions; and so every man was guilty who fought to maintain them.

If those only were innocent who, having voted for war, refused to fight, but preferred to coin the blood of the people into gold through base speculations or the emoluments of civil offices, it were better to have been guilty. There are men who refused to fight as they voted, and now, with epigrammatic insolence, advise men who were honest soldiers to vote as they shot.

A recurrence to these matters would be without profit or fitness on this occasion, when peace is the subject of our reflections, only that the truth of history, as revealed in the actions of those who fought in the civil war, is the only test by which we can determine whether that peace, which has at last hung its white banners in the heavens, is a true and genuine reconciliation, or only a hollow truce. Is it a restoration of the country to the solid foundations of confidence and regard, whence peace flows like a river from its fountains beneath the eternal hills; or is it a mere soothing of angry resentments which linger in malicious concealment awaiting the hot breath of some fanatical demagogue to kindle them again into fury?

If it is merely an allayed excitement smoothed into temporary quiet by the silken hand of policy there are bad and dangerous men who will arouse it again.

Then our condition will be worse than it has ever been. Confidence will be gone—respect for each other will be changed for disgust—and we will abandon forever all hopes of peace under our free government.

Fear will drive us to take shelter under despotism, that we may secure repose by the force of some imperial will—having failed to obtain peace by the honorable consent of our brethren, based upon a candid survey of the past, and a good understanding for the future.

If we agree that the peace, that we now hail with rejoicing, is the result of a final conclusion of the people that the States are to have and enjoy—within the Union and under the Constitution as it is—the right of local self-government as it now exists, that peace will be enduring.

If, otherwise, the right is claimed for the Federal Government to reconstruct the States, as occasion may offer, through the war-making power of the President, or Congress, so as to conform their laws, constitutions, and official rosters to the will of the dominant party in the Union, we will have strife that will end in destruction.

I have faith in the peace of 1877. It is just, reasonable, honorable, and constitutional; and for these reasons it is commended to the hearts of strong men North and South, who intend to stand by it, and see that it is maintained.

Conflicts of opinions and of interests may again arise between the sections of the country, divided by lines of latitude or longitude; but we have all learned that forbearance is a virtue. The people have deliberately reviewed all the grounds upon which the peace of 1877 is founded, and after many tests of the ballot since 1865, they have finally decreed that it is fixed, permanent, and inviolable.

The volunteer armies of 1861 to 1865, in the main, have sustained the peace which they conquered and declared. But while they were hanging up their arms and furling their banners at the close of the war, men took possession of the civil power and eagerly broke the solemn covenant of blood, not a drop of which had ever flowed from their opened veins, and to them the country now justly attributes the calamities and disorders of the past ten years.

They were heartless politicians, who would reap the harvest of victory where they had not sowed the blood of the battle-field.

They gained the sympathies and support of a confiding people by appealing to the sentiments and passions that were quickened by the horrors of warfare, and, as a reward for their simulated griefs, were placed in offices that gave them the power to crush the helpless and to plunder them under the forms of law and in the name of the United States. Once in power they quickly did their work, and improvised a new army of enlisted men to sustain them in measures at which the true armies of the North, who had gone home in triumph, would have revolted.

But who, of all this host of oppressors, can now stand up before the world and dare to claim its honest judgment on the history of his official life?

In this final and solemn judgment of the people, uttered through the ballot-box and put into execution by a bold and faithful Executive, the moral assurance of a lasting, honorable, and blessed peace receives its final confirmation.

The Southern people are parties to this covenant of peace, entitled to its benefits, and bound by its stipulations.

It is not a mere act of grace. It is not a mere boon or favor given to us to soothe the anguish or compensate for the misfortunes of the past. It is our due under the Constitution. If it had been the reward of long suffering in support of the Constitution, we should have well earned it; but it is our inheritance; ours by the highest title—and honor and duty, as well as our best interests, require that we should support, maintain, and defend it.

Not every man in the North accepts the peace or feels bound to support it, for some are found who, in their conduct and by open declaration, are its enemies. They disavow it as binding upon them, because they pretended to believe that we intended to violate it. Wishing it broken, they affect to distrust us because they assert that we will destroy it. But these men misunderstand us. They prefer to think evil of us. They studied us at too great a distance during the war; and since, they have studied us while the deep shadows of humiliation rested upon us, and the sullen defiance of tyranny and oppression was expressed in every act. When they have scanned us in the light of the sun of liberty and in the day of deliverance, they will be less afraid that we will break the honorable peace we have so long coveted.

They have heretofore studied our material resources, and the easiest and surest means of appropriating them, and seem to distrust us as covenant-breakers because we were querulous at the liberties they took with our rights.

We were not covenant-breakers. We have kept the faith with all who have ever relied upon our honor. Even with those who have oppressed us we have never broken faith.

It is true that insulted justice has dared to bring to its bar some of the most corrupt and most dangerous men, who have set the law at defiance; and this is complained of already as a breach of the peace of 1877. But we should be unworthy of any peace but that of oblivion if we could accept any conditions which such malefactors would demand as the price of a base and disgraceful condonation of their crimes.

Liberty is not acceptable to the people of the South when it is polluted with corruption.



These men in the North who oppose this peace of 1877 know that it has destroyed their vocation.

The States that they sought to destroy have survived their evil machinations, and now they hiss their fierce anathemas into the ears of an offended country.

They are chiefly of that class whose treachery to their own convictions betrayed them at a late day into the Abolition party.

They joined that party in the hope of gaining power and place, after they had bestowed upon it the labor of years in denunciation of its purposes.

They were chiefly Democrats of the States-Rights school, who were converted by the troubles which had lost that party its ascendancy in the Government into consolidationists and coercionists.

They readily became warriors of the home-guard; minute-men in making military arrests; judge-advocates, to prosecute citizens within the States where civil law still was supreme, and to execute upon them sentences of banishment and death. They were the faithful jailors of women, and even of children, who fell under the suspicion of exercising liberty of thought.

While battles raged in other States, they gave to the country their best efforts to save their talents until the gathering in of the spoils of victory should require their services. When the war had ended they begun the great work of confiscation. Some mounted the bench; some rose at the bar; some prowled about the country as marshals, with retinues of spies and informers at their heels. They seized whatever was valuable. They met afterwards in court, and condemned without mercy, and divided without shame the spoils wrested from a powerless people. These resources failing, from exhaustion, they determined to seize the offices of the country, and, through the power to tax the people, to confiscate their little earnings accumulated since the war.

Then they became the Robespierres and Marats of the revolution of 1867—leading the hordes of plunderers, who, with halters, had strangled poor men suspected only of being rich: who with incendiary torches had fired the houses of sleeping families, and filled dungeons with brave men, because they had fought to sustain what they had formerly preached.

Reconstructionists, who, with avowed contempt of the Constitution, rudely trampled upon the rights and powers of the prostrate States, whose sovereignty they had in former years bowed themselves down to worship. Since Heaven has willed that their works shall perish, rather than those against whom they have wrought injustice and iniquity, they now assume another *role*. They are now Nationalists—artfully concealing behind a name the design that struggles in their hearts, and impatiently waiting for an opportunity for action, they would sweep out of

existence the whole fabric of the American system of government, with its thirty-nine written constitutions, and would plant upon its ruins a military oligarchy, with its capital in a fortified camp. Such a place as Washington City was in the closing hours of the nine years' sway of reconstruction, when a significant array of frowning batteries admonished Congress that while that war continued military power would enforce its own decrees, whatever might be the expressed will of the people.

In the South these malcontents still have a meager following. These few are a class peculiar to Southern politics.

No other country could have presented the conditions under which their existence was possible.

In the beginning they zealously urged the demands of the people of the South on all the issues that had led to the war of 1861.

They did not believe that war was possible, and in this supposed security they raged for it.

When the war surprised them in their violent demonstrations, a few ventured into the first campaign as quartermasters and the like. Many took refuge in agriculture, and made peace-offerings of beef and bacon to appease the demands of the conscription. Others began to murmur their convictions that the war was being waged at the expense of civil rights.

It was a very just war, they said, but it was not conducted with sufficient delicacy by some of the Generals in matters of personal rights. They were chiefly men of wealth, but they complained with most disinterested protestations that it was a "rich man's war and a poor man's fight," and, as the rich did not all desire to fight, the poor should not be allowed to continue the struggle.

When the four years' war was ended, and peace appeared to be assured, those who had fought in the Confederate armies and had gained the heartfelt gratitude of their countrymen, though their cause was lost, stood aside in a spirit of self-denial, and, to encourage a feeling of amity between men of all grades of opinions, invited these men to take the lead in public affairs.

They accepted the situation, but it was a poor one, for robbery and plunder were not then the perquisites of office.

The revolution of 1867 promised richer rewards for public service, and when it offered them employment they again accepted the situation, and with it the blood-money of their new allies.

When that second war came, with political intriguers and spoilsmen for its generals, thieves, bummers and camp-followers for its soldiery, and the paroled prisoners of the war of 1861 and a poor and helpless people for its victims, these men were found among the most unpitying and aggressive of all these hordes. Some of these were natives of the South ;

others are not claimed by any country. With permanent peace their vocation ends. They feebly and despairingly unite their voices with the disappointed revolutionists of the North in their protests against the peace of 1877.

The people of the North who approve and support this final adjustment are those who recognize and obey the authority of the Constitution. They trust no man with their liberties who, in legislation, in administration, in policy or in judgment, in peace or in war, goes outside the Constitution to find the sources of his civil power or the sanctions of his conduct in public affairs.

Such men feel the pulsations of fraternal regard that beat in honest hearts in all sections of the country, and are not restrained by lines of latitude in expressing their cordial response. They do not despise the weak nor worship the powerful. They do not believe that the moral worth of five millions of Americans has been settled against their pretensions to virtuous and patriotic love of country, and against their right to be esteemed as worthy of respect and confidence, by the fact that they fought four years and did not resist successfully thirty millions of Americans. They do not believe that only those are worthy of trust who belonged to the victorious power.

With supporters like these, the country need not fear that peace and reconciliation will not abide in the land.

I turn now to those in the South who support this great work, and I will endeavor to establish the proposition that they will abide by it with fidelity, and maintain it with honor and zeal.

I know that distrust is ready to meet us at the door of many an honest heart; that passion and prejudice are not yet extinguished or removed from every mind; that differences of opinion yet exist amongst us, the discussion of which recalls the bitterness and intolerance of former strife.

We feel that this distrust is not deserved by the people of the South, because they acted with good conscience and without any criminal intent or purpose in their great controversy with the North.

If we have now met in peace and reconciliation upon the broad concessions, mutually accepted, that the war was not a crime, we need not inquire who was right or who was wrong. Nor need we concern ourselves whether the one side or the other retains the bitter memories of the war with the greater tenacity. Controversies between States are not capable of being adjusted by reference solely to the temper of mind which may influence even a majority of the people.

Peace would never follow any war if it could only be established after the people had forgotten or had ceased to cherish their bitter animosities.

When the cause of war is removed, it is a crime in any people to refuse to make peace.

It is due to the President of the United States, who has inaugurated this restoration of the Constitution, and to the people of the North who support him in this policy, and it is but justice to ourselves, that we should be able to assure them, that on our part, we intend to keep this peace inviolate.

This is sufficiently established by the fact that we have no motive for any other line of conduct. And this fact is demonstrated when we turn to the Constitution of the United States, and find that it protects every right that we claim; that it is now recognized as the supreme law, and that those in power respect their oaths to support and obey it. What further have we to ask or desire? But our claims upon the confidence of the country rest on higher grounds than our personal interests.

It is not a very pleasing duty to argue with your brother, or a stranger, the facts and deductions which should justify or encourage him in the confidence that you mean to deal honestly and justly with him. But our sectional estrangement has so long existed, and has been attended with such unseemly vituperation in all quarters, that those who desire that a better feeling should be encouraged, ought carefully to remove any possible distrust which may retard the restoration of mutual confidence and good will. In doing this, nothing is gained by uncandid protestations of affectionate regard, or by concealing the opinions and sentiments which we honestly entertain. It is probable that we shall live together a great many years—I trust it may be centuries, and that as time advances, we shall become more strongly attached by ties of common interests.

It would seem to be impossible to misconceive the precise effects of the war of 1861 upon the Constitution of the country, and it is absurd to assume that any change in the organic law was effected beyond that set forth in those amendments that have been added to it. So that we know fully the results of the war upon our Government.

The States of the South have adopted the thirteenth amendment, and have accepted the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. These are a part of the Constitution. We did not like them or approve them, but we have bound ourselves collectively as States, and in our State Constitutions, as well as by multiplied oaths taken on all possible occasions, by our people individually, to support and obey those amendments as parts of the Constitution of the United States. We can do no more except to live up to our pledges.

We yielded, in some of our State Constitutions, the right of secession. This was not required of us, and we surrendered it, because we supposed the Northern States would demand it. That was claimed to be an issue involved in the war. Some of those who fought the hardest and longest

declared that this doctrine was the cause of the war, and was, of course, the object of their most intense hate.

It was the immediate cause of hostilities in the form in which they were opened, and unless the South had believed in the right of secession as an essential element of State sovereignty, it is most likely that war would not have ensued between the States. It would have been a war between the people, and we should have had anarchy within the States. If the same number of men that were engaged in the war of 1861 had fought with the same vigor, under partizan leadership and organization, and not under the State organizations, anarchy would have reigned throughout the country.

The abolishment of slavery would have resulted in the abolishment of State Governments; in the destruction of the Union beyond all the power of restoration; and the final overthrow of Republican Government on this continent.

The people of the United States must abandon the idea that war is to be a remedy for any abuse or usurpation, or they must recognize the doctrine that it is best, whether right or wrong, constitutional or unconstitutional, if war must come, that it should be between States as organizations, and not under control of partisan leaders merely.

For one half of a century Mexico has furnished us with a sad historical proof of this proposition.

The Southern States in a nervous solicitude to satisfy the people of the North that they intended to remain forever at peace, cut themselves off, by constitutional provisions, from all access to the means of making war or of defending themselves by lawful measures as organized bodies.

If they fight again, it must be with halters around their necks. They have given their pledges, and delivered their hostages to keep the peace. The Northern States have accepted them, but they have given nothing in return to bind them to like conditions.

They are free, and have proved themselves wisely diligent to preserve their State Constitutions and the Federal Constitution free from any provisions that may hamper their future action.

The historian who may hereafter consider this peculiar condition of the States will be astonished to find that a great war, fought, as is claimed, to destroy the treasonable doctrine of secession, should have closed without any apparent impression being left upon the Constitution relating to that subject, while the abolition of slavery, which was claimed not to have been the purpose of the war, but a mere incident of the hostilities—a necessary war measure—was provided for in three solemn amendments. It is for the North to answer on this question. The South was as ready to place a *quietus* upon this question as the North was to demand it. But it was not demanded. Those who hereafter quarrel with the doctrine of

secession must quarrel with the North, where it was first asserted as a right of the States, and not with the Southern States that have surrendered it.

The South is willing to trust the North on this question. Our incomparable physical geography, giving us the world-wide monopoly of the cotton growth, our soil that is capable of sustaining a larger proportionate population than China or India, our inviting climate, our exhaustless minerals, furnish us with every resource of national wealth and power.

We shall not be impoverished if any of the States shall find an association with us in the Federal Union incompatible with their interests or their moral sensibilities and should prefer to go in peace. We shall not wish to withdraw. The sceptre of wealth and power is again within our grasp.

The enfranchisement of the negro has added so materially to our political power that we have ceased to fear that we shall be buffeted about at the will of a despotic majority-power in the country.

Faithful to the Consttution, we will see that it is obeyed in letter and spirit in the South, and so we will consolidate our power, and its impregnable citadel of strength will be in the hearts of our people of all races and conditions.

Those who fear that we will oppress the free negroes, do not understand either our feelings or our interests. Our interest in slavery was never so great as our interest in our slaves. And now that they are free, our concern for their personal welfare is naturally greater than it is for their political promotion. We desire to benefit them practically. We did not enslave them. If their enslavement was a sin, it is not at our door. They were brought to us as slaves, and from a slave country; and chiefly, by Northern slave-dealers.

Few Southern eyes ever witnessed the horrors of the middle passage, and fewer Southern ships ever sailed in the slave-trade.

We have not added a shadow to the darkness of their native barbarism. On the contrary, we have used the code under which they were born; the system of laws adopted instinctively by their rulers, as all systems of unrevealed law have been adopted by all races of men; and we have added to it, in their government, the revealed law which contains statutes adapted to such people. We have thus educated and enlightened them until they compare favorably in actual knowledge with many civilized and christianized peoples; until our own brethren have thought them worthy to be set in authority over the people who have been their only teachers.

We believe that as a body of people they are deficient in the faculties which comprise the power to govern with wisdom and safety, in that highest form of civilized government, the constitutional republic of the

United States; but they can fully enjoy its blessings; and it is to our interest, and in full accordance with our desires, that they should do so. They can participate with safety in the electoral franchise, and when left to the guidance of their own free wills, they will do themselves and the country justice. At all events, we cannot afford to surrender the political power that depends upon their right of suffrage.

These plain statements seem to dispense with further argument as to the grounds of our satisfaction with our present relations to the United States, and of our faith in the future prosperity of the South.

There are still higher grounds upon which we feel that we are justly entitled to repose confidence, and to receive confidence, when we assert our intention to abide by the decisions which were the result of the war.

I refer confidently to the character of the American people, which, after all, is the vital power of the government, and the foundation of every hope of the future. Our government rests on that character, and looks to it, as pledged in oaths of fidelity for the maintenance of justice towards the people and the States.

If oaths are not sufficient to hold a free people to the line of duty, nothing that is consistent with liberty will ever secure this end.

Without confidence and forbearance amongst the people, the government cannot be long maintained.

No country can be so unhappy as that where every man feels that every other man who may oppose him in his political opinions, is a traitor to his country. Sometimes, the people acting under great excitement, seem to be controlled by such thoughts; but the moment a result is obtained, and declared by lawful authority, it is peacefully accepted, and the people assume their wonted friendship.

An illustration was furnished, in the events with which this year began, of the love of the people for their country and its institutions and for each other, rising above their regard for any man or any party, or anything except the written Constitution and the law as declared by legitimate authority, that should shame into silence those who traduce the honor of the people of the country.

In this great matter of the Presidential election, the Democrats of the South and the whole country felt that they had been victimized and betrayed by a false confidence reposed in the most important tribunal which has existed in this country since 1787; and while millions of them believed, and still believe, that its judgment was a mere expression of partisan injustice, yet that judgment stood for law and admitted of no appeal, and they obeyed it. They consented to look to their lawful power to correct it hereafter at the ballot-box, and to provide against its recurrence by additional laws.

It was expected of the people in the South that, through the alliance of Democrats in the North and West, they would seek to avenge them-

selves for the losses and sufferings of the past by dragging the country into civil war.

When we disappointed those to whom "the wish was father to the thought" and refused to make or to suffer war to establish a presidential succession, they taunted us with a want of spirit and decried our boasted chivalry. They should have known that whatever of blood our people have shed, or may have to shed, on questions of controversy with their brethren, is consecrated to the cause of the Constitution of their country.

Neither malice, nor revenge, nor lust of power, nor even any wrong or insult, however grievous, for which the Constitution and laws afford a remedy has caused us, or will ever cause us to open our veins, or theirs, in any controversy with our brethren. But a fatal blow, aimed at that instrument, which no other means can meet or parry, will never find our hearts too weak for resentment, nor our arms too feeble to strike in its defence.

The men who saved the land from bloodshed in 1877, because the Constitution, though in some sense violated, was not broken beyond the reach of a peaceful remedy, are the same who in 1861 attempted to supply the remedy of armed resistance against those who outlawed their rights, and declared them beyond the pale of the Constitution.

Many of these men yet live, and their sons, who were little children in 1861, have taken the places of their heroic dead, with not a vacancy in the ranks to tell that ever one was lost. It is a mistake to suppose that they are numerically weak, or that they are broken in spirit.

Those heroes of a thousand battle-fields, whose very graves are lost beyond the power of recognition, are all replaced with men just such as they were; men who have no higher conceptions of honor and glory than to wish to live or die just such as they were; men who feel that the grave of every Confederate soldier contains the ashes of a patriot whose memory is a sacred legacy—fathers and sons, they are the same men now that they have always been.

These younger men, however, are not amenable to any accusation of treason, except that they had hearts to love their venerable fathers and the cause which they espoused; their brothers, and the country whose bosom was bathed with the outpouring of their blood.

The framers of the Constitution, remembering that its most important principles were born of Anglo-Saxon rebellion against royal power, and that attainder and confiscation had too often been the badges of a noble martyrdom, protected the children of rebels against confiscation and their blood against attainder by positive provisions of the organic law.

How insulting to the spirits of the great men who ordained this Constitution is that unworthy prejudice which would visit upon the children, even then unborn, the penalties which have been denounced against



their fathers. The American people cannot dishonor themselves by the encouragement or toleration of a feeling so unworthy.

These young men have not been taught to hate the Government of the United States, but they have been taught to hold as enemies to their country those who trample upon and spurn its Constitution after having been sworn to defend it.

But few of those remain who had passed the meridian of life in 1861. They are tottering along the steep declivities of life, without purse or scrip, looking hopefully to a future where peace is eternal, and feeling that the work of life has been faithfully accomplished. The honor and reverence bestowed upon them by the people of the South compensates them for the privations and hardships which followed the sacrifices they made of all their wealth and influence to the cause that commanded their homage.

The soldiers of the Confederacy are now, as they have been since 1861, the representative men of the South. Those who would comprehend the people of the South must know them and their children.

When I speak of the soldiers of the Confederacy as representative men, I do not mean that they have sought or received recognition as the official exponents of the opinions of the people. Deference to the opinions of their friends in other sections, and a just regard for the policy that was thought to be the wisest in the restoration of peace, confidence and composure to the country, led them to decline any unavoidable part in the public councils.

Some politicians in the South also demanded that they should take "back seats," and they took them cheerfully, until the people required them to come to the front.

Neither do I exclude from the honorable title of Confederate soldiers the men and women who devoted themselves, through their sympathies, prayers, labors, sacrifices, and sufferings, and gave their property, comfort, and ceaseless toil to the cause of the Confederacy.

The honors of the battle-field won by their soldiers are not a more precious remembrance to the people of the South than the heroic devotion and sufferings of their mothers, sisters, and wives. Whatever may be the judgment of those who yet live amidst the lingering shadows of that great struggle, human nature will never find in the history of all the generations past and to come a higher or more worthy example of patriotism and sacrificial devotion than was furnished us in the conduct of the women of the Confederacy.

Woman cannot espouse, with her soul's deepest and truest devotion, a cause that is not just and honorable. If she doubts the cause in which her husband or son suffers or is lost, her bereavement has no bounds, It is misery without consolation. Philosophy, or religion even, affords no balm for the wounded spirit.

The Confederate cause had a place in the hearts of the women of the South, where no doubt could find a lodgment. When the dearest ties were severed in that cause they suffered the bereavement in silent, uncomplaining grief, feeling sustained by the purest and highest motives, as they bore upon their bleeding hearts a rich sacrifice of love to the altars of their country.

For the same reasons that inspired our soldiers, the wives and mothers of the country were as willing to give their loved ones to their country as they were to die in its service.

When the battle was over, and the faithful and true one was lost to his loved ones at home, the life of the husband and the love of the wife, blended in a sweet incense of free-offering, ascended together to Heaven.

Did not you, my comrades, act worthily, according to your most sincere and solemn sense of duty, when you entered the field to sustain convictions and defend rights which were thus felt and understood by the mothers, wives and daughters of the land?

Was not their honor, their future welfare, their safety against evils which seemed to threaten the sacred things of your home circles the decisive influence which called you to arm for the defence of your country?

Not a selfish thought of personal aggrandizement influenced you, not a doubt disturbed your reflections as to the merits of the controversy that commanded your devotion.

No lingering apprehensions of mistaken duty hung upon your resolution to impede your progress, or to cause you to falter in your course.

Under the guide of your own convictions, after having reflected maturely and voted with unconstrained freedom, you felt that the ballot-box could not protect your rights, and you grasped your musket.

You stood on the defensive, feeling that you had no responsibilities then, or in the past, for the spirit of aggression which had set itself to the abolishing of slavery. This you believed would overwhelm the South with ruin, degrade it to a political vassalage, deprave it to a social position which you could not contemplate without abhorrence.

When they left their homes to join the army, whether their feet pressed for the last time the marble threshold of palace or the rude door-sill of a log cabin, the soldiers of the Confederacy went forth with equal alacrity. Their purposes, hopes, and resolves were the same. Their cause was one, and without any distinctions or jealousies they united in its defence; poured out their blood in a common libation beneath its banners; fell side by side; their ashes mingle in undistinguishable brotherhood, and their fame is one common legacy to their country.

No more unjust or disparaging misrepresentation was ever made than that which imputed to the non-slaveholders, or the poor man of the

South, reluctance in fighting its battles. It was the base suggestion of cowardly demagogues, who avoided the fields where Confederate laurels were being won, and sought to stop the war before public opinion would compel them to fight.

They hoped to influence the people of the States to withdraw their armies, and cared not though they should leave the men abandoned on the fields who were winning honors for the South that more than compensated all their sufferings.

This false accusation maligns the true people of the South. It perverts that living truth, which shines like a star in the night of error, that the Southern soldier took up arms for no other motive and for no other inducement than to defend a country that he loved, and a cause that commanded the unbought allegiance of his heart.

No men have ever exhibited, in their faithful service and fortitude, a higher degree of proof that their hearts were in a cause than those who were called the "poor men of the South." They were in no respect poor, though by comparison with others they were not rich in the things which save men from honest toil.

In spirit, independence, honest self-appreciation, in their lineage, and in proud exaltation of sentiment they had riches, inherited from their fathers, which the people of America have valued as above all price.

In the heraldry of their lineage, the wars of the Revolution, the war of 1812, and the war with Mexico are inscribed as the events which sealed the patents of their nobility.

I am proud, my countrymen, to adopt for you that title—"the poor men of the South"—which, though applied by those who knew you not as a badge of your inferiority and poverty of spirit, is yet the highest proof that your "glory which the world cannot take away" was earned in a struggle that involved honor, justice and liberty only, and in which you had neither gold nor slaves to protect, to gain, or to lose.

Could your traducers have seen you when you left your homes, and when you returned after the war, they would scarcely believe that you had been compelled to take up arms by a power you could not resist.

When you left your humble but loved homes, where virtue and contentment had made your lives so happy, your sinking, saddened heart was lifted up and your soul was strengthened when you saw the stars of hope glittering in the tears that were shed by your wife as she gave you to God and your country, as they had given you to her. Her clinging arms almost refused to yield you to the battle's fury, but she would not ask you to stay. The familiar fields where you had toiled in peace through many years and the sentinel forests standing around were the last witnesses of your grief at the parting.

When the lord of the log cabin had passed beyond the view of the lonely watchers at its door a brief prayer was uttered, a quaint musical voice sang the old hymn of faith,

“How firm a foundation ye saints of the Lord,”

and with a deft and busy hand, and a fortitude worthy of an honest mother's faith in God, she turned to her homely duties, and your house was set in order for the war. It would be a sad thought that language cannot convey a just idea of the beauty and excellence of character manifested by these silent, suffering, toiling, trusting, faithful women, if it were not that the great story is reserved for that day when Heaven shall reveal it in its fullness as the fairest chapter in the history of mankind.

The greatest of your trials was to remain in the army, far away from your homes, when you knew that hunger, sickness, and distress in almost every form, were invading them. At long intervals the travel worn letters from home would reach you in the distant camp. In plaintive but uncomplaining narrative your almost martyr wife would tell you how the cattle had been impressed; the horse had been taken from the plow by raiders; the corn had been nearly consumed, and of meat there was none; the children were languishing in sickness, and medicines had even been declared contraband of war; that as she toiled in the hot field by day, and spun by the pine torch at night, rumors would often come that brought the pangs of widowhood and orphanage to the little circle at home; but, thanking God that this calamity had been spared them, she closed with prayer that you might return, a free and independent man, to a country worthy of your citizenship, and to a family proud of your achievements.

Your devotion under such circumstances, which are but a mere glimpse of the trials you endured for years, ought to convince every honorable man that a government which lays a just claim to your allegiance, by securing your rights under its Constitution, will receive in return the most faithful support.

Your children, reared amidst such hardships, became sadly wise and self-reliant. In facing dangers that might well have appalled the stoutest men, they came to be familiar with them in childhood. They have listened to the fireside traditions of the war from night to night, as related by their fathers and mothers, and weaving them into the woof of their own experiences they understand the war in all its vast and sanguinary history. Not once have they doubted that their fathers fought in a just cause. Not a word of reproach against the Confederate States, its army or its leaders, have they ever heard uttered by any sufferer who fought for its cause.

They are men now, and comprise with yourselves, the essential power of the South.

No sting of dishonor, no shame for past delinquencies of duty, no sense of humiliation in the presence of those who were victorious in the war, makes you or them reluctant to meet our former enemies face to face in frank, open, manly and honest agreement for the future.

You demand no guarantees except obedience to the Constitution, and you offer none but these.

Such an element of population is worthy of the confidence, respect and proud regard of any nation.

The country cannot afford to hold these people in a state of dishonorable subjection. Granting that they would long remain in such subserviency, the loss of power for good, and the increase of power for evil, would so deeply affect the confidence of the people in the future of the Government, that it would soon cost the country more billions of dollars to balance the material losses occasioned by such folly, than it has cost to bring them to that condition.

This imperfect view of the facts, opinions, convictions and sentiments of the people of the South, on which they claim the respect and confidence of the people of the entire country, ought to be sufficient to quiet the apprehensions of such as are least willing to extend to us the fraternal hand of reconciliation.

Men who are not true to themselves are not to be trusted to keep their covenants with others.

No man can be trusted as the guardian of his own rights or of the rights of others who is incapable of feeling a wrong, and unwilling to redress it.

But we turn with confidence to a still higher plane on which Americans can meet and unite in making the future of our country as happy, as the past has been unhappy. All causes of sectional strife are removed. There remains no justifiable excuse for longer indulgence in the bitter recollections of the past. Neither section has cause to feel humiliated in association with the other. Any nation would feel proud to welcome the States of the South or of the North into fellowship or alliance. Why should we grudgingly or with reluctance consent to such honorable association? It is certain that prosperity cannot result from longer contention; peace cannot hold its happy sway while discord reigns in the hearts of the people. There are none, not even the most virulent enemies of peace and restoration, who would willingly protract the era of strife and dissension forever. Once in power even they would turn with honeyed words of brotherly love to their late victims and bid them, in the name of the God of peace, to arise and be enfolded in their broad and tranquil bosoms.

There can be no motive to delay the return of the American people to the cordial relations, and to the pure love of a common country which

prevailed in the beginning of the century, save only to gratify a partisan desire to help those men to high positions who have been the chief barrier to the drawing together of the people.

If their friends think them worthy of reward, even as the enemies of peace, how much more ought they to rejoice to reward them as the magnanimous friends of a reconciled and happy country.

The American people, moved by an impulse of mutual affection long restrained by unworthy resentments, have, at a single step, risen to the height of their former glory. "A union of hearts and a union of hands" has made them again one people.

In the beginning and in the end, before the war and since the war, the vital question was whether the Constitution, with its guarantees to the States of the right local self-government, could be preserved during the tempest that swept the institution of slavery from this continent.

It was long submerged beneath the billows of anarchy and despotism, but at last they have subsided, revealing the old rock of the Constitution standing secure and firm on its eternal foundations.

Gathered upon this rock, with honor untarnished, spirit undismayed, their souls elate with noble aspirations and aflame with love of country, the soldiers and people of the Confederate States are at home again, welcomed to the honored abode of their fathers by the heroes who fought them in war, honored them in victory, and love them in peace.

General Morgan was frequently interrupted with rapturous applause, and the thanks of the Society were warmly voted to the orator for his "able and eloquent address," and a copy requested for publication.

General Early paid a brief but touchingly-appropriate tribute to the memory of Admiral Raphael Semmes, late Vice-President of the Society for the State of Alabama, and, on motion of General Dabney H. Maury, the following minute was unanimously adopted:

The death of Admiral Raphael Semmes, the Vice-President of this Society for the State of Alabama, having occurred since the last annual meeting, the Society takes this occasion to express its high admiration for the exalted character, eminent abilities, and distinguished services of the deceased, and its profound regret for the loss the Society has sustained in his death; which is ordered to be entered on the Journal.

General D. H. Maury then read the following as the

**Fifth Annual Report of the Executive Committee of the Southern Historical Society, for Year Ending October 31st, 1877.**

The Executive Committee have to report that during the past year they have endeavored to keep in view the great objects of the trust committed to their charge; that they have steadily worked for the interests of the Society amid some peculiar difficulties, and that there has been most gratifying progress in our important work. The acknowledgments we have made from time to time attest that the kind interest of our friends has steadily added to our

MATERIAL FOR A TRUE HISTORY OF THE WAR,

until we have now a collection which is widely recognized as one of priceless value. The Secretary has received from all parts of this country and from Europe numbers of letters seeking information concerning events of the war, and in almost every instance he has been able to furnish from our archives the information sought. We have given to a number of writers facts, narratives, &c., to aid them in elucidating the truth of our Confederate history, and we have the most gratifying assurances that our publications are looked to as *high* authority, not only in the South, but also at the North and in Europe.

Our friends have given us with cheerful alacrity material which could readily be sold for thousands of dollars, but which is of *inestimable* value to the cause of truth; and yet there remains in private hands much that ought to be on our shelves.

PUBLICATIONS.

Our monthly has received the heartiest commendation from the press generally, and warm endorsement from leading Confederates, while we number among our constant readers some of the most distinguished Federal soldiers and some of the ablest military critics in Europe.

As to the *character* of our publications we have steadily pursued the policy announced in our last annual report, and unanimously approved by our last annual meeting; and we are gratified to

know that this policy meets with the well nigh universal approval of our friends.

We have now on hand copies of the first three volumes of our *Papers* handsomely bound; (the fourth volume will be ready 1st of January, next,) besides our "Confederate View of the Treatment of Prisoners," which we beg our friends to help us to circulate, and especially to place in every public library in the country.

We have reason to congratulate ourselves that, in spite of the unfavorable year we have had for the conduct of such an enterprise, we have been enabled to maintain our list of subscribers at about what it was twelve months ago, and that we have bright prospects for a large increase during the coming year; and we are satisfied that we only need efficient canvassers to swell our list of members and subscribers several thousand, within a short time.

#### CONFEDERATE ARCHIVES AT WASHINGTON.

In our last annual report we gave an account of our unsuccessful efforts to gain access to the Confederate archives in charge of the War Department at Washington.

In January last the Department reopened the correspondence with us, and seemed anxious to secure such documents as they need to complete their files. We reiterated our desire to give them the freest access to our archives, and to furnish them copies of anything they might desire, provided they would reciprocate; but, as they declined to allow us access to the "Archive Bureau," to give us in exchange any copies of documents, or to allow us anything in return, save the doubtful advantage of *advance* sheets of the publication they propose to make, *when they shall be ready for the press*, we could not see that we would be justified in acceding to their proposition.

We call the earnest attention of the Society to this matter, and hope that such action will be taken as will induce all fair-minded men to oppose appropriating public funds to publishing the "Official History of the War" until the Department adopts such rules as will allow citizens of every section free and equal opportunity of inspecting and verifying the *originals* of documents which it is proposed to publish.



## FINANCES.

With the exception of the liberal donation of W. W. Corcoran, Esq., who, last November, added \$500 to his donation of the year before, the Committee has been dependent for the means of carrying on its work upon membership fees and subscriptions to our *Papers*.

The following summary will exhibit our receipts and disbursements, from November 1st, 1876, to October 30th, 1877:

## RECEIPTS.

Membership fees, subscriptions, and advertisements.....	4,244 45
Donation of W. W. Corcoran, Esq.....	500 00
Total receipts.....	<u>\$4,744 45</u>
Balance in treasury, as per last report.....	51 94
Total funds.....	<u>\$4,796 39</u>

## DISBURSEMENTS.

Paid on account of printing, stereotyping, and binding.....	2,584 43
Commissions to agents.....	646 32
Salary of Secretary.....	816 85
Pay of clerk, stationery, and miscellaneous office expenses.....	365 89
Postage, express, and telegrams.....	382 90
Total disbursements.....	<u>\$4,796 39</u>

We have liabilities on account of printing and binding amounting to \$2,100.

To liquidate this amount, we have the following assets:

Back Nos. of our Papers to make 2,000 volumes.....	4,000 00
1,500 copies "Treatment of Prisoners".....	1,500 00
Due us by agents.....	800 00
Renewal fees and subscriptions now due.....	300 00
Due from advertisers.....	175 90
Total.....	<u>\$6,775 00</u>

There will be due us on the 1st of January next, for renewal fees and subscriptions, \$3,600.

We have so far reduced our expenses, that if our receipts are as large next year as they have been during the past year, (and we have great reason to hope that they will be much larger), we will have no difficulty in meeting all of our expenses.

But we are in pressing need of means to enable us to adequately prosecute our great work, and we know not how a lover of the truth of history can better employ funds than by contributing them to the use of the Southern Historical Society.

In conclusion, we would express our growing sense of the importance of collecting *now*, the material for a true history of our great struggle for Constitutional freedom, and we earnestly appeal to all who can add *anything* of value to our collection, to do so *at once*.

By order of the Executive Committee.

DABNEY H. MAURY, *Chairman.*

J. WM. JONES, *Secretary.*

The report was unanimously adopted.

The President then announced the selection of General E. W. Pettus, of Selma, as Vice-President for Alabama; and Col. Thos. H. Carter, of King William county, Va., formerly Chief of Artillery of Rodes' Division, A. N. V., as a member of the Executive Committee to fill a vacancy.

**Leading Confederates on the Battle of Gettysburg.**

We continue to give papers bearing on this great battle written by men who participated in it.

A few of our readers may weary of the discussion, but we have assurances from every quarter that this series is of deep interest, and of the highest historic value.

We take pleasure in giving the following from a gallant soldier who led gallant troops from the gallant "Old North State":

**Letter from General James H. Lane.**

VIRGINIA AGRICULTURAL AND MECHANICAL COLLEGE,  
BLACKSBURG, *October 20, 1877.*

*Rev. J. W. M. JONES, Secretary Southern Historical Society,  
Richmond, Va.:*

MY DEAR SIR: As great injustice has been done my gallant old brigade of North Carolinians in all the published accounts of the battle of Gettysburg that I have seen, and as you are now publishing in the *Southern Historical Society Papers* the brigade-reports of that great battle, I hope you will also publish mine, which I herewith enclose. I am sure the *public* will consider this *official* paper, written about a month after the battle, a more valuable *historical* document than the many recent articles written from *memory*, which is at all times *treacherous*, and, as every Confederate soldier knows, particularly so as regards the incidents, &c., of our heroic struggle for independence. For instance, General Heth, in his letter in the October No., 1877, of the *Southern Historical Society Papers*, in speaking of the fight of *the 3d of July* at Gettysburg, makes General Lee say, "I shall ever believe if General Pender had remained on his horse half an hour longer we would have carried the enemy's position," when the facts are, General Pender was mortally wounded on the right of his line by an artillery shot on the afternoon of *the 2d of July*, and was taken to the rear, where he was on the 3d of July, and could not even mount his horse. Surely General Heth could not have read the report of General A. P. Hill in the November No., 1876, of the *Southern Historical Society Papers*, in which he says: "On the morning of the 3d the divisions of my corps occupied the same positions as on the 2d. \* \* \* \* I was directed to hold my line with Anderson's division and the half of Pender's, now commanded by Gen. Lane, and to order Heth's division, commanded by Pettigrew, and Lane's and Scales' brigades, of Pender's division, to report to Lieutenant-General Longstreet, as a support to his

corps in the assault on the enemy's lines." It is also evident that Gen. Heth had not read the report of General Lee, which appeared in the July No., 1876, of the *Southern Historical Society Papers*, in which he says, in speaking of the fight on the 2d of July: "General Ewell had directed General Rodes to attack in concert with Early, covering his right, and had requested Brigadier-General Lane, then commanding Pender's division, to co-operate on the right of Rodes. \* \* \* \* General Lane was prepared to give the assistance required of him, and so informed General Rodes; but the latter deemed it useless to advance after the failure of Early's attack." And further: "In this engagement our loss in men and officers was large. Major-Generals Hood and Pender, Brigadier-Generals Jones, Semmes, G. T. Anderson, and Barksdale, and Col. Avery (commanding Hoke's brigade) were wounded, the last two mortally. Generals Pender and Semmes died after their removal to Virginia."

In his "Memorandum" (August No., 1877, of the *Southern Historical Society Papers*), Colonel Walter H. Taylor, in speaking of the fight on the 3d of July, says: "Had Hood and McLaws followed or supported Pickett, and Pettigrew and Anderson have been advanced, the design of the Commanding-General would have been carried out—the world would not be so at a loss to understand *what was designed* by throwing forward, unsupported, against the enemy's stronghold, so small a portion of the army." Now I happen to know, as one who had his horse shot under him in that celebrated charge, by the enemy which flanked us on the left, that Pettigrew, with his wounded hand in a sling, did advance Heth's division, and that very gallantly. After such a declaration, strange to say, Col. Taylor, in his "second paper" (September No., 1877, of the *Southern Historical Society Papers*), admits that Pettigrew advanced on the left of Pickett, and that he witnessed it. I suppose he was at the time on the left of the assaulting column with General Lee, who, he states, "finally took position about the Confederate centre, on an elevated point, from which he could survey the field and watch the result of the movement." The Colonel states further, that from that position *to the left*, "to one who observed the charge, it *appeared* that Pettigrew's line was not a continuation of that of Pickett's, but that it advanced in *echelon*." Further on he adds: "The assaulting column really consisted of Pickett's division—two brigades in front, and one in the second line as a support, with the brigade of Wilcox in the rear of its right to protect that flank; while Heth's division moved forward on Pickett's left in *echelon*, or with the alignment so imperfect and *so drooping on the left* as to appear in *echelon*, with Lane's and Scales' brigades in rear of its right." This statement does great injustice to Heth's division, under Pettigrew, as the line was neither drooping nor did it move in *echelon*. Colonel Taylor seems not

to have been aware, or to have forgotten that the assaulting column was not formed parallel to the enemy's position, but decidedly *oblique* to it; according to General Trimble, "Pickett being about three-fourths of a mile and Pettigrew one mile and a quarter from the enemy's line." From Colonel Taylor's position, then, to the *left*, the *apparent drooping* of Pettigrew's line and its *apparent echelon* advance must, I think, have been the result of his *right-oblique view* of the charge.

Colonel Taylor is again at fault when he says "the charge was made down a gentle slope, and then up to the enemy's lines, a distance of over half a mile, denuded of forests, and in full sight of the enemy and perfect range of their artillery. These combined causes produced their natural effect upon Pettigrew's division and the brigades supporting it—caused them to falter, and finally retire. Then Pickett's division, continuing the charge, without supports and in sight of the enemy, was not half so formidable or effective as it would have been had trees or hills prevented the enemy from so correctly estimating the strength of the attacking column, and our own troops from experiencing that sense of weakness which the known absence of support necessarily produced. In spite of all this it steadily and gallantly advanced to its allotted task." Why "*to falter and finally retire*," from the causes enumerated, should have been the "*natural effect*" upon Heth's division, under the noble and gallant Pettigrew, and Lane's and Scales' brigades, under that old hero Trimble, who lost a leg in the charge, and not upon Pickett's command, is something that I cannot comprehend. I *know*, however, *personally*, that my old brigade, in all its glorious achievements, never behaved more gallantly than on that terrible and bloody battle-field. As General Trimble says, "the truth is, Pickett's, Pettigrew's, and Trimble's divisions were literally shot to pieces, and the small remnants who broke the first Federal line were too feeble to hold what they had gained," and as he also adds, from *close personal observation*, "notwithstanding the losses as we advanced, the men (in Lane's and Scales' brigades) marched with the deliberation and accuracy of men on drill." In that much-talked-of and generally misunderstood charge, my brigade were as much the "heroes of Gettysburg" as *any other* troops that took part in it, and when we were driven back we were among the *first* to re-form, and we did so immediately in rear of the artillery, and not at the hospitals.

Yours, very respectfully,

JAMES H. LANE.

**Official Report of General Lane.**

HEADQUARTER'S LANE'S BRIGADE,  
*August 13, 1863.*

MAJOR: I have the honor to report that on the morning of the 1st July, we moved from South Mountain, Pennsylvania, through Cashtown in the direction of Gettysburg, and formed line of battle in rear of the left of Heth's division, about three miles from the latter place to the left of the turnpike, in the following order: Seventh, Thirty-seventh, Twenty-eighth, Eighteenth, and Thirty-third North Carolina regiments—the right of the Seventh resting on the road. After marching nearly a mile in line of battle, we were ordered to the right of the road, and formed on the extreme right of the Light division. Here I ordered the Seventh regiment to deploy as a strong line of skirmishers some distance to my right and at right angles to our line of battle, to protect our flank, which was exposed to the enemy's cavalry; Pettigrew's and Archer's brigades were in the first line immediately in our front. We were soon ordered forward again after taking this position, the Seventh being instructed to move as skirmishers by the left flank. In advancing we gained ground to the right, and on emerging from the woods in which Pettigrew's brigade had been formed, I found that my line had passed Archer's, and that my entire front was unmasked. We then moved about a mile, and as the Seventh regiment had been detained a short time, Colonel Barbour threw out forty men under Captain Hudson, to keep back some of the enemy's cavalry which had dismounted, and were annoying us with an enfilade fire. We moved across this open field at quick time, until a body of the enemy's cavalry and a few infantry opened upon us from the woods, subsequently occupied by Pegram's battalion of artillery, when the men gave a yell and rushed forward at a double-quick—the whole of the enemy's force beating a hasty retreat to Cemetery Hill. My right now extended into the woods referred to, and my left was a short distance from the Fairfield road. On passing beyond the stone fence and into the peach orchard near McMillan's house, I was ordered by General Pender not to advance further unless there was another general forward movement. As I could see nothing at that time to indicate such

a movement, and as one of the enemy's batteries on Cemetery Hill was doing us some damage, I ordered the brigade back a few yards that the left might take shelter behind the stone fence. We remained in this position that night, and next day, before the heavy artillery-firing commenced, I ordered the Thirty-third and Eighteenth regiments to the left of Colonel Garnett's battalion of artillery, that they might be better sheltered, and at the same time be out of the enemy's line of fire. In the afternoon I was ordered by General Pender to take possession of the road in my front with my skirmishers, if possible. Fresh men were thrown forward, and the whole, under Major O. N. Brown, of the Thirty-seventh, executed the order very handsomely, driving the enemy's skirmishers and occupying the road along our entire front. With the exception of the gallantry displayed by our skirmishers, nothing of interest occurred in my command on the second day.

After a portion of the army on our right (I suppose they were some of Anderson's troops,) had driven the enemy some distance, General Pender rode from the left of my line to the right of his division. About sunset I was informed by Captain Norwood, of General Thomas' staff, that General Pender had been wounded, and that I must take command of the division and advance, if I saw a good opportunity for doing so. At that time the firing on the right was very desultory—the heavy fighting having ended.

I was soon afterwards informed by Major Whiting, of General Rodes' staff, that General Rodes would advance at dark, and that he wished me to protect his flank. I did not give him a definite answer then as I had sent you to notify General Hill of General Pender's fall, and to receive instructions. On being notified, however, by General Ewell, that his whole command would move on the enemy's position that night, commencing with Johnson's division on the left, I told Major Whiting that I would act without awaiting instructions from General Hill. I at once ordered forward Thomas' brigade and McGowan's, (then commanded by Col. Perrin,) to form an obtuse angle with Ramseur's brigade, which was the right of Rodes' first line, leaving an interval of one hundred paces. I, at the same time, determined to support these two brigades with Scales' and my own, commanded respectively by Colonels Lowrance and Avery, should there be any occasion for it. I subsequently received orders from General Hill, through Capt.

Starke, corresponding with what I had already done. Rodes' right advanced but a short distance beyond the road which was held by my skirmishers, when the night attack was abandoned, and Rodes' front line occupied the road—Thomas and Perrin extending the same with their commands, the right of Thomas' brigade resting a short distance from an orchard near a brick dwelling and barn.

Next morning the skirmishing was very heavy in front of Thomas and Perrin, requiring, at times, whole regiments to be deployed to resist the enemy and drive them back, which was always most gallantly done. While this was going on, I was ordered by General Hill, through Captain Hill, to move in person to the right with the two brigades forming my second line, and to "*report to General Longstreet as a support to Pettigrew.*" General Longstreet ordered me to form in rear of the right of Heth's division, commanded by General Pettigrew. Soon after I had executed this order, putting Lowrance on the right, I was relieved of the command of the division by Major-General Trimble, who acted under the same orders that I had received. Heth's division was much larger than Lowrance's brigade and my own, which were its only support, and there was consequently no second line in rear of its left.

Now, in command of my brigade, I moved forward to the support of Pettigrew's right, through the woods in which our batteries were planted, and through an open field about a mile in full view of the enemy's fortified position, and under a murderous artillery and infantry fire. As soon as Pettigrew's command gave back, Lowrance's brigade and my own, without ever having halted, took position on the left of the troops which were still contesting the ground with the enemy. My command never moved forward more handsomely. The men reserved their fire in accordance with orders, until within good range of the enemy, and then opened with telling effect, repeatedly driving the cannoneers from their pieces—completely silencing the guns in our immediate front, and breaking the line of infantry which was formed on the crest of the hill. We advanced to within a few yards of the stone wall, exposed all the while to a heavy raking artillery fire from the right. My left was here very much exposed, and a column of infantry was thrown forward in that direction, which enfiladed my



whole line. This forced me to withdraw my brigade—the troops on my right having already done so. We fell back as well as could be expected, reformed immediately in rear of the artillery, as directed by General Trimble, and remained there until the following morning.

I cannot speak too highly of my brigade in this bloody engagement. Both officers and men moved forward with a heroism unsurpassed, giving the brigade-inspector and his rear guard nothing to do. Our great loss tells but too sadly of the gallant bearing of my command—six hundred and sixty (660) out of an effective total of thirteen hundred and fifty-five, (1,355) including ambulance corps and rear guard—our loss on the 1st and 2nd being but slight.\*

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\* General Trimble writes as follows of the third day's fight:

“On the morning of the 3d I had been put in command, by order of General Lee, of two of the brigades of General Pender, who had been wounded. These were both of North Carolina troops, commanded by J. H. Lane and Alfred M. Scales. On taking command of these troops, entire strangers to me, and wishing as far as I could to inspire them with confidence, I addressed them briefly—ordered that no gun should be fired until the enemy's line was broken, and that I should advance with them to the farthest point.

“When the charge commenced, about 3 P. M., I followed Pettigrew (Heth's division), about one hundred and fifty yards in rear—a sufficient distance to prevent the adverse fire raking both ranks as we marched down the slope. Notwithstanding the losses as we advanced, the men marched with the deliberation and accuracy of men on drill. I observed the same in Pettigrew's line. When the latter was within one hundred, or one hundred and fifty yards from the Emmettsburg road, they seemed to sink into the earth under the tempest of fire poured into them. We passed over the remnant of their line, and immediately after some one close by my left sung out, ‘Three cheers for the Old North State,’ when both brigades sent up a hearty shout, on which I said to my aid, ‘Charley, I believe those fine fellows are going into the enemy's line.’

“They did get to the road, and drove the opposing line from it. They continued there some minutes, discharging their pieces at the enemy. The loss here was fearful, and I knew that no troops could long endure it. I was anxious to know how things went on with the troops on our right, and taking a quick but deliberate view of the field over which Pickett had advanced, I perceived that the enemy's fire seemed to slacken there, and men in squads were falling back on the west side of the Emmettsburg road. By this I inferred that Pickett's division had been repulsed, and, if so, that it would be a useless sacrifice of life to continue the contest. I therefore did not attempt to rally the men who begun to give back from the fence.

“As I followed the retiring line, on horseback at a walk, to the crest of Seminary Ridge, under the increasing discharge of grape, shell, and musketry, I had cause to wonder how ANY ONE could escape wounds or death.

“On reaching the summit of the ridge, I found the men had fallen into line behind some rude defences. I said, ‘That is right, my brave fellows; stand your ground, and we will presently serve these chaps as they have us.’ For, by all the rules of warfare, the Federal troops should (as I expected they would) have marched against our shattered columns, and sought to cover our army with an overwhelming defeat.”

General Trimble being wounded, I was again thrown in command of the division, and with Lowrance's brigade and my own, under command of Colonel Avery, moved back to the rear of Thomas and Perrin on the 4th. There was skirmishing at intervals that day, and at dark we commenced falling back in the direction of Fairfield, Captain W. T. Nicholson, of the Thirty-seventh, being left in command of the skirmishers from my brigade.

We formed line of battle at Hagerstown, Md., on the 11th, and threw up breastworks along our entire front. Next day the Light division was consolidated with Heth's, and the whole being put under the command of General Heth, I again returned to the command of my brigade.

On the 13th we had one man killed in the works, and had twenty-seven (27) skirmishers captured. The skirmishers were taken by a body of the enemy that advanced from a point of woods under cover of stone fences and an orchard.

The retreat from Hagerstown the night of the 13th was even worse than that from Gettysburg. My whole command was so exhausted that they all fell asleep as soon as they were halted, about a mile from the pontoon bridge at Falling Waters. Just as we were ordered to resume our march, the troops of Heth's division that occupied the breastworks in our rear as a rear-guard were attacked by the enemy's cavalry. I at once ordered my command to fix bayonets, as our guns were generally unloaded, and moved down the road after General Thomas, but was soon halted by General Heth's order, and subsequently made to take position in line of battle, to allow those brigades that were engaged to withdraw. I threw out a very strong line of skirmishers along our whole front, under Lieutenant Crowell of the Twenty-eighth, with instructions not to fire until the enemy got close upon him, and to fall back gradually when he saw the main line retiring towards the river. The Eighteenth regiment, under Col. Barry, was deployed to the right as skirmishers, and Colonel Avery had supervision of the right wing, so as to enable me to be apprised of the movements of the enemy more readily. As soon as the other brigades withdrew a large force moved to our right, and as our left was threatened, I lost no time in falling back, which was done in excellent order.

Our thanks are due to Lieutenant Crowell, and the officers and men under him, for the stubbornness with which they contested

every inch of ground against the enemy's mounted and dismounted cavalry, thereby enabling us to effect a crossing without the brigade's being engaged. Lieutenant Crowell's command was the last organized body to cross the bridge.

Our loss in bringing up the rear was six (6) wounded and thirty-eight (38) missing. Our entire loss in the "trans-Potomac" campaign was seven hundred and thirty-one (731).

Colonel Avery, of the Thirty-third, who continued at his post after he had been bruised by a shell, refrains from making special allusion to any one of his command, as they all gallantly discharged their duties.

Colonel Barbour, of the Thirty-seventh, refers to his heavy loss as sufficient evidence of the gallantry of his command. The loss of such officers as Lieutenants Doherty, Royster, Jno. P. Elms, and W. N. Michle, who nobly discharged their duties, will be seriously felt.

Colonel Barry, of the Eighteenth, is proud of his command, which acted throughout the campaign in a manner satisfactory to him and creditable to themselves.

Colonel Lowe, of the Twenty-eighth, was wounded and had to leave, but Lieutenant-Colonel Speer speaks in high terms of the bravery of his officers and men during the whole of that desperate and hard-fought battle. He alludes to Adjutant R. S. Folger as having acted with great gallantry throughout the engagements, and also to Captains Linebarger, Morrow, Randle and Smith, and Lieutenant Thompson, who were wounded while gallantly leading their companies to the charge.

Captain Turner, commanding the Seventh, was wounded in front of his command, while gallantly leading it forward, and was left on the field. Captain Harris then assumed command, and is well pleased with the gallant bearing of the old Seventh, which was surpassed by none.

My aid, Lieutenant Oscar Lane, and my two couriers, Geo. E. Barringer and A. R. Joyce, privates from the Twenty-eighth, were very efficient, both on the march and in action, and again bore themselves well under fire.

Respectfully,

JAMES H. LANE, *Brig.-General.*

*Major* JOS. A. ENGELHARD,

*Assist.-Adjutant-General Pender's Light Division.*

**Letter from Colonel J. B. Walton.**

NEW ORLEANS, *October 15th*, 1877.

Rev. J. WM. JONES, D. D.,

*Secretary Southern Historical Society, Richmond, Va.:*

DEAR SIR: My attention has been directed to the letter of Col. E. P. Alexander, of date of 17th March, 1877, on the subject of "Causes of Confederate Defeat at Gettysburg," published in the September No. of *Southern Historical Society Papers*, in which occurs the following statement by Colonel Alexander: "My rank and position during that campaign was colonel of artillery, commanding a battalion of six batteries attached as reserve to Longstreet's corps; and on the field at Gettysburg, I was placed by Gen. Longstreet in command of all his artillery on the field, as chief of artillery for the action."

I am at a loss to comprehend how it could be stated by Colonel Alexander that he was "placed by General Longstreet in command of all his artillery on the field as chief of artillery for the action" at Gettysburg, for I had been for more than a year before, was during the battle and after the battle of Gettysburg, Chief of Artillery of the First Army Corps, under Lieutenant-General Longstreet, and caused all the batteries in the grand bombardment of the 3d July to be placed in position from right to left, placing the Washington Artillery, under Major Eshleman, in the centre as nearly as could be. During the entire engagement I was present in person on the field, directing and superintending the batteries in action. Colonel Alexander commanded one of the battalions, composed of six batteries of the First corps; all the artillery of that corps being under my command, as chief of artillery, commanding.

On the 20th June, 1862, General Order No. 28, right wing Army Northern Virginia, I was announced as follows:

Colonel J. B. Walton, of the battalion Washington Artillery, having reported for duty with this command, he is announced as Chief of Artillery. He will be obeyed and respected accordingly.

By command of Major-General Longstreet.

G. M. SORREL,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

And on the 15th August, 1862, the following order was published to battery commanders:

HEADQUARTERS, TAYLOR'S HOUSE,  
NEAR GORDONSVILLE, August 15th, 1862.

*General Order No. 32.*

II. Colonel J. B. Walton, of the battalion Washington Artillery, is announced as Chief of Artillery of this command, and will be obeyed and respected accordingly.

III. Battery commanders will report to him without delay, to be disposed of in such camp or camps as may be selected; making their regular reports to him, for consolidation and transmission to this office.

\* \* \* \* \*

By command of Major-General Longstreet.

G. M. SORREL,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

*To Colonel J. B. WALTON, Commanding, &c.*

And on the 4th June, 1863 (one month before the battle of Gettysburg), after the artillery of the Army of Northern Virginia had been reorganized by battalions and assigned to the three corps of the army, General Lee announced the appointments of commanders of the artillery of the several corps as follows:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT NORTHERN VIRGINIA,  
June 4th, 1863.

*Extract Special Order No. 151.*

In accordance with the recommendation of the Chief of Artillery, made under par. II of General Order No. 69, current series, from these headquarters, the following-named officers are assigned to the command of the artillery under the recent organization: Colonel J. B. Walton, of the First corps; Colonel V. Crutchfield, of the Second corps; Colonel R. L. Walker, of the Third corps.

By command of General Lee.

W. H. TAYLOR,  
*Assistant-Adjutant General.*

*To Colonel J. B. WALTON.*

On the 23d June, 1863, General Longstreet directed to "Col. J. B. Walton, Chief of Artillery First corps, commanding," the following, as the order of march for Hagerstown *via* Berryville:

- 1st. Pickett's division.
- 2d. Walton's *Reserve* Artillery (Alexander and Washington Artillery).

3d. Hood's division.

4th. McLaws' division.

During the march to Hagerstown, Md., and thence to Gettysburg, all orders from General Lee or General Longstreet were communicated to me officially as Chief of Artillery, First corps.

On the night of the 30th June, I encamped near Greenwood, on the road to Gettysburg, with the two battalions composing the reserve artillery of the artillery of the First corps of the army—Alexander's battalion and the Washington Artillery. It had rained all day in torrents, greatly impeding our progress, and in consequence, the two battalions were not as well advanced as they otherwise would have been. We remained halted at Greenwood all day of the first of July.

At about ten o'clock at night, July 1st, a courier came to my camp and delivered to me the following, from General Longstreet's headquarters:

HEADQUARTERS, NEAR GETTYSBURG, PA.,  
*July 1st, 5:30 P. M., 1863.*

COLONEL: The Commanding-General desires you to come on to-night as far as you can, without distressing your men and animals. Ewell and Hill have sharply engaged the enemy to-day, and you will be wanted for to-morrow's battle. The action to-day has been vigorous and successful. The enemy was driven two or three miles and out of Gettysburg, without hesitation. General Rodes now occupies the town. The enemy's loss in prisoners and casualties considerable—ours light. Major-General Heth wounded, not dangerously.

I am, very respectfully,  
G. M. SORREL, *Assist.-Adjt.-General.*

*To Colonel J. B. WALTON,  
Chief Artillery, Commanding.*

The following is Adjutant W. M. Owen's statement of what was done from the moment of the receipt of the note above recited until the two battalions reported on the field on the morning of the 2d July:

I carried the order to Colonel Alexander, commanding one of the battalions of artillery attached to the reserve, (all under Col. Walton, chief of artillery,) at about 10:30 to 11 o'clock, at night. At 12 o'clock Alexander's battalion and the Washington Artillery were stretched out on the road to Gettysburg. A long delay then occurred in starting, on account of an immense wagon-train pass-

ing, said to belong to Johnson's division. At 2:30 A. M., July 2d, we took the road, (both battalions,) and by an easy march reached the neighborhood of Gettysburg about sun-up; halting in an open field, the command got breakfast, and I was sent to report the presence of the artillery reserve of Longstreet's corps on the field and ready for battle. I found General Longstreet on Seminary Hill with General Lee and Generals Heth and A. P. Hill, and Doctors Cullen and Maury, surgeons. Upon making my report, Gen. Longstreet ordered that the battalions be kept where they were until further orders.

On the morning of the third of July, at day-light, the batteries of the First corps were all in position, extending from Hood, in front of the "Round Top," to and beyond the peach orchard. At this point General Longstreet sent for me, accompanied by Adjutant Owen. I rode to the rear of the line, where we found Gen. Longstreet in consultation with the general officers. He gave me then my final instructions, and informed me of the plan of battle. At a given signal, to be arranged by myself, all the guns on the line were to open simultaneously on the enemy's batteries. The signal fixed was two guns in quick succession by the Washington Artillery. Upon returning to the front I dispatched Adjutant Owen along the entire line, to notify each of the artillery commanders, and to give them their orders, which he did and returned to me.

It was understood that Colonel Alexander had been charged with the duty of observing the effect of the fire of the batteries upon the enemy's lines, and to give the signal for General Pickett to advance to the assault.

Everything was in readiness—no firing on either side—when, at a few minutes after one o'clock, P. M., while in rear of the Washington Artillery, near the peach orchard, I received by a courier, the following in General Longstreet's hand-writing.

HEADQUARTERS, IN THE FIELD,  
*July 3d, 1863.*

COLONEL: Let the batteries open. Order great care and precision in firing. If the batteries at the peach orchard cannot be used against the point we intend attacking, let them open upon the rocky hill.

Most respectfully,

J. LONGSTREET,  
*Lieutenant-General Commanding.*

*To Colonel WALTON.*

Major Eshleman, in command of the Washington Artillery, was ordered to fire the signal gun, when instantly from the right to the extreme left of the line, as had been arranged by order of General Longstreet, the guns of every battery opened the tremendous cannonade.

On the 4th of July, at 1 o'clock A. M., I received the following, addressed to me as Chief of Artillery, First corps: "General Longstreet directs that you have your artillery in readiness to resist an attack by daylight, remembering you have no ammunition to spare except for the enemy's infantry," etc., and the following order before day on the 4th July:

HEADQUARTERS FIRST ARMY CORPS,  
*July 4th, 1863.*

COLONEL: The Lieutenant-General directs that such of your wagons as can be spared from your command be sent to Cashtown during the day as quietly as possible, reporting to Colonel Corley and Major Mitchell about dark. Let there be as little confusion as possible. Have the wagons which are to accompany the troops parked on the Fairfield road, so that they can file in with the column as it passes.

*Will you please send Colonel Alexander to see the General at this point at light.*

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

OSMAN LATROBE,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

*To Colonel WALTON, Commanding Artillery, &c.*

Enough has been written to show that Colonel Alexander has made a mistake in the assertion that he was in command of *all the artillery* of the First corps on the field, "as chief of artillery for the action." Certainly, I was chief of artillery of the First corps before the action, commanded in the action directly under General Longstreet's orders on the field, fired the signal guns, as agreed with General Longstreet, to commence the bombardment, and I never was relieved from nor did I at any time relinquish my command of all the artillery of the First corps, until long after General Longstreet was ordered to Tennessee; and I was subsequently appointed by the Secretary of War, "Inspector-General of Field Artillery," in March or April, 1864.

I really regret that, in justice to myself and to the responsible, and I may say distinguished position, I had the honor to fill at the



battle of Gettysburg, I find myself compelled, for the first time since the war, to present myself in print.

If my poor services on that sanguinary and trying field were of any value or of any merit, such as they were, I have the pride to wish to preserve the record of them as dear to me and to my my friends.

Your obedient servant,

J. B. WALTON,

*Late Chief of Artillery, First Corps, A. N. V., Comd'g.*

#### Letter from General Longstreet.

GAINESVILLE GA., *November 6th, 1877.*

Colonel J. B. WALTON, *New Orleans:*

MY DEAR SIR: I find in my account of Gettysburg just published, ambiguous remarks about our artillery officers.

The paragraph beginning "Our artillery," etc., should read: On the 2d, Colonel Alexander's battalion being at the head of the column, he was ordered to assign the batteries to positions and to general supervision, pending the absence of Colonel Walton, chief of artillery.

On the 3rd, Colonel Alexander being an officer of unusual promptness, sagacity, and intelligence, and being more familiar with the ground to be occupied by the artillery, was directed to see that the batteries were posted to the best advantage.

I beg to assure you that the idea of interfering with your prerogatives, or authority or fitness for your position, did not enter my mind. Your duties were such as to take you away from headquarters, and often render it difficult to find you just at the right moment, particularly when the entire corps was not together, as was the case on the 2d.

*On the 3rd, Colonel Alexander's special service, after seeing that the batteries were most advantageously posted, was to see that field artillery was ready to move with General Pickett's assault, and to give me the benefit of his judgment as to the moment the effect of the artillery combat would justify the assault.*

I regard Colonel Alexander's position on the 3d *as that of an engineer staff officer*, more than one exercising any authority in a manner calculated to place you in an improper light.

My account of Gettysburg was put together rapidly, to meet the call of the newspapers, as you will see. Supposing that I should review it after it was copied, I had made a note of explanation of the apparent anomalous position of artillery officers; but the papers were sent to press before I had an opportunity to read and correct this point.

I remain, very truly yours,

JAMES LONGSTREET.

**General James Longstreet's Account of the Campaign and Battle.**

[The following paper is not properly one of our "Gettysburg Series," and was not called forth by our enquiry for detailed narratives by active participants, nor by anything which we have published.

In the early part of last year the Philadelphia *Times* announced that it had engaged General Longstreet to prepare his account of Gettysburg, and his article appeared in that paper on the 3d of November last. But we have no hesitancy in republishing the paper, although it was not written for our pages, and we are under no obligation to *copy* an article which has first appeared elsewhere. General Longstreet's position as second in command at Gettysburg, the important part he bore in the great battle, his unquestioned gallantry, and the fact that he commanded as noble a corps as ever fought for any cause—all demand that, in addition to his official report (which our Society published for the first time), we shall put into permanent form the narrative which he now gives of these great events. We, therefore, print the paper in full.]

It has been my purpose for some years to give to the public a detailed history of the campaign of Gettysburg, from its inception to its disastrous close. The execution of this task has been delayed by reason of a press of personal business, and by reason of a genuine reluctance that I have felt against anything that might, even by implication, impugn the wisdom of my late comrades in arms. My sincere feeling upon this subject is best expressed in the following letter, which was written shortly after the battle of Gettysburg, when there was a sly under-current of misrepresentation of my course, and in response to an appeal from a respected relative that I would make some reply to my accusers:

CAMP, CULPEPER COURTHOUSE,  
July 24, 1863.

MY DEAR UNCLE: Your letters of the 13th and 14th were received on yesterday. As to our late battle, I cannot say much. I have no right to say anything, in fact, but will venture a little for you alone. If it goes to aunt and cousins, it must be under promise that it will go no further. The battle was not made as I would have made it. My idea was to throw ourselves between the enemy and Washington, select a strong position, and force the enemy to attack us. So far as is given to man the ability

to judge, we may say with confidence that we should have destroyed the Federal army, marched into Washington, and dictated our terms, or, at least, held Washington and marched over as much of Pennsylvania as we cared to, had we drawn the enemy into attack upon our carefully chosen position in his rear. General Lee chose the plans adopted; and he is the person appointed to choose and to order. I consider it a part of my duty to express my views to the Commanding-General. If he approves and adopts them, it is well; if he does not, it is my duty to adopt his views, and to execute his orders as faithfully as if they were my own. I cannot help but think that great results would have been obtained had my views been thought better of; yet I am much inclined to accept the present condition as for the best. I hope and trust that it is so. Your programme would all be well enough, had it been practicable; and was duly thought of, too. I fancy that no good ideas upon that campaign will be mentioned at any time that did not receive their share of consideration by General Lee. The few things that he might have overlooked himself were, I believe, suggested by myself. As we failed, I must take my share of the responsibility. In fact, I would prefer that all the blame should rest upon me. As General Lee is our commander, he should have the support and influence we can give him. If the blame (if there is any) can be shifted from him to me, I shall help him and our cause by taking it. I desire, therefore, that all the responsibility that can be put upon me shall go there and shall remain there. The truth will be known in time, and I leave that to show how much of the responsibility of Gettysburg rests on my shoulders. \* \* \*

Most affectionately yours,

J. LONGSTREET.

To A. B. LONGSTREET, LL. D., *Columbus, Ga.*

I sincerely regret that I cannot still rest upon that letter. But I have been so repeatedly and so rancorously assailed by those whose intimacy with the Commanding-General in that battle gave an apparent importance to their assaults, that I feel impelled by a sense of duty to give to the public a full and comprehensive narration of the campaign from its beginning to its end; especially when I reflect that the publication of the truth cannot now, as it might have done then, injure the cause for which we fought the battle. The request that I furnish this history to the *Times* comes opportunely, for the appeal just made through the press by a distinguished foreigner for all information that will develop the causes of the failure of that campaign has provoked anew its partisan and desultory discussion, and renders a plain and logical recital of the facts both timely and important.

After the defeat of Burnside at Fredericksburg in December, it was believed that active operations were over for the winter, and I was sent

with two divisions of my corps to the eastern shore of Virginia, where I could find food for my men during the winter, and send supplies to the Army of Northern Virginia. I spent several months in this department, keeping the enemy close within his fortifications, and foraging with little trouble and great success. On May 1st I received orders to report to General Lee, at Fredericksburg. General Hooker had begun to throw his army across the Rappahannock, and the active campaign was opening. I left Suffolk as soon as possible, and hurried my troops forward. Passing through Richmond, I called to pay my respects to Mr. Seddon, the Secretary of War. Mr. Seddon was at the time of my visit deeply considering the critical condition of Pemberton's army at Vicksburg, around which Gen. Grant was then decisively drawing his lines. He informed me that he had in contemplation a plan for concentrating a succoring army at Jackson, Miss., under the command of General Johnston, with a view of driving Grant from before Vicksburg by a direct issue at arms. He suggested that possibly my corps might be needed to make the army strong enough to handle Grant, and asked me my views. I replied that there was a better plan, in my judgment, for relieving Vicksburg than by a direct assault upon Grant. I proposed that the army then concentrating at Jackson, Miss., be moved swiftly to Tullahoma, where General Bragg was then located with a fine army, confronting an army of about equal strength, under General Rosecranz, and that at the same time the two divisions of my corps be hurried forward to the same point. The simultaneous arrival of these reinforcements would give us a grand army at Tullahoma. With this army General Johnston might speedily crush Rosecranz, and that he should then turn his force toward the north, and with his splendid army march through Tennessee and Kentucky, and threaten the invasion of Ohio. My idea was, that in the march through those States the army would meet no organized obstruction; would be supplied with provisions, and even reinforcements, by those friendly to our cause, and would inevitably result in drawing Grant's army from Vicksburg to look after and protect his own territory. Mr. Seddon adhered to his original views; not so much, I think, from his great confidence in them as from the difficulty of withdrawing the force suggested from General Lee's army. I was very thoroughly impressed with the practicability of the plan, however, and when I reached General Lee I laid it before him with the freedom justified by our close personal and official relations. The idea seemed to be a new one to him, but he was evidently seriously impressed with it. We discussed it over and over, and I discovered that his main objection to it was that it would, if adopted, force him to divide his army. He left no room to doubt, however, that he believed the idea of an offensive campaign was not only important but necessary.

At length, while we were discussing the idea of a western forward movement, he asked me if I did not think an invasion of Maryland and Pennsylvania by his own army would accomplish the same result, and I replied that I did not see that it would, because this movement would be too hazardous, and the campaign in thoroughly Union States would require more time and greater preparation than one through Tennessee and Kentucky. I soon discovered that he had determined that he would make some forward movement, and I finally assented that the Pennsylvania campaign might be brought to a successful issue if he could make it offensive in strategy, but defensive in tactics. This point was urged with great persistency. I suggested that, after piercing Pennsylvania and menacing Washington, we should choose a strong position and force the Federals to attack us, observing that the popular clamor throughout the North would speedily force the Federal General to attempt to drive us out. I recalled to him the battle of Fredericksburg as an instance of a defensive battle, when, with a few thousand men, we hurled the whole Federal army back, crippling and demoralizing it, with trifling loss to our own troops; and Chancellorsville as an instance of an offensive battle, where we dislodged the Federals, it is true, but at such a terrible sacrifice that half a dozen such victories would have ruined us. It will be remembered that Stonewall Jackson once said that "we sometimes fail to drive the enemy from a position; they always fail to drive us." I reminded him, too, of Napoleon's advice to Marmont, to whom he said, when putting him at the head of an invading army, "Select your ground and make your enemy attack you." I recall these points simply because I desire to have it distinctly understood that, while I first suggested to General Lee the idea of an offensive campaign, I was never persuaded to yield my argument against the Gettysburg campaign, except with the understanding that we were not to deliver an offensive battle, but to so manoeuvre that the enemy should be forced to attack us—or, to repeat, that our campaign should be one of offensive strategy, but defensive tactics. Upon this understanding my assent was given, and General Lee, who had been kind enough to discuss the matter with me patiently, gave the order of march.

The movement was begun on the 3d of June. McLaws' division of my corps moved out of Fredericksburg for Culpeper Courthouse, followed by Ewell's corps on the 4th and 5th of June. Hood's division and Stuart's cavalry moved at the same time. On the 8th we found two full corps (for Pickett's division had joined me then) and Stuart's cavalry concentrated at Culpeper Courthouse. In the meantime a large force of the Federals, cavalry and infantry, had been thrown across the Rappahannock and sent to attack General Stuart. They were encountered at Brandy Station on the morning of the 9th, and repulsed. General Lee

says of this engagement: "On the 9th a large force of Federal cavalry, strongly supported by infantry, crossed the Rappahannock at Beverly's Ford and attacked General Stuart. A severe engagement ensued, continuing from early in the morning until late in the afternoon, when the enemy was forced to recross the river with heavy loss, leaving four hundred prisoners, three pieces of artillery, and several colors in our hands." The failure of General Lee to follow up his advantage, by pouring the heavy force concentrated at Culpeper Courthouse upon this detachment of the Federals, confirmed my convictions that he had determined to make a defensive battle, and would not allow any casual advantage to precipitate a general engagement. If he had had any idea of abandoning the original plan of a tactical defensive, then, in my judgment, was the time to have done so. While at Culpeper, I sent a trusty scout (who had been sent to me by Secretary Seddon while I was at Suffolk) with instructions to go into the Federal lines, discover his policy, and bring me all the information he could possibly pick up. When this scout asked me, very significantly, where he should report, I replied: "Find me, wherever I am, when you have the desired information." I did this because I feared to trust him with a knowledge of our future movements. I supplied him with all the gold he needed, and instructed him to spare neither pains nor money to obtain full and accurate information. The information gathered by this scout led to the most tremendous results, as will soon be seen.

General A. P. Hill, having left Fredericksburg as soon as the enemy had retired from his front, was sent to follow Ewell, who had marched up the Valley and cleared it of the Federals. My corps left Culpeper on the 15th, and, with a view of covering the march of Hill and Ewell through the Valley, moved along the east side of the Blue Ridge and occupied Snicker's and Ashby's Gaps, and the line of the Blue Ridge. General Stuart was in my front and on my flank, reconnoitering the movements of the Federals. When it was found that Hooker did not intend to attack, I withdrew to the west side and marched to the Potomac. As I was leaving the Blue Ridge, I instructed General Stuart to follow me, and to cross the Potomac at Shepherdstown, while I crossed at Williamsport, ten miles above. In reply to these instructions, Gen. Stuart informed me that he had discretionary powers; whereupon I withdrew. General Stuart held the Gap for awhile, and then hurried around beyond Hooker's army, and we saw nothing more of him until the evening of the 2d of July, when he came down from York and joined us, having made a complete circuit of the Federal army. The absence of Stuart's cavalry from the main body of the army during the march is claimed to have been a fatal error, as General Lee says: "No report had been received (on the 27th) that the enemy had crossed the Potomac,

and the absence of the cavalry rendered it impossible to obtain accurate information." The army, therefore, moved forward as a man might walk over strange ground with his eyes shut. General Lee says of his orders to Stuart: "General Stuart was left to guard the passes of the mountains and to observe the movements of the enemy, whom he was instructed to harass and impede as much as possible, should he attempt to cross the Potomac. In that event, General Stuart was directed to move into Maryland, crossing the Potomac on the east or west of the Blue Ridge, as in his judgment should be best, and take position on the right of our column as it advanced."

My corps crossed the Potomac at Williamsport, and General A. P. Hill crossed at Shepherdstown. Our columns were joined together at Hagerstown, and we marched thence into Pennsylvania, reaching Chambersburg on the evening of the 27th. At this point, on the night of the 29th, information was received by which the whole plan of the campaign was changed. We had not heard from the enemy for several days, and Gen. Lee was in doubt as to where he was; indeed, we did not know that he had yet left Virginia. At about 10 o'clock that night Colonel Sorrell, my chief-of-staff, was waked by an orderly, who reported that a suspicious person had just been arrested by the provost-marshal. Upon investigation, Sorrell discovered that the suspicious person was the scout, Harrison, that I had sent out at Culpeper. He was dirt-stained, travel-worn, and very much broken down. After questioning him sufficiently to find that he brought very important information, Colonel Sorrell brought him to my headquarters and awoke me. He gave the information that the enemy had crossed the Potomac, marched northwest, and that the head of his column was at Frederick City, on our right. I felt that this information was exceedingly important, and might involve a change in the direction of our march. General Lee had already issued orders that we were to advance toward Harrisburg. The next morning I at once sent the scout to General Lee's headquarters, and followed him myself early in the morning. I found General Lee up, and asked him if the information brought by the scout might not involve a change of direction of the head of our column to the right. He immediately acquiesced in the suggestion, possibly saying that he had already given orders to that effect. The movement toward the enemy was begun at once. Hill marched toward Gettysburg, and my corps followed, with the exception of Pickett's division, which was left at Chambersburg by General Lee's orders. Ewell was recalled from above—he having advanced as far as Carlisle. I was with General Lee most of that day (the 30th). At about noon the road in front of my corps was blocked by Hill's corps and Ewell's wagon train, which had cut into the road from above. The orders were to allow these trains to precede us, and that we should go into camp at Green-



wood, about ten miles from Chambersburg. My infantry was forced to remain in Greenwood until late in the afternoon of the 1st. My artillery did not get the road until 2 o'clock on the morning of the 2d.

General Lee spent the night with us, establishing his headquarters, as he frequently did, a short distance from mine. General Lee says of the movements of this day: "Preparation had been made to advance upon Harrisburg; but on the night of the 29th information was received from a scout that the enemy had crossed the Potomac, was advancing northward, and that the head of his column had already reached South Mountain. As our communications with the Potomac were thus menaced, it was resolved to prevent his further progress in that direction by concentrating our army on the east side of the mountains." On the morning of the 1st General Lee and myself left his headquarters together, and had ridden three or four miles when we heard heavy firing along Hill's front. The firing became so heavy that General Lee left me and hurried forward to see what it meant. After attending to some details of my march, I followed. The firing proceeded from the engagement between our advance and Reynolds' corps, in which the Federals were repulsed. This rencontre was totally unexpected on both sides. As an evidence of the doubt in which General Lee was enveloped, and the anxiety that weighed him down during the afternoon, I quote from General R. H. Anderson the report of a conversation had with him during the engagement. General Anderson was resting with his division at Cashtown, awaiting orders. About 10 o'clock in the morning he received a message notifying him that General Lee desired to see him. He found Gen. Lee intently listening to the fire of the guns, and very much disturbed and depressed. At length he said, more to himself than to General Anderson: "I cannot think what has become of Stuart; I ought to have heard from him long before now. He may have met with disaster, but I hope not. In the absence of reports from him, I am in ignorance as to what we have in front of us here. It may be the whole Federal army, or it may be only a detachment. If it is the whole Federal force we must fight a battle here; if we do not gain a victory those defiles and gorges through which we passed this morning will shelter us from disaster."

When I overtook General Lee at 5 o'clock that afternoon, he said, to my surprise, that he thought of attacking General Meade upon the heights the next day. I suggested that this course seemed to be at variance with the plan of the campaign that had been agreed upon before leaving Fredericksburg. He said: "If the enemy is there to-morrow, we must attack him." I replied: "If he is there, it will be because he is anxious that we should attack him—a good reason in my judgment for not doing so." I urged that we should move around by our right to the left of Meade and put our army between him and Washington, threatening

his left and rear, and thus force him to attack us in such position as we might select. I said that it seemed to me that if, during our council at Fredericksburg, we had described the position in which we desired to get the two armies, we could not have expected to get the enemy in a better position for us than that he then occupied. I said, further, that he was in strong position and would be awaiting us, which was evidence that he desired that we should attack him. I said, further, that his weak point seemed to be his left; hence I thought that we should move around to his left, that we might threaten it if we intended to manoeuvre, or attack it if we were determined upon a battle. I called his attention to the fact that the country was admirably adapted for a defensive battle, and that we should surely repulse Meade with crushing loss if we would take position so as to force him to attack us, and suggested that even if we carried the heights in front of us, and drove Meade out, we should be so badly crippled that we could not reap the fruits of victory; and that the heights of Gettysburg were in themselves of no more importance to us than the ground we then occupied, and that the mere possession of the ground was not worth a hundred men to us. That Meade's army, not its position, was our objective. General Lee was impressed with the idea that by attacking the Federals he could whip them in detail. I reminded him that if the Federals were there in the morning it would be proof that they had their forces well in hand, and that with Pickett in Chambersburg and Stuart out of reach, we should be somewhat in detail. He, however, did not seem to abandon the idea of attack on the next day. He seemed under a subdued excitement which occasionally took possession of him when "the hunt was up," and threatened his superb equipoise. The sharp battle fought by Hill and Ewell on that day had given him a taste of victory. Upon this point I quote General Fitzhugh Lee, who says, speaking of the attack on the 3d: "He told the father of the writer (his brother) that he was controlled too far by the great confidence he felt in the fighting qualities of his people, who begged simply to be 'turned loose,' and by the assurances of most of his higher officers." I left General Lee quite late on the night of the 1st. Speaking of the battle on the 2d, General Lee says in his official report: "It had not been intended to fight a general battle at such a distance from our base unless attacked by the enemy; but finding ourselves unexpectedly confronted by the Federal army, it became a matter of difficulty to withdraw through the mountains with our large trains."

When I left General Lee on the night of the 1st, I believed he had made up his mind to attack, but was confident that he had not yet determined as to when the attack should be made. The assertion first made by General Pendleton, and echoed by his confederates, that I was ordered to open the attack at sunrise, is totally false. Documentary testimony

upon this point will be presented in the course of this article. Suffice it to say at present that General Lee never in his life gave me orders to open an attack at a specific hour. He was perfectly satisfied that when I had my troops in position and was ordered to attack, no time was ever lost. On the night of the 1st I left him without any orders at all. On the morning of the 2d I went to General Lee's headquarters at daylight and renewed my views against making an attack. He seemed resolved, however, and we discussed the probable results. He observed the position of the Federals and got a general idea of the nature of the ground. About sunrise General Lee sent Colonel Venable, of his staff, to General Ewell's headquarters, ordering him to make a reconnoissance of the ground in his front, with a view of making the main attack on his left. A short time afterwards he followed Colonel Venable in person. He returned at about 9 o'clock and informed me that it would not do to have Ewell to open the attack. He finally determined that I should make the main attack on the extreme right. It was fully 11 o'clock when General Lee arrived at this conclusion and ordered the movement. In the meantime, by General Lee's authority, Law's brigade, which had been put upon picket duty, was ordered to rejoin my command, and upon my suggestion that it would be better to await its arrival, General Lee assented. We awaited about forty minutes for these troops and then moved forward. A delay of several hours occurred in the march of the troops. The cause of this delay was that we had been ordered by General Lee to proceed cautiously upon the forward movement so as to avoid being seen by the enemy. General Lee ordered Colonel Johnson, of his engineer corps, to lead and conduct the head of the column. My troops, therefore, moved forward under guidance of a special officer of General Lee, and with instructions to follow his directions. I left General Lee only after the line was stretched out on the march, and rode along with Hood's division, which was in the rear. The march was necessarily slow, the conductor frequently encountering points that exposed the troops to the view of the signal station on Round Top. At length the column halted. After waiting some time, supposing that it would soon move forward, I sent to the front to inquire the occasion of the delay. It was reported that the column was awaiting the movements of Colonel Johnston, who was trying to lead it by some route by which it could pursue its march without falling under view of the Federal signal station. Looking up toward Round Top I saw that the signal station was in full view, and, as we could plainly see this station, it was apparent that our heavy columns was seen from their position, and that further efforts to conceal ourselves would be a waste of time.

I became very impatient at this delay, and determined to take upon myself the responsibility of hurrying the troops forward. I did not order

General McLaws forward because, as the head of the column, he had direct orders from General Lee to follow the conduct of Colonel Johnson.

Therefore I sent orders to Hood, who was in the rear and not encumbered by these instructions, to push his division forward by the most direct route so as to take position on my right. He did so, and thus broke up the delay. The troops were rapidly thrown into position and preparations were made for the attack. It may be proper just here to consider the relative strength and position of the two armies. Our army was 52,000 infantry, Meade's was 95,000; these are our highest figures and the enemy's lowest. We had learned on the night of the 1st, from some prisoners captured near Seminary Ridge, that the First, Eleventh, and Third corps had arrived by the Emmetsburg road and had taken position on the heights in front of us, and that reinforcements had been seen coming by the Baltimore road just after the fight of the 1st. From an intercepted dispatch we learned that another corps was in camp about four miles from the field. We had every reason, therefore, to believe that the Federals were prepared to renew the battle. Our army was stretched in an elliptical curve, reaching from the front of Round Top around Seminary Ridge, and enveloping Cemetery Heights on the left; thus covering a space of four or five miles. The enemy occupied the high ground in front of us, being massed within a curve of about two miles, nearly concentric with the curve described by our forces. His line was about 1,400 yards from ours. Any one will see that the proposition for this inferior force to assault and drive out the masses of troops upon the heights was a very problematical one. My orders from General Lee were "to envelop the enemy's left and begin the attack there, following up as near as possible the direction of the Emmetsburg road."

My corps occupied our right, with Hood on our extreme right and McLaws next. Hill's corps was next to mine, in front of the Federal centre, and Ewell was on our extreme left. My corps, with Pickett's division absent, numbered hardly 13,000 men. I realized that the fight was to be a fearful one; but being assured that my flank would be protected by the brigades of Wilcox, Perry, Wright, Posey, and Mahone moving *en echelon*, and that Ewell was to co-operate by a direct attack on the enemy's right, and Hill to threaten his centre and attack if opportunity offered and thus prevent reinforcements from being launched either against myself or Ewell, it seemed that we might possibly dislodge the great army in front of us. At half-past 3 o'clock the order was given General Hood to advance upon the enemy, and, hurrying to the head of McLaws's division, I moved with his line. Then was fairly commenced what I do not hesitate to pronounce the best three hours' fighting ever done by any troops on any battle-field. Directly in front of us, occupying the peach orchard, on a piece of elevated ground that General Lee desired

me to take and hold for his artillery, was the Third corps of the Federals, commanded by General Sickles. My men charged with great spirit and dislodged the Federals from the peach orchard with but little delay, though they fought stubbornly. We were then on the crest of Seminary Ridge. The artillery was brought forward and put into position at the peach orchard. The infantry swept down the slope and soon reached the marshy ground that lay between Seminary and Cemetery Ridges, fighting their way over every foot of ground and against overwhelming odds; at every step we found that reinforcements were pouring into the Federals from every side. Nothing could stop my men, however, and they commenced their heroic charge up the side of Cemetery Ridge. Our attack was to progress in the general direction of the Emmetsburg road, but the Federal troops, as they were forced from point to point, availing themselves of the stone fences and boulders near the mountain as rallying points, so annoyed our right flank that General Hood's division was obliged to make a partial change of front so as to relieve itself of this galling flank fire. This drew General McLaws a little further to the right than General Lee had anticipated, so that the defensive advantages of the ground had enabled the Federals to delay our purposes until they could occupy Little Round-Top, which they just then discovered was the key to their position. The force thrown upon this point was so strong as to seize our right, as it were, in a vise.

Still the battle on our main line continued to progress. The situation was a critical one. My corps had been fighting over an hour, having encountered and driven back line after line of the enemy. In front of them was a high and rugged ridge, on its crest the bulk of the Army of the Potomac, numbering six to one, and securely resting behind strong positions. My brave fellows never hesitated, however. Their duty was in front of them and they met it. They charged up the hill in splendid style, sweeping everything before them, dislodging the enemy in the face of a withering fire. When they had fairly started up the second ridge, I discovered that they were suffering terribly from a fire that swept over their right and left flanks. I also found that my left flank was not protected by the brigades that were to move *en echelon* with it. McLaws' line was consequently spread out to the left to protect its flank, and Hood's line was extended to the right to protect its flank from the sweeping fire of the large bodies of troops that were posted on Round Top.\* These

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\*The importance of Round Top as a *point d'appui* was not appreciated until after my attack. General Meade seems to have alluded to it as a point to be occupied "if practicable," but in such slighting manner as to show that he did not deem it of great importance. So it was occupied by an inadequate force. As our battle progressed, pushing the Federals back from point to point, subordinate officers and soldiers, seeking shelter, as birds flying to cover in a tempest, found behind the large boulders of its rock-bound sides not only protection, but rallying points. These reinforcements to the troops already there, checked our advance on the right, and some superior officer arriving just then, divined from effect the cause, and threw a force into Round Top that transformed it, as if by magic, into a Gibraltar.

two movements of extension so drew my forces out that I found myself attacking Cemetery Hill with a single line of battle against not less than 50,000 troops.

My two divisions at that time were cut down to eight or nine thousand men, four thousand having been killed or wounded. We felt at every step the heavy stroke of fresh troops—the sturdy regular blow that tells a soldier instantly that he has encountered reserves or reinforcements. We received no support at all, and there was no evidence of co-operation on any side. To urge my men forward under these circumstances would have been madness, and I withdrew them in good order to the peach orchard that we had taken from the Federals early in the afternoon. It may be mentioned here as illustrative of the dauntless spirit of these men, that when General Humphreys (of Mississippi) was ordered to withdraw his troops from the charge, he thought there was some mistake, and retired to a captured battery near the swale between the two ridges, where he halted, and when ordered to retire to the new line a second time, he did so under protest.\* Our men had no thought of retreat. They broke every line they encountered. When the order to withdraw was given a courier was sent to General Lee informing him of the result of the day's work.

Before pursuing this narrative further, I shall say a word or two concerning this assault. I am satisfied that my force, numbering hardly 13,000 men, encountered during that three and a half hours of bloody work not less than 65,000 of the Federals, and yet their charge was not checked nor their line broken until we ordered them to withdraw. Mr. Whitelaw Reid, writing a most excellent account of this charge to the *Cincinnati Gazette*, says: "It was believed from the terrific attack that the whole rebel army, Ewell's corps included, was massed on our centre and left, and so a single brigade was left to hold the rifle-pits on the right and the rest hurried across the little neck of land to strengthen our weakening lines." He describes, too, the haste with which corps after corps was hurried forward to the left to check the advance of my two-thirds of one corps. General Meade himself testifies (see his official report) that the Third, the Second, the Fifth, the Sixth, and the Eleventh corps, all of the Twelfth except one brigade and part of the First corps, engaged my handful of heroes during that glorious but disastrous afternoon. I found that night that 4,529 of my men, more than one-third of their total number, had been left on the field. History records no parallel to the fight made by these two divisions on the 2d of July at Gettysburg. I cannot

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\*The troops engaged with me in the fight of the 2d were mostly Georgians, as follows: The four Georgia brigades of Generals Benning, Anderson, Wofford and Semmes, General Kershaw's South Carolina brigade, General Laws' Alabama brigade, General Barksdale's (afterward General Humphrey's) Mississippi brigade, and General Robertson's Texas brigade.

refrain from inserting just here an account of the battle of the 2d taken from a graphic account in the *New York World*. It will be seen that the correspondent treats the charge of my 13,000 men as if it were the charge of the whole army. The account is as follows:

“He then began a heavy fire on Cemetery Hill. It must not be thought that this wrathful fire was unanswered. Our artillery began to play within a few moments, and hurled back defiance and like destruction upon the rebel lines. Until 6 o'clock the roar of cannon, the rush of missiles and the bursting of bombs filled all the air. The clangor alone of this awful combat might well have confused and awed a less cool and watchful commander than General Meade. It did not confuse him. With the calculation of a tactician and the eye of an experienced judge, he watched from his headquarters on the hill whatever movement under the murky cloud which enveloped the rebel lines might first disclose the intention which it was evident this artillery firing covered. About 6 o'clock, P. M., silence, deep, awfully impressive but momentary, was permitted, as if by magic, to dwell upon the field. Only the groans—unheard before—of the wounded and dying, only a murmur, a warning memory of the breeze through the foliage; only a low rattle of preparation of what was to come embroidered this blank stillness. Then, as the smoke beyond the village was lightly borne to the eastward, the woods on the left were seen filled with dark masses of infantry, three columns deep, who advanced at a quick step. Magnificent! Such a charge by such a force—full forty-five thousand men, under Hill and Longstreet—even though it threatened to pierce and annihilate the Third corps, against which it was directed, drew forth cries of admiration from all who beheld it. General Sickles and his splendid command withstood the shock with a determination that checked but could not fully restrain it. Back, inch by inch, fighting, falling, dying, cheering, the men retired. The rebels came on more furiously, halting at intervals, pouring volleys that struck our troops down in scores. General Sickles, fighting desperately, was struck in the leg and fell. The Second corps came to the aid of his decimated column. The battle then grew fearful. Standing firmly up against the storm, our troops, though still outnumbered, gave back shot for shot, volley for volley, almost death for death. Still the enemy was not restrained. Down he came upon our left with a momentum that nothing could check. The rifled guns that lay before our infantry on a knoll were in danger of capture. General Hancock was wounded in the thigh, General Gibbon in the shoulder. The Fifth corps, as the First and Second wavered anew, went into the breach with such shouts and such volleys as made the rebel column tremble at last. Up from the valley behind another battery came rolling to the heights, and flung its contents in an instant down in the midst of the enemy's ranks. Crash! crash! with discharges deafening, terrible, the musketry firing went on. The enemy, reforming after each discharge with wondrous celerity and firmness, still pressed up the declivity. What hideous carnage filled the minutes between the appearance of the Fifth corps and the advance to the support of the rebel columns of still another column from the right, I cannot bear to tell. Men fell, as the leaves fall in autumn, before those horrible discharges. Faltering for an instant the rebel columns seemed about to recede before the tempest. But their officers, who could be seen through the smoke of the conflict galloping and swinging their swords along the lines, rallied them anew, and the next instant the whole line sprang forward, as if to break through our own by mere weight of num-

bers. A division from the Twelfth corps, on the extreme right, reached the scene at this instant, and at the same time Sedgwick came up with the Sixth corps, having finished a march of nearly thirty-six consecutive hours. To what rescue they came their officers saw and told them. Weary as they were, barefooted, hungry, fit to drop for slumber, as they were, the wish for victory was so blended with the thought of exhaustion that they cast themselves, in turn, en masse into line of battle, and went down on the enemy with death in their weapons and cheers on their lips. The rebel's camel's back was broken by this "feather." His line staggered, reeled and drifted slowly back, while the shouts of our soldiers, lifted up amid the roar of musketry over the bodies of the dead and wounded, proclaimed the completeness of their victory."

It may be imagined that I was astonished at the fact that we received no support after we had driven the Federals from the peach orchard and one thousand yards beyond. If General Ewell had engaged the army in his front at that time (say 4 o'clock) he would have prevented their massing their whole army in my front, and while he and I kept their two wings engaged Hill would have found their centre weak, and should have threatened it while I broke through their left and dislodged them. Having failed to move at 4 o'clock, while the enemy was in his front, it was still more surprising that he did not advance at 5 o'clock with vigor and promptness, when the trenches in front of him were vacated or rather held by one single brigade (as General Meades' testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War states). Had he taken these trenches and scattered the brigade that held them, he would have found himself in the Federals' flank and rear. His attack in the rear must have dislodged the Federals, as it would have been totally unexpected—it being believed that he was in front with me. Hill charging upon the centre at the same time would have increased their disorder and we should have won the field. But Ewell did not advance until I had withdrawn my troops, and the First corps, after winning position after position, was forced to withdraw from the field with two corps of their comrades within sight and resting upon their arms. Ewell did not move until about dusk (according to his own report). He then occupied the trenches that the enemy had vacated (see General Meade's report). The real cause of Ewell's non-compliance with General Lee's orders was that he had broken his line of battle by sending two brigades off on some duty up the York road. General Early says that my failure to attack at sunrise was the cause of Ewell's line being broken at the time I did attack. This is not only absurd but impossible. After sunrise that morning Colonel Venable and General Lee were at Ewell's headquarters discussing the policy of opening the attack with Ewell's corps. They left Ewell with this definite order: that he was to hold himself in readiness to support my attack when it was made. It is silly to say that he was ready at sunrise, when



he was not ready at 4 o'clock when the attack was really made. His orders were to hold himself in readiness to co-operate with my attack when it was made. In breaking his line of battle he rendered himself unable to support me when he would have been potential. Touching the failure of the supporting brigades of Anderson's division to cover McLaws' flank by *echelon* movements, as directed, there is little to be said. Those brigades acted gallantly, but went astray early in the fight. General Anderson in his report says: "A strong fire was poured upon our right flank, which had become detached from McLaws' left." General Lee, alluding to the action of these two brigades, says: "But having become separated from McLaws, Wilcox's and Wright's brigades advanced with great gallantry, breaking successive lines of the enemy's infantry and compelling him to abandon much of his artillery. Wilcox reached the foot and Wright gained the crest of the ridge itself, driving the enemy down the opposite side; but having become separated from McLaws, and gone beyond the other two brigades of the division they were to attack in front and on both flanks, and compelled to retire, being unable to bring off any of the captured artillery, McLaws' left also fell back, and it being now nearly dark General Longstreet determined to await the arrival of Pickett." So much for the action of the first day.

I did not see General Lee that night. On the next morning he came to see me, and fearing that he was still in his disposition to attack, I tried to anticipate him by saying: "General, I have had my scouts out all night, and I find that you still have an excellent opportunity to move around to the right of Meade's army and manoeuvre him into attacking us." He replied, pointing with his fist at Cemetery Hill: "The enemy is there, and I am going to strike him." I felt then that it was my duty to express my convictions; I said: "General, I have been a soldier all my life. I have been with soldiers engaged in fights by couples, by squads, companies, regiments, divisions and armies, and should know as well as any one what soldiers can do. It is my opinion that no 15,000 men ever arrayed for battle can take that position," pointing to Cemetery Hill. General Lee in reply to this ordered me to prepare Pickett's division for the attack. I should not have been so urgent had I not foreseen the hopelessness of the proposed assault. I felt that I must say a word against the sacrifice of my men; and then I felt that my record was such that General Lee would or could not misconstrue my motives. I said no more, however, but turned away. The most of the morning was consumed in waiting for Pickett's men and getting into position. The plan of assault was as follows: Our artillery was to be massed in a wood from which Pickett was to charge, and it was to pour a continuous fire upon the cemetery. Under cover of this fire, and supported by it, Pickett was to charge.

Our artillery was in charge of General E. P. Alexander, a brave and gifted officer. Colonel Walton was my chief of artillery, but Alexander being at the head of the column, and being first in position, and being besides an officer of unusual promptness, sagacity and intelligence, was given charge of the artillery. The arrangements were completed about one o'clock. General Alexander had arranged that a battery of seven 11-pound howitzers, with fresh horses and full caissons, were to charge with Pickett, at the head of his line, but General Pendleton, from whom the guns had been borrowed, recalled them just before the charge was made, and thus deranged this wise plan. Never was I so depressed as upon that day. I felt that my men were to be sacrificed, and that I should have to order them to make a hopeless charge. I had instructed General Alexander, being unwillingly to trust myself with the entire responsibility, to carefully observe the effect of the fire upon the enemy, and when it began to tell to notify Pickett to begin the assault. I was so much impressed with the hopelessness of the charge that I wrote the following note to General Alexander: "If the artillery fire does not have the effect to drive off the enemy or greatly demoralize him, so as to make our efforts pretty certain, I would prefer that you should not advise General Pickett to make the charge. I shall rely a great deal on your judgment to determine the matter, and shall expect you to let Pickett know when the moment offers."

To my note the General replied as follows: "I will only be able to judge the effect of our fire upon the enemy by his return fire, for his infantry is but little exposed to view, and the smoke will obscure the whole field. If, as I infer from your note, there is an alternative to this attack, it should be carefully considered before opening our fire, for it will take all of the artillery ammunition we have left to test this one thoroughly, and if the result is unfavorable, we will have none left for another effort, and even if this is entirely successful it can only be so at a very bloody cost." I still desired to save my men and felt that if the artillery did not produce the desired effect I would be justified in holding Pickett off. I wrote this note to Colonel Walton at exactly 1:30 P. M.: "Let the batteries open. Order great precision in firing. If the batteries at the peach orchard cannot be used against the point we intend attacking, let them open on the enemy at Rocky Hill." The cannonading which opened along both lines was grand. In a few moments a courier brought a note to General Pickett (who was standing near me) from Alexander, which, after reading, he handed to me. It was as follows: "If you are coming at all you must come at once, or I cannot give you proper support; but the enemy's fire has not slackened at all; at least eighteen guns are still firing from the Cemetery itself." After I had read the note Pickett said to me: "General, shall I advance?" My feel-

ings had so overcome me that I would not speak for fear of betraying my want of confidence to him. I bowed affirmation and turned to mount my horse. Pickett immediately said: "I shall lead my division forward, sir." I spurred my horse to the wood where Alexander was stationed with artillery. When I reached him he told me of the disappearance of the seven guns which were to have led the charge with Pickett, and that his ammunition was so low that he could not properly support the charge. I at once ordered him to stop Pickett until the ammunition had been replenished. He informed me that he had no ammunition with which to replenish. I then saw that there was no help for it, and that Pickett must advance under his orders. He swept past our artillery in splendid style, and the men marched steadily and compactly down the slope. As they started up the ridge over one hundred cannon from the breastworks of the Federals hurled a rain of cannister, grape and shell down upon them; still they pressed on until half way up the slope, when the crest of the hill was lit with a solid sheet of flame as the masses of infantry rose and fired. When the smoke cleared away Pickett's division was gone. Nearly two-thirds of his men lay dead on the field, and the survivors were sullenly retreating down the hill. Mortal man could not have stood that fire. In half an hour the contested field was cleared and the battle of Gettysburg was over.

When this charge had failed I expected that of course the enemy would throw himself against our shattered ranks and try to crush us. I sent my staff officers to the rear to assist in rallying the troops, and hurried to our line of batteries as the only support that I could give them, knowing that my presence would impress upon every one of them the necessity of holding the ground to the last extremity. I knew if the army was to be saved those batteries must check the enemy. As I rode along the line of artillery I observed my old friend Captain Miller, Washington Artillery, of Sharpsburg record, walking between his guns and smoking his pipe as quietly and contentedly as he could at his camp-fire. The enemy's skirmishers were then advancing and threatening assault. For unaccountable reasons the enemy did not pursue his advantage. Our army was soon in compact shape, and its face turned once more toward Virginia. I may mention here that it has been absurdly said that General Lee ordered me to put Hood's and McLaws' divisions in support of Pickett's assault. General Lee never ordered any such thing.\* After our troops were all arranged for assault General Lee rode

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\* Colonel Taylor says that General Lee, in his presence, gave me orders to put Hood's and McLaws' divisions in this column of attack. This I deny, and do not suppose he will claim that any one else heard the order. If the reader will examine any of the maps of Gettysburg he will see that the withdrawal of these two divisions from their line of battle would have left half of General Lee's line of battle open and by the shortest route to his line of supplies and retreat. Fully one-half of his army would have been in the column of assault

with me twice over the lines to see that everything was arranged according to his wishes. He was told that we had been more particular in giving the orders than ever before; that the commanders had been sent for and the point of attack had been carefully designated, and that the commanders had been directed to communicate to their subordinates, and through them to every soldier in the command, the work that was before them, so that they should nerve themselves for the attack and fully understand it. After leaving me he again rode over the field once, if not twice, so that there was really no room for misconstruction or misunderstanding of his wishes. He could not have thought of giving any such an order. Hood and McLaws were confronted by a largely superior force of the enemy on the right of Pickett's attack. To have moved them to Pickett's support would have disengaged treble their number of Federals, who would have swooped down from their rocky fastnesses against the flank of our attacking column and swept our army from the field. A reference to any of the maps of Gettysburg will show from the position of the troops that this would have been the inevitable result. General Lee and myself never had any deliberate conversation about Gettysburg. The subject was never broached by either of us to the other. On one occasion it came up casually and he said to me (alluding to the charge of Pickett on the 3d), "General, why didn't you stop all that thing that day." I replied that I could not under the circumstances assume such a responsibility, as no discretion had been left me.

Before discussing the weak points of the campaign of Gettysburg, it is proper that I should say that I do so with the greatest affection for General Lee and the greatest reverence for his memory. The relations existing between us were affectionate, confidential, and even tender, from first to last. There was never a harsh word between us. It is then with a reluctant spirit that I write a calm and critical review of the Gettysburg campaign, because that review will show that our Commanding-General was unfortunate at several points. There is no doubt that General Lee, during the crisis of that campaign, lost the matchless equipoise that

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and half of Meade's army would have been free to sally out on the flank of our column and we should have been destroyed on that field of battle beyond a doubt. Of course, if we assume that Meade would place his army in line of battle and allow us to select our point of attack, we could have massed against it and rushed through. But this assumption would be absurd. The only way for those divisions to have been moved was to have attacked the heights in front. But this attack had been tried and failed the day before. If Pickett had shown signs of getting a lodgment, I should, of course, have pushed the other divisions forward to support the attack. But I saw that he was going to pieces at once. When Colonel Freemantle (Her Majesty's service) approached me (see his account) and congratulated me on Pickett's apparent success, I told him that his line would break in a moment—that he was not strong enough to make a serious impression. My assertion was correct. To have rushed forward my two divisions, then carrying bloody noses from their terrible conflict the day before, would have been madness.

usually characterized him, and that whatever mistakes were made were not so much matters of deliberate judgment as the impulses of a great mind disturbed by unparalleled conditions. General Lee was thrown from his balance (as is shown by the statement of General Fitzhugh Lee) by too great confidence in the prowess of his troops and (as is shown by General Anderson's statement) by the deplorable absence of General Stuart and the perplexity occasioned thereby. With this preface I proceed to say that the Gettysburg campaign was weak in these points—adhering, however, to my opinion that a combined movement against Rosecranz in Tennessee and a march toward Cincinnati would have given better results than could possibly have been secured by the invasion of Pennsylvania: First, the offensive strategical but defensive tactical plan of the campaign as agreed upon should never have been abandoned after we entered the enemy's country. Second, if there ever was a time when the abandonment of that plan could have promised decisive results, it was at Brandy Station, where, after Stuart had repulsed the force thrown across the river, we might have fallen on that force and crushed it, and then put ourselves in position, threatening the enemy's right and rear, which would have dislodged him from his position at Fredericksburg and given us the opportunity for an effective blow. Third, General Stuart should not have been permitted to leave the general line of march, thus forcing us to march blindfolded into the enemy's country; to this may be attributed, in my opinion, the change of the policy of the campaign. Fourth, the success obtained by the accidental rencontre on the 1st should have been vigorously prosecuted and the enemy should have been given no time to fortify or concentrate. Fifth, on the night of the 1st the army should have been carried around to Meade's right and rear, and posted between him and his capitol, and we could have manœvered him into an attack. Sixth, when the attack was made on the enemy's left on the 2d by my corps, Ewell should have been required to co-operate by a vigorous movement against his right and Hill should have moved against his centre. Had this been done his army would have been dislodged beyond question. Seventh, on the morning of the 3d it was not yet too late to move to the right and manœuver the Federals into attacking us. Eighth, Pickett's division should not have been ordered to assault Cemetery Ridge on the 3d, as we had already tested the strength of that position sufficiently to admonish us that we could not dislodge him. While the co-operation of Generals Ewell and Hill, on the 2d, by vigorous assault at the moment my battle was in progress, would in all probability have dislodged the Federals from their position, it does not seem that such success would have yielded the fruits anticipated at the inception of the campaign. The battle as it was fought would, in any result, have so crippled us that the Federals would have been able to

make good their retreat, and we should soon have been obliged to retire to Virginia with nothing but victory to cover our waning cause.

The *morale* of the victory might have dispirited the North and aroused the South to new exertions, but it would have been nothing in the game being played by the two armies at Gettysburg. As to the abandonment of the tactical defensive policy that we had agreed upon, there can be no doubt that General Lee deeply deplored it as a mistake. His remark, made just after the battle, "It is all my fault," meant just what it said. It adds to the nobility and magnanimity of that remark when we reflect that it was the utterance of a deep-felt truth rather than a mere sentiment. In a letter written to me by General Lee in January, 1864, he says: "Had I taken your advice at Gettysburg instead of pursuing the course I did, how different all might have been." Captain T. J. Gorie, of Houston, Texas, a gentleman of high position and undoubted integrity, writes to me upon this same point as follows: "Another important circumstance which I distinctly remember was in the winter of 1864, when you sent me from East Tennessee to Orange Courthouse with dispatches for General Lee. Upon my arrival there General Lee asked me in his tent, where he was alone with two or three Northern papers on his table. He remarked that he had just been reading the Northern official report of the Battle of Gettysburg; that he had become satisfied from reading those reports that if he had permitted you to carry out your plans on the third day, instead of making the attack on Cemetery Hill, we would have been successful." I cannot see, as has been claimed, why the absence of General Lee's cavalry should have justified his attack on the enemy. On the contrary, while they may have perplexed him, I hold that it was additional reason for his not hazarding an attack. At the time the attack was ordered we were fearful that our cavalry had been destroyed. In case of a disaster, and a forced retreat, we should have had nothing to cover our retreat. When so much was at stake as at Gettysburg the absence of the cavalry should have prevented the taking of any chances.

As to the failure of Stuart to move with the army to the west side of the Blue Ridge, I can only call attention to the fact that General Lee gave him discretionary orders. He doubtless did as he thought best. Had no discretion been given him he would have known and fallen into his natural position—my right flank. But authority thus given a subordinate general implies an opinion on the part of the commander that something better than the drudgery of a march along our flank might be open to him, and one of General Stuart's activity and gallantry should not be expected to fail to seek it. As to Ewell's failure to prosecute the advantage won on the 1st, there is little to be said, as the Commanding-General was on the field. I merely quote from his (General Ewell's)

official report. He says: "The enemy had fallen back to a commanding position that was known to us as Cemetery Hill, south of Gettysburg, and quickly showed a formidable front there. On entering the town I received a message from the Commanding-General to attack the hill, if I could do so to advantage. I could not bring artillery to bear on it; all the troops with me were jaded by twelve hours' marching and fighting, and I was notified that General Johnson was close to the town with his division, the only one of my corps that had not been engaged, Anderson's division of the Third corps, having been halted to let them pass. Cemetery Hill was not assailable from the town, and I determined with Johnson's division to take possession of a wooded hill to my left, on a line with and commanding Cemetery Hill. Before Johnson got up the Federals were reported moving to our left flank—our extreme left—and I could see what seemed to be his skirmishers in that direction. Before this report could be investigated by Lieutenant T. T. Turner, of my staff, and Lieutenant Robert Early, sent to investigate it, and Johnson placed in position, the night was far advanced." General Lee explains his failure to send positive orders to Ewell to follow up the flying enemy as follows: "The attack was not pressed that afternoon, the enemy's force being unknown and it being considered advisable to await the arrival of the rest of our troops. Orders were sent back to hasten their march, and in the meantime every effort was made to ascertain the numbers and positions of the enemy and find the most favorable point to attack."

Pursuit "pell-mell" is sometimes justified in a mere retreat. It is the accepted principle of action in a rout. General Early, in his report of this day's work, says "the enemy had been routed." He should, therefore, have been followed by everything that could have been thrown upon his heels, not so much to gain the heights, which were recognized as the rallying point, but to prevent his rallying at all in time to form lines for another battle. If the enemy had been routed this could and should have been done. In the "Military Annals of Louisiana," (Napier Bartlett, Esq.,) in the account of this rout, he says: "Hays had received orders through Early from General Ewell (though Lee's general instructions were subsequently the reverse) to halt at Gettysburg and advance no further in case he should succeed in capturing that place. But Hays now saw that the enemy were coming around by what is known as the Baltimore road, and were making for the heights—the Cemetery Ridge. This ridge meant life or death, and for the possession of it the battles of the 2d and 3d were fought. \* \* \* \* Owing to the long detour the enemy was compelled to make, it was obvious that he could not get his artillery in position on the heights for one or two hours. The immediate occupation of the heights by the Confederates, who were in position to get them at the time referred to, was a matter of vital importance.

Hays recognized it as such and presently sent for Early. The latter thought as Hays, but declined to disobey orders. At the urgent request of General Hays, however, he sent for General Ewell. When the latter arrived many precious moments had been lost. But the enemy, who did not see its value until the arrival of Hancock, had not yet appeared in force." General Hays told me ten years after the battle that he "could have seized the heights without the loss of ten men." Here we see General Early adhering to orders when his own convictions told him he should not do so, and refusing to allow General Hays to seize a point recognized by him as of vast importance, because of technical authority, at a moment when he admitted and knew that disregard of the order would only have made more secure the point at issue when the order was given.

Before closing this article I desire to settle finally and fully one point concerning which there has been much discussion, viz: the alleged delay in the attack upon the 2d. I am moved to this task not so much by an ambition to dissolve the cloud of personal misrepresentation that has been settled about my head, as by a sense of duty which leads me to determine a point that will be of value to the historian. It was asserted by General Pendleton, with whom the carefulness of statement or deliberateness of judgment has never been a characteristic, but who has been distinguished for the unreliability of his memory, that General Lee ordered me to attack the enemy at sunrise on the 2d. General J. A. Early has, in positive terms, indorsed this charge, which I now proceed to disprove. I have said that I left General Lee late in the night of the 1st, and that he had not then determined when the attack should be made; that I went to his headquarters early the next morning and was with him for some time; that he left me early after sunrise and went to Ewell's headquarters with the express view of seeing whether or not the main attack should be made then, and that he returned at about 9 o'clock; and that after discussing the ground for some time he determined that I should make the main attack, and at 11 o'clock gave me the order to prepare for it. I now present documents that sustain these assertions.

The first letter that I offer is from Colonel W. H. Taylor, of General Lee's staff. It is as follows:

"NORFOLK, VA., *April 28, 1875.*

"DEAR GENERAL: I have received your letter of the 20th instant. I have not read the article of which you speak, nor have I ever seen any copy of General Pendleton's address; indeed, I have read little or nothing of what has been written since the war. In the first place, because I could not spare the time; and in the second, of those of whose writings I have heard I deem but very few entitled to any attention whatever. I can only say that I never before heard of 'the sunrise attack' you were to have made as charged by General Pendleton. If such an order was



given you I never knew of it, or it has strangely escaped my memory. I think it more than probable that if General Lee had had your troops available the evening previous to the day of which you speak, he would have ordered an early attack, but this does not touch the point at issue. I regard it as a great mistake on the part of those who, perhaps, because of political differences, now undertake to criticise and attack your war record. Such conduct is most ungenerous, and I am sure meets the disapprobation of all good Confederates with whom I have had the pleasure of associating in the daily walks of life.

“Yours, very respectfully,                      W. H. TAYLOR.

“*To General LONGSTREET.*”

The next letter is from Colonel Charles Marshall, of General Lee's staff, who has charge of all the papers left by General Lee. It is as follows:

“BALTIMORE, MD., *May 7, 1875.*

“DEAR GENERAL: Your letter of the 20th ult. was received and should have had an earlier reply but for my engagements preventing me from looking at my papers to find what I could on the subject. I have no personal recollection of the order to which you refer. It certainly was not conveyed by me, nor is there anything in General Lee's official report to show the attack on the 2d was expected by him to begin earlier, except that he notices that there was not proper concert of action on that day.

“Respectfully,    CHARLES MARSHALL.

“*To General LONGSTREET, New Orleans.*”

Then a letter from General A. L. Long, who was General Lee's military secretary:

“BIG ISLAND, BEDFORD, VA., *May 31, 1875.*

“DEAR GENERAL: Your letter of the 20th ult., referring to an assertion of General Pendleton's, made in a lecture delivered several years ago, which was recently published in the *Southern Historical Society Magazine* substantially as follows: ‘That General Lee ordered General Longstreet to attack General Meade at sunrise on the morning of the 2d of July,’ has been received. I do not recollect of hearing of an order to attack at sunrise, or at any other designated hour, pending the operations at Gettysburg during the first three days of July, 1863. \* \* \*

“Yours truly,    A. L. LONG.

“*To General LONGSTREET.*”

I add the letter of Colonel Venable, of General Lee's staff, which should of itself be conclusive. I merely premise it with the statement that it was fully 9 o'clock before General Lee returned from his reconnoissance of Ewell's lines:

“UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA, *May 11, 1875.*

*General JAMES LONGSTREET:*

DEAR GENERAL: Your letter of the 25th ultimo. with regard to Gen. Lee's battle order on the 1st and 2d of July at Gettysburg, was duly received. I did not know of any order for attack on the enemy at sunrise on the 2d, nor can I believe any such order was issued by General Lee. About sunrise on the 2d of July I was sent by General Lee to General Ewell to ask him what he thought of the advantages of an attack on the enemy from his position. (Colonel Marshall had been sent with a simi-

lar order on the night of the 1st). General Ewell made me ride with him from point to point of his lines, so as to see with him the exact position of things. Before he got through the examination of the enemy's position General Lee came himself to General Ewell's lines. In sending the message to General Ewell, General Lee was explicit in saying that the question was whether he should move all the troops around on the right and attack on that side. I do not think that the errand on which I was sent by the Commanding-General is consistent with the idea of an attack at sunrise by any portion of the army.

Yours, very truly,  
CHAS. S. VENABLE."

I add upon this point the letter of Dr. Cullen, medical director of the First corps:

"RICHMOND, VA., *May 18, 1875.*

*General JAMES LONGSTREET:*

DEAR GENERAL—Yours of the 16th ult. should have received my immediate attention, but before answering it I was desirous of refreshing my memory of the scenes and incidents of the Gettysburg campaign by conversation with others who were with us and who served in different corps of the command. It was an astounding announcement to the survivors of the First army corps that the disaster and failure at Gettysburg was alone and solely due to its commander, and that had he obeyed the orders of the commander-in-chief that Meade's army would have been beaten, before its entire force had assembled, and its final discomfiture thereby made certain. It is a little strange that these charges were not made while General Lee was alive to substantiate or disprove them, and that seven years or more were permitted to pass by in silence regarding them. You are fortunate in being able to call upon the Adjutant-General and the two confidential officers of General Lee's staff for their testimony in the case, and I do not think that you will have any reason to fear their evidence. They knew every order that was issued for that battle, when and where attacks were to be made, who were slow in attacking, and who did not make attacks that were expected to be made. I hope, for the sake of history and for your brave military record, that a quietus will at once be put on this subject. I distinctly remember the appearance in our headquarter camp of the scout who brought from Frederick the first account that General Lee had of the definite whereabouts of the enemy; of the excitement at General Lee's headquarters among couriers, quartermasters, commissaries, etc., all betokening some early movement of the commands dependent upon the news brought by the scout. That afternoon General Lee was walking with some of us in the road in front of his headquarters and said: 'To-morrow, gentlemen, we will not move to Harrisburg as we expected, but will go over to Gettysburg and see what General Meade is after.' Orders had then been issued to the corps to move at sunrise on the morning of the next day, and promptly at that time the corps was put on the road. The troops moved slowly a short distance when they were stopped by Ewell's wagon trains and Johnson's division turning into the road in front of them, making their way from some point north to Cashtown or Gettysburg. How many hours we were detained I am unable to say, but it must have been many, for I remember eating a lunch or dinner before moving again. Being anxious to see you I rode rapidly by the troops (who, as soon as they could get into the road, pushed hurriedly by us also), and overtook you about dark at the hill this side of Gettysburg, about half a mile from the

town. You had been at the front with General Lee and were returning to your camp, a mile or two back. I spoke very exultingly of the victory we were thought to have obtained that day, but was surprised to find that you did not take the same cheerful view of it that I did, and presently you remarked that it would have been better had we not fought than to have left undone what we did. You said that the enemy were left occupying a position that it would take the whole army to drive them from and then at a great sacrifice. We soon reached the camp, three miles, perhaps, from Gettysburg, and found the column near by. Orders were issued to be ready to march at 'daybreak,' or some earlier hour, next morning. About 3 o'clock in the morning, while the stars were shining, you left your headquarters and rode to General Lee's, where I found you sitting with him *after sunrise* looking at the enemy on Cemetery Hill. I rode then into Gettysburg and was gone some two hours, and when I returned found you still with General Lee. At 2 or 3 o'clock in the day I rode with you toward the right, when you were about to attack, and was with you in front of the peach orchard when Hood began to move towards Round Top. General Hood was soon wounded and I removed him from the field to a house near by. \* \* \* \*

I am yours, very truly,

J. S. D. CULLEN."

I submit next an extract from the official report of General R. H. Anderson:

"Upon approaching Gettysburg I was directed to occupy the position in line of battle which had first been vacated by Pender's division, and to place one brigade and battery of artillery a mile or more on the right. Wilcox's brigade and Captain Ross' battery, of Lane's battalion, were posted in the detached position, while the other brigades occupied the the ground from which Pender's division had first been moved. We continued in position until the morning of the 2d, when I received orders to take up a new line of battle on the right of Pender's division, about a mile and a half further forward. In taking the new position the Tenth Alabama regiment, Wilcox's brigade, had a sharp skirmish with the body of the enemy who had occupied a wooded hill on the extreme right of my line. \* \* \* Shortly after the line had been formed I received notice that Lieutenant-General Longstreet would occupy the ground on my right, and that his line would be in a direction nearly at right angles with mine, and that he would assault the extreme left of the enemy and drive him toward Gettysburg."

From a narrative of General McLaws, published in 1873, I copy the following:

"On the 30th of June, I had been directed to have my division in readiness to follow General Ewell's corps. Marching toward Gettysburg, which it was intimated we would have passed by 10 o'clock the next day (the first of July), my division was accordingly marched from its camp and lined along the road in the order of march by 8 o'clock the 1st of July. When the troops of Ewell's corps—it was Johnston's division in charge of Ewell's wagon trains, which were coming from Carlisle by the road west of the mountains—had passed the head of my column, I asked General Longstreet's staff officer, Major Fairfax, if my division should follow. He went off to enquire, and returned with orders for me to wait

until Ewell's wagon train had passed, which did not happen until after 4 o'clock P. M. The train was calculated to be fourteen miles long, when I took up the line of march and continued marching until I arrived within three miles of Gettysburg, where my command camped along a creek. This was far into the night. My division was leading Longstreet's corps, and of course the other divisions come up later. I saw Hood's division the next morning, and understood that Pickett had been detached to guard the rear. While on the march, at about 10 o'clock at night, I met General Longstreet and some of his staff coming from the direction of Gettysburg, and had a few moments conversation with him. He said nothing of having received an order to attack at daylight the next morning. Here I will state that until General Pendleton mentioned it about two years ago when he was on a lecturing tour, after the death of General Lee, I never heard it intimated even that any such order had ever been given."

I close the testimony on this point by an extract from a letter from General Hood. He writes:

"I arrived with my staff in front of the heights of Gettysburg shortly after daybreak, as I have already stated, on the morning of the 2d of July. My division soon commenced filing into an open field near me, when the troops were allowed to stack arms and rest until further orders. A short distance in advance of this point, and during the early part of the same morning, we were both engaged in company with Generals A. P. Hill and Lee in observing the position of the Federals. General Lee, with coat buttoned to the throat, sabre belt around his waist and field glasses pending at his side, walked up and down in the shade of large trees near us, halting now and then to observe the enemy. He seemed full of hope, yet at times buried in deep thought. Colonel Freemantle, of England, was esconced in the forks of a tree not far off with glasses in constant use examining the lofty position of the Federal army. General Lee was seemingly anxious that you should attack that morning. He remarked to me: 'The enemy is here, and if we do not whip him he will whip us.' You thought it better to await the arrival of Pickett's division, at that time still in the rear, in order to make the attack, and you said to me subsequently, while we were seated together near the trunk of a tree: 'General Lee is a little nervous this morning. He wishes me to attack. I do not wish to do so without Pickett. I never like to go into a battle with one boot off.'"

Having thus disproved the assertions of Messrs. Pendleton and Early in regard to this rumored order for a sunrise attack, it appears that they are worthy of no further recognition; but it is difficult to pass beyond them without noting the manner in which, by their ignorance, they marred the plans of their chief on the field of battle. Mr. Pendleton robbed Pickett's division of its most important adjunct, fresh field artillery, at the moment of its severest trial, and thus frustrated the wise and brilliant programme of assault planned by General Alexander, and without the knowledge of that officer. (See narrative of General Alexander in the *Southern Historical Papers* for September, 1877.] General Early broke up General Lee's line of battle on the 2d of July by detaching

part of his division on some uncalled-for service, in violation of General Lee's orders, and thus prevented the co-operative attack of Ewell ordered by General Lee.

It is proper to discuss briefly, at this point, the movements of the third day. The charge of that day as made by General Pickett was emphatically a forlorn hope. The point designated by General Lee as the point of attack seemed to be about one mile from where he and I stood when he gave his orders. I asked him if the distance that we had to overcome under a terrific fire was not more than a mile. He replied: "No; it is not more than fourteen hundred yards." So that our troops, when they arose above the crest, had to advance this distance under the fire of about half of the Federal army, before they could fire a shot. Anything less than thirty thousand fresh veterans would have been vainly sacrificed in this attempt. The force given me for this work was Pickett's division (or rather a part of it), about 5,500 men, fresh and ready to undertake anything. My supporting force of probably 8,000 men had bloody noses and bruised heads from the fight of the previous day, and were not in physical condition to undertake such desperate work. When fresh they were the equals of any troops on earth; but every soldier knows that there is a great difference between fresh soldiers and those who have just come out of a heavy battle. It has been charged that the delay of the attack on the third was the cause of the failure of Ewell to co-operate with Pickett's attack. Colonel Taylor says that Ewell was ordered to attack at the same time with me, mine being the main attack. He says:

"General Longstreet's dispositions were not completed as soon as was expected. \* \* \* General Ewell, who had orders to co-operate with General Longstreet, and who was, of course, not aware of any impediment to the main attack, having reinforced General Johnson during the night of the 2d, ordered him forward early the next morning. In obedience to these instructions, General Johnson became hotly engaged before General Ewell could be informed of the halt that had been called upon our right."

Let us look at the facts of this. Instead of "making this attack at daylight," General Ewell says: "Just before the time fixed for General Johnson's advance the enemy attacked him to regain the works captured by Stuart the evening before." General Meade in his official report, says: "On the morning of the 3d, General Geary, having returned during the night, attacked at early dawn the enemy, and succeeded in driving him back and reoccupying his former position. A spirited contest was maintained along this portion of the line all the morning, and General Geary, reinforced by Wharton's brigade of the Sixth corps, maintained his position and inflicted very severe loss upon the enemy." Now to return to my end of the line. At about sunrise General Lee came to

me and informed that General Pickett would soon report to me, and then ordered that his troops were to be used as a column of assault, designating the point of assault, and that portions of the Third corps were to be used in support. About 7 o'clock General Pickett rode forward and stated that his troops would soon be upon the field and asked to be assigned his position. Colonel W. W. Wood, of Pickett's division, in his account of the day, says: "If I remember correctly, Pickett's division and the artillery were all in position by 11 A. M." Hence we see that General Geary attacked General Ewell at least one hour before I had received my orders for the day; that at the very moment of my receiving these instructions General Ewell was engaged in a "spirited contest;" that this contest had continued several hours before General Pickett's troops came upon the field, and that the contest was virtually over before General Pickett and the artillery were prepared for the battle. When these arrangements were completed and the batteries ordered to open, General Ewell had been driven from his position and not a foot-step was made from any other part of the army in my support. That there may have been confusion of orders on the field during the second and third days I am not prepared to deny, but there was nothing of the kind about the headquarters of the First corps.

General Wilcox steps forward as a willing witness in all concerning the battle of Gettysburg, and seems to know everything of General Lee's wishes and the movements of the First corps, and in fact everything else except his own orders. His brigade was the directing brigade for the *echelon* movement that was to protect McLaws' flank. He went astray at the opening of the fight, either through ignorance of his orders or a misapprehension or violation of them. Had he but attended to his own brigade instead of looking to the management of the general battle, the splendid exhibition of soldiery given by his men would have given better results.

I have not seen the criticism of the Comte de Paris upon the campaign, but I gather from quotations that he adduced as one of the objections to the invasion of Pennsylvania that the Federals would do superior fighting upon their own soil. The Confederates, whom I have read after, deny that this is true. Although not technically correct the Comte is right in the material point. The actual fighting on the field of Gettysburg by the army of the Potomac was not marked by any unusual gallantry, but the positions that it occupied were held with much more than the usual tenacity of purpose.

There is little to say of the retreat of General Lee's army to the Potomac. When we reached South Mountain, on our retreat, we learned that the Federal cavalry was in strong force threatening the destruction of our trains then collecting at Williamsport, and that it was also inter-

cepting our trains on the road and burning some of our wagons. Upon the receipt of this intelligence, General Lee ordered me to march as rapidly as possible to the relief of our trains. By a forced march we succeeded in clearing the road and reached Williamsport in time to save our supply trains. We then took position covering the crossing there and at Falling Water, a short distance below. As the other corps arrived they were assigned positions and we went to work, as rapidly as possible to strengthen our line with field-works. On the 13th General Lee informed me that the river had fallen sufficiently at Williamsport to allow us to ford, and that the bridge at Falling Water had been repaired, and that he would that night recross the river with his entire army. I suggested as a matter of convenience and to avoid confusion, that it might be better to pass the trains over that night, with everything not essential to battle, and let his troops remain in position until the night of the 14th; that if the rest of his line was as strong as mine we could easily repulse any attack that might be made, and thus recover some of the prestige lost by the discomfiture at Gettysburg. After we crossed the Potomac we soon found that the Federals were pushing along the west side of the Blue Ridge with the purpose of cutting off our retreat to Richmond. General Lee again sent my corps forward to prevent this effort on the part of General Meade, and we succeeded in clearing the way, and holding it open for the Third corps that followed us. General Ewell, however, was cut off, and was obliged to pass the mountains further south. The First corps reached Culpeper Courthouse on the 24th.

In the month of August, 1863, while lying along the Rapidan, I called General Lee's attention to the condition of our affairs in the West, and the progress that was being made by the army under General Rosecranz, in cutting a new line through the State of Georgia, and suggesting that a successful march, such as he had started on would again bisect the Southern country, and that when that was done the war would be virtually over. I suggested that he should adhere to his defensive tactics upon the Rapidan, and reinforce from his army the army lying in front of Rosecranz—so that it could crush that army and then push on to the West. He seemed struck with these views, but was as much opposed to dividing his army as he was in the spring when I first suggested it. He went down to Richmond to arrange for another offensive campaign during the fall. While there several letters passed between us, only two of which I have preserved in connected form. The result of this correspondence was, however, that I was sent with two divisions—Hood's and McLaws'—to reinforce our army then in Georgia. The result of this movement was the defeat of Rosecranz at Chickamauga, when the last hope of the Confederacy expired with the failure of our army to prose-

cute the advantage gained by this defeat. The letters are appended herewith:

[Copy.]

(Confidential.)

“RICHMOND, August 31, 1863.

“Lieutenant-General J. LONGSTREET,

“Headquarters Army Northern Virginia:

“GENERAL: I have wished for several days past to return to the army, but have been detained by the President. He will not listen to my proposition to leave to-morrow.

“I hope you will use every exertion to prepare the army for offensive operations, and improve the condition of men and animals. I can see nothing better to be done than to endeavor to bring General Meade out and use our efforts to crush his army while in the present condition.

“The Quartermaster's Department promise to send up 3,000 bushels of corn per day, provided the cars can be unloaded and returned without delay. I hope you will be able to arrange it so that the cars will not be detained. With this supply of corn, if it can be maintained, the condition of our animals should improve.

“Very respectfully and truly yours,

(Signed) “R. E. LEE, General.”

[Copy.]

“HEADQUARTERS, September 2, 1863.

“GENERAL: Your letter of the 31st is received. I have expressed to Generals Ewell and Hill your wishes, and am doing all that can be done to be well-prepared with my own command. Our greatest difficulty will be in preparing our animals.

“I don't know that we can reasonably hope to accomplish much *here* by offensive operations, unless we are strong enough to cross the Potomac. If we advance to meet the enemy on this side he will in all probability go into one of his many fortified positions. These we cannot afford to attack.

“I know but little of the condition of our affairs in the West, but am inclined to the opinion that our best opportunity for great results is in Tennessee. If we could hold the defensive here with two corps and send the other to operate in Tennessee with that army, I think that we could accomplish more than by an advance from here.

“The enemy seems to have settled down upon the plan of holding certain points by fortifying and defending, while he concentrates upon others. It seems to me that this must succeed, unless we concentrate ourselves and at the same time make occasional show of active operations at all points.

“I know of no other means of acting upon that principle at present, except to depend upon our fortifications in Virginia, and concentrate with one corps of this army and such as may be drawn from others in Tennessee and destroy Rosecranz's army.

“I feel assured that this is practicable, and that greater advantages will be gained than by any operations from here.

“I remain, General, very respectfully,

“Your obedient servant,

(Signed) JAMES LONGSTREET, *Lieut.-General.*

“General R. E. LEE, *Commanding, etc.*”



It will be noticed by those who have watched the desultory controversy maintained upon this subject, that after I had proved the fallacy of Gen. Pendleton's and General Early's idea of a sunrise attack, they fall back upon the charge that I delayed bringing my troops into action, waiving all question of an order from General Lee. I have shown that I did not receive orders from General Lee to attack until about 11 o'clock on the 2d; that I immediately began my dispositions for attack; that I waited about forty minutes for Laws' brigade, by General Lee's assenting authority; that by especial orders from General Lee my corps marched into position by a circuitous route, under the direction and conduct of Col. Johnson of his staff of engineers; that Colonel Johnson's orders were to keep the march of the troops concealed, and that I hurried Hood's division forward in the face of these orders, throwing them into line by a direct march, and breaking up the delay occasioned by the orders of Gen. Lee. I need only add that every movement or halt of the troops on that day was made in the immediate presence of General Lee, or in his sight—certainly within reach of his easy and prompt correction. I quote in this connection the order that I issued to the heads of departments in my corps on the 1st. I present the order issued to Colonel Walton of the artillery, similar orders having been issued to the division commanders:

[Order.]

“HEADQUARTERS FIRST ARMY CORPS,  
“NEAR GETTYSBURG, *July 18, 5:30 P. M.*

“COLONEL: The Commanding-General desires you to come on to-night as fast as you can without distressing your men or animals. Hill and Ewell have sharply engaged the enemy and you will be needed for to-morrow's battle. Let us know where you will stop to-night. \* \* \* \* \*

“Respectfully,

“G. M. SORRELL, *A. A. General.*

“*To Colonel J. B. WALTON, Chief of Artillery.*”\*

I offer also a report made by General Hood touching this march. He says:

“While lying in camp near Chambersburg information was received that Hill and Ewell were about to come into contact with the enemy near Gettysburg. My troops, together with McLaws' division, were at once put in motion upon the most direct road to that point, which we reached after a hard march at or before sunrise on July the 2d. So imperative had been our orders to hasten forward with all possible speed that on the march my troops were allowed to halt and rest only about two hours during the night from the 1st to the 2d of July.”

It appears to me that the gentlemen who made the above-mentioned charges against me have chosen the wrong point of attack. With their motives I have nothing to do; but I cannot help suggesting that if they had charged me with having precipitated the battle instead of having

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\*I am indebted to Colonel Walton for a copy of this order.

delayed it, the records might have sustained them in that my attack was made about four hours before General Ewell's. I am reminded in this connection of what a Federal officer, who was engaged in that battle, said to me when we were talking over the battle and the comments it had provoked. He said: "I cannot imagine how they can charge you with being late in your attack, as you were the only one that got in at all. I do not think their charge can be credited."

In conclusion I may say that it is unfortunate that the discussion of all mooted points concerning the battle was not opened before the death of General Lee. A word or two from him would have settled all points at issue. As it is, I have written an impartial narrative of the facts as they are, with such comments as the nature of the case seemed to demand.

The following appeared in the same issue of the *Times* which contained General Longstreet's paper:

**Some Additions to General Longstreet's Article, printed elsewhere.**

After the pages containing General Longstreet's article on the Gettysburg campaign had been stereotyped, two paragraphs were received from him which he desired to have added as foot notes to the text. As it was impossible to insert them in their proper place, they are given here. The first is a note to the passage which treats of Longstreet's arguments with Lee against making the attack on the morning of the 2d:

Now that the war is over, and we have the privilege of reviewing the conduct of both armies, we can see more clearly what would have been the effect of this proposed movement around the Federal left on the afternoon of the 1st. General Meade telegraphed to General Halleck in cipher just before my battle on the 2d: "If not attacked, and I can get any positive information of the position of the enemy which will justify me in doing so, I will attack. If I find it hazardous to do so, and am satisfied that the enemy is endeavoring to move to my rear and interpose between me and Washington, I shall fall back on my supplies at Westminster." If, therefore, we had drawn everything up on the night of the 1st and made a concentrated move on the morning of the 2d by our right flank, so as to seize the Emmetsburg road, we should either have been attacked or we should have dislodged General Meade from his position. The attack was of all things that which we most desired and had labored for. If, however, we had dislodged him from his position without his daring to strike a blow for his own soil—which is most probable, if not certain—the moral effect upon his army would have been appalling. The grandest feat that a general can hope to perform is to win a victory without striking a blow.

The next is a remark which should be added to the narrative at the point where General Longstreet argues against Colonel Taylor's assumption that he should have advanced Hood's and McLaws' divisions to the attack opened by Pickett, on the 3d:

A reading of the testimony before the committee on the conduct of the war (page 408) will show that General Meade fully anticipated my attack on the 3d, and was determined, if we moved our army in a direct column of assault, to attack it upon the flanks and destroy it. He told General Hancock upon the evening of the 3d that if we attacked him "he would throw the Fifth and Sixth Corps upon the enemy's flank." This determination was thwarted by the position of Hood's and McLaws' divisions, which were in line of battle before him. If I had moved them into the column of assault led by Pickett, as it is absurdly assumed by Colonel Taylor I was expected to do, the two threatening corps would have swept down upon our moving flank, with what effect any military man can easily divine.

The letter from General Longstreet, which accompanies these enclosures, dwells particularly upon a point which he wishes to have his readers understand as the justification of his present narrative. It is that while General Lee on the battle-field assumed all the responsibility for the result, he afterward published a report that differs from the report he made at the time while under that generous spirit. General Longstreet and other officers made their official reports upon the battle shortly after its occurrence, and while they were impressed with General Lee's noble assumption of all the blame; but General Lee having since written a detailed and somewhat critical account of the battle—and the account from which General Longstreet's critics get all their points against him—Longstreet feels himself justified in discussing the battle upon its merits. It is in recognition of his soldierly modesty that the substance of his letter is given here; the article is its own sufficient justification.

**Our Gettysburg Series.**

The origin of the series of papers on Gettysburg which we have published since August last, was the following letter of enquiry which we have recently received permission from its distinguished author to publish. We sent some twenty-five copies of this letter to leading Confederates who participated in the battle and were in position to know its inside history, selecting representatives of every corps and division of our army, and of every arm of the service. The replies received we forwarded to the Count of Paris, and have published in our papers without note or comment of our own.

Besides these we have published at different times the official reports of Generals R. E. Lee, Longstreet, A. P. Hill, J. E. B. Stuart, Rodes, R. H. Anderson, Brigadier-General J. B. Robertson, Colonel W. W. White, commanding Anderson's brigade, Brigadier-General H. L. Benning, Brigadier-General J. B. Kershaw, Colonel E. P. Alexander, and Brigadier-General J. H. Lane.

The reports of Generals Early, and Ewell had been previously published in the *Southern Magazine*, and the report of General W. N. Pendleton, Chief of Artillery, Army Northern Virginia, which is crowded out of this number, will be published hereafter.

These letters and official reports, and the other papers which we have published have made a series which has excited wide interest and attention, and called forth warm expressions as to their value and importance.

The Count of Paris says, in a recent letter concerning these papers: "I cannot say how valuable, how interesting for one who wishes to reach the truth, these letters are. As far as opinions go they do not always agree, and even where it is so, one may take a view different from those expressed by the writers; but they give, with a large number of unknown facts, a most interesting insight into the way in which the campaign, and especially the battle of Gettysburg was managed by General Lee and his subordinates."

It will be seen in the letter from our friend Major Scheibert, of the Prussian Royal Engineers, which we publish below, that he regards these papers as of the very highest interest and value.

We have thought proper to prefix these remarks to the letter which originated the series, which we now give in full as follows:

**Letter from the Count of Paris.**SEVILLA, *January 21st, 1877.**Rev. J. WM. JONES, D. D.,**Secretary Southern Historical Society:*

DEAR SIR: I am writing the account of the battle of Gettysburg, and consider that chapter as the most important, the most difficult to write of the whole work which I have undertaken. I share the opinion of those who think that the Confederate cause was not a lost cause from the beginning; that it may have been successful; and therefore I seek with great care to find out why it did not succeed. The battle of Gettysburg, coupled with the surrender of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, is, in that respect, the turning point of the war.

The Army of Northern Virginia, when it invaded the Northern States was more powerful than it had ever been before. The issue of the invasion was disastrous for the Confederate cause. This is a mere fact which neither a Southerner nor a Northerner can dispute. Therefore, I must show the causes of this disaster without any disparagement for the army or its leader, just as I pointed out the causes of the ill successes of McClellan and Burnside, and shall do the same for Hooker.

At present, as far as my studies of this period go, my opinion on the question is this: The mistakes which brought upon the Confederate arms the repulse at Gettysburg with its fatal consequences were the following:

1st. It was a mistake to invade the Northern States at all, because it stirred up their military spirit. The best chance of the Confederacy was the pecuniary exhaustion of the North, and not the exhaustion of its resources in men. The invasion was the death-blow to what has been called the Copperhead party. It called under arms thousands of men who would never have enrolled otherwise, and who became experienced soldiers in '64, and, moreover, it diminished for one or two years the resisting powers of the Confederate army.

2d. If the invasion was to be undertaken, only raiding parties should have been sent until the Army of the Potomac should have been defeated. It was a great mistake to bring her on the

Northern soil, where they fought ten times better than in Virginia. A real invasion, viz: the establishment of the Confederate army in Pennsylvania, with its communications well secured, was an impossibility as long as the Federal army was not crushed. The proof is, that as soon as the latter began to move, Lee, who had undertaken nothing but a raid on a too large scale, found himself so much endangered that he was obliged to fight an offensive battle on the ground where Meade chose to wait for him. He ought to have manœuvered in Virginia so as to bring on a battle before crossing the Potomac.

3rd. The way in which the fights of the 2nd of July were directed does not show the same co-ordination which ensured the success of the Southern arms at Gaines' Mill and Chancellorsville.

4th. I do not understand why Lee, having gained some success on the 2nd, but found the Federal position very strong, did not attempt to turn it by the south, which was its weak place, by extending his right so as to endanger Meade's communications with Washington.

5th. The heroic but foolish attack of Pickett, on the 3rd, should never have been attempted. Longstreet seems to think that it was imposed upon him against his will by Lee. General Early says distinctly, in a paper published by the Southern Historical Society, that Longstreet deferred it so long that the Second corps could not co-operate with it as it would have done if the attack had taken place early in the morning. I hesitate very much between these two opinions.

I put these questions to you in a letter which I wish you to keep private, at least, not to publish; because, in my sincere desire to judge fairly the Confederate army, you may help me by putting the same questions to some of the Confederate leaders who are still alive, and with whom you are in correspondence. The opinion of General Early, for whom I have the greatest consideration as a soldier, would be especially valuable for me. Of course I do not pledge myself to accept wholly any one's opinion, but it would be of the greatest importance for me to know what Confederate officers think now of the causes of their repulse at Gettysburg.

Believe me, dear sir, yours truly,

L. P. D'ORLEANS, *Comte de Paris.*

[Address: Chateau d'Eu Seine-Inferiense, France.]

**Letter from Maj. Scheibert, of the Prussian Royal Engineers.**

[As the opinion of a distinguished foreigner who witnessed the battle of Gettysburg and has manifested the liveliest interest in the discussion concerning it, the following letter will have an interest for all of our readers; but for those who knew the gallant Prussian, and appreciated his warm sympathy for our struggling people, it will have a peculiar interest.]

STUTTGART, 21st Nov., '77.

Rev. J. WM. JONES,

*Sec'y S. H. Soc'y :*

DEAR SIR: You will, perhaps, be surprised that a foreigner should desire to mingle in the discussion of the battle of Gettysburg; but I have some reasons which urge me to give you *my* opinion about that affair. 1. I was an impartial observer; 2. I was, so far as I know, the only man on the Southern side who could see everything going on in that battle, having climbed into the top of a very tall tree near Gettysburg, which overlooked all the woody country. I had so good a view that Gen'l Lee himself came up to the tree twice to ask about the positions and movements of the enemy.

It was the same tree upon which Col. Freemantle sat (see Gen'l Hood's letter) until the opening of the battle, when (longing to see a fight, which he had never seen before,) he left his position.

The questions of the English author, whose name I do not know, lead me to suppose that either he is not a soldier or has never studied the war, and they remind me of the questions asked by the famous "Committee on the Conduct of the War," which made the officers of our army smile.

But the result of those poor questions is a splendid, rich, military harvest, which will most deeply interest every European soldier.

I cannot remember, notwithstanding my earnest studies in military history, one case where the history of a battle has been so fully illustrated and illuminated by individual reports given by all of the prominent leaders—not immediately after the battle, when personal impressions are conflicting, but after a lapse of more than ten years, when time and matured judgment have ripened the

fresh sketch into a splendid picture. The result is so impressive that if I were professor of military science, I would choose the battle of Gettysburg for the special study of my students. My personal impressions about the poor result of the battle of Gettysburg have been exactly expressed by Gen'l Heth, whose letter I fully endorse. But he, as well as the other writers, has omitted one element which seems to me to be of the highest importance. I refer to the individual character of Gen'l Lee. I have made the military character of this General, who has never had an admirer of such fervour as myself, my peculiar study, and have written a biographical sketch of him, which appeared in a German paper.

Lee was, in my opinion, one of the ablest leaders of this century in two great qualities. He weighed everything, even the smallest detail, in making his general plan of battle, and he made the boldest dispositions with heroic courage and the most stubborn energy. He gave to every link the right place in the construction of a chain which became a masterpiece of military workmanship.

He did not reach his conclusions, as Jackson and Stuart did, by an instinctive, sudden impulse; his plans did not come upon him like the lightning's flash followed by the thunder's crash: but he painfully and studiously labored in order to arrange those splendid dispositions fraught with the keenest and most hardy enterprises, and well worthy of the troops which were ordered to execute them.

General Lee, in speaking to me of his dispositions, said: "Captain, I do everything in my power to make my plans as perfect as possible, and to bring the troops upon the field of battle; the rest must be done by my generals and their troops, trusting to Providence for the victory."

Thus he would successfully oppose immense odds, as the result of his thorough preparation, so long as he was minutely advised of the whereabouts, strength, and intentions of the enemy. "The eyes" by which he saw these things, as my friend Colonel Taylor justly observes, was his cavalry, and without these he was groping unsafely in the dark night.

But in all these cases General Jackson (who had his special information coupled with his natural instincts, his sudden impulses, and his peculiar ideas,) came or was ordered to headquarters to



give his personal opinions to the Commanding-General, who linked the genial thoughts of Jackson to his own beautiful chain: *e. g.*, before the battle of Chancellorsville these famous leaders met on a hill near the Aldrich house to mature those plans which resulted in the unequalled battles of the Wilderness and Chancellorsville. Each of these generals was the supplement to the other; just as in the family, *both man and wife* are necessary to keep up the household.

When Jackson fell, Lee, as he himself said, lost his right arm, the army lost the mother, and thus the void which had been made was too great to be so soon closed, the wound which the army received too deep to be healed in four weeks. Thus the carefully-planning general encountered the fearful odds at Gettysburg without his faithful mirror, the cavalry, and without his ready counsellor, General Jackson. He himself felt this great loss in making his dispositions. He felt uneasy, as Hood justly remarks.

All who saw him on these two occasions, Chancellorsville and Gettysburg, will remember that Lee at Chancellorsville (where I had the honor of being at his side in the brunt of the struggle), was full of calm, quiet, self-possession, feeling that he had done his duty to the utmost, and had brought the army into the most favorable position to defeat the hostile host. In the days at Gettysburg this quiet self-possessed calmness was wanting. Lee was not at his ease, but was riding to and fro, frequently changing his position, making anxious enquiries here and there, and looking care-worn. After the shock of battle was over he resumed his accustomed calmness, for then he saw clearly and handled the army with that masterly ability which was peculiar to him. This uneasiness during the days of the battle was contagious to the army, as will appear from the reports of Longstreet, Hood, Heth, and others, and as appeared also to me from the peep I had of the battle-field. What a difference from the systematic advance of the army from the Wilderness to the assault of the breastworks at Chancellorsville, where a unity of disposition and a feeling of security reigned in all the ranks. At Gettysburg there was cannonading without real effect, desultory efforts without combination, and lastly, the single attack which closed the drama, and which I, from my outlook in the top of the tree, believed to be only a reconnoissance in heavy force.

Want of confidence, misapprehensions, and mistakes were the consequences, less of Stuart's absence than of the absence of Jackson, whose place up to this time had not been filled.

After this it was filled *by Lee himself*, who, like a father when the mother dies, seeks to fill both her place and his own in the house. He doubled his fighting qualities, he made the most judicious use of his cavalry, and the result was splendid, for the campaign of 1864 to the closing scene at Appomattox was the most brilliant which Lee ever fought.

We European soldiers have only one wish, and that is that, like the battles of 1861 to 1863, the last campaign may find Southern authors and authorities to give special narratives and correct details of that famous series of battles, concerning which we are in comparative ignorance.

The battle of Gettysburg would have been won by Lee's army if it could have advanced at any time and on any part of the field to *one concentrated and combined attack* on the enemy's position. This is the impression I have received from my personal observation, and from the valuable details of your exceedingly interesting papers.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

I. SCHEIBERT.

## EDITORIAL PARAGRAPHS.

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THE COMBINING OF OUR JANUARY AND FEBRUARY numbers enables us to give articles which have been already delayed longer than was desirable, while our readers lose nothing by the change, and gain an earlier reception of the matter for our February number.

RENEWALS AND NEW SUBSCRIBERS are now in order, and we beg our friends to let us have both as rapidly as possible. If you hear an old subscriber complaining that he has not received his *January* number, please ask him, with our compliments, if he has sent on his *renewal fee!* We do not send this number to those whose time has expired and from whom we have not heard; and let each one of our friends try to send us at least one new subscriber.

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MISTAKES BY OUR PRINTER are not frequent, but our last number contained some which were as annoying to him as to the writer and the editor. In the two papers by General Early on the Battle of Gettysburg there were a number of errors, the most important of which we correct, as follows: Page 243, line 10, for "round" read "moved"; page 246, line 16, for "above" read "alone"; page 248, line 19, for "Brownsboro'" read "Boonsboro'"; page 259, line 23, for "our" read "one"; page 259, line 4 from bottom, for "force" before "strongly" read "part"; page 272, line 4, for "northwest" read "southwest"; page 273, line 15, for "argued" read "agreed"; page 281, line 5 of note, for "Jenlac" read "Senlac"; page 288, line 18, for "morning" read "evening"; page 291, line 24, for "sabre-hilt" read "sabre-belt"; page 299, line 29, for "Gracy's" read "Geary's"; page 300, line 4 of note, for "2nd" read "3rd"; page 301, line 4 from bottom of note, for "our" read "one"; page 279, line 10, the date "18th of September" should be the "19th of September," the error being in the manuscript. There are a number of verbal errors, as the substitution of "in" for "on," and of "these" for "those."

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OUR LIBERAL BENEFACTOR, W. W. CORCORAN, Esq., of Washington, has placed the Society under renewed obligations by another donation of

\$500. Of princely liberality, Mr. Corcoran is at the same time *judicious* in his donations, and it adds to the pleasure of this gift to receive it as a token of his continued interest in the work we are doing and his confidence in the management of our affairs.

### Book Notices.

THE NARRATIVE OF A BLOCKADE-RUNNER, by Capt. J. Wilkinson, C. S. Navy. New York: Sheldon & Co.

We had the privilege of reading this book in the MS. of its gallant author, and have read it again with the liveliest interest in the handsome form in which Sheldon & Co. have brought it out.

The first three chapters of the book contain an exceedingly interesting narrative of the secession of Virginia, naval service on the Potomac and on the lower Mississippi, and of the events which preceded the fall of New Orleans.

In his fourth chapter he gives an account of his prison experience, discusses somewhat the "prison question," and does us the honor to quote the *summing up* of the discussion of this question in our *Papers*.

The remaining chapters of the book tell the thrilling story of his adventures as a blockade-runner, and give incidents of deep interest and great historic value.

Captain Wilkinson made twenty-one successful trips in the "Lee," and then commanded most successfully the "Whisper," the "Chickamauga," and the "Chameleon."

The narrative is admirably written, and, although the modesty of the author keeps himself in the background, it is easy to see that Capt. Wilkinson was one of the most gallant and skilful of that noble body of old naval officers who gave up lucrative and pleasant places in the United States service and cheerfully sacrificed their all for the cause of constitutional freedom.

He has produced a book of rare interest, which should have a place in every library and be widely read by our people.

It is sufficient to say of the general *get-up* of the book that it is in the best style of those masters of the art of book-making, Sheldon & Co., New York.

FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE, by Colonel Walter H. Taylor, of his staff, is a book which must have the widest circulation, and go down to posterity as of highest authority on the points of which it treats.

From the time that General Lee took command of the Virginia forces in '61 to the surrender at Appomattox, Colonel Taylor served on his staff, and was one of his most trusted officers. For a large part of this period he occupied the position of Adjutant-General of the Army of Northern Virginia, and no man in that army was more widely known or more universally esteemed for high personal character, or for the intelligent zeal and rare ability and tact with which he discharged his delicate and responsible duties.

With such opportunities for knowing the *inside* history of our grand old army, we expected Colonel Taylor to give us a book of great historic value, and we have not been disappointed. We have read it twice with increasing interest, and have placed it on a convenient shelf for frequent consultation. There will be, of course, differences of opinion in reference to certain of his statements and opinions; but no one who knows Colonel Taylor can doubt for a moment that he has carefully, and conscientiously endeavored to "tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth" concerning the great events of which he writes.

He gives a number of hitherto unpublished incidents which illustrate the character of General Lee and make us wish that his narrative had been fuller in this respect, and he brings out invaluable material for a correct understanding of the campaigns of his great chief.

But a main object of his book was to determine the relative numbers of the Confederate and Federal armies in all of the principal battles, and this he has certainly *settled* beyond all dispute.

By some means (*how* we are not told) Colonel Taylor was so fortunate as to obtain access to the field returns of the Army of Northern Virginia, now in the "Archive Bureau" at Washington, and to verify his memoranda of our numbers; and thus he is enabled to show (taking the Federal official reports of their numbers) the fearful odds against which we always fought.

We propose to give his figures in a future number. We have only space now to add that the style of the author is simple, clear, direct, and admirably suited to his subject. The fact that the book is published by D. Appleton & Co., New York, is sufficient guarantee that in paper, type, binding, &c., it is all that could be desired.

We only regret that the publishers have put in as frontispiece a very poor likeness of General Lee, instead of a very fine one which they have used in others of their publications.

We conclude with the hope that this book will meet with such general favor as to induce the accomplished author to write a *full* history of the campaigns of the Army of Northern Virginia.

# SOUTHERN HISTORICAL SOCIETY PAPERS.

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## The True Story of the Capture of Jefferson Davis.

BY MAJOR W. T. WALTHALL,

(Late A. A. G., Confederate Army.)

[The following article was written and ready for publication a few weeks after the appearance of that of General Wilson, which was the proximate occasion for its preparation. It was sent to the *Philadelphia Times*, in which General Wilson's paper had appeared, and which had agreed to publish it. In consequence, however, of protracted and unexplained delay in the fulfilment of this agreement, it was withdrawn from the office of that journal, after lying there for some months, and is now submitted to the readers of the *Southern Historical Society Papers*, with this explanation of the delay in its publication.]

The publication, in the *Philadelphia Weekly Times* of July 7th, 1877, of an article by Major-General James H. Wilson, professing to give an account of the capture of the Confederate President in 1865, has not only revived a fictitious story circulated soon after that event occurred—perhaps still current among the vulgar, though long since refuted—but has surrounded it with a cluster of new embellishments, which had heretofore been either “unwritten history” or unimagined fiction. To which of these classes they belong, the reader may be better able to determine after an examination of the evidence which it is one of the objects of this paper to lay before him.

The key-note to the temper, as well as the truthfulness of Gen. Wilson's narrative, may be found in its first paragraph, which I quote entire:

“On the first Sunday of April, 1865, while seated in St. Paul's church in Richmond, Jeffersen Davis received a telegram from

Lee, announcing the fall of Petersburg, the partial destruction of his army, and the immediate necessity for flight. Although he could not have been entirely unprepared for this intelligence, it appears that he did not receive it with self-possession or dignity; but with tremulous and nervous haste, like a weak man in the hour of misfortune, he left the house of worship and hurried home, where he and his more resolute wife spent the rest of the day in packing their personal baggage. Those who are acquainted with the character of Mrs. Davis, can readily imagine with what energy and determination she must have prepared her family for flight, and with what rage and disappointment she resigned the sceptre she had wielded over the social and fashionable life of 'Richmond on the James.' They may be sure, too, that although heartsick and disgusted, there was nothing irresolute or vascillating in her actions. At nightfall everything was in readiness; even the gold then remaining in the treasury, not exceeding in all \$40,000, was packed among the baggage, and under cover of darkness the President of the Confederacy, accompanied by his family and three members of his Cabinet, Breckinridge, Benjamin, and Reagan, drove rapidly to the train which had been prepared to carry them from Richmond. This train, it is said, was the one which had carried provisions to Amelia Courthouse for Lee's hard-pressed and hungry army, and having been ordered to Richmond, had taken those supplies to that place, where they were abandoned for a more ignoble freight. As a matter of course the starving rebel soldiers suffered, but Davis succeeded in reaching Danville in safety, where he rapidly recovered from the fright he had sustained, and astonished his followers by a proclamation as bombastic and empty as his fortunes were straightened and desperate."

Whether the tone of this extract is that of chivalrous generosity and courtesy, or of coarse and bitter vulgarity, is a minor question, which it is not necessary to discuss. Whether its statements are true or false, is one of more interest, with regard to which it will be found on analysis that there is but *one* positive truth in the whole passage. There are at least *four* positive falsehoods in relation to matters of fact, susceptible of proof; *one* assertion of a sort perhaps not capable of being finally tested by positive evidence, but contrary to the statements of witnesses and to all moral and circumstantial proof to which it can be subjected; and *two* others, with regard to which I am not fully informed, but which are at least improbable and not in harmony with known facts.

To come to particulars, the one truth is that contained in the first sentence, that a certain telegram was received on a certain

day by President Davis, while seated in St. Paul's church, Richmond.

The statement immediately following, that he did not receive this dispatch "with self-possession or dignity," but that he left the house "with tremulous and nervous haste, like a weak man in the hour of misfortune," is that which I have classified as one *perhaps* not capable of being tested by positive proof; and this not from any doubt as to its entire *untruth*, but on account of the subjective character of the only evidence that can be applied to it. Two observers, the one self-possessed and impartial, the other, either frightened himself, or imbued with the malignant spirit that seems to animate the pen of General Wilson, might form very different estimates of the demeanor of the object of their observation. General Wilson does not profess to have been a witness of what he describes, nor does he give the name of his informant, although his account is directly contrary to all the statements of actual witnesses that have heretofore been generally received. Whatever other accusations may be entertained, no one familiar with the character and history of Jefferson Davis, whether honest friend or candid foe, will believe that he ever exhibited weakness or lack of self-possession in time of peril or calamity.

Let us hurry on, however, to an examination of the positive patent falsehoods in respect of matters of fact, contained in Gen. Wilson's first paragraph. [I am very desirous of avoiding hard words, but really know no euphuism for *falsehood* at all applicable to this case.]

1st. "*He left the house of worship and hurried home.*"

President Davis did not hurry home at all. On the contrary, he went to the executive office, which was not in the same part of the city with his home, and there called a meeting of his Cabinet, which continued in session for several hours. At this session there was no hurry or confusion. On the contrary, the calmness with which the grave questions under consideration were discussed by the principal member of the council, and his apparent indifference to his personal safety and private interests, were subjects of remark by others present. He did not go to his home until late in the afternoon.

2nd. "*He and his more resolute wife spent the rest of the day in packing their personal baggage,*" &c.



This statement and the highly-colored description which follows, of the "packing" and of the "rage and disappointment" of Mrs. Davis, are pure fiction, presumably of General Wilson's own invention; for it is well known that Mrs. Davis and all the President's family had left Richmond some time before, and were *at this very time either in Raleigh or Charlotte, North Carolina*. The "packing" of Mr. Davis' official papers was done by the gentlemen of his personal staff; that of his wearing apparel by his servants.

It would be beyond the scope of my present purpose to pause here to pay more than a casual tribute to the soldierlike and chivalrous magnanimity that could invent a story like this for the sake of making an opportunity to jeer and sneer at the distress of a lady in time of danger and calamity.

3rd. "He drove rapidly to the train, \* \* \* \* accompanied by his family."

This statement is merely a variation of the previous fiction, without even an atom of foundation in fact, and needs no further comment.

4th. He was also accompanied, says General Wilson, by "*three members of his Cabinet, Breckinridge, Benjamin, and Reagan.*"

He was really accompanied by *five* members of his Cabinet, Messrs. Benjamin, Mallory, Reagan, Trenholm, and Davis; Gen. Breckinridge was not among them, and did not leave Richmond until the next morning. The misstatement in this case is altogether immaterial. It seems to spring out of the very wantonness and exuberance of untruthfulness in the narrator; but it serves to show how much reliance may be placed upon the accuracy of his assertions in minor matters, as well as in greater.

The two other statements which, by way of abundant caution against doing any injustice even to General Wilson, I have designated merely as "*improbable*" and scarcely consistent with known facts, are first, that the gold in the Confederate treasury was "packed among the baggage," which from the context seems to be intended to mean that it was packed among the President's baggage; and second, that the train in which the party traveled, "it is said," was one which had carried provisions to Amelia Courthouse for Lee's army, had thence been ordered to Richmond, and had abandoned the supplies for a "more ignoble freight."

With regard to the first of these statements, it need only be said that the gold which was taken was in charge of Mr. Trenholm, the Secretary of the Treasury. How and where he "packed" it, I am not informed; but it is not at all likely that it was packed among the President's "baggage."

As to the other point, waiving all question of the nobility or ignobility of the Confederate President and Cabinet, considered as freight, it is enough to say that they traveled by a passenger train, not adapted nor employed for carrying provisions; and moreover, that, if supplies had been sent by this or any other train to Amelia Courthouse, a village on the Richmond and Danville railroad, they were no doubt sent *through* it, on the way to Richmond. The Commissary-General of the Confederate army has shown in a recent publication (*Southern Historical Society Papers* for March, 1877), that no requisition for supplies to be sent to Amelia Courthouse was ever received by him or his assistants, and that the Secretary of War had no knowledge of any such. Mr. Harvie, the president at that time of the Danville road, also testifies (*Ibid.*), that ample supplies could have been sent to Amelia Courthouse for an army twice the size of Lee's, but that neither he nor the superintendent had any notice that they were wanted there. General Wilson qualifies this particular statement by the vague limitation, "it is said," but the *on dit* seems to be entitled to little more credit than if it had been his own assertion.

Passing over all subordinate and incidental matters we come, in the next paragraph, to a yet more astounding historic revelation, as follows:

"It is stated upon what appears to be good authority, that Davis had, many weeks before Lee's catastrophe, made 'the most careful and exacting preparations for his escape, discussing the matter fully with his Cabinet in profound secrecy, and deciding that, in order to secure the escape of himself and principal officers, the Shenandoah should be ordered to cruise off the coast of Florida to take the fugitives on board.' These orders were sent to the rebel cruiser many days before Lee's lines were broken. It was thought that the party might make an easy and deliberate escape in the way agreed upon, as the communications with the Florida coast were at that time scarcely doubtful, and once on the swift-sailing Shenandoah, the most valuable remnant of the Anglo-Confederate navy, 'they might soon obtain an asylum on a foreign shore.' "

General Wilson, it will be observed, adopts this remarkable story from some source which he does not indicate otherwise than as "what appears to be good authority." He does injustice both to its inventor and his readers, in failing to specify the authority, for it surpasses in reckless audacity of invention anything else that he has told us.\* To appreciate this, we must remember that the *Shenandoah* was at that time on the other side of the world. Indeed, if I mistake not, she had never been and never was, on or near the American coast. Cruising in remote seas, her commander was not informed of the fall of the Confederacy and close of the war until long afterward. It was late in the autumn of 1865 before she was surrendered by him to the British authorities. Blockaded as the Confederate coast was, there could have been no reasonable hope that such orders as those described could reach her and be executed, within six or eight months at the least. And even if she had been within reach, an order to a ship of war to cruise "off the coast of Florida"—a coast of more than a thousand miles in extent, with all its ports in possession of the enemy—to take off a party of fugitives at some point which could not possibly be designated beforehand, would have been too stupid a thing to have been done, or discussed even "in profound secrecy" by a government, the members of which have never been charged, even by their enemies, with total insanity.

Although the facts above stated with regard to the *Shenandoah* are well known, the following letter from a distinguished authority on Confederate naval history may serve to confirm them. The death of the illustrious author soon after it was written invests it with a painful interest:

**Letter from Admiral Semmes.**

MOBILE, ALABAMA, *August 13th, 1877.*

*Major W. T. WALTHALL:*

DEAR SIR: You are quite right as to the *locus in quo* of the *Shenandoah*. She was either in the North Pacific or Indian ocean at the time of the surrender. The news of the final catastrophe to

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\* From a subsequent remark of General Wilson, it seems likely that his only "authority" for some of his statements—perhaps for this, among others—is that of Pollard, who wrote a defamatory "Life of Jefferson Davis." The book is so utterly worthless as "authority," that the more intelligent and respectable, even of Mr. Davis' enemies, would blush to quote it.

our arms reached her in the latter ocean, when she struck her guns below in her hold, made the best of her way to England, and surrendered herself to the British government in trust for the conquering belligerent.

It is well known to the country that only a few weeks before the surrender of Lee, President Davis had no thought of surrender himself. His speech at the African church in Richmond, after the return of the Commission from Old Point, is ample evidence of this. If he had meditated flight from the country, as is falsely pretended by General Wilson, and to facilitate this, had desired to communicate with the Shenandoah, three or four months must have elapsed before a dispatch could reach her, and an equal length of time before she could return to the coast of Florida—even if he had known her precise locality; which was a matter of great improbability under the discretionary orders under which the ship was cruising.

I was, myself, commanding the James river fleet in the latter days of the war, and was in daily communication with the Navy Department, and if any such intention as that mentioned had been entertained by the Executive, I think I would have been consulted as to the whereabouts of the Shenandoah and the means of reaching her. Nothing of the kind transpired.

I remain very truly yours, &c.,

RAPHAEL SEMMES.

General Wilson continues:

“When Davis and his companions left Richmond in pursuance of this plan, they believed that Lee could avoid surrender only a short time longer. A few days thereafter the news of this expected calamity reached them, when they turned their faces again toward the South. Breckinridge, the Secretary of War, was sent to confer with Johnston, but found him only in time to assist in drawing up the terms of his celebrated capitulation to Sherman. The intelligence of this event caused the rebel chieftain to renew his flight; but, while hurrying onward, some fatuity induced him to change his plans and to adopt the alternative of trying to push through the Southwest toward the region which he fondly believed to be yet under the domination of Forrest, Taylor, and Kirby Smith, and within which he hoped to revive the desperate fortunes of the rebellion. He confided his hopes to Breckinridge, and when he reached Abbeville, South Carolina, he called a council of war to deliberate upon the plans which he had conceived for regenerating what had now become in fact ‘The Lost Cause.’ This council was composed of Generals Breckinridge, Bragg, and the commanders of the cavalry force which was then escorting him. All united that it was hopeless to struggle longer, but they added that they would not disband their men till they had guarded their chieftain to a place of safety. This was the last council of the Confederacy. Davis, who had hitherto commanded with all the

rigor of an autocrat, found himself powerless and deserted. From this day forth he was little better than a fugitive, for although his escort gave him and his wagon-train nominal company and protection till he had reached the village of Washington, just within the northeastern boundary of Georgia, they had long since learned the hopelessness of further resistance, and now began to despair even of successful flight."

In all this, as in what precedes it, there is scarcely an atom of truth. When Mr. Davis left Richmond he did *not* expect Lee to have to surrender. His preparations for defence at Danville would have been wholly inconsistent with such an expectation. Breckinridge was *not* "sent to confer with Johnston," nor did he find him "only in time to assist in drawing up the terms of his celebrated capitulation to Sherman." On the contrary, he arrived at Greensboro' on the 12th or 13th of May, in time to take part in a conference already in progress between President Davis and some of his Cabinet, Generals Johnston and Beauregard. Several days afterward he again met General Johnston, in response to a telegraphic request from the latter, in full time to take part in the negotiations with General Sherman, which resulted, on the 18th, not in the final "capitulation," but in the *armistice* which the Government of the United States declined to ratify. General Breckinridge was not present and took no part in the celebrated capitulation. [See Johnson's Narrative, pages 396-407.]

There was no such change of "plan", fatuous or not fatuous, as represented by General Wilson. No "council of war" was held at Abbeville. General Bragg was not at Abbeville. No cavalry commander was a member of "the last council of the Confederacy." Mr. Davis had no wagon train. But it would be tedious and unprofitable to follow the misstatements of General Wilson and expose them in detail. They are too manifold even for enumeration. Enough has been said to show how utterly unworthy of credit is his evidence in support of any statement whatever.

Admiral Semmes, in the letter above copied, has briefly noticed the falsity of the representation that President Davis had been preparing to leave the country, or had even entertained any thought of surrender. The removal of his family from Richmond was not in anticipation of such an event, but as an example to encourage what the government was recommending to the citizens

in general, that all should leave that city who conveniently could, on account of the increasing scarcity of supplies. It is reasonable to presume—and I speak only from presumption, not from any positive information—that the *possibility* of having to abandon the capital had been considered by the Confederate authorities for nearly three years previous, and that some degree of preparation for removal of the archives of the government in such case may have existed during all that period; but no expectation of the necessity for an early evacuation had been entertained until Gen. Lee's telegram of the 2d April was received. General Lee himself had expected to be able to hold his position at Petersburg at least "until the roads were hardened," (to use his own expression,) and continued to entertain that hope until his attenuated lines were broken at Five Forks, on the 1st of April; nor did he anticipate, in leaving Petersburg, the series of disasters which compelled the surrender of his army, within a week afterward, under circumstances which made the surrender more illustrious than the conquest.

As to the charge that President Davis was preparing for "flight" from the country, there is not even the pretence of any evidence to support it. It is a mere calumny, without any basis of truth whatever. The only proposition of that sort of which we have any evidence, proceeded from a very different quarter—from the headquarters of the Federal army. General Sherman, in his *Memoirs* (pages 351–52), says that, in a conference with *his* general officers, pending the negotiations for an armistice, they discussed the question whether, "if Johnston made a point of it," he (Sherman) should assent to the "escape from the country" of the Confederate President and Cabinet; and that one of the council insisted that, if asked for, a vessel should be provided to take them to Nassau. He does not say whether he himself favored this proposition, or not; but General Johnston, in a note to his account of the negotiations, which Sherman pronounces "quite accurate and correct," says "General Sherman did not desire the arrest of these gentlemen. He was too acute not to foresee the embarrassment their capture would cause; *therefore, he wished them to escape.*"

Comparing these statements with each other, and with impressions made upon others who were participants in the events of

the period, there can be no doubt as to General Sherman's inclinations in the matter, "if Johnston [had] made a point of it;" but General Johnston made no such point. He knew, no doubt, that any proposition to abandon the country would have been promptly rejected by President Davis, and no Confederate General would have made so offensive a suggestion to him.

A week or two later, when it was proposed by one or more of his friends, that he should endeavor to reach Havana or some other West Indian port—not for the purpose of *escape*, but as the best and safest route to "the Trans-Mississippi"—he refused, on the ground that it would require him to leave the country, although it were only for a few days. Some allowance ought perhaps to be made for General Wilson's offences against truth in this particular, on the score of his inability to comprehend the high sense of official honor by which Mr. Davis was actuated. Men's ethical standards are very diverse.

General Wilson shows as little regard for common sense, or consistency, as for truth and candor. Thus, we find him saying that "Davis, *instead of observing the armistice*, was making his way toward the South with an escort." And again: "I still felt certain, from what I could learn, that Davis and his Cabinet would endeavor to escape to the west side of the Mississippi river, *notwithstanding the armistice and capitulation*." The armistice was one thing, and the capitulation another. The capitulation of General Johnston did not take place until after the armistice had been repudiated by the United States Government and the forty-eight hours allowed for notice of its disapproval had expired. President Davis became a party to the armistice by giving it his consent and approval, but had nothing to do with the capitulation. So far was he from failing to observe the former, that he remained in Charlotte, quiescent, not only until he was informed of its rejection at Washington, but *until the forty-eight hours were completed*, when he mounted his horse and rode off, having scrupulously observed it to the letter and the minute. This was on the 26th of April. On the same day took place, near Durham's Station, the capitulation of "the troops under General Johnston's command," which certainly did not include the President of the Confederate States, who was not "under General Johnston's command," and who had no part whatever in the transaction.

Leaving General Wilson to describe the disposition made of his own troops, and to recite their movements—a task which, in the absence of any other information, I can only presume that he has performed with more fidelity to truth than is exhibited in the other parts of his article—I now proceed briefly to narrate the facts immediately connected with the capture of President Davis. In doing this, it will suffice to repeat the substance, and, in general, the very words of a narrative published more than a year ago (in the *Mobile Cycle* of May 27th, 1876), which probably met the eye of but few who will be readers of the present article. Proceeding in either case from the same pen, it will be unnecessary to designate such passages as are repetitions of the same language by quotation marks.

The movements of President Davis and his Cabinet, after the evacuation of Richmond, on the night of the 2d of April, are related with substantial accuracy in Alfriend's "Life of Jefferson Davis"—a great part of them in the words of a narrative written by the late Mr. Mallory, Secretary of the Confederate Navy—until the dispersion of the party at Washington, Georgia, where Mr. Mallory parted with him. It is not necessary to go over this ground. The incidents that follow have not been so well known, but I am enabled to give them on the best authority. If there is any inaccuracy or uncertainty, it is merely with regard to minor matters of dates, places, names, &c.

Mr. Mallory's narrative mentions the passage of the Savannah river "upon a pontoon bridge" (which was really only a ferry flat), by the President and his escort, about daybreak on the morning of one of the early days of May. The main body of the troops (perhaps a thousand cavalry, or more,) which had accompanied them, were left, under command of General Breckinridge, to follow as soon as they could cross the river, the President pushing forward with only a few gentlemen of his Cabinet and personal staff, and an escort of a single company, commanded by Captain Campbell, to the little town of Washington, in Georgia. On the way he was informed that some Federal troops in the vicinity were preparing to attack the village and capture some stores which had been deposited there, and he sent back a messenger to the officer commanding the advance of the troops left



at the river, urging him to come on with his command with all possible speed.

Arriving at Washington, the President was hospitably received and entertained at the house of a private citizen, and preparations were made to resist the expected attack as effectually as possible with the small force at his disposal. He soon ascertained, however, from the reports of scouts sent out into the surrounding country, that there were none but small and scattered squads of Federal soldiers in the neighborhood.

Meantime, advices were received from General Breckinridge, to the effect that, in the demoralized condition of his troops, it was almost impossible to hold them together. They were demanding money, and he asked that the Secretary of the Treasury should send some specie, to make a partial payment to the troops, hoping by this means to prevent a disintegration of the command. The specie was sent, but the troops did not come forward.

Under these circumstances the President determined to abandon the design of taking the troops with him, and to endeavor to make his own way, with only a small party, by a *detour* to the southward of the parts of the country occupied by the enemy, across the Chattahoochee. It was believed that Generals Taylor and Forrest were yet holding the field in Alabama and Mississippi, and that many soldiers who had not been surrendered and paroled in Virginia or North Carolina, would join those commands and might constitute a formidable force. In the event, however, of finding the position in those States untenable, it was then his purpose to cross the Mississippi river, in the hope of continuing the struggle with the forces yet free to operate in the "Trans-Mississippi Department," until the Government of the United States should agree to such terms of peace as would secure to the States of the Confederacy at least those rights which it had declared there was no intention to invade.

Calling for Captain Campbell, the President announced his purpose, and asked for ten volunteers of that officer's company, if they were to be had, with the understanding that they were to incur any danger, or endure any hardship, that might be necessary; to obey any order, and to ask no questions. The whole company promptly volunteered when the call was made, but ten trusty men

were selected. With these, under command of Captain Campbell; Mr. Reagan, Postmaster-General, and Colonel William Preston Johnston, Colonel John Taylor Wood (formerly of the Confederate Navy), and Colonel Lubbock, of Texas, Aids to the President, he set off on his journey toward the southwest.

How long or how far they had proceeded, we are unable to state with precision—certainly, however, not more than a day or two—when they learned from some persons met with on the way that Mrs. Davis and her party were in danger of being attacked by some marauding banditti, composed of deserters and stragglers from both armies, who were prowling through the country. [The President's family, it should be understood, had been sent, by his direction, several weeks earlier, from North Carolina southward, and after a delay of some days at Abbeville, South Carolina, had passed through Washington, Georgia, only a day before his own arrival there. They were travelling in ambulances, or wagons, under escort of a few paroled Confederate soldiers. Aiming to reach East Florida, their route diverged from his own, being more to the southward and less to the westward.]

On receipt of this intelligence, Mr. Davis at once changed his course. Four of his small escort had already been detached to assist and protect a quartermaster's train going to the southward with some valuable stores. With the remaining six, and the gentlemen of his personal staff already mentioned, he struck off in the direction of his family, intending to see them safely through the immediate danger and then prosecute his own journey. Riding rapidly and without halting, they came, near midnight, to a ferry, where they learned that his family had not crossed, and must have taken another route. Here Captain Campbell reported the horses of his men to be exhausted, and proposed to wait until morning. The President, unwilling to wait, and attended only by his staff officers and two colored servants, pressed on by a bridle-path to the road which it was thought Mrs. Davis' party had followed. A little before daybreak they encountered a party of men on foot, but with a number of bridles and other suspicious articles, who, on being questioned, said they belonged to the Thirty-sixth Alabama regiment, and stated that a party in which were some women and children were encamped not far off. It was afterwards ascertained that these men were of the band of marauders

who had been heard of. The moon, which had shone brightly during the night, was just sinking below the tree-tops, and the dark hour that precedes the dawn was probably what they were waiting for.

Riding on a little further, the President was challenged by a sentinel on guard in the woods, whose voice he recognized at once as that of his private secretary, Burton N. Harrison, Esq., who had accompanied Mrs. Davis and family, and was now keeping watch for their protection from imminent peril.

Mr. Davis remained with his family two days, until he had reason to suppose that they had passed the range of immediate danger. On the evening of the second day (which was the 9th of May) preparations were made for departure immediately after nightfall, when Colonel W. P. Johnston returned from a neighboring village with the report that a band of one hundred and fifty men were to attack the camp that night. The President, with abiding confidence in and attachment for all who had been Confederate soldiers, did not doubt that, if any such were in the party, they would desist from the attack on his appeal to them, and even take sides with him in case of conflict with others. He remained, therefore, fully confident of his ability to protect his family.

Meantime his horse, already saddled, with his holsters and blanket in place, was in charge of his body servant, and he himself was lying clothed, booted, and even spurred, when, a little after day-break, the alarm was given that the camp was attacked. Springing to his feet and stepping out of the tent, he saw at once, from the manner in which the assailants were deploying around the camp, that they were trained soldiers, and not irregular banditti, and returning he so informed Mrs. Davis.

As we have said, the President was already fully dressed. He hastily took leave of his wife, who threw over his shoulders a water-proof cloak or wrapper, either as a protection from the dampness of the early morning, or in the hope that it might serve as a partial disguise, or perhaps with woman's ready and rapid thoughtfulness of its possible use for both these purposes. Mrs. Davis also directed a female servant, who was present, to take an empty bucket and accompany him in the direction of the spring—

his horse, on the other side of the camp, being cut off from access by the interposition of the assailants.

He had advanced only a few steps from the door of the tent, when he was challenged by a mounted soldier, who presented his carbine and ordered him to "surrender." The answer was: "I never surrender to a band of thieves." The carbine was still presented, but the man refrained from firing—it is but fair to presume from an unwillingness to kill his adversary—while the President continued to advance. This was not from desperation or foolhardy recklessness, but of deliberate purpose. I take the risk of going perhaps a little beyond the limits of the authorized use of information obtained in the freedom of personal confidence, in stating that, with the rapid process of thought and formation of design which sometimes takes place in moments of imminent peril, Mr. Davis recalled an incident of his own experience that had occurred many years before. On the field of Buena Vista, while riding along a ravine in search of a slope that his horse could ascend, he was fired at and missed by the whole front rank of a squadron of Mexican cavalry on the crest of the bank above. Remembering this, and observing that the man, who was finely mounted, was so near as to be considerably above him, he had little apprehension of being hit, and believed that, by taking advantage of the excitement of the shot, he might easily tip him from the saddle and get possession of his horse. The feasibility of this design was not to be tested, however, for at this moment Mrs. Davis, seeing only his danger, and animated by a characteristic and heroic determination to share it, ran forward and threw her arms around his neck, with some impassioned exclamation, which probably none of the parties present would be able to repeat correctly. The only hope of escape had depended upon bringing the matter to an immediate issue, and, seeing that this was now lost, the President simply said, "God's will be done," as he quietly turned back and seated himself upon a fallen tree, near which a camp-fire was burning.

While these events were occurring, there had been some sharp firing around the camp. It appeared afterward that the assailants had been divided into two parties, and, approaching from different directions, had encountered and fired upon each other by mistake,

killing and wounding several of their own men. In the confusion consequent upon this, some of the Confederate party escaped—among them Colonel Wood, who afterwards accompanied General Breckinridge in his perilous and adventurous voyage in an open boat from the coast of Florida to Cuba.

After some delay, an officer with a paper, on which he was taking a list of the prisoners, approached the spot where the President was sitting, and asked his name. This he declined to give, telling the questioner that he might find it out for himself, but Mrs. Davis, anxious to avoid giving provocation as far as possible, gave the required information.

When Colonel Pritchard appeared upon the scene, President Davis, under the influence of feelings naturally aroused by certain indignities offered by subordinates, and by the distress inflicted upon the ladies of his family, addressed him with some asperity. It would probably be impossible (as it always is under such circumstances) for any participant, or even any witness, to recite with accuracy the conversation that ensued. I may say, however, that Mr. Davis has never made any complaint of the language or demeanor of Colonel Pritchard to himself, personally. Among the remarks made in that, or some subsequent conversation, by that officer, was one to the effect that, having refused to surrender, Mr. Davis had given the soldier who demanded the surrender the right to shoot him—a right, under the laws of war, of which President Davis was well aware at the time, and which he did not deny. As to the conversation recited by Wilson, Colonel Johnston, in his very temperate, cautious, and conscientious statement, appended to this article, avers most positively that no such remark was made (about Mr. Davis' "garb," means of "rapid locomotion," &c.,) as is there attributed to Colonel Pritchard.

It would require too much space to point out in detail all the misrepresentations in General Wilson's account of this affair. I shall copy merely a paragraph. After quoting from the account of the capture given by Pollard, who, although one of the most virulent and unscrupulous of President Davis' enemies, has rejected the contemptible fiction of the "petticoat story," he says:

"Between the two explanations given above, nearly all the truth has been told, for Davis certainly had on both the shawl and

water-proof, the former folded triangularly and pulled down over his hat, and the latter buttoned down in front and covering his entire person except the feet. In addition to this he carried a small tin pail and was accompanied by his wife and his wife's sister, one on each side, both of them claiming him as a female relative and both trying to impose him upon the soldiers as such. The articles of the disguise are now in the keeping of the Adjutant-General of the army at Washington, and I am assured by him that they correspond in all respects to the description given of them. From the foregoing it will be seen that Davis did not actually have on crinoline or petticoats, but there is no doubt whatever that he sought to avoid capture by assuming the dress of a woman, or that the ladies of the party endeavored to pass him off upon his captors as one of themselves. Was there ever a more pitiful termination to a career of treachery and dishonor? What greater stigma was ever affixed to the name of rebel? Many loyal men have declared that Davis should have been tried by drum-head court-martial and executed—but what new disgrace could the gallows inflict upon the man who hid himself under the garb of woman, when, if ever, he should have shown the courage of a hero?"

With regard to the exact form of the fold of the shawl and the extent to which the "water-proof" was "buttoned down," General Wilson's assertions may pass for what they have already been shown to be worth. I have no evidence, and have not thought it necessary to seek any, as to the shape of the one or the dimensions of the other. Those who are curious might possibly ascertain something on the subject by inquiry and examination at the War Department, if permission can be obtained of the Adjutant-General of the army, who, according to General Wilson, is the custodian of the stolen articles of Mr. Davis' wearing apparel. It is enough to know that they were both articles which he "had been accustomed to wear." Colonel Johnston testifies, in the letter subjoined, that he himself had a "water-proof" of exactly the same sort, except in color, and that he turned this over to Mr. Davis, who wore it, *after* his capture, to supply the place of that of which he had been robbed. The very name ("Raglan") by which Col. Johnston describes it, and by which it is commonly known, sufficiently indicates its origin and use as an article of masculine attire. Indeed, there was no female grenadier in the President's party, whose cloak would have been capable of "covering his entire person except the feet"—he being a man of nearly six feet in height.

It is also positively untrue that he "carried a small tin pail." As already stated, there was a bucket in the hands of a colored female servant, whom the narrators seem to have indiscriminately confounded with President Davis, or with Miss Howell, (who was *not* in company with him,) as it might serve a purpose.

But why this persistent effort to perpetuate a false and foolish story, which seems to have been originally invented for sensational purposes by a newspaper correspondent? Even if it had been true, there would have been nothing unworthy or discreditable in it. Princes and peers, statesmen and sages, heroes and patriots, in all ages, have held it permissible and honorable to escape from captivity in *any* guise whatever. The name of Alfred has never been less honored because he took refuge from the invaders of his country under the guise of a cowherd. It has never been reckoned as a blot on the escutcheon of Richard Cœur-de-Lion, that he attempted to evade the recognition of enemies (less ruthless and vindictive than those of the Confederate President) by assuming the garb of a pilgrim—*although* the attempt was a failure, and he was detected and imprisoned. Not to cite the scores of instances of a like sort scattered through the pages of ancient and modern history, I do not find in our own generation any disposition to traduce the character of a late President of the United States, held in high honor by a great many Americans—a President from whom General Wilson held his own commission—on account of a certain "Scotch cap and cloak," which, according to the current accounts, he assumed, on the way to his own inauguration, as a means of escaping recognition by a band of real or imaginary conspirators, and in which he slipped through Baltimore undetected, and (in the words of Horace Greeley, who, nevertheless, approves the act,) "clandestinely and like a hunted fugitive." Far be it from me, in retaliatory imitation of General Wilson, to sneer at this incident as the "ignoble" beginning of a bloodstained administration, which was to have a "pitiful termination" amidst the desecration of a day hallowed by the sanctity of eighteen centuries of Christian reverence. No Southern writer has spoken in such a strain of the departed Chief, although known to us while living only as the chief of our foes. The dignity of death, no less than the respect due to the feelings of the thousands of our countrymen who hold his memory in honor, protects his name and

fame from opprobrious or vindictive mention. Yet such language as we have supposed, would be less coarse, less churlish, less offensive, less brutal, than the terms which General Wilson employs in exulting over the calamities of an illustrious enemy, whose reputation is dear to myriads of his countrymen. His relations to that enemy, as captor to captive, would have created in the heart of any truly generous and chivalrous soldier an obligation of respect, forbearance, gentleness, and courtesy. Such a soldier feels toward such a prisoner a sentiment which renders him a defender and protector, rather than a defamer and calumniator.

The terms "treachery," "dishonor," "disgrace," applied by Wilson to Jefferson Davis, admit of no reply that I care to make, and require none. They are indeed "foul, dishonoring words," but the reader needs not to be told *who* it is that they dishonor.

The length to which this article has already been extended, leaves but little room for the remainder of the story. General Wilson gives a brief account of the march to Macon, but says nothing of the horses, watches, and other articles of plunder secured by the captors, of which we have information from other sources. It must be remembered that all, or nearly all of the thirteen private soldiers of whom he speaks—if that was the correct number—and some of the officers, were *paroled* men, not arrested in any violation of their parole, but merely acting as an escort to a party of women and children, for their protection from the thieves and marauders who were roaming through the country. The horses of these men were their own private property, secured to them by the terms of their surrender. This pledge was violated, as was also the pledge of personal immunity—for some of them were remanded into captivity. The writer of an account of the capture, in the "Atlantic Monthly" for September, 1865, who is identified by General Wilson as an officer of his command, chuckles over the appropriation of what he elegantly and politely styles "Jeff's wines and other 'amenities'"—that is to say, the private stores of Mrs. Davis and her family—for Mr. Davis carried no stores—in a tone of sportive exultation, as if it were a very good thing. He tells it in a vein that reminds one of Master Slander's desire to have Mrs. Anne Page hear the capital joke about his father's "stealing two geese out of a pen." The same writer gives us, in the same jocose vein, an account of a brutal indignity offered



by his "brigade band" to the illustrious prisoner, of which—if it ever occurred—the object of it was happily unconscious. He also tells us that "Mrs. Davis was very watchful lest some disrespect should be shown her husband;" whereas the true and manifest cause of her anxiety was the wifely apprehension that some pretext might be devised for his assassination.

General Wilson fails in some respects to do himself justice. His reception of Mr. Davis, on his arrival at Macon, was more courteous and respectful than he represents it. The troops were drawn up in double lines, facing inward, and presented arms to the Confederate President as he passed between them. He was conducted, with his family, to private rooms at the hotel where the Federal commander was quartered, and a message was brought, inquiring whether he preferred to call on General Wilson, or to receive him in his own apartments. The answer was, that he would call on General Wilson, to whom he was accordingly conducted. (There was a reason for this use of the option offered, which it is not necessary to state.) The conversation that followed is not correctly reported by General Wilson, except that part of it relating to West Point, which was introduced by himself. Those who know Mr. Davis' keen sense of social and official propriety will not need to be told that what is said of his criticisms upon the principal Confederate leaders is purely fictitious. No such conversation occurred, and it is simply *impossible* that it could have occurred under the circumstances.

I deny the statement on the best authority, but no authority besides that of the moral evidence would be necessary to refute the assertion that the Confederate President could talk to a stranger and an enemy in a strain of gushing confidence which he never indulged in conversation with his own familiar friends. It is but charity to presume that General Wilson has confounded opinions attributed to Mr. Davis by popular rumor (whether right or wrong) with imaginary expressions of them to himself.

In the course of the interview, General Wilson abruptly and rather indelicately introduced the subject of the reward offered by the President of the United States for the arrest of Mr. Davis, and the charge against him of complicity in the assassination of Mr. Lincoln, inquiring whether he had heard of it. "I have," was the answer, "and there is one man who knows it to be a lie."

“By ‘one man’” rejoined Wilson, “I presume you mean some one particular man?” “I do,” answered Mr. Davis; “I mean the man [Andrew Johnson] who signed the proclamation; for *he* knows that I would a thousand times rather have Abraham Lincoln to deal with, as President of the United States, than to have *him*.” This was said with the full expectation that it would be reported.

The statement that he expressed apprehensions of the charge of *treason*, as one which it would give him “trouble to disprove,” is manifestly absurd. For two years of imprisonment, and another year while on bail, the most strenuous efforts of Mr. Davis and his friends were to bring this charge of treason to the issue of a trial. This issue the Government of the United States never dared to make, but, after delays and postponements from time to time, under various pretexts, finally dismissed the charge with a *nolle prosequi*.

The remark about Colonel Pritchard is not correctly stated. No expression of a choice of custodians or request of any sort was made by Mr. Davis, who, from the time of his capture to that of his release, adhered to the determination to *ask nothing* of his captors; nor did he say or intimate to General Wilson that he had shown any lack of “dignity and self-possession,” or express “regret” for anything said or done at the time of his capture.

There are so many other misstatements in General Wilson’s narrative that it would be a waste of time to point out and contradict them. With regard to one only of them, I may say that, in the light—or rather under the shadow—of the incomparable fictitiousness already exposed, it would be a sort of injustice to the people of Georgia to give any attention to what General Wilson would have us believe of their lack of sympathy with their President and his family in the hour of calamity.

To revert for a moment to the foolish and malignant “petticoat story,” which, with some modification of its original draft, Gen. Wilson has attempted, at this late day, and in opposition to the slowly-returning tide of peace and good will, to revive and reconstruct; it has no support from any contemporary official statement that has been given to the public. It has been repeatedly and positively denied by eye-witnesses on both sides. One such denial by a Federal soldier, which was published in a Northern paper a few years ago, and has been copied more than once since its

first appearance, was republished in the *Southern Historical Society Papers* for August, 1877. The statement of James H. Jones, President Davis' colored coachman, now a respectable citizen of Raleigh, N. C., recently republished in the *Philadelphia Times*, is clear and satisfactory on the same point, although it has some mistakes in names of persons, places, &c.,—as might be expected from a witness of limited education, after so long a lapse of time. Appended, also, will be found interesting letters from Colonels Wm. Preston Johnston and F. R. Lubbock, (Ex-Governor of Texas), both of whom were aids to President Davis, and both in company with him when captured, and also from the Hon. George Davis, of North Carolina, who was a member of his Cabinet. Colonel Johnston's letter (from which some passages of a merely personal interest have been omitted), is singularly clear, dispassionate, and temperate in tone, and bears on its face the impress of intelligent and conscientious truthfulness. Governor Lubbock writes more briefly and with freer expression of honest indignation, but the two statements (made without any sort of concert) fully confirm each other. Mr. Davis' letter—received after the foregoing narrative was written—substantiates all that has been said as to events occurring at the time of the evacuation of Richmond.

Still later, but entirely independent of all other evidence, has appeared the letter of the Hon. John H. Reagan, Confederate Postmaster-General, published in the *Philadelphia Times*, entirely corroborating the statements hereunto appended, and giving emphasis (if that were possible) to their exposure of the untruthfulness of General Wilson's narrative in its beginning, its middle, and its end.

W. T. WALTHALL.

*September, 1877.*

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**Letter from Colonel William Preston Johnston, Late Aid to President Davis.**

LEXINGTON, VA., *July 14th, 1877.*

Major W. T. WALTHALL, *Mobile, Ala.:*

MY DEAR SIR: Your letter has just come to hand, and I reply at once. Wilson's monograph is written with a very strong *animus*, not to say *virus*. It is in no sense *historical*. It bears upon

its face all the marks of special pleading. He states, as matters of fact, numberless circumstances which could not be of his own knowledge, and which he must have picked up as rumor or mere gossip. Single errors of this sort are blemishes; but when they are grouped and used as fact and argument, they become, what you truly call them, "calumny."

For instance, Mrs. Davis is represented as leaving Richmond with the President. My recollection is that she left some weeks beforehand. Breckinridge left on horseback, and went to General Lee, rejoining Mr. Davis at Danville. I do not doubt that *all* the account of "the preparations for flight" is purely fictitious. His statement of the conditions of the armistice is incorrect.

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You will have the facts of our retreat and capture from many sources. My best plan is to tell you only what I know and saw myself. My testimony is chiefly *negative*, but in so far as it goes will probably aid you. My understanding was that we were to part with Mrs. Davis' train on the morning of the 9th. We did not, and the President continued to ride in the ambulance. He was sick and a good deal exhausted, but was not the man to say anything about it. The day previous he had let little Jeff. shoot his Derringers at a mark, and handed me one of the unloaded pistols, which he asked me to carry, as it incommoded him. At that time I spoke to him about the size of our train and our route, about which I had not previously talked, as he had said nothing and I did not wish to force his confidence. It was, however, distinctly understood that we were going to Texas. I that day said to him that I did not believe we could get west through Mississippi, and that by rapid movements and a bold attempt by sea from the Florida coast, we were more likely to reach Texas safely and promptly. He replied: "It is true—every negro in Mississippi knows me." I also talked with Judge Reagan and Colonel Wood on this topic. The impression left on my own mind was, however, that Mr. Davis intended to turn west, south of Albany; but I had no definite idea of his purpose, whether to go by sea or land. Indeed, my scope of duty was simply to follow and obey him; and, so long as I was not consulted, I was well content to do this and no more. I confess I did not have great hopes of escape, though not apprehensive at the time of capture, as our scouts, ten

picked men, were explicit that no Federals were near and that pickets were out. Both of these were errors. On the night of the 9th I was very much worn out with travel and watching, and lay down at the foot of a pine tree to sleep.

Just at gray dawn Mr. Davis' servant, Jim, awakened me. He said: "Colonel, do you hear that firing?" I sprang up and said, "run and wake the President." He did so. Hearing nothing as I pulled on my boots, I walked to the camp-fire, some fifty or less steps off, and asked the cook if Jim was not mistaken. At this moment I saw eight or ten men charging down the road towards me. I thought they were guerrillas, trying to stampede the stock. I ran to my saddle, where I had slept, and begun unfastening the holster to get out my revolver, but they were too quick for me. Three men rode up and demanded my pistol, which, as soon as I got out, I gave up to the leader, a bright, slim, soldierly fellow, dressed in Confederate-grey clothes. The same man, *I believe*, captured Colonels Wood and Lubbock just after. One of my captors ordered me to the camp-fire and stood guard over me. I soon became aware that they were Federals.

In the meantime the firing went on. After about ten minutes, maybe more, my guard left me, and I walked over to Mrs. Davis' tent, about fifty yards off. Mrs. Davis was in great distress. I said to the President, who was sitting outside on a camp stool: "This is a bad business, sir." He replied, supposing I knew about the circumstances of his capture: "I would have heaved the scoundrel off his horse as he came up, but *she* caught me around the arms." I understood what he meant, *how* he had proposed to dismount the trooper and get his horse, for he had taught me the trick. I merely replied: "It would have been useless."

Mr. Davis was dressed as usual. He had on a knit woolen visor, which he always wore at night for neuralgia. He wore cavalry boots. He complained of chilliness, and said they had taken away his "Raglan," (I believe they were so called,) a light *aquascutum* or spring overcoat, sometimes called a "water-proof." I had one exactly similar, except in color. I went to look for it, and either I, or some one at my instance, found it, and he wore it afterwards. His own was not restored.

As I was looking for this coat, the firing still continuing, I met a mounted officer, who, if I am not mistaken, was a Captain Hod-

son. Feeling that the cause was lost, and not wishing useless bloodshed, I said to him: "Captain, your men are fighting each other over yonder." He answered very positively: "You have an armed escort." I replied: "You have our whole camp; I *know* your men are fighting each other. We have nobody on that side of the slough." He then rode off. Colonel Lubbock had a conversation nearly identical with Colonel Pritchard, who was not polite, I believe. You can learn from Colonel Lubbock about it.

Not long afterwards, seeing Mr. Davis in altercation with an officer—Colonel Pritchard—I went up. Mr. Davis was denunciatory in his remarks. The account given by Wilson is fabulous, except so far as Mr. Davis' remark is concerned, that "their conduct was not that of gentlemen, but ruffians." Pritchard did not make the reply attributed to him; I could swear to that. My recollection is that he said in substance, and in an offensive manner, "that he (Davis) was a prisoner and could afford to talk so," and walked away. Colonel Hamden's manner was conciliatory, if he was the other officer. If I am not mistaken, the first offence was his addressing Mr. Davis as "Jeff," or some such rude familiarity. But this you can verify. I tried just afterwards to reconcile Mr. Davis to the situation.

On the route to Macon, three days afterwards, Mrs. Davis complained to me with great bitterness that her trunks had been ransacked, the contents taken out, and tumbled back with the leaves sticking to them.

I had not seen Mr. Davis' capture. I was with him until we were parted at Fortress Monroe. Personally, I was treated with as much respect as I cared for. The officers were rather gushing than otherwise, and talked freely. Some were coarse men, and talked of everything; but I *never heard* of Mr. Davis' alleged disguise until I saw it in a New York *Herald*, the day I got to Fort Delaware. I was astonished and denounced it as a falsehood. The next day I was placed in solitary confinement, and remained there. I do not believe it possible that these ten days could have been passed with our captors without an allusion to it, if it had not been an after-thought or something to be kept from us.

\* \* \* \* \*

Very sincerely yours,

WM. PRESTON JOHNSTON.

**Letter from Ex-Governor Lubbock, of Texas, Late Aid to President Davis.**

GALVESTON, *August 2d*, 1877.

*Major W. T. WALTHALL:*

DEAR SIR: Yours of 28th came to hand a day or two since, finding me quite busy. At the earliest moment I perused the article you alluded to in your letter, which appeared in the *Weekly Times*, of Philadelphia, of July 7th. It does really appear that certain parties, with the view of keeping themselves before the public, will continue to write the most base, calumnious, and slanderous articles, calculated to keep the wounds of the past open and sore. Such a writer now appears in General James H. Wilson, whose sole aim seems to be that of traducing and misrepresenting the circumstances of the capture of President Davis and his small party, who, it would appear, were pursued by some fifteen thousand gallant soldiers, commanded by this distinguished general. I shall leave it to you and others better qualified than myself, to reply to this "Chapter of the Unwritten History of the War." I have this, however, to say: I left Richmond with President Davis, in the same car, and from that day to the time of our separation (he being detained at Fortress Monroe and I sent to Fort Delaware), he was scarcely ever out of my sight, day or night.

The night before the morning of our capture, Colonel William P. Johnston slept very near the tent. Colonel John Taylor Wood and myself were under a pine tree, some fifty to one hundred feet off. Our camp was surprised just a while before day. I was with Mr. Davis and his family in a very few moments, and never did see anything of an attempted disguise or escape until after I had been confined in Fort Delaware several weeks. I then pronounced it a base falsehood. We were guarded by Colonel Pritchard's command until we reached Fortress Monroe. I talked freely with officers and men, and on no occasion did I hear anything of the kind mentioned.

Judge Reagan and myself had entered into a compact that we would never desert or leave him, remaining to contribute, if possible, to his well-being and comfort, and share his fortune, whatever might befall. My bed-mate, Colonel John Taylor Wood (one of

the bravest and purest of men), having been a naval officer of the United States, and having been charged with violating the rules of war in certain captures made, deeming it prudent to make his escape, informed me of his intention and invited me to accompany him. I declined to avail myself of the favorable opportunity presented, telling him of my compact with Judge Reagan. He did escape.

The conduct of the captors on that occasion was marked by anything but decency and soldierly bearing. They found no armed men—my recollection is that there was not one armed man in our camp. Mr. Davis, Judge Reagan, Colonel William Preston Johnston, Colonel John Taylor Wood, a young gentleman (a Mr. Barnwell, of South Carolina,) who escaped, and myself, constituted the President's party. Colonel Harrison, the private secretary of the President, and a few paroled soldiers, were with Mrs. Davis and party, protecting their little baggage, &c.

Upon taking the camp, they plundered and robbed everyone of all and every article they could get hold of. They stole the watches, jewelry, money, clothing, &c. I believe I was the only one of the party not robbed.

The man and patriot, who a few days before was at the head of a government, was treated by his captors with uncalled for indignity; so much so that I became indignant, and so completely unhinged and exasperated that I called upon the officers to protect him from insult, threatening to kill the parties engaged in such conduct.

I cannot see how Mr. Davis could speak of Colonel Pritchard or his command with any degree of patience, as we all know that Mrs. Davis was robbed of her horses (a present from the people of Richmond). The money that she sold her trinkets, silverware, &c., for, was stolen, and no effort was made to have it returned to her. Time and time again they promised that the watches stolen on that occasion should be returned, that the command would be paroled, and the stolen property restored to the owners; but it was never done, nor any attempt made, that I can recall to my mind.

A Captain Douglass stole Judge Reagan's saddle, and used it from the day we were captured.

They appropriated our horses and other private property. But why dwell upon this wretchedly disagreeable subject? I hope



and pray that the whole truth will some day be written, and I feel assured when it is done we of the South will stand to all time a vindicated people. As for him who is the target for all of the miserable scribblers, and of those unscrupulous and corrupt men living on the abuse heaped upon the Southern people by fanning the embers of the late war—when he is gone from hence history will write him as one of the truest and purest of men, a dignified and bold soldier, an enlightened and intelligent statesman, a man whose whole aim was to benefit his country and his people.

I know him well. I have been with him under all circumstances, and have ever found him good and true. How wretched the spirit that will continue to traduce such a man! How miserably contemptible the party that will refuse to recognize such a man as a citizen of the country in whose defence his best days were spent and his blood freely spilt!

I have the honor to be,

Yours very respectfully,

F. R. LUBBOCK.

**Letter from the Hon. George Davis, late Attorney-General of the Confederate States.**

WILMINGTON, N. C., *September 4th, 1877.*

*Major W. T. WALTHALL:*

DEAR SIR: Your favor of the 14th ult. and the copy of the Philadelphia "*Times*" were duly received, but my engagements with the courts have prevented an earlier reply.

I regret that I can give you but little information in aid of the purpose you have in mind, as I parted from Mr. Davis and the rest of the Cabinet at Charlotte; and the narrative of General Wilson professes to deal chiefly with events which occurred afterward.

I was not present at the Cabinet meeting on the first Sunday in April, 1865, when the telegram was received from General Lee announcing that his lines had been broken at Petersburg. I had that day attended service at a church to which I was not in the habit of going, and in consequence did not receive the message until about 1 o'clock, P. M. I went immediately to Mr. Davis'

office, and found him alone, and calm and composed as usual. He informed me of the orders that had been given and the dispositions made for the evacuation of Richmond. After some conversation I left to make my own preparations for departure. I believe that even the intensity of Northern hatred has never doubted Mr. Davis' courage; and certainly none who know him can doubt his pride of personal character. And these admitted qualities were quite sufficient to preserve him from any unmanly display of weakness, such as General Wilson has pretended to relate. A brave man may be unnerved by a sudden and unexpected danger, but never by a danger that has been anticipated and prepared for during many weeks, (as he relates). During my intimate association with Mr. Davis, I have seen him often in circumstances of extreme trial and excitement, and sometimes of imminent danger. Especially do I recall that other Cabinet meeting which was interrupted by the intelligence that Dablgren was at the outworks of Richmond, with nothing in his way but a raw battalion of Department clerks. And never yet have I seen him "tremulous and nervous," as "without self-possession and dignity." Assuredly, such language does not truthfully describe his conduct and demeanor as I saw him on the first Sunday in April, 1865.

The unfortunate are always in the wrong; and the men of the Confederacy have had little reason to expect magnanimity, or even fairness, from their adversaries. But a generous tribute of respect and honor has been universally and ungrudgingly yielded to their women. And the soldier, professing to deal with history, who cannot sufficiently belittle a great enemy without invading the sanctity of his home to hold up his wife in half-sneering, half-complimentary contrast to him, does not commend himself to the confidence of an impartial world. And the judgment of the world in this instance will probably be a near approach to the truth; for the "energy and determination," the "rage and disappointment" of Mrs. Davis, so graphically described by General Wilson, are all pure fiction. That admirable lady had left Richmond some time before the evacuation, and was then in North Carolina.

This candid soldier further says: "It is stated, upon what appears to be good authority, that Davis had many weeks before Lee's catastrophe made 'the most careful and exacting preparations for his escape, discussing the matter fully with his Cabinet

in profound secrecy, and deciding that, in order to secure the escape of himself and his principal officers, the Shenandoah should be ordered to cruise off the coast of Florida, to take the fugitives on board.' These orders were sent to the rebel cruiser many days before Lee's lines were broken."

Who this "good authority" is we are left to conjecture; but General Wilson himself is responsible for the assertion that "these orders were sent," as he does not quote even a dubious authority for that. Was ever a more daring statement given to a credulous world? Mr. Davis and his Cabinet were so extremely concerned for their personal safety that they took the one impossible way to secure it! The Shenandoah was then, and long had been, on the broad bosom of the Pacific ocean, hunted on all sides by Federal cruisers, and without a single friendly port in which to drop her anchor. Were these orders sent around the Horn, or overland from Texas? How long would it have taken them to find her and bring her to the coast of Florida? And how long would the Federal navy have permitted her to remain there waiting for "the fugitives"?

Again: The narrative deals in pure fiction, too absurd for the wildest credulity. No such orders were issued. There were no discussions in the Cabinet, no "careful and exacting preparations for escape," and no preparations of any kind until the fall of Petersburg rendered them necessary; and then the anxiety was for the preservation of the Government, and not for the safety of its individual members. Day by day, for many months, the varying fortunes of the Confederacy were the subject of grave and anxious deliberations in the Cabinet. But never was there any plan proposed, or any suggestion made, or even a casual remark uttered, regarding the personal safety of its officers. Bad as General Wilson may think them, they were neither selfish enough nor cowardly enough for that. And as to Mr. Davis, it was well known in Richmond that his unnecessary and reckless exposure of himself was the cause of frequent and earnest remonstrances on the part of his friends.

The Northern people triumphed in arms, but they can never add to the glories of that triumph by endeavoring to depreciate and degrade the men whom they found it so difficult to conquer.

Very respectfully yours,

GEORGE DAVIS.

**A Correction of General Patton Anderson's Report of the Battle of Jonesboro', Ga.**

[The following letters explain themselves, and are cheerfully published. Besides their historic value, they are models of soldierly courtesy which cannot be too warmly commended to any who may have occasion to controvert statements made by others in reference to events of the war.]

**Letter from General Clayton.**

CLAYTON, ALA., *December 31, 1877.*

*Rev. J. WM. JONES, Secretary, &c.,*

*Richmond, Va.:*

DEAR SIR: My attention has been called to a report of the battle of Jonesboro', Ga., on the 31st August, 1864, by General Patton Anderson, and especially to a statement which, if suffered to pass unnoticed, may do injustice to the officers and men of the Thirteenth Louisiana regiment, of Gibson's brigade. I can best notice it by copying from my own report of that battle, written a few days after.

That it may be better understood, let it be remembered that General Anderson commanded the front line, composed of Deas', Brantley's, and Sharpe's brigades.

The second or supporting line was commanded by myself, and was composed of Gibson's brigade in the centre, Holtzclaw's brigade (Colonel Bush. Jones commanding) on the right, and Manegault's brigade, of Anderson's division, on the left. Stovals' brigade, of my division, had that morning been sent to report to General Stevenson, further to our left, and Baker's had several days before been sent to Mobile. Preparatory to moving forward, brigade commanders had been instructed that they should halt beyond certain earthworks and fallen timber in our front, to correct the alignment, before morning, to the assault, and that they would be guided by the centre.

“ When this point was reached, seeing that the troops in the front line were already falling back, and fearing the effect on my own, and seeing, also, now that the attack had begun, the importance of pressing it at once, I rode forward and ordered the whole division to move on without halting.

“Brigadier-General Gibson, seizing the colors of one of his regiments, dashed to the front, and to the very works of the enemy. This conduct created the greatest enthusiasm throughout his command, which again, as in the engagement of the 28th of July previously, moved against a salient in the enemies works. This gallant brigade lost half its numbers, and was finally driven back.”

This was my official report as to that brigade, written a few days after the battle. I regret that a portion of it is lost, or I would enclose it. My recollection of everything that transpired in that battle is still clear, especially as to the part performed by Gibson's brigade, and every portion of it. My own eyes bore witness to its splendid conduct from the beginning to the close. It captured the guns of the enemy, and occupied their main works until overwhelming and increasing numbers forced their abandonment. It was handled with skill, and fought with the heroism of desperation. The living may protest with confidence against reproach for the conduct of that day, and the dead may well defy it.

Now, as to what General Anderson says in regard to the Thirteenth Louisiana, I state, without qualification, he was imposed on.

He had but recently come in command of his division. He was very badly wounded and carried from the field to the rear, where he wrote his report, without having an opportunity to correct an erroneous impression received in the heat of a terrible battle.

A reading of his report shows that he made the statement complained of in some doubt as to its accuracy, (see November number *Southern Historical Society Papers*, page 201). I am not and cannot be mistaken as to what I state.

To go a little more into particulars, General Gibson left my side when he rode through his brigade. I immediately sent a staff-officer with orders to General Mannegault's brigade, and myself rode around the right of Gibson's brigade in front of Holtzclaw's where I met General Anderson pressing forward his own men. Here I also met Generals Brantley and Sharpe.

I ordered a disposition to protect our right flank lest we might be taken unawares in that direction, and we were all engaged in urging forward the troops on Gibson's right.

The left of Holtzclaw's brigade was suffering terribly, but the right, though fully on a line, was scarcely engaged.

The Thirty-sixth Alabama was as warmly engaged and perhaps suffered as badly as Gibson's brigade. There were men lying here

and there partially concealed behind piles of rails, and in the rifle pits, but in no considerable number. From the time I met General Anderson we were not separated one hundred yards, and at no time out of sight of each other. No part of Gibson's brigade was about us. We were on a line with his front, but to the right, when we both fell in twenty steps of each other.

About this time Gibson's brigade fell back, as I afterwards learned, by his order.

I was unhurt and walked to General Anderson, who was immediately moved off the field. How General Anderson came to fall into error in regard to the Thirteenth Louisiana, I have no means of knowing; but this I do know, General Anderson would rise from his grave, if he had the power, to prevent an injustice to a soldier.

The Bayard of the "land of flowers" may have been led into an error; he could not purpose an injustice.

It is a singular circumstance that a portion of that command which most distinguished itself should need or seem to need this defense. But I will not moralize.

If excuse is demanded for this communication, or, if the speaking of my own opportunity for knowing whereof I testify shall provoke a criticism, let me say with becoming modesty, that there are men living who know whether this is true or false, but perhaps none who can so well testify as to the point in issue as myself. He who has once commanded brave soldiers should give sleepless vigils to their honor. Nor can he ever shift the responsibility of its vindication from aspersion, wherever or however made; especially since it was all that was left from their heroic struggle to the living, and all the dead secured in dying.

H. D. CLAYTON,

*Formerly Maj-Gen'l Commanding Clayton's Div., C. S. A.*

**Letter from General S. D. Lee.**COLUMBUS, MISS., *January 28, 1878.**Rev. J. Wm. Jones,**Secretary Southern Historical Society:*

MY DEAR SIR: In the November number of the *Southern Historical Society Papers* is General Patton Anderson's report of the battle of Jonesboro'. There was no more gallant and honorable soldier in the Confederate Army than Patton Anderson. He was the peer of any in chivalry and honorable bearing, and would have given his life rather than intentionally have wronged an individual or a regiment of troops.

As to his implied reflection on the Thirteenth Louisiana, I have just this to say: About the time of the incident related of the color-bearer of the Thirteenth Louisiana, General Anderson was terribly wounded in the face and passed immediately by me being borne from the field. A more painful sight was seldom seen.

I cannot but believe the general was in error as to the Thirteenth Louisiana, and believe that his absence and distance from the army on account of his painful wound alone prevented a further enquiry and correction of this matter, and, knowing him as I did, I take the liberty of writing this letter, believing that no injury can possibly befall the memory of the lamented Patton Anderson.

I know that Gibson's brigade (the Thirteenth was one of the regiments of that brigade) was as gallant as any on the field of Jonesboro'. They reached and for some time staid in the works of the enemy, and the list of killed and wounded (about one-half) attested their heroism and should vindicate their record on that field. Possibly the incident might have occurred after the withdrawal of the brigade from the works of the enemy, where they lost half of their number. All troops, under such terrible circumstance, are a little scattered, and it requires time to rearrange them, and the color-bearer, from excessive gallantry or excitement, was no doubt separated a short distance from his regiment. But I do state most emphatically that the incident (implied) related is the first and only time I ever heard aught against any man of Gibson's gallant Louisiana brigade.

I saw them around Atlanta and in Hood's Nashville campaign, and I know that, on consultation with Major General Clayton, I designated Gibson's brigade to cross the Tennessee river in open boats, in the presence of the enemy, opposite Florence, Ala., and a more gallant crossing of any river was not made during the war. The enemy was supposed to be in large force, covered by the banks, but Gibson and his men never enquired as to numbers when they were ordered forward, and their gallant bearing soon put the enemy's sharpshooters to flight and secured a good crossing for two divisions of my corps.

At Nashville, where Hood was defeated by Thomas, Gibson's brigade, of my corps, was conspicuously posted on the left of Pike, near Overton Hill, and I witnessed their driving back, with the rest of Clayton's division, two formidable assaults of the enemy, and my corps repulsed all attacks till compelled to retire because the two corps on my left had given back and the enemy was already in my rear. They were rallied readily, about two and one-half miles in rear of the original line, by brigades and divisions.

I recollect, near dark, riding up to a brigade near a battery and trying to seize a stand of colors and lead the brigade against the enemy. The color-bearer refused to give up his colors, and was sustained by his regiment. I found it was the color-bearer of the Thirteenth Louisiana, and it was Gibson's Louisiana brigade. Gibson soon appeared by my side, and in my admiration of such conduct I exclaimed: "Gibson, these are the best men I ever saw. You take them and check the enemy." Gibson did lead them and did check the enemy.

This incident ought to satisfy any member of the Thirteenth Louisiana that that regiment was as gallant as any in the service, and it affords me great pleasure, as a comrade, to add my mite in their vindication.

Yours truly,

S. D. LEE.



**Letter from General R. L. Gibson.**WASHINGTON, *January 22, 1878.*

REV. J. WM. JONES, *Secretary,*  
*Richmond, Va.:*

DEAR SIR: My attention has been called by a member of the Thirteenth Louisiana regiment, writing from New Orleans, to a criticism by General Anderson in his report of the battle of Jonesboro', Ga., August 31, 1864, published in the November number of the *Southern Historical Magazine*, that might be construed to reflect upon that regiment.

It will be observed, by referring to the report, that General Anderson expresses his own doubt as to the correctness of the information which was furnished him, and on which his report is based. It is, indeed, extraordinary that General Anderson should have permitted himself to have said a word in criticism of a regiment which had served with him on so many battle-fields, and that had often received from him the highest praise.

That regiment was in my brigade at the battle of Jonesboro', and I feel it my duty to put upon record the fact that it bore itself in that, as it had done on many historic battle-fields, with distinguished valor. It was commanded by Colonel Francis Lee Campbell, who, like General Anderson, went down to his grave bearing several wounds received under the colors of his regiment.

My brigade consisted of the Sixteenth and Twenty-fifth (consolidated) Louisiana regiments, Colonel Joseph Lewis commanding; the Fourth Louisiana regiment, Colonel Sam. E. Hunter commanding; the Thirtieth Louisiana regiment, the Fourth Louisiana battalion, and Austin's battalion of sharpshooters, Major J. E. Austin commanding, and the Nineteenth Louisiana regiment, Colonel F. C. Zacharie commanding.

Colonel Lewis, at the head of his regiment, was killed, sword in hand, at the works of the enemy. Colonel Hunter (since dead), with his noble regiment, drove the enemy from his position. Indeed, every regiment did its duty in the assault, as was evidenced by the fact that the brigade lost more than half its numbers, and, as I remember, was complimented by General Clayton, command-

ing the division, who was an eye-witness of the assault and lost three horses in the charge, riding just on the right of the brigade.

Perhaps I may be permitted to relate a circumstance that occurred on another field, and that will illustrate the metal of this regiment. At the battle of Nashville, where the army met with a disaster and was in retreat, Fenner's battery was placed in position on the pike and ordered to fire over the heads of the retreating troops for moral effect. When it was observed that the enemy was pressing close, General Stephen D. Lee desired infantry to drive him back. It was found that this regiment, with those associated with it, were formed in regular order just in the rear of the battery. He rode up to the color-bearer of the Thirteenth Louisiana and said, "Give me those colors, I wish to lead this regiment and brigade to drive back the enemy." The color-bearer and officers replied, "No, general, it is not necessary to expose yourself in that way; point in the direction you desire these colors to be borne, and we will carry them forward as long as there is a shred of them or a man left." General Lee turned to the writer and said: "These are the best men I have ever seen." The enemy was checked.

This regiment was one of the first to cross the Tennessee river on the advance of Hood's army to Nashville, and was the last, as the rear guard of that army, to recross it on the retreat, and fired the last volley in regular line of battle in the last ditch of the Confederacy at Mobile. Its record is too well established to need defense at this late day.

If General Anderson were living he would be glad of the opportunity to expunge even the hypothetical criticism which he makes, and would recall with pride the many occasions on which this regiment had received warm encomiums from his lips.

Very respectfully,

R. L. GIBSON.

**Report of Major-General H. D. Clayton of Battle of Jonesboro', Ga.**

[From original MS.]

HEADQUARTERS CLAYTON'S DIVISION,  
IN THE FIELD.

MAJOR: I have the honor to make the following report: This division was moved from East Point on the night of the 30th August, and after an exceedingly fatiguing march, reached Jonesboro' about the middle of the day of the 31st. Here resting about two hours, I received orders from the Lt.-Gen. Commanding to send a brigade to report to General Stevenson, and to move out for battle. I was directed to form my two remaining brigades, Gibson's and Holtzclaw's, (Brig-Gen. Stovall having been sent to report to General Stevenson,) in the second line and on the right of General Manigault's brigade, which was also placed under my command.

Between 3 and 4 P. M. the front line moved out of the breastworks to make the attack. Having a considerable quantity of brush-wood to go through and to pass over the breastworks, both of which I knew would create confusion in the line, I ordered that it should halt so soon as it should reach the open field beyond, and gave the order to move forward as soon as the front line moved. A portion of the line in front seemed to move forward with great reluctance, and when I had reached the point where I had directed the alignment to be rectified, I found that many of the troops in front who had then scarcely engaged the enemy were coming back, and some of them were endeavoring to conceal themselves in the gullies of the old field. Fearing the effect of this upon my own men, and seeing, now that the attack had fairly begun, the importance of pressing it at once, I rode forward and ordered the whole command to move on. Brig-General Gibson seizing the colors of one of his regiments dashed to the front and up to the very works of the enemy. This conduct created the greatest enthusiasm throughout his command, which again, as in the engagement of the 28th July, previously mentioned, moved against a salient in the enemy's works. Unfortunately a large portion of the whole command stopped in the rifle-pits of the enemy, behind piles of rails and a fence running nearly parallel to

his breastworks; and to this circumstance I attribute the failure to carry the works. Never was a charge begun with such enthusiasm terminated with accomplishing so little. This gallant brigade lost one-half its numbers and was finally driven back, as was also Manigault's upon the left. Holzclaw's brigade, Colonel Bush. Jones commanding, which, except its left, had not been so warmly engaged, was subsequently withdrawn.

H. D. CLAYTON, *Major General.*

*Major J. W. RATCHFORD, A. A. General.*

**Advance Sheets of "Reminiscences of Secession, War, and Reconstruction," by Lieutenant-General Richard Taylor.**

[The following advanced sheets from General Taylor's forthcoming book will be read with an interest which will excite a desire to see the whole work. We publish without note or comment of our own, and without, of course, expressing any opinion as to the justness of some of the keen thrusts of the distinguished Author.]

**The Valley of Virginia.**

The great Valley of Virginia was before us in all its beauty. Fields of wheat spread far and wide, interspersed with woodlands, bright in their robes of tender green. Wherever appropriate sites existed, quaint old mills, with turning wheels, were busily grinding the previous year's harvest, and, from grove and eminence, showed comfortable homesteads. The soft vernal influence shed a languid grace over the scene.

The theatre of war in this region was from Staunton to the Potomac, one hundred and twenty miles, with an average width of some twenty-five, and the Blue Ridge and Alleghany bounded it east and west. Drained by the Shenandoah with its numerous affluents, the surface was nowhere flat, but a succession of graceful swells, occasionally rising into abrupt hills. Resting on limestone, the soil was productive, especially of wheat, and the underlying rock furnished abundant metal for the construction of roads. Frequent passes or gaps in the mountains, through which wagon roads had been constructed, afforded easy access from east and west, and, as has been stated, pikes were excellent, though unmetaled roads became heavy after rains.

But the glory of the Valley is Massanuttin. Rising abruptly from the plain near Harrisonburg, twenty-five miles north of Staunton, this lovely mountain extends fifty miles and as suddenly ends near Strasburg. Parallel with Blue Ridge and of equal height, its sharp peaks have a bolder and more picturesque aspect, while the abruptness of its slopes gives the appearance of greater altitude. Midway of Massanuttin a "gap" affords communication between Newmarket and Luray. This eastern or Luray valley, much narrower than the one west of Massanuttin, is drained by

the eastern branch of the Shenandoah, which, at Front Royal, at the northern end of the mountain, is joined by its western affluent, whence the united waters flow north, near the base of Blue Ridge, to meet the Potomac at Harper's Ferry.

The inhabitants of this favored region were worthy of their inheritance. The North and South were peopled by scions of colonial families, and the proud names of the "Old Dominion" abounded. In the central counties of Rockingham and Shenandoah were many descendants of Hessians, captured at Trenton and Princeton during the Revolutionary era. These were thrifty, substantial farmers, and, like their kinsmen of Pennsylvania, expressed their opulence in huge barns and fat cattle. The devotion of all to the Southern cause was wonderful. Jackson, a Valley man by reason of his residence at Lexington (south of Staunton), was their hero and idol. The women sent husbands, sons, lovers to battle as cheerfully as to marriage feasts. No oppression, no destitution could abate their zeal. Upon a march I was accosted by two elderly ladies, sisters, who told me they had secreted a large quantity of bacon in a well on their estate, hard by. Federals had been in possession of the country, and, fearing the indiscretion of their slaves, they had done the work at night with their own hands, and now desired to *give* the meat to their own people. Wives and daughters of millers, whose husbands and brothers were in arms, worked the mills, night and day, to furnish flour to their soldiers. To the last, women would go distances to carry the modicum of food between themselves and starvation to a suffering Confederate. Should the sons of Virginia ever commit dishonorable acts, grim indeed will be their reception on the farther shores of Styx. They can expect no recognition from the mothers that bore them.

The year the war closed the Valley was ravaged with a cruelty surpassing that inflicted on the Palatinate two hundred years ago. That foul act smirched the fame of Dubois and Turenne and public opinion, in what has been deemed a ruder age, forced an apology from the grand "monarque." Yet we have seen the report of a Federal General, wherein is recounted the many barns, mills, and other buildings destroyed, concluding with the assertion that "a crow flying over the Valley must take rations with him." In the opinion of the admirers of the officer making

this report the achievement on which it is based ranks with "Marengo." Moreover, this same officer (Lieutenant-General Sheridan), many years after the close of the war, denounced several hundred thousands of his fellow-citizens as "banditti," and solicited permission of his Government to deal with them as such. May we not pause and reflect whether religion, education, science, and art combined have lessened the brutality of man since the days of Wallenstein and Tilly?

### Gettysburg.

Of most of the important battles of the war I have written except of Shiloh, on which I purpose to dwell, but will first say a few words about Gettysburg, because of the many recent publications thereanent. Some facts concerning this battle are established beyond dispute. In the first day's fighting a part of Lee's army defeated a part of Meade's. Intending to continue the contest on that field, a commander, not smitten by idiocy, would desire to concentrate and push the advantage gained by the previous success and its resultant "morale." Instead of attacking at dawn, Lee's attack was postponed until the afternoon of the following day in consequence of the absence of Longstreet's corps. Federal official reports show that some of Meade's corps reached him on the second day several hours after sunrise, and one or two late in the afternoon. It is positively asserted by many officers present, and of high rank and character, that Longstreet, on the first day, was nearer to Lee than Meade's reinforcing corps to this commander, and even nearer than a division of Ewell's corps, which reached the ground in time to share in the first day's success. Now, it nowhere appears in Lee's report of Gettysburg that he ordered Longstreet to him or blamed him for tardiness; but his report admits errors, and quietly takes the responsibility for them on his own broad shoulders. A recent article in the public press, signed by General Longstreet, ascribes the failure at Gettysburg to Lee's mistakes, which he (Longstreet) in vain pointed out and remonstrated against. That any subject involving the possession and exercise of intellect should be clear to Longstreet and concealed from Lee is a startling proposition to those possessing knowledge of the two men. We have biblical authority for the story that the angel in the path was visible to the ass though in-

visible to the seer, his master; but suppose that instead of smiting the honest, stupid animal, Balaam had caressed him and then been kicked by him, how would the story read? And thus much for Gettysburg.

### **Shiloh.**

Shiloh was a great misfortune. At the moment of his fall, Sidney Johnston, with all the energy of his nature, was pressing on the routed foe. Crouching under the bank of the Tennessee river, Grant was helpless. One short hour more of life to Johnston would have completed his destruction. The second in command—Beauregard—was on another and distant part of the field, and before he could gather the reins of direction, darkness fell and stopped the pursuit. During the night Buell reached the northern bank of the river and crossed his troops. Wallace, with a fresh division from below, got up. Together they advanced in the morning, found the Confederates rioting in the plunder of captured camps, and drove them back with loss. But all this was as nothing compared with the calamity of Johnston's death. Educated at West Point, Johnston remained in the United States Army for eight years, and acquired a thorough knowledge of the details of military duty. Resigning to aid the cause of the infant Republic of Texas, he became her adjutant-general, senior brigadier and Secretary at War. In the war with Mexico he raised a regiment of Texans to join General Zachary Taylor, and was greatly distinguished in the fighting around and capture of Monterey. General Taylor, with whom the early years of his service had been passed, declared him to be the best soldier he had ever commanded. More than once I have heard General Zachary Taylor express this opinion. Two cavalry regiments were added to the United States Army in 1854, and to the colonelcy of one of these Johnston was appointed. Subsequently, a brigadier by brevet, he commanded the expedition against the Mormons in Utah. Thus he brought to the Southern cause a civil and military experience far surpassing that of any other leader. Born in Kentucky, descended from an honorable colonial race, connected by marriage with influential families in the West, where his life had been passed, he was peculiarly fitted to command Western armies. With him at the helm, there would have been no Vicks-



burg, no Missionary Ridge, no Atlanta. His character was lofty and pure; his presence and demeanor dignified and courteous, with the simplicity of a child, and he at once inspired the respect and gained the confidence of cultivated gentlemen and rugged frontiersmen. Besides, he had passed through the furnace of ignorant newspapers, hotter than that of the Babylonian tyrant. Commanding some raw, unequipped forces at Bowling Green, Kentucky, the accustomed American exaggeration represented him as at the head of a vast army, prepared and eager for conquest. Before time was given him to organize and train his men, the absurdly constructed works on his left flank were captured. At Fort Donelson, on the Cumberland, were certain political generals, who, with a self-abnegation worthy of Plutarch's heroes, were anxious to get away and leave the glory and renown of defense to others. Johnston was in no sense responsible for the construction of these forts nor the assignment to their command of these self-denying warriors, but his line of communication was uncovered by their fall and he was compelled to retire to the southern bank of the Tennessee river. From the enlighteners of public opinion a howl of wrath came forth. Johnston, who had just been Alexander, Hannibal, Cæsar, Napoleon, was now a miserable dastard and traitor, unfit to command a corporal's guard. President Davis sought to console him, and the noblest lines ever penned by man were written by Johnston in reply. They even wrung tears of repentance from the pachyderms who had attacked him, and will be a text and consolation to future commanders who serve a country tolerant of an ignorant and licentious press. As pure gold he came forth from the furnace, above the reach of slander, the foremost man of all the South, and had it been possible for one heart, one mind, and one arm to save her cause, she lost them when Albert Sidney Johnston fell on the field of Shiloh. As soon after the war as she was permitted, the commonwealth of Texas removed his remains from New Orleans, to inter them in a land he had long and faithfully served. I was honored by a request to accompany the coffin from the cemetery to the steamer, and as I gazed upon it there arose the feeling of the Theban who, after the downfall of the glory and independence of his country, stood by the tomb of Epaminondas.

**Appeal of the Lee Monument Association.**

TO THE PEOPLE OF THE SOUTHERN STATES:

The State of Virginia has initiated the noble undertaking of erecting an equestrian statue of General Robert E. Lee on the Capitol grounds at Richmond, Va.; and has committed this trust, by statute, to the care and keeping of a Board of Managers. This Board, constituting the Lee Monument Association, is composed of her Governor, Auditor of Public Accounts, and Treasurer, whose names guarantee that this trust will be well discharged.

In deference to the fact that the glory of General Lee is the common heritage of our country, the Board has signified the desire that all the Southern States shall share in the tribute to him, and purpose that all so sharing shall, when the time comes, have an equal voice in awarding the contract.

*We*, your Senators and Representatives in the Congress of the United States, being assured that you will not be slow to manifest, by an earnest and liberal support, your veneration for the life, character and services of our great chief, express hereby our warm sympathy and co-operation in the effort of the Lee Monument Association to consummate this work of love:

John T. Morgan, Wm. H. Forney, C. M. Shelley, H. H. Herbert, Wm. W. Garth, J. N. Williams, R. F. Ligon, Jas. Taylor Jones, G. W. Hewitt, of Alabama; A. H. Garland, L. C. Gause, Jordan E. Cravens, T. M. Gunter, W. F. Slemons, of Arkansas; Charles W. Jones, R. H. M. Davidson, of Florida; J. B. Gordon, Benj. H. Hill, Alexander H. Stephens, Julian Hartridge, W. H. Felton, James H. Blount, Philip Cook, H. P. Bell, H. R. Harris, M. A. Candler, W. E. Smith, of Georgia; J. Proctor Knott, Albert S. Willis, J. E. S. Blackburn, Thomas Turner, J. G. Carlisle, John W. Caldwell, A. R. Boone, J. A. McKenzie, M. J. Durham, J. B. Clarke, of Kentucky; J. B. Eustis, E. John Ellis, E. W. Robertson, J. B. Elam, R. L. Gibson, of Louisiana; L. Q. C. Lamar, O. R. Singleton, Van H. Manning, James R. Chalmers, H. D. Money, H. L. Muldrow, Charles E. Hooker, of Mississippi; F. M. Cockrell, D. M. Armstrong, T. T. Crittenden, A. H. Buckner, Benj. J.

Franklin, R. P. Bland, R. H. Hatcher, John B. Clarke, Jr., David Rea, J. M. Glover, C. H. Morgan, of Missouri; M. W. Ransom, A. S. Merrimon, A. M. Waddell, A. M. Scales, Joseph J. Davis, Robert B. Vance, J. J. Yeates, Wm. M. Robins, of North Carolina; M. C. Butler, D. Wyatt Aiken, John H. Evans, of South Carolina; J. E. Bailey, Isham G. Harris, John F. House, G. G. Dibrell, Wm. P. Caldwell, W. C. Whitthome, J. D. C. Atkins, Casey Young, J. M. Bright, H. Y. Riddle, of Tennessee; Richard Coke, S. B. Maxey, G. Scleisher, D. B. Culberson, R. Q. Mills, J. W. Throckmorton, D. C. Giddings, John H. Reagan, of Texas; R. E. Withers, John W. Johnston, G. C. Walker, Eppa Hunton, John Goode, G. C. Cabell, J. T. Harris, J. R. Tucker, A. L. Pridemore, B. B. Douglas, of Virginia; John E. Kenna, B. F. Martin, Benjamin Wilson, of West Virginia.

## EDITORIAL PARAGRAPHS.

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RENEWALS have been coming in quite briskly; but there are still a large number of old subscribers to whom we are not now sending our *Papers* simply because their time is out and they have failed to renew their subscriptions. We are very sorry to part with any of our friends, but we are obliged to insist upon our terms—\$3 *per annum in advance*. We beg that subscribers in every locality will “stir up the pure minds of their neighbors by way of remembrance,” and will send us new subscribers or the renewals of old ones.

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GENERAL GEO. D. JOHNSTON of Alabama has been duly appointed GENERAL AGENT of our Society and authorized to travel in our interest, to collect money or material for us, to appoint local agents, or to act for us as occasion may demand.

We deemed ourselves fortunate in securing the services of this gallant soldier and accomplished gentleman, and the result has fully justified our expectations. He has been canvassing Nashville with the most gratifying success, and now proposes to visit other cities and towns of Tennessee and Kentucky. We bespeak for him the hearty co-operation of all friends of the cause of truth.

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ANNALS OF THE ARMY OF TENNESSEE is the title of a new monthly which it is proposed to start in April at Nashville, Tenn.

We have received the circular and prospectus from the editor, Dr. E. L. Drake, and shall cordially welcome the new worker in the cause of historic truth, and bid it a hearty “God speed.” The circular is signed by a number of gallant soldiers of the Western army, and contains a number of important statements in reference to the preservation and vindication of the truth of history, especially as it regards the achievements of the Western armies.

It, however, does the *Southern HISTORICAL SOCIETY* injustice (unintentionally, of course,) in the statement that our publications have been “confined mainly” to the Army of Northern Virginia. We have published a large number of articles on the *general* history of the Confederacy, in which the soldiers of all of our armies are alike interested, and we have published a number of reports, “Recollections,” &c., of the Southern, Western, and Southwestern armies. For the past six months we have devoted a large part of our space to Gettysburg; but we are ready to illustrate as fully the great battles of the West if our friends who fought them so gallantly will only furnish us the material.

The truth is that our Society was originally started in New Orleans by officers of the *Western* army—that we have on our shelves a large mass of material which illustrates the gallant deeds of our comrades of the West—and that while we hail the “*Annals*” as a valuable co-worker and helper, we shall still claim the privilege of asking our friends in the West to help us to put them right on the record.

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A LETTER FROM GENERAL FITZ. LEE, on Gettysburg, will appear in our next number, and will contain some things about the great battle never before published.

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WE HAVE ON HAND and waiting for publication, a number of valuable articles. Our friends will please bear with us, and their papers shall appear at the earliest possible day.

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ORIGINAL PAPERS that have never been published in any form before always have the preference in making our selections. And while we sometimes copy articles even from current newspapers, yet we insist upon it that where gentlemen select first some other vehicle of publication, we are thereby released from any obligation to *copy* their papers; but, whether we can publish or not, we are always glad to place in our scrap-book or on our shelves *anything* bearing on the “*War between the States.*”

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CORRECTION.—In the letter from General Clayton, page 127, line 7 from bottom, the word “*morning*” should be “*moving.*”

# SOUTHERN HISTORICAL SOCIETY PAPERS.

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Vol. V.      Richmond, Va., April, 1878.      No. 4.

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## Torpedo Service in the Harbor and Water Defences of Charleston.

BY GENERAL G. T. BEAUREGARD.

[The following article from the distinguished engineer and accomplished soldier who made the heroic defence of Charleston, has been delayed much longer than we had intended by circumstances over which we had no control.]

### Letter from General Beauregard.

Rev. J. W. JONES, D. D.,  
Secretary Southern Historical Society,  
Richmond, Virginia:

DEAR SIR: During last summer several articles appeared in Northern papers, giving accounts of Russian torpedoes and torpedo-boats in the Danube, in which erroneous statements were made of the use of those engines of destruction at Charleston during our late civil war. To give a correct account of their use, as well as of other means employed by me to defend that city against the powerful naval and land batteries of the Federals, I prepared a paper on the subject for the *Philadelphia Weekly Times*, which, through accidental delays in transmission, did not appear until the first week in October. Since then, an interesting article on "torpedo service," by Commander W. T. Glassel, C. S. N., who commanded the "David" in its gallant night attack on the New Ironsides in the outer harbor of Charleston, Oct. 5, 1863, has appeared in last November's number of the *Southern Historical Society Papers*, which enables me to correct a few slight errors I had made in my narrative of that attack. I have added also to my article a few remarks taken from a Northern source which

contains information I did not at first possess. Thus amended, I enclose it to you that it may appear of record, should you think it worthy of the honor, among the valuable Confederate papers which are published monthly in the *Southern Historical Society Papers*, so ably conducted by you.

I remain, dear sir, yours very truly,

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

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#### **Narrative by General Beauregard.**

On my return to Charleston in September, 1862, to assume command of the Department of South Carolina and Georgia, I found the defences of those two States in a bad and incomplete condition, including defective location and arrangement of works, even at Charleston and Savannah. Several points—such as the mouths of the Stono and Edisto rivers, and the headwaters of Broad river at Port Royal—I found unprotected; though soon after the fall of Fort Sumter, in 1861, as I was about to be detached, I had designated them to be properly fortified. A recommendation had even been made by my immediate predecessor that the outer defences of Charleston Harbor should be given up as untenable against the ironclads and monitors then known to be under construction at the North, and that the water-line of the immediate city of Charleston should be made the sole line of defence. This course, however, not having been authorized by the Richmond authorities, it was not attempted, except that the fortifications of Cole's Island—the key to the defence of the Stono river—was abandoned and the harbor in the mouth of the Stono left open to the enemy, who made it their base of operations. Immediately on my arrival I inspected the defences of Charleston and Savannah, and made a requisition on the War Department for additional troops and heavy guns deemed necessary; but neither could be furnished, owing, it was stated, to the pressing wants of the Confederacy at other points. Shortly afterward Florida was added to my command, but without any increase of troops or guns, except the few already in that State; and, later, several brigades were withdrawn from me, notwithstanding my protest, to reinforce the armies of Virginia and Tennessee.

As I have already said, I found at Charleston an exceedingly bad defensive condition against a determined attack. Excepting Fort Moultrie, on Sullivan's Island, the works and batteries covering Charleston Harbor, including Fort Sumter, were insufficiently armed and their barbette guns without the protection of heavy traverses. In all the harbor works there were only three 10-inch and a few 8-inch columbiads, which had been left in Forts Sumter and Moultrie by Major Anderson, and about a dozen rifle guns—unbanded 32-pounders, made by the Confederates—which burst after a few discharges. There were, however, a number of good 42-pounders of the old pattern, which I afterward had rifled and banded. I found a continuous floating boom of large timbers bound together and interlinked, stretching across from Fort Sumter to Fort Moultrie. But this was a fragile and unreliable barrier, as it offered too great a resistance to the strong current of the ebb and flood tide at full moon, especially after southeasterly gales, which backed up the waters in the bay and in the Ashley and Cooper rivers. It was exposed, therefore, at such periods, to be broken, particularly as the channel-bottom was hard and smooth, and the light anchors which held the boom in position were constantly dragging—a fact which made the breaking of the boom an easy matter under the strain of hostile steamers coming against it under full headway. For this reason the engineers had proposed the substitution of a rope obstruction, which would be free from tidal strain, but little had been done toward its preparation. I, therefore, soon after assuming command, ordered its immediate completion, and, to give it protection and greater efficiency, directed that two lines of torpedoes be planted a few hundred yards in advance of it. But before the order could be carried out, a strong southerly storm broke the timber boom in several places, leaving the channel unprotected, except by the guns of Forts Sumter and Moultrie. Fortunately, however, the Federal fleet made no effort to enter the harbor, as it might have done if it had made the attempt at night. A few days later the rope obstruction and torpedoes were in position, and so remained without serious injury till the end of the war.

The rope obstruction was made of two heavy cables, about five or six feet apart, the one below the other, and connected together by a network of smaller ropes. The anchors were made fast to



the lower cable, and the buoys or floats to the upper one. The upper cable carried a fringe of smaller ropes, about three-fourths of an inch in diameter by fifty feet long, which floated as so many "streamers" on the surface, destined to foul the screw propeller of any steamer which might attempt to pass over the obstruction. Shortly after these cables were in position a blockade-runner, in attempting at night to pass through the gap purposely left open near the Sullivan Island shore, under the guns of Fort Moultrie and of the outside batteries, accidentally crossed the end of the rope obstruction, when one of the streamers got entangled around the shaft, checking its revolutions. The vessel was at once compelled to drop anchor to avoid drifting on the torpedoes or ashore, and afterward had to be docked for the removal of the streamer before she could again use her propeller. The torpedoes, as anchored, floated a few feet below the surface of the water at low tide, and were loaded with one hundred pounds of powder arranged to explode by concussion—the automatic fuse employed being the invention of Capt. Francis D. Lee, an intelligent young engineer officer of my general staff, and now a prominent architect in St. Louis. The fuse or firing apparatus consisted of a cylindrical lead tube with a hemispherical head, the metal in the head being thinner than at the sides. The tube was open at the lower extremity, where it was surrounded by a flange; and, when in place, it was protected against leakage by means of brass couplings and rubber washers. It was charged as follows: In its centre was a glass tube filled with sulphuric acid and hermetically sealed. This was guarded by another glass tube sealed in like manner, and both were retained in position by means of a peculiar pin at the open end of the leaden tube; the space between the latter and the glass tube was then filled with a composition of chlorate of potassa and powdered loaf sugar, with a quantity of rifle powder. The lower part of the tube was then closed with a piece of oiled paper. Great care had to be taken to ascertain that the leaden tube was perfectly water-tight under considerable pressure. The torpedo also had to undergo the most careful test. The firing of the tube was produced by bringing the thin head in contact with a hard object, as the side of a vessel; the indentation of the lead broke the glass tubes, which discharged the acid on the composition, firing it, and thereby igniting the charge in the torpedo. The charges used

varied from sixty to one hundred pounds rifle powder, though other explosives might have been more advantageously used if they had been available to us. Generally four of the fuses were attached to the head of each torpedo so as to secure the discharge at any angle of attack. These firing tubes or fuses were afterward modified to avoid the great risk consequent upon screwing them in place and of having them permanently attached to the charged torpedo. The shell of the latter was thinned at the point where the tube was attached, so that, under water pressure, the explosion of the tube would certainly break it and discharge the torpedo; though, when unsubmerged, the explosion of the tube would vent itself in the open air without breaking the shell. In this arrangement the tube was of brass, with a leaden head, and made water-tight by means of a screw plug at its base. Both the shell and the tube being made independently water-tight, the screw connection between the two was made loose, so that the tube could be attached or detached readily with the fingers. The mode adopted for testing against leakage was by placing them in a vessel of alcohol, under the glass exhaust of an air-pump. When no air bubbles appeared the tubes could be relied on. Captain Lee had also an electric torpedo which exploded by concussion against a hard object; the electric current being thus established, insured the discharge at the right moment.

Captain Lee is the inventor also of the "spar-torpedo" as an attachment to vessels, now in general use in the Federal navy. It originated as follows: He reported to me that he thought he could blow up successfully any vessel by means of a torpedo carried some five or six feet under water at the end of a pole ten or twelve feet long, which should be attached to the bow of a skiff or row-boat. I authorized an experiment upon the hulk of an unfinished and condemned gunboat anchored in the harbor, and loaded for the purpose with all kinds of rubbish taken from the "burnt district" of the city. It was a complete success; a large hole was made in the side of the hulk, the rubbish being blown high in the air, and the vessel sank in less than a minute.\* I then determined

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\* Since writing the above I have been informed by Captain F. Barrett, United States Navy, that he had invented the same "spar-torpedo" in the first year of the war, but it had not been applied by the Federals. In the spring of 1862, I had also recommended its use to General Lovell for the defence of New Orleans, by arming river boats with it to make night attacks on the enemy's fleet—but it was proposed to use it above water.

to employ this important invention, not only in the defense of Charleston, but to disperse or destroy the Federal blockading fleet by means of one or more small swift steamers, with low decks, and armed only with "spar-torpedoes" as designed by Captain Lee. I sent him at once to Richmond, to urge the matter on the attention of the Confederate Government. He reported his mission as follows:

"In compliance with your orders, I submitted the drawing of my torpedo and a vessel with which I propose to operate them, to the Secretary of War. While he heartily approved, he stated his inability to act in the matter, as it was a subject that appertained to the navy. He, however, introduced me and urged it to the Secretary of Navy. The Secretary of War could do nothing, and the Secretary of the Navy would not, for the reason that I was not a naval officer under his command. So I returned to Charleston without accomplishing anything. After a lapse of some months I was again sent to Richmond to represent the matter to the Government, and I carried with me the indorsement of the best officers of the navy. The result was the transfer of an unfinished hull, on the stocks at Charleston, which was designed for a gunboat—or rather floating battery, as she was not arranged for any motive power, but was intended to be anchored in position. This hull was completed by me, and a second-hand and much worn engine was obtained in Savannah and placed in her. Notwithstanding her tub-like model and the inefficiency of her engine, Captain Carlin, commanding a blockade-runner, took charge of her in an attack against the *New Ironsides*. She was furnished with a spar designed to carry three torpedoes of one hundred pounds each. The lateral spars suggested by you, Captain Carlin declined to use, as they would interfere very seriously with the movements of the vessel, which, even without them, could with the utmost difficulty stem the current. The boat was almost entirely submerged, and painted gray like the blockade-runners, and, like them, made no smoke, by burning anthracite coal. The night selected for the attack was very dark, and the *New Ironsides* was not seen until quite near. Captain Carlin immediately made for her; but her side being oblique to the direction of his approach, he ordered his steersman, who was below deck, to change the course. This order was misunderstood, and, in place of going the "bow on" as was proposed, she ran alongside of the *New Ironsides* and entangled her spar in the anchor-chain of that vessel. In attempting to back the engine hung on the centre, and some delay occurred before it was pried off. During this critical period Captain Carlin, in answer to threats and inquiries, declared his boat to be the *Live Yankee*, from Port Royal, with dispatches for the admiral. This deception was not discovered until after Carlin had backed out and his vessel was lost in the darkness."

Shortly after this bold attempt of Captain Carlin, in the summer of 1863, to blow up the *New Ironsides*, Mr. Theodore Stoney, Dr. Ravenel, and other gentlemen of Charleston, had built a small cigar-shaped boat, which they called the "David." It had been specially planned and constructed to attack this much-dreaded naval Goliath, the *New Ironsides*. It was about twenty feet long, with a diameter of five feet at its middle, and was propelled by a small screw worked by a diminutive engine. As soon as ready for service, I caused it to be fitted with a "Lee spar-torpedo" charged with seventy-five pounds of powder. Commander W. T. Glassel, a brave and enterprising officer of the Confederate States Navy, took charge of it, and about eight o'clock one hazy night, on the ebb tide, with a crew of one engineer, J. H. Tomb; one fireman, James Sullivan; and a pilot, J. W. Cannon; he fearlessly set forth from Charleston on his perilous mission—the destruction of the *New Ironsides*. I may note that this ironclad steamer threw a great deal more metal, at each broadside, than all the monitors together of the fleet; her fire was delivered with more rapidity and accuracy, and she was the most effective vessel employed in the reduction of Battery Wagner.

The "David" reached the *New Ironsides* about ten o'clock P. M., striking her with a torpedo about six feet under water, but fortunately for that steamer she received the shock against one of her inner bulk-heads, which saved her from destruction. The water, however, being thrown up in large volume, half-filled her little assailant and extinguished its fires. It then drifted out to sea with the current, under a heavy grape and musketry fire from the much alarmed crew of the *New Ironsides*. Supposing the "David" disabled, Glassel and his men jumped into the sea to swim ashore; but after remaining in the water about one hour he was picked up by the boat of a Federal transport schooner, whence he was transferred to the guardship "Ottawa," lying outside of the rest of the fleet. He was ordered at first, by Admiral Dahlgren, to be ironed, and in case of resistance, to be double ironed; but through the intercession of his friend, Captain W. D. Whiting, commanding the *Ottawa*, he was released on giving his parole not to attempt to escape from the ship. The fireman, Sullivan, had taken refuge on the rudder of the *New Ironsides*, where he was discovered, put in irons and kept in a dark cell until sent with

Glassel to New York, to be tried and hung, as reported by Northern newspapers, for using an engine of war not recognized by civilized nations. But the government of the United States has now a torpedo corps, intended specially to study and develop that important branch of the military service. After a captivity of many months in Forts Lafayette and Warren, Glassel and Sullivan were finally exchanged for the captain and a sailor of the Federal steamer "Isaac Smith," a heavily-armed gunboat which was captured in the Stono river, with its entire crew of one hundred and thirty officers and men, by a surprise I had prepared, with field artillery only, placed in ambush along the river bank, and under whose fire the Federal gunners were unable to man and use their powerful guns. Captain Glassel's other two companions, Engineer Tomb and Pilot Cannon, after swimming about for a while, espied the David still afloat, drifting with the current; they betook themselves to it, re-lit the fires from its bull's-eye lantern, got up steam and started back for the city; they had to repass through the fleet and they received the fire of several of its monitors and guard-boats, fortunately without injury. With the assistance of the flood tide they returned to their point of departure, at the Atlantic wharf, about midnight, after having performed one of the most daring feats of the war. The New Ironsides never fired another shot after this attack upon her. She remained some time at her anchorage off Morris Island, evidently undergoing repairs; she was then towed to Port Royal, probably to fit her for her voyage to Philadelphia, where she remained until destroyed by fire after the war.

Nearly about the time of the attack upon the New Ironsides by the David, Mr. Horace L. Hunley, formerly of New Orleans, but then living in Mobile, offered me another torpedo-boat of a different description, which had been built with his private means. It was shaped like a fish, made of galvanized iron, was twenty feet long, and at the middle three and a half feet wide by five deep. From its shape it came to be known as the "fish torpedo-boat." Propelled by a screw worked from the inside by seven or eight men, it was so contrived that it could be submerged and worked under water for several hours, and to this end was provided with a fin on each side, worked also from the interior. By depressing the points of these fins the boat, when in motion, was made to descend,

and by elevating them it was made to rise. Light was afforded through the means of bull's-eyes placed in the man-holes. Lieut. Payne, Confederate States Navy, having volunteered with a crew from the Confederate Navy, to man the fish-boat for another attack upon the *New Ironsides*, it was given into their hands for that purpose. While tied to the wharf at Fort Johnston, whence it was to start under cover of night to make the attack, a steamer passing close by capsized and sunk it. Lieut. Payne, who at the time was standing in one of the man-holes, jumped out into the water, which, rushing into the two openings, drowned two men then within the body of the boat. After the recovery of the sunken boat Mr. Hunley came from Mobile, bringing with him Lieutenant Dixon, of the Alabama volunteers, who had successfully experimented with the boat in the harbor of Mobile, and under him another naval crew volunteered to work it. As originally designed, the torpedo was to be dragged astern upon the surface of the water; the boat, approaching the broadside of the vessel to be attacked, was to dive beneath it, and, rising to the surface beyond, continue its course, thus bringing the floating torpedo against the vessel's side, when it would be discharged by a trigger contrived to go off by the contact. Lieutenant Dixon made repeated descents in the harbor of Charleston, diving under the naval receiving ship which lay at anchor there. But one day when he was absent from the city Mr. Hunley, unfortunately, wishing to handle the boat himself, made the attempt. It was readily submerged, but did not rise again to the surface, and all on board perished from asphyxiation. When the boat was discovered, raised and opened, the spectacle was indescribably ghastly; the unfortunate men were contorted into all kinds of horrible attitudes; some clutching candles, evidently endeavoring to force open the man-holes; others lying in the bottom tightly grappled together, and the blackened faces of all presented the expression of their despair and agony. After this tragedy I refused to permit the boat to be used again; but Lieutenant Dixon, a brave and determined man, having returned to Charleston, applied to me for authority to use it against the Federal steam sloop-of-war *Housatonic*, a powerful new vessel, carrying eleven guns of the largest calibre, which lay at the time in the north channel opposite Beach Inlet, materially obstructing the passage of our blockade-runners

in and out. At the suggestion of my chief-of-staff, Gen. Jordan, I consented to its use for this purpose, not as a submarine machine, but in the same manner as the *David*. As the *Housatonic* was easily approached through interior channels from behind Sullivan's Island, and Lieutenant Dixon readily procured a volunteer crew, his little vessel was fitted with a Lee spar torpedo, and the expedition was undertaken. Lieutenant Dixon, acting with characteristic coolness and resolution, struck and sunk the *Housatonic* on the night of February 17, 1864; but unhappily, from some unknown cause, the torpedo boat was also sunk, and all with it lost. Several years since a "diver," examining the wreck of the *Housatonic*, discovered the fish-boat lying alongside of its victim.

From the commencement of the siege of Charleston I had been decidedly of the opinion that the most effective as well as least costly method of defence against the powerful iron-clad steamers and monitors originated during the late war, was to use against them small but swift steamers of light draught, very low decks, and hulls iron-claded down several feet below the water-line; these boats to be armed with a spar-torpedo (on Captain Lee's plan), to thrust out from the bow at the moment of collision, being inclined to strike below the enemy's armor, and so arranged that the torpedo could be immediately renewed from within for another attack; all such boats to be painted gray like the blockade-runners, and, when employed, to burn anthracite coal, so as to make no smoke. But unfortunately I had not the means to put the system into execution. Soon after the first torpedo attack, made, as related, by the *David* upon the *New Ironsides*, I caused a number of boats and barges to be armed with spar-torpedoes for the purpose of attacking in detail the enemy's gunboats resorting to the sounds and harbors along the South Carolina coast. But, the Federals having become very watchful, surrounded their steamers at night with nettings and floating booms to prevent the torpedo boats from coming near enough to do them any injury. Even in the outer harbor of Charleston, where the blockaders and their consorts were at anchor, the same precaution was observed in calm weather.

The anchoring of the large torpedoes in position was attended with considerable danger. While planting them at the mouth of the Cooper and Ashley rivers (which form the peninsula of the

city of Charleston), the steamer engaged in that duty being swung around by the returning tide, struck and exploded one of the torpedoes just anchored. The steamer sank immediately, but, fortunately, the tide being low and the depth of water not great, no lives were lost. In 1863-4, Jacksonville, Florida, having been evacuated by the Confederates, then too weak to hold it longer, the Federal gunboats frequently ran up the St. John's river many miles, committing depredations along its banks. To stop these proceedings I sent a party from Charleston under a staff officer, Captain Pliny Bryan, to plant torpedoes in the channels of that stream. The result was the destruction of several large steamers and a cessation of all annoyance on the part of the others. In the bay of Charleston and adjacent streams I had planted about one hundred and twenty-five torpedoes and some fifty more in other parts of my department. The first torpedoes used in the late war were placed in the James river, below Richmond, by General G. R. Raines, who became afterward chief of the Torpedo Bureau. Mr. Barbarin, of New Orleans, placed also successfully a large number of torpedoes in Mobile bay and its vicinity.

To show the important results obtained by the use of torpedoes by the Confederates and the importance attached, now, at the North to that mode of warfare, I will quote here the following remarks from an able article in the last September number of the *Galaxy*, entitled, "Has the Day of Great Navies Past?" The author says: "The real application of submarine warfare dates from the efforts of the Confederates during the late war. In October, 1862, a 'torpedo bureau' was established at Richmond, which made rapid progress in the construction and operations of these weapons until the close of the war in 1865. Seven Union iron-clads, eleven wooden war vessels, and six army transports were destroyed by Southern torpedoes, and many more were seriously damaged. This destruction occurred, for the most part, during the last two years of the war, and it is suggestive to think what might have been the influence on the Union cause if the Confederate practice of submarine warfare had been nearly as efficient at the commencement as it was at the close of the war. It is not too much to say, respecting the blockade of the Southern ports, that if not altogether broken up, it would have been rendered so inefficient as to have commanded no respect from European powers, while the



command of rivers, all important to the Union forces as bases of operations, would have been next to impossible.

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“Think of the destruction this infernal machine effected, and bear in mind its use came to be fairly understood, and some system introduced into its arrangement, only during the last part of the war. During a period when scarcely any vessels were lost, and very few severely damaged by the most powerful guns then employed in actual war, we find this long list of disasters from the use of this new and, in the beginning, much despised comer into the arena of naval warfare. But it required just such a record as this to arouse naval officers to ask themselves the question, ‘Is not the days of great navies gone forever?’ If such comparatively rude and improvised torpedoes made use of by the Confederates caused such damage and spread such terror among the Union fleet, what will be the consequence when skilful engineers, encouraged by governments, as they have never been before, diligently apply themselves to the perfecting of this terrible weapon? The successes of the Confederates have made the torpedo, which before was looked on with loathing—a name not to be spoken except contemptuously—a recognized factor in modern naval warfare. On all sides we see the greatest activity in improving it.”

I shall now refer briefly to the use in Charleston harbor of rifle-cannon and iron-clad floating and land batteries. In the attack on Fort Sumter, in 1861, these war appliances were first used in the United States. When I arrived at Charleston, in March of that year, to assume command of the forces there assembling and direct the attack on Fort Sumter, I found under construction a rough floating battery made of palmetto logs, under the direction of Captain Hamilton, an ex-United States naval officer. He intended to plate it with several sheets of rolled iron, each about three-quarters of an inch thick, and to arm it with four 32-pounder carronades. He and his battery were so much ridiculed, however, that he could with difficulty obtain any further assistance from the State government. He came to me in great discouragement, and expressed in vivid terms his certainty of success, and of revolutionizing future naval warfare as well as the construction of war vessels. I approved of Captain Hamilton’s design, and having secured the necessary means, instructed him to finish his battery

at the earliest moment practicable. This being accomplished before the attack on Fort Sumter opened, early in April I placed the floating battery in position at the western extremity of Sullivan's Island to enfilade certain barbette guns of the fort which could not be reached effectively by our land batteries. It therefore played an important part in that brief drama of thirty-three hours, receiving many shots without any serious injury. About one year later, in Hampton Roads, the Merrimac, plated and roofed with two layers of railroad iron, met the Monitor in a momentous encounter, which first attracted the attention of the civilized world to the important change that iron-plating or "armors" would thenceforth create in naval architecture and armaments. The one and a half to two-inch plating used on Captain Hamilton's floating battery has already grown to about twelve inches thickness of steel plates of the best quality, put together with the utmost care, in the effort to resist the heaviest rifle-shots now used. About the same time that Captain Hamilton was constructing his floating battery, Mr. C. H. Steven, of Charleston, (who afterward died a brigadier-general at the battle of Chickamauga,) commenced building an iron-clad land battery at Cumming's Point, the northern extremity of Morris Island and the point nearest to Fort Sumter—that is, about thirteen hundred yards distant. This battery was to be built of heavy timbers covered with one layer of railroad iron, the rails well-fitted into each other, presenting an inclined, smooth surface of about thirty-five degrees to the fire of Sumter; the surface was to be well greased and the guns were to fire through small embrasures supplied with strong iron shutters. I approved also of the plan, making such suggestions as my experience as an engineer warranted. This battery took an active part in the attack and was struck several times; but excepting the jamming and disabling one of the shutters, the battery remained uninjured to the end of the fight.

From Cumming's Point also, and in the same attack, was used the first rifled cannon fired in America. The day before I received orders from the Confederate Government, at Montgomery, to demand the evacuation or surrender of Fort Sumter, a vessel from England arriving in the outer harbor, signalled that she had something important for the Governor of the State. I sent out a harbor boat, which returned with a small Blakely rifled-gun, of

two and a half inches diameter, with only fifty rounds of ammunition. I placed it at once behind a sand-bag parapet next to the Steven battery, where it did opportune service with its ten-pound shell while the ammunition lasted. The penetration of the projectiles into the brick masonry of the fort was not great at that distance, but the piece had great accuracy, and several of the shells entered the embrasures facing Morris Island. One of the officers of the garrison remarked after the surrender, that when they first heard the singular whizzing, screeching sound of the projectile, they did not understand its cause until one of the unexploded shells being found in the fort the mystery was solved. As a proof of the rapid strides taken by the artillery arm of the service, I shall mention that two years later the Federals fired against Fort Sumter, from nearly the same spot, rifle projectiles weighing three hundred pounds. Meantime I had received from England two other Blakely rifled cannon of thirteen and a quarter inches calibre. These magnificent specimens of heavy ordnance were, apart from their immense size, different in construction from anything I had ever seen. They had been bored through from muzzle to breech; the breech was then plugged with a brass block extending into the bore at least two feet, and into which had been reamed a chamber about eighteen inches in length and six in diameter, while the vent entered the bore immediately in advance of this chamber. The projectiles provided were shells weighing, when loaded, about three hundred and fifty pounds, and solid cylindrical shots weighing seven hundred and thirty pounds; the charge for the latter was sixty pounds of powder. The first of these guns received was mounted in a battery specially constructed for it at "The Battery," at the immediate mouth of Cooper river, to command the inner harbor. As no instructions for their service accompanied the guns, and the metal between the exterior surface of the breech and the rear of the inner chamber did not exceed six to eight inches, against all experience in ordnance, apprehensions were excited that the gun would burst in firing with so large a charge and such weight of projectile. Under the circumstances it was determined to charge it with an empty shell and the minimum of powder necessary to move it; the charge was divided in two cartridges, one to fit the small rear chamber and the other the main bore. The gun was fired by means of a long lanyard from

the bomb-proof attached to the battery; and, as apprehended, it burst at the first fire, even with the relatively small charge used; the brass plug was found started back at least the sixteenth of an inch, splitting the breech with three or four distinct cracks and rendering it useless.

With such a result I did not attempt, of course, to mount and use the other, but assembled a board of officers to study the principle that might be involved in the peculiar construction, and to make experiments generally with ordnance. The happy results of the extensive experiments made by this board with many guns of different calibre, including muskets, and last of all with the other Blakely, was that if the cartridge were not pressed down to the bottom of the bore of a gun, and a space were thus left in rear of the charge, as great a velocity could be imparted to the projectile with a much smaller charge and the gun was subject to less abrupt strain from the explosion, because this air-chamber, affording certain room for the expansion of the gases, gave time for the inertia of the heavy mass of the projectile to be overcome before the full explosion of the charge, and opportunity was also given for the ignition of the entire charge, so that no powder was wasted as in ordinary gunnery. When this was discovered the remaining Blakely was tried from a skid, without any cartridge in the rear chamber. It fired both projectiles, shell and solid shot, with complete success, notwithstanding the small amount of metal at the extremity of the breech. I at once utilized this discovery. We had a number of 8-inch columbiads (remaining in Charleston after the capture of Sumter in 1861) which contained a powder-chamber of smaller diameter than the calibre of the gun. The vent in rear of this powder-chamber was plugged, and a new vent opened in advance of the powder chamber, leaving the latter to serve as an air-chamber, as in our use of the Blakely gun. They were then rifled and banded, and thus turned into admirable guns, which were effectively employed against the Federal iron-clads. I am surprised that the new principle adapted to these guns has not been used for the heavy ordnance of the present day, as it would secure great economy in weight and cost. The injured Blakely gun was subsequently thoroughly repaired, and made as efficient as when first received.

In the year 1854, while in charge as engineer of the fortifications of Louisiana, I attended a target practice with heavy guns by the garrison of Fort Jackson, on the Mississippi river, the object fired at being a hogshead floating with the current at the rate of about four and a half miles an hour. I was struck with the difficulties of trailing or traversing the guns—42-pounders and 8-inch columbiads—and with the consequent inaccuracy of the firing. Reflecting upon the matter, I devised soon afterward a simple method of overcoming the difficulty by the application of a “rack and lever” to the wheels of the chassis of the guns; and I sent drawings of the improvement to the Chief of Engineers, General Totten, who referred them, with his approval, to the Chief of Ordnance. In the course of a few weeks the latter informed me that his department had not yet noticed any great obstacle in traversing guns on moving objects, and therefore declined to adopt my invention. When charged in 1861 with the Confederate attack on Fort Sumter, I described this device to several of my engineer and artillery officers; but before I could have it applied I was ordered to Virginia to assume command of the Confederate force then assembling at Manassas. Afterward, on my return to Charleston in 1862, one of my artillery officers, Lieutenant-Colonel Yates, an intelligent and zealous soldier, applied this principle (modified, however,) to one of the heavy guns in the harbor with such satisfactory results that I gave him orders to apply it as rapidly as possible to all guns of that class which we then had mounted. By April 6, 1863, when Admiral Dupont made his attack on Fort Sumter with seven monitors, the *New Ironsides*, several gunboats and mortar boats, our heaviest pieces had this traversing apparatus adapted to their chassis, and the result realized fully our expectations. However slow or fast the Federal vessels moved in their evolutions, they received a steady and unerring fire, which at first disconcerted them, and at last gave us a brilliant victory—disabling five of the monitors, one of which, the *Keokuk*, sunk at her anchors that night. It is pertinent for me professionally to remark that had this Federal naval attack on Fort Sumter of the 6th of April, 1863, been made at night, while the fleet could have easily approached near enough to see the fort—a large, lofty object, covering several acres—the monitors, which were relatively so small and low on the water, could not have been seen from the

fort. It would have been impossible, therefore, for the latter to have returned with any accuracy the fire of the fleet, and this plan of attack could have been repeated every night until the walls of the fort should have crumbled under the enormous missiles, which made holes two and a half feet deep in the walls, and shattered the latter in an alarming manner. I could not then have repaired during the day the damages of the night, and I am confident now, as I was then, that Fort Sumter, if thus attacked, must have been disabled and silenced in a few days. Such a result at that time would have been necessarily followed by the evacuation of Morris and Sullivan's Islands, and, soon after, of Charleston itself, for I had not yet had time to complete and arm the system of works, including James Island and the inner harbor, which enabled us six months later to bid defiance to Admiral Dahlgren's powerful fleet and Gilmore's strong land forces.

**A Review of the First Two Days' Operations at Gettysburg and a Reply to General Longstreet by General Fitz. Lee.**

[Even if his gallant services and military reputation did not entitle him to speak, we are sure that our readers will be glad to have the following paper from one so closely allied to our great Commander-in-Chief.]

The "great battle of Gettysburg" has always occupied a prominent position in the mind of the Confederate soldier. This surpassing interest is due from the fact that there prevails, throughout the South, a wide-spread impression that had the plans of the Southern chieftain been fully endorsed, entered into, and carried out by his corps commanders, the historic "rebel yell" of triumph would have resounded along Cemetery Ridge upon that celebrated 2d July, 1863, and re-echoing from the heights of Round Top, might have been heard and heeded around the walls of Washington, Baltimore, and Philadelphia. There is a ghastliness about that picture of the struggle at Gettysburg, that the blood of the heroes who perished there serves but to increase; and over that splendid scene of human courage and human sacrifice, there arises like the ghost of Banquo at Macbeth's banquet, a dreadful apparition, which says that the battle was lost to the Southern troops because "some one blundered." Military critics, foreign and native, have differed as to the individual responsibility of what was practically a Confederate defeat. The much-abused cavalry is lifted into great prominence and is constrained to feel complimented by the statement of many of these critics that the failure to crush the Federal army in Pennsylvania in 1863 can be expressed "in five words" (General Heth, in a late paper to the *Philadelphia Times*), viz: "the absence of our cavalry;" but such language implies an accusation against General J. E. B. Stuart, its commander, who has been charged with a neglect of duty in not reporting the passage of the Potomac by Hooker's army (afterwards Meade's), and with disobedience of orders, which resulted in placing the Federal army between his command and the force of General Lee, thereby putting out the eyes of his own "giant." There are those who bring our troubles to the door and cast them at the feet of General Ewell, the gallant commander of the Second corps, who is charged with not obeying his chief's orders, by following

up his success and occupying Cemetery Heights upon the afternoon of July 1st.

Others confidently agree with Colonel Taylor, General Lee's adjutant-general, that "General Longstreet was fairly chargeable with tardiness" on the 2nd July, in not making his attack earlier; and again it is stated, that his charging column upon the 3rd, which moved so magnificently to assault the positions of the Federals, was not composed of all the troops General Lee designed should be placed in it.

And last, but by no means least, the Confederate Commander-in-Chief himself is now for the first time charged with everything relating to the disaster of Gettysburg, and the whole accountability for the results of the battle are pointedly placed upon his shoulders by one of his subordinates, in a paper prepared for the *Philadelphia Times*. To whom, therefore, it may be asked, can the loss of the battle of Gettysburg be properly attributed—to Stuart, or Ewell, or Longstreet, or to General Lee? Very many of us who are deeply interested in the subject may honorably differ as to that, but upon the splendid courage displayed by the rank and file of the Confederate army upon those three first days in July, 1863, wherever tested, the world unites in perfect harmony.

We were indeed "within a stone's throw of peace" at Gettysburg—and although in numbers as 62,000\* is to 105,000, before any portion of either army had become engaged—yet the advantages were so manifestly on General Lee's side in consequence of the more rapid concentration of his troops upon a common point, that the heart of every Southern soldier beat with the lofty confidence of certain victory.

Any new light, therefore, thrown upon the matter in discussion, should be well-sifted before permitting it to shine for the benefit of the future historian, less it dazzle by false rays the sympathetic minds of generations yet to come.

The *Philadelphia Times* of November 3rd, 1877, in commenting upon some additional points furnished that paper by General Longstreet as an addenda to his article published in the same issue, says:

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\* Walter Taylor.—The Federal force is overestimated. Their total of all arms was about 90,000. General Humphreys puts, in a letter to me, the Federal infantry at 70,000, inclusive of 5,000 officers.



“The letter from General Longstreet which accompanies these enclosures, dwells particularly upon a point which he wishes to have his readers understand. It is that while General Lee on the battle-field assumed all the responsibility for the result, he afterwards published a report that differs from the report he made at the time while under that generous spirit. General Longstreet and other officers made their official reports upon the battle shortly after its occurrence, and while they were impressed with General Lee’s noble assumption of all the blame, but General Lee having since written a detailed and somewhat critical account of the battle, Longstreet feels himself justified in discussing the battle upon its merits.”

Whilst claiming the same privilege as a Confederate soldier, I, yet, would not have exercised it, being only a cavalryman, who added to his “jingling spur” not even a “bright sabretache,” but only a poor record, were it not my good fortune to have known long and intimately the Commander-in-Chief, and to have conversed with him frequently during and since the war, upon the operations of the Army of Northern Virginia.

First then, let us examine the charge that the battle of Gettysburg was lost by the “absence of our cavalry.” The cavalry of General Lee’s army in the Gettysburg campaign consisted of the brigades of Hampton, Fitzhugh Lee, W. H. F. Lee’s (under Chambliss), Beverly Robertson, Wm. E. Jones, Imboden, and Jenkins, with a battalion under Colonel White. The first three named accompanied Stuart on his circuit around the Federal army, reaching Gettysburg on the 2nd of July—Jones and Robertson were left to hold the gaps of the Blue Ridge, and did not get to the vicinity of Gettysburg until after the battles; so that of all the force I enumerate, Jenkins’ brigade and White’s battalion alone crossed the Potomac with the army. (Imboden’s command was detached along the Baltimore & Ohio railroad, and was not in the fight at Gettysburg). Stuart after fighting at Brandy Station, on the 9th of June, a large body of Federal cavalry supported by infantry, and forcing them to recross the Rappahannock river with a loss (to them) of “four hundred prisoners, three pieces of artillery, and several colors,” (General Lee’s report), marched into Loudoun county upon the right flank of the army, and was engaged in a series of conflicts, terminating with Pleasonton’s cavalry corps and Barnes’ division of infantry, upon the 21st June, which caused him to retire to the vicinity of Ashby’s Gap in the Blue Ridge, *our infantry* being upon the western side of the mountains.

Leaving the brigade before mentioned to hold the position, Stuart then, in the exercise of a *discretion* given him by General Lee and so stated in his report, determined to pass to the rear of the Federal army and cross the Potomac at Seneca Falls, a point between that army and their capital. Thus, it will be seen, including the brigade and battalion of cavalry which composed the vanguard of the army, that *over one-half* of the cavalry was left in position to be used by General Lee.

Hooker, in his dispatch to his President, June 21st, (Report on the Conduct of the War, volume 1, page 279,) referring to Stuart's command, says: "This cavalry force has hitherto prevented me from obtaining satisfactory information as to the whereabouts of the enemy; they had masked all their movements." General Hooker had reference to the five brigades holding the country between his army and the marching column of General Lee—Jenkins being in front of the advanced corps (Ewell's) with Colonel White's battalion, in addition to his own command. The cavalry corps, by the return of May 31st, 1863, numbered 9,536. According to a letter from Major McClellan, Stuart's A. A. G., this force was divided about as follows: Hampton, 1,200; Fitz. Lee, 2,000; W. H. F. Lee, 1,800; Jones, 3,500; Robertson, 1,000. It is proper to state that the figures above refer to the enlisted men present for duty. The total effective strength (inclusive of officers) numbered, according to Walter Taylor, at that date, 10,292. (I am satisfied, from a conversation with General Robertson, that McClellan overestimates the number of men in Jones' brigade, and therefore underestimates the number in some of the other brigades.) There is no authenticated return after the above date until August. After the return above cited, the losses at Brandy Station fight, the three days fighting in Loudoun, the encounter at Westminister, Maryland, Hanover, Pennsylvania, and other points, occurred, together with the usual reduction of mounted troops from long and rapid marching. It is proper to say that the return quoted did not include the commands of Jenkins, Imboden, or White. General Stuart, in his report (August No., 1876, *Southern Historical Society Papers*, p. 76,) estimated Jenkins' brigade, on leaving Virginia, at 3,800 troopers. I think this number is probably a misprint; from the best information I can get, this brigade numbered at that time 1,600. (See Rodes' official

report.) Adding this last number to 4,500, (McClellan's estimate of Robertson's and Jones' brigade,) and putting White's battalion at 200, the result is a cavalry force of 6,300 doing duty for the main army, and greater in numerical strength than the three brigades Stuart carried with him, which at Gettysburg numbered less than 4,000. Whilst not endorsing Stuart's march as the best movement under the circumstances, I assert that he had the Commanding-General's permission to make it; (General Lee's report, *Southern Historical Society Papers* for July, 1876, page 43;) that it involved a loss of material and men to the enemy and drew Kilpatrick's and Gregg's divisions of cavalry from their aggressive attitude on Mead's flank and front, leaving only Buford's to watch for the advance of our troops, and hence we find only his two brigades in the Federal front on the first of July; that it kept the Sixth Federal corps, some 15,000 men, from reaching Gettysburg until after 3 P. M. on the 2nd of July; that it caused General Meade to send General French to Frederick, to protect his communications, with from 5,000 to 7,000 men, (the latter figure is Walter Taylor's estimate, page 113, "Four Years with General Lee,") and prevented that body of troops from being made use of in other ways—which force, Butterfield says, Hooker (before being relieved) contemplated throwing, with Slocum's corps, in General Lee's rear; and finally, that there was inflicted a loss upon the enemy's cavalry of confessedly near 5,000. (Stuart's report, p. 76, August No., 1876, *Southern Historical Society Papers.*) The Federal army crossed the Potomac upon the 26th June. General Lee heard it on the night of the 28th, from a scout, and not from his cavalry commander. Stuart crossed between the Federal army and Washington on the night of the 27th, and necessarily, from his position, could not communicate with General Lee. He sent information about the march of Hancock towards the river, and after that was not in position to do more. The boldness of General Lee's offensive strategy, in throwing his army upon one side of the Potomac whilst leaving his adversary upon the other, made it particularly necessary for him to know the movements of the Federal army. Stuart, with his experience, activity, and known ability for such work, should have kept interposed always between the Federal army and his own, and whilst working close on Meade's lines, have been in direct communication with

his own army commander. It is well known that General Lee *loitered*, after crossing the Potomac, because he was ignorant of the movements and position of his antagonist. For the same reason he groped in the dark at Gettysburg. From the 25th of June to July 2d, General Lee deplored Stuart's absence, and almost hourly wished for him, and yet it was by his permission his daring chief of cavalry was away. General Stuart cannot, therefore, be charged with the responsibility of the failure at Gettysburg. Did such failure arise from Ewell and Hill not pushing their success on the 1st of July? I have always been one of those who regarded it a great misfortune that these two corps commanders did not continue to force the fighting upon that day. Each had two divisions of their corps engaged, thus leaving one division to each corps, viz., Johnson of Ewell's, and Anderson of Hill's, at their service for further work—something over 10,000 men. The four divisions engaged upon the Confederate side in the battle amounted to about 22,000. The loss after the repulse of the enemy, in Early's division, amounted to 586, (Early's review of Gettysburg, December number of *Southern Historical Society Papers*, 1877, page 257,) leaving him still about 4,500 fighting men. Heth says, (see his paper in *Philadelphia Times*, September 22d, 1877,) he went into that fight with 7,000 muskets, and lost 2,700 men killed and wounded. He was still left with 4,300. Estimating those four divisions, at the close of the action, at an average of 4,500 men apiece, we had 18,000 men; add the 10,000 of the two divisions not engaged, and there will be found 28,000 men ready to move on, flushed with victory and confident of success. General Early, in a letter to me, places the effective force in Ewell's and Hill's corps, on the morning of the 2nd, at 26,000 men. Upon the Federal side there had been engaged the First and Eleventh corps, (save one brigade, Smith's of Steinwehr's division, left on Cemetery Hill as a reserve,) and Buford's two brigades of cavalry. As bearing directly upon this portion of the subject, I give a letter from Major General Hancock, and also one from Colonel Bachelder. (The latter remained on the field of Gettysburg for eighty-four days after the battle, making sketches and collecting data, and has since visited the field with over 1,000 commissioned officers who were engaged, forty-seven of them being Generals Commanding. General Hancock writes of him to General Humphrey's: "Mr. Bachel-

der's long study of the field has given him a fund of accurate information in great detail, which I believe is not possessed by any one else.")

**Letter from General Winfield Hancock.**

NEW YORK, *January 17th*, 1878.

MY DEAR GENERAL:

I am in receipt of yours of the 14th inst., and in reply have to say, that in my opinion, if the Confederates had continued the pursuit of General Howard on the afternoon of the 1st July at Gettysburg, they would have driven him over and beyond Cemetery Hill. After I had arrived upon the field, assumed the command, and made my dispositions for defending that point (say 4 P. M.), I do not think the Confederate force then present could have carried it. I felt certain at least of my ability to hold it until night, and sent word to that effect back to General Meade, who was then at Taneytown. Please notice the following extract from my testimony before the committee on the "Conduct of the War" on that point—Vol. 1, page 405, March 22nd, 1864:

"When I arrived and took the command, I extended the lines. I sent General Wadsworth to the right to take possession of Culp's Hill with his division. I directed General Geary, whose division belonged to the Twelfth corps, (its commander, General Slocum, not then having arrived,) to take possession of the high ground towards Round Top.

"I made such disposition as I thought wise and proper. The enemy evidently believing that we were reinforced, or that our whole army was there, discontinued their (?) great efforts, and the battle for that day was virtually over. There was firing of artillery and skirmishing all along the front, but that was the end of that day's battle. By verbal instructions, and in the order which I had received from General Meade, I was directed to report, after having arrived on the ground, whether it would be necessary or wise to continue to fight the battle at Gettysburg, or whether it was possible for the fight to be had on the ground Gen. Meade had selected. About 4 o'clock P. M. I sent word by Maj. Mitchell, aide-de-camp, to General Meade, that I would hold the ground until dark, meaning to allow him time to decide the matter for himself.

"As soon as I had gotten matters arranged to my satisfaction, and saw that the troops were being formed again, and I felt secure, I wrote a note to General Meade, and informed him of my views of the ground at Gettysburg. I told him that the only disadvantage which I thought it had was that it could be readily turned

by way of Emmettsburg, and that the roads were clear for any movement he might make. I had ordered all the trains back, as I came up, to clear the roads."

When I arrived upon the field, about 3 P. M., or between that and 3:30, I found the fighting about over—the rear of our troops were hurrying through the town pursued by the Confederates. There had been an attempt to reform some of the Eleventh corps as they passed over Cemetery Hill, but it had not been very successful. I presume there may have been 1,000 to 1,200 at most, organized troops of that corps, in position on the hill. Buford's cavalry, in a solid formation, was showing a firm front in the plain just below (in line of battalions in mass, it is my recollection) Cemetery Hill, to the left of the Taneytown road.

I at once sent Wadsworth's division of the First corps, and a battery of artillery, to take post on Culp's Hill, on our right. The remainder of the First corps I placed on the right and left of the Taneytown road, connecting with the left of the Eleventh corps. These were the troops already on the battle-field when I had arrived and had made my dispositions.

About the time the above-described dispositions were made, Williams' division of the Twelfth army corps came upon the field and took position to the right and rear of Wadsworth's division of the First corps, and, subsequently, Geary's division of the Twelfth corps arriving, I caused it to move to our left and occupy the higher ground towards Round Top, to prevent any local turning of my left, (feeling safe as to the front).

You will perceive that up to the time I transferred the command of our forces on the field to my senior, Major-General Slocum, who arrived there between 6 and 7 o'clock P. M., these two divisions of his corps (Williams' and Geary's) were all the fresh troops that had actually marched on the battle-field.

Please see, on this point, the following extract from my official report of that battle:

\* \* \* \* \*

"At this time the First and Eleventh corps were retiring through the town closely pursued by the enemy. The cavalry of General Buford was occupying a firm position on the plain to the left of Gettysburg, covering the rear of the retreating corps. The Third corps had not yet arrived from Emmettsburg.

“Orders were at once given to establish a line of battle on Cemetery Hill, with skirmishers occupying that part of the town immediately in our front. The position, just on the southern edge of Gettysburg, overlooking the town and commanding the Emmettsburg and Taneytown roads, and the Baltimore turnpike, was already partially occupied, on my arrival, by direction of Major-General Howard.

“Some difficulty was experienced in forming the troops of the Eleventh corps, but by vigorous efforts a sufficiently formidable line was established to deter the enemy from any serious assault on the position. They pushed forward a line of battle for a short distance east of the Baltimore turnpike, but it was easily checked by the fire of our artillery.

“In forming the line I received material assistance from Major-General Howard, Brigadier-General Warren, Brigadier-General Buford, and officers of General Howard’s command.

“As soon as the line of battle mentioned above was shown by the enemy, Wadsworth’s division, First corps, and a battery, (thought to be the Fifth Maine,) were placed on the eminence just across the turnpike, and commanding completely this approach. This important position was held by the division during the remainder of the operations near Gettysburg.

“The rest of the First corps, under Major-General Doubleday, was on the right and left of the Taneytown road, and connected with the left of the Eleventh corps, which occupied that part of Cemetery Hill immediately to the right and left of the Baltimore turnpike.

“A division of the Twelfth corps, under Brigadier-General Williams, arrived as these arrangements were being completed, and was established, by order of Major-General Slocum, some distance to the right and rear of Wadsworth’s division.

“Brigadier-General Geary’s division of the Twelfth corps arriving on the ground subsequently and not being able to communicate with Major-General Slocum, I ordered the division to the high ground to the right of and near Round Top mountain, commanding the Gettysburg and Emmettsburg road, as well as the Gettysburg and Taneytown road to our rear.”

\* \* \* \* \*

The Third corps, however, was in close proximity, coming up on the Emmettsburg road, and a portion of it arrived upon the field before night. The Second corps did not reach the field that evening, only because I halted it about three miles in rear of Gettysburg, where an important road came in from the direction of Emmettsburg, to prevent any turning of the left of our army, in case General Lee should make any movement of that nature on the evening of the 1st, or early on the morning of the 2d. I consider

that, had a prolonged struggle taken place that evening (after the dispositions which I have already described as having been made by me), portions at least, of both the Second and Third corps, might have been brought forward in time to have taken part in it. For a sudden assault or a brief contest, they would not, however, have been available before dark. In reference to the numbers of the First corps, after it had fallen back from in front of the town, and reformed on Cemetery Hill, I have seen a statement in Bates' "Battle of Gettysburg," page 82, fixing them at 2,450 men; but as to the correctness of this estimate, I cannot speak with any certainty.

As to the Eleventh corps, I have already stated that I did not think there were more than 1,000 to 1,200 organized men of that corps in position on Cemetery Hill at the time I arrived there, and these were a portion of Steinwehr's division, which, with the artillery of the corps, was left there by Howard when he marched up in the morning.

In reference to the numbers of the Second, Third, and Twelfth corps, our returns of June 30th give their strength, "present for duty," as follows:

Second corps,	-	-	-	-	12,088 men.
Third corps,	-	-	-	-	11,799 men.
Twelfth corps,	-	-	-	-	8,056 men.

The Fifth corps came up during the night of the 1st, and morning of 2nd, from Hanover—see following extract from testimony of General S. W. Crawford, who commanded a division in that corps, on that point:

\*       \*       \*       \*       \*       \*       \*       \*

"I was in the rear division of the corps (Fifth), and on the evening of the 1st July I marched through Hanover and along the road through McSherrytown, marching until between two and three o'clock in the morning, and bivouacked at a town called Brushtown; and before dawn on Thursday, the 2nd of July, a staff-officer of General Sykes, then commanding the corps, rode to my headquarters and directed me to march my men, without giving them any coffee, at once to the field. I placed the column in motion and arrived before noon in the rear of the other divisions of the corps."

\*       \*       \*       \*       \*       \*



The Sixth corps was at Manchester on the evening of the 1st, and marched all of that night and until two o'clock P. M. on the 2nd, before it reached the field.

It has been stated "that Steinwehr's division of Howard's corps, on the first day, threw up lunettes around each gun, on Cemetery Hill—solid works of such height and thickness as to defy the most powerful bolts which the enemy could throw against them—with smooth and perfectly level platforms on which the guns could be worked."

This is a great error; there were no works of the kind above described on that field when I arrived there, and all that I saw in the way of "works" were some holes (not deep) dug to sink the wheels and trains of the pieces.

I am, very truly yours,

WINF'D HANCOCK.

*To General FITZHUGH LEE, Richmond, Va.*

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**Letter from John B. Bachelder, Esq.**

You ask, "How many troops would have opposed Hill and Ewell had the attack been continued on the first day?" For reasons already explained, I am not prepared to give, historically, the exact numbers, but I will say that there was but *one* brigade that had not been engaged: Smith's, of Steinwehr's division, which, with one battery remained in reserve on Cemetery Hill; Costar's brigade, of the same division, was sent out to cover the retreat of the Eleventh corps, but was met soon after it emerged from the town by Hoke's and the left of Hays' brigades and repulsed.

There is no question but what a combined attack on Cemetery Hill, made within an hour, would have been successful. At the end of an hour the troops had been rallied, occupied strong positions, were covered by stone walls, and under the command and magnetic influence of General Hancock—who in the meantime had reached the field—would, in my opinion, have held the position against any attack from the troops then up.

But at 6 o'clock everything was changed; both armies were reinforced at that hour, and had the battle been renewed after that it would have been by fresh troops on either side, with all the chances of a new battle. At 6 o'clock, Johnson's division entered the town; and Anderson's division might have reached there at the same time if it had been ordered to do so. The head of the Twelfth corps also reached the battle-field at 6 P. M., but not being required at Cemetery Hill, Geary's division was moved to the left to occupy the high land near Round Top, and Williams' division was turned to its right as it moved up the Baltimore pike, crossed Wolf Hill, with orders to seize the high land on the Confederate left, where Johnson's division subsequently spent the night.

If, therefore, Hill and Ewell had renewed the attack at 6 P. M., with their full commands, the two divisions of the Twelfth corps would have been in position to meet it. This, as before remarked, would have been a new phase of the battle, fought by fresh troops, and therefore subject to all the uncertainties of battle; but with strong probabilities in favor of Confederate success. The First corps had been engaged in a long and severe contest, in which it was everywhere beaten and had suffered heavily. The Eleventh corps had also suffered as much, and portions of it were badly demoralized. On the contrary, the Confederate forces would have continued the engagement with the prestige of victory. Several brigades had been badly cut up, but others had fired scarcely a shot, and the presence of General Lee, who had now arrived, would have given a new impulse to the battle. It is probable strong efforts would have been made to hold the position until the troops of the Third and Second corps could be brought up. Although General Sickles reached the field at an earlier hour, only two brigades of his command arrived that night—these reaching the field at sunset. Two brigades were left at Emmettsburg to hold the pass towards Fairfield, and General Humphreys, with two brigades of his division, reached the field at 1 o'clock the next morning. The Second corps was ordered to move up to Gettysburg, but General Hancock met it on the road on his return to Taneytown, where he went to report to General Meade, and not considering its presence necessary, ordered it to go into bivouac. In case of an engagement, however, these troops could hardly have reached the field before nightfall.

By this brief explanation you will see that the best chance for a successful attack was within the first hour, and unquestionably the *great mistake of the battle* was the failure to follow the Union forces through the town, and attack them before they could reform on Cemetery Hill. Lane's and Thomas' brigades, of Pender's division, and Smith's, of Early's division, were at hand for such a purpose, and had fired scarcely a shot. Dole's, Hoke's, and Hays' brigades were in good fighting condition, and several others would have done good service. The artillery was up, and in an admirable position to have covered an assault, which could have been pushed, under cover of the houses, to within a few rods of the Union position.

I have a nominal list of casualties in the First and Eleventh corps, but not at my command at present. If you desire anything additional I shall be pleased to furnish it, if at my disposal.

I am sir, yours with respect,

JNO. B. BACHELDER.

These letters unquestionably show that had we known it at the time, the position on the heights fought for on the 2nd could have been gained on the afternoon of the 1st by continuing without delay the pursuit of the Federals. It will be observed that they also affirm that the success of an attack made by us after an hour's delay would have been involved in doubt. General Hancock says that an attempt had been made "to reform some of the Eleventh corps as they passed over Cemetery Hill, but it had not been successful; and that when he arrived there, about 3 P. M., there were only some 1,000 or 1,200 troops on the hill, with Buford's cavalry in front; and that up to 6 P. M. the troops that had been collected from the First and Eleventh corps had only been reinforced by Williams' and Geary's divisions of the Twelfth corps, under Slocum—numbering together by return of June 30th, 8,056.

The number collected in the First corps amounted to 2,450—(Bates, page 82, and also Doubleday's, its commander's, testimony). Of the Eleventh, (see Hancock,) 1,200. Estimating Buford's cavalry at about 2,500, we would have a Federal force, up to 6 P. M., of 14,206,\* opposed to our 26,000. Birney's division of the Third

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\* This includes all troops except those afterwards collected in Eleventh corps in addition to the 1,200 mentioned by General Hancock.

corps (Sickles) were the next troops to arrive; they came up about sunset, less one brigade left at Emmettsburg, and numbered, at that hour, 4,500.

Humphrey's division of that corps did not reach the field until towards midnight—(General Humphreys, in a letter to me). It will be noticed, however, that General Hancock says that portions of the Second and Third corps, had our assault been sudden or the contest brief, would not have been available until dark. If these figures are correct, I am authorized in reaffirming that "a little more marching, perhaps a little more fighting," would have gained for us the possession of the heights on the evening of the 1st of July.

On the other hand, General Early, in a masterly review of those operations in the December number *Southern Historical Society Papers*, 1877, gives some strong reasons, which at the time prevented a further advance, made more convincing by the fact of its being well known that he desired to move on after the retreating Federals. I can well imagine that, with the existing doubt as to what portion of the Federal army was then within supporting distance of the First and Eleventh corps, the arrival at a most inopportune moment of what proved to be a false report, that the enemy were advancing on the York road, which would have brought them in the rear of the Confederate troops; the time consumed in investigating the report; the *apparent* strength of the enemy's position; would all combine to make a subordinate commander hesitate to take the responsibility of beginning another battle; more especially as his chief was close at hand. I know, too, how easy it is, in the light of subsequent events, to criticise an officer's action. "Young man, why did you not tell me that before the battle"? General Lee is reported to have said to an officer who was commenting upon some of the movements at Gettysburg, "even as stupid a man as I am can see it all now," illustrates the point.

Being at the commencement of the war Ewell's chief-of-staff, knowing his soldierly qualities, and loving his memory, God forbid that I should utter one word to detract from the splendid record he has left behind him. His corps being more advanced than Hill's after the action was over, and he being the senior officer present, has caused his conduct on the first, in not pursuing the enemy, to

be criticised; of course, after the arrival of his chief, all responsibility was taken from Ewell in not ordering the troops forward—it was assumed by and is to be placed upon General Lee.

While the capture of Cemetery Hill on the 1st would have probably thrown Meade back on the already selected line of Pipe Clay creek, in gaining it we would have shattered the Twelfth corps—possibly portions of two others—and the Federal army offering battle with three or more of its corps beaten, would have been a less formidable antagonist than we found it on the 2d, from Culps' Hill to Round Top. The Confederates, too, would have suffered an additional loss; but the victor, in most instances, loses less in proportion to the vanquished, except in an attack on fortified places. General Hancock, the opposing commander, does not enumerate this as one of those.

To the operations of the 2d of July I now direct attention, not with the view of going over the whole ground, because it has been fully covered by official reports of the higher officers operating there and by recent papers, some of them bearing exhaustively upon the subject, but for the purpose of examining some of the statements contained in General Longstreet's article, written for and published by the *Philadelphia Times* in its issue of November the 3d, 1877. It is charged by persons, particularly from the North, that Longstreet's political apostacy, since the war, has made his comrades forget his services during that period. Upon that point, whilst I believe, as General Lee once said to me in Lexington, (referring to a letter he had received from General Longstreet, asking an endorsation of his political views,) that "General Longstreet has made a great mistake," I concede the conscientious adoption of such opinions by General Longstreet. The fact that he differs widely, and has not acted politically with the great majority of his old comrades since the war, has nothing to do with his undoubted ability as a soldier during the contest. I saw him for the first time on the 18th of July, 1861, at Blackburn's Ford, on the Bull Run, and was impressed with his insensibility to danger. I recollect well my thinking, there is a man that cannot be stampeded. For the last time I saw him the night before the surrender at Appomattox Courthouse, and there was still the bull-dog tenacity, the old genuine *sang froid* about him which made all feel he could be depended upon to hold fast to his

position as long as there was ground to stand upon. These solid characteristics were always displayed by him during the four years of war, and gained for him the soubriquet of "General Lee's old war-horse." But when General Longstreet writes for the public prints a paper which has generally been construed as an attack upon the reputation of General Lee, it will be criticised by a great many; by me, because I find it difficult to reconcile many of his statements with facts in my possession. While there are very few who will deny that General Longstreet was a hard fighter when once engaged, I have never found any one who claimed that he was a brilliant strategist; indeed, upon the only occasions when he exercised an independent command, Suffolk and Knoxville, the results in the public mind were not satisfactory. It is, therefore, with some surprise we learn from his paper that when in Richmond, en route from Suffolk to join General Lee at Fredericksburg, he paused to tell Mr. Seddon (then Secretary of War), how to relieve Pemberton at Vicksburg. Our astonishment is increased when we read further, that before entering upon the campaign of 1863, he exacted a promise from General Lee that the "campaign should be one of offensive strategy, but defensive tactics, and upon this understanding my (his) assent was given," and that therefore General Lee "gave the order of march." Our wonder culminates when finally we are told that he had a plan to fight the battle different from General Lee's, and that General Lee had since said it would have been successful if adopted.

The invasion of Maryland and Pennsylvania was undoubtedly undertaken with a view of manoeuvring the Federal army, then in front of Fredericksburg, to a safer distance from the Confederate capital; to relieve Virginia of the presence of both armies; to subsist our troops upon new ground, that the old might recuperate, and with the idea a decisive battle fought elsewhere might be more productive of substantial results. These premises admitted, not only is gross injustice done to the memory of General Lee, in believing he crossed the Potomac bound fast by a promise to a subordinate to make the movement "strategically offensive, tactically defensive," as charged by General Longstreet, but such reported promise contains a positive reflection upon General Lee's military sagacity. As well might the Czar of Russia, acting as commander-in-chief of his army, have so committed himself to

the Grand Duke Nicholas, or under like circumstances, the Sublime Porte have tied himself up to Osman Pasha, the hero of Plevna. The truth is, General Lee and his army were full of fight, their "objective point" was the Federal army of the Potomac, and "those people" the Confederate chief had resolved to strike whenever and wherever the best opportunity occurred, "strategically offensive and tactically defensive," to the contrary notwithstanding. An army of invasion is naturally an offensive one in strategy and tactics, and history rarely points to an instance where it has been concentrated on a given point to patiently await an attack. The distance from its base making supplies a difficult matter to procure, in itself regulates the whole question.

An army so situated must move or fight. The absurdity of Longstreet's statement is shown in admitting the presumption, General Lee knew all this; nor can we reconcile with the facts of the case General Longstreet's expression, wherein he says that his paper in the *Times* is called out by the fact that he has "been so repeatedly and rancorously assailed by those whose intimacy with the Commanding-General, in that battle, gives an importance to their assaults."

His communications *just after the war* to Mr. Swinton, the historian, were in substance the same attack upon General Lee which he has repeated in this paper. It was, therefore, in him, and came out before any of the utterances now complained of were made. The official reports of Generals Ewell, Early, and Pendleton, written soon after the battle, clearly stated it was well understood and expected that General Longstreet would make the main attack *early* in the morning of the 2nd of July.

If these reports furnished the "sly under-current of misrepresentation" of his course, why did he not ask his chief to correct their statements, and set him right upon the record? His revelations, if accepted now, would greatly injure the military reputations of Generals Lee, Ewell, and Hill. Alas! not one of whom live, for history's sake, to defend their stainless fame.

I propose to show, first, it was General Lee's intention to attack at sunrise or as soon as possible thereafter; second, the probable result of such an attack promptly made at an early hour, and, third, to examine the statement that General Longstreet had a plan to fight the battle different from General Lee's, which plan General Lee has since said would have been successful if adopted.

On the night of July 1st two corps of General Lee's army lay in close proximity to the enemy, ready, willing, and expecting to fight as early as possible on the next morning; and two divisions, McLaws and Hood's, of the three in the remaining corps the same night bivouaced some four miles in rear.

The natural inference to be deduced from their positions would be that the Federal troops hastening up would concentrate and fortify in front of the two corps already in position, while the force in rear would be used to attack at the most vulnerable and available point. That such was General Lee's intention I think can be as clearly established as that General Longstreet did not, upon the 2nd of July, 1863, use due diligence in carrying out the wishes of his chief.

General Early, a division-commander in Ewell's corps, in a recent paper on Gettysburg, gives a detailed narrative of a conference which General Lee held on the evening of the 1st with Ewell, Rodes, and himself, in which General Lee seemed very anxious for an attack to be made as early as possible next morning, and after being persuaded that it would not be best to make the main attack in Ewell's front said, "Well, if I attack from my right, Longstreet will have to make the attack—Longstreet is a very good fighter when he gets in position and gets everything ready, but he is so slow." General Early further states that General Lee left the conference with the distinct understanding that he would order Longstreet up to make the attack early the next morning.

General W. N. Pendleton, General Lee's chief-of-artillery, testifies that General Lee told him on the night of the 1st, when he reported to him the result of a reconnoissance on the right flank, that he "had ordered General Longstreet to attack on that flank at sunrise next morning."

The official reports of Generals Ewell, Early, and Pendleton, all confirm this testimony. General A. P. Hill, in his official report of the battle of Gettysburg, says, speaking of the operations of the morning of the 2nd, "General Longstreet was to attack the left flank of the enemy and sweep down his line, and I was directed to co-operate with him." General Long, one of the witnesses introduced by General Longstreet, who was at that time General Lee's military secretary, says, (in the portion of his letter which General Longstreet found it convenient to leave out, but which Gen.



Early was fortunately able to supply,) "that it was General Lee's intention to attack the enemy on the 2nd of July as early as practicable, and it is my opinion that he issued orders to that effect." In letters published in the *Southern Historical Society Papers* for August and September, 1877, General Long gives various details which demonstrate that General Lee expected Longstreet to attack early in the morning of the 2nd; that, at 10 o'clock, "General Lee's impatience became so urgent that he proceeded in person to hasten the movements of Longstreet; that he was met by the welcome tidings that Longstreet's troops were in motion; and that, after further annoying delays, at 1 o'clock P. M. General Lee's impatience again urged him to go in quest of Longstreet." Col. Walter H. Taylor, of General Lee's staff, whose letter General Longstreet gives to show that he did not hear the order for an early attack, says, in his article published in the *Southern Historical Society Papers* for September, 1877, "it is generally conceded that General Longstreet on this occasion was fairly chargeable with tardiness;" that he had been urged the day before by General Lee "to hasten his march;" and, that, on the morning of the 2nd, "General Lee was chafed by the non-appearance of the troops, until he finally became restless and rode back to meet General Longstreet and urge him forward."

General Lindsay Walker, chief-of-artillery of Hill's corps, in a letter to me, says:

**Letter from General R. Lindsay Walker.**

RICHMOND, VA., *January 17th, 1878.*

*General FITZ. LEE:*

MY DEAR SIR: I cheerfully comply with a request to give you the following brief statement:

I was, at Gettysburg, as I continued to be to the surrender at Appomattox Courthouse, chief of artillery of the Third corps, (Lieutenant-General A. P. Hill, commanding,) and it was, therefore, necessary for me to know on the evening of the 1st of July what dispositions of my artillery to make for the next day. I have a *strong impression* that I heard General Lee say that evening that he wished the battle opened at the earliest possible moment the next morning by a simultaneous attack on both flanks, and

that this conversation took place with Generals Lee, Longstreet, Hill, and perhaps Ewell.

But I am positive that in receiving my instructions from General Hill, on the night of the 1st of July, he told me that the orders were for the attack on the heights to be made at daybreak the next morning on both flanks—that the Third corps was to co-operate as circumstances might determine—and that the artillery should be held in readiness to support either flank, or to advance in front as should be decided.

We were ready at daybreak the next morning, and waited impatiently for the signal. Between 9 and 10 o'clock, I was lying under the shade of a tree near Colonel W. F. Poague, who commanded that day the reserve artillery of my corps, when General Lee rode up to him and, mistaking him for one of General Longstreet's officers, administered to him a sharp rebuke for being *there* instead of hurrying into position on the right. Colonel Poague explained that he was in Hill's, not Longstreet's command, and General Lee at once apologized and eagerly asked, "Do you know where General Longstreet is?" Colonel Poague referred him to me, and I immediately came forward from my position (where I had heard distinctly the conversation), and offered to ride with General Lee to where I thought he could find General Longstreet. As we rode together General Lee manifested more impatience than I ever saw him show upon any other occasion; seemed very much disappointed and worried that the attack had not opened earlier, and very anxious for Longstreet to attack at the very earliest possible moment. He even, for a little while, placed himself at the head of one of the brigades to hurry the column forward.

I was fully satisfied then, as I am now, that General Lee had decided to attack early on the morning of the 2d; that he was bitterly disappointed at the protracted delay, and that this delay enabled General Meade to concentrate his forces and to occupy key positions, which we could have seized in the morning, and thus lost us a great victory.

I have the honor to be sir,

Very respectfully, your obd't serv't,

R. L. WALKER.

At daylight on the morning of the 2d General Longstreet was at General Lee's headquarters renewing his protest against making an attack, but General Lee "seemed resolved to attack," so says General Longstreet. As General Lee afterwards became so worried at the non-appearance of General Longstreet's troops, is it not a fair presumption that General Longstreet had already received his instructions? General Hood, writing to Longstreet, says, "General Lee was seemingly anxious you should attack that morning, and you said to me, the General is a little nervous this morning; he wishes me to attack; I do not wish to do so without Pickett."

In General Longstreet's official report we find that "Laws' brigade was ordered forward to its division during the day and joined about noon on the 2d. *Previous to his joining* [the italics are mine] I received instructions from the Commanding-General to move with the portion of my command *that was up*, to gain the Emmettsburg road on the enemy's left," \* \* \* and that "fearing that my force was too weak to venture to make an attack, I DELAYED until General Laws' brigade joined its division." And yet in face of this, his official report, he charges the responsibility of the delay of his attack to General Lee in his recent paper to the *Times*, by writing that after receiving from General Lee the order to attack at 11 o'clock, he waited for Laws' brigade to come up, and that "*General Lee assented.*" The two statements, it will be readily perceived, are at variance.

General Hood says he arrived, with his staff, in front of the heights of Gettysburg shortly after daybreak on the morning of the 2d, and that his troops soon filed into an open field near by. Colonel Walton, chief of artillery, Longstreet corps, states that his reserve artillery arrived on the field about the same hour and reported themselves ready to go into battle. The Commanding-General was impatient—why the delay then until 4 P. M. in what General Lee intended to be his main attack?

General Longstreet, in his narrative, contends that the delay of several hours in the march of his column to the right was General Lee's fault, since the column was moved under the special directions of Colonel Johnston, an engineer officer of the Commanding-General, and having for the time the authority of General Lee himself, which he, Longstreet, could not set aside. Although he

finally "became very impatient at this delay and determined to take the responsibility of hurrying the troops forward," which he did by what he seems to regard an ingenious flanking of General Lee's orders, viz., marching Hood, who was in McLaws' rear and not governed by General Lee's dilatory orders, "by the most direct route" to the position assigned him. If the military principle here established by General Longstreet is correct, why would not it have been that much better to have simply left a platoon at the head of his command to go through the form of following General Lee's engineer, and hasten on with the remainder of his command?

But in his official report (which he should have consulted) Longstreet says: "Engineers sent out by the Commanding-General and myself guided us by a road which would have completely disclosed the move—*some delay* ensued in seeking a more convenient route" (italics mine). It contains no hint that he lost "several hours by the blundering" of General Lee's engineer, Colonel S. P. Johnston, the gallant engineer officer mentioned by General Longstreet, tells me that he read the paper in the *Times* "with some surprise, particularly that portion where reference is made to the part I took in the operations of the 2d July," and says that he "had no idea that I (he) had the confidence of the great Lee to such an extent that he would entrust me with the conduct of an army corps moving within two miles of the enemy's line, while the lieutenant-general was riding at the rear of the column." Colonel Johnston, and I state it on his authority, was ordered by General Lee to make a reconnoissance on the enemy's left early on the morning of the 2d. On that errand he left army headquarters about 4 A. M. Upon returning he was required to sketch upon a map General Lee was holding the route he had taken, and was soon ordered to ride with General Longstreet." **NO OTHER ORDERS HE RECEIVED.** In obedience to such instructions he joined the head of Longstreet's corps about 9 A. M., and it was then about three miles from Round Top, by the route selected for its march. "After no little delay [I quote Colonel Johnston's words] the column got in motion and marched under cover of the ridge and woods until the head of the column got to about one and a half miles of the position finally taken by General Hood's division. Here the road turned to the right and led over a high hill to where

it intersected a road leading back in the direction of the Round Top. When we reached the bend of the road, I called General Longstreet's attention to the hill over which he would have to pass, in full view of the enemy, and also to a route across the field, shorter than the road and completely hidden from the enemy's observation. General Longstreet preferred the road, and followed it until the head of his column reached the top of the hill. He then halted McLaws and ordered Hood forward. At the time our movement was discovered we were not more than a mile and a half from the position finally reached by Hood. Had General McLaws pushed on by the route across the field he would have been in position in less than an hour; yet General Longstreet says 'several hours' were lost by his taking the wrong road. The delay of 'several hours' cannot be attributed to General Longstreet's taking the wrong road (whether he or I is to blame for that), but in the delay in starting, the slowness of the march, the time unnecessarily lost by halting McLaws, and the time lost in getting into action after the line was formed. The fact that General Lee ordered me to make the reconnoissance and return as soon as possible, led me to believe, if he intended to attack at all, such attack was to be made at an early hour."

Colonel Johnston did not even know where General Longstreet was going. He supposed he had been ordered to ride with him simply to give him the benefit of his reconnoissance. He must be surprised then, as he states, to find himself considered by Gen. Longstreet in charge of McLaws' division, First corps, Army Northern Virginia. I dwell on this point because it is a most important one. Gettysburg was lost by just this delay of "several hours."

Facts, however, do not warrant us in believing that General Longstreet was always so particular in following officers sent by General Lee to guide his column, because many of us recall that in the opening of the spring campaign of 1864, General Lee sent an engineer officer to General Longstreet, then encamped near Gordonsville, to guide him to the point he wanted him in the wilderness, but this officer was pushed aside by General Longstreet's saying he knew the route and had no use for his services. As a consequence, he lost his way and reached the wilderness twenty-four hours behind time, just as A. P. Hill was about to sustain

a terrible disaster which Longstreet gallantly averted. This incident comes direct from General Lee himself, who cited it as an instance of Longstreet's habitual slowness.

From known facts then, it seems clearly established that to General Longstreet and not to General Lee, as the former claims, must be attributed the delay in the attack of the 2nd.

Let us now enquire what would have been the probable results of an earlier attack. From very accurate data in my possession I am enabled to give the following as the position of the Federal forces on the 2nd of July:

I begin on their right: At 6 A. M. Culp's Hill was only occupied by Wadsworth's division, First corps, and Stevens' Fifth Maine battery, Wadsworth's command being much shattered by the fight of the 1st. On our extreme left opposed to Wadsworth, were three brigades of Johnson's division, Ewell's corps. One of his brigades, Walker's, was in position faced to the left to guard the flank of our army. In front of Walker lay William's division of the Twelfth corps, and two regiments of Lockwood's independent brigade, and the Fifth corps, except Crawford's division, which arrived on the field about twelve o'clock. (Crawford's testimony before Committee on Conduct of the War).

The Eleventh corps occupied Cemetery Hill with the artillery attached to the First and Eleventh corps, except Stevens' battery, before mentioned. Doubleday's division of the First corps was massed in rear of Cemetery Hill, while Robertson's division of the same corps extended to the left along Cemetery Ridge, embracing that portion of it assaulted by Longstreet on the 3rd.

From the left of Robertson the line was occupied for about three quarters of a mile beyond which point two brigades of Humphreys' division of the Third corps were massed, and on their left two brigades of Birney's division of same corps, and constituting all of that corps then up—Birney and Humphreys having each left a brigade at Emmettsburg. General Humphreys, in a private letter to me, says "Birney reached Gettysburg about sunset the first day, leaving one brigade at Emmettsburg—with Birney there were probably 4,500, and at Emmettsburg 1,500. My division (Second division Third corps) reached the ground towards midnight of July 1st, leaving one brigade at Emmettsburg—with me there were about 4,000, and at Emmettsburg about 1,200.

“The return of the Third corps for the 30th of June, 1863, gives officers and enlisted men, infantry, present for duty 11,942; but there were less than 11,000 present at the battle. My impression is that the corps did not exceed 10,000 present on the ground.”

These four brigades of the Third corps lay a little west of the crest of the ridge. The crest proper was held by Geary's division of the Twelfth corps from the night before, but about this time they began to move over to Culp's Hill, where they formed on a prolongation of Wadsworth's line, already mentioned. In front of the Third corps was Buford's two brigades of cavalry; and these troops at the time mentioned, 6 A. M., except some batteries of artillery, constituted all the troops *then up*. Mark the point—the the Second corps, Hancock's, 12,088, by the return of June 30th, was in bivouac three miles in rear on the night of the 1st, (nearly as far from the Federal as Longstreet was from the Confederate lines). It broke camp at an early hour, and a little after 6 A. M. had reached that portion of the Taneytown road, running along the slope of Little Round Top. Between the hours of 6 and 9 A. M. some important changes were made. Let us commence on the Federal right again. Williams had assumed command of the Twelfth corps, and Ruger had taken his division, and with Lockwood's regiments, had moved over to Culp's Hill and formed on a prolongation of Geary's line. Notice how Meade was increasing the forces opposed to our left—the Fifth corps numbering, on the 10th of June, 1863, 10,136 for duty, to which was added a portion of the Pennsylvania reserves, some 4,000 or 5,000, (Butterfield, then chief of Meade's staff, testimony before Committee on Conduct of the War, page 428,) moved across Rock Creek, was massed and held in reserve, where it lay until called upon to support Sickles in the afternoon, when its place was taken by the Sixth corps, which arrived at 3 P. M., having marched 32 miles since 9 P. M. on the first—(Meade's testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, page 438). This was the largest of the seven corps Meade had at Gettysburg, and on the 10th of June, 1863, numbered, for duty, 15,408. (Butterfield, page 428). It will be perceived that when two-thirds of Longstreet's corps went into camp four miles in rear of the field of Gettysburg, on the evening of the first of July, Sedgewick, with over 15,000 men, was 32 miles away. Upon his arrival, about the hour above

named, he was ordered to relieve the Fifth corps. The latter corps was then ordered to move to the rear of Round Top; it reached there and was massed half a mile in rear between 4 and 5 P. M. Caldwell's division of the Second corps occupied Round Top just before the Fifth corps got up. (Meade.) Wadsworth's division and the Eleventh corps continued to occupy its first position until the close of the battle. Doubleday remained in the position before named until night, but Robertson's division was relieved by the Second corps, which had arrived at 7 A. M., and gone into position on Cemetery Ridge. The two remaining brigades of the Third corps left at Emmettsburg got up about 9 A. M., relieving Buford's cavalry, which was ordered back to Westminster to protect the depot of supplies. About the same time General Tyler came up with eight batteries of artillery. At half-past 10 A. M. Major McGilverey reached the field with the artillery reserve and ammunition train. At this hour the Federal army was all up, except one regiment of Lockwood's brigade, Sixth corps, whose movements have been previously given. At about 11 A. M. General Sickles ordered a reconnoissance, and at 12, advanced his command and occupied the intermediate ridge, extending his line to the foot of Round Top. Round Top was occupied as a signal station; the Fifth, it will be recollected, was, after 4 P. M., massed in its rear.

I ask a careful perusal of the positions, strength, and time of arrival upon the battle-field of the Federal troops on the 2d of July as here given. I think it will show that an attack at day-break or sunrise, or at an hour preceding 9 A. M., nay, even 12 M., would have combined many elements of success. General Lee knew it, and to use Longstreet's own words, "was impressed with the idea that by attacking the Federals *he could whip them in detail*" (italics mine). General Lee, it seems, as was habitual with him, had a correct idea of the situation. His army, except a portion of the cavalry and one division of infantry, was practically concentrated on the night of July 1st, and could have attacked, if necessary, at daylight on the 2d. General Meade arrived, in person, at 1 A. M. on the 2d, and was engaged in getting his army up until after 2 P. M. on that day. He commanded at Gettysburg seven corps of infantry, viz., First, Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Eleventh, and Twelfth, and three divisions of cavalry, viz., Buford's,



Kilpatrick's, and Gregg's—the two last reaching the field after Buford left. The First corps went into battle on the 2d with 2,450 men (Bates' History of Gettysburg, page 52, and Doubleday's testimony—who commanded it after Reynolds' death—page 309, Committee on the Conduct of the War); the Second corps being put at 12,088 (return of June 30th); the Third, including the two brigades not then up, 10,000 (General Humphrey's letter to me); the Fifth at 10,136; the Eleventh at 3,200 (this corps numbered 10,177 on the 10th of June. General Hancock said he could not find but 1,200 organized on the afternoon of the 1st of July, after their little difficulty with Ewell and Hill. Wadsworth's division, of that corps, went into the fight on the 1st with 4,000 men, and on the morning of 2d but 1,600 answered to their names—Wadsworth's testimony, page 413). The Twelfth corps, by the return of the 30th of June, numbered 8,056. These six corps numbered, then, on the 2d of July, before the Sixth corps reached the field, 45,930. The cavalry and 4,000 Pennsylvania reserves are not included in this statement of the Federal force. Ewell and Hill's corps numbered together about 28,000 men on the morning of the 2d, and Longstreet says he had, without Pickett, some 13,000 men, making our strength (leaving out the cavalry, too,) 41,000. General Lee could have had his 41,000 men in hand at daybreak, whereas General Meade could not count upon all of his 45,930 until after 12 M., Crawford's division, Fifth corps, not getting up, until then. General Longstreet, by an early attack, would have undoubtedly seized Round Top, for even as late as the attack was made, General Warren, Meade's chief of artillery (Warren's testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, page 377), says he went by General Meade's directions to Round Top, and from that point "I could see the enemy's line of battle. I sent word to General Meade that he would at once have to occupy that place very strongly. He sent as quickly as possible a division of General Sykes' corps, (Fifth,) but before they arrived the enemy's line of battle, I should think a mile and a half long, began to advance and the battle became very heavy at once. The troops under General Sykes arrived barely in time to save Round Top, and they had a very desperate fight to hold it." An attack at that point even before 12 o'clock would have been successful, because Sykes was then in reserve behind Meade's right and could

not have gotten up. And Meade testifies (page 332) that Sykes, by hurrying up his column, fortunately was enabled to drive the enemy back and secure a foothold upon that important position, viz., Round Top, "the key-point of my whole position," General Meade says. And again, that "if they had succeeded in occupying that, it would have prevented me from holding any of the ground I subsequently held until the last." Behold the sagacity of General Lee! He wanted to attack early so as to "whip the Federals in detail," and selected the very point admitted by his able opponent to be his "key-point." It seems he would have gained the position if he could have imparted more velocity to the commander on his right. General Lee's plan seems, in a military sense, almost faultless. An English writer has said of General Lee, that with a character as near perfect as has been hitherto vouchsafed to mortals, there was yet in it, for a military man, a slight imperfection, viz., "a disposition too *epicene*." To the tender and loving heart of the woman he united the strong courage and will of the man, but a reluctance to oppose the wishes or desires of others, or to order them to do things disagreeable to them which they would not fully consent to or enter into. Perhaps herein lies the secret of his troubles on the 2d of July. He was fully alive, on his part, to the necessity of an early attack, and he saw with an unerring eye the "key-point," but in view of the unwillingness of the commander of the troops he had determined to begin the battle with, and who was at his headquarters at daylight arguing against, instead of making the attack, he may not have put his orders in that positive shape from which there could be no evasion, no appeal. General Hood, in a letter to me, says "I did not hear General Lee give the direct order to Longstreet to attack on the morning of the second day, nor have I ever believed that he gave a positive and direct order to do so, but merely as he (General Lee) often did, suggested the attack." If Hood is correct, the suggestion had the strength of an order in General Lee's own mind at least, because upon no other theory can we explain his personal actions and impatience on that morning or his own words to others. The attempt of General Longstreet to hold General Lee to the full responsibility of the failure at Gettysburg, because, in a spirit of magnanimity which has excited the highest admiration both in this country and in Europe, he said on the

field of Gettysburg, "It is all my fault," as he had said in like spirit to Stonewall Jackson at Chancellorsville, "The victory is yours, not mine," will excite only surprise and not carry conviction to the minds of the old soldiers of General Lee, who knew the General's habit of self-depreciation. The effort must therefore fail in its purpose.

Now let us scrutinize the statement of General Longstreet that he had a plan to fight the battle of Gettysburg, which was submitted to General Lee and refused by him at the time, but which he afterwards regretted not having adopted, as it would have been successful. General Dick Taylor, in recent paper, says: "That any subject involving the possession or exercise of intellect should be clear to Longstreet and concealed from Lee, is a startling proposition to those possessing knowledge of the two men."

Readers of the history of the four years of "War between the States" will doubtless agree with General Taylor. General Lee's plan of battle at Gettysburg, in the light of subsequent facts, could not have been more admirably arranged if he had have possessed, in lieu of his own grand genius, the McCormick telescope, and the centre and both flanks of the Federal army had been within its focus. Why should he then have regretted that he had not adopted the plan of another? About one month after the battle of Gettysburg, General Lee wrote a letter to the President of the Confederacy, in which, after undervaluing his own ability, he says, "Everything, therefore, points to the advantages to be derived from a new commander, and I the more anxiously urge the matter upon your Excellency, from my belief that a younger and abler man than myself can readily be obtained. I know that he will have as gallant and brave an army as ever existed to second his efforts, and it would be the happiest day of my life to see at its head a worthy leader—one who could accomplish more than I could perform, and all that I have wished. I hope your Excellency will attribute my request to the true reason, the desire to serve my country." To this the Honorable Jefferson Davis, in the course of his reply, responds, "But suppose, my dear friend, that I were to admit, with all their implications, the points which you present, where am I to find that new commander who is to possess the greater ability which you believe to be required? I do not doubt the readiness with which you would give way to one

who could accomplish all that you have wished; and you will do me the justice to believe that if Providence should kindly offer such a person, I would not hesitate to avail myself of his services. To ask me to substitute you by some one, in my judgment, more fit to command or who would possess more of the confidence of the army or of the reflecting men of the country, is to demand an impossibility."

I give extracts from these two letters because, some two years ago, General Lee's whole letter to Mr. Davis was reproduced in some of the public prints. It was followed by General Longstreet's letter to his uncle, (again republished in his paper to the *Times*,) and which first gave to the world the information that another plan to fight this great battle had been considered by the Commander of the Confederate army. This news was in turn succeeded by an extract from a letter from General Lee to General Longstreet, wherein he says, "Had I taken your advice at Gettysburg, instead of pursuing the course I did, how different all might have been." Following this came an extract from a letter of Captain Gorie to General Longstreet. The captain had been sent as a bearer of dispatches from General Longstreet, then in East Tennessee, to General Lee at Orange Courthouse. In this extract Captain Gorie tells us that, "upon my arrival there General Lee asked me in his tent, where he was alone, with two or three Northern papers on his table: He remarked that he had just been reading the Northern official reports of the battle of Gettysburg, and that he had become satisfied that, if he had permitted you to carry out your plans on the 3rd day, instead of making the attack on Cemetery Hill, we would have been successful."

These little extracts which General Longstreet uses again in his narrative, seem to appear as a desirable connection and to ring out a public notice, that the younger and abler man referred to by General Lee was the commander of his First army corps, and as there are witnesses still living to testify that General Longstreet once said in the house of the late John Alexander, at Campbell Courthouse, just after the surrender at Appomattox, that in case of another war he would never fight under General Lee again, it is fair to presume that he, too, was conscious of his own superiority, if all this be true.

Very many of us were not able to reconcile these reported utterances of General Lee with facts within our own knowledge; and General Longstreet was asked more than once to publish the whole letter that he claimed to have received from General Lee, that we might see the connection before and after the short sentence he permitted only to be known. His reply to this was concluded in hasty language foreign to the enquiry, and he failed to produce anything more. In the narrative in the *Times*, once again appears the same sentence, "only that and nothing more." It is possible that after General Lee's plans had been frustrated and his opportunity lost, he would naturally regret that he had not taken the advice of one who urged him not to attack.

In the Rev. J. Wm. Jones' "Personal Reminiscences, Anecdotes, and Letters of Lee," page 156, we find that General Lee, in speaking (to Professor White, of Washington and Lee University,) of the irreparable loss the South had sustained in the death of Jackson, said with emphasis: "If I had had Stonewall Jackson at Gettysburg, we should have won a great victory." How, by General Lee's or General Longstreet's plan? Tell me, you who knew Jackson best, if he had been in command of troops, say four miles in rear of the battle-field on the night of the 1st of July, 1863, and General Lee had SUGGESTED to him to attack from his right on the morning of the 2d, what hour would he have attacked Meade's "key-point" on Round Top? Would the hour have approached nearer to 4 A. M. or 4 P. M.? For General Lee has said, "I had such implicit confidence in Jackson's skill and energy that I never troubled myself to give *him* detailed instructions—the most general instructions were all that he needed." But as bearing upon this point stronger, if possible, than Lee's wish for Jackson at Gettysburg, is the following language in a letter to me from a gentleman extensively known and universally noted for the purity of his life and the conscientiousness of his character, and who now worthily fills the responsible position of Governor of his State. This letter was written some two years ago in response to a note of mine sending him the published controversy between General Longstreet and Early in reference to the operations at Gettysburg. The high character of the writer gives to his statements great weight, but the letter being a private one, would have been kept from the public had not General Longstreet paraded what he

terms "the weak points of the campaign of Gettysburg," in attempting to show the "eight" mistakes committed by General Lee.

The name of the author is not now given, because I do not wish to draw him into the discussion, but it is at the disposal of any one who questions the facts. His letter bears date April 15th, 1876:

"Major-General FITZHUGH LEE:

"MY DEAR SIR: I am in receipt to-day of your letter of the 14th inst., with its interesting inclosures in reference to the battle of Gettysburg. I have not had leisure to follow closely the controversy to which the article refers, but I remember perfectly my conversation with General Lee on this subject. He said plainly to me 'that the battle would have been gained if General Longstreet had obeyed the orders given him and had made the attack early instead of late.' He said further, 'General Longstreet, when once in a fight, was a most brilliant soldier; but he was the hardest man to move I had in my army.'" \* \* \* \* \*

Does this testimony prove that General Lee regretted that he had not adopted another's plan to fight the battle of Gettysburg, or is it not cumulative to all the other well-known facts? Gen. Pleasanton, Meade's cavalry commander, writes a paper for the *Philadelphia Times*, January 19th, 1878, in which he tells us what he said to Meade after our repulse on the 3rd, and this is it: "I rode up to him, and after congratulating him on the splendid conduct of his army I said, 'General, I will give you half an hour to show yourself a great general. Order the army to advance while I take the cavalry; get in Lee's rear and we will finish the campaign in a week.'" A Sandwich Islander, knowing nothing about the war except what he might read in these papers of Generals Longstreet and Pleasanton, but of a humane and benevolent disposition, would inwardly rejoice that *they* did not command their respective armies lest the historic feat of the "Kilkenny Cats" should have been eclipsed by not even leaving to the public their two tales.

In conclusion, let our fancy picture the grim veterans of the Army of Northern Virginia paraded in their camp-grounds in that month of August, 1863, to hear the announcement that Mr. Davis had accepted the resignation of their chief, would there not have resounded from front to rear, from flank to flank, "*Le Roi est*

*mort*"? but when the "younger and abler man," whoever he might be, assumed command, the mummies of the Pyramids or the skeleton bones beneath the ruins of Pompeii could not be more silent than the refusal of these heroes to sing to Lee's successor, "*Vive Le Roi.*"

Aye, as certain as that the day will roll around, when "the secrets of all hearts shall be disclosed," so sure would the Angel of Peace have donned her white and shining robes in that hour that General Lee bid farewell to the Army of Northern Virginia and mounted "Traveller" to ride away from his people. The termination of the war would indeed have simplified the duties of "the younger and abler man!"

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#### **Official Report of General W. N. Pendleton, Chief of Artillery, A. N. V.**

[The following report has never been published, and so far as we know the original MS. from which we print is the only copy in existence. We are indebted to its distinguished author for the privilege of adding it to our Gettysburg series.]

HEADQUARTERS ARTILLERY CORPS, A. N. V.,  
September 12th, 1862.

GENERAL: A report of artillery operations during the late campaign I have now the honor to submit. It has been somewhat retarded by delays on the part of battalion commanders.

The severe contests near Fredericksburg, early in May, having resulted disastrously to the enemy, opportunity was allowed us of repairing losses and getting ready for subsequent operations. To this end my energies were directed throughout the month of May. What had been the general reserve was distributed, and the three corps into which the army was now divided had assigned to each five artillery battalions, averaging four four-gun batteries, each battalion being satisfactorily equipped and well commanded; and the group for each corps being under charge of a suitable chief.

On the 5th of June, when preparations were in progress for a removal of general headquarters on the new campaign, the First and Second corps having already marched toward Culpeper, the enemy appeared in some force opposite Fredericksburg, and in the afternoon opened a heavy artillery fire near the mouth of Deep Run, under cover of which they established, as some months before, a pontoon bridge and pushed across a body of infantry. That evening and the following morning were employed in adjusting the artillery and other troops of the Third corps, left on the Fredericksburg heights for this very contingency. But indications being satisfactory that the movement was only a feint, the Commanding-General, soon after midday, moved forward. According to instructions, my own course was also directed towards Culpeper, where, after a bivouac for the night, we arrived early on Sunday morning, June 7th. On the afternoon of June 13th the Second corps, Lieutenant-General Ewell commanding, which had a day or two before marched from Culpeper, approached Win-

chester, and Lieutenant-Colonel Andrews' artillery battalion operated with effect in driving back the enemy's advance on the Front Royal road.

In the attack upon the enemy's fortifications next day, resulting in his hasty retreat and the capture of his guns and stores, most valuable service was rendered by the artillery under the immediate command of Lieutenant-Colonel Jones, and the general charge of the acting chief of artillery for the corps, Colonel J. T. Brown. The works and their armament were alike formidable, and that they were thus rendered untenable by the enemy evinces at once the skill with which our batteries were disposed and the resolution with which they were served. The death of Captain Thompson, of the "Louisiana Guard Artillery," a most gallant and esteemed officer, was part of the price of this victory.

Retreating towards Charlestown, the enemy, near Jordan's Springs, on the morning of the 15th, encountered, with Johnson's division which had marched to intercept him, Lieutenant-Colonel Andrews' artillery battalion. The sharp action ensuing, which resulted in the rout of the enemy and capture of most of his men, was especially remarkable for the unexampled steadiness with which artillery fought infantry skirmishers at close quarters. Lieutenant Contee, who commanded a section in a contest of this kind, distinguished himself by cool and persistent daring; and several non-commissioned officers are mentioned by their commanders as evincing like gallantry. Lieutenant-Colonel Andrews and Lieutenant Contee were in this affair painfully, though not very dangerously wounded.

While these events were transpiring at and near Winchester, General Rodes' division, accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel Carter's artillery battalion, having marched by Berryville, approached Martinsburg, where was an additional force of the enemy. Under the well-directed fire of Colonel Carter's batteries that force speedily abandoned the town, leaving, in addition to twenty-three captured in Winchester, five superior field-guns. In these several engagements our batteries lost *six* men killed and *fifteen* wounded.

The Second corps, in its subsequent advance across the Potomac into Maryland and Pennsylvania, was attended by its five battalions: Lieutenant-Colonel Carter's, Lieutenant-Colonel Andrews', Lieutenant-Colonel Jones', Colonel Brown's, and Lieutenant-Colonel Nelson's—the three former marching with Rodes', Johnson's, and Early's divisions, the two latter constituting a corps reserve.

Simultaneously with these movements of the Second corps, the First and Third were put in motion, each accompanied by its own artillery force. The First corps, Lieutenant-General Longstreet commanding, left Culpeper June 15th, attended by Major Henry's, Colonel Cabell's, Major Dearing's, Colonel Alexander's, and Major Eshleman's artillery battalions—the three former marching with Hood's, McLaws', and Pickett's divisions, and the two latter constituting a corps reserve. As the route of this corps lay along the eastern slope of the Blue Ridge, to guard the several passes of that barrier against incursions of the enemy, its artillery was subjected to serious trial from roads frequently difficult and generally rough, and marches, under extreme heat, more than usually long. Additional labor was also imposed on some of the battalions by the necessity of meeting certain demonstrations of the enemy. Actual contest, beyond cavalry skirmishing, he declined.

The Third corps, on the 15th June, left Fredericksburg *en route* for Culpeper and the Shenandoah Valley, *via* Front Royal, accompanied by its artillery battalions, viz.: Lieut.-Colonel Garnett's, Major Poague's, and Lieutenant-Colonel Cutt's, attending the divisions of Generals Heth, Pender, and Anderson, and Majors McIntosh's and Pegram's battalions as a corps reserve.

In this advance, general headquarters being with the First corps, my own were thereby also chiefly regulated. On June 16th, after a week at Culpeper of such artillery preparation and supervision as were requisite and practicable,



I marched towards the Valley, attending near the Commanding-General to be ready for such service as might be required.

On the 25th, the army having sufficiently rested in camp near Millwood and Berryville, crossed the Potomac, the Third corps at Shepherdstown, the First at Williamsport—the Commanding-General being with the latter, and my duties lying near him.

On Wednesday, 1st July, Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, having been reached by easy marches, and passed after a rest of one or two days, and the army being in motion towards Gettysburg, occasional cannon shots in that direction were heard by myself and others with the main body, as, before noon, we crossed the mountain. Two divisions of the Third corps, Heth's and Pender's, the former with Pegram's artillery battalion, the latter with McIntosh's, were in advance on this road; while of the Second corps, Early's division, attended by Jones' artillery battalion was approaching from the direction of York, and Rodes' from that of Carlisle, accompanied by Carter's battalion. The advance of the Third corps had encountered, at Gettysburg, a force of the enemy, and the firing heard was the beginning of the battle. Its significance, however, was not then fully understood. It might be only a passing skirmish; it might be more serious.

After a brief pause near Cash Town, to see how it would prove, the Commanding-General finding the cannonade to continue and increase, moved rapidly forward. I did the same, and at his request rode near him for instructions. Arriving near the crest of an eminence more than a mile west of the town, dismounting and leaving horses under cover, we, on foot, took position overlooking the field. It was, perhaps, two o'clock, and the battle was raging with considerable violence. The troops of the Second corps having reached the field sometime after the engagement was opened by those of the Third, Carter's and Jones' batteries were, at the time of our arrival, plied on the left with freshness and vigor upon the batteries and infantry that had been pressing the Third corps; and when these turned upon their new assailants they were handsomely enfiladed by the batteries of McIntosh and Pegram, posted in front of our look-out on the left and right of the road. To counteract this damaging double-attack, the enemy made, especially with his artillery, such effort as he could. Observing the course of events, the Commanding-General suggested whether positions on the right could not be found to enfilade the valley between our position and the town and the enemy's batteries next the town. My services were immediately tendered, and the endeavor was made. Where the Fairfield road crosses our range of hills was the farthest to the right admissible, as there was no infantry support near, and a wooded height a few hundred yards beyond seemed occupied by the enemy. Here some guns that had been sent for from McIntosh's battery were posted, under command of Captain M. Johnson; but to advance them and open fire was not deemed proper till some infantry should arrive, need of which had been promptly reported. Under fire they were, more or less, from the first.

Meanwhile, the enemy yielded ground on the left, our batteries as well as infantry were advanced, and additional troops came up. Garnett's battalion moved to the front, slightly participated in the fight, and then, under cover of a hill near the Brick seminary, awaited orders. Poague's battalion also arrived, and moved to Garnett's right into line under cover, across the Fairfield road, between Captain Johnson's position and the town. Having sent members of my staff to reconnoitre the woods on the right, and explore, as well as they might be able, a road observed along a ravine back of those woods, I now pushed forward on the Fairfield road to the ridge adjoining the town, intending to put there Garnett's and other guns, which had been previously ordered forward. The position was within range of the hill beyond the town to which the enemy was retreating, and where he was massing his batteries. General Ramseur, coming up from the town which his command had just occupied, met me at this point and requested that our batteries might not then

open, as they would draw a concentrated fire upon his men, much exposed. Unless as part of a combined assault, it would be worse than useless, I at once saw, to open fire there. Captain Maurin, of Garnett's battalion, in command of several batteries, was therefore directed to post his guns and be ready, but to keep his horses under cover, and not to fire till further orders. Having further examined this ridge, and communicated with Colonel Walker, chief of artillery, Third corps, I returned across the battle-field and sent to inform the Commanding-General of the state of facts, especially of the road to the right, believed to be important towards a flank movement against the enemy in his new position. While these operations occurred, Andrews' battalion and the two reserve battalions, Second corps, came up with Johnson's division, on the Cash Town road, and proceeded to join the other troops of their corps on the left; and Colonel Brown, acting chief of artillery for that corps, sent to find, if practicable, an artillery route towards a wooded height commanding the enemy's right. No farther attack, however, was made, and night closed upon the scene.

Early on the morning of the 2d the enemy, being now strongly posted on the heights to which he had retired the previous evening, the artillery of the Second corps occupied positions from the Seminary hill round to the left, the gallant Major Latimer, commanding Andrews' battalion, being on the extreme left, and Colonel Brown's battalion, under Captain Dance, on the right, near the Seminary. Further to the right, on Seminary Ridge, Colonel Walker posted the artillery of the Third corps, except Poague's battalion and a portion of Garnett's, held for a season in reserve. From the farthest occupied point on the right and front, in company with Colonels Long and Walker, and Captain Johnson (engineer), I soon after sunrise surveyed the enemy's position towards some estimate of the ground, and the best mode of attack. So far as from such a view judgment could be formed, assault on the enemy's left by our extreme right might succeed, should the mountain there offer no insuperable obstacle. To attack on that side, if practicable, I understood to be the purpose of the Commanding-General. Returning from this position more to the right and rear, for the sake of tracing more exactly the mode of approach, I proceeded some distance along the ravine road noticed the previous evening, and was made aware of having entered the enemy's lines by meeting two armed, dismounted cavalymen. Apparently surprised, they immediately surrendered, and were disarmed and sent to the rear, with two of the three members of my staff present.

Having satisfied myself of the course and character of this road, I returned to an elevated point on the Fairfield road, which furnished a very extensive view, and dispatched messengers to General Longstreet and the Commanding-General. Between this point and the Emmettsburg road the enemy's cavalry were seen in considerable force, and moving up along the road towards the enemy's main position, bodies of infantry and artillery, accompanied by their trains.

This front was, after some time, examined by Colonel Smith and Captain Johnson, engineers, and about midday General Longstreet arrived and viewed the ground. He desired Colonel Alexander to obtain the best view he then could of the front. I therefore conducted the Colonel to the advanced point of observation previously visited. Its approach was now more hazardous from the fire of the enemy's sharpshooters, so that special caution was necessary in making the desired observation.

Just then a sharp contest occurred in the woods to the right and rear of this forward point. Anderson's division, Third corps, had moved up, and was driving the enemy from those woods. Poague's artillery battalion was soon after sent to co-operate with that division, and also a battery from Lane's battalion.

These woods having been thus cleared of the enemy, some view of the ground beyond them, and much farther to the right than had yet been exam-

ined, seemed practicable. I therefore rode in that direction, and when about to enter the woods, met the Commanding-General *en route* himself for a survey of the ground. There being here still a good deal of sharp-shooting, the front had to be examined with caution. General Wilcox, commanding on the right of Anderson's division, had already seen beyond the farther edge of the woods, and under his guidance I accompanied Colonel Long to the farmhouse, at the summit where the cross-road from Fairfield, &c., emerges. Having noticed the field, and the enemy's batteries, &c., I returned to General Longstreet for the purpose of conducting his column to this point, and supervising, as might be necessary, the disposition of his artillery. He was advancing by ravine-road, as most out of view, time having been already lost in attempting another, which proved objectionable because exposed to observation.

On learning the state of facts ahead, the General halted and sent back to hasten his artillery. Members of my staff were also dispatched to remedy, as far as practicable, the delay. Cabell's, Alexander's, and Henry's battalions at length arrived, and the whole column moved towards the enemy's left. Colonel Alexander, by General Longstreet's direction, proceeded to explore the ground still farther to the right, and Henry's battalion, accompanying Hood's division, was thrown in that direction. Upon these, as soon as observed, the enemy opened a furious cannonade, the course of which rendered necessary a change in the main artillery column. Cabell's battalion deflected to the right, while Alexander's was mainly parked for a season, somewhat under cover, till it could advance to better purpose. The fire on the cross-road through the woods having, after some time, slackened, I reconnoitered that front again. As before, the enemy was only a few hundred yards off, awaiting attack.

Soon after, at about 4 P. M., the general assault was made. Alexander's battalion moved into position, fronting the peach orchard near the Emmetsburg road, and opened with vigor, as did the battalion to its right. The enemy obstinately resisted and our batteries suffered severely. Within an hour, however, his guns were silenced and his position carried. Alexander then ran forward his pieces, which did effectual service in hastening and confining the enemy to his rear position on the mountain. Between his guns in that position and our batteries, a cannonade was kept up more or less briskly until dark.

While the First corps thus advanced into position and operated on the right, the batteries of the Third corps, from the advanced position in the centre, early taken, occupied the attention of the enemy by a deliberate fire during the whole afternoon. Opportunity was once or twice taken by myself to observe the progress and effect of this fire. It elicited a spirited reply, and was useful in preventing full concentration by the enemy on either flank.

On the left attack was also delayed till the afternoon. About 4 P. M. the guns of the Second corps in position on that front generally opened with a well-directed and effective fire. This also, although the right seemed to claim my chief attention, was partially observed by me from the central ridge in rear of the Third corps. Massed as were the enemy's batteries on the Cemetery Hill fronting our left, and commanding as was their position, our artillery admirably served, as it was there operated under serious disadvantage and with considerable loss. It still, however, for the most part maintained its ground and prepared the way for infantry operations. Here the gallant Major Latimer, so young and yet so exemplary, received the wound which eventuated in his death. Thus stood affairs at nightfall the 2d: on the left and in the centre, nothing gained; on the right, batteries and lines well advanced—the enemy meanwhile strengthening himself in a position naturally formidable and everywhere difficult of approach.

By direction of the Commanding-General the artillery along our entire line was to be prepared for opening, as early as possible on the morning of the 3d,

a concentrated and destructive fire; consequent upon which a general advance was to be made. The right especially was, if practicable, to sweep the enemy from his stronghold on that flank. Visiting the lines at a very early hour towards securing readiness for this great attempt, I found much, by Colonel Alexander's energy, already accomplished on the right. Henry's battalion held about its original position on the flank, Alexander's was next in front of the peach orchard, then came the Washington artillery battalion, under Major Eshelman, and Dearing's battalion on his left, (these two having arrived since dusk of the day before,) and beyond Dearing, Cabell's battalion had been arranged, making nearly sixty guns for that wing, all well advanced in a sweeping curve of about a mile. In the posting of these there appeared little room for improvement, so judiciously had they been adjusted. To Colonel Alexander, placed here in charge by General Longstreet, the wishes of the Commanding-General were repeated. The battalion and battery commanders were also cautioned how to fire so as to waste as little ammunition as possible. To the Third corps artillery attention was also given. Major Poague's battalion had been advanced to the line of the right wing and was not far from its left; his guns were also well posted; proper directions were also given to him and his officers. The other battalions of this corps, a portion of Garnett's under Major Richardson, being in reserve, held their positions of the day before, as did those of the Second corps; each group having from its chief specific instructions. Care was also given to the convenient posting of ordnance trains, especially for the right, as most distant from the main depot, and due notice given of their position.

From some cause the expected attack was delayed several hours. Meanwhile, the enemy threw against our extreme right a considerable force, which was met with energy, Henry's battalion rendering in its repulse efficient service.

At length, about 1 P. M., on the concerted signal, our guns in position, nearly one hundred and fifty, opened fire along the entire line, from right to left—salvos by battery being much practiced, as directed, to secure greater deliberation and power. The enemy replied with their full force. So mighty an artillery contest has, perhaps, never been waged, estimating together the number and character of guns, and the duration of the conflict. The average distance between contestants was about 1,400 yards, and the effect was necessarily serious on both sides. With the enemy there was advantage of elevation and protection from earth works; but his fire was unavoidably more or less divergent, while ours was convergent. His troops were massed; ours diffused. We, therefore, suffered apparently much less. Great commotion was produced in his ranks, and his batteries were to such extent driven off or silenced as to have ensured his defeat but for the extraordinary strength of his position.

Proceeding again to the right, to see about the anticipated advance of the artillery, delayed beyond expectation, I found, among other difficulties, many batteries getting out of or low in ammunition, and the all-important question of supply received my earnest attention. Frequent shells endangering the First corps ordnance train in the convenient locality I had assigned it, it had been removed farther back. This necessitated longer time for refilling caissons. What was worse, the train itself was very limited, so that its stock was soon exhausted, rendering requisite demand upon the reserve train farther off. The whole amount was thus being rapidly reduced. Our means to keep up supply at the rate required for such a conflict proved practically impossible. There had to be, therefore, some relaxation of the protracted fire, and some lack of support for the deferred and attempted advance. But if this and other causes prevented our sweeping the enemy from his position, he was so crippled as to be incapable of any formidable movement. Night closed upon our guns in their advanced position, and had our resources allowed ammunition for the artillery to play another day, the tremendous part it had performed on this, his stronghold could scarcely have sufficed to save the enemy from rout and ruin.

In the defensive measures directed for the 4th, my care was given to the whole line. The batteries on the right and left were drawn back and kept ready for emergencies. Two batteries of Garnett's battalion, Third corps; two of Eshleman's, First corps; and one of Jones', Second corps, were detailed to report to General Imboden at Cash Town, and aid in guarding the main wagon train back to Williamsport. The battalions generally remained in position most of the day. Nothing, however, was attempted by the enemy. That night artillery and infantry all moved to the rear.

After some casualties, incident in part to the progress of such a train through mountains in an enemy's country infested by cavalry detachments, the batteries accompanying General Imboden arrived with the train at Williamsport late on the 5th, and on the 6th did excellent service in repelling an attack of the enemy.

On the 7th the artillery, with the body of the army, encamped near Hagerstown, without material incident since leaving Gettysburg. Men and animals were, however, much fatigued, and the latter greatly worn down by the hard service they had endured with light fare, and by heavy draught in roads rendered deep by continued rain, with numbers reduced by losses in battle.

On the 10th, attack being threatened by the enemy, the artillery, partaking the hopeful expectations of the whole army, earnestly participated in forming an extended and fortified line of battle, whose left rested on heights west of Hagerstown, and right on the Potomac, some miles below Williamsport.

In full expectation of a decisive battle here, the army was by the Commanding-General called upon for its utmost efforts, and I was specially directed to see that everything possible was accomplished by the artillery. Accordingly for three days, during which the enemy was waited for, my best energies were given, with those of others, to the work of arrangement and preparation. The enemy, however, prudently forebore, and it being undesirable to await him longer, our army was on the night of the 13th withdrawn to the south bank of the Potomac.

In this movement, necessarily involving much labor, greatly increased difficulty was imposed upon those responsible for artillery operations by the enfeebled condition of horses, drawing through roads saturated with rain, and by the swollen state of the river, which confined the whole army, train and all, to one route across the pontoon bridge at Falling Waters. Still, the task was cheerfully undertaken, and in the main successfully accomplished. With the exception of a few caissons, abandoned by some officers because teams could draw them no longer, and two guns left by those in charge for like reason, the battalions were entirely across by noon of the 14th. After crossing, Carter's guns were placed in position on the hills just below the bridge, some of Garnett's on that just above. Lane's 20-pound Parrotts were also posted some distance further down, and Hurt's Whitworths higher up—all to repel an expected advance of the enemy. A few only of his guns, however, approached, and threw a shell or two, though they took care to keep out of view. A small body of skirmishers, besides, ventured rather nearer, but they were speedily dispersed by some well-directed shots, and cannon were then needed no longer.

In the Pennsylvania expedition our artillery lost: In the First corps—2 officers killed and 9 wounded; 45 men killed, 215 wounded, and 42 missing. Second corps—2 officers killed and 8 wounded; 28 men killed, 94 wounded, and 5 missing. Third corps—1 officer killed, 9 wounded, and 2 missing; 16 men killed, 102 wounded, and 28 missing—total, 5 officers killed, 26 wounded, and 2 missing; 89 men killed, 411 wounded, and 75 missing. Aggregate—608.

Of the officers lost, Captain Fraser, Cabell's battalion, First corps, claims the tribute of grateful honor. No soldier of more unflinching nerve and efficient energy has served the Confederacy in its struggle for existence. He fell severely wounded at Gettysburg, and has since yielded his life for his country. Besides the two serviceable guns mentioned as lost from failure of

teams near the Potomac, the enemy got three of our disabled pieces, of which two were left on the field as worthless, and one sent to the rear, was captured by his cavalry, with a few wagons from the train.

We wrested from him on the battle-field at Gettysburg, three 10-pound Parrott's, one 3-inch rifle, and three Napoleon's, all ready for use against himself.

In the operations thus imperfectly reported, officers and men, almost without exception, evinced in high degree the important virtues of courage, fortitude, and patience; shrinking from no danger at the call of duty, they accepted with equal fidelity the hardships incident to just forbearance and stern service in an enemy's country; alternately heat and protracted storm aggravated other trials. The arid hills of Gettysburg afford no springs, and wells are there speedily exhausted; many, therefore, were the sufferers from thirst in this long mid-summer conflict. Subsequently on the march scarcely less was endurance taxed by pouring rain day and night; yet all this and whatever else occurred, was borne with ready acquiescence and steady resolution. When great merit is so prevalent, individual instances can scarcely be distinguished without danger of injustice to others; certain cases of special heroism are however mentioned by several commanders, whose reports present the facts. On all such details and all the minutiae of operations, more exact information is contained in the several reports of the corps chiefs of artillery and battalion commanders, herewith submitted, than can be presented in a general statement.

Regretting that no more could be achieved in the campaign, yet grateful for what has been accomplished, and for the still increasing strength with which we are enabled to wield this great arm of defence,

I have the honor to be General,

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. N. PENDLETON,

*Brigadier-General and Chief of Artillery.*

*General R. E. LEE, Commanding.*

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### Letter from General E. P. Alexander.

MONTGOMERY, ALA., *February 23, 1878.*

*Rev. J. WM. JONES, Secretary:*

DEAR SIR: The letter of Colonel J. B. Walton, in the February No. of the *Southern Historical Society Papers*, compels me, very reluctantly, to intrude upon your readers with a brief personal explanation. It might not be necessary were your readers confined to those who have any personal knowledge of the subject, but I trust that even these will excuse me when they remember that your pages have a very wide circulation, and will be referred to for many years to come. I cannot, therefore, consent to be represented in them as having falsely claimed for myself a position which I did not occupy—to wit: that of having commanded in the action at Gettysburg all of the artillery of Longstreet's corps on the field. But I will endeavor to be as brief and as courteous as possible. The facts, which are notorious to every surviving officer and private of every battery concerned in them, are as follows:

I arrived with my battalion, not at the head of the column, but at the very tail of it, having marched in that honorable but unappreciated position from Culpeper to Gettysburg without once having the usual privilege of alternating in the lead on the march. Soon after our arrival Colonel Walton himself brought me an order to report in person to General Longstreet. On doing so,

I was ordered to take command of all the artillery on the field for action, but to leave Colonel Walton's own battalion where it was then in bivouac near the Cashtown road. I did take the command and exercised it actively, and personally put in position every battalion, and nearly every battery, except a part of Henry's battalion, on our extreme right flank, which the pressure in the centre did not allow me time to visit. I did not see or hear from Colonel Walton again that day. During the night his own battalion, under Major Eshleman, reported to me, and I myself placed it in position before daylight, and after daylight corrected its position and posted every other battalion in the corps, and some batteries lent me from the Third corps. Throughout that day I was in the most entire and active command of the whole line of guns, and only withdrew with the last battery late at night, and I have remained in ignorance until this day that my personal supervision was not exclusive. Again, on the 4th, I was sent for by General Longstreet at daylight, and put in charge of a few batteries which, with the infantry, were held to cover the retreat of the rest. Permit me to add brief extracts from a few, out of many letters in my possession, from the best living witnesses, that my statements may not rest on my own word alone. Colonel H. C. Cabell writes to me: \* \* "You rode up and said you were assigned to the command of the artillery for the fight. Halting my battalion, we rode together to the front, where you showed me the positions you had selected for my guns. \* \* In short, you were generally recognized as exercising a general command for the fight by me, and the other commands I was in contact with. \* \* Similar authority was frequently conferred on you—for instance, at Ashby's Gap, Downesville, and notably at Chancellorsville." Colonel W. M. Owens, then Colonel Walton's own adjutant, writes me that late on the night of July 2d, he "found wagon and Colonel Walton on Cashtown road; slept until dawn; firing heard on right; saddled and rode to front. Firing was from left of peach orchard by Washington artillery, under Eshleman, *put there by you during the night.*"

Major B. F. Eshleman writes me, "You placed my battalion in position just to left of peach orchard before dawn of day, and at dawn corrected my position to prevent an enfilade fire from the enemy. \* \* During the engagement I remember your visiting my command to find how ammunition was holding out." Colonel John C. Haskell, then major of Henry's battalion, writes me, \* \* "I received an order from you to bring some batteries from the right to the peach orchard and to report to you. You were in command of the line as far as I knew anything about it and Walton was never on the line to my knowledge. You gave me orders to advance on Pickett's right and I heard you give orders to Major Dearing to advance on his left. In short it was notorious that you were in command." Captain R. M. Stribling, of Dearing's battalion, writes, "I saw you frequently on the lines, as I supposed, commanding all the artillery. In frequent conversation afterwards with other artillery officers, it was always assumed as a known fact that you were in command. You in person gave me instructions where to direct my fire. I never saw Colonel Walton during the day." Captain H. H. Carlton, whose battery was one of the nearest to Cemetery Hill, writes me, "My battery was put in position by yourself in front of Cemetery Hill about three or four o'clock on the morning of the 3d. I remember distinctly seeing you often during the day. \* \* I am confident the whole line of artillery considered itself altogether and entirely under your command. \* \* You advanced my battery after Pickett's charge and were present and gave all the orders about advancing and firing in person."

These writers represent every battalion on the field except my own—from which it is unnecessary to quote. I omit also corroborating letters from staff officers of General Lee and General Longstreet, and conclude with the following conclusive statement addressed to me the 5th instant by General W. N. Pendleton, then chief of artillery of the army:

“That up to the time of the battle of Gettysburg, Colonel Walton was duly sanctioned chief of artillery of the First corps, he may rightly claim, and that there was no formal order issued displacing him from that position and substituting yourself. But you at the same time are fully justified in affirming that, with care not to mortify Colonel Walton, you were actually put in charge of the artillery of the First corps on the field—as a younger and more active man and a trained officer. The direction was given by General Longstreet, but it had my ready sanction.”

The letter of General Longstreet of November 6th, which Colonel Walton prints, only conflicts with the above in saying that I arrived at the head of the column, and in implying that Colonel Walton was absent—on both of these points I am sure that Colonel Walton himself will admit that General Longstreet is mistaken.

General Longstreet also states that he considered me an engineer officer, but as he gave me an artillery command, I trust I am excusable in having spoken of it as such. It is proper to say, in closing, that nearly every letter from which I have quoted expresses personal respect and kind feeling toward Colonel Walton, with much surprise and regret that he should have forced this unpleasant issue and statement of facts; and none can entertain the feelings more deeply and keenly than I do, and I have no desire to say any more than seems essential to establish the truth of my statement and relieve me from the imputation of having unjustly claimed credit due to a comrade.

Respectfully yours,

E. P. ALEXANDER.



### Remarks on the Numerical Strength of Both Armies at Gettysburg by Comte de Paris.

[We publish with great pleasure the following paper from our distinguished friend, and only regret that a clear, conclusive note from Colonel Walter H. Taylor, pointing out the errors which the Count still holds (in spite of the fair spirit in which he writes), is crowded into our next number.]

The returns of both armies generally gave three figures for each body of troops, which figures it is essential not to mistake the one with the other for the same army, nor to compare the one with a different one in the opposite armies. These figures showed the number of officers and soldiers: 1st, on the rolls; 2d, present; 3d, present for duty. The first category contained every man belonging to the regiment, either present or absent on leave, sick or healthy, or without leave. It happened in both armies, at certain times, that the absentees numbered more than one-third of the whole force. The second category contained both the officers and men present for duty, and those detached on special duty, under arrest, and in the regimental ambulances or corps hospitals. The proportion between these different classes after a fortnight's active campaign is well illustrated by General Early's divisional return for the 20th June, which is as follows:

Present for duty (3d category), 5,638; percentage, 87. On detached service, 468; percentage, 7.3. Under arrest, 22; percentage, 0.3. Sick list, 343; percentage, 5.4. Total, 6,471; percentage 100.

The total is the figure which is generally given in both armies where only one is given, the number of the men on detached service being liable to vary greatly from day to day.

*Confederate Army.*—According to the return of the 31st of May, the effective strength of the Army of Northern Virginia was:

Present: Infantry, 54,356; cavalry, 9,536; artillery, 4,460. Total present, 68,852.

If the percentage of the men on detached service, under arrest, and on the sick list was the same for the whole army as for Early's division, and if the army had neither been increased nor diminished, we should find the figure representing the men present for duty at the time each corps reached the banks of the Potomac by a deduction of 13 per cent., which would give us for the three arms 59,901 men.

I do not believe that those two figures (68,852 and 59,901) represent fully the whole strength of the Army of Northern Virginia when it invaded Maryland. Through the operation of the draft the effective strength of each regiment had been increased after Chancellorsville. The regiments had received some recruits between the 15th and the 31st of May; some more came between the 1st and 10th of June. Von Bocke says that the regiments of cavalry were largely increased in that way, but I am not satisfied by such vague statements, and in order to prove the fact, I propose to calculate the average strength of the regiments from the known strength of several corps, divisions, or brigades a few days before the battle, as stated by reliable authorities, and mostly by official reports. I have picked out the following figures from the statement of Confederate officers:

Four regiments: Present, 1,420; average per regiment, 372; present for duty, —; average per regiment, —. Benning's brigade.

Eighteen regiments: Present, 6,471; average per regiment, 360; present for duty, 5,638; average per regiment, 313. Early's division, with one battery of artillery.

Seventeen regiments: Present, 7,000; average per regiment, 412; present for duty, —; average per regiment, —. Heth's division.

Fifteen regiments: Present, —; average per regiment, —; present for duty, 4,484; average per regiment, 299. Pickett's division.

Fifty-three regiments: Present, —; average per regiment, —; present for duty, 17,500; average per regiment, 330. First corps.

It will be seen that the average of the men present for duty in Early's division is exactly the average between the two other figures (299 and 330); we can take it, therefore, as the real standard of the regimental strength, while we shall take, also, Early's figures as being the lowest average for the whole of the men present per regiment.

According to the tabular return of losses of the Army of Northern Virginia in the campaign north of the Potomac, furnished to me by the archives of the United States War Department, this army contained 167 regiments of infantry, and not 163, as Dr. Bates has alleged; and 167 multiplied by 360 and 313 would give us respectively 60,120 infantry men present, and 52,271 present for duty. These 167 regiments of infantry represent the force with which Lee invaded Pennsylvania after he had left Corse's brigade at Hanover Junction, one regiment at Winchester, and had sent two regiments back to Staunton with the prisoners from the latter place. The addition of Pettigrew's brigade, and especially the increase by the draft, must consequently have raised the force of Lee's infantry north of the Potomac by about 6,000 men above the return of the 31st of May. Since that date Stuart's command of cavalry had been increased by Jenkins' brigade of five regiments. Moreover, Imboden's command, which contained three regiments of cavalry and at least a few hundred infantry not accounted for in the above 167 regiments, and was stationed in the Alleghanies somewhat about Romney, I think, joined Lee across the Potomac. Before these additions Stuart's cavalry numbered twenty-five regiments, and had on the 31st of May 9,536 men present, which gives an average of 381 men per regiment. This standard would give 1,905 horsemen to Jenkins, and 1,143 to Imboden, and in the whole 12,584 present, or at the same rates as the infantry, 10,978 present for duty. But, of course, from both figures should be deducted the severe loss of the cavalry at Fleetwood hill and Upperville, which, being about 1,100, reduces the strength of the cavalry when it crossed the Potomac to about 11,484 present, and 9,878 present for duty. The cavalry not being able to take in its rapid marches any one on the sick list, I shall from the first of the last two figures deduct again 5.4 per cent. on that head, which brings down to 10,864 the number of cavalymen who crossed the Potomac. If we reckon Imboden's infantry at only 300 present for duty, we get accordingly the following figures, which, for the cavalymen present for duty, are rather low, as the men detached for duty were less numerous than in the infantry:

Infantry present, 60,459; present for duty, 52,571. Artillery present, 4,460; present for duty, 4,190. Cavalry present, 10,864; present for duty, 9,878. Total present, 75,783; present for duty, 66,639.

As the artillery had no men on detached duty as teamsters, guards, &c., I have deducted, instead of 13 per cent., only 6 per cent. for men on the sick list or under arrest; 4,090 seems already a very low figure if it embraces all the men on duty with the trains of ammunition, which is a military duty, as it gives only men per gun. If all these troops were not at Gettysburg during the whole battle, every man out of them was at a certain time within reach of the field of battle, and therefore under the hand of General Lee. According to General Pendleton's official report, the artillery was divided in 15 battalions, 5 to each corps: each battalion contained 4 batteries of 4 guns each, which give 16 guns per battalion, 80 per corps, and 240 for the whole, to which should be added the horse artillery, containing 6 batteries of 4 guns each or 24 guns, and one brigade battery of 4 guns in Early's division, or 268 guns in the whole. I reckon, therefore, the whole strength of the Army of North-

ern Virginia, in Pennsylvania, at about 76,000 present, out of which at least 66,600 were present for duty, and 268 guns.

*Federal Army.*—The effective strength of the Army of the Potomac, viz: The number of the men reported as present at the time of the battle, is partly given by Gen. Butterfield, in the testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, the remainder calculated from the average per regiment, and agrees in its total with figures given by General Meade to the same Committee or mentioned in his dispatches. Whenever Federal officers gave what they called their effective strength, the figures represented always all the men present and not only those present for duty. To find the number of these we cannot deduct less than the same 13 per cent. as for the Confederate army. I know positively that the difference was generally larger, sometimes as much as 18 per cent., for if in the Union army the teamsters were not enlisted men, the number of guards, hospital men, escorts of trains, &c., was much larger than in the Southern ranks. Here are the figures derived from Meade's, Butterfield's, and some other statements:

Infantry and divisions artillery present, 87,500; present for duty (13 per cent. less), 76,125. Cavalry present, 12,000; present for duty, 10,440. Reserve artillery, headquarters' escort, signal corps, &c. present, 5,500; present for duty, 4,785. Total present, 105,000; present for duty, 91,250.

The number of regiments of infantry was, according to Dr. Bates's table, 242, which, by a remarkable coincidence, gives an average of 361 men present per regiment, within one man the same average as in Early's division. The Federal regiments were certainly not stronger than the Confederate ones. The reason is, that by the operation of the draft, however limited, the old regiments in the Southern army were at certain times refilled by recruits, while on the Union side, whenever a new call of volunteers was made it was by the creation of new regiments. It is a well known fact that as soon as a regiment left for the army it ceased altogether to recruit itself. The old regiments became, therefore, mere skeletons, and before the time of Grant very few of these were *consolidated*. The figures given by Meade and Butterfield, do not show, as has been alleged by Dr. Bates, all the men borne upon the rolls, nor, I think, as Confederate writers have asserted, only the men present for duty on the battle-field, but all the men who at the morning call were not reported absent, whatever may be their occupation at that time. The men known as having fallen off the ranks not being generally reported absent at once to give them a chance to join without losing their pay, the usual stragglers were in fact embraced in that figure.

*Reduction by Straggling.*—There were stragglers on both sides, but the Confederates, better accustomed to long marches, having left behind the sickly men and being in a country where the stragglers found no safety, had much less than the Federals; there could be none in Stuart's cavalry after the passage of the Potomac, as every man who dropped off had to be reported lost and considered as missing. The straggling was always very large in the Union army; it was especially so in a friendly country, where it was easy for the men to drop out from the ranks and remain for a time behind. I see no reason to doubt General Doubleday's statement that on the 1st of July, the First corps, when it reached Seminary Ridge, after several days of hard marching, was for the time being reduced from 11,350 men present to 8,200 fighting men. Many of the stragglers joined the army before the end of the battle, but it is not a high estimate to reckon at 10,000 the total loss entailed, by straggling, upon different corps of the Army of the Potomac at the arrival of each on the battle-field. Let us reckon only 6,000 stragglers on the Union and 2,500 on the Southern side, and deducting both cavalries which operated outside of the real field of battle, I think we can say that Meade brought about 75,000 blue-bellies against Lee's 54,000 grey-backs, and 300 guns against 268. If we were to take no notice of the stragglers, the figures would be 81,000 against some-

what less than 57,000; which figures are certainly, on both sides, above the mark. Taking the most favorable view for the Federal army, it would then have been either somewhat less than three-tenths or somewhat more than a fourth stronger than the Southern one; a numerical superiority not so great as that alleged by some Confederate writers, but which, at the time, no one, I believe, suspected at Meade's headquarters. Since the Army of the Potomac came into existence there was always a disposition to overrate the enemy's numerical strength.

French's division cannot be counted in this return, as it never was within reach of the field of battle and was left at Frederick to act as a kind of outpost to cover the garrison of Washington.

Couch's militia was too raw at the time to have been subjected to such an ordeal as a drawn fight in the open field against Lee's veteran soldiers.

*Losses on Both Sides.*—We have now the official figures, which preclude any further discussion on that subject; I acknowledge my mistake pointed out by Colonel Allan, concerning the losses of the Confederate army, as he acknowledges his regarding the losses of the Third corps.

From the returns of Stuart, now in my hands, his loss on the 2d and on the 3d of July, was 264, and including Imboden's and Jenkin's, must be above 300, while, on the other hand, we must deduct from the 22,728, about 700 men lost between the 3d and the 18th of July; therefore the whole Confederate loss at Gettysburg must have been about 22,300 or 22,400.

The official figures are for the Federals: Killed, 2,834; wounded, 13,709; missing, 6,643. Total, 23,186.

For the Confederates: Killed, 2,665; wounded, 12,599; missing, 7,464. Total, 22,728.

The number of Confederate prisoners reported by Meade was 13,621, but as this figure includes 7,262 wounded prisoners treated in the Federal hospitals, it leaves a balance of 6,359 valid prisoners only, which agrees well with the Confederate statement, about a thousand of the men reported missing, especially in Pickett's division, being really wounded left on the ground. There is therefore no discrepancy between these figures.

LOUIS PHILIPPE D'ORLEANS,  
*Comte de Paris.*

CHATEAU D'EU SEINE INFERIEURE, FRANCE,  
*December 4th, 1877.*

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## EDITORIAL PARAGRAPHS.

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OUR CONTRIBUTORS have placed us under many obligations for the valuable papers they have furnished us, and we beg that they will have patience if their articles do not appear promptly. We have on hand a number of papers, reports, &c., which we are anxious to publish at the earliest possible moment, but we are unable to crowd into our pages more than they will hold.

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ON PAGE 137 (March No.) the types make General Taylor speak of "the fame of *Dubois*," when he wrote "*Louvois*," who was, at the time alluded to, the War Minister of Louis the Fourteenth.

OUR GENERAL AGENT in the West, General George D. Johnston, continues to be most successful in his canvass, and to meet a cordial reception wherever he goes in Tennessee. In Nashville, Clarksville, and Jackson he has secured more than 350 subscribers. He is just beginning the canvass of Memphis. We again commend him as a gallant soldier and an accomplished gentleman every way worthy of confidence and esteem, but he needs no introduction to his comrades of the Western army.

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OUR TRIP TO CHARLESTON, S. C., and participation in the 22d of February celebration, was a most delightful one, and we made notes of some matters of special historic interest, but want of space compels us to postpone them. We were also fortunate in securing as our agent for South Carolina Colonel Zimmerman Davis, a gallant soldier and excellent gentleman, who is making a most successful canvass for the Society.

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OUR FINANCIAL PROSPECTS, (our friends will be glad to learn) continue to grow brighter, and if our receipts keep up in proportion to those of the past two months, we will have by far the most encouraging report for our next annual meeting which we have ever had.

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THE SKETCH OF THE SIEGE OF VICKSBURG, by Major E. S. Gregory, of the Petersburg *Index and Appeal*, which was published in a recent issue of the Philadelphia *Weekly Times*, is an exceedingly graphic, entertaining, and valuable paper. We hope that his success in producing so readable and valuable a sketch will induce Major Gregory to try his facile pen on other scenes through which as a gallant soldier he passed.

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THE SKETCH OF HART'S South Carolina battery, as given in the eloquent addresses of Major F. B. Hart and Governor Wade Hampton, would have appeared in this number, but that we are waiting for a corrected copy of Governor Hampton's speech.

# SOUTHERN HISTORICAL SOCIETY PAPERS.

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Vol. V.

Richmond, Va., May, 1878.

No. 5.

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## BATTLE OF MURFREESBORO'.

We purpose publishing during this year a number of reports and other papers concerning the operations of our western armies; and we feel sure that our readers will thank us for presenting the following reports of the battle of Murfreesboro' by the lamented Breckinridge and the gallant General Gibson:

### Report of General J. C. Breckinridge.

HEADQUARTERS BRECKINRIDGE'S DIVISION,

January —, 1863.

*Major T. B. ROY, A. A. Gen.:*

SIR: I have the honor to report the operations of this division of Lieutenant-General Hardee's corps in the recent battles of Stone River in front of Murfreesboro'.

The character and course of Stone river and the nature of the ground in front of the town are well known, and as the report of the General Commanding will no doubt be accompanied by a sketch, it is not necessary to describe them here.

On the morning of Sunday the 28th of December, the brigades moved from their encampments and took up line of battle about one and a half miles from Murfreesboro' in the following order: Adams' brigade on the right, with its right resting on the Lebanon road and its left extending towards the ford over Stone river a short distance below the destroyed bridge on the Nashville turnpike; Preston on the left of Adams; Palmer on the left of Preston, and Hanson forming the left of the line, with his left resting on the right bank of the river near the ford. The right of Major-General Withers of Lieutenant-General Polk's corps, rested near the left bank of the river and slightly in advance of Hanson's left.

Brigadier-General Jackson having reported to me with his command, was placed, by the direction of the Lieutenant-General Commanding, upon the east side of the Lebanon road, on commanding ground, a little in advance of the right of Brigadier-General Adams.

My division formed the front line of the right wing of the army. Major-General Cleburne's division, drawn up some six hundred yards in rear, formed the second line of the same wing, while the division of Major-General McCown, under the immediate direction of the General Commanding, composed the reserve. My line extended from left to right along the edge of a forest, save an open space of four hundred yards, which was occupied by Wright's battery of Preston's brigade, with the Twentieth Tennessee in reserve to support it. An open field eight hundred yards in width extended along nearly the whole front of the line, and was bounded on the opposite side by a line of forest similar to that occupied by us. In the opinion of the Lieutenant-General Commanding (who had twice ridden carefully over the ground with me) and the General commanding, who had personally inspected the lines, it was the strongest position the nature of the ground would allow.

About six hundred yards in front of Hanson's center was an eminence which it was deemed important to hold. It commanded the ground sloping towards the river in its front and on its left, and also the plain on the west bank occupied by the right of Withers' line. Colonel Hunt with the Forty-first Alabama, the Sixth and Ninth Kentucky, and Cobb's battery, all of Hanson's brigade, was ordered to take and hold this hill, which he did, repulsing several brisk attacks of the enemy, and losing some excellent officers and men. A few hundred yards to the left and rear of this position a small earthwork, thrown up under the direction of Major Graves, my Chief of Artillery, was held during a part of the operations by Semple's battery of Napoleon guns.

In the afternoon of Tuesday, the 30th, I received intelligence from Lieutenant-General Hardee that the divisions of Cleburne and McCown were to be transferred to the extreme left, and soon after an order came to me from the General Commanding to hold the hill at all hazards. I immediately moved the remainder of Hanson's Brigade to the hill and strengthened Cobb's battery with a section from Lumsden's battery and a section from Slocomb's Washington Artillery. At the same time Adams' brigade was moved from the right and formed on the ground originally occupied by Hanson's brigade. Jackson was moved to the west side of the Lebanon road to connect with the general line of battle.

All the ground east of Stone river was now to be held by one division, which in a single line did not extend from the ford to the Lebanon road. I did not change my general line, since a position in advance, besides being less favorable in other respects, would have widened considerably the interval between my right and the Lebanon road. The enemy did not again attack the hill with infantry, but our troops there continued to suffer during all the operations from heavy shelling. Our artillery at that position often did good service in diverting the enemy's fire from our attacking lines of infantry, and especially, on Wednesday the 31st, succeeded in breaking several of their formations on the west bank of the river.

On the morning of Wednesday the 31st, the battle opened on our left. From my front information came to me from Pegram's cavalry force in advance that the enemy, having crossed at the fords below, were moving on my position in line of battle. This proved to be incorrect. \* a \* \*

About 10½ o'clock A. M. I received through Colonel J. Stoddard Johnston a suggestion from the General Commanding to move against the enemy, instead of awaiting his attack. (I find that Colonel Johnston regarded it as an order, but as I moved at once it is not material.) I preferred to fight on the ground I then occupied, but supposing that the object of the General was to create a diversion in favor of our left, my line, except Hanson's brigade, was put in motion in the direction from which the enemy was supposed to be advancing. We had marched about half a mile when I received through Colonel Johnston an order from the General Commanding to send at least one brigade to the support of Lieutenant-General Polk, who was hard pressed, and as I recollect, two, if I could spare them. I immediately sent Adams and Jackson, and at the same time suspended my movement, and sent forward Captain Blackburne with several of my escort, and Captain Coleman and Lieutenant Darragh of my staff, with orders to find and report with certainty the position and movements of the enemy. Soon after an order came from the General Commanding to continue the movement. The line again advanced, but had not proceeded far when I received an order from the General Commanding through Colonel Johnston, repeated by Colonel Greenfell, to leave Hanson in position on the hill, and with the remainder of my command to report at once to Lieutenant-General Polk. The brigades of Preston and Palmer were immediately moved by the flank towards the ford before referred to, and the order of the General executed with great rapidity. In the meantime, riding forward to the position occupied by the General Commanding and Lieutenant-General Polk, near the west bank of the river and a little below the ford, I arrived in time to see at a distance the brigades of Jackson and Adams recoiling from a very hot fire of the enemy. I was directed by Lieutenant-General Polk to form my line with its right resting on the river and its left extending across the open field, crossing the Nashville turnpike almost at a right angle. While my troops were crossing the river and getting into line, I rode forward with a portion of my staff, assisted by gentlemen of the staffs of Generals Bragg and Polk, to rally and form Adams' brigade, which was falling back chiefly between the turnpike and the river. Jackson, much cut up, had retired farther towards our left.

The brigade of Brigadier-General Adams was rallied and placed in line across the field behind a low and very imperfect breastwork of earth and rails. These brigades did not again enter the action that day (which, indeed, closed soon after with the charge of Preston and Palmer). They had suffered severely in an attack upon superior numbers, very strongly posted and sustained by numerous and powerful batteries, which had repulsed all preceding assaults. The list of casualties shows the courage and determination of these troops.



General Adams having received a wound while gallantly leading his brigade, the command devolved upon Colonel R. L. Gibson, who discharged its duties throughout with marked courage and skill.

Preston and Palmer being now in line—Preston on the right—Lieutenant-General Polk directed me to advance across the plain until I encountered the enemy. The right of my line rested on the river (and from the course of the stream would in advancing rest on or very near it), while the left touched a skirt of woods from which the enemy had been driven during the day. At the opposite extremity of the plain a cedar brake extended in front of Palmer's whole line and two-thirds of Preston's line, the remaining space to the river being comparatively open, with commanding swells, and through this ran the railroad and turnpike nearly side by side. It was supposed that the enemy's line was parallel to ours, but the result showed that in advancing our right and his left the point of contact would form an acute angle.

These two brigades, passing over the troops lying behind the rails, moved across the plain in very fine order under the fire of the enemy's artillery. We had advanced but a short distance when Colonel O'Hara (my acting Adjutant-General) called my attention to a new battery in the act of taking position in front of our right between the turnpike and the river. I immediately sent him back to find some artillery to engage the enemy's battery. He found and placed in position the Washington Artillery. About the same time Captain E. P. Byrne reported his battery to me, and received an order to take the best position he could find and engage the enemy. He succeeded in opening on them after our line had passed forward.

A number of officers and men were killed along the whole line; but in this charge the chief loss fell upon Preston's right and center. His casualties amounted to one hundred and fifty-five. The Twentieth Tennessee, after driving the enemy on the right of the turnpike and taking twenty-five prisoners, was compelled to fall back before a very heavy artillery and musketry fire, Colonel Smith, commanding, being severely wounded; but it kept the prisoners and soon rejoined the command. The Fourth Florida and Sixtieth North Carolina encountered serious difficulty at a burnt house (Cowan's) on the left of the turnpike from fences and other obstacles, and was for a little while thrown into some confusion. Here for several minutes they were exposed to a destructive and ~~partially~~ enflading fire at short range of artillery and infantry. But they were soon rallied by their gallant brigade commander, and rushing with cheers across the intervening space, entered the cedar glade. The enemy had retired from the cedars and was in position in a field to the front and right.

By changing the front of the command slightly forward to the right my line was brought parallel to that of the enemy and was formed near the edge of the cedars. About this time, meeting Lieutenant-General Hardee, we went together to the edge of the field to examine the position of the enemy, and found him strongly posted in two lines of battle supported by numerous batteries. One of his lines had the protection of the railroad cut, forming an

excellent breastwork. We had no artillery, the nature of the ground forbidding its use.

It was deemed reckless to attack with the force present. Night was now approaching. Presently the remainder of Lieutenant-General Hardee's corps came up on the left, and with McCown's command and a part of Cheatham's prolonged the line of battle in that direction. Adam's brigade also appeared and formed on the right of Preston. The troops bivouaced in position.

The Commanding-General expecting an attack upon his right the next morning, ordered me during the night, to recross the river with Palmer's brigade. Before daylight Thursday morning Palmer was in position on the right of Hanson. No general engagement occurred on this day, the troops generally being employed in replenishing the ammunition, cooking rations, and obtaining some repose.

On Friday, the 2d of January, being desirous to ascertain if the enemy was establishing himself on the east bank of the river, Lieutenant-Colonel Buckner and Major Graves, with Captain Byrne's battery and a portion of the Washington Artillery, under Lieutenant D. C. Vaught, went forward to our line of skirmishers toward the right and engaged those of the enemy, who had advanced perhaps a thousand yards from the east bank of the river. They soon revealed a strong line of skirmishers, which was driven back a considerable distance by our sharpshooters and artillery—the latter firing several houses in the fields in which the enemy had taken shelter. At the same time, accompanied by Major Pickett, of Lieutenant-General Hardee's staff, and Major Wilson, Colonel O'Hara, and Lieutenant Breckinridge of my own, I proceeded towards the left of our line of skirmishers, which passed through a thick wood about 500 yards in front of Hanson's position and extended to the river. Directing Captain Bosche, of the Ninth, and Captain Steele, of the Fourth Kentucky, to drive back the enemy's skirmishers, we were enabled to see that he was occupying with infantry and artillery the crest of a gentle slope on the east bank of the river. The course of the crest formed a little less than a right angle with Hanson's line, from which the center of the position, I was afterwards ordered to attack, was distant about 1,600 yards. It extended along ground part open and part woodland.

While we were endeavoring to ascertain the force of the enemy, and the relation of the ground on the east bank to that on the west bank of the river, I received an order from the Commanding-General to report to him in person. I found him on the west bank near the ford below the bridge, and received from him an order to form my division in two lines and take the crest I have just described with the infantry. After doing this I was to bring up the artillery and establish it on the crest, so as at once to hold it and enfilade the enemy's lines on the other side of the river. Pegram and Wharton, who, with some cavalry and a battery, were beyond the point where my right would rest when the new line of battle should be formed, were directed, as the General informed me, to protect my right and co-operate in the attack. Captain

Robertson was ordered to report to me with his own and Semple's batteries of Napoleon guns. Captain Wright, who, with his battery, had been detached some days before, was ordered to join his brigade (Preston's). The brigades of Adams and Preston, which were left on the west side of the river Wednesday night, had been ordered to rejoin me. At the moment of my advance our artillery in the center and on the left was to open on the enemy. One gun from our center was the signal for the attack. The Commanding-General desired that the movement should be made with the least possible delay.

It was now 2½ o'clock P. M. Two of the brigades had to march about two miles, the other two about one mile. Brigadier-General Pillow, having reported for duty, was assigned by the Commanding-General to Palmer's brigade, and that fine officer resumed command of his regiment, and was three times wounded in the ensuing engagement. The Ninth Kentucky and Cobbs' battery, under the command of Colonel Hunt, were left to hold the hill so often referred to.

The division, after deducting the losses of Wednesday, the troops left on the hill and companies on special service, consisted of some 4,500 men. It was drawn up in two lines, the first in a narrow skirt of woods, the second two hundred yards in rear. Pillow and Hanson formed the first line, Pillow on the right. Preston supported Pillow, and Adams' brigade (commanded by Colonel Gibson) supported Hanson. The artillery was placed in rear of the second line under orders to move with it and occupy the summit of the slope as soon as the infantry should rout the enemy. Feeling anxious about my right, I sent two staff officers in succession to communicate with Pegram and Wharton, but received no intelligence up to the moment of assault. The interval between my left and the troops on the hill was already too great, but I had a battery to watch it with a small infantry support.

There was nothing to prevent the enemy from observing nearly all our movements and preparations. To reach him it was necessary to cross an open space six or seven hundred yards in width with a gentle ascent. The river was several hundred yards in rear of his position, but departed from it considerably as it flowed towards his left.

I had informed the Commanding-General that we would be ready to advance at 4 o'clock, and precisely at that hour the signal gun was heard from our center. Instantly the troops moved forward at a quickstep and in admirable order. The front line had bayonets fixed, with orders to deliver one volley and then use the bayonet.

The fire of the enemy's artillery on both sides of the river commenced as soon as the troops entered the open ground. When less than half the distance across the field, the quick eye of Colonel O'Hara discovered a force extending considerably beyond our right. I immediately directed Major Graves to move a battery to our right and open on them. He at once advanced Wright's battery and effectually checked their movements.

Before our line reached the enemy's position his artillery fire had become heavy, accurate, and destructive. Many officers and men fell before we closed

with their infantry; yet our brave fellows rushed forward with the utmost determination, and after a brief but bloody conflict routed both the opposing lines, took four hundred prisoners and several flags, and drove their artillery and the great body of their infantry across the river. Many were killed at the water's edge. Their artillery took time by the forelock in crossing the stream. A few of our men, in their ardor, actually crossed over before they could be prevented, most of whom subsequently moving up under the west bank recrossed at a ford three quarters of a mile above.

The second line had halted when the first engaged the enemy's infantry and laid down under orders; but very soon the casualties in the first line, the fact that the artillery on the opposite bank was more fatal to the second line than the first, and the eagerness of the troops, impelled them forward, and at the decisive moment, when the opposing infantry was routed, the two lines had mingled into one—the only practical inconvenience of which was that at several points the ranks were deeper than is allowed by a proper military formation.

A strong force of the enemy beyond our extreme right yet remained on the east side of the river. Presently a new line of battle appeared on the west bank directly opposite our troops and opened fire, while at the same time large masses crossed in front of our right and advanced to the attack. We were compelled to fall back.

As soon as our infantry had won the ridge Major Graves advanced the artillery of the division and opened fire. At the same time Captain Robertson threw forward Semple's battery towards our right, which did excellent service. He did not advance his own battery (which was to have taken position on the left), supposing that that part of the field had not been cleared of the enemy's infantry. Although mistaken in this, since the enemy had been driven across the river, yet I regard it as fortunate that the battery was not brought forward. It would have been a vain contest.

It now appeared that the ground we had won was commanded by the enemy's batteries within easy range on better ground upon the other side of the river. I know not how many guns he had. He had enough to sweep the whole position from the front, the left, and the right, and to render it wholly untenable by our force present of artillery and infantry. The infantry, after passing the crest and descending the slope towards the river, were in some measure protected, and suffered less at this period of the action than the artillery. We lost three guns, nearly all the horses being killed, and not having the time or men to draw them off by hand. One was lost because there was but one boy left (Private Wright, of Wright's battery,) to limber the piece, and his strength was unequal to it.

The command fell back in some disorder, but without the slightest appearance of panic, and reformed behind Robertson's battery, in the narrow skirt of timber from which we emerged to the assault. The enemy did not advance beyond the position in which he received our attack. My skirmishers continued to occupy a part of the field over which we advanced until the army

retired from Murfreesboro'. The action lasted about one hour and twenty minutes. As our lines advanced to the attack several rounds of artillery were heard from our center, apparently directed against the enemy on the west bank of the river.

About twilight Brigadier-General Anderson reported to me with his brigade, and remained in position with me until the army retired. I took up line of battle for the night a little in rear of the field over which we advanced to the assault, and Captain Robertson at my request disposed the artillery in the positions indicated for it.

Many of the reports do not discriminate between the losses of Wednesday and Friday. The total loss in my division, exclusive of Jackson's command, is 2,140, of which, I think, 1,700 occurred on Friday. The loss of the enemy on this day was, I think, greater than our own, since he suffered immense slaughter between the ridge and the river.

I cannot forbear to express my admiration for the courage and constancy of the troops, exhibited even after it became apparent that the main object could not be accomplished. Beyond the general good conduct, a number of enlisted men displayed at different periods of the action the most heroic bravery. I respectfully suggest that authority be given to select a certain number of the most distinguished in each brigade to be recommended to the President for promotion.

I cannot enumerate all the brave officers who fell, nor the living who nobly did their duty; yet I may be permitted to lament, in common with the army, the premature death of Brigadier-General Hanson, who received a mortal wound at the moment the enemy began to give way. Endeared to his friends by his private virtues, and to his command by the vigilance with which he guarded its interest and honor, he was, by the universal testimony of his military associates, one of the finest officers that adorned the service of the Confederate States. Upon his fall the command devolved on Colonel Trabue, who in another organization had long and ably commanded most of the regiments composing the brigade.

I cannot close without expressing my obligations to the gentlemen of my staff. This is no formal acknowledgement. I can never forget that during all the operations they were ever prompt and cheerful by night and day in conveying orders, conducting to their positions regiments and brigades, rallying troops on the field, and, indeed, in the discharge of every duty.

It gives me pleasure to name Lieutenant-Colonel Buckner, A. A. G., who was absent on leave, but returned upon the first rumor of battle; Colonel O'Hara, Acting Adjutant-General; Lieutenant Breckinridge, Aide-de-Camp; Major Graves, Chief of Artillery (twice wounded, and his horse shot under him); Major Wilson, Assistant Inspector-General (horse shot); Captain Semple, ordnance officer; Lieutenant Darragh, severely wounded. Captains Martin and Coleman, of my volunteer staff, were active and efficient. The former had his horse killed under him.

Drs. Heustis and Pendleton, Chief Surgeon and Medical Inspector, were unremitting in attention to the wounded. Dr. Stanhope Breckinridge, Assistant Surgeon, accompanied my headquarters, and pursued his duties through the fire of Wednesday. Mr. Buckner and Mr. Zantzinger, of Kentucky, attached themselves to me for the occasion and were active and zealous.

Captain Blackburn, commanding my escort, ever cool and vigilant, rendered essential service, and made several bold reconnoissances.

Charles Choutard of the escort, acting as my orderly on Wednesday, displayed much gallantry and intelligence.

The army retired before daybreak on the morning of the 4th of January. My division, moving on the Manchester road, was the rear of Hardee's corps. The Ninth Kentucky, Forty-first Alabama, and Cobb's battery, all under the command of Colonel Hunt, formed a special rear-guard. The enemy did not follow us.

My acknowledgments are due to Colonel J. Stoddard Johnston, Lieutenant-Colonel Brent, and Lieutenant-Colonel Garner, of General Bragg's staff, and to Major Pickett, of Lieutenant-General Hardee's staff, for services on Friday, the 2d of January.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN C. BRECKINRIDGE, *Major-General, C. S. A.*

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### **Report of Colonel R. L. Gibson.**

HEADQUARTERS ADAMS' BRIGADE, BRECKINRIDGE'S DIVISION,  
HARDEE'S CORPS, A. T., TULLAHOMA, *January 11th, 1863.*

*Colonel T. O'HARA, A. A. A. G.:*

SIR: I beg leave to submit the following report of the part taken by the Thirteenth Louisiana volunteers in the action of the 31st:

We were posted on the right of Adams' brigade, the right of the regiment resting near the river and the two left companies overlapping the rail-track. We advanced in line of battle until we reached the houses destroyed by fire, and the point at which the ground swelled into a considerable hill, stretching towards the line of the enemy, and where the river turned off quite abruptly to the right. We here halted in order that disposition might be made to pass the obstacles in front of us, the regiment next to the Thirteenth—the Sixteenth Louisiana volunteers—having been thrown into column. We then advanced up the ascent, leaving quite an unoccupied space between the right and the river. Ascending the elevated position, I discovered the enemy moving troops rapidly down the river on our right, and placing them also in ambush in the cornfield on our front. Riding to the rail-track, I saw, not more than fifty yards distant, a line of battle of the enemy, using the embankment as a breast-work and to conceal them from our troops, on the low-ground to our left. The line of battle on the rail-track, as the line of battle on the river bank,

was at right angles to our advancing line, and the enemy reserved his fire until we were flanked. So soon as I discovered the disposition of the enemy, I rode across the railroad and informed General Adams. It was, however, too late to accomplish a timely change in our positions. Moreover, from the moment of our advance in the face of the enemy, their artillery had kept a constant fire upon us, while the fire of his infantry was reserved, rendering it the more difficult, in addition to the broken nature of the ground, to make new dispositions.

The first fire we received was from the river bank and directed upon the Infirmary corps of the regiment, posted considerably in our rear. I immediately moved the regiment double-quick by the right-flank towards the river, but finding a front as well as flanking fire open upon us, I commanded a halt, and determined to contest the field. The right of the regiment stood firm for a few minutes, but under the combined fires gave way. The men naturally faced the direction in which the severest fire came, and this caused some confusion. We were enabled to hold the left in its position, the fence in its front affording some protection. I felt the necessity of holding our position until the balance of the brigade, already falling back, should pass the point at which the enemy was pressing us on the right. Should this be prematurely lost, there had been a much larger force than the rest of the brigade, with every advantage of position, covering its entire front and enveloping its right flank. I called upon Major Austin to form on my line and assist in its defence. In a few moments he disposed his battalion of sharpshooters as I suggested. We were successful in holding the high-ground on the right of the railroad until the left portion of the brigade, driven back by a storm of artillery and infantry fire on its front and flank, had reached a point beyond our line. The ground was much broken; a continuous line of battle could not be formed on the hill, and this was one of the main reasons why there was some apparent irregularity in falling back.

I should do injustice to the officers and men of the Thirteenth Louisiana volunteers, did I not state that they displayed the best qualities of soldiers. It is difficult for troops to stand firm against great odds, under a heavy fire from the front and on the flank. This was not only done for some minutes, but at the outset and until the full force of the enemy was developed on our right flank. We drove back his line on our front, charging beyond the fence in the cornfield and rescuing the colors of some Confederate regiment, which had previously engaged the enemy in this position and whose dead marked plainly its line of battle. I send the colors that you may return them to the gallant regiment, whose brave dead spoke its eulogy.

Major Charles Guillet, acting Lieutenant-Colonel, commanding the right, contributed much to steady this exposed flank of the command.

I am indebted chiefly to Captain M. O. Tracy, acting Major, and in charge of the left wing, for the steadiness with which it moved forward and for its handsome behavior on retiring.

This officer has been mentioned in every report of various battles in which the regiment has been engaged—Shiloh, Farmington, Perryville—and having

lost his leg in this action, I would especially commend him to the favorable consideration of our superior officers.

To Captains King, Bishop, and Ryan, the praise of having borne them themselves with great efficiency and marked courage is especially due.

Adjutant Hugh H. Bein acted with becoming coolness and efficiency, and to the color-bearer, Sergeant Roger Tammure, and Sergeant-Major John Farrell, great credit is due for their disregard of personal danger and soldierly conduct.

We moved to the rear of our artillery and were no longer, on that day, under the infantry fire of the enemy. Lieutenants Hepburn and Smith were killed in this action—they were brave and devoted soldiers.

A reference to the list of casualties will show the heavy loss sustained in this action.

I have the honor to remain, your obedient servant,  
R. L. GIBSON, *Colonel Commanding.*

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### **Report of Colonel Gibson of Operations of Adams' Brigade.**

HEADQUARTERS ADAMS' BRIGADE, BRECKINRIDGE'S DIVISION,  
HARDEE'S CORPS,  
NEAR TULLAHOMA, TENN., *January 24th, 1863.*

*Colonel T. O'HARA, A. A. G.:*

SIR: On Friday, January 2d, while in command of Adams' brigade, I was ordered from the cedar brake on the left, where I was reporting to Brigadier-General Preston, commanding division of two brigades, to report to Major-General Breckinridge, our division commander, on the right of Stone river. I was placed in position by yourself, about one hundred and fifty yards in the rear of Brigadier-General Hanson's brigade, as a supporting line in the charge to be made.

In obedience to orders from General Breckinridge, I posted a reserve, consisting of the Thirty-second Alabama, Colonel McKinstry, and a battalion of Louisiana sharpshooters, Major Austin, under the command of Colonel McKinstry, in the position occupied by the second line when formed originally.

These dispositions had hardly been effected when the general advance began, and I immediately moved forward my line, consisting of the Thirteenth Louisiana consolidated regiment, Major Guillet, and the Sixteenth Louisiana consolidated regiment, Major Zacharie. The interval between the first and second lines was very well preserved until the first became generally engaged with the enemy, when I at once halted the second line and ordered the officers and men to lie down, so as to cover them from the enemy's batteries, whose fire we were drawing. We drove in his skirmishers from the opposite side of the river. I then rode forward to the first line in the woods on the right to consult with General Hanson as to the particular moment when the second line



should come to his support. I had scarcely reached him when he was struck, and, I observed, so seriously wounded as to disable him from conferring with me. I determined not to engage the second line until the first gave way. General Hanson had hardly fallen, however, when his line began to yield, and after a few moments many of his men were falling to the rear. I saw that they needed support, and going back to the second line, instantly ordered the right regiment (Thirteenth Louisiana volunteers, Major Guillet,) to move by the right flank, in order to avoid the river, towards which we were marching, and then to advance in line of battle towards the woods; and having my horse disabled by a wound in riding back, I dispatched Captain Lipscomb to give the same order to Major Zacharie, commanding the Sixteenth Louisiana volunteers, already under the bank. I moved rapidly forward the right regiment and soon engaged the enemy, under heavy fire. I presumed that the Sixteenth was moving under the river bank on our left, in accordance with the order sent by Captain Lipscomb.

The woods were full of troops apparently in great confusion. Many of these formed on our line, and we advanced, driving the enemy before us beyond a ravine, on the further side of which was a picket fence. This ravine was filled with men broken from their commands, who were sheltered from the enemy, but such was their confusion, that they could accomplish nothing against him. I formed the fighting line on the rear side of the ravine, on the lower side of the crest, and by a well-directed volley poured into the advancing lines of the enemy, broke and dispersed it. When this first compact line gave way there was a momentary lull—a suspension of fire—and we prepared to charge; but, as if in the twinkling of an eye, another line of the enemy, extending far beyond our right, assumed the lost position. This was dispersed.

Presently a number of skirmishers appeared on our right, and we were fired upon from the left, on the opposite side of the river. The men in the ravine broke to the rear under these fires, that were aimed chiefly at them, and from which they appeared to suffer. There was perpetual skirmishing from the moment we entered the woods. Again, another line came on our front, which engaged us. I observed that our own right had given way, going through the open field on the right of us to the rear. I moved to our extreme left and saw the enemy was in heavy lines on the opposite bank, and already beginning to cross. I saw at once that we would be enveloped on the right and left. I ordered my command to fall back. It was a matter of doubt whether this could be accomplished successfully. Scarcely any one could enter the open field to our right and rear without being shot down, either by the infantry or by the batteries of the enemy. I should observe, that from the moment we approached the elevated ground near the river, the batteries of the enemy, posted on the opposite side, poured into our ranks without intermission.

As soon as he was driven from the high ground on this side his batteries played upon it. His batteries and infantry concentrated on every spot from

which he was driven. It was for this reason that after a sharp conflict of thirty minutes, and having won the position, we were forced to abandon it. And this accounts, too, for the extraordinary loss we sustained, and for the fact that nearly all our wounded and killed were left on the field. Under my own observation several parties bearing off wounded were shot down as soon as they entered the open field. Many, therefore, of those put down as missing, were killed or wounded in this affair. Out of twenty-eight officers who went into the fight, fourteen were wounded, and most of them severely, and as the event may prove, I fear, mortally. This was in the Thirteenth Louisiana volunteers, Major Charles Guillet, of whose conduct I cannot speak in terms too high. The regiment behaved throughout like veterans. Captains Ryan, Lipscomb, King, Bishop, and McGrath, and Lieut. Levy displayed distinguished steadiness and courage. The loss of this regiment was, in two short actions, lasting both together not more than an hour, say nineteen officers and three hundred and thirty-two men killed, wounded, and missing—losing as many as some brigades.

Major Zacharie's position enabled him to drive in the skirmishers of the enemy and to hold him in check in front of our batteries for some time. After entering the woods the fire of our own batteries, together with that of the enemy just opposite, and the immediate development of infantry in heavy force along the opposite bank below him, prevented any orders of mine from reaching him or his joining us. He moved up the river, recrossed and joined the reserve. I assembled the whole command on this line and held our position until our battery was secured and we moved, in obedience to orders, on the right of Brigadier-General Preston's brigade.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. L. GIBSON, *Colonel Commanding.*

**Letter from President Davis—Reply to Mr. Hunter.**

[We publish the following letters, as we have done the previous papers on this subject, without comment of our own, except to say that both sides having been heard, we hope the distinguished gentlemen will now consent to close the controversy, at least in our pages.]

MISSISSIPPI CITY, *March 27th*, 1878.

Rev. J. W. JONES, *D. D.*,

*Secretary of Southern Historical Society :*

DEAR SIR: In the December number of your magazine was published an article by Hon. R. M. T. Hunter, purporting to be a reply to my answer to his previous article published in a Northern paper and copied into your magazine. In the beginning of his second article Mr. Hunter avows that "no offence was intended" by the first one. His right to declare what was his intention is admitted. Whether the assumption that my action in sending commissioners as soon as Mr. Lincoln gave assurance that they would be received was to be ascribed, not to the avowed desire for peace between the two countries, but, as presented by Mr. Hunter, to the recently recognized danger from public dissatisfaction with the Confederate Executive, was to be construed as "offensive," or otherwise, each man will decide for himself, according to his standard of personal and official honor.

I will not encumber your pages by following the verbose and contradictory article through its windings, but will leave Mr. Hunter, who was at one time Secretary of State, and subsequently a Senator in the Confederacy, to enjoy the shelter he seeks under an ignorance of the addresses and messages of the President of the Confederate States.

There are, however, few Virginians of that time who can be so little informed as not to know that the executive department of the Confederate Government, with the necessary books and papers, was removed from Richmond to Danville, Virginia, when the army which covered the capital was compelled to retreat, and that at Danville the President issued an address to arouse the people to the defence of the soil of the State. Yet, importing his phraseology from beyond the country of the President and his friends, Mr. Hunter denominates that removal "a flight," and states "in

no history of his flight from Richmond to the woods in Georgia, where he was captured, have I seen it stated that his head was once turned towards the enemy," &c.

Perhaps the search after some new chasm into which he could "*Curtius*"-like plunge the most prized of his country's possessions—i. e., himself—prevented Mr. Hunter from learning that the President was at Danville exerting himself for the common defence, and that there were gaps in the ranks of Lee's army which a patriot might have filled more usefully than in playing a travesty of "*Curtius*" by keeping far from the field, where the defenders of his State were gallantly contending against its invaders.

I will not further consider his sophomoric twaddle about *Curtius* and the murder of the innocents, or his lame effort to show that he meant only—that the phrase, "the two countries," embarrassed the commissioners in their *progress* to Hampton Roads. Indeed, I should not have deemed that his article required my notice, but for the unfounded insinuation that a confidential interview which he had held with me had been reported to my aids, and by them used to his injury.

Premising that I have no recollection of such an interview as he describes, I must express my surprise that any one should, after the lapse of thirteen years, be able to *report fully* a conversation of which, when it ended, he never expected to hear again. I do, however, remember a visit made to me in the executive office, some time after the Hampton Roads conference, by Senators Hunter, Graham, and Orr, to induce me to offer to negotiate on the basis of abandoning our independence; and that I closed the conversation by asking them to send me a resolution of the Senate, and promising to make a *prompt* reply. I assembled the Cabinet as soon as the Senators left me, and made a statement to them of the interview, which I would not have permitted to be held confidentially. I then went to the house of Senator Barnwell, who was ill, stated the matter to him, and asked him to see that the resolution expected should be so unequivocal that my issue with the cabal should be distinctly understood by the people. Then, for the first time, my faith in Mr. Hunter was impaired; and confidence is a plant which will not bear "topping."

That he should have thought I distrusted while yet confiding in him, must find its solution elsewhere than in my conduct. Per-

haps his suspicion originated in the same source from which came the unfriendly and injurious terms which it appears from his own statement he employed secretly against me.

It is true that I believed his usefulness diminished by his timidity; but before having the advantage of his philosophy, as expounded in the article now under notice, I had concluded to take him as God made him, esteeming him for his good qualities, despite his defects; and now regret that these last have proved greater than was supposed.

I have waited for answers to enquiries about the only point in Mr. Hunter's article to which a response was considered obligatory, and this has delayed my communication to the present date. Of the aids who were then near to me, one is abroad; the answers of the other three are annexed, and they require no explanation.

The characters of those gentlemen would render worse than useless a defence against the absurd suspicion that they were employed in backbiting gossip about a visitor to the house of their chief.

I remain yours, respectfully,

JEFFERSON DAVIS.

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LEXINGTON, VA., 15th January, 1878.

MY DEAR FRIEND:

I received last week your letter of the 4th instant, and showed it to Colonel Johnston, who said that he would write to you on the subject of your enquiry without delay.

To the best of my recollection and belief, I never heard, before the receipt of your letter of the 4th instant, of Mr. Hunter's interview with you, in the interests of peace, referred to in the letter published over his signature in the December number of the *Southern Historical Society Papers*, which I have just read for the first time; nor do I remember to have ever heard a word from you that could be repeated to his disparagement.

I do remember, however, that you were not in the habit of talking to me about public matters out of the line of my duties, and with which I had no special concern.

With many thanks for your kind wishes, and with my very sincere prayers for the happiness of yourself and household, I remain faithfully,

Your friend and servant,

G. W. C. LEE.

Hon. JEFFERSON DAVIS, *Mississippi City, Miss.*

LEXINGTON, VA., *January 9th*, 1878.

Hon. JEFFERSON DAVIS:

MY DEAR SIR: Your letter has been received calling my attention to a statement of the Hon. R. M. T. Hunter, made in the *Southern Historical Society Papers* for December, 1877, page 308.

Mr. Hunter, after detailing a confidential conversation said to have been held with you, says: "After we separated I scarcely expected to hear more from this conversation; but soon, perhaps the next day after, I heard it was bruited all over Richmond that I had been thoroughly conquered, had submitted, and was disposed to make peace on any terms, with many other disparaging remarks. Amongst others, the President's aids were said to be freely discussing these matters. How did they get hold of them, &c.?"

At that time your aids, on duty at Richmond, were Colonels Wood, Lubbock, and myself. I can only speak for myself. It is very difficult, after thirteen years, for me to remember many things I once knew well; but so far as I can recollect, this is the first time I ever heard that Mr. Hunter had such a conversation with you as that detailed by him.

I do remember that about that time—that is to say, early in 1865—a friend, a Member of Congress, if I am not mistaken, called my attention to Mr. Hunter, near St. Paul's church, and used almost the expressions which Mr. Hunter employs. He further stated, to my great surprise, that there was a cabal in the Senate to supersede Mr. Davis and put Mr. Hunter at the head of the government.

It was my surprise which impressed this upon me, for I supposed that your relations with Mr. Hunter were of the most confidential character.

I would further state, that I do not believe it possible for you to have revealed any conversation confidential in its character. The statement is moreover improbable in many aspects. I was not living with you; I met you generally at the office. I rode frequently with you on horseback; more than all others put together. Your conversation was friendly and familiar, but it generally turned upon anything else than the business of the hour, as your rides were for relaxation. Your business with your aids related to *war*, not politics.

I never knew, until this correspondence arose, that any except the kindest relations existed between Mr. Hunter and yourself. I knew that he was frequently consulted by you, and was regarded as in perfect accord with you. I have always heard you speak of him kindly—even affectionately. It is therefore with regret that I learn that a different state of feeling exists.

Very sincerely yours,

WM. PRESTON JOHNSTON.

GALVESTON, March 21st, 1878.

Rev. J. WILLIAM JONES,

*Sec. S. H. Society, Richmond, Va.:*

DEAR SIR: I have quite recently seen in the *Southern Historical Society Papers*, for December last, a communication from the Hon. R. M. T. Hunter, of Virginia, purporting to be a rejoinder to a letter of the Hon. Jefferson Davis, appearing in the November number of the *Southern Historical Society Papers*, in reply to a former communication of Mr. Hunter on the subject of the "Peace Commission" conference at Hampton Roads.

The paper of Mr. Davis I have not seen, but I desire to advert briefly to some of the statements contained in Mr. Hunter's rejoinder, which I believe my official relations to President Davis, as a member of his staff, not only entitle but qualify me to intelligently consider.

After relating that he had an interview with the President, shortly subsequently to the conference, respecting the urgent necessity of some efforts to procure terms of accommodation from the enemy, Mr. Hunter proceeds to say (page 308):

"After we separated I scarcely expected to hear more from the conversation; but soon, perhaps the next day after, I heard it was bruited all over Richmond that I had been thoroughly conquered, had submitted, and was disposed to make peace on any terms, with many other disparaging remarks. *Amongst others the President's aids were said to be freely discussing these matters.* How did they get hold of them? It is true there was no positive pledge of secrecy in these conversations, but from their nature and circumstances discussed, their confidential character was to have been implied and ought to have been respected."

At the time of the alleged interview and subsequently until his capture, I had the honor of being one of the "President's aids," and was most intimately and cordially associated with him and the remaining members of his official family; and I beg to say, that he never spoke a word to me on the theme suggested by Mr. Hunter; nor did I ever hear a word spoken by one of his "aids" implying any disparagement of Mr. Hunter, or indicating that any facts had been gotten "hold of" respecting the alleged or any other interview with Mr. Davis.

It is almost incredible to me that any one at all acquainted with the character of Mr. Davis could indulge a suspicion, however faint, that he could have been capable of betraying trust or of breaking faith. Of all men he is the last to whom such imputation could attach.

It is equally beyond belief that he could have tolerated, much less inspired in his staff, any assault upon the motives or character of Mr. Hunter.

The Confederate President was immeasurably superior to any such thing. Whether Mr. Hunter's great solicitude for "accommodation" became known to the public, I know not—it is not at all unlikely that the views of so distinguished a gentleman were divined by his compeers and associates in Congress.

It may be that the course claimed by Mr. Hunter to have been advised by him, would have been the wiser. Indeed, in the light of the present, it might have been *wiser* not to have fought at all, but to have surrendered at Lincoln's call for 75,000 men!

But whatever men may think of that, I believe it will not be considered extravagant to say that a proposition to surrender the cause and abandon the battle for freedom, after the conference at Hampton Roads, would have been received (*and justly, as I think,*) by the army and the people as the inspiration of either pusillanimity or treason.

I have the honor to be, yours very truly and respectfully,

F. R. LUBBOCK,

*Ex-Aide-de-Camp to President Jefferson Davis.*

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### GRANT AS A SOLDIER AND CIVILIAN.

BY GENERAL DABNEY H. MAURY.

The war which placed General Grant in the high position he so lately occupied, is so recent and was so fierce, that it is natural his contemporaries should entertain opinions widely different as to the conduct and capacity of the successful general who ended it.

Even European critics have been affected by the flood of military reports which have been poured forth by the able and *ingenious* historians who accompanied the Northern armies—and their discrimination has been dazzled by the glare of the great results accomplished by General Grant—so that they oftentimes seem to overestimate his capacities as a commander.

On the other hand, it has been difficult for the conquered people of the South to recognize the virtues or even to admit the high capacities which may be found in the leaders who have wrought us so much evil.

But there are indications of a returning sense of justice in the factions so lately arrayed against each other in the bloodiest drama of modern times, and as the era of peace and fraternity, of which we of the South have heard so much and seen so little, is near at hand, a discussion of the military conduct of the great Captains who led the opposing hosts may now be conducted in a spirit of fairness—and in such manner as may conserve the interests of history.



While I cannot agree with the extravagant estimate of General Grant in which the popular sentiment of the Northern people of these United States holds him—nor with the lower, but still over-estimate in which he is held by even clever English critics, I have never been of the number of those who despised him as a General, or who attribute successes coextensive with the greatest theatre of war the world has ever seen—whether we consider the vastness of the country covered by his operations, the number of the battles, or the fierceness and duration of the struggle—to sheer obstinacy and to mere luck. Whatever the political enemies of General Grant (I believe he has no personal enemies) may think about him, they cannot deny that his career has been most extraordinary, and that no instance can be found, even in America, where the fortunes of men fluctuate most suddenly, of such strange, eventful history as his has been. Born and reared in the simple habits of plain people in a western town, his appointment as a cadet of the United States Military Academy opened to him his first acquaintance with associates of a higher culture, and his first opportunity to measure himself with those whom it has been his destiny to overwhelm with disasters, or to reward with the highest prizes of their profession. The Academy was not, however, a sphere in which his peculiar traits could find scope or appreciation, for after the four years' course there, he graduated only respectably, and was remembered as a fair mathematician—a very good fellow, and notably the most daring horseman in the riding school. His feats of horsemanship have probably never been equaled there. When his turn came to ride at “the leaping bar,” the dragoons in attendance would lift the bar from the three foot trestles, on which it rested, raise it as high as their heads, and he would drive his horse over it without a graze, clearing near six feet! In this alone can I recall any germ of the character which has achieved for him the pre-eminent success he now enjoys. I next remember him as a quartermaster of the Fourth United States infantry in Monterey, in the fall of 1846—where he was not yet esteemed more than a very good fellow, with good sense, self-reliant, no bad habits, and a shrewd judgement in horse-flesh. There I left him in December, 1846, and have never since, to this day, laid eyes upon him; but his career in the United States army, before the war, is fully recorded and well known to all the world.

He contracted the love of drink, which finally lost him his commission, and retired into civil life under circumstances of the most depressing nature; he struggled along in obscurity, with narrow means, sometimes sober, sometimes not—but never charged with intentional wrong done to anybody—until the war burst upon the country and brought him at once to a prominent position in the Federal army in the West. And such a retrieval of destiny as he wrought during the ensuing four years has never been known.

Grant's first military operations at Belmont were not regarded as auspicious of a brilliant future. But the capture of Fort Donaldson was masterly, and lent a brightness to his prospects, which was soon after dimmed by his defeat at Shiloh.

Many of the participants in the battle of Shiloh believe that but for the death of Sidney Johnston, Grant and his army would have been captured before the timely arrival of Buell.

Although the laurels of Shiloh were won by Buell, Grant reposed upon them during some months of inaction. It did not suit his government to give them to Buell, who was an intractable officer when the policy of the government became adverse to his convictions of right. Thinking men, on both sides, believed that Buell won the battle of Shiloh, but Grant has the reward.

Grant's next campaign was in North Mississippi, during the fall and winter of 1862. It opened with the quasi victory over Price at Iuka, which was followed, two weeks later, by the repulse of Van Dorn (by Rosecranz) at Corinth.

Notwithstanding the great advantages these successes gave Grant, he utterly failed to improve them, and through his inaction and sluggish conduct the whole of this important campaign was completely defeated by Van Dorn's brilliant dash, at the head of two thousand horsemen, into the depot of the Federal army at Holly Springs. In one day Van Dorn destroyed three months' supplies, for sixty thousand men, and compelled Grant to fall back and abandon the invasion of Mississippi. But the Northern government soon began the organization of another and greater army, and to the surprise of us all, Grant was placed at its head.

Then was manifested to the minds of some the mysterious force of that man, who, after misconduct which had cost better men their commissions, and in spite of widespread charges of drunkenness, was again entrusted with the most important military enter-

prise ever undertaken in the West, and with the greatest army that had ever yet been assembled outside of Virginia. The war was now two years old; and in that time Grant's career had embraced the doubtful affair of Belmont, the capture of Fort Donaldson, the disastrous first day at Shiloh, the battle of Iuka, in which Grant did not fight at all, but by his slowness opened the way for Price's retreat, after he had repulsed Rosecranz, the battle of Corinth, won by Rosecranz during Grant's absence, who, on his return, not only failed to follow up the beaten army of Van Dorn, but allowed it to recruit and reorganize close by him, and when at last he did march against it, he moved (with overwhelming forces) so cautiously and slowly that by Christmas he was only six days' march from Corinth, where his enemy had been almost destroyed three months before. This unpardonable inaction, and the grave neglect to guard his depots, gave Van Dorn the opportunity to pass behind him, destroy all the supplies of his army, and defeat his campaign. Yet, after all this, Mr. Lincoln recognized in Grant the qualities essential for the successful leader of his armies; and he then reposed in him irrevocably his absolute confidence; and there it rested, through evil report and through good report, to the very end. What made him do it, no man can tell; but he did it, and the results are before us!

I will not dwell on the subsequent military operations of General Grant. They were on a grand scale. He was never stinted in material nor in men. He would never move until his estimates were met, and they were enormous. He soon found he could only defeat our armies by overwhelming them with much greater armies, and he had the force of will to compel his government to furnish him with such armaments as modern war has never seen. We can almost believe the stories of Xerxes and his Persian hosts, when we remember the blue lines and the blue masses which covered the flats beyond Young's Point, surged and resurged against the works around Vicksburg, burst over Bragg's attenuated lines about Chattanooga, and swarmed over the Potomac in countless thousands to attempt and reattempt the deadly "on to Richmond," until, at last, two hundred thousand of them enveloped all that was left of the grand old army of Virginia, then reduced to eight thousand way-worn, starving, but desperate men, who only awaited the signal of their chief to charge upon the

hated blue lines before them, force their way through to the mountains, or die together there.

In estimating Grant's claims as a general, we must admit that one principle by which he achieved his success is a new one. It is known in this country as the "principle of attrition"; and being a newly-announced principle of war, may be appropriately discussed in a paper like this. Whatever the military student may find in Grant's career to admire, he should not unadvisedly adopt this "principle of attrition." Humanity revolts at it and history will arraign Grant for the recklessness with which he dashed his men to death.

In Virginia, he either could not or would not manœuvre, but knowing that for every thousand men who were slain by the rifles of the army of Virginia he would within ten day's time receive an equal number of recruits, he persevered in a criminal manner in this new principle of war. It is quite remarkable that the tactics of the late Commander of the Army of the United States and his successor, General Sherman, were so at variance, and yet carried both men to such substantial personal rewards.

Grant announced and acted on the principle, "I never manœuvre." Sherman *never fought* when he could avoid it, except at Chickasaw Bluff, but is the greatest of living manœuvrers.

Without doubt Grant must be held responsible for the stoppage of the exchange of prisoners, which was the most cruel act of his plan of attrition. No parallel can be found for this double crime against humanity.

In order that two hundred thousand effectives should be kept from the ranks of the Confederate army, they were incarcerated and starved deliberately in Northern prisons, while a greater number of his own men (two hundred and sixty thousand) were suffered to languish in Southern prisons. It may be said that Grant's superiors adopted this cruel measure. While I am ready to believe it was conformable with their war policy, I cannot resist the conviction that Grant could at any time have opened all those prisons, North and South, and have arrested the most cruel of all the horrors of this dreadful war. I have seen gentlemen who were confined in Northern prisons for more than two years, and who have assured me they never, during the last year of their imprisonment, knew what it was to be free from the pangs of hun-

ger! Although we have moved the greater part of our dead from Northern soil, eleven thousand still sleep in their graves about the prisons. During little over two years twenty six thousand Confederate prisoners died of starvation and hard treatment in Northern prisons, while in the same time twenty thousand Federal prisoners died in the Southern prisons. And when we remember they were all young able-bodied men, how cruel and unnecessary must have been the hardships which killed them, and how criminal the author of their sufferings!

Still we must recognize the great capacities of a general which bore Grant steadily on to his success, sometimes through disaster and defeat, but ever onward to the ultimate successful end, through four years of surging war. Pre-eminently he possesses the first and highest of all virtues—courage. Not merely that physical courage which calmly meets personal danger, but the courage to execute his own plans, regardless of the opposition of all opposers. His judgment of military men is good. He gathered good men about him during the war, and made them work and fight. His reticence, his self-reliance, and his tenacity of purpose, are the qualities which have mainly borne him to fortune. The success of his military operations has often been attributed to the counsels of one or another of his generals, who have been supposed to have “more head” than some critics are willing to accord to him; but this is a great mistake. Grant has “head” enough to conceive his own plans, with nerve and ability to accomplish them. At the same time he does not hesitate to ask the opinions and suggestions of his subordinate officers. A remarkable instance of this has been related to the writer in such manner as entitles it to full credit, and as it is not generally known, I will state it here.

In the spring of 1863 Grant had failed to capture Vicksburg by the canal through which the Mississippi would not run, and summoned to his headquarters on Young’s Point, opposite Vicksburg, Generals Sherman, Frank Blair, and McPherson, and submitted to them in council of war his plan of taking that place. He invited their opinions upon it, and called first on General McPherson to speak. McPherson was accounted by our officers the ablest general in the Western armies, and his gentlemanlike character had impressed itself upon his enemies, while he was held in high and just esteem by General Grant. On this occasion he expressed him-

self opposed to the execution of the plan proposed by Grant, and gave his reasons against it with much earnestness and force. After hearing him Grant called on Sherman to state his views, which was done with a fluency characteristic of that commander. He also opposed Grant's plan. General Frank Blair was then invited to give his opinions of his Commanding-General's designs; but with a modesty and frankness which do him credit declined to express himself upon the question, on the ground that he did not feel justified in giving an opinion after the superior wisdom which had been evolved before him. Grant dismissed the council with orders to reassemble at 10 A. M. the next day, when he would communicate the result of his consideration of their views. Accordingly, next morning, on the reconvening of the officers, they were informed by Grant that he had given full attention to the opinions expressed by them, but that he had not been shaken in his own plan of operation; that on returning to their respective headquarters they would find the orders that had already been issued for the movement, which would begin at once. That movement captured Vicksburg!

Abundant other instances might be cited to show that, such as it was, Grant's military policy was all his own. No man controlled it. And oftentimes he not only enforced it on reluctant subordinates, but on his government itself!

It has often been said that General Sherman inspired some of Grant's happiest decisions, but notwithstanding Grant's generous acknowledgments in the beautiful letter Colonel Chesney reproduces in his biographical sketch of Grant, and which Grant wrote to Sherman when he was on the eve of going to assume command of the armies of the United States, I cannot believe it at all probable that so erratic and undignified a character as Sherman's could have ever influenced Grant much; and it is noteworthy in this connection, that irreverent and vainglorious as Sherman is, Grant alone seemed to be the object of his real respect. It is far more likely that Sherman, in the only independent operations he ever conducted which did not result in failure—I mean those from Dalton to Atlanta—was aided by the sound sense of his superior commander; and I have some direct testimony on this point.

During these remarkable operations a Southern gentleman was permitted to pass through the lines of both Johnston and Sher.

man on an errand of mercy and affection to an aged relative north of Dalton. His mission accomplished, he was not allowed to return through Sherman's lines, but was required to go to City Point, on James river, to get a pass from General Grant. When the General was informed of his arrival and wishes he courteously sent for him to come to his headquarters, and entered freely into conversation with him, and left upon the mind of my friend the impression that General Grant himself was the real *deus ex machina* of Sherman's army while manœuvring in front of Johnston before Atlanta. He explained that by the aid of the electric telegraph he had free and instant communication with Sherman, and stated that every night they passed some time in telegraphic conversation with each other relative to the day's movements as well as to those to be made on the morrow; and the inference is plain that through all of that campaign Sherman had the benefit of Grant's advice at every stage of it.

After Atlanta was passed, Hood having removed his army from Sherman's path, there was no longer any obstacle to his "march to the sea." It lay through a pleasant and abundant country, occupied only by women and old men, and Sherman could go on and have his pleasure of the unprotected people—as he did.

During the conversation before recited General Grant remarked to my friend, "When I heard, sir, that your government had removed General Johnston from command of that army, I felt as much relief as if I had been able to reinforce General Sherman with a large army corps."

Not only has Grant been capable of forming and executing his own plans, but we must give him credit for ability to handle the great armies he forced his government to give him with more facility than any of his predecessors of the Army of the Potomac, McClellan excepted. When Grant took command of that army it had been successively commanded by McDowell, McClellan, Burnside, Pope, Hooker, and Meade. The Army of Northern Virginia had struck the Army of the Potomac under all these generals *seriatim*, and always, except at Antietam and at Gettysburg, the Army of the Potomac had been utterly defeated, and could only be marched away from the presence of its victorious enemy to be reinforced, refitted, and brought back again after repose and reinforcement to attempt anew the "on to Richmond" under another experimental general.

Antietam was a drawn battle. It made Lee abandon his first campaign beyond the Potomac, and saved the Federal capital and cause. But McClellan was too high-bred, too broad in his philanthropy, too honest a gentleman to serve Lincoln and Stanton. Therefore he was retired, even after a service so signal, and in spite of the fact that he was known to the Confederate and Federal armies as the most accomplished of the Federal commanders.

After Grant came to the Army of the Potomac it never left the field. It was punished more severely under him than it had ever been under any of his predecessors. Some accounts show that it lost 100,000 men!—one hundred thousand men from the first movement in May, 1864, till the battle of Cold Harbor closed, in June, 1864! Yet Grant never suffered it to get beyond his control. After his repulse at Cold Harbor he could not get it to fight any more there, but he held it near the victorious army, and marched it in order by flank to his new base on the James, where he kept it till the end. This was what no other commander of that army had ever done, and stamps him an able general.

He has been severely criticised for fighting all those battles and losing so many men to gain a position which he might have reached without any loss at all. But, in justice, we can say he was not chargeable with want of military capacity for adopting that plan of campaign. It was a moral, and not a strategical error, on his part. From unquestionable authority we know that when Stanton first told Grant that he was to be placed in command of the armies of Virginia he was well pleased, and said: "I shall at once change the plan of campaign, and make my base of operations upon the James river south of Richmond." Stanton said, "No, you must operate from the other direction." "But," said Grant, "if I do it will cost us one hundred thousand men before we can get to where we can take Richmond." "Well," said Stanton, "you shall have the hundred thousand men to lose rather than this administration, by abandoning its plan and route of operations in which we have so long persisted shall be convicted before the country of having persisted in error." Said Grant: "If you furnish me the men to do it I will execute your plan." So that, while he had military capacity to appreciate the surroundings of the Secretary's campaign, and to foresee the tremendous slaughter of his men which it would involve, he consented to be the instrument of its execution!



A fair review of Grant's career will not rank him high amongst the generals of history, and will not furnish such illustrations of the art of war as will cause military men to study his campaigns. But they may learn from him how fortitude may retrieve even the most depressing personal misfortunes, and how supreme in war are self-reliance, constancy, and courage. These were the peculiar capacities for war which the United States Government required of him in its emergency. And it is a consolation to us who fought against him that he possessed them in an extraordinary degree, and that the vast resources of the Northern States, wielded by his inexorable will and unyielding tenacity, were insuperable by our unhappy people, and would long before the final issue have overwhelmed any other army than the Army of Northern Virginia.

I have endeavored to place General Grant fairly in this paper. I desire to set down naught in malice, if I can nothing extenuate. I should not do this if I did not acknowledge one shining characteristic which has ever been the accompaniment of the highest courage. In the whole course of his career no acts or words of personal cruelty or insult to his prisoners or others whom the misfortunes of war threw into his power have ever been attributed to him. Vicksburg was his first great victory; it was the very culmination of his career; it was won after unexampled efforts and cost of time, of treasure, and of blood. Grant evinced no vulgar exultation in his triumphs. He neither did nor permitted any acts of insult or injury to any member of the conquered army, but showed every attention, not only to their material wants, but to the feelings of his prisoners.

At the surrender of General Lee, Grant evinced a consideration of his fallen enemy worthy of all honor. He indulged in no "stage effect" exultations over his grand victory. He granted promptly the terms of surrender proposed by Lee, observed the most careful respect for his feelings, provided liberally for the comfort and transportation of the captive army, and abstaining even from entering Richmond, proceeded direct to City Point, whence he embarked for his office in Washington city, and addressed himself to the final duties his great conquest had devolved upon him. History has honored the young Napoleon for refusing to humiliate old Wurmsur by his presence at the capitulation of

Mantua. So will it honor Grant for the respect he showed to the feelings of his conquered foes. He was capable of appreciating their high courage, and he did more at that time to restrain the ferocity of the non-combatants of the North, and to tranquilize the unhappy people of the South, than was accomplished by his whole government.

Grant's interposition in behalf of General Lee and his bold resistance of the purpose of the government to disregard the paroles which we had given, gave great hope to our prostrate people that he would worthily sustain the grand role he had assumed.

But in sadness and sorrow we must now turn to the record of his civil life, and as we read it feel that Grant misunderstood the value and the uses of the great opportunity his sword had placed before him.

Had he justly appreciated his high responsibilities he would never have sold himself to the party whose principles he had all his life opposed, but content with the fame he had earned and with his position as head of the army, he would have remained faithful to his convictions, well knowing that with him rested the power to restrain the reckless men who had been undermining the foundations of the republic, and who have sought to overthrow it for their personal ends.

Instead of turning a deaf ear to the allurements of these conspirators against his country, we have seen Grant silently deliberate over the prizes before him, and then abandon his own party and pass at once without progression to the head of that which paid him best.

They won him from his life-long allegiance by the high prize of the Presidency, and so soon as he gained it he began to prostitute it to the accomplishment of the designs of the basest set of politicians this continent has ever known, and to his own personal convenience and emolument.

He gathered about him and filled the most responsible positions of the government with venal partisans or incompetent relations. His "republican court" became the focus of the chief gift-givers and gift-takers of the land; and from the moment of his acceptance of the supreme power it was evident there had been no "sweetness for him in the uses of adversity" for having been born

and always lived in poverty. The one clearly-marked policy of his eight years' reign was, that he "never intended to be poor any more."

In reviewing the history of this century it will be impossible to find a rule so barren of statesmanship, or of evidences of broad national policy, as Grant's has been. When we consider our foreign relations we can point only to the Samana speculation as an effort to extend our influence.

And when we turn to our domestic affairs, we see the sad spectacle of States overthrown and constitution and laws set aside by the man who had sworn to protect them, and all the rights of the people subordinated to the one prime object of placing a centralized power in the hands of him who was incapable of statesmanship broader than the bounds of his own personal convenience or pecuniary profit.

To this condition he strove to reduce us all, and first sought to secure the nomination by his party for a third presidential term. When that effort failed, he thought to possess, by fraud and force, the control of the government, and hoped to keep it till his life's end. Only a few months have passed since the people realized the danger in which we stood, and rose in their might and rebuked this usurper and scattered the power of his confederates.

Those who have believed in the capacity of our people for self-government, and who had begun to despair of the republic, now take heart again, and once more hope to enjoy the blessing of freedom.

Let not Grant misconstrue the recent honors paid him by the monarchical powers of Europe. They are but the tributes paid by those who owe their offices to force to the military prowess of him who has ever been ready to use force to perpetuate his power.

They only defer, they do not avert his ultimate destiny, and when he returns to his people he will soon pass, followed by their curses and contempt, to his native obscurity.

It is uncharitable and of little profit to speculate upon the remnant of his life left to him. But we may well believe "his days will be few and evil." Without taste for literary and intellectual pursuits, bereft of power and of influence, deserted by those who have hung about him for what he gave them, with a growing pro-

pensity for the special sin that besets him, when the morning telegrams shall announce that Grant is dead, men will lament and wonder that capacities so good, with opportunities so great, should reach a conclusion so impotent.

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### NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMIES AT GETTYSBURG.

BY COLONEL WALTER H. TAYLOR, A. A. G., A. N. V.

[The following explanation and correction of his former article was sent by Colonel Taylor simultaneously to the *Philadelphia Times* and to us. We exceedingly regret that its publication in our *Papers* has been unavoidably delayed until now:]

As my account of the battle of Gettysburg was first given to the public in your columns, I respectfully ask space therein sufficient to make the following explanation and correction of the statement of the strength of the Confederate Army then made in that campaign:

I would premise with the mention of the fact that two kinds of returns of the strength of the army were required to be made to the Department during the war—the one a “field return,” made twice a month (on the 10th and 20th), and the other a “monthly return,” made on the last day of each month.

In the field returns there was a column for the “officers present for duty,” and one for “enlisted men present for duty”; the sum of the two would give the “effective total” as generally understood—that is, the fighting strength.

In the monthly report the arrangement was different: there was a column for each grade of officers, both of the line and staff, and also a column for sergeants, one for corporals, and one for privates—enlisted men. There was then a column headed “effective total,” which embraced only the enlisted men present for duty—that is, the non-commissioned staff, sergeants, corporals, and privates; there being no column for the aggregate of the commissioned officers present for duty.

There are many methods of comparing the strength of opposing armies. The one adopted by me was to take the “effective total,” or the sum of the officers and enlisted men present for duty,

excluding all consideration of the special or extra-duty men, those sick, and those in arrest. As this manner of estimating was applied to both armies, it seemed to me the most equitable and satisfactory.

In taking notes from the returns on file in the Archive Office at Washington, I aimed to arrive at the "effective total." This in the "field returns" was readily determined by adding together the officers and enlisted men present for duty; but in the case of the "monthly reports" it was a very natural error for one to take the addition of the column headed "effective total" as representing the effective strength. Now, it so happened that the basis of my estimate of the strength of General Lee's army at Gettysburg was the *monthly report* of the 31st May, 1863, and not a *field return*. I, therefore, took the total amount of the column headed "effective total"—viz., 68,352—as representing what is generally understood by that term, and under the impression that the extensions under that column embraced the officers and men present for duty.

I was the more naturally led into this error, as Mr. Swinton, whose figures I had before me, had done precisely the same thing. Lieutenant-General Early having directed my attention, on the 9th instant, to the discrepancy between certain figures given by General Humphreys from the same return to the Comte de Paris and my own, and having expressed his apprehension that I took the figures from the column headed "effective total," inasmuch as, excluding the cavalry, the strength of the army as taken from the field return of the 20th May, 1863, was greater than that taken from the monthly report of the 31st May, 1863, I began to suspect that the officers were not included in the estimate given. I at once made application to the War Department for the information necessary to settle the matter, and having been kindly favored with a prompt reply to my request, I have been enabled to review my figures, and find that the estimate of strength on the 31st May, 1863, does not include the officers present for duty. *At that date* the effective strength of General Lee's army was as follows: Longstreet's command, 29,171; A. P. Hill's command, 30,286; cavalry, 10,292; artillery, 4,702. *Total effective* of all arms, 74,451. And carrying out the same reasoning as that originally pursued, I would say that General Lee had at Gettysburg, including all the cavalry, 67,000 men—that is to say, 53,500 infantry, 9,000 cavalry, and 4,500 artillery.

Of course this number was not available to him at any one time, as I have previously explained, but I prefer to adopt the greatest number as shown by the official reports; and in like manner I would persist in estimating the strength of the Federal army by the statement of General Hooker to General Halleck, made on the 27th day of June, to the effect that his "whole force of *enlisted men* present for duty would not exceed 105,000."

As General Hooker thus gave only his *enlisted men* present for duty, perhaps the figures originally given by me as the strength of General Lee's army—that is say, 67,452 on the 31st May, 1873, and 62,000 at Gettysburg—should be employed in the comparison, as they represent also his *enlisted men* present for duty.

For if we add to the 105,000 enlisted men of the Federal army the same proportion for officers as that found in the Confederate army, it would raise the effective strength of the former to fully 115,000 on the 27th day of June, four days previous to the battle. View these figures as one will, the disparity in numerical strength is very apparent.

Historical accuracy being my great aim in all that I have to say upon this subject, I hasten to correct the error into which I have inadvertently fallen along with Mr. Swinton.

*Strength of the Army of Northern Virginia, May 31st, 1863.*

COMMANDS.	PRESENT FOR DUTY.		EFFECTIVE TOTAL.
	Enlisted men.	Officers.	
<i>First Army Corps:</i>			
General Staff.....		13	
Anderson's Division.....	6,797	643	
McLaws' Division.....	6,684	627	
Hood's Division.....	7,030	690	
Pickett's Division.....	6,072	615	
Total First Corps.....	26,583	2,588	29,171
<i>Second Army Corps:</i>			
General Staff.....		17	
A. P. Hill's Division.....	8,501	798	
Rodes' Division.....	7,815	648	
Early's Division.....	6,368	575	
Johnson's Division.....	5,089	475	
Total Second Corps.....	27,773	2,513	30,286
Cavalry.....	9,536	756	10,292
Artillery.....	4,460	242	4,702
Total effective "Army of Northern Virginia".....			74,451

**Colonel Taylor's Reply to the Count of Paris.**NORFOLK, VA., *March 8, 1878.*

Rev. J. WILLIAM JONES,

*Secretary, &c., Richmond, Va.:*

MY DEAR MR. JONES: In compliance with your request, I enclose herewith the copy of the memorandum of the Count of Paris concerning the strength of the two armies at Gettysburg, sent to me by Colonel Allan. I have only found time to read the same to-day. It is, in my judgment, as conclusive evidence as has yet been presented of the great disparity in the strength of the two armies, when one who deducts thirteen per cent. from the effective strength of the Army of the Potomac, and makes a further deduction of seven per cent. for the straggling from that army, during a period of four days, while he allows but four per cent. for the reduction of the Army of Northern Virginia, from the same cause, during a period of nearly one month, should yet admit that the former army exceeded the latter in numerical strength by "somewhat more than one-fourth." It appears to me, however, that the Count unnecessarily surrounds a plain matter of fact with perplexing questions involving much that is indeterminate, and seeks to reach a result by doubtful inferences and intricate calculations which is readily attainable by direct, positive, and contemporaneous evidence.

In the first place, I do not see the necessity for attempting a comparison that shall embrace the men on extra or special duty with both armies. I would not object to this if a satisfactory result could be had; but when the most positive evidence we have relates to the numbers present with each army for duty, why not limit the comparison to these? Why not seek at once to ascertain the number of men in line of battle available for the fight? When we speak of "officers and enlisted men present for duty," a clear understanding is had of what is meant. It matters not how many men were with the organizations, or sick in ambulances; they took no part in the fight, and some of them were, perhaps, so far removed from the scene as not even to hear the guns. But, apart from this, it is not so easy to determine their number as it is to ascertain the number of those who were present for duty.

The returns of both armies were alike in this, viz.: in each there was a column for the officers "present for duty," and one for the enlisted men "present for duty." Entirely distinct from this, but under the general heading "present," were separate columns for "extra or special duty," "sick," and "in arrest." The extra or special-duty men were, as a rule, on service with the trains, and were never counted by regimental commanders with us in their reports of "men present for duty." Without discussing the point made by the Count, that the "Federal officers gave as what they called their *effective strength* the figures representing *all the men present*, and not only those *present for duty*," I would call attention to the fact that, in his official correspondence with the General-in-Chief, General Hooker, on the 27th day of June, 1863—four days previous to the battle—stated that his "whole force of *enlisted men present for duty* would not exceed 105,000." He does not use the term "effective strength," but "enlisted men present for duty." Evidently these figures were taken from the column headed "enlisted men present for duty." Now, why will all the writers on the other side persist in ignoring this evidence of the General of the Army of the Potomac? This dispatch from General Hooker to General Halleck was sent under peculiar circumstances. The former desired to impress upon the latter the necessity for reinforcing him, and that there "might be no misunderstanding," he informs his superior that his whole force of enlisted men present for duty will not exceed 105,000. This evidence, written down at the time by the General of the Army, with the reports of his subordinates before him, is worth ten times that sustained only by the hind-sights of the officers whose evidence, given from memory some time afterwards, is made the basis of calculation by the Count. General Meade himself testified that when he took command the returns shown him called for 105,000 men—evidently the same from which General Hooker derived his figures—although he erroneously claims that those figures embraced the garrison at Harper's Ferry. General Meade also testified from memory, before the Congressional Committee, that he had "*upon that battle-field*," of all arms of the service, a little under 100,000 men: whereas the Count gives him but 85,000. Surely, General Meade did not include in this statement the men on duty with the trains.



The trains of the Army of the Potomac on the 27th day of June were doubtless strung out for a considerable distance, a large portion being still in Virginia. Is it reasonable to suppose that General Hooker, in his endeavor to impress upon the War Department the necessity for giving him additional troops, would embrace in his report of the enlisted men present for duty all those on extra or special duty with the trains? The percentage of officers to men present for duty with the Confederates was as one to ten; allowing the same for the Federals, and General Hooker's effective strength on the 27th of June was 115,500. The Count claims that the 105,000 represented the entire present strength of the Army of the Potomac—including not only officers and men present for duty, but those on extra or special duty, those sick, and those in arrest. But I do not think he can substantiate this in absolute contradiction, as it is, to the testimony of General Hooker. He then deducts from this 105,000 thirteen per cent. for men on special duty, sick, and in arrest, and gives 91,350 as the number (officers and men) present for duty. These figures are further reduced by an allowance of 6,000 for straggling, and he estimates the effective strength of the Army of the Potomac at Gettysburg at 85,000 of all arms.

In regard to the strength of the Army of Northern Virginia, as given in his paper, viz.: 66,600, I do not think he is much out of the way, although I do not agree with him in his reasoning. But his estimate is based upon the effective strength of that army on the 31st May, 1863, as given in my account of the battle—that is, 68,852. As has already been publicly stated, those figures did not include the officers present for duty. The total effective at that date was 74,451. The Count would, therefore, carry this difference in his calculations, and thus increase his numbers to about 73,000—fully 6,000 in excess of our real strength. Although it is past my comprehension why the Count should deduct 6,000 for straggling from the Army of the Potomac in a period of four or five days, and only allow 2,500 for the reduction by the same cause of the Army of Northern Virginia after it crossed the Potomac—nearly a month—yet we can afford to allow his estimate to stand, for all purposes of comparison, provided the testimony of General Hooker, given four days previous to the encounter, is accepted by

him as a basis for determining the strength of the Army of the Potomac at the same time.

According to the best information that I have, and after a careful study of the subject, I think that General Lee's strength at Gettysburg, embracing his entire effective force of all arms of the service, from first to last, was, in round numbers, 67,000. So, also, after a careful review of all the evidence, I would say that General Meade had about 105,000. The Count contends that we should include Jones' and Robertson's brigades of cavalry, that reached us after the battle; but he is careful to exclude the troops taken from Harper's Ferry by General Meade and sent to Frederick. There is as much reason for counting the one as the other. Nevertheless, I do count the two brigades of cavalry of General Lee's army, and do not count the Federals at Frederick.

On the 31st May, General Lee's effective was 74,451. He received after that one brigade, Pettigrew's; but, to offset this addition, we must deduct Corse's brigade and one of Pettigrew's regiments, left in Virginia. The cavalry, under Jenkins and Imboden, was not embraced in the report of the 31st May, and must be added. The two brigades numbered about 3,000 men. This was offset by the loss sustained by the brigades of Hampton, Fitz Lee, and W. H. F. Lee in their encounters with the enemy before and after crossing the Potomac, and by reason of their hard marching. General Lee says that "the ranks of the cavalry were much reduced by its long and arduous march, repeated conflicts, and insufficient supplies of food." Then the army, in its movement north, in the fighting in the valley, and in guards for captured property, was reduced about ten per cent. According to my estimate, we had 53,500 infantry. There were nine divisions, and this would give an average of about 6,000. I think nearly every living division commander of General Lee's army will endorse these figures. Of cavalry, I think there was, in round numbers, 9,000. There were seven brigades, counting Imboden and Jenkins—an average of 1,300 to the brigade. The five with the army on the 31st May had an average of but 2,000, and Jenkins and Imboden had originally an average of but 1,500, showing an original average of, say, 1,800. This reduction in the cavalry is but a reasonable one, considering their service between the 31st May and 1st of July. The artillery I put at 4,500. The three arms of

service then numbered as follows: Infantry, 53,500; cavalry, 9,000; artillery, 4,500. Total effective of all arms, 67,000. Against this let us put the minimum number, as claimed by General Meade, "a little under 100,000 men." If the Count, however, persists in giving General Lee the maximum effective strength with which he commenced the campaign, say 74,000, in equity and fairness he should put the Army of the Potomac at what its commander stated it to be on the 27th day of June, viz.: 105,000 enlisted men, or about 115,000 effective, officers and enlisted men, present for duty. Compare our 67,000 to their 100,000 or 105,000, or compare our 74,000 to their 115,000; but do not compare our maximum 74,000 with their minimum 95,000.

Yours, truly,

W. H. TAYLOR.

P. S. In an article contributed to the *Weekly Times* of Philadelphia, March 10th, General Humphreys, U. S. A., rather confirms my estimate of the strength of the Army of the Potomac at Gettysburg. According to his statement, the return of that army on the 30th June, 1863, showed present for duty, officers and enlisted men, 99,475. He further states that "Stannard's brigade, of five regiments, and Lockwood's brigade, of two regiments, coming from the Department of Washington and the Middle Department, joined the Army of the Potomac on the morning of the 2d of July, and consequently they were not on the return of the 30th June. Two regiments of Stannard's brigade went to the main trains, and three joined the First Corps. His regiments are stated on good authority to have been about five hundred each—much larger than the average of the Army of the Potomac." The same estimate is made by General Humphreys of the strength of Lockwood's two regiments.

If we add to the strength of the Army of the Potomac, as shown by the return of the 30th of June, viz., 99,475, the seven regiments, numbering five hundred each, that joined it subsequently, there results as the strength of that army at Gettysburg 102,975—say 103,000—differing very little indeed from my estimate.—W. H. T.

**Flanner's North Carolina Battery at the Battle of the Crater.**

[We only regret that the publication of the following narrative by the gallant Captain of Flanner's battery has been so long delayed by circumstances beyond our control:]

After reading Captain Gordon McCabe's article in the *Southern Historical Society Papers* on the defence of Petersburg, I think I have the right to find fault, not with what is written, but what was omitted in the article referred to.

I claim that the battery commanded by me, and composed entirely of North Carolinians, is entitled to the credit of preventing the Federal army from entering Petersburg on the morning of the springing of the mine. The facts are these: The mine was sprung about daylight of the 29th of July, and was immediately followed by the capture and occupation of our line of breast-works by the enemy. They remained in the works until 8 o'clock before making preparations for the advance. About that time they reformed line of battle and began advancing toward the city. Flanner's battery was posted in the main road near the Gee House, about two hundred yards in rear of the Confederate breast-works, immediately in rear of the mine, forming what might be considered a second line, but entirely without infantry support. Immediately upon the advance of the enemy we opened on them with shell and canister, and they soon sought shelter in their trenches. In a few minutes they again formed and commenced advancing. Again we opened on them with our six guns. The enemy pressed steadily forward, when our guns were double charged with canister, and a deadly fire poured into their ranks. Their lines were then broken, and they fled to the works and there remained until our infantry, composed of the brigades of Mahone, Girardy, and Sanders, all under the command of Mahone, arrived, and were placed in position preparatory to making the final charge, which resulted in the recapture of the works about 2 o'clock in the day.

The fire of the enemy, from nearly one hundred guns, was concentrated upon my company for two hours; but amid this terrible rain of deadly missiles these brave North Carolinians stood to their guns and repulsed every advance made by the enemy, hold-

ing them in check alone, and without infantry support, until the arrival of General Beauregard with the troops commanded by Mahone before mentioned.

We claim the honor of saving the day, and preventing what might have been a very serious disaster and probable loss of Petersburg.

No one save those who went through the fiery ordeal can form the slightest conception of the fury of this attack. Not less than fifty shells a minute were hurled at the company; and but for the protection afforded them by the sides of the road, they would have been swept off the face of the earth. There are those now living who can confirm my statement; and if this should meet the eye of the gentlemen cognizant of these details, they will doubtless do us this justice. The history of a battle cannot be truthfully written from the same stand-point of any one man, although present in the engagement. It is due, therefore, to the brave men who composed my command that they should be properly placed upon the record.

We do not wish to lessen the claims to which the valorous troops of other commands are entitled, but let us make such contributions as the future historian can work into a continuous narrative and do justice to all.

HENRY G. FLANNER,  
*Late Captain Flanner's N. C. Battery.*

**Justice to General Magruder—Letter from Rev. P. G. Robert.**

EDITOR SOUTHERN HISTORICAL SOCIETY PAPERS:

I have just finished Colonel Taylor's valuable book, "Four Years With General Lee."

On page 49, in the history of Malvern Hill, it is written: "Considerable delay was occasioned in the pursuit from the fact that the ground was unknown to the Confederate commanders. On this occasion General Magruder took the wrong route, and had to be recalled, thereby losing much precious time."

As one of the peninsula army, jealous for the reputation of General Magruder, I write to suggest a correction of this statement. At least, to record another account which we had of the affair at the time.

It was understood when we left the battle-field of Frazer's Farm, which we reached the night before, after that action, that our column was to move to a point south or southeast of the position it held at the battle of Malvern Hill, and we were expected to reach it before the enemy. We were to take the Quaker road. Unfortunately there were two paths of that name—an old and a new one. We were following the former, when the column was halted, once or twice, without apparent reason. Presently the head of the column, at which rode *Longstreet* and Magruder, was counter-marched, after we had gone about a mile, and we turned in at Crew's farm.

As I was standing near the colonel of my regiment, conversing with him, an aid (I think, of General Magruder,) rode along our front, and the colonel asked him the cause of these halts and the counter-march. He replied that there was a difference of opinion between Generals Longstreet and Magruder as to the road—Longstreet insisting that we were going wrong, Magruder that we were right, as his guide was a man who had fox-hunted over the country, and knew every foot of it. This quieted General Longstreet the first time, but he soon became again dissatisfied; and then General Magruder said that if our direction was changed General Longstreet must give the order, and he, of course, would obey, although he knew we were right.

Longstreet turned us back, and then we lost the valuable time in which we might have anticipated the enemy. If Magruder had been permitted to proceed, perhaps there might have been a different result, at least to our brigade (Cobb's), which suffered so severely that afternoon.

One of his old command feels that it is but just to "Old Mag." and the love we bore him to remove any reflection from his memory, however slight; for it was always felt that the General never received full credit for the masterly manner in which he so long guarded the real approach to Richmond.

P. G. ROBERT.

*St. Louis, Mo.*

**The First Maryland Cavalry, C. S. A.**

BY REV. HORACE EDWIN HAYDEN.

In the March, 1877, number of the *Southern Historical Society Papers*, page 136, Mr. Lamar Holliday, quite unintentionally, I am satisfied, fails to do full justice to the First Maryland Cavalry, C. S. A. The impression conveyed by his article is that the First Maryland Cavalry was not in the Confederate service until its organization as a battalion, in November, 1862. A fuller history of this command will, I am sure, interest those who survive. The facts I give are from my own knowledge and from my diary, kept during the first two years of the war.

Before 1861 there were organized in Howard county, Maryland, two cavalry companies of from 75 to 100 men each. They were composed of the choicest material of the county. In one company there were seventeen members of the Dorsey family; in the other company, eleven members of the same family. The first company organized was named the Howard County Dragoons, commanded by Captain Geo. R. Gaither. Both companies were handsomely uniformed according to United States army regulations, well mounted, and furnished by Governor Hicks with the best cavalry sabres and Colt's revolvers. When the indignation of the citizens of Baltimore burst forth at the appearance, on the 19th of April, 1861, of a Massachusetts regiment marching through her streets to make war on the South, the Howard County Dragoons immediately assembled at Ellicott's Mills, and on the next day marched into the city and placed themselves under the command of General G. H. Steuart. This action, and the subsequent treachery of Governor Hicks, made it necessary, when quiet was seemingly restored, either to disband the company or to march it South of the Potomac. Early in May a large portion of the Dragoons, mounted and equipped, crossed at Point of Rocks and rendezvoused at Leesburg under Captain Gaither. Here the writer joined them May 30, 1861. At that time an effort was made to organize "the Maryland Line."

This proposed organization failing, "the Maryland Cavalry," as the company was called, marched on the 15th of June to Winchester, and on the 17th united with the cavalry regiment under Colo-



nel Angus McDonald. This regiment was ordered to Romney, Va., on the 18th of June, where the Maryland company encamped, and performed picket duty until July 18th, when, owing to some dissatisfaction with the idle life they were leading, the company withdrew from Colonel McDonald's command, and by forced marches placed itself under the command of Colonel J. E. B. Stuart, and became Company K of the First Virginia cavalry; doing such excellent service during her connection with this famous regiment, that at the retreat from Manassas Colonel Fitzhugh Lee said, "Give me the Maryland company and one hundred other men, and I will keep McClellan back a month longer."

The company reached Manassas on the night of the 20th July, and participated in that memorable battle of the 21st. About the 28th of July, near Fairfax Courthouse, the company was for the first time mustered in the Confederate States Army, and an election of officers was held, resulting as follows: George R. Gaither, captain; George Howard, first lieutenant; Thomas Griffith, second lieutenant. As well as I can remember, the company numbered fifty members rank and file.

Before the *one* year for which this company had enlisted had expired the time of enlistment was unanimously extended to two years more, or *three* years from the date of first enlistment (May, 1861). During this year there had been various changes among the officers; Corporals Brown and Bond had each risen to the grade of sergeant, and then to first and second lieutenant.

On Saturday, April 26, 1862, a new election occurred in the company, resulting in the re-election of George R. Gaither, captain, and the election of G. W. Dorsey, first lieutenant; N. Hobbs, second lieutenant; W. Cecil, third lieutenant. The same day the minority of thirty-one sent a petition to Colonel Fitzhugh Lee, and also to General George H. Steuart, by James Clark, asking to be transferred as cavalry to the "the Maryland Line." The result is thus noted in my diary: "Monday, 5, 12, '62.—Company to be mustered out on Wednesday; Company Q (the title assumed by the minority, in jest rather,) is to be transferred to-morrow. Tuesday, 5, 13, '62.—Lieutenant Bond returned from Richmond; Company Q transferred and move towards Richmond; Company K discharged." The next movement of Company Q is recorded in Go'dsborough's History of the Maryland Line, p. 197. On the

15th of May, 1861, (Thursday), eighteen of the thirty-one assembled at Richmond and organized Company A, the nucleus of the First Maryland cavalry; and the following officers were elected: Captain, Ridgeley Brown; First Lieutenant, Frank A. Bond; Second Lieutenant, Thomas Griffith; Third Lieutenant, James A. Ventris Pue. The subsequent history of this company is already recorded by Major Goldsborough.

During its connection with the First Virginia Cavalry it won for itself a reputation for bravery and faithfulness in the performance of duty second to none. Owing to its material and excellent equipment, it was frequently called upon to do extra duty; was in all the encounters with the enemy in which the First Virginia Cavalry was engaged, from the first battle of Manassas to the mustering out of the company on the Peninsula.

It is a just tribute to the beloved Colonel Ridgeley Brown, who was killed while gallantly leading his command in a victorious charge, June 1, 1864, near the South Anna, to notice that, from the day he first entered the company as a private, he won and retained the confidence and love of his comrades. His faithful devotion to his duties as a soldier won for him, step by step, the positions he held—as corporal, sergeant, lieutenant, captain, major, and lieutenant-colonel. And the same tribute is justly due to his brave fellow-in-arms, Colonel Frank A. Bond, who also entered the ranks as a private, and filled each grade of rank within the gift of his command.

*Brownsville, Pa., July 4, 1877.*

## EDITORIAL PARAGRAPHS.

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"THE CONFEDERATE HOME" at Charleston, S. C., is an institution which we have had opportunity of visiting several times recently, and which should command the warm sympathies, fervent prayers, and liberal contributions of philanthropists everywhere.

Not long after the close of the war an energetic, devoted South Carolina woman determined to establish a "HOME" for the widows and daughters of Confederate soldiers, who gave their lives or were disabled in the cause of Southern Independence. A contribution of \$1, made by a poor widow, an inmate of a "Home" in Baltimore, was the small beginning of this noble charity; benevolent gentlemen and noble women took hold of the enterprise; a building, once the leading hotel of Charleston, and every way suitable for the purpose, was rented (the projector of the scheme mortgaging her private property as pledge for payment of the rent), and has since been purchased; and the enterprise has succeeded beyond the most sanguine expectations of its friends.

The *Home* is under the management of a "Board of Control," consisting of thirteen ladies, aided by the advice and counsel of a "Gentlemen's Auxiliary Association," composed of annual members, who pay \$10 per annum, and life members, who pay \$200. There are now in the Home seventy-three orphan daughters of Confederate soldiers, and thirty-six Confederate widows. The Home is sustained at an annual expenditure of about \$8,000, and is most economically and judiciously managed in all of its departments.

A walk through the well-ventilated and admirably-kept rooms; a peep into the well-disciplined and well-taught school, and an examination into the plans and the general management of the institution, are sufficient to convince any one of the wisdom and enlightened zeal with which the affairs of the Home are conducted. No wonder that when W. W. Corcoran, Esq., of Washington, visited it he added \$5,000 to the liberal contributions he had before made. And, surely, an institution which is endeavoring to fulfill in part the pledges we made our brave soldiers when they went to the front—to pay a small part of the debt we owe the men *who died for us*—ought to command the cheerful help of every true son of the South who is not willing to repudiate the most sacred obligations.

Mrs. M. A. Snowden, President, or Miss J. A. Adger, Corresponding Secretary, would take pleasure in communicating with any one desiring further information concerning the Home.

ERRATA are troublesome, but some errors crept into our last issue which must be corrected.

In General Fitz. Lee's article, page 185, (twelve lines from the bottom), "occupied" should read *unoccupied*. On page 188, instead of "General Warren, Meade's Chief of Artillery;" it should read *Chief of Engineers*. Page 192, "concluded" should read "couched;" and on same page, instead of *attacked* Meade's key-point, it should be "*unlocked*."

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"THE ARCHIVE BUREAU" at Washington has excited, from time to time, considerable interest. For years closely guarded from all save a favored few, its occasional outgivings have only served to sharpen the appetite of those interested in such matters, and to make them all the more anxious to have access to the rich store of material for the future historian which they contain. A more liberal spirit seems to prevail with the present Secretary of War, and some of our friends have recently been allowed to inspect important documents. Indeed, the outrage of keeping those documents locked up to Confederates, and open to every writer on the other side who might desire to defame our leaders or falsify our history, has become so patent to all right-thinking men that there have been denials that access has ever been denied to any seeker after historic truth. The *Washington Post* of March 14 published what purported to be an "interview" of one of its reporters with Adjutant-General Townsend, in which he denies that access is refused to any save to those who might use them in prosecuting false claims against the Government; and, while this is not distinctly stated, it is strongly intimated that this *has always been the rule of the Department*. Now, we will do General Townsend the justice to believe that the reporter misrepresented him, or else that he is personally ignorant of what has occurred in reference to those archives. At all events, we hold ourselves prepared to *prove* before any fair tribunal that General R. E. Lee tried in vain to get access to his own battle reports and field returns; that General E. P. Alexander, Colonel Wm. Allan, Colonel Charles Marshall, and a number of Confederate gentlemen have been refused the privilege of seeing papers which they wished for purely historical purposes; that the Executive Department of the State of Virginia has been *rudely* refused to see or to have copied its own records, which were seized and carried off after the capture of Richmond; that Governor Vance, of North Carolina, has been refused access to his own letter-books to disprove charges made against him from garbled extracts of those letters furnished by the Department; and that, in a number of instances, there has been this same unfair use of those archives.

But the correspondence between our Society and the War Department settles the whole matter beyond controversy. That correspondence was inaugurated by Secretary Belknap with a view of obtaining such Confederate documents, reports, &c., as were not in the Bureau at Washington. The Secretary of the Society promptly responded, and offered *to give the Depart-*

*ment copies of everything we had which was wanted, provided that we should receive in exchange copies of such documents as we needed. This was refused, on the ground that the Department had never allowed any one copies of those records, and could not do so. A further correspondence with the Department during Secretary Don. Cameron's administration secured us no further concession, except the doubtful one of having advanced sheets so soon as Congress orders the publication of the Archives.*

# SOUTHERN HISTORICAL SOCIETY PAPERS.

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## General Longstreet's Second Paper on Gettysburg.

We again depart from our general rule against *copying* articles which are published in other periodicals, in order that we may give General Longstreet the fullest opportunity of putting on record his views concerning Gettysburg. We published for the first time his official report; we have published a number of the reports of gallant officers belonging to his corps; and we have published letters from his division commander, General Hood, and his artillery commanders, General E. P. Alexander and Colonel J. B. Walton, besides his own narrative in the *Philadelphia Times*. We now copy from the *Times* his second paper:

I am induced to prepare an article on the campaign of Gettysburg, supplementary to the one that appeared in the columns of your paper some weeks ago, that I may correct some slight errors of print or transcription that occurred in that paper; that I may make some additional statements, forbidden in my first paper by reason of its length; that I may correct an apparent injustice to a very worthy officer; and, last and not least, to make some allusion to the ill-natured and splenetic attacks provoked by that paper from certain wordy soldiers. I prepared my first paper with genuine reluctance. It was brought into existence by the request of the editor of the *Times* and the petition of the Comte de Paris, in which he publicly announced his inability to settle definitely certain points of that campaign, and urged the surviving Confederate officers to give the theory and the detail of the invasion from their point of view. It was justified, in my own mind, by the reflection that I was, perhaps, the only person living who could explain the *motif* of that campaign and the true reasons of its failure. It was made necessary by the fact that our amateur historians, through misapprehension or malice, had nearly all gone wrong, and utterly misconstrued the plan and purpose of that invasion, misused and misstated its facts, and dislocated its responsibilities. The Comte de

Paris and the general historian, had they relied upon these statements, instead of finding the true solution of this, the great problem of the war, would have had it involved in more profound obscurity.

In my first article I declared that the invasion of Pennsylvania was a movement that General Lee and his council agreed should be defensive in tactics, while, of course, it was offensive in strategy; that the campaign was conducted on this plan until we had left Chambersburg, when, owing to the absence of our cavalry, and our consequent ignorance of the enemy's whereabouts, we collided with them unexpectedly, and that General Lee had lost the matchless equipoise that usually characterized him, and through excitement and the doubt that enveloped the enemy's movements, changed the whole plan of the campaign, and delivered a battle under ominous circumstances. I declared that the battle of the 2d was not lost through the tardiness of the First corps, but through the failure of the troops ordered to co-operate to do so; that there was no order ever issued for a sunrise attack; that no such order could have been issued, and that the First corps could not possibly have attacked at that time; that when it did attack its movement was weakened by the derangement of the directing brigade of support under General Wilcox, and was rendered hopeless by the failure of Ewell's corps to co-operate, its line of battle having been broken through the advice of General Early, and that in this attack Hood's and McLaws' divisions did the best fighting ever done on any field, and encountered and drove back virtually the whole of the Army of the Potomac. I held that the mistakes of the Gettysburg campaign were:

First, the change of the original plan of the campaign, which was to so manœuvre as to force the Federals to attack us; second, that if the plan was to have been changed at all it should have been done at Brandy Station, near Culpeper Courthouse, when we could have caught Hooker in detail and probably have crushed his army; third, that Stuart should never have been permitted to leave the main route of march, and thus send our army into the enemy's country without cavalry for reconnoissance or foraging purposes; fourth, that the crushing defeat inflicted on the advance of the Federal army in the casual encounter of the 1st at Willoughby's Run, should have been pushed to extremities, that occasion furnishing one of the few opportunities ever furnished for "pursuit pell-mell"; fifth, the army should have been carried around to Meade's right and rear on the night of the 1st, and placed between him and his capital, and thus forced him to attack us, as he certainly intended doing; sixth, when I attacked the enemy's left, on the 2d, Ewell should have moved at once against his right and Hill should have threatened his centre, and thus prevented a concentration of the whole Federal army at the point I was assaulting; seventh, on the morning of the 3d we should still have moved to the right, and manœuvred the Federals into attacking us; eighth, the assault by Pickett, on the 3d, should never have been made, as it could not have succeeded by any possible prodigy of courage or tactics, being absolutely a hopeless assault.

These points I supported with the most particular proof. Not a single one of them has been controverted. The truth of a single fact, or the correctness of a single opinion laid down in that article, has not been disproved. Very few of them have been questioned—none of them overthrown. I have been subjected to a loud and incoherent assault, led by certain gentlemen whose steady purpose of misrepresenting my record has become notorious, and seconded by a few others who follow through ignorance or innocence. Without proceeding directly against the essential parts of my narrative, they raise a clamor of objection and denial. One of the chief elements of this tom-tom warfare is found in the fact that, owing to wounds received in the honorable service of my country, which have virtually paralyzed my right arm and made it impossible for me to write, save under pain and constraint, I have been compelled in the preparation of my articles to accept the service of a professional writer, generously tendered me by the editor of the *Times*. Upon such trifling casuals as this do my enemies purpose to build their histories and amend mine. The attempt is at once pitiful and disgraceful.

The first point that demands attention is the number of forces on each side engaged in the Gettysburg campaign. In my first article I claimed that we had 52,000 infantry and the Federals 95,000 men; stating, further, that those were the highest figures of our forces and the lowest of theirs. General R. R. Dawes, in commenting on this estimate, disagrees with it quite widely. The main point that he makes is to quote from Swinton's "Army of the Potomac" the following paragraph (page 310): "The number of infantry present for duty in Lee's army on the 31st of May, 1863, was precisely 68,352. I learn from General Longstreet that when the three corps were concentrated at Chambersburg, the morning report showed 67,000 bayonets, or above 70,000 of all arms." This statement is certainly explicit, but there are discrepancies on the face of it that should have warned a cautious and capable writer not to accept it: First, any one at all familiar with the history of the campaign, or even the leading points of it, must have known that the three corps of the army were never "concentrated at Chambersburg" at all; second, it is well known that any organization upon 67,000 bayonets would have involved an infantry force alone of "over 70,000," and thus have left no margin in the estimate that Mr. Swinton ascribes to me for the other arms of the service.

If General Dawes had followed Swinton's narrative closely he must have discovered that (page 365) he says: "General Lee's aggregate force present for duty on the 31st of May, 1863, was 68,352." These are the precise figures that he gives on page 310 as the aggregate of the infantry alone. My information upon this subject was taken from General Lee's own lips. He estimated his force to be, including the detachments that would join him on the march, a trifle over 70,000. On the 30th of June, or the 1st of July, he estimated his infantry at 52,000 bayonets. If Mr. Swinton received any information from me upon the subject he received this, for it was all that I had. Since I have read the report of the Adjutant-General of the Army of Northern Virginia, lately published, I am inclined to believe that General Lee



included in his estimate two brigades of Pickett's division (Jenkins' and Corse's) which were left in Virginia, or some other detachments made during the march. If this surmise is correct, it would make the total figures considerably less than I gave them. I am certain the real strength of his army cannot go above the number given in my first article. As to the strength of General Meade's army, I take his own statement for that. In his evidence taken before the Committee on the Conduct of the War (page 337 of their report) he says: "My strength was a little under 100,000—probably 95,000 men." I used in my narrative the lowest figures that he gave. In printing the article it is made to appear that Meade had 95,000 infantry. It should have been 95,000 men. This much as to the comparative strength of the two armies. It is the truth, and will stand as history that Meade's army was nearly double that of Lee.

In my first article I claimed that my troops fought an extraordinary battle on the 2d. I asserted that my 13,000 men virtually charged against the whole Federal army, encountered nearly 65,000 of the enemy, and broke line after line of fresh troops, until at length, after three hours of the best fighting ever done, they found themselves in a single line of battle charging 50,000 Federals intrenched, massed on Cemetery Ridge. Then, when one-third of their number lay in their bloody track, dead or wounded, and they were exposed in front and flank to an overwhelming fire, and their supporting brigades had gone astray, and there was no sign of positive or strategic co-operation from their comrades, I ordered them to withdraw to the peach orchard that they had wrested from the Third corps early in the engagement. This claim has been severely criticised. It can be established by the testimony of every honest and well-informed man who was in that battle. But I relied for my proof upon the official report of General Meade himself. He made this report, it will be remembered, thinking that the whole or greater part of Lee's army had charged his position in the afternoon of the 2d. He says:

"The Third corps received the shock most heroically. Troops from the Second were sent by Major-General Hancock to cover the right flank of the Third corps, and soon after the assault commenced. \* \* \* The Fifth corps most fortunately arrived and took position on the left of the Third, Major-General Sykes commanding, immediately sending a force to occupy Round Top Ridge, where a most furious contest was maintained, the enemy making desperate but unsuccessful attempts to secure it. Notwithstanding the stubborn resistance of the Third corps, under Major-General Birney (Major-General Sickles having been wounded early in the action), superiority of number of corps of the enemy enabling him to outflank its advanced position, General Birney was compelled to fall back and reform behind the line originally desired to be held. In the meantime, perceiving the great exertions of the enemy, the Sixth corps (Major-General Sedgwick) and part of the First corps, to which I had assigned Major-General Newton, particularly Lockwood's Maryland brigade, together with detachments from the Second corps, were brought up at different periods, and succeeded, together with the gallant resistance of the Fifth corps, in checking and finally repulsing the assault of the enemy. \* \* \* During the heavy assault upon our extreme left, portions of the Twelfth corps were sent as reinforcements."

To make this specific and positive proof still more conclusive, I may add the testimony of General Meade, given before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, in which he says (speaking of this battle of the 2d): "My extreme right flank was then held by a single brigade of the Twelfth corps, commanded by General Green." Then the troops opposing my 13,000 men (two divisions of my corps) were as follows: Third corps, 11,898; Fifth corps, 10,136; Sixth corps, 15,408; Pennsylvania reserves, 4,500; Lockwood's Maryland brigade, 2,500; total, 44,442. The above figures are taken from the Congressional Report, page 428. To these figures must be added the detachments from the other corps enumerated by General Meade. As he is not minute in his statements, I have no accurate data by which I can tell precisely what these "detachments" were. As General Meade states, however, that he left but a single brigade to guard his extreme right, and as he had no use for troops elsewhere, it is reasonable to suppose that the other corps may have sent as many as 20,000 men, other than those enumerated above. Indeed, this estimate is quite low in all probability; because General Meade believed, and his counselors all believed, as is shown by their concurrent testimony, that the assault made by my handful of heroes was really the onset of the whole of Lee's army. It is fair to presume then, that, under this belief, he massed everything that he could get his hands on in front of the direct attack. He says as much as this when he says he left "only a single brigade" on his right. My former estimate, therefore, "that my 13,000 men met 65,000 men during the three hours' fighting that afternoon," will not be abandoned until the report of General Meade and the figures of the Congressional Report shall have been overthrown; conceding, of course, to the technical demand of historical statement that the "detachments" of other corps sent forward may not have been exactly 20,000 men.

It has never been claimed that we met this immense force of 65,000 men at one time; nor has it been claimed that each and every one of them burnt powder in our faces. But they were drawn off from other parts of the field to meet us, and were hurried to our front and massed there, meaning to do all the mischief they could. If some of them did not shoot us, or stick us with their bayonets, it was simply because they could not shoot through the solid blocks of their own troops or reach us with their bayonets over the heads of their comrades. But they were in position and eager for battle—ready to rush down upon us the moment the line next in front of them was broken. The *morale* of their presence in reinforcing the position and threatening our flanks as we pressed on, was about as effective as their actual bloody work could have been. As to the accounts of the *Cincinnati Gazette* and the *New York World*, they were not given as documents of historical record, but simply as confirmatory of General Meade's statements, which are, of course, historical. It was not too much to assume that the representatives of these papers would know what Federal corps were actively engaged in the battle of the 2d. They both confirmed the account given by General Meade in the belief that the whole of the Confederate army was engaged in the assault, and in the state-

ment that very nearly the whole of the Federal army was engaged in repelling it. After a review, therefore, of the whole situation, and a careful reading of everything that has been published since the appearance of my first article, I am confirmed in the opinion then expressed that my troops did, on that afternoon, "the best three hours' fighting ever done by any troops on any field."

In my general narrative I did not give a detailed criticism or account of the tactical movements of the 2d for two reasons: First, my newspaper friends admonished me that my article had grown quite long, and that it was already clear enough to satisfy the most skeptical mind; second, I thought that my allusions to time, cause, and effect, would arrest the attention of those who had misconceived and therefore misrepresented them, and that they would hasten to make proper explanation and corrections. I find their minds, however, so filled with prejudice and preconceived opinions, that it seems imperative I should explain the relations of our tactical moves on the 2d, and force a confession from even their reluctant mouths. Having demonstrated beyond cavil in my first article that General Lee never ordered a sunrise attack, that he never expected one, and that it was physically impossible to have made one, I shall now show that even if one had been made it could not have bettered the result that was achieved by the afternoon attack. It will be proved that the battle made by my men could not have been so improved, in plan or execution, as to have won the day. The only amendment that would have ensued, or even promised victory, was for Ewell to have marched in upon the enemy's right when it was guarded by a single brigade, run over their works, and fall upon their rear while I engaged them in front, and while Hill lay in a threatening position in their centre. Had this co-operative movement been made, the battle would, in all probability, have been ours. As it was, no disposition of the men under my charge, no change in the time or method or spirit of the assault, could have changed the result for the better.

Let us briefly review the situation on the morning of the 2d. During the night of the 1st General Sickles rested with the Third corps upon the ground lying between General Hancock's left and Round Top, General Geary's division of the Twelfth corps occupying part of the same line. General Meade had given General Sickles orders to occupy Round Top if it were practicable; and in reply to his question as to what sort of position it was, General Sickles had answered, "There is no position there." At the first signs of activity in our ranks on the 2d General Sickles became apprehensive that we were about to attack him, and so reported to General Meade. As our move progressed his apprehensions were confirmed, and being uneasy at the position in which his troops had been left, and certain that he was about to receive battle, he determined to seize the vantage ground in front of the peach orchard. Without awaiting for orders, he pushed forward and took the position desired. Meanwhile the reports made to General Meade drew his attention to our part of the field, and finally he rode out just in time to see the battle open. It will be seen, therefore, that General Sickles' move, and all the movements of the Federal left, were simply sequents of mine. They would have followed my

movements inevitably, no matter when they had been made. Had the attack been made earlier or later, we should have seen the Federals move just as they did, and with the same results—except that if I had attacked earlier I should have had Geary's division of the Twelfth corps in my immediate front in addition to the Third corps. This would certainly have been the effect of "a sunrise attack."

Colonel Taylor, in referring to the hour of my battle on the 2d, says: "Round Top, the key of their position, which was not occupied in the morning, was now held in force." The answer to this statement, direct and authoritative, is at hand. General Meade says, in Congressional Report, page 332: "Immediately upon the opening of the batteries (which began the battle), I sent several staff officers to hurry up the column under General Sykes, of the Fifth corps, then on its way, and which I expected would have reached there at that time. The column advanced rapidly, reached the ground in a short time, and General Sykes was fortunately enabled by throwing a strong force upon Round Top mountain, where a most desperate and bloody struggle ensued, to drive the enemy from it and secure our foothold upon that most important position." Even the muses were invoked to speed this helter-skelter march toward the knob of ground now suddenly grown into importance.

"On to the Round Top!" hailed Sykes to his men;

"On to the Round Top!" echoed the glen.

"On to the Round Top!"

In my former narrative I showed that General Meade did not appreciate the importance of this position until the battle had finally opened. He had ordered Sickles to occupy it "if practicable"; but it was not occupied in force when my battle opened, and was made strong as the fight progressed, as much by the fragments of the enemy's broken lines that took shelter behind its boulders as by any definite plan to seize it. It is needless to say that the same thing would have happened had the battle taken place either earlier or later. The force stationed there when the battle opened had been there all day, and was wholly inadequate to hold it; hence General Meade's anxiety to hurry up additional troops after the battle had opened, and his congratulation that Sykes, by throwing forward "a strong force," was enabled to drive us from it and secure it to the Federals. But why go further with these details? It is impossible that any sane man should believe that two of my divisions, attacking at any hour or in any manner, could have succeeded in dislodging the Army of the Potomac. We had wrestled with it in too many struggles, army against army, to prefer, in sincerity, any such claim. From daylight until dark not a single Confederate soldier, outside of my two divisions and the three supporting brigades, was advanced to battle, or made to even threaten battle. The work was left entirely with my men. General Ewell dates his co-operative move at dusk. General Meade says it was at 8 o'clock. In any event, it was after my battle had closed, and too late to do any good. Hence there seems to be no place for honesty in the speculation that my com-

tionate, intimate, and tender during the whole war. That his confidence in me was never shaken there is the most abundant proof; but I cannot be tempted, even by direct misrepresentations, into a discussion of this subject. I will advert to one point that will go to show the relations that existed between us. It is an incident of the second battle of Manassas.

When the head of my column reached that field it was about 12 o'clock on the 29th. As we approached the field we heard sounds of a heavy battle, which proved to be General Jackson very severely engaged with the enemy. As my column deployed on the field, the enemy at once withdrew, in good order, however, and took up a strong position a little in the rear or where the heaviest fighting had been going on. During the lull that succeeded, General Lee rode up to where I was and told me that he had determined to attack the position taken by the enemy and indicated his purpose to have me open the fight. My men were then arranged for battle, but I asked General Lee to withhold the order for attack until I had made a careful reconnoissance and determined exactly how the troops had best be handled. He consented, of course, to this, and I went forward to make the reconnoissance. After a careful examination of the ground I rode back to General Lee, and reported that the position was very strong and the prospects hardly such as to warrant the heavy sacrifice of life that a serious attack would involve. General Lee was not satisfied, however, but seemed disposed to insist upon an attack. He began to suggest moves by which an advantageous assault might be made. Before the question was at all decided a dispatch was received from General Stuart, giving us notice that a very strong column was moving up against my right. General Lee ordered me at once to reinforce that part of my line and be ready to repel the attack. I ordered the reinforcing column to the march and rode out rapidly in advance, that I might see precisely what was needed. The threatening column proved to be General Fitz John Porter's command. After seeing it, I reported back to General Lee that it was too light a column in my opinion to mean a real attack. This presumption was correct, and the advance soon halted and then withdrew.

General Lee then recalled the question of an immediate attack upon the main position of the Federals. I was thoroughly convinced that the position was too strong to be taken without very severe loss, and I suggested to General Lee that the attack be postponed, and that we make a forced reconnoissance just at nightfall, and that we could then prepare to attack at daylight, if it seemed advisable after thorough investigation to make the attack at all. He consented very readily to this, and I left him to prepare for the forced reconnoissance. The reconnoissance was successfully made at nightfall. During the night several of my brigadiers came in and they all agreed in reporting the position very strong. At about midnight Generals Hood and Evans, and possibly one or two others, came to my headquarters and made similar reports, expressing apprehensions as to the result of the attack. Everything developed by this closer reconnoissance went to confirm the impression made upon me by my reconnoissance during the day. I therefore determined not to make the attack, and ordered my troops back to the original line of battle.

The next day the Federals advanced against General Jackson in very heavy force. They soon made the battle so severe for him that he was obliged to call for reinforcements. At about 3 P. M., while the battle was raging fiercely, I was riding to my front when I received a note from Generals Hood and Evans, asking me to ride to a part of the field where they were standing. I changed my course and hurried to the point indicated. I found them standing upon a high piece of ground, from which they had full view of the battle being made against Jackson. We could see the solid masses of the Federals forming for a charge against Jackson's weakening lines. They were gathered in immense force, and it seemed impossible that Jackson's thin lines could withstand the onset. The Federals moved forward steadily, surging on in solid blocks, headed directly for Jackson's lines. Just then a courier arrived in great haste with orders from General Lee for me to hurry to the assistance of Jackson. It was in the very crisis of the battle. I had very serious doubts about being able to reach General Jackson in time to be of any service to him. I had no doubt, however, that I could impede or paralyze the immense mass of men that was pressing steadily to his overthrow. We were standing on the flank of the advancing columns. They swept on at right angles to our line of vision. They were within easy artillery range, and I felt certain that a heavy enfilading fire poured unexpectedly into their charging columns would disconcert and check it. Instead of moving to reinforce Jackson, therefore, I sent dispatches for batteries to hurry to where I was. In an exceedingly short time Captain Wiley's six-gun batteries came dashing up at full gallop, the horses covered with foam, and the men urging them forward. They were wheeled into position and directed against the moving flank of the enemy. The range was fair, and as the six guns flashed the heavy shot went ploughing through the solid flank of the Federals, doing terrible damage.

The result was anticipated. The line faltered for an instant, started again, hesitated, reformed and pressed forward, and then as a rear broadside was poured into them, broke ranks and retired, slowly, sullenly and doggedly. General Jackson did not pursue, and the Federals halted after moving back a short distance, and arranged to reform their ranks and renew the charge. As soon as they started, however, they were obliged to face against General Jackson. This exposed them, of course, to our enfilading fire. We now had several batteries in position, and as soon as the lines had taken shape and started on their second assault we poured a perfect hail of balls into their flanks and scattered them again. Although discomfited they were not broken, but retired with their slow, angry, sullen step. When they had gone beyond the fair range of our batteries they halted and tried to form again for the third assault. I now determined to end the matter, feeling that I had an easy victory in my grasp. I therefore ordered every battery to be in readiness, and drew my men up for a charge, designing to throw them into the broken ranks of the enemy as soon as my artillery had dispersed them. The Federals moved forward once more. When they were fairly in range every gun was opened upon them, and before they had recovered from the stunning effect, I

sprung every man that I had to the charge, and swept down upon them like an avalanche. The effect was simply magical. The enemy broke all to pieces. I pushed my men forward in a pell-mell pursuit, hoping to reach the main Federal lines at the same time with their retreating forces. We succeeded in this and drove the enemy back, pursuing them until fully 10 o'clock at night. In the meanwhile I received a note from General Lee. He had heard my guns, and at once supposed I had thought it best to relieve Jackson in a different manner from that indicated by his orders. He therefore wrote that if I had "found anything better than reinforcing Jackson, to pursue it." I mention this incident simply to show the official relations that existed between General Lee and myself. As to our personal relations I present two letters throwing light upon that subject. One is from Colonel W. H. Taylor, assistant adjutant general, and the other is from General Lee himself:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, *April 26, 1864.*

"MY DEAR GENERAL:

"I have received your note of yesterday, and have consulted the General about reviewing your command. He directs me to say that he has written to the President to know if he can visit and review the army this week, and until his reply is received the General cannot say when he can visit you. He is anxious to see you, and it will give him much pleasure to meet you and your corps once more. He hopes soon to be able to do this, and I will give you due notice when he can come. I really am beside myself, General, with joy of having you back. It is like the reunion of a family.

"Truly and respectfully yours,

"W. H. TAYLOR, A. A. G.

"*To General LONGSTREET.*"

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"LEXINGTON, VA., *March 9, 1866.*

"MY DEAR GENERAL:

"Your son Garland handed me, a few days since, your letter of the 15th of January, with the copies of your reports of operations in East Tennessee, the Wilderness, etc., and of some of my official letters to you. I hope you will be able to send me a report of your operations around Suffolk and Richmond previous to the evacuation of that city, and of any of my general orders which you may be able to collect. Can you not occupy your leisure time in preparing memoirs of the war? Every officer whose position and character would give weight to his statements ought to do so. It is the only way in which we can hope that fragments of truth will reach posterity. Mrs. Longstreet will act as your amanuensis. I am very sorry that your arm improves so slowly. I trust that it will eventually be restored to you. You must present my kindest regards to Mrs. Longstreet. I hope your home in New Orleans will be happy, and that your life, which is dear to me, will be long and prosperous.

"Most truly yours,

R. E. LEE."

There is one point to which I call especial attention. The friends of Colonel J. B. Walton, Chief of Artillery of the First corps, think that in my first an inferential injustice was done to that gentleman. Colonel Walton was an officer of great worth, and at all times had the confidence of his commanding officers; and it is with pleasure that I correct what certainly was an unintentional derogation of his quality. It is true that in part of my first narrative there were sentences subject to the erroneous impression that Colonel

Walton was not in full command of the artillery of the First corps at the battle of Gettysburg. My orders, however, as well as my instructions, quoted in another part of the narrative, were addressed to Colonel J. B. Walton as Chief of Artillery, and show conclusively that he was in command on that day. Colonel Alexander figured more prominently in the correspondence that passed between myself and the artillery simply because I had consulted personally with Colonel Alexander on these points before the battle opened, and because he was most directly interested in the handling of the artillery massed at the peach orchard, and under cover of which Pickett was to make his charge. Colonel Walton was a brave and capable officer, and I regret that my narrative was so construed as to reflect upon his fair and spotless record.

There were two or three trifling inaccuracies in my first account of this battle which need correction: The scout, upon whose information the head of our column was turned to the right, reported at Chambersburg on the night of the 28th of June. It is printed the 29th. Several orders that I issued on the 1st of July, and so dated, appear under the date of the 18th. The real strength of Pickett's division was 4,500 bayonets. It was printed at 5,500. In the paragraph where I stated that General Meade anticipated my attack of the 3d, and told General Hancock that he intended to throw the Fifth and Sixth corps against its flanks when it was made, it is printed that he gave this information in the "evening," when, of course, it should have been "morning." With these trifling exceptions, the article, as printed, was correct.

I have now done, for the present, with the campaign of Gettysburg. What I have written about it has been compelled from me by a desire on the one hand to have future historians properly informed upon the most important movement of the war, and a necessity on the other hand of correcting important misstatements made ignorantly or maliciously concerning it. I have written nothing that was not supported by abundant proof, advanced no opinions not clearly justified by the facts. As disastrous as the results of that battle were, and as innocent as I was of bringing them upon my people, I accepted my share of the disaster without a murmur, and cheerfully bore the responsibility of it as long as there was a possibility of injuring the cause we were engaged in by a discussion of the points involved. I should probably have never written a line concerning the battle had it not been for the attempt of the wordy soldiers to specifically fix upon me the whole burden of that battle—their rashness carrying them so far as to lead them to put false orders in the mouth of our great captain, and charge me with having broken them. To disprove these untrue assertions, and to give the world the truth concerning the battle, then became what I considered an imperative duty. I repeat that I regret most deeply that this discussion was not opened before the death of General Lee. If the charges so vehemently urged against me after his death had been preferred, or even suggested, in his lifetime, I do not believe they would have needed any reply from me. General Lee would have answered them himself, and have set history right. But, even as the matter is, I do not fear the verdict of history on Gettysburg. Time sets all things right. Error lives but a day—truth is eternal.



There is an incidental matter to which I shall refer in this connection. It is in regard to a statement made by Mr. Swinton. In his "*Ultimo Suspiro*" he gives the history of a meeting which he says took place on the 7th of April, 1865, between General Lee and his leading officers. He says that this meeting was a private council, and that the officers united in advising General Lee to surrender on that day—two days before the surrender took place at Appomattox. In describing that meeting he does me the grave injustice of putting my name among the officers who gave General Lee this advice. The truth of the matter is, I never attended any such meeting. I had no time to have done so. I was kept incessantly busy in the field during the days preceding the surrender at Appomattox. All night long of the 1st we marched with Field's division from Richmond to Petersburg, reaching that point at early dawn on the 2d. I at once went to General Lee's headquarters. I found him in bed in his tent. While I was sitting upon the side of his couch, discussing my line of march and receiving my orders for the future—this involving a march on the Five Forks—a courier came in and announced that our line was being broken in front of the house in which General Lee had slept. I hurried to the front, and as fast as my troops came up they were thrown into action to check the advance of the Federals until night had come to cover our withdrawal. We fought all day, and at night again took up our march, and from that time forward until the surrender we marched and fought and hungered, staggering through cold and rain and mud to Appomattox—contesting every foot of the way, beset by overwhelming odds on all sides. It was one constant fight for days and days, the nights even giving us no rest. When at length the order came to surrender, on the 9th, I ordered my men to stack their arms, and surrendered four thousand bayonets of Field's division—the only troops that General Lee had left me. I also turned over to General Grant 1,300 prisoners taken by the cavalry and by my troops while on the retreat. As to the conference of officers on the 7th I never attended, and of course did not join in the advice it gave to General Lee. Mr. Swinton has been clearly misinformed upon this point.

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### **Reply to General Longstreet's Second Paper.**

BY GENERAL J. A. EARLY.

General Longstreet is of the opinion that he is a very deeply-aggrieved man, because he has not been permitted, without question, to pronounce that General Lee's strategy in the Gettysburg campaign was very defective; that General Lee had lost his mind when he determined to deliver battle at Gettysburg, or, to use the language in which the idea is conveyed, that he had "during the crisis of the campaign lost the matchless equipoise that usually characterized him, and that whatever mistakes were made were not so much

matters of deliberate judgment as the impulses of a great mind disturbed by unparalleled conditions"; that he, himself, alone understood the requirements of the occasion, and if he had been allowed to control the operations of the army, a brilliant victory would have ensued; and that every other officer in any responsible position, outside of his own immediate command, was grossly derelict, or terribly blundered. All this he claims the right to do, for the benefit of "the Comte de Paris and the general historian," because he is "the only living person who could explain the *motif* of that campaign and the true reasons of its failure."

He laid the foundation for enlightening the "general historian" in regard to the demerits and deficiencies of General Lee, and his own superior claims to the leadership of the Army of Northern Virginia, by a letter written to his uncle, on the 24th day of July, 1863, which letter would have never seen the light of day if he had not, himself, given it to the public. In that letter he said:

"The battle was not made as I would have made it. My idea was to throw ourselves between the enemy and Washington, select a strong position, and force the enemy to attack us. So far as is given to man the ability to judge, we may say with confidence that we should have destroyed the Federal army, marched into Washington, and dictated our terms, or, at least, held Washington and marched over so much of Pennsylvania as we cared to, had we drawn the enemy into attack upon our carefully-chosen position in his rear. General Lee chose the plans adopted; and he is the person to choose and to order. I consider it a part of my duty to express my views to the Commanding General. If he approves and adopts them, it is well; if he does not, it is my duty to adopt his views, and to execute them as faithfully as if they were my own. I cannot help but think that great results would have been obtained had my views been thought better of; yet I am much inclined to accept the present condition as for the best."

The arrogance and egotism of all this might be to some extent pardonable when confined to a private confidential letter to a near relative; but when that letter is given to the public by its author, they become insufferable. The part of the letter published concludes as follows:

"As General Lee is our commander, he should have all the support and influence we can give him. If the blame (if there is any) can be shifted from him to me, I shall help him and our cause by taking it. I desire, therefore, that all the responsibility that can be put upon me shall go there and remain there. The truth will be known in time, and I leave that to show how much of the responsibility of Gettysburg shall rest on my shoulders."

The spirit of the first part of this latter passage is very self-sacrificing and commendable indeed, but the declaration of it is confined to the ear of his uncle, until the letter is made public for the purpose of showing that General Lee made an inexcusable blunder in framing his own plans, and rejecting the wiser counsels of the writer of that letter; and, when the attempt is made to show that the latter was really at fault in not cordially, promptly, and vigorously seconding the plans of the Commanding General, he cries out most lustily that he is the victim of "the ill-natured and splenetic attacks" of "certain wordy soldiers," in a "tom-tom warfare." These figures of rhetoric are,

doubtless, very brilliant in the dress given them by "the professional writer" of the *Philadelphia Times*; but when General Longstreet undertakes to blow his own trumpet, at the expense of others, he must not complain if its discordant notes are drowned by the sound of the tom-tom, nor, when he decks himself in stolen feathers, if he shares the fate of the jackdaw.

He very evidently does not agree with the poet, that—

" Truth crushed to earth shall rise again:  
The eternal years of God are hers."

He has no confidence in her unaided efforts to make herself known, and hence he applies himself to the work of helping her out of the dirt and mud most manfully; and after tugging at her skirts for some time, he presents to the public gaze a brazen-faced image, in which are to be recognized none of the lineaments of the diffident and modest goddess.

Very soon after the war, in what Swinton designates as "a full and free conversation" with him, General Longstreet made the statements upon which were based the very severe criticisms of that writer on General Lee's conduct of the Gettysburg campaign; and when General Lee's letter to President Davis, written a short time after the close of that campaign, was made public, a little more than two years ago, General Longstreet hastened to publish the above-mentioned letter to his uncle. In General Lee's very self-abnegating letter to the President, there occurs this passage:

"Everything therefore points to the advantages to be derived from a new commander, and I the more anxiously urge the matter upon your Excellency, from my belief that a younger and abler man than myself can readily be obtained. I know that he will have as gallant and brave an army as ever existed to second his efforts, and it would be the happiest day of my life to see at its head a worthy leader; one that would accomplish more than I could perform, and all that I have wished."

In a communication, over his signature, in the *New Orleans Republican* of the 27th of February, 1876, General Longstreet, referring to his letter to his uncle, said:

"His [Longstreet's] letter was published owing to its corroborative and sympathetic relations to one of General R. E. Lee written two weeks later. The publication was made following the publication of General R. E. Lee's, so that the facts might be known and noted in their proper connection, not in attack or defence of any one."

The letter of General Lee here referred to is the one to the President from which the foregoing extract is made, and the only part of it to which Longstreet's could bear the remotest "corroborative and sympathetic relations" is the passage given—that is, Longstreet's letter was corroborative of the opinion that a younger and abler leader for the army could have been obtained, and sympathetic with it in pointing out who that leader should have been—to wit: General James Longstreet.

Accompanying the publication of the letter to his uncle, General Longstreet gave the following extract from a letter to him from General Lee, dated, as alleged, in January, 1864:

“Had I taken your advice at Gettysburg instead of pursuing the course I did, how different all things might have been.”

A letter from General Fitz Lee appeared in the public prints very shortly thereafter, and, in that letter, he spoke in very complimentary terms of General Longstreet, but expressed a desire that the whole of General Lee's letter, from which the brief extract was given, should be published.

This was the occasion of the publication of the communication in the *New Orleans Republican*, from General Longstreet, which has been referred to. That communication contained a bitter tirade of denunciation against General Fitz Lee, General William N. Pendleton, the Rev. J. William Jones, and myself, the greater part of it being directed against me. Thus originated the “tom-tom warfare,” in which the leading part on our side was borne by me, and two long articles were published on both sides. It implies no immoderate degree of vanity on my part to say that General Longstreet came out of the first campaign badly worsted. The only ground for his complaint against me has been already shown in my reply to his first article in the *Philadelphia Times*; and I will take occasion here to say, that I did not suspect him of having employed another to write the two articles then published over his own name.

It was very apparent to me, however, when I read the first article in the *Times*, professing to be from him, that the diction was not his, and that he had manifestly been curbed in the expression of his comments on General Lee's character as a commander, and I accordingly said in my reply that the article was evidently not written by him. I mentioned this fact, not because I thought the article, though exhibiting some improvement on his style, contained any better logic than his own productions had shown, but to prevent the lucubrations of a mere newspaper writer from being taken for the criticisms of a soldier of, at least, some experience.

In the last paper on “The Mistakes of Gettysburg,” published in the *Philadelphia Times* of the 23d of February, General Longstreet is made to say:

“One of the chief elements of this tom-tom warfare is found in the fact that, owing to wounds received in the honorable service of my country, which have virtually paralyzed my right arm, and made it impossible for me to write save under pain and constraint, I have been compelled, in the preparation of my articles, to accept the service of a professional writer generously tendered me by the editor of the *Times*. Upon such trifling casuals as this do my enemies propose to build their histories and amend mine. The attempt is at once pitiful and disgraceful.”

I cannot but believe that this passage, in thought as well as diction, is wholly the production of the “professional writer” for the *Times*. I cannot believe that General Longstreet has yet arrived at such a stage as to be the prompter of so unmanly an appeal. He knows very well that there are a number of officers and men who entirely lost their right arms in the war, and are yet able to write with great facility; and it is hardly to be presumed that he suggested that appeal of the “old soldier” for sympathy. My suggestion

had no reference to the mere mechanical task of writing, or the employment of another as his amanuensis, for if he had but done the latter he would only have followed the example of many very able writers, and among them Homer and Milton, whose blindness rendered it necessary for them to use the services of others in transferring the grandest productions of their brains to paper. So if General Longstreet had merely employed another to commit to paper his own ideas, or to correct and render more perspicuous their expression, there would have been no impropriety in that. The objection is that the views, speculations, and criticisms of a professional newspaper writer, without military experience, should be palmed on the public as historical matter, to solve the disputed points as to the battle of Gettysburg. The fact is, that it would be better for General Longstreet if he would get some competent person to do his thinking as well as his writing. He would then avoid the difficulties into which he has been floundering, deeper and deeper, not only with his own productions, but through the instrumentality of those written for him by his friend, the professional writer for the *Times*.

Though professing to be on "The Mistakes of Gettysburg," one of the prime objects of the last article in the *Times* seems to have been to claim for General Longstreet the principal credit for the victory gained at the second battle of Manassas, at the expense of both General Lee and General Jackson. The pretence for advancing this new claim is found in the following passage:

"At this late date the official relations of General Lee and myself are brought in question. He is credited with having used uncomely remarks concerning me, in the presence of a number of subordinate officers, just on the eve of battle. It is hardly possible that any one acquainted with General Lee's exalted character will accept such statements as true."

It is evident that allusion is here made to the language used by General Lee, as given by me, in the conference had with Generals Ewell, Rodes, and myself, after the close of the first day's fight, when he said: "Longstreet is a very good fighter when he gets in position and gets everything ready, but he is so slow." It will be seen, from a letter given by General Fitz Lee, in his article in the April number of the *Papers*, from a distinguished gentleman to himself, that General Lee made a similar remark to that gentleman after the war; and, if the fact was that General Longstreet was slow in his movements, there could be no possible impropriety in mentioning it under the circumstances attending General Lee's remark. It is a little curious, though, that while General Lee's exalted character is cited as being inconsistent with such a remark, General Longstreet himself wrote a letter to the editor of the *Times*, of which the latter gives the substance, as follows:

"The letter from General Longstreet, which accompanies these extracts, dwells particularly upon a point which he wishes to have his readers understand as the justification of his present narrative. It is that while General Lee on the battle-field assumed all the responsibility for the result, he afterwards published a report that differs from the report he made at the time while under that generous spirit. General Longstreet and other officers made their official reports upon the battle shortly after its occurrence, and while they were impressed with General Lee's noble assumption of all the blame;

but General Lee having since written a detailed and somewhat critical account of the battle—and the account from which General Longstreet's critics get all their points against him—Longstreet feels justified in discussing the battle on its merits."

It seems, then, that General Longstreet's appreciation of General Lee's exalted character did not prevent him from making the false charge, that General Lee had, when time enough had elapsed for the generous feelings, which prompted him on the field to assume all the responsibility, to subside, written a report differing from his first report, and from the facts of the case, after General Longstreet and other officers had been entrapped into making the reports which they sent in. For that is the real purport of the charge against General Lee, as the editor of the *Times* gives it, and it is very probable that the letter itself, which is withheld, made it in more emphatic language.

If there was any doubt before of a fact well known to the whole army, that General Longstreet was very slow in his movements on all occasions, he has now furnished very conclusive evidence of its truth, in his narrative of incidents connected with the second battle of Manassas. He says:

"When the head of my column reached that field it was about 12 o'clock on the 29th. As we approached the field we heard sounds of a heavy battle, which proved to be General Jackson very heavily engaged with the enemy."

As soon as his troops were deployed into line, General Lee wanted him to open the attack, but Longstreet insisted on taking time to make a reconnoissance, which was delayed for a time by a report of an advance on his right, and the reconnoissance was not made until about nightfall. This is according to his own showing, and in the meantime General Jackson's command had sustained and repulsed seven different attacks in heavy force during the afternoon. So little evidence had General Longstreet given to the enemy of the presence of his command on the field, that General Fitz John Porter, of the Federal army, was afterwards court-martialed and cashiered for failing to carry out an order sent to him by Pope, at half-past four o'clock of that very afternoon, to attack Jackson's right flank—the very one on which Longstreet was. It was not until after sunset that any part of Longstreet's command became engaged, when there was a conflict between Hood's division and King's division of McDowell's corps, which was moving along the Warrenton Pike to cut off Jackson's troops, erroneously supposed to be retreating. On the next day, though there was skirmishing and fighting in Jackson's front all day, General Longstreet was not ready to go into action until after 3 P. M. What caused this delay he does not pretend to explain, but gives his operations on that day as follows:

"The next day the Federals advanced against General Jackson in very heavy force. They soon made the battle so severe for him that he was obliged to call for reinforcements. At about 3 P. M., while the battle was raging fiercely, I was riding to my front when I received a note from Generals Hood and Evans, asking me to ride to a part of the field where they were standing. I changed my course and hurried to the point indicated. I found them standing upon a

high piece of ground, from which they had full view of the battle being made against Jackson. We could see the solid masses of the Federals forming for a charge against Jackson's weakening lines. They were gathered in immense force, and it seemed impossible that Jackson's thin lines could withstand the onset. The Federals moved forward steadily, surging on in solid blocks, headed directly for Jackson's lines. Just then a courier arrived in great haste with orders from General Lee for me to hurry to the assistance of Jackson. It was in the very crisis of the battle. I had very serious doubts about being able to reach General Jackson in time to be of any service to him. I had no doubt, however, that I could impede or paralyze the immense mass of men that was pressing steadily to his overthrow. We were standing on the flank of the advancing columns. They swept on at right angles to our line of vision. They were within easy artillery range, and I felt certain that a heavy enfilading fire poured unexpectedly into their charging column would disconcert and check it. Instead of moving to reinforce Jackson, therefore, I sent dispatches for batteries to hurry to where I was. In an exceedingly short time Captain Wiley's six-gun batteries came dashing up at full gallop, the horses covered with foam, and the men urging them forward. They were wheeled into position and directed against the moving flank of the enemy. The range was fair, and as the six guns flashed the heavy shot went ploughing through the solid flank of the Federals, doing terrible damage.

"The result was as anticipated. The line faltered for an instant, started again, hesitated, reformed and pressed forward, and then as a rear broadside was poured into them, broke ranks and retired, slowly, sullenly and doggedly. General Jackson did not pursue, and the Federals halted after moving back a short distance, and arranged to reform their ranks and renew the charge. As soon as they started, however, they were obliged to face against General Jackson. This exposed them, of course, to our enfilading fire. We now had several batteries in position, and as soon as the lines had taken shape and started on their second assault we poured a perfect hail of balls into their flanks and scattered them again. Although discomfited they were not broken, but retired with their slow, angry, sullen step. When they had gone beyond the fair range of our batteries they halted and tried to form again for the third assault. I now determined to end the matter, feeling that I had an easy victory in my grasp. I therefore ordered every battery to be in readiness, and drew my men up for a charge, designing to throw them into the broken ranks of the enemy as soon as my artillery had dispersed them. The Federals moved forward once more. When they were fairly in range every gun was opened upon them, and before they had recovered from the stunning effect, I sprung every man that I had to the charge, and swept down upon them like an avalanche. The effect was simply magical. The enemy broke all to pieces. I pushed my men forward in a pell-mell pursuit, hoping to reach the main Federal lines at the same time with their retreating forces. We succeeded in this and drove the enemy back, pursuing them until fully 10 o'clock at night. In the meanwhile I received a note from General Lee. He had heard my guns, and at once supposed I had thought it best to relieve Jackson in a different manner from that indicated by his orders. He therefore wrote me that if I had 'found anything better than reinforcing Jackson, to pursue it.' I mention this incident simply to show the official relations that existed between General Lee and myself."

According to this account the whole credit for that battle was due to General Longstreet, and General Lee had very little to do with it. General Jackson merely withstood the enemy's attacks, while Longstreet was getting ready; and the question comes in here very naturally: What would have been the result, if Jackson and his men had not been of the stuff to withstand the shock of more than three times their numbers, for the long hours it took

Longstreet to get ready? It must be borne in mind that General Lee wanted to make the attack on the enemy the day before, according to Longstreet's own statement, and wanted him to begin it, but he demurred and asked permission to take time to reconnoitre. It was twenty-seven hours after his arrival on the field before he was ready to begin, and if the troops of McClellan, the junction of which with Pope's army Jackson's movement had been intended to prevent, had been hurried to the front, what a different result might have taken place!

Is it to be credited that, when General Lee was anxious for Longstreet to begin the attack as soon as his troops arrived on the 29th, he said nothing to him, nor gave him any orders on the 30th, until, as Longstreet says, after 3 P. M. a courier arrived in great haste with orders from General Lee for him to hurry to the assistance of Jackson; and that the only other part General Lee took in the battle that ensued, was to write him a note saying that if he had "found anything better than reinforcing Jackson, to pursue it"? Let us see what General Longstreet says in his official report, intended for General Lee's own eye. In that report, after describing his riding to the front, and his determination to direct an artillery fire on the attacking column, he says:

"Two batteries were ordered for the purpose, and one placed in position immediately and opened. Just as this fire began, I received a message from the Commanding General, informing me of General Jackson's condition and his wants. As it was evident that the attack against General Jackson could not be continued ten minutes under the fire of these batteries, I made no movement with my troops. Before the second battery could be placed in position, the enemy began to retire, and in less than ten minutes the ranks were broken, and that portion of his army put to flight. A fair opportunity was offered me, and the intended diversion was changed into an attack. My whole line was rushed forward at a charge. The troops sprang to their work, and moved forward with all the steadiness and firmness that characterize war-worn veterans. The batteries, continuing their play upon the confused masses, completed the work of this portion of the enemy's line, and my attack was, therefore, made against the forces in my front. The order for the advance had scarcely been given, when I received a message from the Commanding General, anticipating some such emergency, and ordering the move which was then going on, at the same time offering me Major-General Anderson's division. The Commanding General soon joined me, and, a few minutes after, Major-General Anderson arrived with his division. The attack was led by Hood's brigades, closely supported by Evans. These were rapidly reinforced by Anderson's division from the rear, Kemper's three brigades and D. R. Jones' division from the right, and Wilcox's brigade from the left. The brigades of Brigadier-Generals Featherston and Prior became detached, and operated with a portion of General Jackson's command. The attacking columns moved steadily forward, driving the enemy from his different positions as rapidly as he took them."

The claims here made are exorbitant enough in all conscience, but there is a little room left for a suspicion that Jackson's men had something to do with the repulse of the enemy from their front, and that it was not all the work of Longstreet's two batteries, and that they also took some part in the pursuit of the enemy. The relations which General Lee is made to bear to Longstreet's operations and the battle, are very different from those indicated in the extract from the article in the *Times*.



General Lee's report puts quite a different face on the whole proceeding, and his account is as follows:

"About 3 P. M., the enemy having massed his troops in front of General Jackson, advanced against his position in strong force. His front line pushed forward until engaged at close quarters by Jackson's troops, when its progress was checked, and a fierce and bloody struggle ensued. A second and third line, of great strength, moved up to support the first, but, in doing so, came within easy range of a position a little in advance of Longstreet's left. He immediately ordered up two batteries, and two others being thrown forward about the same time by Colonel S. D. Lee, under their well-directed fire the supporting lines were broken and fell back in confusion. Their repeated efforts to rally were unavailing, and Jackson's troops, being thus relieved from the pressure of overwhelming numbers, began to press steadily forward, driving the enemy before them. He retreated in confusion, suffering severely from our artillery, which advanced as he retired. General Longstreet, anticipating the order for a general advance, now threw his whole command against the Federal centre and left. Hood's two brigades, followed by Evans, led the attack. R. H. Anderson's division came gallantly to the support of Hood, while the three brigades of Wilcox moved forward on his left, and those of Kemper on his right. D. R. Jones advanced on the extreme right, and the whole line swept steadily on, driving the enemy, with great carnage, from each successive position, until 10 P. M., when darkness put an end to the battle and the pursuit."

It was not all Longstreet's battle then, and Jackson and his men had something to do with it. That Longstreet's troops, when once turned loose, fought with all the dash and gallantry possible, no one will pretend to deny; but it seemed an almost interminable period before they were brought into action, and often was uttered the anxious enquiry, by those who for four days had been confronting and fighting Pope's accumulating columns, "Will Longstreet never begin"? Is it to be wondered that General Lee had come to the conclusion that Longstreet was very slow, however well he fought when once in action?

It is to be observed that General Longstreet, in his account of this battle in the article in the *Times*, says that "General Jackson did not pursue," while General Lee says: "Their repeated efforts to rally were unavailing, and Jackson's troops, being thus relieved from the pressure of overwhelming numbers, began to press steadily forward, driving the enemy before them." The inference to be gathered from Longstreet's statement is that Jackson took no further part in the battle after the troops were repulsed from his front, but he (Longstreet) won the victory. The fact is that General Longstreet always proved himself incapable of doing justice to the troops of others who fought in conjunction with his own. To show how different it was with a truly great soldier, who could afford to accord to his comrades their due share of the glory won in battle, the following extract is given from General Jackson's report in regard to the same battle. He says:

"After some desultory skirmishing and heavy cannonading during the day, the Federal infantry, about 4 o'clock in the evening, moved from under cover of the wood and advanced in several lines, first engaging the right, but soon extending its attack to the centre and left. In a few moments our line was engaged in a fierce and sanguinary struggle with the enemy. As one line was

repulsed, another took its place and pressed forward as if determined, by force of numbers and fury of assault, to drive us from our positions. So impetuous and well-sustained were these onsets as to induce me to send to the Commanding General for reinforcements; but the timely and gallant advance of General Longstreet, on the right, relieved my troops from the pressure of overwhelming numbers and gave to those brave men the chances of a more equal conflict. As Longstreet pressed upon the right, the Federal advance was checked, and soon a general advance of my whole line was ordered. Eagerly and fiercely did each brigade press forward, exhibiting in parts of the field scenes of close encounter and murderous strife not witnessed often in the turmoil of battle. The Federals gave way before our troops, fell back in disorder, and fled precipitately, leaving their dead and wounded on the field. During their retreat the artillery opened with destructive power upon the fugitive masses. The infantry followed until darkness put an end to the pursuit."

After giving his statement of the operations at Second Manassas, to show the official relations between General Lee and himself, General Longstreet gives two letters, one from Colonel Taylor and the other from General Lee, to show the kindly personal relations that existed between himself and General Lee and his staff, a matter which no one will pretend to controvert, but which all will say ought to have prevented General Longstreet's insidious efforts to undermine the military fame of one who had been so kind, so indulgent, so magnanimous to him under all circumstances.

It may be observed here, that, while General Longstreet has given a letter from General Lee to him, written since the war, to show their kindly personal relations, he has never yet given the full text of that letter of January, 1864, from which the brief extract before alluded to was taken, though the extract is repeated in the first article in the *Times*.

Referring to the points made in the last-named article, General Longstreet says in the second article:

"These points I supported with the most particular proof. Not a single one of them has been controverted. The truth of a single fact, or the correctness of a single opinion laid down in that article, has not been disproved. Very few of them have been questioned—none of them overthrown."

If it be true that very few of his facts and opinions have been questioned, and none of them overthrown, then why the necessity for another article to sustain them, and whence the cause of all this complaint of attacks on himself?

If he has sustained by proof a solitary fact or opinion that has been in dispute, I am not aware of it. Take, for instance, the question as to the order for the attack on the second day of the battle. Besides his own declaration, he has adduced the letters of four gentlemen as his proof on that question. Three of these gentlemen know nothing of an order to attack at sunrise, or at any particular time, but one of them, in a part of his letter which was suppressed, says he was of the impression, from certain circumstances, that an order was given for an attack at as early an hour as practicable on the second; and the fourth says he knows of no order to attack at sunrise, and does not think such an order was given, for reasons which he states, and which I have shown to be entirely unsatisfactory. This is his whole proof on the question

as to the order. On the other side, we have General Pendleton's statement that General Lee told him, on the night of the first, that he had given the order for Longstreet to attack at sunrise next morning. General Lee also said to the gentleman referred to by General Fitz Lee, "that the battle would have been gained if General Longstreet had obeyed the orders given him, and had made the attack early instead of late." General Hood says that Longstreet said to him on the morning of the second: "The General is a little nervous this morning; he wishes me to attack; I do not wish to do so without Pickett. I never like to go into battle with one boot off." Hood got up before sunrise, and he gives several circumstances tending to show that General Lee was anxious to make the attack at once. General Longstreet, in his first article, has stated that General Lee, at 5 P. M. of the 1st, announced his purpose of attacking the enemy the next day, that he persisted in that purpose late at night against his own repeated remonstrances, and that he reiterated it at daylight next morning. All the presumptions from these statements and circumstances are in favor of the correctness of General Pendleton's statement, and when connected with General Lee's declaration to Ewell, Rodes, and myself, at the close of the first, it becomes absurd for General Longstreet to say that he has sustained all his facts and opinions by the most particular proofs. It is very evident, beyond all reasonable doubt, that General Lee indicated to him the desire for him to attack at a very early hour on the 2d. It is possible, and in fact probable, that no peremptory order was given to make the attack at any specified time, but the purpose must have been indicated in a manner that should have had the force and effect of a peremptory order with one whose duty it was to second promptly and cordially all the Commanding General's plans.

It is beyond all dispute that General Longstreet thwarted General Lee's purpose of attacking the enemy at as early an hour as practicable, by his reluctance and procrastination.

When he asserts that his troops fought on the 2d with heroic courage and devotion, all Confederates will admit the fact; and even when he asserts that they "did the best three-hours' fighting ever done by any troops in any field," the claim will be allowed to pass without challenge, that much being conceded to the admissible pride of a commander in his troops; but when he asserts that his troops "virtually charged against the whole Federal army," the idea at once suggests itself, that, if those troops, who came so near success under such circumstances, had had a leader competent to the occasion, and had been led to battle in the early morning or at any time in the forenoon, when all of the Federal army had not arrived and the bulk of it that was up was massed on its right, in front of our left, victory must inevitably have ensued. We can but lament that the heroic courage and dash of such troops were rendered powerless by the tardiness of their leader, and that when they were given occasion for the display of their prowess, it was but to be sacrificed to his incompetency. It is pitiable to think that Hood's gallant men were doomed to slaughter in a desperate struggle for the heights of Round Top, against

troops that had been on the extreme right of the Federal army until 2 o'clock P. M., about which time they were ordered to the left, and who were barely able to reach the Round Top in time to save it from the assaulting column. Had the movement begun even two hours sooner, that point, which Meade says was the key-point to his whole position, and the possession of which by us would have prevented him from holding any of the ground, would have fallen into the possession of Hood's men with little or no contest; for Sykes' troops, that saved that point from capture, had not then started from the enemy's right. Even the mules, which it is presumed General Longstreet did *not* cite, could not have speeded them enough to secure their arrival at the Round Top in time, if the assault on it had begun when they were two or three miles away.

The attempt to show that the same result that did happen would have followed an attack at sunrise or at any other hour in the forenoon, is an utter failure. It is sought to sustain it by the testimony of Federal officers, by detaching scraps of their testimony from the context, in order to give them a different meaning from that intended by the parties testifying. Here is what is said on that head in the article:

"Let us briefly review the situation on the morning of the 2d. During the night of the 1st General Sickles rested with the Third corps upon the ground lying between General Hancock's left and Round Top, General Geary's division of the Twelfth corps occupying part of the same line. General Meade had given General Sickles orders to occupy Round Top if it were practicable; and in reply to his question as to what sort of position it was, General Sickles had answered, 'There is no position there.' At the first signs of activity in our ranks on the 2d, General Sickles became apprehensive that we were about to attack him, and so reported to General Meade. As our move progressed his apprehensions were confirmed, and being uneasy at the position in which his troops had been left, and certain that he was about to receive battle, he determined to seize the vantage ground in front of the peach orchard. Without awaiting for orders, he pushed forward and took the position desired. Meanwhile the reports made to General Meade drew his attention to our part of the field, and finally he rode out just in time to see the battle open. It will be seen, therefore, that General Sickles' move, and all the movements of the Federal left, were simply sequents of mine. They would have followed my movements inevitably, no matter when they had been made. Had the attack been made earlier, or later, we should have seen the Federals move just as they did, and with the same results—except that if I had attacked earlier I should have had Geary's division of the Twelfth corps in my immediate front in addition to the Third corps. This would certainly have been the effect of 'a sunrise attack.'"

In his testimony, General Sickles says:

"At a very early hour on Thursday morning I received a notification that General Meade's headquarters had been established at Gettysburg, and I was directed by him to relieve a division of the Twelfth corps, (General Geary's division, I think,) which was massed a little to my left, and which had taken position there during the night, I did so, reporting, however, to General Meade that that division was not in position, but was merely massed in my vicinity; the tenor of his order seemed to indicate a supposition on his part that the division was in position. \* \* \* \* \*

"Not having received any orders in reference to my position, and observing from the enemy's movements on the left, what I thought to be conclusive

indications of a design on their part to attack there, and that seeming to be our most assailable point, I went in person to headquarters and reported the facts and circumstances which led me to believe that an attack would be made there, and asked for orders. I did not receive any orders, and I found that my impression as to the intention of the enemy to attack in that direction was not concurred in at headquarters; and I was satisfied, from information which I received, that it was intended to retreat from Gettysburg. I asked General Meade to go over the ground on the left and examine it. He said his arrangements did not permit him to do that."

Geary's division was removed very early in the morning, and Sickles' corps remained on that flank, alone, until late in the afternoon. It was in the morning that he reported to Meade his apprehension of an attack on that flank, as shown by Meade's testimony, and yet no arrangements were made for transferring troops to meet such an attack, and Sickles did not go into position until near 4 o'clock. In fact Meade had been projecting an attack from his right flank on our left until the afternoon, when it was reported impracticable. He then ordered the Fifth corps (Sykes') over to the left about 2 o'clock P. M. In his testimony he says:

"About half-past three o'clock in the afternoon—it having been reported to me about two o'clock that the Sixth corps had arrived—I proceeded from headquarters, which were about the centre of the line and in rear of the cemetery, to the extreme left, in order to see as to the posting of the Fifth corps, and also to inspect the position of the Third corps, about which I was in doubt. \* \* \* \* When I arrived on the ground, which I did a few minutes before four o'clock in the afternoon, I found General Sickles had taken a position very much in advance of what it had been my intention that he should take."

General Warren, after saying he had reconnoitred in front of their right and advised against an attack there, adds:

"Soon afterwards I rode out with General Meade to examine the left of our line, where General Sickles was. His troops could hardly be said to be in position."

He then says that he went to Round Top, by Meade's direction, and from there sent word to Meade that that point would have to be occupied very strongly. Meade then ordered a division of Sykes' corps, which was coming up, to the position, and Warren says:

"The troops under General Sykes arrived barely in time to save Round Top hill, and they had a very desperate fight to hold it."

The assumption, under these circumstances, that, "had the attack been made earlier or later, we should have seen the Federals move just as they did, and with the same results," argues a degree of obtuseness on the part of the writer of the above passage, or of reliance upon the credulity of his readers, which is marvellous. The idea is, that, if Longstreet's columns had gone to the attack at sunrise, or at any time in the morning, when Meade apprehended no attack in that quarter, and Round Top was not occupied and he knew nothing of the character of the ground, he would have been able to make precisely the same dispositions before the enemy was reached by Longstreet's

columns that he was enabled to make in the afternoon, after he had gone to that flank, and Sykes had had two hours for his movement from the right to the left, before Longstreet's advance began; and it is wholly untenable. It is very apparent that General Longstreet has not the remotest conception of the importance of celerity in preparing for and conducting an attack. According to his own admission, he received at 11 o'clock in the forenoon the positive order to make the attack, and yet it took him until 4 o'clock in the afternoon to get ready for that attack. Imagine Stonewall Jackson taking five hours to reconnoitre the enemy's position and get his own troops in position before beginning his advance, after making the circuit to get on Hooker's right flank at Chancellorsville, thus giving the latter time to be informed of the movement and to prepare for receiving the projected blow, and what, can it be supposed, would have been the result? Is it not manifest that instead of the brilliant victory which crowned the career of that immortal hero, there would have been a disastrous repulse?

General Longstreet's repugnance to making the attack, and his foreboding of failure, were very potent causes of the want of success when the attack was made. It was his duty to have accepted the plans of the Commanding General without question, and undertaken their execution at once, with the determination to do all in his power to insure their success. That he did not do so, but presumed to question the wisdom of General Lee's decision, and oppose to it his own judgment, is abundantly established by his own repeated declarations. He went into the fight, from the beginning, with the expectation of losing, and hence he lost. One who determines to achieve success at all hazards, has won half the battle, while he who goes to the performance of any undertaking with no hope of success is not likely to succeed under the most favorable circumstances. This is alike applicable to the case of the sluggard school-boy who thinks his task too heavy, and therefore will not try to learn his lesson, and that of the reluctant Corps Commander who goes to the performance of the duty assigned him with the belief that he is charged with a hopeless undertaking.

General Longstreet's complaint, now, that he was not promptly supported, and therefore failed, is a little singular, as he insists that there was no chance of success from the beginning. The uncertainty with which all his movements were attended, and his almost interminable delay, rendered it impossible for any one to know when he was ready or had actually begun, and the complaint therefore comes from him with a very bad grace. He who is at fault is very generally apt to lay the blame on others for what is due to his own shortcomings.

There is again in this second article an allusion to "our line of battle having been broken through the advice of General Early." By this is meant the posting of two of my brigades in a position to protect our left flank, which was very much exposed before the arrival of Stuart's cavalry. This has been fully explained heretofore, and the fact shown that these two brigades never constituted any part of our line; so that it was not broken by their being

assigned the position they occupied. If General Longstreet found it necessary to take two of his divisions, which were intended to support the attacking column on the 3d, in order to protect his right flank against two brigades of Pleasanton's cavalry, it was certainly not unreasonable to take two brigades to protect a flank that was very much more exposed. This objection is really too insignificant to discuss.

In the second article there is this passage :

"In my first article I declared that the invasion of Pennsylvania was a movement that General Lee and *his council* agreed should be defensive in tactics, while of course it was offensive in strategy."

I have italicized the words "his council" to fix attention upon them, and the question very naturally arises: who constituted this "council" that exercised or claimed to exercise powers co-equal with those of the Commanding General? Was General Lee really Commander-in-Chief, or was it a divided responsibility which he shared with a "council"? It is a novel proposition that there existed any such body or person. On turning to the first article, there will be found the following remarkable passage, a portion of which I have also italicized :

"I recall these points simply because I desire to have it distinctly understood that, while I first suggested to General Lee the idea of an offensive campaign, *I was never persuaded to yield my argument against the Gettysburg campaign, except with the understanding that we were not to deliver an offensive battle, but so to manoeuvre that the enemy should be forced to attack us—or, to repeat, that our campaign should be one of offensive strategy but defensive tactics. Upon this understanding my assent was given, and General Lee, who had been kind enough to discuss the matter with me patiently, gave the order of march.*"

This passage bears very strong "corroborative and sympathetic relations" to the one taken from the second article, and it becomes very apparent that it was General Longstreet himself who was the self-constituted "council" of General Lee, and claimed the right to dictate and control the policy of the Gettysburg campaign.

The impudence, arrogance, and presumptuous self-conceit which characterize both passages, are intolerable; and the only response that is necessary, is simply a reference to the story of that obtuse though useful animal, who, not content with the subordinate station assigned him, essayed to play the part of the monarch of the beasts, by wearing his skin, and succeeded tolerably well in palming himself, in his assumed character, upon the more foolish animals, but when he had the folly to open his mouth, betrayed himself by his voice.

I will not again undertake to discuss the propriety of the attack on the third day of the battle of Gettysburg, but will merely say that the officer who was entrusted with the conduct of the attack from our right, and who failed to begin it at the designated time, but shifted the responsibility for the final order for his charge, that properly attached to himself, to the shoulders of a colonel of artillery, and then withheld two divisions intended and directed to

co-operate in the charge, has no right to complain that that charge was hopeless from the beginning. It was his own conduct that contributed to make it so.

It is evidently assumed by the writer of both articles that there is some magic charm in the phrase "offensive in strategy but defensive in tactics," which settles the whole question as to the propriety of the attack on Meade at Gettysburg, and hence it is given with a "damnable iteration" that may serve to confuse and delude those unskilled in warfare, but when applied to the Pennsylvania campaign, which was a campaign of invasion by the weaker against the stronger power, the phrase becomes the veriest nonsense. The only chance for success in such a campaign was, when the opportunity occurred, to strike blows on the enemy quick and fast, so that he should not have the opportunity of concentrating his superior forces to overwhelm his weaker assailant.

That General Longstreet's idea, "to throw ourselves between the enemy and Washington, select a strong position, and force the enemy to attack us," was entirely impracticable, as well as unsustained by sound logic or wisdom, I hold to be fully demonstrable:

1st. Because General Lee, a consummate master of the art of war, to whom the proposition was submitted, so thought and decided.

2nd. Because, to get between Meade's army and Washington, we would have had to make a wide circuit, and Meade, having the inner and shorter line, would have been able to thwart the attempt, while our trains would have been exposed to destruction, during the movement, by the enemy's cavalry and French's force at Frederick, in the absence of our own cavalry.

3rd. Because we were entirely dependent upon the enemy's country for food and forage for our men, horses, and mules, and when it became necessary for our army to concentrate in the presence of the enemy, it became impossible to send out foraging parties to obtain sufficient supplies of provisions and forage. The consequence, therefore, must have been, if Meade had pursued what would have been his very obvious policy, to-wit: to assume a position sufficiently near us to render necessary the continued concentration of our army, that we would have been compelled to attack him after his army had been considerably reinforced and strengthened, to retreat for the purpose of getting supplies, or to be reduced to a state of starvation, and thus become an easy prey to the enemy.

The idea that popular clamor, through the newspapers, would have compelled Meade to attack us at once, is absurd. It presupposes that he was wholly incompetent to the command of the large army under him, or that he was weak enough to yield to a senseless clamor in opposition to his own judgment. He would have had to wait but a very few days, if he had pursued his true policy, to vindicate its wisdom and put to shame the clamorers for immediate attack. French had 8,000 men at Frederick, with 4,000 more somewhere on the way between Harper's Ferry and Washington; Pennsylvania had put into the field, under a call of President Lincoln for the emergency, 32,104 well-equipped militia; and New York had sent forward 13,971 men, under the same call, as shown by the final report of the Provost-Marshal



co-operate in the charge, has no right to complain that that charge was hopeless from the beginning. It was his own conduct that contributed to make it so.

It is evidently assumed by the writer of both articles that there is some magic charm in the phrase "offensive in strategy but defensive in tactics," which settles the whole question as to the propriety of the attack on Meade at Gettysburg, and hence it is given with a "damnable iteration" that may serve to confuse and delude those unskilled in warfare, but when applied to the Pennsylvania campaign, which was a campaign of invasion by the weaker against the stronger power, the phrase becomes the veriest nonsense. The only chance for success in such a campaign was, when the opportunity occurred, to strike blows on the enemy quick and fast, so that he should not have the opportunity of concentrating his superior forces to overwhelm his weaker assailant.

That General Longstreet's idea, "to throw ourselves between the enemy and Washington, select a strong position, and force the enemy to attack us," was entirely impracticable, as well as unsustained by sound logic or wisdom, I hold to be fully demonstrable:

1st. Because General Lee, a consummate master of the art of war, to whom the proposition was submitted, so thought and decided.

2nd. Because, to get between Meade's army and Washington, we would have had to make a wide circuit, and Meade, having the inner and shorter line, would have been able to thwart the attempt, while our trains would have been exposed to destruction, during the movement, by the enemy's cavalry and French's force at Frederick, in the absence of our own cavalry.

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General, page 53, (Documents 1865-'6). Other troops were on their way from North Carolina and the Virginia Peninsula. The greater part of all these troops, and probably a considerable portion of the troops still in the defenses of Washington, especially south of the Potomac, would have been added to Meade's army, before he would have attacked us, and in the meantime troops would probably have been brought from the West, over the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, to cut off our retreat across the Potomac; and then, with our army weakened and demoralized by starvation, what would have been the result? If we had attempted a retreat on the eve of starvation, it would have been a disorderly one, and our army would have become thoroughly demoralized in the search for food to stay the cravings of hunger. The consequence would have been total and inevitable destruction, unless we began the retreat before the crisis arrived. Such considerations as these, doubtless, presented themselves to General Lee, but they seem never to have penetrated General Longstreet's brain.

He thinks Meade would certainly have attacked us at once, if we had awaited his attack, or, by abandoning his position, given us the moral effect of a victory, because, in a telegram to Halleck he said:

"If not attacked and I can get any positive information of the enemy which will justify me in doing so, I will attack. If I find it hazardous to do so, and am satisfied that the enemy is endeavoring to move to my rear and interpose between me and Washington, I shall fall back on my supplies at Westminster."

Longstreet's deduction from this is most illogical. All the inferences from his telegram are that Meade would not have attacked us in our then position, unless he could do so to great advantage, and the fact is that, after a reconnoissance, he abandoned the only project of attack which he formed, to-wit: from his right against our left flank. If we had abandoned our position after the success of the first day, the moral effect upon our own men would have been that of a defeat. If we had moved to Meade's left to get between him and Washington, and he had made a corresponding movement to protect his supplies and his communications, it is impossible to conceive how that could have given us the moral effect of a victory. That he would not have followed us at once to attack us in any new position we may have taken to threaten his communications with Washington, is shown by his own declared purpose in this telegram. His policy, doubtless, would have been, after securing his depot and rendering his own supplies certain, to take and fortify some position near us, and then the results already indicated would, unquestionably, have ensued.

There is no reason to suppose that Meade would have been more prompt to attack us in position on the heights of Gettysburg, if we had gained that position on the 1st, than he showed himself to attack us in the position on Seminary Ridge, with our left extended in a curve through Gettysburg. He did not attack us on the 4th in our then position on Seminary Ridge, after the disastrous repulse of the day before; nor did he dare attack us, afterwards, in

the vicinity of Hagerstown, when he had been reinforced by 8,000 men under French, and a considerable part of Couch's force from Harrisonburg, besides having at hand (at Harper's Ferry) a portion of the troops from North Carolina and the Peninsula, with all the prestige of victory in his favor, though General Lee had not been reinforced to the extent of a solitary man, unless the cavalry brigades of Robertson and Jones, which reached the vicinity of Gettysburg on the 3d, too late to participate in the battle, be counted as reinforcements.

These facts should satisfy General Longstreet and his adherents that Meade would not have been in a hurry to attack us, if we had awaited his attack on Seminary Ridge, or had moved past his left and assumed another position; and they should equally convince those who think the taking possession of the Gettysburg heights, on the afternoon of the 1st, would in itself have been a great advantage to us, that he would not have attacked us in that position. His whole subsequent career proved him to be an excessively cautious commander in all aggressive movements.

The question which really presented itself to General Lee at Gettysburg was, whether he should attack the enemy in that position, or retreat. Between these alternatives he had to choose, and, if he decided to attack, it was necessary to attack as promptly as possible. Whether or not he chose wisely as between those alternatives, is the proper question for discussion.

Had General Longstreet been content to let that question be settled before the tribunal of history, on the facts as presented in General Lee's report and other authentic forms, I know of no one who would have been disposed to assail his war record, or submit his own operations at Gettysburg to a crucial test. But when his overweening vanity and egotism caused him to enter the arena, as a contestant for the highest honors of that and all other campaigns of the Army of Northern Virginia, by depreciating its commander, his pretensions could not be allowed to pass unquestioned. But for his own folly, and his exorbitant demands for historic honors, there would have been a general disposition to remember to his credit his meritorious deeds, while the mantle of charity would have been allowed to fall upon his shortcomings.

If he has now suffered in the controversy which he has provoked, he has but met the fate of all who, not content with receiving the credit justly due them, aspire to honors to which they are not entitled.

In all that I have written in this controversy, my sole purpose has been to vindicate the fame of the great commander of the Army of Northern Virginia and the truth of history.

J. A. EARLY.

**Decision of the Supreme Court of Tennessee that the Confederacy was de jure as well as de facto—Opinion of Judge Turney.**

The following decision is worthy of a place in our records not only because of the importance of the principles involved, but also on account of the ability with which the learned jurist maintains his positions. It will not detract from the value of the decision, in the eyes of *any* right-thinking man, if we add that Judge Turney was a skillful and gallant Confederate soldier, and was desperately wounded at Fredericksburg:

**The Bank of Tennessee v. Wm. B. Cummings, Adm'r.**

*Statement.*—It appears of record that in the Autumn of 1861, Plumley, defendant's intestate, petitioned the Branch Bank of Tennessee at Sparta to discount his note for \$500,—alleging that he had contracted with the Nitre and Mining Bureau at Nashville to make and furnish saltpetre to "The Confederate States of America." At that time, the Bank was discounting but little:—but, because of the purpose for which the loan was designed, it was allowed. The money was faithfully appropriated to the design for which it was granted; and, by reason of the loan, Plumley was enabled to make and ship large quantities of saltpetre to Richmond and other points, which was used by the Confederate authorities in the manufacture of gunpowder. Suit was instituted on the note, and the defence relied on was, that the money was loaned and borrowed with the intent of aiding the Confederate States in the war then flagrant with the United States.

1. *Governmental Law—The Confederate States of America—A Government de jure.*—The Government of "The Confederate States of America" was organized and called into real active existence in the most solemn and formal mode; and was an integral, independent government, complete in its several departments—was clothed with all the powers and discharged all the functions incident to a Sovereign State. In common with its constituent members, it had the power, and exercised it, of making laws for its own government and that of its citizens.

2. *Same.—Allegiance—juris et de jure.*—Obedience to its authority in civil and local matters was not only a necessity; but a duty. Cited: *Thorrington v. Smith*, 8 Wallace, 12-13; *Vattel*, 97.

3. *International Law.—Belligerent Rights.—Gunpowder.*—The use of gunpowder is a belligerent right of primal importance:—the right to use carries with it the right to purchase or manufacture, and in the manufacture the right to the means requisite for its achievement. Case cited: *Smith v. Brazleton*, 1 Heis., 46.

4. *State.—Right.*—A State having a right may employ the means necessary for its perfection and enjoyment, and to this end may engage its citizens, or they may voluntarily contribute to it.

5. *Case at Bar.*—In the present case the contract was freely and voluntarily entered into, and was, therefore, legal and binding.

FROM WARREN.

Appeal in error from the judgment of the Circuit Court, October term, 1869. William P. Hickerson, J.

W. E. B. Jones, Rowan & Wommack, for appellant; John H. Savage, for appellee.

Turney, J., delivered the opinion of the Court.

The circuit judge charged the jury: "If the officers of the Bank had notice that the money was to be used by the defendant's intestate in aid of the Southern Confederacy, as for the manufacture of one of the ingredients of gunpowder, and with a view and for the purpose of so aiding the Confederacy they advanced the money, then your verdict should be for the defendant."

This is error. In *Thorrington v. Smith*, 8 Wallace, 12-13, the Supreme Court of the United States say: "We have already seen that the people of the insurgent States, under the Confederate Government, were in legal contemplation substantially in the same condition as inhabitants of districts of country occupied and controlled by an invading belligerent. The rules which would apply in the former case would apply in the latter; and, as in the former case, the people must be regarded as subjects of a foreign power; and contracts among them be interpreted and enforced with reference to the conditions imposed by the conqueror; so in the latter case, the inhabitants must be regarded as under the authority of the insurgent belligerent power, actually established as the government of the country, and contracts made with them must be interpreted and enforced with reference to the condition of things created by the acts of the governing power."

Now, what was "*the condition of things created by the acts of the governing power*," at the making of the note in suit? It was, the seceding States, including the State of Tennessee, had by the solemn acts of their *peoples* in convention assembled, or by overwhelming majorities at the ballot box, withdrawn from the Union, and organized and called into real active existence an integral, independent Government,—under the name of "*The Confederate States of America*,"—complete in its several departments, clothed with all the powers, and discharging all the functions incident to a *Sovereign State*. Under its *Constitution*, which had been formally and enthusiastically adopted, without appreciable dissent, by a tremendous popular vote, the seceding States had reorganized their Governments,—elected their governors and legislators, and established their courts,—and had achieved every act necessary to the perfection and successful administration of a civil government, and were maintaining its supremacy and asserting its authority by arms.

The United States Government was unable to give to those within the Confederate States Government who adhered to the cause of the Union any assistance, hence they were compelled to look to the Confederate laws and authority for protection, and in return to yield submission and obedience to those laws and authority.

Just so were the friends of secession within the loyal States compelled to yield obedience to the laws of the United States;—the one was as much without relief as the other;—and the one government was as unable to give assistance to its friends within the enemy's lines as was the other.

Vattel, p. 97, says: "The State is obliged to defend and preserve all its members, and the Prince owes the same assistance to his subjects. If, there-

fore, the State or Prince refuse or neglect to succor a body of people who are exposed to imminent danger, the latter being thus abandoned, become perfectly free to provide for their own safety and preservation in whatever manner they find most convenient, without paying the least regard to those, who by abandoning them, have been the first to fail in their duty."

How could the people within the Confederate States provide for their safety and preservation except by obedience to and compliance with the laws. Every act was measured and determined by laws in antagonism to those of the United States, although in many instances the same language was employed and the same end intended for its people, as for those of the United States. Still they were adopted in antagonism, because adopted by States which had withdrawn from the Union and were at war with it. Their non-observance was remedied by themselves, and the United States were powerless to prevent or hinder,—leaving but one course to the citizen, i. e., submission to *the powers that were*.

Trying the case by this rule, "*interpreting and enforcing the contract with reference to the condition of things created by the acts of the governing power,*" it results that the Government of "*The Confederate States of America*" and its constituent members had the power, and exercised it, of making laws for their own government and that of its citizens:—that the citizen had no escape from them:—that this contract was made freely and voluntarily, and was lawful,—"*interpreted with reference to the condition of things*" at the time of its creation; which "*made,*" as Chief Justice Chase says in the opinion already quoted, "*obedience to its authority in civil and local matters, not only a necessity, but a duty.*"

It has been repeatedly held that the Government of the Confederate States was a government *de facto*, with belligerent rights. In *Smith v. Brazleton*, 1 Heis., 46, Judge Nelson, a statesman and jurist, in whose opinion we see the hand of a master, said, "That although municipal rights of sovereignty remained in the United States during the late civil war, and could be reasserted whenever and wherever the Government was successful in arms, yet while the war was pending and wherever the Government was unable to assert its authority, the belligerent rights of the parties to the war were precisely the same, and neither could lawfully assert any belligerent right superior to or different from the other."

It must be conceded that it is a belligerent right of the first importance to use gunpowder; the right to use carries with it the right to procure by purchase or manufacture, and in the manufacture the right to all the means in reach for its accomplishment. Then if it was lawful for the State to do these things, by what rule is it unlawful for the citizen to contribute to the lawful act of his State? The State, as a State, cannot manufacture powder, but must do it through employees or persons,—individual constituents of the aggregate composing the State.

A State having a right may employ all the means necessary to the enjoyment of that right, and it is a gross solecism to say that the State may lawfully

have a thing, but may not lawfully engage its citizens to create that thing, or that its citizens may not *voluntarily* do so.

There is no conflict of opinion between this holding and the case of *Puryear, adm'r, v. McGavock et als.*, manuscript opinion by Judge Deaderick, as the transaction in that case was in April, 1861, before action was taken by the State in the matter of separation.

Reverse the judgment.

NOTE.—The opinion above was delivered at Nashville, December term, 1872, and introduced here as conclusive of the numerous cases, still pending in the courts of the State, involving the principles it determines. It was recently reaffirmed, without a written opinion, in the case of *The Union Bank of Tennessee v. Alexander Pattison*, at Jackson, September term, 1876.—J. C. M.

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**Steuart's Brigade at the Battle of Gettysburg.--A Narrative by Rev. Randolph H. McKim, D. D., late First Lieutenant and Aide-de-Camp, Confederate Army.**

[*Rev. J. Wm. Jones, D. D.,*

*Secretary Southern Historical Society :*

DEAR SIR: The sketch which I send herewith has been prepared at the urgent request of several of the survivors of the Third brigade, (Second corps, A. N. V.,) who think that justice to the memory of the heroic men of that command who gave up their lives at Gettysburg demands a more extended notice than has yet appeared of the part borne by them on that bloody field. (Owing to the fact that on the 3d July I was occupied chiefly on the right of the line, my narrative relates principally to the deeds of the regiments on the right.) In preparing the narrative my memory has been assisted by pocket memoranda, made on the field, and by letters written immediately after the events related. This enables me to hope that in all substantial points this account may be relied on as accurate.

It is proper to add that I was attached as aide-de-camp to the staff of the brigadier-general commanding the brigade, so that I had excellent opportunities of informing myself of its condition and its deeds.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

RANDOLPH H. MCKIM.

*New York, March 4, 1878.]*

The Third brigade of Johnson's division entered the battle of Gettysburg very much jaded by the hard marching which fell to its lot the week previous. It formed part of an expeditionary force of infantry, cavalry, and artillery which was detached from the Second corps on the

24th June, under the command of Brigadier-General George H. Steuart, and ordered to Mercersburg and McConnellsburg. In the execution of the duty assigned it was required to perform some heavy marching, as the following itinerary record will show :

Tuesday, June 23, 1863.—Broke camp near Sharpsburg, and passing through Hagerstown, halted 5 miles beyond at 3 o'clock. Distance, 17 miles.

Wednesday, June 24.—Moved at 4½ A. M. At Greencastle filed to the left on the road to Mercersburg. Entered McConnellsburg about 9 P. M., after a march of 24 miles.

Friday, June 26.—Marched from McConnellsburg to Chambersburg, 20 miles, through a steady rain. The cavalry under Major Gilmore captured 60 head of cattle, 40 horses, a few mules, and some militia.

Saturday, June 27.—Column moved at 7½ A. M., through Shippensburg, to Springfield. Men much broken down, having marched 19 miles, many of them barefooted.

Sunday, June 28.—After a short march of 6 or 7 miles made camp at 2 P. M. about 5 miles south of Carlisle. Rejoined our division to-day.

Monday, June 29.—About 9 A. M. received orders to march back to Chambersburg. Great surprise expressed. Marched 11 miles and camped 1 mile south of Stowstown.

Tuesday, June 30.—Column moved at 5 A. M. Passed through Shippensburg, to Greenvillage, where we took left road to Fayetteville.

Wednesday, July 1.—Column moved at 7 A. M. Passed through Fayetteville. On top of mountain heard rapid cannonading. Soon saw the smoke of the battle, and then of burning houses. Hurried to the front, but the battle was over. Distance from our camp on Monday to Gettysburg, 35 miles. This was marched by the brigade on Tuesday and Wednesday. It may have been a greater distance; it was not less. Our camp on the night of the 30th must have been not far east or west of Greenwood.

Thus it appears that the men of the Third brigade had marched, within the nine days preceding the battle, at least 133, perhaps as much as 138 miles. But, though weary and footsore, they moved forward with alacrity to take part in the great conflict which was already begun. In the first day's action they were not engaged, the enemy having been driven from the field by A. P. Hill, Rodes, and Early before their arrival. The time of their arrival may be fixed by the circumstance which I distinctly remember, viz: the arrival of General Lee upon the field, his survey of the enemy's position on Cemetery Hill with his glass, and the dispatch of one of his staff immediately in the direction of the town.

Passing over the scene of conflict, where the line of battle could be in some places distinctly traced by the ranks of dead Federal soldiers, they entered the town of Gettysburg a little before dusk. (The time of our entering the town I fix by the fact that I easily read a letter handed me by Major Douglass.) After considerable delay the brigade moved to the east and southeast of the town and halted for the night, the men lying down upon their arms in confident expectation of engaging the enemy with the morning light.



Greatly did officers and men marvel as morning, noon, and afternoon passed in inaction—on our part, not on the enemy's, for, as we well knew, he was plying axe and pick and shovel in fortifying a position which was already sufficiently formidable. Meanwhile one of our staff conducted religious services, first in the Tenth Virginia, then in the Second Maryland regiment, the men gladly joining in the solemn exercises, which they knew would be for many of their number the last they should ever engage in on earth. At length, after the conclusion of that tremendous artillery duel which for two hours shook the earth, the infantry began to move. It was past 6 P. M. before our brigade was ordered forward—*nearly twenty-four hours after we had gotten into position.* We were to storm the eastern face of Culp's Hill, a rough and rugged eminence on the southeast of the town, which formed the key to the enemy's right-centre. Passing first through a small skirt of woods, we advanced rapidly in line of battle across a cornfield which lay between us and the base of the hill, the enemy opening upon us briskly as soon as we were unmasked. Rock creek, waist-deep in some places, was waded, and now the whole line, except the First North Carolina, held in reserve on our left flank, pressed up the steep acclivity through the darkness, and was soon hotly engaged with the enemy. After the conflict had been going on for some time, I ventured to urge the brigadier-general commanding to send forward the First North Carolina to reinforce their struggling comrades.\* Receiving orders to that effect, I led the regiment up the hill, guided only by the flashes of the muskets, until I reached a position abreast of our line of fire on the right. In front a hundred yards or so I saw another line of fire, but owing to the thick foliage could not determine whether the musket flashes were *up* or *down* the hill. Finding that bullets were whistling over our heads, I concluded the force in our front must be the enemy, and seeing, as I thought, an admirable chance of turning their flank, I urged Colonel Brown to move rapidly forward and fire. When we reached what I supposed the proper position, I shouted, "Fire on them, boys; fire on them!" At that moment Major Parsley, the gallant officer in command of the Third North Carolina, rushed up and shouted, "They are our own men." Owing to the din of battle the command to fire had not been heard except by those nearest to me, and I believe no injury resulted from my mistake. I mention it only in order to assume the responsibility for the order. Soon after this the works† were gallantly

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\* It was dark, and General Steuart detained one regiment in the field mentioned to prevent our flank being turned. The firing in the woods now became very rapid, and volley after volley echoed and re-echoed among the hills. I felt very anxious about our boys in front, and several times urged General Steuart to send the reserve regiment to the support of the remainder of the brigade.—*Extract from a letter written after the battle.*

† Let me tell you the character of their works. They were built of heavy logs, with earth piled against them to the thickness of five feet, and abattis in front.—*Extract from a letter.*

charged and taken about 9½ P. M., after a hard conflict of two hours, in which the Second Maryland and the Third North Carolina were the chief sufferers.\* Among those who fell severely wounded was Colonel James R. Herbert, of the Second Maryland. The losses in the two regiments named were heavy, but the men were eager to press on to the *crest* of the hill. This, owing to the darkness and the lateness of the hour, it was resolved not to do.† A Federal historian (B. J. Lossing, in his Pictorial History of the Civil War,) gives the following account of this night conflict: "Johnson moved under cover of the woods and deepening twilight, and expected an easy conquest by which a way would be opened for the remainder of Ewell's corps to the National rear; but he found a formidable antagonist in Greene's brigade. The assault was made with great vigor, but for more than two hours Greene, assisted by a part of Wadsworth's command, fought the assailants, strewing the wooded slope in front of the works with the Confederate dead and wounded, and holding his position firmly. Finally, his antagonist penetrated the works near Spangler's Spring, from which the troops had been temporarily withdrawn."—Vol. III, p. 691. This statement needs correction. There is no doubt of the fact that the works taken by Steuart's brigade that night were occupied by Federal troops and that they poured a deadly fire into its ranks. After this fire had been kept up for two hours those troops were indeed "withdrawn"—*but the orders came from the men of Steuart's brigade, and they were delivered at the point of the bayonet.*‡

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\* Bates (author of *The History of the Battle of Gettysburg*) shows his ignorance of the real state of the conflict when he says "*the fast-coming darkness drew its curtains around the vulnerable parts everywhere spread out.*" It was 9 or 9½ P. M. before the works to which he refers were taken by our brigade—two hours after dark.

† Again and again did the rebels attack in front and flank; but as often as they approached they were stricken down and disappeared.—*Bates' Gettysburg*, page 139. This is one of his many misstatements. I say of my own knowledge that the only troops in position to assault this work *on the flank* were those of the Third brigade, and they made no attempt to take it until the next day. This is, unhappily, too true. An assault then would have promised success.

‡ I find a similar statement in Swinton's *Army of the Potomac*, page 355, in a pamphlet by Dr. Jacobs, and in an article by General Howard in the *Atlantic Monthly*, July, 1876. I was at a loss to account for it until I observed that General Howard describes the vacated works as situated between McAllister's Mill and Culp's Hill. *From these works* part of the Twelfth corps had been withdrawn to reinforce Meade's left. *But these were not the works occupied by Steuart's brigade, whose charge was made on Culp's Hill itself, to the north of Spangler's Spring.* Bates says: "Passing over the abandoned breastworks further to the right, the enemy found nothing to oppose him, and pushed out through the woods in their rear over the stone fences that skirt the fields farther to the south, and had nearly gained the Baltimore pike. Indeed, the reserve artillery and ammunition, and the headquarters of General Slocum, the commander of the right wing of the army, were within musket-range of his farthest advance." (Page 140.) This statement, if true at all, must have reference to the movements of troops on our left. Steuart's men did not advance beyond those redoubtable works which, although *vacant*, belched forth flame and smoke and minnie balls, which were just as fatal as though they had been occupied by soldiers. Being dark, we cannot say we saw the men behind

It is sufficient answer to this statement of the Federal historian to quote the language of General Lee's official report (*Southern Historical Society Papers* for July, 1876, page 42): "The troops of the former (Johnson) moved steadily up the steep and rugged ascent under a heavy fire, driving the enemy into his entrenchments, part of which were carried by Steuart's brigade, and a number of prisoner's taken."

The position thus so hardly\* won and at so dear a cost was one of great importance. It was within a few hundred yards of the Baltimore turnpike, which I think it commanded. Its capture was a breach in the enemy's lines through which troops might have been poured and the strong positions of Cemetery Hill rendered untenable. General Howard says: "The ground was rough, and the woods so thick that their generals did not realize till morning what they had gained." Dr. Jacobs says: "This might have proved disastrous to us had it not occurred at so late an hour." And Swinton declares it was "*a position which, if held by him, would enable him to take Meade's entire line in reverse.*"†—Page 355.

It is only in keeping with the haphazard character of the whole battle that the capture of a point of such strategic importance should not have been taken advantage of by the Confederates. It remains, however, no less a proud memory for the officers and men of the Third brigade, that their prowess gained for the Confederate general a position where "Meade's entire line might have been taken in reverse."

But if the Confederates did not realize what they had gained, the Federals were fully aware what they had lost. Accordingly, they spent the night massing troops and artillery for an effort to regain their works. "During the night," says Swinton (page 356), "a powerful artillery was accumulated against the point entered by the enemy." Through the long hours of the night we heard the rumbling of their guns, and thought they were evacuating the hill. The first streak of daylight revealed our mistake. It was scarcely dawn (the writer of this had just lain down to sleep after a night in the saddle) when their artillery opened upon us, at a range of about 500 yards, a terrific and galling fire, to which we had no

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them, but we saw the musketry flashes and we *felt* the balls that came thick into our ranks, and some of the private soldiers who survive testify that when they leaped the works they saw dead and wounded Federal soldiers on the other side.

\* Bates himself, on another page (147), makes an admission fatal to his former assertion: "On the extreme Union right he had effected a lodgment [this, remember, General Lee says was done by Steuart's brigade], and had pushed forward in dangerous proximity to the very vitals of the army; but . . . the night was sure to give opportunity for dispositions which would oust him FROM HIS ALREADY DEAR-BOUGHT ADVANTAGE." How was it "dear-bought" if occupied *without opposition*? Verily, unoccupied breastworks must have been fatal spots in that battle.

† Bates is of the same opinion: "Had he known the advantage which was open to him, and all that we now know, he might, with the troops he had, have played havoc with the trains, and set the whole army in retreat; but he was ignorant of the prize which was within his grasp."—Page 140.

means of replying, as our guns could not be dragged up that steep and rugged ascent.\* Then, a little after sunrise, their infantry moved forward in heavy force to attack us. "The troops of the Twelfth corps," says Swinton, "had returned from the left, and the divisions of Williams and Geary, aided by Shaler's brigade, of the Sixth corps, entered upon a severe struggle to regain the lost position of the line."† They drove in our skirmishers, but could not dislodge us from the works we had captured, although these were commanded in part by the works on the crest of the hill to our right, whence a galling fire was poured into our ranks. Next a strong effort was made to take us in flank, and I well remember that at one time our line resembled three sides of a pentagon, the left side being composed of some other brigade, centre and right composed of our own brigade, which thus occupied the most advanced position towards the crest of the hill.‡ About this time, I think, word came to General Steuart that the men's ammunition was almost exhausted. One of his staff immediately took three men and went on foot to the wagons, distant about a mile and a quarter, and brought up two boxes of cartridges. "We emptied each box into a blanket and swung the blanket on a rail, and so carried it to the front." It was now, I think, about half-past nine, and ever since 4 o'clock the fire of the enemy had been almost continuous, at times tremendous.§ Professor Jacobs says "the battle raged furiously, and was maintained with desperate obstinacy on both sides." He goes on to speak of the "terrible slaughter" of our men. General Howard says: "I went over the ground five years after the bat-

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\*"To one conversant with the ground, it is now apparent why the enemy did not reply. The creek, the forest, and the steep acclivities made it utterly impossible for him to move up his guns, and this circumstance contributed to the weakness of his position and the futility of his occupation of this part of the line. . . . But, though he fought with a determined bravery well worthy the name of the old-time leader, yet he gained no ground and had sustained terrible losses."

†The enemy was evidently before us in immense numbers, and posted behind two lines of breastworks. To resist them we had but one division, which was subsequently strengthened by the brigades of Smith and Daniel.—*Extract from a letter.*

‡"The crest of the hill to the right was still more difficult of approach, and from it the enemy were able to enflade our whole line. . . . The struggle for the hill now became more and more fierce. The enemy endeavored to drive us out of the works. They attacked us in front and in flank, and opened a terrific cannonading upon us from a battery posted about 500 yards off. . . . On the right and left flank, where our lines were almost perpendicular to the front line, there were no breastworks, and the struggle was very fierce and bloody. Our men maintained their position, however, and received reinforcements." The Third North Carolina was on the right, and suffered most heavily during this part of the battle, so that but a handful were left to participate in the final charge.

§"As the day wore on, the heat from the fire and smoke of battle, and the scorching of the July sun, became so intense as to be almost past endurance. Men were completely exhausted in the progress of the struggle, and had to be often relieved; but revived by fresh air and a little period of rest, again returned to the front."—*Bates, page 142.* No such refreshing rest had our brave men. They were never relieved for a moment during all that seven-hours unintermitting fire of which General Kane speaks.

tle, and marks of the struggle were still to be observed—the moss on the rocks was discolored in hundreds of places where the bullets had struck; the trees, as cut off, lopped down, or shivered, were still there; stumps and trees were perforated with holes where leaden balls had since been dug out, and remnants of the rough breastworks remained. I did not wonder that General Geary, who was in the thickest of this fight, thought the main battle of Gettysburg must have been fought there.”\*—*Atlantic Monthly*, July, 1876, page 66.

But all the efforts of the enemy failed to dislodge us. Unassisted, the Third brigade held the position they had won the night before. Several writers speak of Johnson being heavily reinforced. It may be. But I feel sure that that far-advanced line of earthworks into which Steuart had driven his brigade like a wedge the night before was held by him alone through all those terrible hours on the morning of the 3d July. The reinforcements which came to Johnson must have been employed on the flanks or on some other portion of the line than that occupied by us.†

Then came General Ewell's order to assume the offensive and assail the crest of Culp's Hill, on our right. My diary says that both General Steuart and General Daniel, who now came up with his brigade to support the movement, strongly disapproved of making the assault. And well might they despair of success in the face of such difficulties. The works to be stormed ran almost at right angles to those we occupied.‡ Moreover, there was a double line of entrenchments, one above the other, and each filled with troops. In moving to the attack we were exposed to an enfilading fire from the woods on our left flank, besides the double line

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\* Whitelaw Reid wrote as follows: “From 4 to 5 there was heavy cannonading also from our batteries nearest the contested points. . . . The rebels made no reply. . . . The musketry crash continued with unparalleled tenacity and vehemence.”—*Bates*, page 142. Later in the morning he says: “The batteries began to open again on points along our outer line. They were evidently playing on what had been Slocum's line of yesterday. The rebels then were still in our rifle-pits. Presently the battery on Slocum's Hill . . . opened too, aiming apparently in the same direction. Other batteries along the inner line, just to the left of the Baltimore pike [McAllister's Hill], followed the signal, and one after another opened up, till every little crest between Slocum's headquarters and Cemetery Hill began belching its thunder. . . . Still no artillery response from the rebels.”—Page 143.

† My memoranda says that Johnson was “subsequently” reinforced by the brigades of Smith and Daniel. Probably this was just before the last fatal charge. I remember the latter brigade coming up at that time. I did not see it before, and I did not see Smith's brigade at all. Or both brigades may have been employed on the right and left flanks at an earlier hour. I would only state it as my conviction that the *captured works were held by the men who captured them from 9 P. M., July 2d, to 10 A. M., July 3d, and by none others.* During the last hour of their occupation (10 to 11) the *right* of the works was held by the brigade of General Daniel.

‡ They were confident of their ability to sweep him away and take the whole Union line in reverse. Fortunately, Greene had caused his flank to be fortified by a very heavy work, which the make of the ground favored, extending some distance at right angles to his main line.—*Bates' Gettysburg*, page 139.

of fire which we had to face in front, and a battery of artillery posted on a hill to our left rear opened upon us at short range.\* What wonder, then, if Steuart was reluctant to lead his men into such a slaughter-pen, from which he saw there could be no issue but death and defeat! But though he remonstrated, he gallantly obeyed without delay the orders he received, giving the command, "Left-face," and afterwards, "File right." He made his men leap the breastworks and form in line of battle on the other side at right angles, nearly, to their previous position, galled all the time by a brisk fire from the enemy. Then drawing his sword, he gave the command, "Charge bayonets!" and moved forward on foot with his men into the jaws of death. On swept the gallant little brigade, the Third North Carolina on the right of the line, next the Second Maryland, then the three Virginia regiments, (Tenth, Twenty-third, and Thirty-seventh,) with the First North Carolina on the extreme left. Its ranks were sadly thinned and its energies greatly depleted by those six fearful hours of battle that morning; but its nerve and spirit were undiminished. Soon, however, the left and centre was checked and then repulsed, probably by the severe flank fire from the woods; and the small remnant of the Third North Carolina, with the stronger Second Maryland (I do not recall the banners of any other regiment), were far in advance of the rest of the line. On they pressed to within about twenty or thirty paces of the works—a small but gallant band of heroes daring to attempt what could not be done by flesh and blood.†

The end soon came. We were beaten back to the line from which we had advanced with terrible loss in much confusion, but the enemy did not make a counter charge. By the strenuous efforts of the officers of the line and of the staff order was restored, and we reformed in the breastworks from which we had emerged, there to be again exposed to an artillery fire exceeding in violence that of the early morning. It remains only to say that, like Pickett's men later in the day, this single brigade was hurled unsupported against the enemy's works. Daniel's brigade remained in the breastworks during and after the charge, and

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\* Professor Jacobs seems to allude to this when he says: "In this work of death, a battery of artillery placed on a hill to the right of the Baltimore turnpike, and some distance south of the Cemetery, was found to have performed a prominent part."—Page 40.

† Since writing the above I have met with the following account of this memorable charge in Bates' book (page 144): "Suddenly the quiet was broken by a yell bursting from thousands of lungs, and the next instant their grey lines emerged in sight dashing madly on. . . . They had scarcely come into easy musket-range when the men in blue along the line sprang to their feet and poured in a deliberate volley. The shock was terrible. The on coming force was staggered, and for a moment sought shelter behind trees and rocks; but obedient to the voices of their officers, they struggled on, *some of the most desperate coming within twenty paces of the Union front.* 'It cannot be denied,' says Kane, 'that they behaved courageously.' They did what the most resolute could do, but it was all in vain. . . . Broken and well-nigh annihilated, the survivors of the charge staggered back, leaving the ground strewn with their dead and desperately wounded."

neither from that command nor from any other had we any support. Of course it is to be presumed that General Daniel acted in obedience to orders.\* We remained in this breastwork after the charge about an hour before we finally abandoned the Federal entrenchments and retired to the foot of the hill. The Federal historians say we were *driven* from our position. Thus Swinton affirms that "it was carried by a charge of Geary's division." This statement I deny as an eye-witness and sharer in the conflict to the close, and as one of the staff who assisted in carrying out the order withdrawing the troops to the base of the hill. It was a very difficult thing to withdraw the fragments of a shattered brigade down a steep hill in the face of the enemy, and I have a vivid recollection of our apprehensions of the result of such a movement. But it was done, not before a charge of the enemy, but in obedience to orders, and we were not pursued, nor were the works occupied by the Federals until we reached Rock creek, at the base of the hill.

A few of our men on our left, rather than incur the danger of retiring down the hill under that very heavy fire, remained behind in the entrenchments and gave themselves up. The base of the hill reached, skirmishers were thrown out, and we remained on the west side of Rock creek till 11½ P. M., when we retired silently and unmolested. I find the following record in my diary referring to the time when we retired to the foot of the hill: "New troops were brought on, and fighting continued until now (5 P. M)." This must refer to picket firing.

It only remains that I give such statement of our losses as my materials enable me to make. Unfortunately, I have returns only from three

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\*"As soon as we were unmaskèd a most terrific fire was opened upon us from three directions. In front, on a rising ground heavily wooded, the enemy were posted in two lines behind breastworks, one above the other, so that both lines fired upon us at once. On the left was a piece of woods, from which the enemy's sharpshooters opened a very galling fire, raking our whole line. This decided the failure of our attempt to storm their works, for the regiments on the left first halted (while the right of the line advanced), and then fell back. . . . Still we pressed on. General Steuart, Captain Williamson, and I were all on the right-centre, where was the Second Maryland and eight men of the Third North Carolina. Oh! it was a gallant band. We had our sabres drawn, and were cheering on the men, but there was little need of it. Their gallantry did not avail, and their noble blood was spilled in vain. . . . It was as if the sickle of Death had passed along the line and mown down the noblest and the bravest. Major Goldsborough fell (as we supposed), mortally wounded. That brave officer and noble gentleman, Captain Murray, fell dead. Friends dropped all around me, and lay writhing on the ground. . . . It was more than men could endure, and reluctantly they commenced falling back. Then our task was to prevent a rout, for the brigade was terribly cut up and the men much demoralized. Behind some rocks we rallied the scattered regiments and made a stand. Finally we took our old position behind the breastworks, supported by Daniel's brigade. Here we lay for about an hour under the most furious infantry and artillery fire I have ever experienced, but without much loss."—*Extract from a letter describing the battle.* I give it just as I find it, adding that if the tattered battle-flag of the Third North Carolina was followed by only a handful, it was because they had already suffered more heavily than any other regiment.

regiments recorded. In the Tenth Virginia (which I think was very small) the loss was (killed, wounded, and missing) 64. This I have not been able to verify. The Third North Carolina lost, according to my memoranda, killed, wounded, and missing, 207 out of 312 men. Dr. Wood, of that regiment, writes that this corresponds very nearly to statistics in his possession. The Second Maryland lost, according to my notes, 206 men. Other estimates (by Colonel Herbert and Major Goldsborough) put their loss, one at 250, the other at 222. One company, that of the lamented William H. Murray, carried into battle 92 men, and lost 18 killed, 37 wounded, total 55. Another estimate (by the orderly sergeant of Company A) puts it at 62. My diary states that the brigade mustered about 2,200 before the battle. At Hagerstown, on the 8th July, about 1,200 men reported for duty. It is probable that others subsequently came in, as I cannot think the loss was so high as 1,000 men, in the face of the following entry in my diary July 4: "Total loss in the brigade (killed, wounded, and missing) 680."

There were probably many stragglers on the march to Williamsport, some of whom may have been taken prisoners; but many no doubt afterwards came in. Perhaps the entire loss might be put at 800.\*

These fearful losses sufficiently indicate the character of the work those brave men were called on to do. The Light Brigade at Balaklava lost about one-third of their number (247 men out of 673 officers and men) in their famous charge. That, indeed, was over in twenty minutes, while these two regiments sustained their loss of one-half and two-thirds during a conflict of ten hours duration. But at least we may claim for the men of the Third brigade that they maintained a long and unequal contest with a valor and a constancy worthy of the best troops.

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\* What a field was this! For three hours of the previous evening, and seven of the morning, had the most terrible elements of destruction known to modern warfare been wielded with a might and dexterity rarely if ever paralleled. The woods in which the battle had been fought was torn and rent with shells and solid shot and pierced with innumerable minnie balls. Trees were broken off and splintered, and that entire forest, where the battle raged most furiously, was, on the following year, leafless, the stately but mute occupants having yielded up their lives with those whom they overshadowed.—*Page 145.* And speaking of the state of the hill on the 4th: "We came upon numberless forms clad in grey, either stark and stiff or else still weltering in their blood. . . . Turning whichever way we chose, the eye rested upon human forms lying in all imaginable positions. . . . We were surprised at the accuracy as well as the bloody results of our fire. It was indeed dreadful to witness."—*Bates' Gettysburg, page 145.*



## EDITORIAL PARAGRAPHS.

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OUR FIFTH VOLUME closes with this number, and we think our readers will agree that we have redeemed our promise "to maintain the high character of our publications."

We are constantly in receipt of assurances from every quarter that our *Papers* are not only deeply interesting, but *indispensable* to a full knowledge of the truth of Confederate history.

Our friends will be glad to learn that our subscription list is steadily increasing, and that we hope to report at the next annual meeting of the Society very much the best financial exhibit which we have ever made.

It is our purpose to exert every effort to increase the interest and value of our publications, and we feel assured that we can do so if our friends will continue to stand by us and help us.

We contemplate various improvements in our monthly so soon as our subscription list will justify the extra expense, and we beg our friends everywhere to exert themselves to extend our circulation. If each subscriber would forward us a new one by the 1st of July, we would at once increase the number of pages in each issue and make other contemplated improvements.

Shall we not have a number of earnest workers in this direction?

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PHOTOGRAPHS OR ENGRAVINGS OF LEADING CONFEDERATES are a very desirable part of our material. We wish to hand down to posterity the features of the men who made our glorious history, and we should be under special obligations to friends who can make additions to our collection.

*Mr. M. Miley*, of Lexington, Va., has sent us a superb collection of his photographs, embracing the following: President Jefferson Davis, General R. E. Lee, Lieutenant-General "Stonewall" Jackson, Lieutenant-General J. A. Early, Major-General John C. Breckinridge, Major-General Fitz. Lee, Major-General G. W. C. Lee, Major-General W. H. F. Lee, and Brigadier-General W. N. Pendleton.

For accuracy of likeness and beauty of execution these photographs are unsurpassed, and we would be very glad to see them in the homes of our people in place of the miserable daubs so frequently found.

And we, of course, feel none the less kindly towards Miley, the artist, because we remember that he was a gallant soldier in the famous old Rockbridge Artillery.

"MEMORIAL DAY" has not been forgotten this year at the South, and we trust that the time is far distant when our women shall cease to deck with flowers the graves of the patriot heroes "who died for us," or to teach our children to cherish their memories and emulate their virtues.

Our printers stopped work to-day (May the 22d) in order to join the throng that pressed through the avenues of beautiful "Hollywood" to deck the graves and honor the memories of the braves who sleep beneath its sod.

As we gazed on the silent "bivouack of the dead," and noted that all (from every State of the Confederacy and of every rank) were remembered, and that at least some simple flower decorated the grave of each, we felt that it might be gratifying to loved ones far away to assure them that Richmond still cherishes in her heart of hearts the "boys who wore the gray" and freely gave their lives in her defence.

It was a sacred privilege to stand among the graves of these "unknown heroes" of the rank and file, or to linger around the resting-place of "Jeb" Stuart, whose stainless sword is sheathed forever; A. P. Hill, who gladly laid down his noble life at the call of duty; the gallant Pickett, who appropriately bivouacks among his boys on "Gettysburg" hill; Willie Pegram, "the boy artillerist," whose record lives in the hearts of the whole army, and whose last words were: "I have done my duty, and now I turn to my Savior"; John H. Pegram, whose brave young life was sacrificed at the post of duty he always coveted; General Ed. Johnson, who so loved to "go in with the boys," musket in hand; General Henry A. Wise, "the fearless tribune of the people," who claimed no exemption from hardship and danger on account of his age or long service; Colonel D. B. Harris, Beauregard's great engineer officer, "whose merit was only equalled by his modesty"; Commodore Maury, whose brave devotion to the right was not eclipsed by his world-wide fame as a scientist, and many other men of mark whom we may not now even mention.

The following beautiful letter from ex-President Davis was read at the recent laying of the corner-stone of the Confederate monument at Macon, Ga., and so appropriately gives voice to the sentiments of the people of the South generally that we print it in full:

MISSISSIPPI CITY, MISS., *April 11, 1878.*

GENTLEMEN: I sincerely regret my inability to be present at the laying of the corner-stone of "a monument to be erected in Macon, Ga., in honor of our dead Confederate soldiers."

The event possesses every attraction to me; it is inspired by the Ladies' Memorial Association; the monument is to be located in the keystone State of the Confederate arch, and to commemorate the sacrifices of those who died in the defence of our inherited and "inalienable" rights.

What though we were overborne by numbers and accessories not less efficient, truth is not to be measured by success in maintaining it against force; nor is the glory less of him who upholds it in the face of unequal

odds, but is it not rather more to his credit that he counted all else as dust in the balance when weighed with honor and duty? On many a stricken field our soldiers stood few and faint, but fearless still, for they wore the panoply of unquestioning confidence in the rectitude of their cause, and knew how to die but not to surrender. Let not any of their survivors impugn their faith by offering the penitential plea that "they believed they were right."

It is meet that this monument should have originated with the ladies of the land, whose self-denial was conspicuous through all the trials and sufferings of war, whose gentle ministrations in the hospitals and at the wayside refectories so largely contributed to relieve the sick and the wounded, and whose unfaltering devotion to their country's cause in the darkest hours of our struggle illustrated the fidelity of the sex which was last at the cross and first at the sepulchre.

I am profoundly thankful to them for inviting me to represent them as their orator on the approaching occasion. Had it been practicable to accept, their request would have been to me a command, obeyed with no other reluctance than the consciousness of inability to do justice to the theme.

Thanks to the merits of our Confederate dead, they need neither orator nor bard to commend their deeds to the present generation of their countrymen. Many fell far from home and kindred, and sleep in unmarked graves, but all are gathered in the love of those for whom they died, and their memories are hallowed in the hearts of all true Confederates.

By the pious efforts of our people many humble cemeteries—such as, in their impoverishment, were possible—have been prepared, and the Confederate dead have been collected in them from neighboring battlefields. There annually, with reverential affection, the graves alike of the known and unknown are decked with vernal flowers, expressive of gratitude renewable forever, and typical of the hope of a resurrection and reunion "where the wicked cease from troubling and the weary are at rest."

To be remembered, honored, beloved by their people, is the reward bestowed on our Confederate dead. It is the highest which a good and purely patriotic man could desire. Should it be asked, Why, then, build this monument? the answer is, They do not need it, but posterity may. It is not their reward, but our debt. If the greatest gift a hero gives his race is to have been a hero in order that this gift may be utilized to coming generations, its appreciation by cotemporaries should be rendered as visible and enduring as possible. Let the monument, rising from earth toward heaven, lift the minds of those who come after us to a higher standard than the common test of success. Let it teach that man is born for duty, not for expediency; that when an attack is made on the community to which he belongs, by which he is protected, and to which his allegiance is due, his first obligation is to defend that community; and that under such conditions it is better to have "fought and lost than never to have fought at all." Let posterity learn by this monument that you commemorate men who died in a defensive war; that they did not, as has been idly stated, submit to the arbitrament of arms the questions at issue—questions which involved the inalienable rights inherited from their ancestors and held in trust for their posterity; but that they strove to maintain the State sovereignty which their fathers left them, and which it was their duty, if possible, to transmit to their children.

Away, then, with such feeble excuses for the abandonment of principles which may be crushed for awhile, but which, possessing the eternal vitality of truth, must in its own good time prevail over perishable error.

Let this monument teach that heroism derives its lustre from the justice of the cause in which it is displayed, and let it mark the difference between a war waged for the robber-like purpose of conquest and one to repel invasion—to defend a people's hearths and altars, and to maintain their laws and liberties. Such was the war in which our heroes fell, and theirs is the crown which sparkles with the gems of patriotism and righteousness, with a glory undimmed by any motive of aggrandizement or intent to inflict ruin on others. We present them to posterity as examples to be followed, and wait securely for the verdict of mankind when knowledge shall have dispelled misrepresentation and delusion. Is it unreasonable to hope that mature reflection and a closer study of the political history of the Union may yet restore the rights prostrated by the passions developed in our long and bloody war? If, however, it should be otherwise, then from our heroes' graves shall come in mournful tones the

"Answer fit:  
And if our children must obey,  
They must, but thinking on our day,  
'Twill less debase them to submit."

Yours faithfully,

JEFFERSON DAVIS.

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BACK VOLUMES can be furnished now, but the supply is by no means inexhaustible, and we would advise those desiring to secure them to do so at once.

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### BOOK NOTICE.

FITZHUGH ST. CLAIR, *THE S. C. REBEL BOY*, by Mrs. Sallie F. Chapin, of Charleston. Philadelphia: Claxton, Remsen & Haffelfinger.

We are indebted to the accomplished authoress for a copy of this book, which we have read with deep interest.

It is a well-laid plot and an admirably-told story of a noble South Carolina family whose head was killed in battle, and whose members had to struggle with the hardships of "refugeeing," the brutality of Sherman's army when it captured Columbia, and the poverty and bitter trials into which so many of the best people of South Carolina were plunged by the pack of thieves who plundered the State at the close of the war.

It shows how high character and christian principle can resist temptation and win at last the reward of virtue, and holds up a model for the young men of the South which we could wish them all to read and imitate.

















