


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THE NEED FOR INTELLECTUAL GUIDANCE IN
 PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE RESEARCH

1. Experience shows that intellectual inconsistencies and divergences interfere with the effective organization of research in R & A, weaken the impact of R & A conclusions on outside markets, and cause serious administrative confusion and frustration. It would, therefore, seem imperative to recognize the existence of this problem and to initiate measures which will attain a greater degree of intellectual unity in the Branch.
2. At this point, it may be well to note the conception of the function of R & A apparently held in certain other parts of OSS--a conception which would deny the existence of the problem outlined above. According to this view, R & A has no business holding "beliefs" or making "judgments"; its task is exclusively to collect "facts"; and this job is altogether neutral, requiring no policy decisions or directives, nor presumably intellectual guidance of any kind. This view, of course, is founded on a crude conception of the intellectual processes which go into ^{the} ~~historical~~ analysis ^{of events;} ~~analysis~~ but somewhat more important than its epistemological naivete is its practical unworkability. The unwillingness to face basic policy decisions has, in practice, been the source of ~~serious~~ administrative waste in the ~~the~~ planning, scheduling and execution of research, as well as in the marketing of finished projects.



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3. In the first place, it means that programs of research lack that internal coordination -- that tacit agreement on premises and purposes -- which are essential for speedy and effective results. To take an obvious example, it means that the Weekly Roundups do not constitute, as they should, a body of integrated material, internally consistent and expressing a united R & A view on the problems covered. It means -- at least it meant until recently -- that special reports from various sections could adopt opposing points of view about problems falling within the purview of more than one section. It means that large-scale projects requiring priority lists may often be scheduled in ways bearing no sensible relation to the strategy of the war. It means, in general, contradictions, cross-purposes and confusion.

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The existence of this internal incoherence, in the second place, tends to thwart the Branch and OSS in its attempts to exert influence outside. If a unified view on a given topic does not exist within the Branch, the impact of Branch work concerning that topic is bound to be diffuse

The ultimate result will be
 and ineffective, and to weaken the claim of OSS ~~to generate~~ on the confidence of its consumers. The organization and coordination of the premises of R and A. work on psychological warfare--which is what we mean by intellectual guidance--would increase both the internal efficiency and the external effectiveness of R & A work.

4. It is further important that this coordination take place in terms of actual strategic problems which are confronting this government and which must be resolved. The Branch must accept the fact on the political side, as it has on the economic side, that you cannot indefinitely postpone decisions in the midst of war. Since most decisions have to be made on imperfect data, the obligation of the expert to participate in making them becomes all the greater. In that conflict of pressures which creates administrative decision, definite and firmly-held points of view are alone likely to be effective, and the Branch will forfeit its chance of putting its labor to effective use unless it accepts the necessity of operating

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as a pressure group in its outside relations. For the sake, then, not only of administrative efficiency within, but of influence without, it is essential that R and A work on such unresolved strategic problems be given shape and unity. Failure to arrive at (or impose) this unity will result in continued internal incoherence and external ineffectiveness.

It should perhaps be stated at this point that no formal OSS "policy" is contemplated. This exceeds the franchise of OSS. But any agency, to make an impress in the welter of clashing opinions in Washington, must achieve agreement upon its informal policy line; the acknowledgment of the existence of that line is made more or less explicit according to the nature of the consumer. It is in any case indispensable that R and A projects executed for external consumers should not be in basic disagreement among themselves.

5. ^{*is believed,*} ~~It ~~is~~ ~~believed~~ ~~that~~~~ *that in the past* R & A would have gained in internal efficiency, as well as probable effectiveness as an influence within the government, if it had accepted the necessity of reaching some internal conclusion about de Gaulle-Giraud, or Mihailovich-Partisans, or USSR-Poland, and then expressing that conclusion in some appropriate way. In the future, it faces a series of crucial political decisions about the groups with whom we are to deal in the countries our armed forces propose to occupy; it faces the whole range

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of military government problems; it faces the ticklish questions of governments-in-exile, especially in such cases as Greece, Yugoslavia and Poland. If R & A is to work productively within and to exert influence ¹⁵⁵⁰²⁵ about on these ~~issues~~ it must organize intellectually to meet them.

6. The existing internal inconsistencies come from two main sources. Some are due to overlapping jurisdictions and other administrative confusions and may be remedied by proper and modest administrative measures--chiefly consultation and more extended personal contacts. Others are due to more basic political differences and, in some cases, can be resolved only by some form of action from above.

The political sources of policy incoherence, rather than the administrative, contain the difficult problem. Two conceivable ways of attaining some degree of coordination present themselves. On major issues about which there is important difference of opinion, ^{it is recommended that} the Projects Committee ~~should~~ be charged with the responsibility of staging a meeting where the issues could be talked out, and the exact range and cause of disagreement defined. This process in many cases will resolve some of the disagreement; in any case, it will clarify the issue and provide the background out of which a Branch point of view may emerge. The results of such a meeting should be embodied in a paper written under the direction of the Projects Committee, and that paper should

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be communicated to the proper quarters.

As for minor differences, they may perhaps be best settled by each geographical division through an appropriate division arrangement: one person, responsible to a representative committee, could be empowered to bring about consultations between advocates of antagonistic views, and in extreme cases issue policy directives intended to minimize the internal contradictions and assure a united body of opinion.

7. It is believed that the consequences of firmer intellectual guidance would be internally a much diminished wastage of energy and aimlessness of direction, an increased unity of purpose, and a greater pointedness and relevance to R & A work, since it will be planned and thought through in terms of impending strategic decisions. The external results would be the creation of an R & A viewpoint, a more efficient utilization of R & A work because of its closer articulation with the actual problems of the war, and a more solid impact upon consumers.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE P


I. NATURE OF THE PRESENT DIFFICULTIES

Up to the present time the PW work of OSC has consisted of the formulation of Basic Plans, the preparation of Implementation Studies, and the handling of Spot Requests. This program has suffered from errors of (a) commission, (b) omission.

The errors of commission are traceable largely to the lack of an effective coordinating body. The faults have been particularized elsewhere, and need not be dwelt upon here, and a more adequate machinery for providing effective coordination and direction has been proposed. This machinery is essential. It will not, however, eliminate all the flaws in the present arrangements. Especially, it will not automatically correct the errors of omission, which stem from a failure to recognize the extent of work and information required before a PW operation can be realistically planned and undertaken.

Two points should be emphasized:

- 1) More attention must be paid to the establishment and operation of effective working bodies. Coordination and direction are no substitutes for hard work, and the development of specialized knowledge. The present "panels" are ordinarily too loose and hierarchical



to work effectively. By the time the coordinating bodies, hence debating societies, rather than working bodies. By the time the job has been handed down to the workers they are likely to find the assignment vague, unfocused, confusing. The workers, moreover, have many other responsibilities as well, and are unable to concentrate on the special problems of PW, and have failed to become PW experts in any full sense.

This situation has, in fact, appeared to be less serious than it is because of the high level of generality at which Basic Plans and Implementation Studies have been pitched. Any competent member of the R&A staff, with the expenditure of a little time and effort, could, if unhampered by the machinery, prepare a Plan or a Study that would meet the standards set. It is a mistake to conclude from this, however, that an improvement in the machinery is all that is required. The machinery must be fixed, but more important, an entirely new working concept must be developed and accepted -- the concept of the Operational Plan.

2) By Operational Plan is meant the informa-

tion needed to conduct
Implementation Studies are perhaps necessary
first approximations, but they contain little,

if any, of the information required by the
operatives in the field. What kind of information is, in fact, required? Where can this information be obtained? and by whom? Who should combine it into an Operational Plan? These are questions that must be answered, and on the basis of which a PW work program bearing little resemblance to that which has gone before must be initiated.

Since PW is coming to be more and more activist and sabotage and subversion as distinct from propaganda and rumor spreading -- the selection of "targets," broadly defined, looms as the principal task of research and intelligence. It is reasonable to suppose, therefore, that the pattern of relationships between researchers and operations, between Washington and the field, already sweated out in the case of air target selection, would be broadly applicable to the selection of PW targets.

On the basis of this experience the following overall approach to the task of PW planning is suggested:

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II. PROPOSALS FOR THE CONDUCT

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Psychological warfare planning requires the following steps:

1. Establishment of assumptions as to the regions in which the military movements which the psychological warfare activities are designed to assist will take plant.

To date this step appears to have been made by the Planning Staff without consultation with those concerned with later steps in the process. Indeed, there is nothing to show that these assumptions have been anything more than unspoken premises. This has resulted in forcing those in the analysis group to make their own assumptions before proceeding with their work.

2. Determination of the areas to be operated in and the timing of the operations, i.e., whether they are to be confined to D-Day in direct aid of invasion or whether they are to be diversionary or attritional in character.

The nature and timing of operations has apparently been the joint decision of the planning staff and S.O. As to timing, the directives supplied the analysts have been adequate. Considerable confusion has, however, been encountered

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in the statement of the By 4 of the proposed operations. This has resulted in some lost motion at the analytical level.

5. Analysis of topographical, social, political and economic data to determine the points of strategic significance which could most profitably be attacked.

The situation as to responsibility for the analytical work has not always been clear. In regard to fixed targets it seems to have largely been turned over to RMA representatives but in some areas, particularly Greece, RMA have not been participating in work of this kind at all. The writer is not certain as to whether the Far Eastern Division has been engaged in the selection of targets or whether it has merely been asked to provide topographic, economic, and social information for analysis by others.


4. The preparation of operational plans for attack on objectives found to be strategically significant. This will involve the collection and presentation of operational intelligence and require the closest sort of collaboration between those doing the target work and those in charge of carrying out operations.

This step has not heretofore been envisaged, apparently.

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Steps 1 and 2 above fall of the proposed PW Projects Committee. They would, presumably, require the preparation of Basic Plans -- or, more properly, policy directives -- more or less as at present. In addition, they would require the preparation of a PW work schedule, which would, by definition, settle all major priority questions. This work schedule would be determined mainly by the requirements of our global strategy, but it should also take into account the status of R&A work for other customers, since many R&A tasks dovetail neatly if properly timed. The presence of an R&A member on the PW Projects Committee should make this possible.

Steps 3 and 4 above would be handled by the working bodies referred to in Part I and described below. Step 3 may be considered to represent the present implementation studies, but the precise form and content of these first approximations should be determined more by the manner in which a particular working group wishes to approach its task than by a uniform outline imposed from above. Step 4 is additional to anything presently provided for. It will consist of a narrower but much more intensive and detailed assemblage of information in the form best calculated to meet the needs of the field operations. R&A would play a major role in both steps 3 and 4, but the role of the SO, MO, and MU members of the working groups would increase in importance in step 4.



III Composition of the Working Groups

1. The Working Groups shall consist of one competent representative each of the Planning Staff of R&A, SI, and SO; and where needed of MO and MU.
2. A Working Group should be established for every area in which an independent operation is contemplated as possible and for which the PW Project Committee has actually scheduled the preparation of a plan.
3. No Working Group should be established until a plan is scheduled, and no plan should be scheduled until work can actually commence, i.e., until men are available.
4. The reason for proviso 3 is that Working Groups should consist, as a rule, only of those individuals who will handle some or all of the actual work contribution of their organization to the plan in question; and hence that no individual should be required to serve simultaneously on more than one, or at most two, working groups. This principle can be modified, of course, where the actual work contribution of the organization is not expected to be large.