



S E C R E T // N O F O R N // 20331008

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09360



JTF-GTMO-CDR

8 October 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue, Miami, FL 33172

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Transfer Out of DoD Control (TRO) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000249DP (S)

JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

1. (S) Personal Information:

- JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Muhammad Abdullah Muhammad al-Hamiri
- Current/True Name and Aliases: Muhammad Abdallah Muhammad Awad Dyab al-Hamiri, Abu Sanad
- Place of Birth: Hudaydah, Yemen (YM)
- Date of Birth: 1982
- Citizenship: Yemen
- Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9YM-000249DP



2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in over fair health.

3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment:

a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Transfer Out of DoD Control (TRO). JTF-GTMO assessed this detainee for TRO on 1 April 2007.

b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: *If released without rehabilitation, supervision, and means to successfully reintegrate into his society as a law abiding citizen, it is assessed detainee might seek out extremist associations, reengage in hostilities and/or extremist support activities. Since transfer to JTF-GTMO, detainee expresses hostility and makes verbal threats directed at US citizens, indicating he might engage in future extremist activities. Detainee is assessed to be a member of al-Qaida who traveled to Afghanistan (AF) in 2001 where he participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces. Detainee reportedly received training at the al-Qaida al-Faruq Training Camp. Detainee occupied al-*

CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES
REASON: E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 20331008

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Qaida facilities including a guesthouse associated with the al-Zarqawi network. Detainee's name is listed on an al-Qaida affiliated document. Detainee has made verbal threats to kill JTF-GTMO guard force personnel. Detainee's pocket litter provides evidence of coded communications training. JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be:

- A **MEDIUM** risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies
- A **HIGH** threat from a detention perspective
- Of **MEDIUM** intelligence value

c. (S//NF) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee's assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be annotated by ➤ next to the footnote.)

- Added detainee request to another JTF-GTMO detainee to use a substitution code when corresponding with detainee
- Removed assessment of detainee's travel through Syria prior to entering Pakistan
- Removed detainee's ARB admission of receiving training. Report was incorrectly cited

4. (U) Detainee's Account of Events:

The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.

a. (S//NF) Prior History: Detainee has a seventh grade education.¹ Detainee farmed with his father, a wealthy *bedouin* (nomad) landowner. In 1997, detainee moved to Saudi Arabia (SA) to study the Koran; however, he returned to Shabwa, YM (near Hudaydah) as he was unable to obtain permission to remain in Saudi Arabia. In 2000, detainee was involved in a serious car accident, fracturing his skull. Doctors inserted a temporary steel plate in his head. Detainee needed another surgery to remove the plate, but it would have been very expensive and his father decided against it. The plate caused detainee many painful headaches.²

b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: While discussing his head pain with Musab al-Sanae,³ a friend of five years, al-Sanae offered to pay for detainee's treatment and travel expenses to Pakistan (PK). In June 2001, detainee departed Sanaa, YM with al-Sanae to

¹ Multiple ISNs Yemeni Delegation 26-MAR-2008

² TD-314/00963-02, TD-314/00954-02, TD-314/26659-02, 000249 SIR 15-APR-2002(b)

³ Analyst Note: A variant of al-Sanae is al-Sanani.

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Mecca, SA for the *umra*⁴ and then in Amman, Jordan (JO) to stay with friends of al-Sanae. Detainee and al-Sanae returned to Sanaa and waited two weeks until August 2001, before leaving Yemen again. Detainee and al-Sanae traveled to Karachi, PK where they stayed at a hotel for a week before continuing to Islamabad, PK. They resided in Islamabad for one week sighting and visiting various markets. Detainee and al-Sanae then returned to Karachi. At no time while in Pakistan did detainee seek medical attention. Detainee and al-Sanae proceeded to Kandahar, AF via Quetta, PK.⁵

c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: Detainee and al-Sanae stayed in Kandahar for a month to 45 days in an Islamic studies madrassa named Fanoon teaching Arabic to children. Detainee, al-Sanae, and three other Arabs, traveled to Abu Khalid's home in Kabul, AF where they stayed two months. Detainee found out about the 11 September 2001 attacks on the US the day detainee arrived at Abu Khalid's house.⁶ Detainee stated al-Sanae took him to the front lines. The front line position was near Ahmad Shah Masoud's forces and, following an attack, detainee and al-Sanae returned almost immediately to Abu Khalid's home where they stayed for another month. At the beginning of Ramadan, approximately on 17 November 2001, al-Sanae and detainee left Kabul and traveled to a farm in Jalalabad, AF.⁷

5. (U) Capture Information:

a. (S//NF) There are no reports on detainee's capture other than his own statements. It is probable when detainee left Jalalabad he traveled through Tora Bora with al-Qaida members prior to his capture. In December 2001, detainee attempted to flee the area of Jalalabad. An Afghan named Mohaye al-Din showed him a road to Pakistan. Detainee traveled to a house in the mountains where he met a group of seven Saudis. The Arabs paid the owner of the house to take them to Pakistan. The owner took them to a house in Pakistan, where Pakistani police later came and detained them for questioning. On 3 January 2002, Pakistani authorities transferred detainee from Kohat, PK, to the Kandahar Detention Facility (along with many others who had been captured after fleeing Tora Bora)⁸ and placed detainee under US custody.⁹

⁴ Analyst Note: *Umra* is an Islamic ritual often referred to as the Lesser *Hajj* or the Minor *Hajj*. It includes elements of the *Hajj*, but can be observed individually and at any time of the year and is not an obligation.

⁵ TD-314/00963-02, 000249 SIR 15-APR-2002(b)

⁶ TD-314/00963-02, 000249 SIR 15-APR-2002(b), Analyst Note: Detainee providing conflicting reasons for departing Kandahar to Kabul, either because detainee was bored in Kandahar, or al-Sanae recommended they meet their fellow Arabs in Kabul as Kandahar was becoming dangerous.

⁷ TD-314/00963-02, TD-314/00954-02

⁸ DAB Association of Names to 195 Detainees 29-DEC-2006

⁹ TD-314/00963-02, TD-314/00954-02; TD-314/00845-02, paragraph F, number 21

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b. (S) Property Held:

- 1,500 Pakistani Rupees¹⁰
- Miscellaneous items including a pocket calculator, wristwatch, and a pocket notebook containing references to an internet website, email addresses, phone numbers, and a fragment of a rudimentary cipher system¹¹

c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 11 February 2002

d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide information on the following:

- Musab al-Sanae, a British resident from Yemen who had many contacts in Kandahar and Kabul
- Abu Khalid, a Moroccan or Tunisian safe house owner

6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee's Account: Detainee has failed to provide detailed information concerning his activities while in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Detainee's cover story is limited in the way of verifiable fact and contains numerous inconsistencies. These inconsistencies include his going to Pakistan for medical attention, but never receiving treatment and instead claiming he was tricked into going to Afghanistan. Detainee's story includes other discrepancies such as allowing al-Sanae to pay for his travel and treatment, as detainee had no job, but also claiming to be the eldest son of a wealthy bedouin family, and the duration of his acquaintance with al-Sanae. Detainee later retracted al-Sanae donating money to the community, because they both were too poor to obtain medical treatment in Yemen. Detainee reported various dates of departure to Afghanistan.

7. (U) Detainee Threat:

a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a **MEDIUM** risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies.

b. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer out of DoD Control: *If released without rehabilitation, supervision, and means to successfully reintegrate into his society as a law abiding citizen, it is assessed detainee might seek out extremist associations, reengage in hostilities and/or extremist support activities. Since transfer to JTF-GTMO, detainee expresses hostility and makes verbal threats directed at US citizens, indicating he might engage in future extremist activities.* Detainee is assessed to be a member of al-Qaida who traveled to Afghanistan in

¹⁰ Analyst Note: In November 2001, 1,500 Pakistani Rupees were worth approximately \$25.55 US.

¹¹ >IIR 6 034 0413 07, Analyst Note: This includes a simple substitution alphabetic code used with symbols.

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2001 where he participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces. Detainee reportedly received training at the al-Qaida al-Faruq Training Camps. Detainee occupied al-Qaida facilities including a guesthouse associated with the al-Zarqawi network. Detainee's name is listed on an al-Qaida affiliated document.

- (S//NF) Detainee is assessed to be a member of al-Qaida who traveled to Afghanistan to participate in hostilities against US and Coalition forces on the frontlines of Kabul and Tora Bora.
 - (S//NF) Detainee is identified on a document listing the names and aliases of suspected al-Qaida members and the contents of their trust accounts. One such list was recovered during September 2002 raids on a suspected al-Qaida safe house in Karachi.¹² (Analyst Note: Such lists are indicative of an individual's residence within al-Qaida, Taliban, and other extremist guesthouses, often for the purpose of training or coordination prior to travel to the front lines or abroad. Trust accounts, also referred to as safety boxes or safety deposit boxes, were simply storage compartments such as envelopes or folders that guesthouse administrators used to secure the individual's personal valuables, such as passports and plane tickets. These items were entrusted to the guesthouse until completion of training or other activity.)
 - (S//NF) Yasin Muhammad Salih Mazeab Basardah, ISN US9YM-000252DP (YM-252) reported seeing detainee at Tora Bora.¹³ YM-252 was in Tora Bora with UBL appointed commander Ali Muhammad Abd al-Aziz al-Fakhri, aka (Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi), ISN US9LY-000212DP (LY-212).¹⁴
 - (S//NF) Admitted al-Qaida member John Walker Lindh identified detainee's photo as someone Lindh thought he saw on the front lines of Kabul.¹⁵
 - (S//NF) Detainee admitted going to the front lines, but only for a few days.¹⁶
- (S//NF) Detainee received militant training at the al-Faruq Training Camp.
 - (S//NF) Detainee reported he spent forty-five days in Kandahar.¹⁷ Detainee was identified as training at al-Faruq Camp. (Analyst Note: Coincidentally, 45 days is a normal length of time allotted for basic training at the al-Faruq Training Camp in Kandahar.)

¹² TD-314/40693-02, number 260

¹³ >000252 FM40 26-SEP-2006

¹⁴ > 000252 SIR 08-MAY-2008, 000252 SIR 12-APR-2004, Analyst Note: Reports listed here are examples of available reports. YM-252 has provided extensive reporting on his activities in Tora Bora and those of other detainees, senior al-Qaida leadership, and other extremists at large or deceased.

¹⁵ IIR 7 739 0112 03

¹⁶ TD-314/00954-02, TD-314/00963-02

¹⁷ TD-314/00963-02

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- (C//REL TO USA, GCTF) Richard Dean Belmar, ISN US9UK-000817DP (UK-817, transferred), who attended al-Faruq Training Camp from July to mid-September 2001, identified detainee as a trainee at al-Faruq.¹⁸
- (S//NF) Al-Qaida member Musab Omar Ali al-Mudwani, ISN US9YM-000839DP (YM-839), first met detainee at the al-Nebras Guesthouse in Kandahar. YM-839 also knew detainee as a trainee at al-Faruq Training Camp. YM-839 trained at al-Faruq during August 2001.¹⁹ YM-839 also identified Muhammad al-Hamiri (detainee's name) as an acquaintance from his neighborhood that accompanied him to Sanaa but did not travel to Afghanistan.²⁰
- (S//NF) Detainee occupied al-Qaida affiliated facilities, where he reportedly met UBL.
 - (S//NF) Fawaz Naman Hamoud Abdallah Mahdi, ISN US9YM-000678 (YM-678, transferred) stated detainee met UBL while at al-Nebras Guesthouse in the summer of 2001.²¹
 - (S//NF) The al-Nebras Guesthouse, aka (Hajji Habash Guesthouse) was a waypoint and support center for Arabs transitioning to and from local training camps in the Kandahar area, particularly al-Faruq.²²
 - (S//NF) Detainee stated he stayed at Abu Khalid's house in Kabul. Detainee has described Khalid as Algerian, Moroccan, or Tunisian.²³ (S//NF) Analyst Note: The connection between the detainee (and other Yemeni detainees – especially those from Hudaydah) to Syrian guesthouses in Kabul requires further investigation. If claimed travel patterns are factual, it could indicate links between recruitment in Yemen and Syrian terrorist cells which relocated to Afghanistan and which have been linked to preparations for suicide operations.
 - (S//NF) Yemeni detainee Hamud Hasan Abdallah, ISN US9YM-000574DP (YM-574), also reported traveling from Sanaa to Karachi via Syria, and staying at Abu Khalid's house in Kabul.²⁴
 - (S//NF) Yemeni detainee Salah Muhammad Salih Al-Dhabi, ISN US9YM-000572DP (YM-572), who, like the detainee, lived in Hudaydah, also reported

¹⁸ 000817 SIR 31-OCT-2002, IIR 6 034 0420 05

¹⁹ IIR 6 034 1077 04, IIR 6 034 0999 04, TD-314/38075-02

²⁰ IIR 6 034 0694 04

²¹ 000678 302 18-AUG-2002

²² IIR 6 034 0968 03, TD-314/14620-03, 000252 FM40 09-NOV-2004, IIR 6 034 0459 02, IIR 6 034 0201 05, Analyst Note: In TD-314/44432-03, senior al-Qaida operational planner Walid Muhammad Salih Bin Attash aka (Silver) described the al-Qaida al-Nebras Guesthouse as the place where new students gathered before attending al-Faruq Training Camp.

²³ TD-314/26659-02

²⁴ 000574 KB 19-JUN-2002, 000574 HANDNOTE 02-MAR-2002

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staying at Abu Khalid's house in Kabul. YM-572 identified Abu Khalid as Egyptian.²⁵

- (S//NF) Muaz Hamza Ahmad al-Alawi, ISN US9YM-000028 (YM-028), reported Abu Khalid was the facilitator of the safe house in Kabul, who took his passport and money for safe keeping.²⁶
- (S//NF) Abu Bakr Ibn Ali Muhammad al-Ahdal, ISN US9YM-000171DP (YM-171), (from Hedaydah) reported staying in a guesthouse operated by a Syrian named Abu Muaz in Kabul.²⁷ (Analyst Note: Abu Muaz al-Suri, aka (Abdallah al-Shami), ISN US9SY-001454DP (SY-1454) escaped from the Bagram Detention Facility on 10 July 2005.²⁸)
- (S//NF) Abd al-Hadi Omar Mahmoud Faraj, ISN US9SY-000329DP (SY-329), stayed at the Syrian Guesthouse in Kabul operated by Abu Muaz.²⁹ (Analyst Note: SY-317; Ahmad Adnan Muhammad Ajam, aka (Abu Rawda al-Suri), ISN US9SY-000326DP (SY-326); Ali Husayn Muhammad Shaaban, aka (Yaqub al-Suri), ISN US9SY-000327DP (SY-327); Masum Abdah Muhammad, aka (Bilal al-Kurdi), ISN US9SY-000330DP (SY-330) all reported residing in the Syrian Guesthouse in Kabul.)
 - ◆ (S//NF) The Abu Muaz Guesthouse, aka (Syrian House), was part of the Syrian Guesthouse project in Kabul. Students attending the al-Ghuraba Camp, aka (Abu Musab al-Suri Camp), located near Kabul resided in the Abu Muaz Guesthouse. The al-Ghuraba Camp taught electronic networking and remote-controlled improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were assembled during training.³⁰ (Analyst Note: Abu Musab and Abu Khalid, both Syrians, were associates in Kabul.)
 - (S//NF) Sulayman Khalid Darwish, aka (Abu Khalid), leader of a Damascus terrorist cell which relocated to Kabul,³¹ is possibly detainee's associate Abu Khalid. Abu Khalid was the paternal uncle of deceased al-Qaida associate, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.³² (Analyst Note: Detainee's varying identifications for Abu Khalid are assessed to be intentionally misleading, possibly to prevent an association between detainee and members of the Zarqawi Network.)
 - (S//REL TO USA, AUS, GBR) Mamdouh Ibrahim Ahmad Habib, ISN US9AS-000661DP (AS-661, transferred), stated detainee stayed at a guesthouse named Malik. Malik was approximately 90 minutes from Kabul, in the mountains where

²⁵ 000572 HANDNOTE 12-DEC-2004, 000572 SIR 24-JUN-2002

²⁶ IIR 6 034 0968 03

²⁷ 000171 MFR 31-MAR-2002, IIR 6 034 0133 04, IIR 6 034 0221 02

²⁸ >001454 BIAR 15-OCT-2006

²⁹ 000329 302 16-AUG-2002, IIR 6 034 0615 04, IIR 6 034 0123 04, IIR 6 034 0122 04

³⁰ TD-314/21668-00, TD-314/12972-03, TD-314/40896-03, TD-314/41672-02

³¹ TD-314/44247-01

³² TD-314/58064-04, TD-314/26659-02

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chemical weapons were kept. Within the compound was a truck with an anti-aircraft weapon mounted on the bed of the truck.³³ (Analyst Note: It is unknown whether detainee was aware of, or involved with the chemicals.)

- (S//NF) It is assessed the guesthouse mentioned above was the Malik Training Camp, which conducted training on mortar and howitzer artillery weapons. Malik Training Camp was also a resting area for fighters coming from the front lines.³⁴
- (S//NF) Detainee was recruited by Musab al-Sanae, a probable al-Qaida affiliated facilitator and recruiter whom detainee had known for five years. Detainee claimed al-Sanae was a Yemeni who lived in the United Kingdom and returned to Yemen often to distribute money to the poor. Al-Sanae moved back to Yemen in approximately April 2001.³⁵
 - (S//NF) Al-Sanae promised to pay for expenses and medical bills associated with removing the steel plate from detainee's head.³⁶
 - (S//NF) Analyst Note: GZ-10016 stated he provided forged documents to Arab fighters who traveled to Pakistan, certifying that these mujahideen were in Pakistan for medical treatment.³⁷ Senior al-Qaida facilitator Abu Bakr Muhammad Boulghiti, aka (Abu Yasir al-Jazairi), said mujahideen who traveled for prolonged periods of time to Pakistan or Afghanistan needed a reason for their travel when returning to their home country. Therefore, it was common to obtain an authentic document showing medical treatment by bribing a doctor. Travel permission was sometimes easier to obtain if the traveler claimed to be entering a country for medical treatment.³⁸
- (S//NF) Detainee's pocket litter contained a possible version of a phone number code as well as a simple alphabet substitution code.³⁹ Detainee requested Ayman Muhammad Ahmad al-Shurfa, ISN US9SA-000331DP (SA-331) send him a detailed letter regarding the events and activities outside of JTF-GTMO. Detainee wanted his greetings passed to everyone SA-331 comes in contact with after SA-331's transfer from US control. Detainee instructed SA-331 to replace the Arabic letter "ba" in the introduction with the letter "ya" by adding one extra dot to the opening phrase. Detainee would recognize this letter is from SA-331 from the contents.⁴⁰ Detainee has denied possessing the notebook in his pocket litter.⁴¹

³³ IIR 4 201 0851 05

³⁴ IIR 6 034 1288 03

³⁵ IIR 6 034 0041 02, TD-314/00954-02, 000249 SIR 01-SEP-2004

³⁶ TD-314/00954-02, TD-314/00963-02

³⁷ TD-314/48843-05, TD-314/06618-03

³⁸ TD-314/44280-02, TD-314/54543-05

³⁹ >IIR 6 034 0413 07

⁴⁰ >IIR 6 034 0159 07

⁴¹ >000249 SIR 27-AUG-2007

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- (S//NF) Detainee continues to express hostility and makes verbal threats directed at US citizens.
 - (S//NF) Detainee stated he would “kill him (JTF-GMTO guard force) and other Americans. I kill Americans, I love to.”⁴²
 - (S//NF) Oibek Jamaludinovich Jabarov, ISN US9UZ-000452DP (UZ-452) reported detainee told UZ-452 that detainee will lose control of himself, planning to hug the interrogator and “make pregnant” until the team arrives. Detainee further stated if the interrogator was too far to grab, he would take off his clothes and “finish it” in front of the interrogator.⁴³

c. (S//NF) Detainee’s Conduct: Detainee is assessed as a **HIGH** threat from a detention perspective. His overall behavior has been non-compliant and hostile to the guard force and staff. Detainee currently has 131 reports of disciplinary infraction listed in DIMS with the most recent occurring on 30 June 2008, when he was reported failing to comply with the guard’s instructions. He has 26 reports of disciplinary infraction for assault with the most recent occurring on 17 June 2008, when he was reported throwing feces at the guard force. Other incidents for which he has been disciplined include failing to follow camp rules, inciting and participating in mass disturbances, unauthorized communications, damage to government property, provoking words and gestures, and possession of food and non-weapon type contraband. On 29 March 2004, he was reported to be in possession of a welding rod (shank). In 2007, detainee had a total of six reports of disciplinary infraction and nine so far in 2008.

8. (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:

a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of **MEDIUM** intelligence value. Detainee’s most recent interrogation session occurred on 24 July 2008.

b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Detainee arrived in Afghanistan probably between March and August 2001 with the assistance of an assessed al-Qaida facilitator and recruiter. During his time in Afghanistan, detainee resided in extremist and al-Qaida associated guesthouses, including one at which there were reportedly chemical weapons stored and another linked to the al-Zarqawi network. Detainee trained at the al-Faruq Training Camp and probably the Malik Training Camp, exposing him to additional al-Qaida personalities and training curriculum. Detainee admitted to being on the front lines. Detainee’s movement in Afghanistan and eventual capture in late 2001 placed detainee in positions where he probably participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces.

⁴² >000249 JDG INCIDENT REPORT 17-JAN-2006 20:33:00

⁴³ >000452 SIR 22-AUG-2008

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c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee fails to provide information pertaining to any personal affiliation with extremist organizations, although his timeline and third-party accounts firmly support his having received militant training and fought on the front lines. Based on his access and placement, detainee probably possesses little unique information beyond that which he may possess on the Syrian terrorist cell in Kabul. Detainee can probably provide information on personalities he encountered at various guesthouses and training camps. Detainee's reported placement at a guesthouse that stored chemical weapons requires further investigation.


d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:

- Al-Qaida Personnel
 - Guesthouse operators
 - Associates including other detainees
 - Training leadership
- Location of and details about chemical weapons
- Al-Faruq and Malik Training Camps
 - Curriculum and other detainees trained
- Operational activities, planning, affiliated extremists and extremist facilitation based out of or relating to Yemen
 - Recruitment in Yemen
 - Musab al-Sanae
 - Connections to European networks
 - Connections to Syrian terrorist cells
- Acquisition of medical visas in support of international travels
- Terrorist Recruitment of Juveniles
- Terrorist biographical-psychological information
- Communication methods
- Intelligence activities and operations of terrorist and insurgent groups

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9. (S) **EC Status:** Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 13 December 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant.



D. M. THOMAS, JR
Rear Admiral, US Navy
Commanding

* Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessment can be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College October 2001 guide *Intelligence Warning Terminology*.