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**The documents in this
folder continue from the
previous folder.**

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August 25, 1975

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING: AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF ISRAEL AND
THE UNITED STATES

U.S. DRAFT

ISRAEL DRAFT

The United States recognizes that the
Egypt-Israel Agreement of _____, (herein-
after referred to as the Agreement), entailing
the withdrawal from vital areas in Sinai, con-
stitutes an act of great significance on Israel's
part in the pursuit of final peace. That Agree-
ment has full US support.

U.S.-Israeli Assurances

1. The USG will make every effort to be fully responsive,
within the limits of its resources and Congressional
authorization and appropriation, on an on-going and long-
term basis to Israel's military equipment and other de-
fense requirements, to its energy requirements and to its

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
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E.O. 13526, 1/18/2001

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BY: HR 10/17/03

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economic needs. In this spirit the Administration will seek authorization and appropriation of funds from Congress in FY76 in the total amount of \$ _____. It will thereafter submit annually for approval by the US Congress a request for military and economic assistance in order to provide for Israel's economic, energy and military needs. The needs specified in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 below shall be deemed eligible for inclusion within the annual total to be requested in FY76 and later fiscal years.

military equipment and other defense requirements as well as to Israel's economic needs. In this spirit the Administration will seek authorization and appropriation of funds from Congress in FY1976 in the total amount of - - - - - dollars as indicated also in a separate U.S.-Israeli Memorandum dealing with the specific items. It will thereafter submit annually for approval by the U.S. Congress a request for military and economic assistance in order to provide for Israel's economic and military needs.

(In addition to the above, the USG will make provision also for an annual expenditure to Israel for oil supplies to compensate for the net additional annual expenditure to Israel required for oil supplies to replace the oil from Abu-Rodeis to Israel, the quantity being



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
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2. Israel's long-term military supply needs from the United States shall be the subject of periodic consultations between representatives of the US and Israeli defense establishments, with agreement reached on specific items to be included in a separate US-Israeli memorandum. To this end, a joint study by military experts will be undertaken within _____ days. In conducting this study, which will include Israel's 1976 needs, the U.S. will view Israel's requests sympathetically, including its request for advanced and sophisticated weapons.

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presently 4.5 million tons. The cost which is presently estimated at 350 million dollars, will be annually determined by the two Governments on the basis of the market prices.)


2. Israel will seek to make its own independent arrangements for oil supply to meet its requirements under the current market prices. If Israel notifies the USG that it is unable to satisfy its needs, the USG will, upon such notification, act to ensure promptly the supply and delivery of oil to Israel (to meet all its requirements). The USG will determine whether the authority to enter into this commitment and to ensure the supply and delivery of oil to Israel now exists. If the U.S. determines that such authority does not exist or is doubtful, legislative authority,



3. Israel will seek to make its own independent arrangements for oil supply to meet its requirements through purchases in the market. In the event Israel is unable to secure its essential needs in this way, the USG, upon notification, will for a period of three years (subject to review) and within an overall ceiling of 125,000 barrels per day, act to ensure promptly the supply and delivery of oil to Israel if (a) the oil Israel needs to meet its requirements is unavailable for purchase; or (b) an embargo prevents Israel from obtaining the necessary

aving the effect of satisfying this commitment, will promptly be requested from the Congress. USG also agrees that the Congress will be informed of this commitment, on behalf of the U.S. so that it may be respected by the Congress in the framing of any domestic legislation which might affect it.

3. The USG will make available funds, the amount to be determined, to the GOI necessary for a project for the construction and stocking of the oil reserve to be stored in Israel, so as to bring storage reserve capacity, now standing at approximately six months, up to one year needs at the time of the completion of the project. The project will be implemented within four years. The construction, operation and financing and other relevant questions of the project will be the subject of early and detailed talks between the two Governments. (In submitting to the U.S.




supplies of oil. (The foregoing is based on the application of the IEA conservation formula.)

The USG assures Israel of its intention to inform the Congress, based on existing legal authority, of its undertaking to act promptly to ensure the supply and delivery of oil to Israel in the above contingencies.

4. In order to help Israel meet its energy needs, and as part of the overall annual figures in paragraph one above, the United States agrees:

- a. To ask Congress for funds for oil supplies so as to assist Israel in meeting its additional expenditures for the import of oil to replace that which would ordinarily have come from Abu Rodeis (4.5 million tons in 1975).
- b. To ask Congress to make available funds, the amount to be determined, to the GOI necessary for a project for the construction and stocking of the oil reserve to be stored in Israel, bringing storage reserve capacity and reserve

Congress the total Israeli economic aid package, the USG will make provision for an additional annual expenditure to Israel for oil supplies.



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
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stocks now standing at approximately six months, up to one-year's needs at the time of the completion of the project. The project will be implemented within four years. The construction, operation and financing and other relevant questions of the project will be the subject of early and detailed talks between the two Governments.

5. The USG will not expect Israel to begin to implement the Agreement before Egypt fulfills its undertakings under the January 1974 Disengagement Agreement including, inter alia, its commitment to permit a passage of all Israeli cargoes to and from Israeli ports through the Suez Canal.

6. The USG will make every possible effort to assist in the establishment of an atmosphere in which the Agreement will be observed without being subjected to pressures or deadlines.

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
7. The USG agrees with Israel that it is not feasible to enter into a further interim agreement with Egypt and that the next agreement should be a final peace agreement.

8. In case of an Egyptian violation of any of the provisions of the Agreement, the USG is prepared to consult with Israel as to the significance of the violation and possible remedial action.

7. In case of an Egyptian violation of any of the provisions of the Israel-Egypt Agreement in all its parts, the USG will consult with the GOI in order to determine what measures the USG should take in relation to Egypt in order to ensure corrective action.

8. Should Israel take military action as a result of an Egyptian violation of the Agreement or any of its attachments, the USG, if it agrees that such action is reasonable, will lend Israel material and diplomatic support.

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9. The USG will vote against any Security Council resolution which in its judgment affects adversely or alters the Agreement.

9. The USG will vote against any Security Council Resolution which affects adversely or alters the Israel-Egypt Agreement.


10. The USG will not join in and will seek to prevent efforts by others to bring about consideration of proposals which it and Israel : agree are detrimental to the interests of Israel.

11. In view of the long-standing U.S. commitment to the survival and security of Israel, the USG will view with particular gravity threats to Israel's security or sovereignty by a world power. In support of this objective, the USG will in the event of such threat consult promptly with the GOI with respect to the support, diplomatic or otherwise, or assistance that it will lend to Israel.

11. Should a world power threaten Israel's security or sovereignty the U.S. will lend Israel its full appropriate support and assistance. The nature of the support, diplomatic and otherwise, will be subject to prompt consultations between the GOI and USG.

12. The USG and the GOI will, at the earliest possible time, and if possible, within two months

12. The USG and the GOI will, at the earliest possible time, and if possible within two months



after the signature of this document, conclude the contingency plan for a military supply operation to Israel in an emergency situation.


13. It is the USG's position that Egyptian commitments under the Egypt-Israel Agreement, its implementation, validity and duration are not conditional upon any act or developments between the other Arab states and Israel. The USG regards the Agreement as standing on its own.

14. The USG notes the Israeli position that negotiations with Jordan will be directed toward an overall peace settlement at such time as conditions are conducive to such a negotiation. Any US initiative concerning negotiations with Jordan will be fully discussed with the GOI well in advance, and every effort will be made to arrive at a coordinated position.

after the signature of this document, conclude the contingency plan for a military supply operation to Israel.

13. The USG has obtained an Egyptian commitment that the Egypt-Israel Agreement, its implementation, validity and duration are not conditional upon any act or development between the other Arab States and Israel.

14. The USG shares the Israeli position that negotiations with Jordan will be directed toward an overall peace settlement once conditions are conducive to such a negotiation (and not towards an interim agreement with Jordan). Any U.S. initiative concerning negotiations with Jordan will be fully discussed with the GOI well in advance and every effort will be made to arrive at a coordinated position.



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
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15. Should Syria initiate military or paramilitary action against Israel or should Syria undertake or tolerate acts that might threaten the ceasefire the USG will support Israel diplomatically. These acts include, inter alia, the infiltration of terrorists across the Israel-Syria ceasefire lines and the stationing of terrorist groups in frontal areas facing Israel.

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15. Should negotiations between Israel and Syria on an interim agreement develop the USG will support the proposals outlined by Prime Minister Rabin in his talks in Washington in June 1975 and what was reiterated by Ambassador Dinitz in his oral clarification of

16. Should Syria initiate military or paramilitary action against Israel or should Syria undertake or tolerate acts that might threaten the ceasefire the USG will support Israel. These acts include, inter alia, the infiltration of terrorists across the Israel-Syria ceasefire line and the stationing of terrorist groups in frontal areas facing Israel.




16. In accordance with the principle of freedom of navigation on the high seas and free and unimpeded passage through and over straits connecting international waters, the United States Government regards the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb and the Strait of Gibraltar as international waterways. It will support Israel's right to free and unimpeded passage through such straits. Similarly, the United States Government recognizes Israel's right to freedom of flights over the Red Sea and such straits and will support diplomatically the exercise of that right. In the event of any interference with the passage of Israeli ships or cargoes through such straits or with Israeli flights over the Red Sea or such straits, the United States Government will consult with Israel on how best to assure the maintenance and exercise of such rights.

17. With respect to the boycott against Israel, the USG will take appropriate steps authorized by its domestic legislation with respect to (a) the coopera-

17. Without derogating from the principle of freedom of navigation on the high seas and through international waterways, the USG regards, inter alia, the Straits of Bab el-Mandeb leading into the Red Sea as an international waterway. It will strongly support Israel's right to free and unimpeded passage through those Straits. The USG also recognizes Israel's right to freedom of flights over the Red Sea and its approaches and will support strongly the exercise of that right. In the event of any interference with the passage of Israeli ships or cargoes through the Straits or with Israeli flights over the Red Sea and its approaches, the US will consult with Israel on how best to assure the maintenance and exercise of such rights.

18. The USG will take the necessary steps authorized by its domestic legislation to ensure that corporations, controlled by U.S. nationals,




tion by U.S. corporations with the boycott and (b) the practice by such corporations of any form of discrimination direct or indirect against Israel, Israel corporations or Israel nationals.

including oil companies that engage in the exploration, production and marketing of oil, do not cooperate with the Arab boycott against Israel in any form whatsoever, nor practice any form of discrimination, direct or indirect, against Israel, Israel corporations or Israel nationals.

19. In connection with the Israel-Egypt Agreement the USG considers all the Egyptian commitments given to Israel in any form whatsoever via the USG or otherwise, as binding and irrevocable.


18. In the event that UNEF or any other UN organ is withdrawn without the prior agreement of both parties to the Egypt-Israel Agreement and the US before this agreement is superseded by another agreement, the agreement shall remain binding in all its parts. Without prejudice to the generality of this provision it is agreed:



- a. The Buffer Zone between the forces of Egypt and Israel in which UNEF is stationed will continue to serve as a Buffer Zone separating the forces of the two sides with unchanged status.
- b. The arrangements in the Zone, such as those relating to the warning system of both sides as well as the agreed movement of Egypt and Israel personnel in the Zone will not be affected by ~~the withdrawal of UNEF~~.
- c. The demilitarized status of the UN Zone will remain unchanged.
- d. The U.S. civilian presence in the area of the Agreement will remain unchanged.
- e. All other arrangements in the area, as defined by the Agreement, will remain unchanged.

19. If UNEF or any other UN organ is withdrawn because of an action by Egypt contrary to its undertakings

21. If UNEF or any other UN organ is withdrawn because of an action by Egypt, the USG




in the Agreement, the USG notes that Israel claims the right to take corrective measures.

notes that Israel claims the right to take corrective measures, including the reoccupation of the zone by Israel.

20. The USG notes that Israel and Egypt have announced their agreement to aerial reconnaissance missions to be carried out by the US over the areas covered by the Agreement at a frequency of one mission every 7-10 days. The USG will make the photographs available to both Israel and Egypt expeditiously. The area to be photographed is as agreed between the parties.

21. In the spirit of the special relationship existing between the U.S. and Israel and in light of the determination of both sides to avoid a situation in which the U.S. and Israel would pursue divergent courses in peace negotiations, the U.S. will take the position that these are negotiations between the parties. Should the U.S. desire to put forward

23. In the spirit of the special relationship existing between the U.S. and Israel and the desire to avoid a situation in which the USG would be putting forward or supporting at Geneva or elsewhere suggestions or proposals in relationship to an overall peace settlement which Israel would consider unsatisfactory, both countries




proposals of its own, it will make every effort to coordinate with Israel its proposals with a view to refraining from putting forward proposals that Israel would consider unsatisfactory.

will make every effort to reach agreement on the modalities, nature and substance of such proposals.

22. In case of lack of agreed intelligence data between the USG and the GOI concerning an Egyptian violation, the USG will give full weight to the Israeli intelligence data, bearing in mind the cruciality of the time element.

23. The US and Israel agree that signature of the text of the Egypt-Israel Agreement and its full entry into effect shall not take place before approval by the US Congress of the US role in connection with the surveillance and observation functions described in the Agreement and its Annex. Upon notification that Congressional approval has been given, the parties will forthwith (within 72 hours) sign the Agreement as previously initialled. During the period between initialling and Congressional

25. The USG agrees that the Egypt-Israel Agreement will not enter into effect before Congressional approval concerning (a) the U.S. presence in the region of the Sinai Passes and (b) the guarantee of oil supply to Israel. The USG has received the consent of the GOE on this matter.




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action on this US role, Egypt and Israel agree to maintain the status quo, including their obligations under the 1974 Disengagement Agreement, and that UNEF shall continue in its function. The US has informed the GOI that it has obtained GOE agreement to the above..

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ATTN AMBASSADOR ANDERSON WITH SECRETARY'S PARTY
E.O. 11652: N/A
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SUBJECT: COMMENTS TO PRESS BY SECRETARY KISSINGER AND FOREIGN
MINISTER ALLON AFTER MEETING AT PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE
AUG 26, 1975

SECRETARY KISSINGER: MY FRIEND IS GOING TO TALK FIRST THIS

FOREIGN MINISTER ALLON: WE HAD A VERY GOOD TALK TODAY. WE
WENT INTO MANY DETAILS CONCERNING THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, AFTER
LISTENING VERY CAREFULLY TO THE REPORT FROM THE TALKS OF
DR. KISSINGER WITH EGYPTIAN LEADERS. I HAVE THE FEELING THAT
DURING THE LAST TWO DAYS, YESTERDAY AND TODAY, WE ACHIEVED A
REMARKABLE PROGRESS TOWARDS THE CONCLUSION OF AN INTERIM
AGREEMENT AND WE ARE MUCH CLOSER TO A POSITIVE CONCLUSION
THAN EVER SINCE THE SHUTTLE WAS RESUMED.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I WAS GOING TO SAY IN AGREEING WITH MY
FRIEND, YIGAL, THAT WE ARE MAKING REMARKABLE PROGRESS TOWARDS
AN AGREEMENT AND A NERVOUS BREAKDOWN. IT IS GOING TO BE A RACE
WHICH WILL BE ACHIEVED FIRST.

Q: WHAT STILL NEEDS TO BE DONE, DR. KISSINGER?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: SERIOUSLY, I AGREE WITH WHAT THE FOREIGN
MINISTER HAS SAID, AS ONE BEGINS TALKING ABOUT SPECIFIC
PROVISIONS OF AN AGREEMENT, MANY SUBTEL AND FINE POINTS EMERGE
THAT WHEN YOU TALK GENERAL PRINCIPLES ARE NOT SO APPARENT.
THEREFORE, WE ARE NOW GOING AGAIN THROUGH A MINUTE EXAMINATION

*****WHHR COMMENT*****

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OF VARIOUS ASPECTS OF AN AGREEMENT. THIS IS THE MAJOR ISSUE THAT IS NOW BEFORE US.

Q: DR. KISSINGER, ARE YOU BRINGING AN ISRAELI DRAFT AGREEMENT TO EGYPT?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: WE ARE NO LONGER WORKING ON EITHER AN ISRAELI OR AN EGYPTIAN DRAFT AGREEMENT. WE ARE WORKING ON A TEXT WHICH IS PARTIALLY AGREED AND PARTIALLY DISAGREED. WHEN IT IS FINALLY FINISHED IT WILL BE THE COMMON CONSENSUS OF BOTH SIDES.

Q: DR. KISSINGER, MR. ALLON HAS SAID THAT THE TERRITORIAL ISSUE HAS PRACTICALLY BEEN RESOLVED. CAN WE NOT ASSUME THAT WHAT WE ARE DEALING WITH NOW ARE POLITICAL MATTERS SUCH AS AN END TO THE BOYCOTT, AND END TO BELLIGERENCY, AND SO FORTH?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: AS I TOLD YOU, I CANNOT GO INTO THE SUBSTANCE. WE ARE NOW GOING THROUGH FORMULATIONS OF MATTERS, MOST OF WHICH ARE AGREED AND IT DEPENDS WHAT EXPRESSION THEY CAN BE GIVEN. THAT IS WHAT WE ARE SPENDING A GREAT DEAL OF OUR TIME ON IN ADDITION TO BILATERAL ISRAELI-U.S. MATTERS.

Q: WILL WE HAVE AN AGREEMENT BY THE END OF THIS WEEK, THE WAY IT LOOKS NOW?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I JUST DO NOT WANT TO...

Q: DO YOU HAVE ANY REACTION TO SENATOR MANSFIELD'S STATEMENT EXPRESSING CONCERN ABOUT AMERICAN PRESENCE IN THIS? ARE YOU WORRIED ABOUT GETTING THIS THROUGH THE AMERICAN CONGRESS?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I HAVE NOT READ THE ACTUAL TEXT OF SENATOR MANSFIELD'S STATEMENT. I AM NOT EXCESSIVELY SURPRISED. WE WILL CONSULT VERY CAREFULLY WITH THE CONGRESS. OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT WE CAN GET IT THROUGH AFTER SOME SERIOUS DEBATE.

Q: WHAT IS YOUR SCHEDULE NOW, SIR?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: MY SCHEDULE IS TO RETURN FROM EGYPT AS QUICKLY AS I CAN, HOPEFULLY TOMORROW. 88

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φ Egypt Chart

CHECKLIST

Alexandria, Tuesday, August 26

I. Remaining Issues on Elements of Agreement

A. The line is pretty well settled. You have Rabin's agreement to a line at the Giddi Pass, and you are getting a delineation of it on the map.

B. The Egyptian surveillance site. Report the Israeli reaction on location.

-- Israel continues to prefer Point 180.

-- Israel will agree to Point 716.

C. Entry of Agreement into Force.

-- Before discussing the draft Agreement, you will want to discuss the concept of the Agreement coming into force when the Protocol is signed rather than on the signature of the Agreement as in the disengagement agreement.

II. Documents under Discussion

A. Agreement (Tab A)

B. Letter on UNEF duration (Tab B)

C. Israel wants a letter which:

-- defines the cargoes which would be excluded from the Canal

-- repeats the position on the Bab al-Mandab;

-- states that the word "blockades" does not apply to the Arab boycott.

D. Letter on non-use of force (Tab C).

III. Further Documents to Discuss in Concept

A. Annex(es). You will want to begin discussion of the points which will need to be covered in an Annex. For example:

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STATE DEPT. POLICE

10/17/03




- The new deployment areas (Lines A, B, C, D, etc.)
- Zone for surveillance sites
- Limitations on armament and forces.
- Arrangements in coastal area leading to oil fields (UNEF checkpoints, alternate use of roads on temporary basis).
- Procedures and timing for working out implementation schedule at Geneva.
- Principles by which the Joint Commission will work.
- Reconfirm US aerial reconnaissance.
- How the transition will take place in the oil fields.

B. Introduce the concept of the trilateral agreement and annex on US custodianship of early warning systems.

IV. Other Issues

Just to keep them on the agenda, the following will need to be discussed at some point:

- A. Fishing rights.
- B. Those issues which we may agree in the Memo of Understanding with Israel to raise with Egypt.



August 26, 1975

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AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL

The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government of Israel have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Parties

Resolve that the conflict between them and in the Middle East shall not be resolved by military force only but/by peaceful means;

Recall that the Agreement concluded by Parties January 18, 1974, within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference, constituted a first step towards a just and durable peace according to the provisions of Security Council Resolution 338 of October 22, 1973; and

Are determined to reach a final and just peace settlement by means of negotiations called for by Security Council Resolution this Agreement being 338, and as/a significant step towards that end.

ARTICLE II


(1) the Parties hereby undertake not to resort to the threat or use of force or armed military blockades against each other and to settle all disputes between them by negotiations or other peaceful means.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 1.5

STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY HC, DATE 10/17/03



(2) The Parties have given a further written assurance to the Government of the United States of America to this effect.

(Alternative: put "assurances" in Article III.)

ARTICLE III

(1) The Parties ~~will~~ shall continue scrupulously to observe the ceasefire on land, sea and air and to refrain from all military or para-military actions against each other.

(2) The Parties also confirm that the obligations contained in the Annexes and assurances and, when concluded, the Protocol shall be an integral part of this Agreement.

ARTICLE IV

(U.S. version replaced with more general language, and former Article VIII moved here.)

In conformity with the provisions of this Agreement, the military forces of the Parties shall be redeployed along the new lines; buffer zones and an Egyptian civilian administered area with a United Nations presence shall be established; areas of limited forces and armaments shall be delineated; and early warning and surveillance installations shall be erected.

The details concerning the new demarcation lines, the redeployment of the forces and its timing, the limitation on armaments and forces, aerial reconnaissance, the operation of the



early warning and surveillance installations, the United Nations functions and other arrangements will all be in accordance with the provisions of the Annexes and map which are an integral part of this Agreement and of the Protocol which is to result from negotiations pursuant to the Annexes and which, when concluded, shall become an integral part of this Agreement.

ARTICLE V

~~Egypt~~ The Parties agree that the United Nations Emergency Force is essential and shall continue its function and that its mandate shall be extended annually for the duration of this Agreement. (Alternative: "each year for a year.")

ARTICLE VI

~~The Parties hereby establish~~ A Joint Commission of the ~~is~~ Parties/~~hereby established~~ for the duration of this Agreement.
~~to be presided over by~~ It shall operate through the good offices (Alternative: under the aegis) of the Chief Coordinator of the United Nations Peacekeeping Missions in the Middle East ~~for the duration of this Agreement,~~ in order to consider any problem arising from this Agreement and to assist the United Nations Emergency Force in the execution of its mandate. The Joint Commission shall function in accordance with procedures ~~precepts~~/established in the Annex.



ARTICLE VII

All non-military cargoes ~~of non-strategic nature~~ destined for or coming from Israel shall will be permitted through the Suez Canal.

ARTICLE VIII

(1) This Agreement is regarded by the Parties as a significant step toward a just and lasting peace. It is not a final peace agreement.

(2) The Parties shall continue their efforts to negotiate a final peace agreement within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference in accordance with Security Council Resolution 338.

(Israel wants to delete the Article on Article 51.)

ARTICLE IX

This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature of the Protocol and remain in force until superseded by a new agreement ~~between the Parties in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution-338.~~

Done at _____ on the _____
1975, in four copies.

For the Government of Israel

For the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt

WITNESS



Dear Mr. President:

I am writing you this letter to inform you of the position of Egypt on the question of the duration of the second Egyptian-Israeli agreement on the Sinai.

The agreement includes language that the 'agreement shall remain in force until is superseded by a new agreement between the Parties.' With respect to the duration of UNEF, I have informed Secretary Kissinger of Egypt's undertaking to make every effort to extend the United Nations Emergency Force annually for the duration of the agreement.

However, should the Security Council, because of the action of a third state, fail to renew the UNEF mandate to assure continuous operation, Egypt undertakes to concert actively with the U.S. to have the General Assembly take appropriate action to bring about annual renewals for at least two renewals after the first annual mandate goes into effect.



In the event such affirmative General Assembly action did not prove possible, Egypt will request an augmented UNTSO to continue the supervision responsibilities, and to have the joint Egyptian-Israeli Commission cooperate with it.

Sincerely yours,

Mohammed Anwar al-Sadat

His Excellency
Gerald R. Ford,
President of the United States,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.



August 24, 1975

LETTER TO PRESIDENT FORD ON NON-USE OF FORCE

Dear Mr. President,

In connection with the Agreement between Egypt and Israel of _____, and in accordance with the undertakings contained therein, we are herewith submitting the following assurance to you:

- A. Israel is resolved that the conflict between her and Egypt and in the Middle East shall not be resolved by military force but by peaceful means.
- B. Israel undertakes not to resort to the threat or use of force or military blockades against Egypt and to settle all disputes with Egypt by negotiations or other peaceful means.
- C. Israel shall continue scrupulously observe the ceasefire on land, sea and air and to refrain from all military or paramilitary actions against Egypt.

Yours sincerely,





THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, DATE 08-26
BY SP-10/17/03
HR

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Hermann F. Eilts, U.S. Ambassador to Egypt
Winston Lord, Director of Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
Harold H. Saunders, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and Asian Affairs

Egypt: Mohammed Anwar al-Sadat, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt
Major General Mohammed Husni Mubarak, Vice President
Mamdouh Salem, Prime Minister
Ismail Fahmy, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs
Lt. General Abdel Ghany el Gamasy, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of War

DATE & TIME: Tuesday - August 26, 1975
7:05 - 7:45 p.m.

PLACE: The President's Beach House
Alexandria, Egypt

[After a picture taking session with the press, during which President Sadat and the Secretary answered some questions from the journalists, Tab A, the group moved to a table in the garden. There was a brief small talk while further pictures were taken.]

Kissinger: My apologies for the questions of the press, which seemed more designed to embarrass you than to elicit information. But you handled them with great skill.

On the item with respect to the line, we got their agreement to go to the second point I showed you, not the first. [He gets a map from Mr. Sisco.] We will get an exact delineation of it. I haven't the exact delineation, but it is about here [pointing to the map.]

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

SECRET - XGDS (3)
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A.
KISSINGER



M

Kissinger: Yes, in the Giddi.

Sadat: You have moved them.

Kissinger: Yes. We'll get the exact delineation, but it won't vary by more than 50 meters. [There was then a brief discussion of the maps, and the Secretary got out the Giddi map.] They will be down here somewhere.

Sadat: Still in the pass.

Kissinger: They claim that the pass ends here.

Gamasy: The forward line or the main line?

Kissinger: The forward line.

Gamasy: In the same place.

Kissinger: I suppose it could be moved back somewhat. It has to be; otherwise it makes no sense. [President Sadat and Foreign Minister Fahmy exchange words in Arabic.]

On your surveillance site, station, after studying the problem they preferred that point 180 which I gave you yesterday and which you did not much like. I am sure they will accept 716, which they claim is extraordinarily well-chosen; in fact, that is why they would reject it today. They claim it can cover all the Sinai but a small area here. It does not increase their confidence in the General. So I think you can assume they will accept it. I told them that it must be built by an Egyptian construction team. They asked me to tell you that they prefer 180 in the north. [There was then a further exchange among General Gamasy, President Sadat and Secretary Kissinger about the Egyptian warning station.]

Gamasy: They want 180. They prefer that for us.

Kissinger: For you.

Gamasy: [Pointing to the map] No. We prefer this, and then this.



Kissinger: They claim that it [716] is better for you than your second priority.

Gamasy: We gave them three priorities and they rejected even the third one.

Kissinger: I have to tell you quite honestly these two they rejected and the third one they wanted to think about overnight. Overnight they came to the conclusion that this post [716] is electronically better for you than even this one [the Egyptians' second choice], and they showed us on the map why. But I have insisted that they have to accept this one [716]. Is it true that it is electronically better [than your second choice]?

Gamasy: Yes. The other two are better than the third.

Kissinger: They said that this one was better than that.

Sadat: It is not between two passes.

Kissinger: They claim it covers practically all the Sinai except a very narrow part.

Sadat: Maybe there are some mountains.


Kissinger: They say that the General is very clever. At first they did not see the significance [of the warning site.] They seemed somewhat relieved. Then they studied it and wanted to pull out of it. We had a rather extended discussion this morning. [The Egyptian side talks in Arabic among themselves.] They showed me on a map what it covers -- everything except a small section here. It covers everything in all directions. It was very naughty of you [General Gamasy].

Gamasy: It was our specialists who did it.

Sadat: It proves their respect for Gamasy.

Kissinger: It is one of their compliments.

Sadat: We could be nice and take one in the north.



Kissinger: They prefer 180. They admitted that of all the positions this one was the best, better even than this.

Gamasy: This one [716] is better.

Kissinger: Do not tell me what you have in mind. I cannot face it.

So that is it for the warning station.

They agreed to the general process discussed here on how to bring the agreement to a conclusion. There would be initialing on Friday and signature in Geneva the day after the Knesset approves it, which they plan for Monday, after the initialing on Friday. Then the technical commission meeting would take place on a fixed date following the signature, which could not be before Friday because the next two days are Jewish holidays. At any rate, it seems generally agreed.

Sadat: How would it be initialed in Geneva?

Kissinger: It would be signed in Geneva.

Sadat: Where would it be initialed?

Kissinger: We thought we would carry the documents to each of you and get the initialing done in each place.


Sadat: Like before.

Kissinger: The initialing would freeze the document for signing. There would be no further changes. Then they would put it...

Sadat: Before the Knesset.

Kissinger: ...before the Knesset for approval the day after the signing in Geneva. Then there would be the technical talks for implementation. We skipped the initialing stage last time. Last time there was only a signature followed by the technical talks. There is a different stage, initialing, this time. It would be different, but it is better than to put it before the Knesset without initialing.

Fahmy: Normally documents are put before groups after signature, not initialing.



Kissinger: I know.

Fahmy: This is a problem.

Kissinger: Is it your proposal to sign it first?

Fahmy: We propose initialing as indicated and then sign it in Geneva on Monday. They can put it before the Knesset on Monday or Tuesday. That is my personal view.

Kissinger: The technical talks would be on Friday.

Fahmy: Technical talks would start Friday after the Knesset.

Sadat: He [Fahmy] knows more than me on procedures.


Kissinger: He is absolutely right. The normal process is first to sign, then submit it to the Parliament. In the Syrian agreement they [the Israelis] had major trouble having signed a disengagement with you without submitting it to the Knesset. Therefore in the Syrian case before signing they submitted it to the Knesset. They cannot keep the agreement from the Knesset. It still has to be put before the Knesset, such as on the day before signing. They cannot prevent the Knesset from considering it.

Fahmy: We are not trying to prevent that.

Kissinger: My concern is that if it is not initialed, the Knesset will be more tempted to pass a resolution asking for modifications.

Fahmy: If the Knesset stops the agreement, Rabin will be a hero and it will blow up despite both sides having initialed it. Or look at the reverse situation -- suppose our Parliament rejects it.

Kissinger: And suppose you sign it on Sunday before it is put before the Parliament. In my opinion it will be put before the Parliament in any event, whether or not it is initialed. It was initialed in the Syrian case. Suppose your Parliament rejects it after your signing, which our Parliament did for the League of Nations, and then it failed. I think the major use of the initialing is that it stops the nitpicking and further discussion.



Salem: The Knesset can see it whether it is signed or initialed. They are free to see it without its being initialed. Maybe they will change it. We do not want to be embarrassed. What if we initial and then they refuse it?

Kissinger: Let's not confuse two things. In almost all diplomatic negotiations when a document is agreed it gets initialed before signing. The fact that they want to put it before the Knesset before signing is a secondary matter. They cannot put it without its being initialed.

Sadat: If they intend to reject the agreement, whether it is initialed or signed is the same thing.

Kissinger: Right.

Sadat: Initialing means either that one signs or refuses the document without change.

[The Egyptian side talked among themselves in Arabic.]

Kissinger: Actually, we thought... [To Sisco:] It was their [Egyptian] idea.

Sisco: Right.

Kissinger: This is not essentially their idea. My own personal view is that you lose nothing through the initialing. The consequences of rejection are the same whether it is initialed or signed. In fact it is worse to reject a signed agreement than an initialed agreement. Initialing prevents any possible tampering with the text. My strong view is that we should move very quickly after finalizing negotiations to freeze the text.

Sadat: They should submit it very quickly to the Knesset.

Kissinger: His [Rabin] intention is to not have the Knesset defeat it. If this agreement is defeated he is finished. He will have to resign. His political career would be over. For better or worse, Rabin and Allon are committed to the agreement. The others are dancing around. The Embassy believes that there is a narrow majority in the Knesset for the agreement.

Fahmy: My count shows 70 votes.



Sadat: That is still narrow for Rabin.

Kissinger: For Rabin 70 is an unusually large number. If he does get 70, that would be a very significant turn in the political spectrum. They have just released a public opinion poll showing 48% for the agreement and 36% against. That surprised them.

Those are the major items except for the detailed agreement. I do not know how you want to proceed, Mr. President.

Fahmy: Let me see the map. This area is clear.

Sadat: In the south.


Kissinger: The situation is clear that the only function of the United Nations is to check on the non-military forces provision of the agreement. I thought we would work out the exact plans of how to describe the zone. In any event I told them that you do not accept this as a UN zone. They have agreed to that. Now they are proposing a phrase which was on your map which we gave them, "Egyptian Civilian Administration with UN Presence."

Fahmy: That was their map.

Kissinger: No, it is your map. I think there will be no difficulty. I explained to them that you cannot have territory returned to you, to Egyptian administration, and not have it called Egyptian. Also the only restriction is that there are no military forces. There are no other restrictions.

Sadat: That is right.

Kissinger: That principle, in my impression, is accepted. I believe we can solve this. They are prepared to find a way because the principle is accepted that the territory returned to Egyptian administration is Egyptian territory and not UN territory, and the function of the UN is to determine the absence of military forces in the area, and the UN has no other functions in the area. How we express this we have not yet done, because I wanted to talk to you and Fahmy. This will be in the annex, and it is not written yet. My impression is that if other things are solved this will be solved.



I have also made clear that there must be no destruction in the zone, and I have assurance on that subject. I have also discussed the concept of how the transfer [of the oil fields] is to be accomplished, and I think any reasonable proposal can be worked out. My major argument is that if they are ever going to convince Egypt that peace is possible, this is the place to do it. This is the area where you recover territory for the first time that is important economically, and I have told them that it must be handled in an impeccable manner. I think the problem is manageable. We will certainly give you full support. We have no scheme. They will study the problem overnight.

Fahmy: The transfer of the oil fields is no problem. I have checked with the Oil Minister.

Kissinger: They [Israel] are worried how to get their military out.

Fahmy: We will have the Italian technicians take inventory as the UNEF takes over and then Egypt will come in together with Mobil technicians. The technicians will take inventory with UNEF and then on the second day Egypt will come in.

Kissinger: My impression is that it is no problem.

Sadat: Along the lines of the first agreement.

Fahmy: Mobil has a 50% interest and we have a 50% interest. The American and Italian technicians will take inventory from Israel and the second day Egypt will come in. Those companies are as interested as us. They are 50/50 partners with us.

Kissinger: It is an eminently soluble problem--though there are no easy problems in Jerusalem. But no obstacle in principle has been raised. Last time the schedule and general time frame was in the protocol at the Kilometer 101 talks.

Gamasy: Yes, but the principles were agreed beforehand.

Kissinger: The principles were agreed beforehand, but the precise schedule was worked out by the technical people. But I think the principles outlined are principles that will be acceptable to Israel.

Sadat: If there is time for the technical committee to finish the details before they enter [the oil fields].



Kissinger: I only think that you and we should coordinate our timing and put it in a time frame with our Congress with respect to our obligations. I think it will take you two weeks [to work out the technical details].

Gamasy: Two weeks? It will not take more than 7 days. We have a plan and they will have one in 24 hours. Last time it took 7 days.

Sadat: Let's say 10 days.

Kissinger: I recommend we give it two weeks by which time our Congress should have acted.

Sadat: The difference between 14 and 10 days is little.

Kissinger: If it is done earlier, so much the better.

[He then had an exchange with Fahmy in which he said that the U. S. problem was that we did not want implementation until the Congress had acted. Fahmy noted that Mansfield had just come out against the American civilian presence. The Secretary replied that he was more concerned about Senator Jackson's opposition].

Sadat: Very well, Henry.


Kissinger: All the rest of the time with them we spent going over the papers that Ismail and I discussed yesterday, and we have many tiring detailed comments. I do not know if you want to go through them. Ismail tells me that you have comments on the paper too and maybe you want to go over those.

Sadat: Shall we now have a closed session together?

Kissinger: Yes. [To Gamasy:] You are a bad influence with the Israelis. You picked a great warning station.

Gamasy: It was the specialists, not me.

[President Sadat, Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Minister Fahmy went off into another area in the garden and conferred until 9:15 p.m. After that meeting the American group departed on the helicopter for the Ras el-Tin Palace.]





THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

August 27, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

Secretary Kissinger asked that I pass you the following report....

"After seven hours today of tedious point by point negotiation with Rabin and his colleagues followed by three hours tonight with Sadat, I can report that we have reduced the gap on most issues, but there are several remaining problems, each of which if not overcome could cause a break.


"The first relates to language in the agreement committing the parties to settle all disputes between them by negotiations or other peaceful means. The Israelis are not satisfied with the present formulation. They want it in two successive paragraphs. Sadat will not go beyond mentioning it once. Sadat shows signs of digging in -- perhaps a reflection of increasing criticism of him in the Arab world in light of details leaked by the Israelis. I will make a major effort tomorrow to get a satisfactory formulation.

"Second, is Sadat's resistance to writing letters giving certain private assurances. This too is attributable in large measure to Israeli leaks. Sadat said he cannot give assurances by letter which the other side will leak; they will be used against him in the Arab world. I will make another hard try on this one tomorrow.

"The third and most serious problem raised by Sadat relates to the early warning system in the passes. Egypt and Israel have agreed on the locations of their respective strategic early warning stations and we are agreed on U.S. presence. Israel wants them established by means of a tripartite agreement including Egypt, Israel, and the U.S. Sadat raised a fundamental objection to a tripartite agreement governing the maintenance and operation of the system and defining our role on the ground. He says the Sinai is his territory, and he cannot agree that Israel has the legal right to enter into an agreement with the U.S. along with Egypt regarding the use of Egyptian territory. We are exploring urgently other possible ways to establish a proper legal basis for the U.S.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 1.5
NCO MEMO, 11/20/93, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY *HR*, PAPA, DATE 10/17/03



custodial role of the surveillance system in the passes such as an annex to the agreement coupled with a separate protocol between the U.S. and each of the signatories. My concern is that Peres is locked into the tripartite agreement approach and may well break with Rabin on this issue. Thus the press reports are much too euphoric.

"What I am banking on is that both sides are now so far committed that they will find it most difficult to lose an agreement which is so close to their grasp. Both sides are feeling the pressure -- Rabin on the domestic scene and Sadat within the Arab world -- and if there is to be an agreement it must come in the next few days."

Warm regards.





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