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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel
Yigal Allon, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs
Shimon Peres, Minister of Defense
Simcha Dinitz, Ambassador to the United States
Lt. General Mordechai Gur, Chief of Staff
Mordechai Gazit, Director General, Prime Minister's Office
Avraham Kidron, Director General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Eli Mizrachi, Deputy Director, Prime Minister's Office
B. Gen. Ephraim Paron, Military Secretary to the Prime Minister
Col. Aryeh Bar-On, ADC to Minister Peres
Dan Patir, Prime Minister's Press Spokesman

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Kenneth Keating, Ambassador to Israel
Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern & South Asian Affairs
Harold H. Saunders, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern & South Asian Affairs
Robert B. Oakley, NSC Staff
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

DATE AND TIME:
Monday, March 17, 1975
10:15 - 11:30 a.m.

PLACE:
Prime Minister's Office
Jerusalem

E.O. 12953, DEC. 31, 1995, OMB MEMO, SEC. 4.1, EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS EXEMPTION CATEGORY

-- AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON IMP. TO DAT.
Rabin: Well, any news from Egypt?

Kissinger: The only news I have is that Sadat cancelled the trip we had planned for Abu Simbel and cancelled the dinner we were giving.

Allon: It's not kosher.

Kissinger: I think they want to plan for the contingency....

Allon: This is most un-Arab. For the Arabs, hospitality is first.

Kissinger: That's right. They cancelled the dinner for tomorrow. We were going to come back here anyway.

I asked our Ambassador in Damascus to give us his estimate of the Syrian reaction to my visit. And he said: [reading from Damascus 1010] "Atmospherics during and after your meeting yesterday were distinctly better than on March 9. I have only a few observations of the Syrian reaction during the general meeting. The Syrians started off in a notably more relaxed frame of mind. I can only assume Asad must have been doing some hard thinking about your March 9 presentation and consulting with his colleagues about US-Syrian relations and in particular your role in the peace process.

"Asad, while ostensibly addressing you, exploited the presence of his close advisors to detail his views on the necessity for peace and his conviction that since Syrians as a people needed peace 'we will continue to move in the direction of our convictions.' You noted no one demurred when he invited them to comment on this theme."

It was the only time since I met him that he has done this.

Dinitz: He learned from you.

Sisco: He got as much dissent!

Kissinger: [continues reading] "Emotionally loaded words about 'begging,' 'honor,' and 'dignity' were notably absent from Asad's vocabulary yesterday. I noted only one echo of the earlier meeting in his assertion that 'peace is not surrender.... peace is the condition in which no one feels injustice is being done to him.'"
Then, "US-Syrian relations," based on a conversation he had with Haydar—at the first meeting he was extremely nasty. "Haydar observed that Syria must signal its peaceful intentions to Israel principally through the US. Direct reconciliation with Israel is out of the question for the next fifteen years. 'There is not a single family in the states surrounding Israel that has not lost a close relative in the conflicts of the past fifty years.' But practical, pragmatic reconciliation between Syria and Israel with the US as the intermediary is possible."

On Syrian-Palestinian relations, the Ambassador said that "setting up such joint commands might just as logically serve to radicalize Syria instead of moderating the Palestinians. Haydar said no, they don't have that much strength." I draw no conclusion.

Rabin: After last night's meeting, we discussed among ourselves, and while there were certain limits resulting from resolutions of the Cabinet, we must work in their framework. What we say now is subject to approval of the Cabinet, if there would be a positive response.

The first thing not approved by the Cabinet is what I said on ABC-- we are ready to evacuate the passes and the oil fields in the context of a clear-cut commitment to nonbelligerency. I would support it in the Cabinet. Either 'the parties renounce all acts of belligerency,' or they agree "not to resort to the use of force and to resolve all disputes between them by negotiations and other peaceful means and they will refrain from all military or paramilitary actions." This is anyway in the disengagement agreement. [He hands over Israeli memos on non-use of force at Tab A].

Kissinger: This is acceptable to this group?

Rabin: Yes.

Kissinger: I understand this is subject to approval of the Cabinet.

Rabin: Secondly, this commitment should not be limited to the time of the peace-making process.

And third, the question of duration.

You asked us about the Gamasy line. What is the problem with the Gemasy line? We had a disengagement agreement; they have their line-- line A, the present line -- and there are limited forces there. Now, in the process of movement towards peace, he wants to have more soldiers and closer to the Sinai.
Kissinger: It shows the paradoxical nature of human life. [Laughter]

Rabin: How do you show movement towards peace with more soldiers?

Kissinger: After the first SALT agreement, when we asked Congress for an increase in our strategic forces, Senator Symington said that if there is another arms limitation agreement like this, we can't afford it.

Rabin: We might make a change in the deployment of forces and increase the buffer zone at the expense of our area.

Second, regarding the oil, we might consider a third group or three-party practical arrangements in the supplies and production of oil.

Peres: They have the wells and we shall have the oil.

Rabin: And somebody would be in between.

I believe unless we know the reaction to these three basic problems, we can't go into the details on UNEF, etc.

Kissinger: No, it's senseless. Unless there is a new idea.

Allon: There was a new idea, in Yitzhak's presentation.

Rabin: Not on the UNEF extension. We have to have an idea on the duration.

Kissinger: One is the duration of the agreement; the other is the mandate of...

Peres: The supervisory force.

Kissinger: There are two separate problems. I think we have the beginnings of how to handle the duration of the agreement -- "until it is superseded by another agreement" or "a peace agreement." It gives it an unlimited duration.

On the UNEF duration, we haven't an idea. We thought last night of using the Observer mechanism. Joe, who knows the UN better than any of us, says it wouldn't work.

Allon: There we are better off with forces.
Sisco: We could end up with the same problem and with a weaker physical presence. It would still have to go through the Security Council.

Peres: There are two basic differences between UNEF and Observers. Observers are part and parcel of the UN administration, inherent in the general budget of the United Nations administration. Number two, the difference in voting. With the UNEF, it must be renewed annually; with Observers, it goes uninterruptedly unless it is cancelled.

Sisco: On the first point, the budget is not a Security Council problem at all. It has never been a political problem. The past UNTSO operation was an adjunct to the armistice agreement. It's true it's been going on as ad infinitum, open-ended. But to shift now from the UNEF to this, we would first have to get the same open-ended commitment from Egypt and the Security Council.

Kissinger: The Egyptians can't request an open-ended commitment from the Security Council. UNTSO is, first, on sovereign territory. But the Egyptians might be able to go to the Security Council to ask for an open-ended Observer force where it could not do so for UNEF. Because it means fewer people, there is less invasion of sovereignty. Maybe we could explore it.

Peres: The character of the territory is the question of whether it's a demilitarized zone, which is a question of sovereignty, or whether it's a buffer zone, which is no one's area. This question stands on its own. Since we have our doubts, and they have, let's postpone it.

Rabin: No, we can explore it in a non-committal way.

Kissinger: If they reduce the presence from 4500 to less than 1000, that's all you could get for Observers. You will have to pay for the duration in numbers, and you create a precedent for Syria.

Rabin: Let's leave it for the next phase.

Allon: By accepting the idea that the agreement remains valid until the peace agreement is reached, it solves the phrasing problem -- but it doesn't solve the problem that within a few months Egypt will raise new demands. There must be some understanding, if not in the agreement, that for a certain number of years there will be no new demands.
Kissinger: It would be possible if it were not for Geneva. They can't go to Geneva and not ask for the '67 borders.

Allon: But not to make new demands for a new withdrawal. Otherwise we face a new crisis in six months or one year.

Dinitz: We'll face a crisis in 1977 unless we have provisions.

Kissinger: You will face a crisis in 1977 in any event.

Peres: It's the difference between jumping and swimming. Without non-belligerency it's jumping.

Dinitz: In the desert, swimming?

Kissinger: We have two problems: Is this proposal jumping or swimming? And is either one achievable in the desert? [Laughter]

Peres: Jumping is making movements. Swimming is making progress.

Kissinger: The problem has two aspects. If there are differences between Israeli and American perspectives, it is that in Israel you have to be able to sell it; in America, any agreement will be popular. The second problem is what is the quid pro quo? In my judgment, the significant quid pro quo isn't on paper; it's in the management of the future process. Failure will lead to high probability of the U.S. losing control of the process, and will face Israel with choices compared to which the quid pro quos are trivial. But that is a question of judgment; it is not an argument that is easy to use.

Peres: Mr. Secretary, there is no argument between you and us on whether we should seek a settlement. We all are for it, in the most certain way. What we are concerned about is the morrow of the agreement. If Sadat on the morrow of the agreement says, "It is just a military agreement, we gave the Israelis nothing, we will get arms from the Russians, we will form the same coalition." ... How many times can he sell the opening of the Canal?

Kissinger: Once a year. [Laughter]
Peres: I never wanted to hear Aida so often!

Kissinger: I was never a fan of opening the Canal anyway, as long as he rebuilds the cities.

Peres: If he will make political moves, you will find here a cooperative group of people. But we have to be convinced he is ready to make serious moves. We have to take risks, and face our people. We don't want to look like complete fools a month later. We can't match him in visions.

Rabin: We were forthcoming in terms of territory; he is not forthcoming politically.

Peres: Yes.

Rabin: The basic issues are: One, the formulation I've put, second, its relation to what is attainable for him in terms of territory; and three, duration, duration on two levels — of the agreement and the UN force.

Kissinger: Last night I didn't think there was enough to go to Egypt with.

Peres: You see that Rogers criticized you.

Kissinger: My predecessor?

Peres: He says what you are doing is not as elegant as his plan, that you are going to end up with a worse version of his plan. And he was prepared to guarantee Israel. [Laughter]

Rabin: In Israel, when former Foreign Ministers criticize, they criticize Prime Ministers.

Peres: Nothing succeeds like a successor!

Allon: We are discussing the policies of two ex-Secretaries of States.

Peres: Maybe we can reach an agreement.

Since you say we are going to face a crisis in 1977,....
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Kissinger: That is inherent in the dynamics of the situation, regardless of what is in the paper. If you sit tight, you will face it; with a diplomacy of movement, maybe you can avoid it.

Peres: There will have to be an understanding between the U.S. and Israel. One of Sadat's strategic objectives is to lessen the ties between the United States and Israel.

Kissinger: No question.

Peres: He has many expressions which sound pleasing to the American ear. We don't.

Kissinger: That's not my impression from your papers.

Peres: We are pluralistic. Our words are a commitment. No Israeli really thinks we need a government.

Kissinger: And everyone can be Prime Minister. The mere existence of a Prime Minister is a challenge!

Allon: Our Prime Ministers are a very stable system.

Peres: Since you are against him, why fire him?

Allon: Golda could have stayed.

Rabin: But all were forced out, except the ones who died in office.

Peres: When Eshkol died, Ben-Gurion said, "I don't want to go to his funeral, and I don't want him to go to my funeral." [Laughter]

Kissinger: I don't think there is much sense in going much further this morning. What I should do is go to Egypt this afternoon. I will then convey what I understand, and see what I can get. I'll come back tomorrow evening. I'll go to Riyadh Wednesday. It would be good if we can prevent a visible breaking up. Maybe the Cabinet meeting should be Wednesday -- I'm not telling you you have to have one.

I plan to meet with Sadat tonight and tomorrow. We will arrive here at 3:00, and could meet at 6:30 or 7:00 here tomorrow.

Rather than have a Cabinet meeting tomorrow night, if you could have it Wednesday.
Rabin: I don't want the impression of night meetings of the Cabinet.

Kissinger: Then if we handle it skillfully, it won't be an atmosphere of a crisis either in Aswan or here. By tomorrow we will know what is likely to happen. This way we are best prepared for whatever may happen.

Allon: This is a crucial flight. What are you going to tell him about the UN, about the Emergency Force? And second, what will you tell him about the economic and political warfare? Will there be something in the published text, or something between Israel and the United States? Because economic warfare is something very damaging to Israel -- and I want to stress it. We can compromise on publishing it, but I don't think he should agree to something he can't defend publicly.

Rabin: They announced that he let four companies in.

Kissinger: Really?

Rabin: It was announced in Cairo.

Reduction of the standing army is of great importance.

Kissinger: Did they increase it?

Gur: It was 900,000 in the last war. He has reduced it to about 700,000. He is reorganizing it now, with many commando and assault units.

Kissinger: I do not exclude that, regardless of whether these proposals are sensible or not, Sadat may conclude that the negotiation will not succeed and he may make a dramatic reversal. It could happen in the next 24 hours. I don't think it is probable but I don't exclude it. Even if your proposals are the basis of discussion. He thinks he is at the limits.

I have had an uneasy feeling about this negotiation since the beginning, on both sides. My associates know this.

I don't think you should modify anything.

Allon: Maybe he wants it but he can't.

Kissinger: Just keep in mind that this could happen when I'm not here. Since it's only an hour-and-a-half flight, if we could hold the comments...
Allon: What will you offer him?

Kissinger: I think I should concentrate on the major elements, and say that it depends very much on what he is prepared to offer. I'll give him yours.

Peres: The two points -- that it lasts until superseded by a peace agreement, and the duration.

Rabin: It is in the footnote.

Allon: How will you handle the absence of linkage between Egypt and Syria?

Kissinger: Up to now, he's not asked for any linkage except in the clause about your not attacking Syria.

Rabin: It is unacceptable.

Kissinger: He's agreed to treat that in a separate clause. You have made the correct point -- which Gamasy has accepted -- that this can't apply to a war of attrition. That you cannot be treated as attacking if you retaliate in a war of attrition. Gamasy has accepted that that is....

Peres: What if Syria attacks Israel? There is no answer to that.

Kissinger: Excuse me, I think it is clear, from what they have in mind, that if Syria attacks Israel, Egypt will not attack.

Peres: They may have it in mind, but it's not in the draft. There is no reference in writing. That is an important point.

Kissinger: But if a country commits itself not to attack, except when it is attacked....

Allon: How do we define who attacks whom?

Kissinger: That is a serious problem. One idea is to have Israel reiterate the disengagement agreement.

Rabin: What if there is no disengagement agreement?

Kissinger: No, to use the phraseology of it. I have no answer to it.
Peres: Could there be an undertaking by both not to wage an aggressive war?

Kissinger: But how do you define an aggressive war?

Allon: Both will appoint you.

Peres: Or "will not attack." "Not to resort to force or aggression."

Rabin: "Any warlike action."

Dinitz: "Aggression" will not solve the problem, Shimon, because they always say it is not a war of aggression but for self-defense.

Allon: Have you given up on joint patrols?

Kissinger: I haven't pursued it.

Allon: Should you leave it to the next phase?

Kissinger: No, I could ask him. Because he said he didn't exclude it. I don't think he understood "patrols."

Dinitz: He is a military man.

Kissinger: He was in uniform. Like Gur.

Dinitz: The press is coming back from Egypt to report on the deteriorating economic situation there.

Kissinger: Yes.

Allon: It is the worst since Farouk.

Kissinger: Our people say their inefficiency is monumental.

Allon: So he needs peace.

Kissinger: Absolutely.

Peres: The standard of living in Egypt was reduced last year by 7%.

Kissinger: The standard of living?
Peres: Yes.

Gur: Not Sadat's. [Laughter]

Kissinger: What do we say to the press?

Rabin: That we continued the discussions that were started last night, that we gave you our ideas. Not "concrete" ideas.

Kissinger: And I'll now bring these Israeli ideas to Egypt. So it reestablishes the symmetry.

Can I see you for two minutes?

[The Secretary and Prime Minister Rabin conferred alone in the Prime Minister's private office from 11:13-11:25 a.m. In the meantime Under Secretary Sisco and Foreign Minister Allon discussed outstanding issues of bilateral relations.]

Sisco: We are prepared to proceed on the Joint Business Council.

Second, we are prepared to proceed on the waiver of the Buy American Act.

Atherton: Not a blanket waiver but a new formal group which will present opportunities to bid on defense procurement contracts. On a case-by-case basis.

Allon: Officials or businessmen?

Atherton: Officials.

Sisco: We support in principle an increase in the activities of the Bi-National Science Foundation and we are prepared to negotiate how this can best be funded. As a matter of procedure, rather than attempt to negotiate the details by March 19, we would get hold of our Under Secretary Robinson and he would get in touch with your people.

Atherton: Frankly, Joe, we have internal problems of sorting out.

Sisco: Fourth, on desalting, both sides agree in principle we are prepared to proceed with the technical plant, and will consult on the implementation.
Dinitz: Could we have some reference to proceeding?

Sisco: We can cable to Simon that we see no problem.

Next, Israel's eligibility for supply under the AID offshore procurement program can be announced.

Allon: On desalination, the sum of $20 million was decided a few years ago.

Sisco: Many years ago. 1968.

Allon: In prices, the cost will be much, much higher than it was then. So we should take this into account when arranging the financing. Am I right?

Sisco: My advice is to take what you have in hand.

Allon: So the joint team will also study the cost involved.

Dinitz: Of course.

Atherton: Certainly.

Sisco: I don't think we should include this boycott language in the communiqué at this point. We honestly want to have a free hand in dealing with our friend Sadat; and we think this would -- even the earlier language -- interfere with our quiet action.

Dinitz: May I make an objection?

Sisco: Yes.

Dinitz: This is a central issue, for us and for the public. After the President and Dr. Kissinger spoke on it, to do this -- not to have anything in the Joint Communiqué between the U.S. and Israel -- would be a regression.

Allon: President Ford's statement we very much appreciate.

Sisco: It was a good statement.

Allon: It would be impossible to swallow.

Sisco: We feel quite firmly on this point, Yigal.
Allon: It can be phrased without any reference to Egypt.

[Dr. Kissinger and Prime Minister return at 11:25 a.m.]

Sisco: Mr. Secretary, we think this is no time to raise this in the communiqué. What is the date of Rabinowitz's visit?

Allon: Maybe next month.

Kissinger: If it is after the negotiation, there is no problem whatsoever.

Keating: He told me the 19th or 20th.

Peres: Mr. Secretary, on the missing bodies, can you tell us how it will go?

Kissinger: I'll try to get it settled on this trip. But realistically, if the negotiation blows up, he won't do it.

Rabin: This is something -- your man of vision -- that he keeps 39 bodies that he has already committed to in the disengagement agreement.

Kissinger: Why don't we see what happens?

Peres: I checked the prisoners. We can do a little better than I told you. I think we can give something like 20 prisoners. I told you 8.

Kissinger: I'll do my best.

Sisco: Mr. Secretary, you are right. Rightly or wrongly, Yitzhak.

Rabin: Rightly or wrongly?

Sisco: Wrongly.

Rabin: To keep 39 bodies and they use them for blackmailing, it is unbelievable, and Dr. Kissinger talks about the man of vision.

Dinitz: He didn't say it was good vision!

Kissinger: I've given you my assessment of Sadat on many occasions, and I think it is reasonably accurate.
Dinitz: I understand our Minister of Finance is not planning to leave for the United States the day after tomorrow.

Kissinger: Good. Then there is no problem.

Dinitz: But I'd like to take away the public tension. The Minister is postponing the visit since Dr. Kissinger and our Ambassador are here, and as far as the issues between us, all are settled.

Kissinger: Good.

Allon: Whether the negotiations succeed or fail.

Kissinger: Whether the negotiations succeed or fail, you can consider the boycott statement settled, and any agreement that is foreseen you can consider settled regardless of the outcome of the negotiations.

What should we say to the press?

Allon: We considered our proposals and you listened to our ideas and you will take it to Egypt.

[The meeting ended.]

[En route to Ben-Gurion Airport that afternoon, Foreign Minister Allon gave the Secretary a revised formulation on non-use of force. See Tab B.]
Egypt and Israel hereby undertake in the relations between themselves, not to resort to the use of force and to resolve all disputes between them by negotiations and other peaceful means. They will refrain from all military or paramilitary actions, from any warlike and hostile acts and any other forms of warfare.

NOTE: This undertaking will not be linked to anything (duration, peace process etc).

March 17, 1975
(1) This agreement will remain in force until superseded by a peace agreement.

(2) Undertakings regarding the duration of the agreement.

(3) The parties recognize that the conflict between them cannot be solved by force.

Other Formulations to be included:

(a) This is not a peace agreement it is a significant step towards just and lasting peace between them (in accordance ...etc.)

(b) References in the agreement to some of the practical steps agreed.

March 17, 1975
NON-USE OF FORCE

Egypt and Israel hereby undertake in the relations between themselves not to resort to the use of force and to resolve all disputes between them by negotiations and other peaceful means.

They will refrain from permitting, encouraging, assisting or participating in any military, paramilitary or hostile actions, from any warlike or hostile acts and any other form of warfare or hostile activity against the other Party anywhere.

Note: This undertaking will not be linked to anything (duration, peace process etc).

March 17, 1975
General Observations

1. In Syria:

   -- You found the tone of the meetings somewhat less sharp;
   
   -- Asad seemed more thoughtful about what might be involved in another negotiation, although he is still not thinking in precise terms;
   
   -- You told Asad of the progress made in Israel on recognizing that Syria cannot be excluded although simultaneity is impossible, and Asad seemed to regard this as a positive development.

2. King Hussein argued strongly that success in this Sinai negotiation is essential. Because of his currently close relationship with Syria, you told him firmly of what you are trying to achieve for Syria.

3. As for the Israelis, some general points:

   -- Rabin's political position is such that he feels under great pressure to demonstrate that there is more in the way of concrete steps toward peace in this agreement than in the disengagement agreement.
   
   -- Rabin again apparently avoided seeking a firm Cabinet position except for authority to continue the negotiations. So the negotiating team continues to be out in front of the Cabinet.
   
   -- Just to report: Rabin explained the press play over the weekend as necessary to put the heavy press play from Egypt in perspective.
Specific Points

4. Prisoners and bodies. Peres said this morning that the number of prisoners Israel could consider releasing is about 20. The Israelis have asked that you find out exactly what procedure Egypt wants to follow in working out the arrangements on the prisoners and the bodies.
Negotiations. You characterized the Egyptian positions as
but did not present the Egyptian paper. The Israelis
continued to concentrate on the issues which they
have emphasized from the outset:

a. Non-use of force. They continue to regard a
commitment to the essence of non-belligerency as
essential. However, they recognize President Sadat's
problem. They have given you a formulation (Tab-A)
which Rabin said he would be prepared to recommend
the Cabinet approve.

-- They are also considering the possibility of
including Sadat's earlier formulation that both
sides recognize that the conflict between them
cannot be resolved by force.

-- They are concerned that this not be qualified.

b. Duration. Two elements of this issue have been
identified:

-- Duration of the agreement: (1) It is helpful
to include the idea that this agreement will
remain in force until superseded by a peace
agreement. (2) In addition, the Israelis
want to understand that they will not be pressed
for another withdrawal for some specified period
by the threat of abrogation of the present
agreement.

-- Duration of the mandate of the UN force: We
discussed various ways of insuring that the
force will not be removed.

c. Redeployment lines: The important new element here
is that Rabin has authorized you to say he is
prepared to recommend to the Cabinet, if satisfactory
formulas can be achieved on the non-belligerency issue,
that Israel agree to withdraw from the oil fields
and passes. On redeployment of troops, we still do
not have a satisfactory position, although Rabin is
willing now to consider forward movement of Egyptian
forces at least through the present UN zone. (NOTE:
Rabin's position remains that he would support with-
drawal from the oil fields and the passes in return
for non-belligerency. Short of that, he is talking...
of (1) Egyptian troops advancing only through
the present UN zone to the present Israeli line
and (2) "three-party arrangements" in the oil
fields.)

-- Our remains very much interested in discussing
overall force levels.

d. Relation to Syria.

-- The language on the non-use of force would
take care of Egyptian-Israeli hostilities.

-- Israeli seems willing to consider a statement
that it will remain committed to the pledges
in the Israeli-Syrian disengagement agreement.

-- The Israelis feel there needs to be some
understanding about what Egypt will do if
Syria attacks Israel.

e. Buffer Zone.

-- The Israelis remain intent on specific measures
for policing the buffer zone in addition to the
UN force, although it was agreed to leave those
aside for purposes of today's discussion.

-- You did, however, say you would try to clarify
the issue of joint patrols.

f. Specific Steps Toward Peace.

-- You said Friday you would raise the question of
whether goods as well as people could move
freely between Gaza and Sinai and Egypt proper,
although this may be too detailed to raise
today.

6. Summation: You recognize we are moving very slowly,
but you have succeeded in moving the Israeli negotiating
team. If Sadat can agree to the present formulation
on the non-use of force, you will try to persuade the
Israelis this is as far as Egypt can go on this general
point and will press them to decide concretely on a
basis for continuing the discussions.
Continuing Issues

7. You will probably not want to raise these today, but just to keep them before you, here are other issues which have been mentioned and are pending:

a. The Egyptians will want some understanding about Israeli naval activities in the Gulf of Suez.

b. The Israelis have the view that the Mixed Commission should have supervisory responsibility. The Egyptians see it as advisory or complementary to UNEF only.

8. Some of the specifics of non-belligerency -- of which Canal usage and political and economic warfare seem to be most important to the Israelis -- will have to be dealt with more specifically at a later date.
3. NON-USE OF FORCE

Egypt and Israel hereby undertake in the relations between themselves, not to resort to the use of force and to resolve all disputes between them by negotiations and other peaceful means. They will refrain from all military or paramilitary actions, from any warlike and hostile acts and any other forms of warfare.

NOTE: This undertaking will not be linked to anything (duration, peace process etc).

March 17, 1975
(1) This agreement will remain in force until superseded by a peace agreement.

(2) Undertakings regarding the duration of the agreement.

(3) The parties recognize that the conflict between them cannot be solved by force.

Other Formulations to be included:

(a) This is not a peace agreement it is a significant step towards just and lasting peace between them (in accordance ... etc.)

(b) Reference in the agreement to some of the practical steps agreed.

March 17, 1975
(1) **Agreement to stand on its own two feet**

The agreement will be bi-lateral between Egypt and Israel. It is not linked to an agreement with other Arab countries and does not create a pattern for other discussions or settlements. Neither are there any prior conditions attached to its acceptance.

The proposed agreement is not the final settlement between Egypt and Israel, but further settlements are not an element or an implied condition to the execution and continued validity of this agreement until superseded by a new agreement.

(2) **Progress towards peace**

The approach to peace and the further development of elements of peaceful relations, will find its expression in suitable formulation and in concrete and practical arrangements.

It is proposed that the agreement refer to its declared aim of the furtherance of peace between the parties and to its being a significant step towards the establishment of a just and lasting peace between Egypt and Israel.

Furthermore, the concrete arrangements based on the agreement which will express and reflect this progress towards peace will, inter alia, be as follows:
(a) Open bridges for tourists, family visits, goods etc.
(b) Non-restriction on ships, planes or travellers because of call or visit to the territory of the other party.
(c) Abstention from hostile propaganda.
(d) Suspension of economic warfare and boycott practices.
(e) Cessation of anti-Israel diplomatic pressures in third countries and international bodies.
(f) Freedom of navigation on high seas, straits and waterways and freedom of flight over them.
(g) Right of passage through the Canal.
(h) Establishment of Joint Committees with supervision teams to oversee execution of agreement.

(3) Non-use of force

The agreement will express the resolve of the parties to refrain from any further threat or use of force against each other and the decision to settle all disputes between themselves by negotiations and other peaceful means. The document will contain the undertaking of the renunciation of belligerency, clearly and in its appropriate legal wording. The agreement will be made public.

Both parties will add a formal guarantee that they will not participate, directly or indirectly, in any hostilities between the other party and any other state or forces or provide assistance of any kind to states or forces involved in such hostilities.

(4) Arrangements on the ground

(a) The area evacuated by Israel will be established as a buffer zone between the forces.
(b) A defined area of limited armaments and forces east of the new line will be established.
(c) The present area of limited armaments and forces west of Line A, established by the agreement of January 1974, remains unchanged.
(c) Supervision will be carried out by the UN and by the Joint Committees and Supervision teams established (see 2(h)).

(e) Alert systems of each party in the vacated zone to prevent surprise attack is proposed.

(f) There will be aerial reconnaissance missions by aircraft of both sides.

(g) The arrangements will be contained in a Protocol attached to the agreement.

(5) **Duration**

(a) The agreement will be in force until superseded by a new agreement; no time-limit to the present agreement will be set.

(b) Egypt will give an undertaking via the USG that it will not demand a new agreement or a further withdrawal for an agreed period.

(c) The mandate of the supervisory organ will be for an indefinite period.

(d) There will be an agreed timetable for the implementation of the agreement. Stage one will be a preparatory one.

(6) **Relation to Geneva**

The agreement should find its expression in the position of the parties, if and when the Geneva Conference is renewed. The intention of the parties expressed in the agreement, generally and in its detailed provisions, has to find its continued effect in the approaches and attitudes taken in Geneva, in a way to be agreed upon.
The question of the lines will be developed subsequently, after the consideration and discussion of the six points mentioned above and on their basis.
Desirous to reach ultimately the final and just peaceful settlement prescribed by Security Council Resolution 338 and as a significant step towards that end, Egypt and Israel agree to conclude the following disengagement agreement:

1- The agreement should include total withdrawal of Israeli forces to the east of the passes and from all the oilfields including the town of El Tor.

2- The new lines will be drawn on the following basis:
   a) The Israeli forces will withdraw from their present line to a new line east of the passes;
   b) The Egyptian forces will move up to the western entrance of the passes;
   c) The area between the Egyptian line and the Israeli line will be a zone of disengagement in which the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) will be stationed;
   d) The area between the new Israeli line and a line 10 kilometers to the east of it will be limited in armament and forces;
   e) The area between the new Egyptian line and a line 10 kilometers to the west of it will be limited in armament and forces.

3- Israel and Egypt would be prepared to give a formal assurance in writing to the U.S. Government of their intention not to undertake military or paramilitary operations for the duration of this agreement and as long as the process for reaching a just and durable peace is continuing in accordance with the letter and the spirit of Security Council Resolution 338 and other
4- Israel should undertake not to initiate military or paramilitary operations against Syria; in the event that this undertaking is violated by Israel, Egypt will fulfill its obligations towards Syria.

5- Nothing in this agreement would prevent Egypt from exercising its right to self-defence under article 51 of the Charter.

6- The President of the U.S. is expected to give his assurances to President Sadat that the U.S. will actively exert their efforts in order that a further disengagement between Syria and Israel takes place before the middle of 1975.

7- The United Nations Emergency Force will continue in its function as long as the efforts towards a just and peaceful settlement are proceeding and, towards that end, its mandate will be extended annually.

8- The two parties will cooperate with the UNEF Chief of Staff and agree that their military representatives meet with him if necessary in the zone of disengagement to discuss problems arising from the implementation of this agreement.

9- The Israeli withdrawal will be implemented in such a manner as to indicate the willingness of the Israelis to demonstrate their desire for peace, namely that no roads or installations
or equipment of the oilfields be destroyed or transferred from their present location either to Israel or the remaining occupied territories.

10- The agreement should have as an annex a fixed time-table indicating the various phases of the implementation of the agreement bearing in mind that the full implementation should be terminated within three months of the signature of the agreement and that Egypt receives all oilfields within two weeks of the signing of the present agreement.

11- Nothing in this agreement precludes the reconvening of the Geneva Conference which is to take place at the earliest possible date with the participation of all the parties concerned for the purpose of reaching a peaceful settlement of the Middle East problem in accordance with Security Council Resolution 338.

12- The parties agreed that no just and durable peace in the Middle East could be achieved without the participation of the Palestinians.

13- This agreement is not regarded by Egypt and Israel as a final peace agreement.
ALTERNATE PARAGRAPH THREE

3- Israel and Egypt would be prepared to give a formal assurance in writing to the U.S. Government of their intention not to resort to the use of force for the duration of this agreement and as long as the process for reaching a just and durable peace is continuing in accordance with the letter and the spirit of Security Council Resolution 338 and other relevant UN resolutions.

ALTERNATE PARAGRAPH FOUR

4- Israel should undertake not to resort to the use of force against Syria; in the event that this undertaking is violated by Israel, Egypt will fulfill its obligations towards Syria.
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SECRET NODIS CHEROKEE

PARTICIPANTS: GOE SIDE:
President Sadat
Foreign Minister Fahmy
General Gamasy

US SIDE:
Secretary Kissinger
Under Secretary Sisco
Ambassador Ellis

SUBJECT: Meeting between President Sadat and Secretary Kissinger

PLACE: ASWAN, EGYPT

DATE: March 17, 1975

SYRIA

The Secretary first reported on his meetings in Syria. They, he recounted, had been less strained than last time. President Sadat called this "remarkable." The Secretary related that Asad had initially sought to obtain the same points as before. He, the Secretary, had explained why this was impossible at the present time. A simultaneous agreement would get no one anything. He needed time.

The talks in Syria had been in two stages, one with Asad and the entire group and the second with Asad alone. In those meetings, they agreed that Asad might be willing to accept, if not the full Disengagement Agreement, at least an interim agreement. Asad responded that he is willing to move toward peace, but that it is difficult. When meeting with Asad alone, the Secretary told the Syrian President that the Golan problem is different from that of Sinai. Intellectually, there are two kinds of solutions: one that is local and limited and excludes the settlements; the other that includes them. The latter would unquestionably be traumatic for the Israelis. It means they would in effect be agreeing to give up the Golan. Asad said that without knowing the
specific facts he could not, of course, commit himself. Asad agreed with the theory, however, and expressed readiness to talk within that framework.

The Secretary said he explained to Asad that so far as an Egyptian-Israeli agreement is concerned, Israel is asking for political things which Egypt cannot give, while Sadat is asking for military things which the Israelis cannot give. Asad said this shows that, had they moved simultaneously, he, Asad, could have led the way in some political matters. Sadat observed that, to the contrary, Asad would have blocked it.

The Secretary continued that Asad is agreeable to talks. However, Asad wants an exact schedule, which the Secretary cannot give him. Asad finally agreed that if the Secretary comes one more time on this trip, this would be acceptable. Thereafter, Asad began "auctioneering," i.e. the Secretary should come back two weeks later to complete the agreement. The Secretary had pointed out that he could not do so.

The following day, Prabir Haydar -- in Khaddam's absence in Cuba -- spoke with Ambassador Murphy to say that if an agreement is concluded fairly quickly, the Syrians will not cause any great difficulty for Egypt. A direct peace with Israel is not possible for Syria for 10 or 15 years, but a pragmatic step-by-step approach is possible. For that, the Syrians need the US and want good relations with the US. Although Ambassador Murphy earlier felt that the Syrians might go to war after the last meeting, they were much calmer this time. The President noted this is very "encouraging." The Secretary said that, in the presence of others, Asad had made a commitment to him toward peace. Negotiations are possible, but they cannot be called disengagement talks.

JORDAN

Speaking of his visit to Jordan, the Secretary noted that Vinogradov had just been there to urge the Jordanians to go to Geneva. Hussein reminded the Soviet diplomat that Jordan is bound by the Rabat decisions. Vinogradov said the Soviet Union is not, only by the UN Resolutions. If Jordan comes to Geneva, it can negotiate for the West Bank.
The Secretary noted his assumption that Zaid Rifai will report everything to the Syrians. The President agreed. The Secretary had asked the King's advice on how to proceed. Hussein indicated that it is important for Sadat and all of us that negotiations proceed and a separate agreement be reached.

Egyptian-Israeli Talks

Alluding to his talks in Israel, the Secretary said he first wished to outline the situation there. In the Secretary's view, Rabin genuinely wants an agreement and peace. For the first time, the Secretary said, he could see how peace might be made between the Israelis and the Arabs and even on the basis of the 1967 frontiers. This would, of course, take some time. In Israel, Rabin's popularity is down to 30 percent, which is a political liability.

Allon is also for peace, but more inclined to proceed in interim stages. His popularity rating is also down.

Peres' popularity has increased to 70 percent. He is a threat to Rabin and Allon and is playing tactically to become Prime Minister. He has the least understanding. While clever, he does not see the strategic picture. So far as Gur is concerned, the Chief of Staff is not worried about the Syrians, but only about Gamasy.

All of these Israeli leaders have nailed themselves into positions. Rabin and Allon have said in the Knesset that they must obtain non-belligerency as the price of evacuation and Peres has done the same. The Israeli Cabinet is undistinguished. There are massive domestic problems.

Rabin, in the Secretary's view, is looking for a way to conclude an agreement and at the same time give himself some prestige. The Israelis construe concrete ideas as pressure. Within one hour after his arrival, they had put out a negative statement. The Secretary then met with the press and publicly expressed surprise since the Israelis had said no such thing to him. There had been long meetings on Friday, Sunday night and Monday morning with the Israeli negotiating team.
The basic problem, the Secretary continued, is two-fold: a) if the Israelis withdraw, they believe Sinai should be demilitarized. Therefore, Gamasy's ideas are a problem not only in the longer, but also in the shorter term; and b) everything proposed thus far leads to concrete results for Egypt. They attach importance to having at least a paper with some benefits for them. Rabin, in the Secretary's view, is ahead of his negotiating team; the team is ahead of the Cabinet. The Cabinet has never authorized any territorial offer other than that of last December. The negotiating team appears to accept evacuating the passes and the oilfields, but as a buffer zone. Rabin is beginning to accept some of Gamasy's ideas.

The negotiating team -- not the Cabinet -- agreed to two propositions on the military side: First, the Egyptian line can move forward, thus far only to the present Israeli line. The Secretary gave his personal impression that it can probably be moved somewhat farther forward. Second, some redistribution of Egyptian forces can take place, though details were not discussed. Rabin seemed agreeable to having the line go to somewhere in the present Israeli zone as well as having additional Egyptian deployment in the Egyptian zone. Conceptually, this is a big move for them.

They knew that a non-belligerency statement cannot be given. However, some statement that they can use that carries some of the same implications is wanted. The Secretary had discussed the Egyptian formula of not resorting to the use of force. President Sadat reiterated his agreement to a statement about refraining from the use of force.

The Secretary then showed the President the formulations that the Israelis had provided. He noted that if we can meet their concerns, this would probably mean rapid progress. He also referred to the President's earlier public statement that force cannot settle the Arab-Israeli dispute and thought something along these lines might help.

The essential elements, the Secretary recapped, are: a) signing is a step in the process of peace and b) elaboration of the non-resort to force concept the way it is in the Disengagement Agreement; c) they agree that it should be superseded by another agreement and are willing to put these into the peace process language; d) they are...
still hung up on the UNEF duration. They agree it should be extended annually, but are concerned that the Egyptians will collude with the Soviets to arrange to veto it. If so, they would be disadvantaged. The Secretary also noted that they will doubtless have all kinds of points when we negotiate the details.

President Sadat asked if they had given any concrete proposals? The Secretary noted that they had given their version of a non-belligerency statement. On the duration, they agreed that it be in force until superseded by another agreement. They also want peace and agree that this is not a peace agreement, but a significant step and they want some statement that conflicts will not be solved by military force. Duration, UNEF and non-belligerency statements, the Secretary stressed, are the three essential elements. If they are solved, the military side will find rapid solutions.

President Sadat read the Israeli formulations and obviously did not like them. Sisco pointed out that the language in the second Israeli draft eliminated any reference to belligerency. The Secretary noted this is another version of their non-belligerency idea. President Sadat observed that they had dropped some of the phrases from the first draft. The first draft, he thought, was absurd; the second, he first said, "maybe."

Fahmy intervened to say the second draft is more than non-belligerency. Its emphasis is on creating relations between Egypt and Israel. This emphasis is in fact in both papers. He pointed out seven items in the second Israeli draft which, in his view, means more than non-belligerency. They mean a peace treaty.

The Secretary said that the Israelis believe they have stated less.

Fahmy asked what is the implication of all "war-like acts." President Sadat echoed the theme that the Israeli paper is more than non-belligerency.

The Secretary said he did not give them the specific language which President Sadat earlier had given him. The Israelis would simply give it to the press and complicate matters. Instead, he had described it. They had not given them a formal statement.
After some moments of reflection and in view of the President's obvious unhappiness, the Secretary said that we have reached a point where the only practical way to advance is if the President provides a maximum statement for him to take back to see what they would say. The President agreed. On the basis of their reaction, we can then agree to continue or to stop. The Secretary said if they have some qualifications, the President might wish to consider them.

The Secretary recalled the statement he had taken down during an earlier private meeting with the President. If something like that could be combined with some of the Israeli ideas, this could help.

The President indicated his understanding that there are two main points of difference: First, the non-resort to war; Second, the duration and UNEF.

The Secretary cautioned that when we get to military details, there will be "auctioneering." The Israelis have not given them any firm lines. In his view, the stronger the statement, the easier the military lines will be.

The President also understood that the Israelis have agreed that the Egyptian forces might move to a point near the Israeli lines. The Secretary replied in the affirmative and said they have agreed to some deployment of forces, but have not supplied details. He had indicated the line should be moved closer to the passes.

The President asked who will be at the eastern end of the passes? The Secretary responded that the closer the Egyptians are to the western end, the closer the Israelis will want to be to the eastern entrance. The President asked if this is on a reciprocal basis or whether the Israelis will give the UN more area on the east. The Secretary responded that he had as yet not asked the Israelis to draw a line.

His understanding is that they want the major part of the passes in UN hands. They would probably be at the eastern entrance, but this would depend on whether the Egyptian forces were.
The President observed that this could mean that if the Egyptians move to the Israeli line, they may ask for their line at the eastern end. The Secretary recalled that the President had last time agreed that if the Egyptian forces are permitted to the western entrance, he would have no objection if the Israelis are on the eastern entrance. President Sadat called this Gamasy's proposal and indicated it was agreeable only as a last resort. The Secretary said they had not yet gone that far. They are still tying everything to the belligerency idea. They do not think conceptually. The idea that the Egyptian lines should move forward is a new one to them. They accept this in principle, but in the first attempt have only agreed to Egyptian forward movement as far as the UN line is.

President Sadat, who was visibly disturbed by this, said the Israelis should be under no illusions that they will remain in the passes. Their remaining in the eastern end will be only as a last resort. He would prefer that they have the area of limited forces east of the passes and give the UN some area.

BOYCOTT

Fahmy recalled that the President had agreed that there would be a selective lifting of the boycott. This would begin with Ford and then perhaps later Coca-Cola and/or Xerox. However, this could not be given in writing even to the US. It could only be oral.

The Secretary and the President then met privately for about 20 minutes. Thereafter, it was agreed that the two sides would meet again on Tuesday, March 18, prior to the Secretary's departure later that same day.

AMB:HFrelhls:aJc - 3/18/75
DEPARTMENT PASS NSCE FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT AND NESSEN

E.O. 11662 N/A

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, H.A.), XF

SUBJECT: Press Briefing by Department Spokesman Anderson and Egyptian Spokesman Bashir following March 17, 1975, evening meeting in Aswan, between Secretary Kissinger and President Sadat.

ACTION: SECSTATE WASHD C IMMEDIATE

INFO: AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USINFO WASHD C
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

Riyadh

UNCLASSIFIED USDEL ASWAN

SECTOR: 348

REF: STATE 24911

1. Subject: The following is quote:

2. Ambassador Anderson: As was the case the other night following a previous meeting between the President and Secretary Kissinger, he said:

UNCLASSIFIED
Ambassador Bashir and I were briefed by the principals. The meeting tonight began at 7:00 p.m., finished about 8:45 p.m. The principals on each side were: On the Egyptian side, President Sadat, Foreign Minister Fahmy and Minister of War Gamsay, and on the American side Secretary Kissinger, Ambassador Eilts, and Under Secretary Sisco. The breakdown of the meeting: the first hour the two teams met, the last 45 minutes the President met two sides alone with Secretary Kissinger. They will meet tomorrow morning, Ambassador Bashir and I alone, probably around 11:00 a.m. Mr./Bashir wanted to comment to you about what the Egyptian side is doing now, and then I will have one more comment.

3. Ambassador Bashir: The President will have a working dinner with Foreign Minister Fahmy and War Minister Gamsay. Mr. Kissinger presented the Israelis' specific ideas and the President and the Egyptian team will be studying them tonight. Tomorrow they are expecting to give Mr. Kissinger and his team the Egyptian response to these ideas. The general mood of the talks was serious and we feel that we need serious and hard work to solve the issues presented. Thank you.

4. Ambassador Anderson: The Ambassador covered one or two Israeli points I was going to cover. That was the specific ideas being presented by Dr. Kissinger, because I had them.
5. Question: Could you comment about the relative shortness of the meeting itself, the hour and forty minutes versus the nearly three hour meetings that were held previously? Is there any significance in the relative brevity of tonight's talks?

6. Answer: Anderson; I attach no particular significance to the relative brevity of tonight's talks. The Secretary, as I said earlier, had sufficient time to present the specific ideas of the Israelis, and now, as Ambassador Bashir said, the Egyptian side will be studying these ideas. After all, the two sides are going to be meeting tomorrow morning again so there will be plenty of time for further talks.

7. Question: Ambassador Bashir, could you say if there is any initial Egyptian reaction at all, even in terms of mood?

8. Answer: Ambassador Bashir: I just wanted to add that the brevity comes, at the fact that Mr. Kissinger was presenting the Israelis' specific ideas and we feel that those matters are serious. We need a lot of hard work to tackle these issues. Tomorrow the Egyptian team will be presenting, in the morning, the Egyptian response to these specific ideas.

9. Question: Did you say you thought the Israeli ideas were serious? We can't hear you too well.

10. Answer: Ambassador Bashir: The talks indicated we will need
serious and hard work to tackle these issues.

11. Question: What about the Israeli ideas, how did they strike you?

12. Answer: Ambassador Bashir: We will know more about that tomorrow.

13. Question: Do you think the atmosphere in Israel in the last day or so is reflected in what Dr. Kissinger is presenting? Do you get any kind of reaction like that?

14. Answer: Ambassador Bashir: I don't know about the Israeli reaction. I hope they are forthcoming towards peace, and I hope that we feel from them and see signs that they are willing to come to peace with Egypt and the other Arab countries on all fronts.

UNQUOTE.

KISSINGER
The documents in this folder continue into the next folder.