

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 010801

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL Memorandum of Conversation
CREATOR'S NAME Ford/Kissinger/Weyand/Martin/Scowcroft

CREATION DATE 03/25/1975
VOLUME 4 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 036600012
COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. MEORANDA OF
CONVERSATIONS
BOX NUMBER 10
FOLDER TITLE March 25, 1975 - Ford, Kissinger,
General Frederick Weyand, Ambassador
Graham Martin (South Vietnam)

DATE WITHDRAWN 02/01/2000
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST LET

DECLASSIFIED 3/11/02
8/23/10

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

DECLASSIFIED w/ portions exempted
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 2.3
MRG 10-056 #5
State Ltr 8/23/10
By dal NARA Date 10/14/10

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
General Frederick Weyand, Army Chief of
Staff (at end)
Amb. Graham Martin, Ambassador to the
Republic of Vietnam (at end)
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Tuesday, March 25, 1975
9:22 - 10:25 a.m.

PLACE: Oval Office

Kissinger: They [the Israelis] are so used to total support that an even-handed account is biased against them. They think I influenced Berger and Gwertzman against them. I didn't. I think they are cranking up an assault -- not on you, but on me. Javits said I was obviously emotionally upset and had quit too soon. He and Case were one step from being nasty.

President: I have no hesitancy....

Kissinger: It is very painful to me, but you should know that if we continue this route they will go after us.

President: I think we should keep a calm, dispassionate position. If they get emotional, it will reflect on them.

Kissinger: If we cancel the F-15 and the Peres visit, they will howl. But if it happens now, it will look as if giving the F-15 is to enable them to defend their intransigence.



SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

CLASSIFIED BY HENRY A. KISSINGER
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (b) (1, 3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to det.

Discourage the office to see Israelis. All contacts with the Embassy should be reported to us. Dinitz has the verbatim transcript of the leadership meeting. Fisher called me in a state of agitation. I told him it was in the Jews' interest to keep things quiet, not ours. I now will treat Dinitz like any other Ambassador.

President: Tip O'Neill introduced a resolution but the Greeks threatened to make a fight so he withdrew.

Kissinger: Was it objected to just by the Jews?

Faisal was very important to us. The last talk we had, he was magnificent. He said he didn't agree with my approach but he would back whatever I wanted.
.....

President: What about Fahd? What will be his role?

Kissinger: My guess is they will make him Crown Prince and Prime Minister. But the King may surround himself with bad people.

Fahd is tough, but he can't achieve the exalted status of Faisal. Sooner or later there will be a military move. Saudi Arabia is a medieval country. The Shah modernized the country and threw out the feudal class. In Saudi Arabia, the Bedouins move into the cities with the money coming in, and that will destroy him.

President: Who should we send to the funeral?

Kissinger: Maybe Nelson. [Hartman came in with Agnew idea]. But he should go and come straight back.

Sadat is in trouble. Recriminations are starting. The Israelis have such unbelievable bad taste. They invited Keating to a military seder in the Sinai, for Passover.

Hussein was very upset at the failure. He says it was an extreme blow to Sadat. He worries about his own survival and if he does he will have to radicalize. The Syrians and PLO are delighted and Hussein anticipates trouble. We have similar reports from the Gulf.



We have to show Israel that we are a great power and they don't run our foreign policy. I think we should consult with the Soviet Union. If they go too far we can stonewall, but I see no other way to go. I will give you my ideas in a couple of days, but I maybe should go to Moscow and meet with the British, French, and Germans. We can't give them \$2.5 billion now.

President: No way.

Kissinger: Maybe we should give them what we gave last year, plus an inflation factor.

I'll be testifying before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. I don't know whether it's better open or closed.

In Indochina, I think if we don't move fast we will be in big trouble. The withdrawal has been a disaster. We will need a massive resupply to replace what they lost. Weyand should be told to find out what is necessary.

I think we should give what the GVN says it needs. Defense will say it can't be done.

[General Weyand and Ambassador Martin are brought in.]

President: Fred, you are going with the Ambassador. This is one of the most significant missions you ever had. You are not going over to lose, but to be tough and see what we can do. We have talked options -- they're all on the tough side. We want your recommendation for the things which can be tough and shocking to the North. I regret I don't have authority to do some of the things President Nixon could do.

Kissinger: We need Weyand's judgment of what is needed. I think \$300 million isn't enough. John Oakes of the New York Times has religion -- says we can't kill our ally. We have to know: What is the real situation and why? What can be done?

President: We want to be strong and shocking to the North.

Kissinger: But we have that soft Ambassador. [Laughter]

Graham has been telling me that since May we have shipped nothing but POL and ammunition. No spares.



Martin: I think they can give them a helluva scrap.

Kissinger: If they can extricate their forces.

President: Do you have any question about what you are undertaking?

Weyand: Not in my mind.

Martin: If we are not legalistic, there are things we can do.

Kissinger: Like what?

Martin: Art. 7.

Kissinger: [Describes Art. 7]

Martin: I will have a list by the end of the week. Tran van Lam gave a pessimistic appraisal for the aid. If we can show some determination.

Weyand: We will bring back a general appraisal and give them a shot in the arm.

[Martin and Weyand leave.]

Kissinger: The V-E Day celebration. How about Harriman?

President: O.K. I think we ought to try to balance the delegation. We do have to balance it.

Kissinger: Scranton didn't take the job? This is the fifth time.

President: The real reason is he won't face up to the tough job. He says he wants to help me politically instead.

Kissinger: Last, we have a silly dispute with the PRC about this song they want to use. If on top of all the other problems we take this one on, we will get the anti-Taiwan people up in arms. Conversely if we came, the Taiwan people will do the same.

President: I think we must be tough. If they modify the song, O.K., if not, we must hang tough.



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