

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

17 May 2006

TO: SAMEUR, ABDENOUR

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SAMEUR, ABDENOUR

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee met Nouridine at the Finsbury Park Mosque in London, England. Nouridine showed the detainee videos of the jihad in Bosnia and Chechnya, and convinced the detainee to go to Afghanistan.

2. The detainee paid for his own ticket to Afghanistan with money he received from his brother.

3. The detainee gave Nouridine approximately 600 British Pounds, and Nouridine made the detainee's travel arrangements and bought his airline ticket. The detainee traveled alone on a direct flight from England to Pakistan.

4. Finsbury Park Mosque's Nouridine is a well-known Salafist Group for Combat and Preaching (GSPC) recruiter who handled large numbers of Mujahedin transiting to Afghanistan.

5. The Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) is currently the most effective armed group inside Algeria. The GSPC continues to conduct operations aimed at government and military targets, primarily in rural areas, although civilians are sometimes killed. According to press reporting, some GSPC members in Europe maintain contacts with other North African extremists sympathetic to al Qaida. In late 2002, Algerian authorities announced they had killed a Yemeni al Qaida operative who had been meeting with the GSPC inside Algeria.

6. The detainee left London for Afghanistan in the summer of 2001.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SAMEUR, ABDENOUR**

7. In Pakistan the detainee was asked if he wanted to train in Afghanistan or go directly to Chechnya, and he decided to train in Afghanistan.

8. The detainee landed in Islamabad, Pakistan and met a man at an ice cream shop. The man took the detainee to the Algerian House in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

9. The detainee stated he spent approximately five months at the Algerian guest house in Jalalabad, Afghanistan and was assigned a Kalashnikov rifle (AK-47) while there.

10. The detainee traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan and stayed at the Arab House.

11. While at the guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan the detainee volunteered to go see the al Farouq training camp because he was interested. The purpose of the camp was to train Mujahedin for jihad in Algeria and Chechnya.

### b. Training

1. The detainee received training on the Kalashnikov and the Makarov handgun in the Algerian military.

2. The detainee attended the al Farouq Camp in the summer of 2001, but could not recall the specific months that he attended training. The detainee was at al Farouq Camp approximately 14 days, and received limited training on firing the Kalashnikov rifle.

### c. Connections/Associations

1. Another person at the Finsbury Park Mosque also told the detainee that he needed to go to Afghanistan.

2. This other person is a well-known Finsbury Park facilitator reported to be in custody in the United Kingdom.

3. The detainee's Finsbury Park recruiter, Nourdine, arrived at the guest house during the detainee's al Farouq training. Nourdine died in the group's retreat to Tora Bora.

4. The detainee admitted that he was a member of the Algerian resistance group al-Jibhat al-Islamiat lil-Inqath, meaning the Islamic Liberation Front (ILF).

5. The detainee claims the Islamic Liberation Front only fights within Algeria, not against the United States.

6. The detainee gave money to the Finsbury Park Mosque that helped fund individuals going to Afghanistan and other areas of the world where jihad was being fought.

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d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee returned to the Algerian House in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. Upon hearing that the Taliban was fleeing, the detainee fled with about 150 others towards the mountains of the Afghanistan and Pakistan border.

2. The detainee said opposition forces blocked them on the road. The detainee was ordered to put down his weapon, but he refused.

3. While crossing the border the detainee engaged in a battle with Pakistani forces. He was shot in the legs, captured, and spent about four months in several hospitals, before being sent to Kandahar, Afghanistan.

4. The detainee acknowledged having been told that something would happen to the United States within one week of the 11 September 2001 attacks.

5. The detainee said it was his right to lie.

6. The detainee denied ever firing his weapon at a person while he was in Afghanistan. He stated he would carry his weapon when he left the guest house for protection.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that he never went to al Farouq Camp, and that this information was provided to interrogators so that he could obtain medical attention for his legs.

b. The detainee claims that he never attended any training camps, never fought against the Northern Alliance or the United States, and never carried a weapon.

c. The detainee stated that he went to Afghanistan with pure intentions to study the Koran and help the Afghan people.

d. The detainee does not know where he wants to live when he leaves prison. He does not want to fight jihad. The detainee wants to get married and have a family and a job.

e. The detainee denies knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

f. The detainee says he is not a terrorist and has never done anything wrong.

g. The detainee swears that he did not come to Afghanistan to train. He just wants to return to England, work and save some money, and then return to Algeria. The detainee says he did not talk to anyone about the Islamic Liberation Front while in Afghanistan.

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## **UNCLASSIFIED**

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SAMEUR, ABDENOUR**

- h. The detainee knows nothing of Usama bin Laden or any ties between the Islamic Liberation Front and al Qaida or the Taliban.
  - i. The detainee emphatically denied ever having been to Bosnia.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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**000703**

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

18 March 2006

TO: LAGHA, LUFTI BIN SWEI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF LAGHA, LUFTI BIN SWEI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. In 1997 the detainee and two other men stole a boat in an attempt to reach Italy. They were caught by the Italian Coast Guard, taken to Lampedusa Island, Italy and subsequently released.

2. The detainee took a janitor position at the Islamic Institute that paid 500 United States Dollars per month. The detainee worked at this job for about a year until he left for Afghanistan.

3. The head of a terrorist network sent the detainee for military training in Afghanistan. The detainee traveled with a companion to Afghanistan in early 2001.

4. This companion is a member of a terrorist network and a convicted terrorist.

5. The detainee contacted Abu Muad. Abu Muad saw to the detainee's accommodations over a period of six months. During this period, the detainee became acquainted with two other Tunisian nationals.

6. One of these Tunisians is a reported member of the terrorist group Armed Islamic Group (GIA).

7. The other Tunisian had an extremist group that operated in Daruntah and was connected to a known terrorist group, Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF LAGHA, LUFTI BIN SWEI**

8. Abu Muad has three houses in or around Jalalabad and ran a training camp near Lake Daruntah.

## b. Training

1. The detainee was trained to use an automatic Austrian rifle in the Tunisian military.

2. According to a foreign government, Tunisian nationals were recruited in Italy essentially in the midst of petty criminal activity. They were eventually indoctrinated and mobilized for the so-called defense of the Islamic cause in Bosnia, Chechnya, and Afghanistan. These men received military training on the use of light arms in the Daruntah Camp in Jalalabad and in the Khalden Camp situated near Khowst Province, Afghanistan.

3. When the detainee was asked if he recalled hearing of or visiting the Daruntah Camp in Afghanistan, the detainee responded that he had never received any training in Afghanistan. When asked how he knew training was conducted at the Daruntah Camp, the detainee again replied he did not receive any training and refused to directly answer the question.

## c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee provided a positive identification of an alleged al Qaida member in Europe. The person was employed at a children's school near the mosque where the detainee worked.

2. Abu Muad is assessed to be head of the Theological Commission of the Groupe Islamiste Combatant du Maroc (GICM), also known as the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group.

3. The Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group, the Armed Islamic Group, and Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin are foreign terrorist organizations.

## d. Intent

The detainee stated that if released he would like to live in Tunisia.

## e. Other Relevant Data

1. When the detainee left Afghanistan, he hired an Afghan to guide him to Pakistan. The guide took the detainee into the mountains about half way and told the detainee how to go the rest of the way. The detainee became lost for a few days and suffered from frostbite. The detainee eventually ran into some Pakistanis who turned him over to authorities.

2. The detainee spent three months in a hospital and had several fingers and toes amputated. The detainee was then turned over to the United States. According to the detainee,

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF LAGHA, LUFTI BIN SWEI**

the 2,000 United States Dollars he had with him when captured was money left over from the 2,500 United States Dollars he brought from Italy.

3. Another person identified the detainee as a Tunisian he met in a Pakistan hospital who was coming from the mountains of Tora Bora.

4. The detainee was known for his criminal record in Tunisia on charges of theft and violence.

5. A Foreign Government Service has assessed the detainee as a dangerous terrorist known for his radical orientation.

6. The detainee laughed that the United States military still has not caught Usama bin Laden. The detainee stated that we could surround him wherever he is but would not be able to catch Usama bin Laden because the supporters around him would not allow it to happen.

7. The detainee was questioned about his feelings towards the United States, to which the detainee responded that it was an injustice for him to be in Cuba.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that he went to Afghanistan after seeing a television program on al Jazeera relating how Afghanistan was an Islamic state. The detainee claims that he was going only as a tourist and did not watch any jihad videotapes.

b. The detainee stated no one talked him into going to Afghanistan; the detainee decided on his own. The detainee just wanted to travel and used his own money and Tunisian passport.

c. The detainee denied any prior knowledge of the 11 September 2001 attacks and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

d. The detainee saw members of the Taliban while in Afghanistan, but he does not know anything about them. Regarding al Qaida, the detainee thinks their belief system is strange and that they are not good.

e. The detainee claimed he never was a fighter, never took up arms against the Americans or anyone else, and never trained in a camp in Afghanistan.

f. The detainee stated that he does not have anything against the United States and he has no affiliation or knowledge of Usama bin Laden.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF LAGHA, LUFTI BIN SWEI**

Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

28 February 2006

TO: SULEYMAN, AHMED HASSAN JAMIL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SULEYMAN, AHMED HASSAN JAMIL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

The detainee worked for the Hayaat al Irhatha al Islamiyya, a.k.a. the International Islamic Relief Organization.

b. Training

1. The detainee attended a class on using the Kalashnikov rifle in Khowst, Afghanistan.

2. The detainee was in the Jordanian Military from 1979 to 1981, and received training with the Army on the M-16 rifle.

3. The detainee is familiar with electrical detonators.

4. Reportedly, the detainee was a senior commander of al Qaida. The detainee was reported to have been involved in providing military training to al Qaida trainees at a camp in Afghanistan, possibly in the Khowst area.

c. Connections/Associations

1. Beginning in 1993, the detainee attended an annual Jama'at Tablighi meeting in Pakistan.

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ISN 662

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SULEYMAN, AHMED HASSAN JAMIL**

2. The detainee was arrested in April 2000 attempting to cross into Afghanistan. The detainee was carrying a pocket telephone diary containing about 200 entries written in mixed Arabic and English, and two letters written in Arabic. One of the letters was noted to have the name of Ibn al Shaykh, a senior al Qaida member and aide to Usama bin Laden, written at the top.

3. In August 2000 the detainee was sentenced to three years in prison. Reportedly, the detainee was the subject of "a security case with international implications." However, the detainee had been released from jail on 19 October 2000. It was reported that a substantial amount of money, exact amount unknown, was probably paid to arrange the release of the detainee. It was believed that the bribe money was probably paid by an al Qaida supporter and the money for the bribe came from the al Qaida organization.

4. The detainee was reportedly personally acquainted with Usama bin Laden and was known as an active member of the Maktab al Khidmat.

5. The detainee was reportedly one of the sons of the chief founder of the Maktab al Khidmat, Abdallah Azzam. The United States government has no information that supports that the detainee is the son of Abdallah Azzam. In addition to the bin Laden lieutenant Ibn al Shaykh, it is believed the detainee was an associate of Zain ul Abideen, also known as Abu Zubaida, who reportedly was sought for his involvement in planning an attack on American and other western tourists in Jordan during the millennium celebrations.

#### d. Other Relevant Data

When the detainee was arrested in April 2000 attempting to cross into Afghanistan, he had no identification documents on his person, but was carrying 100,000 Pakistani Rupees in cash, the equivalent of about \$2,000 United States Dollars.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee was asked if he ever worked for the Afghanistan Taliban government or al Qaida. He replied he had no relationship with either. The detainee was asked how could we prove he was not a member of either organization and he said the proof was in the fact he has told the truth, believes in Allah, worked for charities, has children and has not killed anyone.

b. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

c. The detainee claims to not have traveled to Afghanistan since 1992.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SULEYMAN, AHMED HASSAN  
JAMIL**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

30 October 2006

TO: ZOHAIR, AHMED ZEID SALEM

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ZOHAIR, AHMED ZEID SALEM

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. A source identified the detainee as a member of al Qaida and described the detainee as being a perfect soldier when he came to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

2. The detainee is responsible for the 1994 or 1995 murder, with a firearm, of United States person, William Jefferson, in Tuzla Canton, Bosnia Herzegovina.

3. The detainee claimed while in Bosnia between 1995 and 1997, he was arrested by the Bosnian police after he was involved in a fender bender while driving a car.

4. Open source reporting stated that the detainee was subsequently imprisoned on illegal weapons charges when three automatic rifles, two bombs, two pistols, and a large quantity of ammunition were found in his vehicle after a car accident.

5. The detainee stated he associated with relief agencies such as Croatian Assistance, a Saudi relief agency funded by the al Haramain relief organization.

6. Al Haramain Saudi Arabian foundation's main mission is to implement and teach true Wahhabism religious doctrine worldwide. It has financial connections within Saudi Arabia and maintains connections with other organizations, to include al Qaida.

7. A source listed the detainee as an individual accused of being a terrorist who has a connection to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ZOHAIR, AHMED ZEID SALEM**

8. On 5 December 1994, The Republic of Croatia Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued the detainee an official identification card as a humanitarian aid worker of the charitable organization known as Charitable Community for Orphans.

9. The Charitable Communities for Orphans is also known as the International Islamic Charitable Organization, which is a variant of the Benevolence International Foundation.

10. The Benevolence International Foundation is suspected of supporting extremist/terrorist activity both in Bosnia and abroad.

11. The detainee stated he traveled to Bosnia and Croatia during the winter of 1995 and stayed for two years. The detainee claimed that he participated in humanitarian relief programs and he hoped to find a Croatian wife.

12. Open source reports indicated the detainee's direct involvement, along with four other Islamic terrorists, in a car bombing that damaged many buildings and injured dozens of people in Mostar, Bosnia and Herzegovina on 18 September 1997.

13. During the war, the detainee and others were actively involved in criminal activities such as the theft and falsification of documents. There were also indications that they were involved in the 1996 murder of Hamid Hotic in Zavidovici, Bosnia and Herzegovina, when they placed an explosive device under his car, and other terrorist activities throughout the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

14. Under a Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina Supreme Court decision dated 18 April 2000, the detainee was sentenced to 12 years in prison for the criminal act of terrorism.

15. A document seized during the 21 October 2001 raid of the Tirana, Albania Headquarters, of al Waqf al Islami, a nongovernmental organization, listed the detainee under Administration with a function area of Finance and Support. Al Waqf al Islami's activities and personnel have, on occasion, been linked to terrorist and Islamic extremist groups.

16. The detainee worked as freelance terrorist without specific affiliations to any particular group.

17. Information has been reported that considers the detainee one of the most dangerous possible foreign Islamic extremists who lived in Bosnia and stated the detainee is a field operative.

18. Information received stated the detainee is a known associate of Islamic extremists in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

b. Training

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## **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ZOHAIR, AHMED ZEID SALEM**

1. A source stated the detainee first trained at the Javar Camp in Afghanistan and then other camps to include al Farouq, Khalden, and al Sada.
2. An Afghan jihadist identified the detainee as a topography trainer at al Farouq Camp.
3. The detainee was a member of the Army of the Bosnia and Herzegovina military unit in Travnik Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was the 7th Reconnaissance-Diversionary Battalion.

### c. Other Relevant Data

The detainee stated he told his aunt that he would go to Gardiz, Afghanistan and attempt to find and bring his cousin back to Saudi Arabia.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
  - a. The detainee stated that he has never received military training of any kind nor has he ever owned or carried a weapon.
  - b. The detainee claimed his original purpose for traveling to Pakistan was business, not for a fatwa or to fight a jihad. The detainee then stated he has no affiliation with the Taliban or al Qaida organizations in Afghanistan, Pakistan, or any other country.
  - c. The detainee stated that everyone suspects he is a Mujahedin, which he is not.
  - d. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
  - e. The detainee stated he has never been arrested and has a clean record with the Saudi government.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

22 March 2006

To: TAHAR, MOHAMMAD AHMED ALI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF TAHAR, MOHAMMAD AHMED ALI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee wanted to study medicine in Pakistan. The detainee was told by a visiting Jamaat al Tablique missionary, that before he could do so, the detainee would have to study the Koran.

2. In mid-September of 2001, the detainee traveled from Sanaa, Yemen to Karachi, Pakistan via Dubai, United Arab Emirates. The detainee was met in Karachi by someone from the Jamaat al Tablique who took him to the Maki Mosque. The detainee then traveled to Lahore, Pakistan and spent two days there, then he went to a mosque in Raywand, Pakistan.

3. The headquarters of the Tablique Jammata is located in Raywand.

4. The detainee then enrolled at the Salafeyah University in Faisalabad, a university run by the Jamaat al Tablique.

5. After Ramadan, the detainee moved from university housing to an off-campus house with five fellow Yemeni. There were about 12 other students already at this house.

b. Connections/Associations

1. A representative from the Jamaat al Tablique Mission went to the Pakistani embassy and got the detainee a visa.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF TAHAR, MOHAMMAD AHMED ALI**

2. Tablique Jammāt is a Pakistan-based Islamic missionary organization used as a cover for action by Islamic extremists, including members of al Qaida.

3. The detainee was sent a personal greeting from the Taliban Deputy Minister of Intelligence.

4. The detainee was recognized by a senior al Qaida operative as someone from the Crescent Mills residence in Faisalabad, Pakistan.

5. A number of suspected al Qaida members were arrested at the al Qaida Crescent Mills safe house in March 2002.

### c. Intent

1. The detainee stated that he should be considered a terrorist.

2. The detainee stated that if muslim scholars say that people must die, muslims must follow the scholars' words. The detainee stated if the scholars issued a fatwa for the attacks of 11 September 2001, then the attacks would have been legitimate.

3. The detainee threatened to instigate an uprising in the Guantanamo camp, claiming that the Americans are assaulting Islam.

4. The detainee advised he wishes to remain in the group of detainees who do not cooperate and who will never leave.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee claims he did not respond to a fatwa. The detainee visited Pakistan to attend a university to study medicine to aid muslims. The detainee withdrew from the classes because they were too difficult. The detainee is not a Jamaat al Tablique member but needed their assistance to get into medical school.

b. The detainee noted that he did not observe any type of weapons, computers or telephones in the Issa house. The detainee further stated that he did not observe or hear anyone preaching about jihad or recruiting for the Taliban and al Qaida.

c. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

d. After being shown the HBO documentary, *In Memoriam*, concerning the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on New York City, the detainee said what he saw was a terrible event.

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## **UNCLASSIFIED**

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF TAHAR, MOHAMMAD AHMED  
ALI**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

9 November 2006

TO: ABDULLAH, IMAD

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDULLAH, IMAD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he traveled on 8 August 2001, from Sanaa, Yemen, via Dubai, United Arab Emirates, to Karachi, Pakistan, and onward to Faisalabad, Pakistan, to attend Jamea Salafeyah University.

2. The detainee's travel to al Farouq, Afghanistan in 2000 was facilitated by an al Qaida operative.

3. A source stated the detainee moved to Kabul, Afghanistan, after training at al Farouq in Afghanistan, joined the front lines, and was asked after fighting on the front lines to become a trainer at one of the camps, but the detainee refused.

4. A source stated the detainee became a common foot soldier carrying a Kalashnikov rifle with ammunition while he was at Tora Bora in Afghanistan.

b. Training

1. Detainee was identified as attending the training camp at al Farouq in Afghanistan, approximately April 2001, where the detainee received small arms training on the Kalashnikov rifle, pistol and physical training.

2. A source stated the detainee was trained as a medic while at Tora Bora in Afghanistan.

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ISN 680

# UNCLASSIFIED

## SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDULLAH, IMAD

### c. Connections/Associations

1. A source stated the detainee was one of 50 men selected at al Farouq in Afghanistan to be Usama bin Laden's guards.

### d. Intent

1. The detainee stated that other people think those who fight a jihad are heroes and that his time for fighting had not come yet.

2. The detainee stated if the conditions are met, it is the duty of everyone to fight. The detainee stated the conditions requiring someone to fight in the jihad would be if Muslims are attacked or if the homeland is attacked. The detainee stated he believed his homeland has been attacked by the British.

3. The detainee stated he would follow a fatwa that declared jihad because it is the law of the land and he would not question the guidance of his leader. The detainee also stated he would be bound by duty to obey if the leader of his tribe declared Americans to be enemies of Islam, and subsequently ordered their attack.

4. The detainee stated you will never defeat us, but did not specify who he was referring to when he said us.

### e. Other Relevant Data

The detainee stated he was arrested along with fifteen other men by the Pakistanis at a guesthouse in Faisalabad, Pakistan. Most of 15 were Yemenis, along with one Saudi, a Palestinian, a Libyan, and a Russian.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he had never entered Afghanistan.

b. The detainee denied ever attending a Taliban or an al Qaida camp and denied ever receiving medical training at Tora Bora in Afghanistan.

c. The detainee stated he heard about the attacks of 11 September 2001, while he was at the Salafeyah University in Pakistan and that it was wrong that so many innocent people were killed.

d. The detainee denied allegations that he was involved with the bombing of the USS COLE and stated there is no reason that anyone would identify him as being involved with the bombing.

e. The detainee stated, if released, he would like to return to Yemen and start a family.

# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDULLAH, IMAD**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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000719

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

26 February 2006

TO: HASSEN, MOHAMMED MOHAMMED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HASSEN, MOHAMMED MOHAMMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee left for Pakistan from San'a, Yemen circa June 2001. The detainee arrived in Karachi, Pakistan and spent approximately four days in a hotel before he flew to Lahore, Pakistan. When the detainee arrived in Lahore, he immediately traveled by bus to the Tablique Jammah headquarters in Raywand, Pakistan. The detainee remained at the headquarters for five months.

2. A individual who was in Afghanistan, identified the detainee as a fighter who traveled between Kandahar and Khost, Afghanistan.

b. Training

A student from al Farouq identified the detainee as a Yemeni who trained at al Farouq.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee's father met an Imam who was identified as the leader of the Jamat-al-Tabligh approximately 10 to 20 years ago. The detainee related that his father set up his trip to Pakistan with this Imam.

2. A source identified the detainee as a follower of the Jamat-al-Tabligh.

3. The preachers of the Jamat-al-Tabligh organization have been supporting Islamic terrorist groups in South and Southeast Asia under the cover of conducting religious activities.

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ISN 681

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HASSEN, MOHAMMED MOHAMMED**

The group is closely aligned with other Pakistani terrorist organizations and the al Qaida network. Recruited foreigners were taken to Pakistan, trained at various madrassas with Tablighi Jamaat funding, and then sent to Afghanistan.

4. A source said that the detainee had already been living at the guesthouse upon his arrival.

5. A source identified numerous current detainees that were occupants of the house where the detainee was arrested. The detainee was identified as an occupant of the house.

6. One of the occupants of the house was identified as a driver of a truck that was used as a transport to and from the front lines.

7. A second occupant was further identified as going to Afghanistan to fight jihad and receiving training at al Farouq.

8. A third occupant of the house traveled with a fake passport to Afghanistan and Pakistan to train with the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.

9. United States Department of Homeland Security has designated the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group as a foreign terrorist organization. Some members are aligned with Usama Bin Ladin's al Qaida organization or are active in the international Mujahidin network.

#### d. Other Relevant Data

A senior al Qaida operative noted that a photo of the detainee may be a Yemeni and that he may have seen him at one point "inside," meaning Afghanistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

b. After hearing of the attacks, the detainee commented that the attacks were a terrible tragedy.

c. The detainee related he has only traveled to Pakistan. The purpose of his travel was to study at Salafeia University in Faisalabad, Pakistan.

d. While at the madrassa, the detainee denied ever being approached by a Taliban or al Qaida recruiter.

UNCLASSIFIED

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HASSEN, MOHAMMED MOHAMMED**

- e. The detainee also denied ever being pressured by the madrassa to travel to Afghanistan to fight.
- f. The detainee said he was not involved with any of the Tabligh movements.
- g. The detainee related he has neither served in the Yemeni military nor received any kind of military training. According to the detainee, he does not own a Kalashnikov or has he ever fired one.
- h. The detainee stated he has never participated in the Hajj, and he does not follow any fatwas.
- i. If released, the detainee plans to go home to Yemen, get married, and work in a market.
- j. The detainee stated he has no desire to fight against the United States.
- k. The detainee stated that he had only spent one night at the guesthouse, and as such, didn't know or recognize many of the other residents.
- l. According to the detainee, he did not know all the individuals in the house at the time of the arrest. Once the detainee was arrested and detained with the others, he found out their names through conversation.
- m. The detainee denied any knowledge concerning the possibility some of the men living at the guesthouse might have been aligned with, or sympathetic to, the Taliban or al Qaida.
- n. The detainee stated that he thinks that United States is a nice place, but like every society it has it's good and bad.
- o. The detainee said that he has learned respect and to treat people how you want to be treated.
- p. The detainee commented that he had learned how to get along with different types of people.
- q. A source identified the detainee as a student from Yemen.
- r. A second source stated that the detainee arrived at the house approximately two days prior to them being captured. He identified the detainee as a student at Al Solafiya University.
- s. A third source identified the detainee as a Koran student that arrived at the house the day that they were all arrested.

UNCLASSIFIED

## **UNCLASSIFIED**

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HASSEN, MOHAMMED  
MOHAMMED**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

**UNCLASSIFIED**



# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

23 November 2006

TO: AHMED, FAYAD YAHYA

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AHMED, FAYAD YAHYA

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. In 1997 or 1998 the detainee studied under a Sheik at the Demaj Mosque in Sadah, Yemen. The Sheik suggested the detainee travel to Pakistan with the Tablique Jammata.

2. The detainee is a Yemen citizen who traveled to Karachi, Pakistan and finally Lahore, Pakistan prior to 11 September 2001.

3. The detainee traveled to Pakistan to study and be part of the Jammata Tablique.

4. Jammata al Tabligh is a Pakistani based, Islamic missionary organization, which is believed to be used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists including members of al Qaida.

b. Connections/Associations

The detainee spent about one and a half months at the al Salafia University in Faisalabad, Pakistan.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. After one month at a house in Faisalabad, Pakistan, the detainee was arrested in a raid by Pakistani police.

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UNCLASSIFIED

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ISN 683

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AHMED, FAYAD YAHYA**

2. The detainee was recognized by a senior al Qaida operative.
3. The senior al Qaida operative was the director of a Yemeni guest house in Faisalabad, Pakistan.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
  - a. The detainee had no knowledge of al Qaida, the Taliban or Usama bin Laden outside of what the detainee had learned from the news in Yemen and Pakistan.
  - b. The detainee had no knowledge of pending or planned attacks and did not know about the attacks on 11 September 2001 prior to execution.
  - c. It was the detainee's understanding that Jammāt Tabliqīe was a group who wanted to prove themselves through good deeds and through the spread of religion.
  - d. The detainee explained part of his motivation to go to Pakistan was that the country was strong in religion and commented that studying in Saudi Arabia was too expensive.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

14 November 2006

TO: TAHANMATAN, MOHAMMED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF TAHANMATAN, MOHAMMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he became a member of the Jamaat al Tablighi religious group when he was 14 years old.

2. The detainee stated he traveled to Jordan in October 2001, seeking a visa to Pakistan. The detainee turned his passport over to the Jamaat al Tablighi when he arrived in Jordan and Jamaat al Tablighi arranged for the detainee visa for travel to Pakistan.

3. The detainee stated he went on two conversion missions while at the Jamaat al Tablighi headquarters in Raiwand, Pakistan.

4. The detainee stated he met two Afghani men during a lecture at the Jamaat al Tablighi headquarters in Raiwand, Pakistan who pressured him into traveling to Afghanistan in February 2001, even though the Jamaat al Tablighi expressly forbade travel to Afghanistan as too dangerous. The detainee stated he departed for Afghanistan despite the warning.

5. The detainee stated he traveled with the two Afghan men to Quetta, Pakistan, where he was taken to a compound containing Afghan refugees and Arab men who looked like fighters. The detainee was advised not to travel to Afghanistan, and his travel was arranged to Lahore, Pakistan.

b. Connections/Associations

DMO Exhibit 1  
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ISN 684

# UNCLASSIFIED

## **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF TAHANMATAN, MOHAMMED**

1. The detainee identified 16 other detainees who were with him at the guest house in Faisalabad, Pakistan, where he was captured.

2. The safe house in Faisalabad, Pakistan was used by a senior al Qaida operative.

3. A source stated the detainee was with the Jamaat al Tablighi group and went to Afghanistan for training.

4. The detainee stated he heard that two of his uncles are associated with Hamas. The detainee stated that his uncles are well known to Israeli authorities, and both have been arrested numerous times.

### c. Intent

The detainee stated he believes Christians and Jews are his enemies, and he must fight them, but he has not picked up any weapons to fight.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he has no connection to al Qaida or the Taliban, and has no knowledge of past or future terrorist attacks. The detainee stated he has no allegiance to any terrorist organization in the West Bank, such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization, Hamas, or Islamic Jihad. The detainee stated his father has had an ongoing feud with his uncles about their role with Hamas for about twenty years.

b. The detainee stated he does not support the use of suicide bombers, and does not believe that individual religious leaders are qualified to issue fatwas.

c. The detainee stated he was invited to go to Afghanistan for the purpose of tourism, which he accepted. The detainee stated he was not part of any opposition forces and went to Afghanistan believing he would stay away from the areas of fighting. The detainee stated he was asked to go to Afghanistan to fight the jihad. The detainee refused because he was not interested in jihad, but had considered going as a tourist.

d. The detainee stated he did not observe any weapons or hear any talk of fighting or of the Taliban while staying at the guest house in Faisalabad, Pakistan.

e. The detainee stated he does not want to return to Palestine because of the ongoing war with Israel. The detainee stated if he is given the opportunity to return to the Middle East, he would like to live in either Saudi Arabia in Mecca or Medina or in Doha, Qatar. The detainee stated he does not have any family there and the reason to return there is to pray and study Islam.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF TAHANMATAN, MOHAMMED**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

14 August 2006

TO: AZAK, ABDULLAH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AZAK, ABDULLAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. A source stated that he traveled in July 2001 from Khandahar, Afghanistan to Kabul, Afghanistan where he stayed at a guesthouse with the detainee.
    2. A source stated that the detainee was in Khowst, Afghanistan during Ramadan, 2001.
    3. A senior al Qaida operative stated that the detainee was in Birmal, Afghanistan after Ramadan, 2001 in the company of a senior al Qaida member.
    4. A senior al Qaida operative stated that the detainee proceeded him from Birmal, Afghanistan to Lahore, Pakistan.
    5. A senior al Qaida operative stated that the detainee moved from a safehouse in Lahore, Pakistan to a safehouse in Faisalabad Pakistan.
    6. The detainee was arrested on 28 March 2002 in a raid in Faisalabad, Pakistan.
    7. A senior al Qaida operative stated that the detainee was a member of his "Martyrs Brigade".
    8. The detainee stated that he departed Algeria in August 1994, for better job opportunities in al Jilat, Libya.

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000729

ISN 685

## UNCLASSIFIED

### SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AZAK, ABDULLAH

9. The detainee lied for a period of two years eight months prior to revealing his real name and actual place of birth.

10. The detainee stated that he returned to Algeria from Libya in December 1994 due to an unsuccessful job search.

11. The detainee stated that he traveled to Libya to work with a cousin in 1995.

12. The detainee claimed that he traveled to Pakistan in October 2001 to go to school to learn how to read and write.

13. The detainee claimed that he traveled by taxi from Al Jilat, Libya to Tunis, Tunisia, and flew to Damascus, Syria. The detainee spent one day in Damascus then flew Karachi, Pakistan.

14. The detainee claimed that two Afghans met him at the airport and he stayed with the Afghans for a week. After a week, they changed locations to the Afghan's other house, which was near the Afghanistan/Pakistan border, to be closer to the school.

15. The detainee claimed that he stayed at the house for two to three days then left because there was no school in the vicinity of the house. He then took a taxi to the Pakistan/Afghanistan border and then to Kabul, Afghanistan where there was a school for them to attend.

16. The detainee claimed that he stayed at this location for a month then crossed the border back to Pakistan on approximately 5 January 2002.

17. The detainee claimed that when he returned to Pakistan, he went to a house in Falisabad.

#### b. Training

A source stated that the detainee trained in the Khalden al Qaida training camp circa 1996/1997.

#### c. Connections/Associations

1. A senior al Qaida operative identified the detainee in a photograph as an individual named Usama al Jazairi.

2. When shown an unidentified photograph of the detainee, a source stated that the individual was an Algerian named Abu Usama al Jazairi.

## UNCLASSIFIED

### **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AZAK, ABDULLAH**

3. A senior al Qaida operative said that he met the detainee in 2000 in Afghanistan while the detainee was traveling with a senior al Qaida member.

4. A senior al Qaida operative stated that the detainee was at a house for the Khalden Camp people in Kabul on 11 September 2001 and celebrated after he heard about the attacks on the news.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. A senior al Qaida operative said the detainee spent some time in Sudan looking for jihad and perhaps farming, but he did not know if the detainee joined al Qaida.

b. The detainee stated that he never received training in Afghanistan.

c. The detainee denied any involvement with al Qaida.

d. A senior al Qaida member stated the detainee was not a member of al Qaida because they would not accept Algerians.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.



# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

22 August 2006

TO: HAKIM, ABDUL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HAKIM, ABDUL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. The detainee decided to join the Tabligh because he heard a lot about their mission in his mosque. The detainee did not want to officially become a member of the Tabligh but believed that by traveling with them to Pakistan, it would further his own goal of memorizing the Koran.
    2. Jama'at Tablighi is a Pakistan-based Islamic missionary organization which is believed to be used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists.
    3. The detainee flew from Sana'a, Yemen to Karachi Pakistan with a Tabligh group and then took a train to Lahore, Pakistan in order to study at the Rawand Religious Center.
    4. The Raywan Center is the world headquarters of the Tablighi movement.
    5. The director of the Raywand Religious Center told the detainee about the Salafia University in Faisalabad, Pakistan. The director told the detainee that many Arabs studied at the university and that the detainee might prefer life there.
    6. The detainee traveled with a group of fifteen to seventeen Pakistani men by a microbus from Lahore, Pakistan to Faisalabad, Pakistan.
    7. The detainee stayed at a guest house for several months while studying at Selafiya University. At times, there were 12 to 15 Arabs staying at the house.

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Page 1 of 3

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ISN 686

# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HAKIM, ABDUL**

b. Training

A senior al Qaida operative planner recalled seeing the detainee at al Farouq in summer 2001.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee advised that a local benefactor paid for his plane ticket to Pakistan.
2. Pakistan authorities arrested the detainee at a guesthouse with 17 other individuals.
3. According to a source, a senior Al Qaida operative was the director of the guest house.
4. One of the individuals arrested with the detainee was a primary weapons instructor at the Khalen training camp.
5. A source saw the detainee in Kandahar, Afghanistan. According to the source the detainee was a scholar and was very well respected by all the fighters. The source stated that Usama bin Laden used to travel to various places in Afghanistan in order to give speeches and have people swear bayat to him and the detainee used to travel with Usama bin Laden on the trips.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. 274,000 Afghanis, 15,000 Rupees in currency and one 7.62 round of ammunition were found on the detainee at the time of capture.
  2. When questioned about the Koran since the detainee had spent extensive time with the Tabligh group and was so committed to his religion, the detainee advised he only memorized the Koran and had no real idea about its meaning.
  3. The detainee has stated that he knew very little about the Koran or religion in general.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee advised that he went to Pakistan to study the Koran.
  - b. The detainee has denied being at the al Farouq training camp.
  - c. The detainee claims he has never received any type of military training.
  - d. The detainee claims he only went to Pakistan and never entered Afghanistan.

UNCLASSIFIED

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## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HAKIM, ABDUL**

- e. The detainee denied having ammunition in his possession when he was arrested.
  - f. The detainee considers the attacks on America unacceptable. The detainee believes the people who attacked the United States need to be captured and prosecuted.
  - g. The detainee's career plans once he is back in Yemen is to resume farming khat.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

000734

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

7 August 2006

TO: KARIM, ABDUL AZIZ

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KARIM, ABDUL AZIZ

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee traveled to Karachi, Pakistan by going through Jeddah, Saudi Arabia; Damascus, Syria; Tehran, Iran; and Lahore, Pakistan.

2. The detainee was arrested by Pakistani police during a raid on a guest house in Faisalabad, Pakistan and accused of being a Mujahed.

b. Training

1. A senior al Qaida operative stated that the detainee attended the Khaldan Camp in approximately 1997.

2. The Khaldan Training Camp was co-managed by senior al Qaida officials. The training program at Khaldan was six months in length and consisted of instruction in light weapons, heavy weapons, explosives, topography and tactics.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee, along with several of the individuals arrested with him in the guest house raid, were identified by a senior al Qaida operative.

DMO Exhibit 1  
Page 1 of 2

UNCLASSIFIED

000735

ISN 687

# UNCLASSIFIED

## SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KARIM, ABDUL AZIZ

2. While in Lahore, Pakistan, the detainee stayed at the Raywan Islamic Center for one month.

3. The Riwind Center in Lahore, Pakistan is the headquarters of the Jamat-al-Tabligh.

4. Jamat-al-Tabligh, a Pakistan-based Islamic missionary organization, was believed to be used as a cover for action by Islamic extremists.

### d. Intent

The detainee stated that justification for killing infidels is written in the Koran. The detainee also stated that Jews and Christians are enemies of Islam and should be dealt with as prescribed by the Koran. The detainee believes Usama bin Laden is a great man.

### e. Other Relevant Data

The detainee was captured with a Casio F-91W watch. This watch model has been used in bombings that have been linked to al Qaida and radical Islamic terrorists groups with improvised explosive devices.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001.

b. The detainee stated that if he were to be released, he would like to open a fruit store and perhaps get married and start a family.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

1 August 2006

TO: AKHMED, FAHI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AKHMED, FAHI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated that he was recruited in the community of Taiz, Yemen.

2. The detainee stated that he became a true Muslim at the hand of his recruiter.

3. The detainee stated that he traveled to Pakistan to attend a religious school in Faisalabad, Pakistan.

4. The detainee claimed that he was on the front lines in Afghanistan as a member of the Taliban and not al Qaida.

5. The detainee claimed that he served the Taliban by driving a truck supplying food and other supplies to the front line.

b. Connections/Associations

1. A Yemeni National recruited in Taiz, Yemen for the Taliban. (FN6)

2. The Yemeni National paid for travel and airline tickets to Pakistan and Afghanistan for individuals who attended al Farouq Training Camp in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

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ISN 688

## UNCLASSIFIED

### **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AKHMED, FAHI**

3. An individual stated that he knew the detainee from a training camp in Afghanistan.
4. A source identified the detainee as someone from the Afghanistan/Pakistan border.
5. Pakistani authorities captured the detainee at a guest house in Faisalabad, Pakistan.
6. A senior al Qaida operative stated that he knew the detainee from a guest house for trained Mujahedin.
7. A senior al Qaida operative stated that he met the detainee on two occasions. The first occasion was at a guest house in Afghanistan and the second was in Pakistan.
8. One of the guest houses where the detainee stayed at was used as a reception point for Mujahedin arriving in Afghanistan. It also facilitated travel to the front lines and the training camps. The guest house was also used as a storage and distribution facility for mortars and rifles.
9. An individual stated that the detainee was with him on the front lines in Afghanistan.

#### c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee claimed that his mother gave him 3,500 United States Dollars to travel to Pakistan and open a fabric store.
2. The detainee denied ever going to Afghanistan.
3. The detainee stated that while on the front lines in Bagram, Afghanistan he fought against the Northern Alliance and other Muslims, but not against the Americans.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
  - a. The detainee emphasized that he was not in al Qaida.
  - b. The detainee stated that if he found a wife he would have settled down in Afghanistan.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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**UNCLASSIFIED**  
**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy**  
**Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

16 August 2006

TO: AL HATABI, MOHAMMED AKHMED SALAM

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HATABI, MOHAMMED AKHMED  
SALAM

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated that at the end of May 2001, he traveled to Karachi, Pakistan. The detainee stated that a man he had met at a mosque in Taizz, Yemen had suggested the detainee go to Pakistan and had paid approximately 800 United States Dollars for the airline ticket.

2. The detainee stated that he met an individual in Karachi, Pakistan whose name the man at the mosque in Taizz, Yemen had provided. The detainee stated that he stayed three months in Karachi, Pakistan.

3. The detainee stated that the Jamaat Tablique paid for all his travels. The detainee stated that the individual he met in Karachi, Pakistan was part of Jamaat Tablique and paid for his lodgings in Karachi, Pakistan.

4. The detainee stated that he went to Faisalabad, Pakistan to study the Koran at the Salafi Mosque. The detainee stated that he was in Faisalabad seven to eight months when the Pakistan Army captured him.

5. A senior al Qaida member stated that he saw the detainee in early summer 2001 at al Qaida's Nibras guest house, where new students gathered before being transported to al Faruq for basic training.

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**UNCLASSIFIED**

**000739**

ISN 689



## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HATABI, MOHAMMED AKHMED SALAM**

6. The Niberas guest house was an al Qaida guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan and was used for new recruits who were on their way to the al Farouq Training Camp for basic training.

7. A senior al Qaida member stated that he saw the detainee in late summer 2001 at the Hasan guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan which was a guest house for trained Mujahedin.

8. The Hassan guest house was an al Qaida guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan, and was used for veterans of basic training who were either returning from al Farouq Training Camp or receiving more advanced training.

### b. Training

1. A senior al Qaida member stated that he saw the detainee in early summer 2001 at al Farouq Training Camp.

2. An individual stated that al Qaida funded the al Farouq Training Camp and that basic training at al Farouq consisted of two weeks of weapons training, two weeks of basic commando course, two weeks of topography, and two weeks of explosives.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that he had never stayed at the Hasan or Nibras guest houses.

b. The detainee stated that he went to Pakistan to get medical treatment for his sinuses and has never been to Afghanistan.

c. The detainee stated that he has no knowledge on anyone involved with al Qaida.

d. The detainee stated that he had never seen any al Qaida or Taliban members.

e. The detainee stated that he had nothing to do with the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States.

f. The detainee stated that if released he wanted to get married and possibly work in his father's store.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

5 November 2006

TO: QADIR, AKHMED ABDUL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF QADIR, AKHMED ABDUL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he left Yemen in approximately September 1999 and traveled to Pakistan to learn the Koran.

2. The detainee stated he spent three months in Quetta, Pakistan living at the Tabligh Mosque and planning to study the Koran.

3. The detainee stated that while in Karachi, Pakistan he met a man who agreed to assist the detainee to establish a relief organization in Afghanistan in return for employment in that organization. The detainee stated the two arrived in Kabul, Afghanistan in late September 1999, but the detainee remained there alone until approximately December 1999.

4. The detainee stated that he met and spoke to a member of al Wafa, an organization the detainee stated he was familiar with.

5. The al Wafa organization is on the United States Department of Homeland Security Terrorist Exclusion List. An organization on the Terrorist Exclusion List is known to support terrorist activity.

6. The detainee stated he traveled to Kabul, Afghanistan in September 2000 and met four Taliban fighters at a market. After two meetings at the detainee's house, the detainee stated he traveled with the fighters to the rear of the Taliban lines, where he stayed for two days before returning to Kabul, Afghanistan.

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ISN 690

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF QADIR, AKHMED ABDUL**

7. The detainee stated he left Quetta, Pakistan and returned to Afghanistan again, hoping to find employment with a humanitarian organization.

8. The detainee stated he visited the al Wafa office in Kabul, Afghanistan again to ask advice on starting the detainee's charitable organization.

9. The detainee has been identified as the person responsible for collecting passports and valuables at the Khana Gulam Bacha Guest House used by Taliban fighters in 1999.

10. The detainee stated he returned to the Taliban lines to join a group of Afghan fighters in October 2000.

11. The detainee stated he joined a group of Arab fighters on the Taliban lines in January 2001, and the detainee stayed for approximately eight months, until August 2001. The detainee also stated he was issued an AK-47 rifle.

12. A source identified the detainee as the person who was in charge of the Golam Pache Guest House in Kabul, Afghanistan. The source stated the detainee would get weapons for and arrange transportation for people staying at the guest house.

### b. Training

1. The detainee stated he was issued a loaded AK-47 on the Taliban lines and one week later was taught how to disassemble and shoot the weapon.

2. A source identified the detainee as a Yemeni who trained at al Farouq Camp in Afghanistan.

3. A source stated the detainee traveled to Afghanistan to receive military training using a cover story that the detainee had traveled to Pakistan to engage in religious studies.

### c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated he returned to Afghanistan and met three Taliban individuals who suggested that the detainee go to the front line to protect Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee also stated he was provided with a Kalashnikov AK-47 (rifle) and was driven to the front lines where he spent two days before returning to Kabul. The detainee stated he stayed one week in Kabul and then went back to the front for two and a half to three months. The detainee stated he was initially assigned with an Afghan group of soldiers who only spoke Pashtu, but was later transferred to a group of Arab fighters. The detainee stated he spent nine months on the front.

2. The detainee stated he traveled to a house in Faisalabad, Pakistan, where he stayed for approximately three months before the house was raided and where he was arrested.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF QADIR, AKHMED ABDUL**

3. A source stated the detainee knew Usama bin Laden personally and was authorized by Usama bin Laden to carry a special handgun.

4. The detainee has been identified as a guard at the Golam Pasha Guest House and as a bodyguard for Usama bin Laden.

5. A source reported that Ghulam Batsha was al Qaida's main guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan.

6. The detainee has been identified as the person who was in charge of securing the passports and documents taken from the al Farouq Training Camp attendees and guest house residents in Kabul, Afghanistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a. The detainee claimed he did not work for al Wafa.
- b. The detainee stated he did not receive any military training while in Afghanistan.
- c. The detainee stated the Taliban did not recruit him to fight, but did invite him to visit the back lines of Kabul, Afghanistan, and the detainee accepted the invitation.
- d. The detainee stated he never met anyone who was a member of al Qaida in Yemen.
- e. The detainee stated he did not have any knowledge of the 11 September 2001 attacks on the New York World Trade Center and Pentagon nor did he have information on future attacks against the United States.
- f. The detainee stated he had no idea that al Qaida was in Afghanistan until after he was captured. The detainee also stated he never heard anyone talk about al Qaida while he was in Afghanistan.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

19 August 2006

TO: ZARNUKI, MOHAMMED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ZARNUKI, MOHAMMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee met twelve Tabligh missionaries who encouraged him to become a missionary and go on a Tabligh with them.

2. Two months later, the detainee went to the al Huda Mosque, also known as al Dawa, in the village of al Hudayda. There, the detainee met a Sheik who also encouraged him to go on Tabligh.

3. Some al Qaida members had joined the al Dawa al Tabligh religious organization, which was well known for its support of jihadist causes. Al Dawa al Tabligh is most likely identifiable with the Jamaat al Tabligh, an Islamic missionary organization based in Pakistan and used to mask travel and activities of terrorists.

4. A source claimed to have seen the detainee on the Taliban front lines around late 1999 to early 2000.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee traveled via public bus to Lahore, Pakistan and went by taxi to the Raywand Mosque, which is about 20 kilometers outside of Lahore, Pakistan. For two months the detainee accompanied ten other missionaries, where they traveled from mosque to mosque.

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ISN 691

## UNCLASSIFIED

### **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ZARNUKI, MOHAMMED**

2. The detainee then joined a different group of 12 missionaries and went with them to Islamabad, Pakistan where they traveled for two months from mosque to mosque.

3. The day the detainee returned to the Raywand Mosque, he got his money and passport and traveled to Faisalabad, Pakistan and enrolled at the Salafeyah University. While attending this school, the detainee lived at an off-campus house with approximately 16 other students.

4. A source identified Raiwind, also spelled Raiwand, as the world center for the Jamaat Tabligh.

5. A source stated that the Jamia Salafia School taught the Sunni school of thought and was located in the city of Faisalabad, Pakistan. Only religious subjects were taught.

6. According to a senior al Qaida operative, he first met the detainee in early 1999 at an al Qaida village near the Kandahar, Afghanistan airport.

7. A source identified the detainee as being a member of al Qaida due to his association with the Kandahar, Afghanistan airport. The source claimed that it was well known that those individuals associated with the Kandahar, Afghanistan airport were automatically associated with being a member of Usama bin Laden's group.

8. A source identified Usama bin Laden's compound in Kandahar, Afghanistan called al Matar, which meant the airport.

9. A source identified al Farouq, al Matar and Aynak as the three al Qaida military training camps.

10. A senior al Qaida operative thought the detainee had already completed training in Kabul, Afghanistan by the time he met him in 1999. The al Qaida operative claimed that the detainee remained in Kandahar, Afghanistan for several months and then returned to Yemen in about the spring of 1999.

11. A senior al Qaida operative claimed that he next saw the detainee at Mes Aynak Camp in the fall of 1999. The detainee was not a student at Mes Aynak. Rather, the detainee served as a carpenter and was busy constructing structures on the base.

12. A source identified the detainee from a photo book as being in charge of a guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

13. According to a senior al Qaida operative, he first saw the detainee in Kabul, Afghanistan and the last time he remembered seeing him was in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The source claimed that the detainee spent a lot of time at an individual's house in Kabul, Afghanistan at the front lines.

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### **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ZARNUKI, MOHAMMED**

14. A source claimed that the house the detainee spent a lot of time in Kabul, Afghanistan was the house of the individual in charge of Usama bin Laden's personal security after the United States air strikes in Afghanistan.

15. A source identified the detainee as Gulaybib and stated that he met the detainee at a market in Kabul, Afghanistan and at the Afghanistan/Pakistan border.

16. A source knew the detainee as Julaibeeb and was among a group of Arabs traveling from Zurmat, Afghanistan to Bannu, Pakistan.

17. While attending the Salafeyah University, the detainee lived at an off-campus house run by a Pakistani. The detainee had been staying at this house for about one and a half months when the Pakistanis arrested everyone in the house.

#### c. Intent

An al Qaida operative identified the detainee as an attendee of a meeting at Kandahar, Afghanistan with Usama bin Laden, a senior al Qaida operative and about 25 other Yemeni and Saudi individuals. The meeting took place more than a month after the bombing of the USS Cole and they discussed attacking another ship or a plane that accompanied the ship.

#### d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee went to the Pakistan Embassy in Yemen twice to obtain a visa. Both times the detainee was denied and accused of being a terrorist.

2. The Huda Mosque's Sheik provided the detainee with a letter for the Pakistani Embassy identifying the detainee as a missionary so that he could obtain a visa.

3. A source stated that he had seen the detainee in a Kandahar, Afghanistan guest house in April or May of 2001. The guest house was simply known as the Arab House and is located in the Hajji Habash district of Kandahar, Afghanistan.

4. A source stated that the detainee led five prayers every other day. Then, the detainee would preach about jihad and recite verses from the Koran while in a guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

5. The same source claimed that the group then traveled to a school near Barmal, Pakistan. The school in Barmal was described as a madrassa that was owned and operated by Jamiat Ulema e Islami. The school was being used by many different groups of foreigners passing through Barmal on their way to Pakistan.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

## **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ZARNUKI, MOHAMMED**

6. The Jamiat Ulema e Islami is a radical Sunni religious-political party best known for its anti-United States threats, vocal support of Usama bin Laden and sponsorship of some 3000 religious schools.

7. When presented with the eye witness accounts placing him in Afghanistan over the period of about two years, the advised they were mistaken. However, when pressed about telling the truth, the detainee slipped when he said, "if I tell you the truth, you are just going to ask me about everywhere I have been".

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied he had ever traveled to Afghanistan.

b. The detainee denied having been on a Tabligh in the Lahore area with any of the men he lived with at the Aysa House.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.



# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

5 April 2006

TO: ALEH, ALI BIN ALI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALEH, ALI BIN ALI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee's decision to travel to Pakistan was driven by his desire to see Pakistan and pursue higher education. The detainee desired to study Salafia.

2. The detainee claims he left Yemen with the equivalent of 800 United States Dollars to purchase airfare and live on for the month he was in Pakistan.

3. The detainee moved to Issa's (Zubayda) guest house in Faisalabad, Pakistan.

4. The detainee stated that he stayed at Issa's guest house in Faisalabad, Pakistan for approximately four and a half months.

b. Connections/Associations

1. While the detainee was in Karachi, Pakistan an individual paid for the detainee's airline ticket to Lahore, Pakistan.

2. When the detainee arrived in Faisalabad, Pakistan he was met by Issa.

3. Five to seven days prior to the Pakistani raid on Issa's house in Faisalabad, Pakistan the detainee received 300 United States Dollars from Mohammed Abdul Rahman. Rahman asked the detainee to hold the money until he returned from Karachi, Pakistan.

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000748

ISN 692

# UNCLASSIFIED

## SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALEH, ALI BIN ALI

4. The detainee's alias was found on a listing of captured Mujahedin. This information was found on a hard drive, which was associated with Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (a.k.a. Mukhtar, a.k.a. al Mukh).

5. An individual identified the detainee as Bilal, a Yemeni whom he saw when he was being smuggled from Zurmat, Afghanistan to Banu, Pakistan.

6. An individual described a Madrasa operated by Jamiat Ulema-e-Islami in Barmal, Afghanistan, used by foreigners traveling to Pakistan. The detainee was a member of this individual's travel group at the Madrasa.

7. The Jamiat Ulema e Islami or "Assembly of the Scholars of Islam" is a radical Sunni Deobandi Religio-Political Party best known for its anti-U.S. threats, vocal support of Usama bin Laden, and sponsorship of some 3,000 religious schools, also known as Madrasas.

8. An individual stated that he might have seen the detainee at the border coming out of Afghanistan and entering into Pakistan. This individual knows the detainee's name as Bilal.

### c. Other Relevant Data

1. In Faisalabad, Pakistan the detainee was arrested at a guest house.

2. Ten other individuals were arrested along with the detainee in Faisalabad. The detainee describes all ten individuals as students.

### 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee claims that he will most likely not stay in touch with detainees that he has met here if he were to leave Cuba.

b. The detainee claims that he will return to Yemen when he is freed, study the Koran, learn English to teach Americans about the Koran, but never leave Yemen.

c. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the U.S. prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the U.S. or U.S. interests.

d. The detainee denied ever going to Afghanistan.

e. The detainee claims that he did not receive any military training while living in Pakistan.

f. The detainee denies being a member of the Taliban or al Qaida.

# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALEH, ALI BIN ALI**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

8 March 2006

TO: AHMED, ALI ABDULLAH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AHMED, ALI ABDULLAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

The detainee acknowledges that he quit his business; left his young wife behind; spent \$500 on a passport, visa, and ticket; and went to Pakistan with \$400 in his pocket. The detainee insists that nobody helped him financially in this endeavor. The detainee insists that once he arrived in Karachi, Pakistan (on an unspecified date), nobody met him at the airport. The detainee then spent seven days at an unidentified hotel that was one hour by car from the airport. After a week in Karachi, the detainee took a bus to Faisalabad, Pakistan where he was admitted to al Salafia University.

b. Training

A witness reviewed all photographs in a photo book and stated that he was familiar with the detainee from the witness's time in Kabul, Afghanistan, as well as the witness's time at Camp Khalden. This witness correctly identified the detainee in the photo book.

c. Connections/Associations

1. A senior al Qaida facilitator claimed that he first met the detainee at the Abu Suhaib guest house in Kandahar in spring 2000.
2. A senior al Qaida lieutenant commented on photographs of other detainees who were arrested during 28 March 2002 raids; the photographs were of detainees from the "Crescent

UNCLASSIFIED

DMO Exhibit 1  
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ISN 693

## UNCLASSIFIED

### **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AHMED, ALI ABDULLAH**

Mill" residence in Faisalabad, Pakistan. One of the photographs was of an individual who identified himself as Ali Abdalla Ahmed, a Yemeni national. The senior al Qaida lieutenant identified the person in the photo as someone he had met with Mukhtar in Kandahar, Afghanistan sometime before or after 11 September 2001. The witness said he could not remember the exact date.

3. The detainee identified individuals who were with him at al Salafia University, including eleven Yemenis, a Libyan, a Saudi, and a Palestinian. These people later moved with the detainee to the safe house of Issa. The detainee positively identified all of these detainees from pictures. The detainee moved with others to the safe house about three months before a raid by Pakistani police.

4. The detainee states that an unidentified person at the Jamia al Salafia told the detainee to go to Issa's house.

5. A witness looked at photos and recognized the detainee, a Yemeni, as one of those staying and captured at Issa's house near al Salafia University in Faisalabad, Pakistan.

6. A witness, after reviewing a photograph book, identified the detainee, a Yemeni, from a guest house in Faisalabad, Pakistan.

7. A witness identified fifteen individuals as residents of the Yemeni safe house. The detainee was one of those individuals identified as a resident of the Yemeni safe house.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. A witness was shown a photograph of the detainee, and the witness stated that the detainee is not the individual who was an instructor at the training camp in Kohtal.

b. The detainee denied ever knowing Abu Yasir or Abu Zabayda. The detainee denied ever being in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee stated he went to Pakistan to study the Koran and was not involved with the Taliban or al Qaida. The detainee said he was innocent. The detainee denied ever having stayed at the Abu Suhaib.

c. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

11 October 2006

TO: MAHJOUR, OMAR KHALIF MOHAMMED ABU BAKER

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MAHJOUR, OMAR KHALIF  
MOHAMMED ABU BAKER

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he has participated in activities against the Libyan president since he was eleven - twelve years old and was encouraged by his two uncles. The detainee joined the Libyan Salvation Movement in 1989 and was a member for approximately three years.

2. The detainee stated that he was recruited by his cousin to work for the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group in about 1994.

3. The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group is a terrorist organization that declared the government of Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi un-Islamic and pledged to overthrow it. Some members maintain a strictly anti-Qadhafi focus and organize against Libyan Government interests, but others are aligned with Usama bin Laden's al Qaida organization or are active in the international Mujahadin network.

4. The detainee stated he preached anti-Qadhafi sentiment in local mosques, at weddings, and on street corners. When the Libyan Security Service began to harass the detainee's family, the detainee moved and used sheep herding as a cover to continue Libyan Islamic Fighting Group operations.

5. The detainee stated he fled Libya in 1995 with a fake passport and was smuggled in a convoy to Sudan where he stayed at a house for Libyans for one month. The detainee found work overseeing Sudanese drivers for one of Usama bin Laden's transportation companies.

DMO Exhibit 1  
Page 1 of 4

UNCLASSIFIED

000753

ISN 695

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MAHJOUB, OMAR KHALIF MOHAMMED ABU BAKER**

6. The detainee stated while in Sudan he injured his legs and was hospitalized. The detainee's hospital expenses were paid by some members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. While he was recovering from his injuries the detainee lived in another Libyan house where he took weapons and explosives training.

7. The detainee stated while in Sudan he met an individual who provided the detainee with a visa and plane ticket to Pakistan. The detainee claimed he had originally planned to travel to Europe for political asylum, but due to travel restrictions from the Sudan, he was advised to first travel to Pakistan and then to Europe.

8. The detainee stated he spent one night in Pakistan at a house and then bought a ticket to Peshawar, Pakistan. The detainee was told to meet a Libyan in Peshawar. In Peshawar, the detainee rented a house for one year with a group of other males who were all trying to travel to Europe for political asylum. The detainee and others went to the home of a Libyan in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. The home belonged to the Jamal Islamic Fighting Group that was fighting against Muammar Khadafi. The detainee joined this fighting group.

9. A source identified the detainee as being on the front lines in late 1999 when the Taliban were fighting against the Northern Alliance near Afghanistan. The source stated that the detainee was brought in to clear mines so that the Taliban could advance. The detainee's right leg was cut off by one of the mines and he received medical treatment at a hospital.

10. Another source stated that approximately two weeks after 11 September 2001 the detainee and other fighters left the front lines and traveled to Kabul, Afghanistan where they stayed at a Libyan guesthouse.

11. The detainee had in his possession at the time of his capture a Casio F-91W electronic wristwatch.

12. The Casio model F-91W electronic wristwatch has been used in bombings that have been linked to al Qaida and radical Islamic terrorist improvised explosive devices.

13. Another source identified the detainee and stated that the detainee was with him on the front lines near Taloqan, Afghanistan, fighting the Northern Alliance in 2001. The detainee was identified as a military leader in charge of many Arabs from Saudi Arabia, Yemen and other Gulf States while on the front lines.

14. The detainee denies being at Taloqan, Afghanistan or any place north of Kabul, Afghanistan or Jalalabad, Afghanistan. The detainee claims he never fought the Northern Alliance or the Americans and that he had never been at the al Farouq Training Camp.

UNCLASSIFIED

000754

# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MAHJOUB, OMAR KHALIF MOHAMMED ABU BAKER**

## b. Training

1. The detainee stated he received training on Kalashnikov rifle, PK's, Doshka anti-aircraft weapons, grenades and pistols at a camp in Jalalabad, Afghanistan run by the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. The grenade training lasted one month. The detainee stated he observed a surface-to-air missile in a weapons storage area at this camp.

2. The detainee stated he attended the Jihad Wahl Training Camp in 1996 where he received explosives training and also took a course on heavy artillery. The detainee was also taught on planning attacks, setting up missions, organizing a resistance cell, leadership, politics and reasons for the success or failure of past jihad operations.

3. According to a source, the Jihad Wahl Camp was an al Qaida camp in the Khowst area of Afghanistan.

4. The detainee stated after Usama bin Laden visited Jihad Wahl, the detainee was placed in charge of a guard post behind the camp. The guard post had a 23mm cannon and an SA-7 anti-aircraft missile launcher. The detainee commanded five men during daylight hours and 20-30 men at night.

5. The detainee stated that he instructed explosives at the al Farouq Camp during the time he lived and worked at Jihad Wahl.

6. A source stated the al Farouq Training Camp was funded by al Qaida.

7. The detainee stated that trainees only went to Jihad Wahl for specialization in ambush techniques after receiving basic military skills at the adjacent al Sadiq Camp. The detainee worked in the carpentry shop inside the al Sadiq Camp, building props for ambush technique instruction at Jihad Wahl. The detainee also filmed Jihad Wahl training sessions.

8. A source stated he immigrated to Afghanistan in 1999 and was trained under the detainee at the Libyan camp near Kabul, Afghanistan.

9. The detainee stated he was in Afghanistan from 1998 to 2001, that he was a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and he was trained on the Kalashnikov rifle, pistol, rocket propelled grenade and anti-aircraft weapons.

UNCLASSIFIED

000755



# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MAHJOUR, OMAR KHALIF MOHAMMED ABU BAKER**

c. Connections/Associations

The detainee said he met Abu Musab Al Zarqawi on two occasions. The first time was at the Jalalabad, Afghanistan Libyan Islamic Fighting Group house in 2000. The detainee had an entire evening to speak with Zarqawi and came to the conclusion that he was a wise man. The second time, the detainee saw Zarqawi standing outside of Zarqawi's house in Kabul, Afghanistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer.

a. The detainee stated he has no problem with the United States and does not plan to use what he learned at the training camp to attack the United States.

b. The detainee denies having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans for future attacks on the United States or its interests.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceedings. The Assisting Military Office (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

13 June 2006

TO: ARIVIL, MIN GAZOV

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ARIVIL, MINGAZOV

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee served as a conscript in the Russian Military from 1986 to 1988 and then continued to serve voluntarily until 1996.

2. The detainee turned to Islam while he was still serving in the Russian Army.

3. In March 2000 the detainee decided to go to Afghanistan because believers there lived according to the laws of Shariat.

4. The detainee decided to leave his wife and son and travel to Afghanistan and Pakistan to pursue living in a pure Muslim state.

b. Training

1. The detainee attended Islamic Movement in Uzbekistan, a basic training camp called Akadem Gorodok, in a village near Dushanbe, Tajikistan.

2. Islamic Movement in Uzbekistan basic training consisted of battle drills, tactics, infantry weapons training, orienteering, survival training, mines and explosives familiarization, physical training and first aid.

3. The detainee spent two weeks at the Islamic Movement in Uzbekistan basic training.

DMO Exhibit 1  
Page 1 of 4

UNCLASSIFIED

000757

ISN 702

# UNCLASSIFIED

## **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ARIVIL, MIN GAZOV**

4. The detainee heard about recruitment for al Farouq training camp, so he went there to find out how the Arabs trained.

5. The al Farouq training camp was funded by al Qaida and therefore was more advanced than the other camps in Afghanistan.

6. The detainee received basic weapons training and physical fitness training while at al Farouq.

7. The detainee attended the camp at al Farouq for one month with 60 to 70 students and was present at the camp on 11 September 2001.

8. The detainee found out that there would be lessons on making explosive mixtures in the Kara Karga region. Since it was boring in Bagram, Afghanistan, and there wasn't anything to do, he decided to go out of curiosity. The lessons lasted for approximately two weeks, until the Americans started bombing and everyone headed to Pakistan.

9. Training at Kara Karga included how to make a formula bomb. Students were taught how to make explosives out of common items such as fertilizer and ammonia.

10. Instruction at Kara Karga also included lessons on how to make poisons that could be inhaled, swallowed, or absorbed through the skin. Poisons were made then tested on rabbits. While the rabbits got sick none of the students died.

### c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee then was transferred to the location of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in the central Tajikistan Taldar Ravine District.

2. The Islamic Movement in Uzbekistan is designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. During Operation Enduring Freedom, the Counter-Terrorism Coalition has captured, killed, and dispersed many of the Islamic Movement in Uzbekistan militants who were fighting with the Taliban in Afghanistan.

3. The detainee left the Islamic Movement in Uzbekistan due to poor living conditions and what he perceived as the Islamic Movement in Uzbekistan's anti-Islamic ideas and a mistrust of the detainee.

4. The detainee stayed at the Tablighi Islamic Center in Lahore, Pakistan from January 2002 to March 2002.

5. The detainee was identified as being at the Salafist University and as being a member of the Tablighi Organization.

UNCLASSIFIED

## UNCLASSIFIED

### SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ARIVIL, MIN GAZOV

6. On 12 March 2002 the detainee traveled by van from Lahore, Pakistan to an al Qaida safe house where Abu Zubaydah lived in Faisalabad, Pakistan.

7. The detainee was arrested in late March 2002 at the Crescent Mills, Faisalabad, Pakistan safe house with a number of suspected al Qaida members.

8. The detainee did not meet Usama bin Laden personally but was forced to attend his speeches on politics and religion even though he did not understand the language.

#### d. Intent

1. The detainee is familiar with the history of Afghanistan and believes that things became much better for the true Muslim nature of life after the Taliban came to power.

2. The detainee is a religious person that would fight for Islam.

3. When confronted by investigators who believed he was fighting in Afghanistan, the detainee stated that he may have been involved but there are some things in life that are so important that you must protect them at all cost.

4. The detainee refuses to say anything about his fellow detainees because they are fellow Muslims that have given him their last piece of bread even though they were starving.

5. The detainee has made numerous controversial statements to investigators including threatening to hit an investigator.

#### e. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee claimed that if he had wanted to fight he would have gone to Chechnya where it was closer and everybody speaks Russian.

2. The detainee has a loathing distaste for the Russian Government whom he considers to be the mafia.

3. The detainee does not want to go back to Russia. He wants to live in a nice country among Muslims. Once settled there he would bring his family to be with him.

4. The detainee is not pleased with the United States because of their lack of action in Chechnya to protest the Russian's genocide of Muslims.

5. The detainee said that the United States is supporting the Northern Alliance fighters who are killing innocent people.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ARIVIL, MIN GAZOV**

6. The detainee has offered to exchange information about criminal activity for United States or European citizenship.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee claims no knowledge of al Qaida or Taliban personalities or network.

b. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks.

c. The detainee recognizes the United States policies of freedom of religion and does not oppose the United States Government.

d. The detainee claims that he did not go to Afghanistan to fight.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

**UNCLASSIFIED**

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

16 June 2006

To: HUSSEINI, ABDALLAH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HUSSEINI, ABDALLAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he traveled to Afghanistan to fight jihad to make amends for the wrongs he committed.

2. The detainee was approached by members of Jamaat al Tablighi and they asked him to attend the al Nur Mosque in Hamburg, Germany. The detainee went to the mosque on three occasions, each time listening to the moderate preaching of Jamaat al Tablighi emirs.

3. The al Nur Mosque in Hamburg, Germany belongs to Jamaat al Tablighi.

4. The detainee went door-to-door with the Jamaat al Tablighi members for three days in Hamburg, Germany attempting to discuss Islam with people.

5. Jamaat al Tablighi is a Pakistan-based Islamic missionary organization used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists, including members of al Qaida.

6. While in Germany, the detainee listened to cassette tapes that encouraged jihad. The tapes discussed the Taliban, Chechnya and training camps in Afghanistan used to prepare for jihad.

7. The detainee and his girlfriend made plans to travel to Afghanistan under the guise of training for jihad but mostly to purchase inexpensive and easily accessible drugs. After watching some videotapes, the detainee contacted a jihad sympathizer and made travel arrangements for Afghanistan.

DMO Exhibit 1  
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UNCLASSIFIED

000761

ISN 703

## UNCLASSIFIED

### **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HUSSEINI, ABDALLAH**

8. In June 2001, the detainee purchased a fraudulent Belgian passport. A Jamaat al Tablighi member purchased a round trip plane ticket for the detainee to travel from Germany to Afghanistan and return to Germany approximately one month later.

9. The detainee decided to go and fight for only six months because he did not want to be a devout Muslim for the rest of his life. The detainee wanted to see if he could make money by bringing drugs back from Afghanistan.

10. On 3 September 2001, the detainee began his travels with 3,000 United States Dollars.

11. On 6 September 2001, the detainee flew from Karachi, Pakistan to Quetta, Pakistan. Upon arriving in Quetta, Pakistan, the detainee proceeded to the local Taliban Office as instructed by an al Qaida operative. The detainee was picked up by a Taliban driver and taken to the local Taliban Office in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee was taken to a small Taliban safe house where he remained for approximately four days.

12. The detainee volunteered to fight against the Northern Alliance.

13. The detainee was taken from Kandahar, Afghanistan to Kabul, Afghanistan where he stayed in a Taliban house for approximately four days.

14. The detainee stated several times that he was comfortable and happy where he was and he did not want any trouble. The detainee also referenced four razor blades he had hidden and told of how he had cut a man's throat. The detainee continued to state that he was comfortable and happy.

15. The detainee spent about two months near the front lines. The detainee claimed that he did not see close combat, but that the United States and Northern Alliance Air Forces bombed his position.

#### b. Training

1. The detainee entered the Algerian Army as a conscript in January 1979. The detainee served as a physical training teacher and weapons guard. The detainee received training on the Kalashnikov rifle, Semenov rifle and Dictaroff single-shot rifle.

2. On 11 September 2001, the Taliban took a group of approximately thirty individuals, to include the detainee, to the al Farouq Training Camp in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

3. The detainee was taken into the mountains outside the al Farouq Training Camp in Kandahar, Afghanistan, where he remained for approximately thirteen days. The detainee received training on the Kalashnikov rifle, rocket-propelled grenade and physical training.

UNCLASSIFIED

000762

# UNCLASSIFIED

## **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HUSSEINI, ABDALLAH**

4. The detainee went to Camp Nine in Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee received training for approximately 25 days in camouflage techniques, weapons and physical fitness. The detainee stayed at the Bayt Nazafah guest house, which was operated by the Taliban and able to hold up to 200 people.

5. The detainee did admit to training on weapons while at the al Farouq training camp in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee stated that he was formerly in the Algerian Army and had learned to use a number of the Russian weapons that were at the al Farouq training camp in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

### c. Connections/Associations

1. In February or March 2001, a Jamaat al Tablighi member gave the detainee fundamentalist tapes to listen to and persuaded the detainee that he needed to go to Afghanistan and participate in jihad to atone for his past sins.

2. One member of Jamaat al Tablighi, a Sunni Lebanese, came to the detainee's residence on two occasions and spoke of paradise. The Jamaat al Tablighi member gave Islamic lectures at the al Nur Mosque and had been studying Islamic laws in Syria in 2000. The Jamaat al Tablighi member also traveled to Kabul, Afghanistan in October 2001 and asked the detainee to return to Germany with him in October 2001, but the detainee refused.

3. The detainee was questioned regarding his association with a known al Qaida operative in Hamburg, Germany. The detainee first met the al Qaida operative at the Masjid al Atrak Mosque in Hamburg, Germany during Ramadan 2000. The Masjid al Atrak Mosque is a Turkish Mosque.

4. While in Bannu, Pakistan, the detainee came into contact with members of the Jamaat al Tablighi. The Jamaat al Tablighi took the detainee to Lahore, Pakistan.

5. While in Lahore, Pakistan, the detainee was placed in two al Qaida safe houses owned by Jamaat al Tablighi members.

6. The detainee was taken to a known al Qaida operative's safe house in Faisalabad, Pakistan. The detainee was captured at the al Qaida operative's safe house by Pakistani authorities and transferred to the control of the United States Government.

### d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee claims no knowledge of the al Qaida operations out of Hamburg, Germany that were involved in the 11 September 2001 attacks.

UNCLASSIFIED

000763



# UNCLASSIFIED

## **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HUSSEINI, ABDALLAH**

2. On 23 December 1996, the detainee was given a three-day pass from Dammtor Knass Prison in Hamburg, Germany. The detainee fled the country and traveled to Paris, France. While in Paris, France, the detainee was provided with a fraudulent French identification card under the name of Tassotti Giovanni.

3. The detainee re-entered Germany using the name Tassotti Giovanni in March 1997. The detainee was recaptured by German authorities in August 1997 and jailed thru July 1999.

4. The detainee stated on numerous occasions that his only intentions for traveling to Afghanistan were to obtain drug connections but appeared to hide his true intentions. The detainee stated if he wanted to fight, he would have stayed in the Algerian Military.

5. In December 2001, the Taliban began retreating from Bagram, Afghanistan. The detainee left the area and traveled to Gardez, Afghanistan and then Zormut, Afghanistan. The detainee remained in Zormut, Afghanistan during the month of Ramadan and then traveled to Bannu, Pakistan.

6. As of early August 2002, the nongovernmental organization al Wafa, headquartered in Saudia Arabia, was believed to have had connections to Usama bin Ladin and the Afghan Mujahedin according to a foreign government service.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a. The detainee stated that he has no ill feelings toward anyone or the United States.
- b. The detainee stated that he was aware he had made mistakes in the past and was willing to pay for these mistakes.
- c. The detainee stated that he had spent most of his life in jail or prison. The detainee hoped this would be his last detention. The detainee no longer wants to live a life of crime. The detainee wants to settle down with his family.
- d. The detainee stated that it was not his intention to fight with the Taliban.
- e. The detainee stated that he hoped his truthfulness would eventually allow him to be released so he could return to Germany.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

000764

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

27 June 2006

TO: HAMLILY, MUSTAFA AHMED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HAMLILY, MUSTAFA AHMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee left Algeria in search of work during 1987 when there was much political unrest in Algeria.

2. The detainee left Algeria and intended to travel to Makkah, Saudi Arabia. He traveled to Bamako, Mali and stayed there for several months. While there, he resided at a local mosque. From Mali, he traveled to Nouakchott, Mauritania and remained there for several months.

3. The detainee traveled from Mauritania to Jedda, Saudi Arabia. He then went to Mecca, Saudi Arabia and stayed there for several months living off charity. While in Mecca, the detainee went to Hiyat al Igatha, the Islamic Relief Organization, for assistance.

4. The detainee was able to find work with the Islamic Relief Organization while in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. The Islamic Relief Organization told the detainee that they had a job for him in Pakistan.

5. The detainee flew from Jedda, Saudi Arabia to Islamabad, Pakistan. Hiyat al Igatha employees met him. The detainee stayed there before traveling to Beshar, a village on the Pakistan/Afghanistan border, for training.

6. At the end of training, the detainee returned to Peshawar, Pakistan and began working for Hiyat al Igatha full time. He would assist in preparing packages of relief supplies to be taken to the people of Afghanistan.

DMO Exhibit 1  
Page 1 of 3

UNCLASSIFIED

000765

ISN 705

## UNCLASSIFIED

### **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HAMLILY, MUSTAFA AHMED**

7. In 1988, the detainee stopped working with Hiyat al-Igatha and began working for Hya Assuna Laytam School in Peshawar, Pakistan as a deliveryman. The detainee worked for this school until approximately 1990.

8. In 1991, the detainee flew from Pakistan to the capital of Algeria due to favorable government conditions. The political situation in Algeria worsened, and the detainee left Algeria and traveled to Tunisia and then to Tripoli, Libya.

9. The detainee traveled to Karachi, Pakistan and then to Peshawar, Pakistan. He found a job with Mecktamir, which is a Saudi organization that made furniture.

10. In 1994, the detainee left Pakistan and traveled to Yemen. The detainee worked for a construction company based in Sanaa, Yemen. In 1997, the detainee left Yemen and returned to Peshawar, Pakistan. He then moved to Afghanistan in 1998. From 1998 through 2001, the detainee sold honey.

11. After two months in Pakistan, the detainee got in contact with an individual from Jalalabad, Afghanistan who could help the detainee and his family get set up in Afghanistan to live. The Taliban gave the detainee a house outside of Jalalabad, Afghanistan to live with his family.

12. The detainee worked for the al Waffa organization between June and August 2001.

13. The detainee ran the Kandahar, Afghanistan office of al Wafa in the absence of the regular director.

14. In September 2001, the al Wafa organization closed. The detainee returned to Peshawar, Pakistan and prepared to return to Algeria. The detainee was arrested at his home on 28 May 2002.

#### b. Training

1. The detainee took light and heavy weapons familiarization training but only fired the Kalashnikov.

2. The training camp lasted approximately two weeks.

#### c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was part of the Chaabani network. The detainee's specialization was forging documents. The Chaabani network was an extremist network that was activated and financed by Usama bin Laden.

## UNCLASSIFIED

### **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HAMLILY, MUSTAFA AHMED**

2. The detainee's name was found on a computer that was associated with an al Qaida operative among a list of names of captured Mujahedin.

3. The detainee stayed in a Usama bin Laden guest house in Saudi Arabia in 1987.

4. The detainee was arrested in his residence in Peshawar, Pakistan by Pakistani police. At the time of the arrest, the detainee had a member of the Lashkar-e-Tayba terrorist organization living with him.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee has a very good opinion of America and, if offered, said he would gladly live there.

b. The detainee has no idea why people would dislike the United States. Everyone the detainee knows either liked the United States or wanted to go there.

c. The detainee claimed that al Wafa did not have any ties to the Taliban or al Qaida.

d. The detainee claimed to be completely unaware of any extremist activities linked to Wafa, although he conceded that his work responsibilities in Kandahar, Afghanistan did not give him a complete picture of the activities therein.

e. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001.

f. The detainee denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

g. The detainee denied any knowledge or planning of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo Bay, Cuba detention facility.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

14 November 2006

TO: MUHAMMED, ZAMIR

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MUHAMMED, ZAMIR

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee states he was pushed by friends to train and fight against the communist forces of Najibullah in Afghanistan in 1990. After a wealthy livestock owner from Port Sudan gave the detainee 700-800 United States Dollars, the detainee flew to India via Kenya then took a train into Pakistan followed by a bus into Afghanistan.

2. The detainee was a primary weapons instructor at the Khalden Training Camp near Khowst, Afghanistan where he was in contact with many members of al Qaida leadership in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

3. The detainee stated he served as a weapons trainer at Camp Khalden in Afghanistan for approximately six to seven months in 1997. The detainee trained personnel on the use of the following weapons: PKs, Kalashnikov rifles, RPGs, RPKs, mortars and artillery. Instruction included assembly and disassembly of weapons, operations of the weapons and controlling fields of fire.

4. The detainee stated he lived and worked at Khaldan Training Camp from 1996 until sometime in 2000.

DMO Exhibit 1  
Page 1 of 3

UNCLASSIFIED

000768

ISN 707

# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MUHAMMED, ZAMIR**

## b. Training

1. The detainee stated he arrived at Khalden Camp in 1994 where he was trained on the Kalashnikov rifle, PK machine gun, 75 and 82 mm heavy artillery, SPG-9 anti-tank weapon, 82 mm mortar, Zukair anti-aircraft weapon, RPG launcher and mountain warfare. The detainee then trained hundreds of recruits on the use of small arms and artillery until 1999.

2. The detainee received a two-month training course on electronic firing devices taught in 1998. The training included electrical theory and basic electronic circuitry, simple remote control firing devices, timers and photocell firing devices. The detainee was expected to train other Mujahedin on electronics after the course.

## c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee attended a meeting with several individuals, including senior al Qaida operatives and several other weapons and mountain warfare trainers, where they were informed that the Taliban government did not want to re-open Camp Khalden. Camp Khalden was formally deactivated in July 2000.

2. The detainee stated he traveled to Kabul, Afghanistan after the Khalden Camp closed in 1999. During the detainee's stay there, he met two senior al Qaida operatives, one of which he had frequent contact with. The detainee stayed in Kabul until shortly before it was liberated by the Northern Alliance forces in late 2001. The detainee then fled to Bannu, Pakistan, where a senior al Qaida operative was waiting for him. The group continued to Lahore, Pakistan, and then to Faisalabad, Pakistan, where the detainee was captured.

3. The detainee stated he was at a senior al Qaida operative's house when he was captured.

4. The detainee worked among Usama bin Laden's guards and was important within al Qaida.

5. The detainee advised that he met Usama bin Laden and Abu Haffs, while he was at the Jihad Wahl Camp to gain assistance with the operation of a radio purchased for Camp Khalden.

6. The detainee stated he was the 70th Taliban commander.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he is not a fighter and does not believe in fighting nor does he agree with the fatwa issued by Usama bin Laden calling for violence against America.

b. The detainee stated he never swore allegiance to al Qaida, the Taliban, Usama bin Laden or any other individuals or groups.

# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MUHAMMED, ZAMIR**

c. The detainee stated he felt as if he was being accused of al Qaida and he is not a member of al Qaida and has no knowledge of al Qaida's operations.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

000770

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

1 May 2006

TO: ALI BAKUSH, ISMAEL ALI FARAJ

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALI BAKUSH, ISMAEL ALI FARAJ

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated in 1991, while in Saudi Arabia, he decided to travel to Afghanistan to help support the Mujahedin.

2. The detainee, during the first half of 1993, joined the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.

3. The detainee stated that he went to Afghanistan to help the Taliban fight the Northern Alliance.

4. The detainee is committed to the overthrow of Mummar Khadaffi's government.

b. Training

1. In Afghanistan the detainee attended the Kun Saiaf camp. He trained on light weapons.

2. The detainee received training at the al Ghanad camp in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

3. The detainee specialized in electronics, energy, and conductive circuits, and was considered an expert with explosives.

4. During 1993 the detainee received security training under the supervision of Pakistani Intelligence in the village of Sher/Khan in Balusistan, Pakistan.

c. Connections/Associations

DMO Exhibit 1  
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UNCLASSIFIED

000771

ISN 708



# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALI BAKUSH, ISMAEL ALI FARAJ**

1. The detainee was a member of the military committee of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.
2. At the end of 1994 the detainee left Afghanistan and traveled to Pakistan where he stayed for ten days while in route to Sudan.
3. The detainee traveled to Sudan in an attempt to enter Libya through the desert.
4. In 1997 the detainee was arrested by the Sudanese government and told to leave the country. The detainee flew to Damascus, Syria where he was subsequently arrested for being a spy for Israel.
5. He was released by the Syrian government and traveled to Zarka, Jordan where he stayed for three to four months with members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.
6. The detainee then traveled from Jordan through Pakistan to Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
7. While in Afghanistan the detainee stayed in a safe house owned by the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.
8. In 1999 the detainee and four other Libyan Islamic Fighting Group members moved to Kabul and stayed in the town of Wazeer Akbar Khan. This is a neighborhood for Arabs in Kabul.

#### d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee and his group would fight sporadically whenever there was a fight between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance.
  2. In Saudi Arabia he was arrested for assaulting a woman and did not return to Libya during that time.
  3. The detainee fought against the Najeeb Allah government until it collapsed. He then returned to Torkhum where he remained until 1994.
  4. The detainee's name was found on a hard drive that was associated with al Qaida.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee stated that the reason he decided to help fight with the Taliban was because he lived in Afghanistan both prior to Taliban control and after Taliban control. Prior to Taliban control there were robberies, thefts, and fights between groups. After the Taliban took over the area became safe.

UNCLASSIFIED

000772

# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALI BAKUSH, ISMAEL ALI FARAJ**

- b. While in Afghanistan the detainee had never met bin Laden.
  - c. Prior to the events of 11 September 2001 the detainee said he had no feelings towards the United States and considered the United States like any other country. His main concern is Libya and the overthrow of Khadaffi.
  - d. The detainee claimed that at no time did he conduct any operations against the American Forces.
  - e. He stated that he differentiates between the Taliban and al Qaida. He considers the Taliban a state, while he sees al Qaida as an organization, like his own.
  - f. The detainee stated only God knows why his name is on the hard drive.
  - g. He relates that he does not blame anyone for his current situation and it is a result of his own personal struggle. He further related that he never swore allegiance to any extremist groups.
  - h. The detainee advised that he would like to be released to a non-Arabic country. He has a problem with how the Libyan government treats Muslims and believes the government of Libya would not treat him well if he returned.
  - i. He stated that he would like to find a wife and start a family. He would work in any job that would allow him to support his family.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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000773

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

29 September 2006

TO: MUTI ZAHRAN, MOHAMMED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MUTI ZAHRAN, MOHAMMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee served as a fighter against the Northern Alliance.
2. The detainee stated he is committed to the idea of jihad and that his mission is to fight as a soldier of god against other soldiers.
3. The detainee stated he decided to go fight jihad after a fatwa was issued declaring that jihad should be waged against Americans.
4. The detainee stated he is honored, as a man, to belong to al Qaida.
5. The detainee approached a jihad facilitator to join and facilitate his travel arrangements to Afghanistan.
6. The detainee admitted to being proud that he was a low-level Taliban fighter.
7. The detainee stated he was proud that he came to Afghanistan to be a Mujahedin, and stated that if he had not lost his leg, he still would have fought.

b. Training

1. The detainee attended Khalden Training Camp in Afghanistan where he received pistol training.

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000774

ISN 713

## UNCLASSIFIED

### SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MUTI ZAHRAN, MOHAMMED

2. The detainee stated he attended the al Farouq Training Camp and received training in anti-aircraft weapons.

3. The detainee stated he attended an Algerian house in Afghanistan and received RPG and firearms training.

4. The detainee stated he was trained on numerous light weapons systems to include Kalashnikov rifle, hand grenades, rocket propelled grenades, anti-personnel mines, and light machine guns at an Algerian guest house.

5. The detainee stated he was personally trained by a senior al Qaida operative in the use of small arms at the Algerian guest house.

6. The detainee stated he attended a six month explosives training course at a guest house in an Algerian neighborhood.

7. The detainee stated he received specialized task dependent explosives training at a guest house.

8. The detainee stated he fought on the front lines in Afghanistan and continued his training using manuals and actual enemy contact.

9. The detainee stated that he attended sniper training.

10. The detainee stated he was trained by a senior al Qaida operative on explosives, battlefield tactics and enemy territory infiltration.

11. The detainee stated he was trained how to turn a radio into an improvised explosive device.

12. The detainee stated that as an al Qaida member he attended an advanced explosives training course in the mountains of Afghanistan.

13. The detainee stated he attended special nighttime training camps in Afghanistan.

14. The detainee stated that he and Abu Abbassi al Janubi, one of the 11 September 2001 hijackers, trained for nighttime combat in Afghanistan.

15. The detainee stated he was trained in the use of codes and communications equipment.

16. The detainee received training on the use of mobile, fixed, and wireless battlefield communications systems.

## UNCLASSIFIED

### SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MUTI ZAHRAN, MOHAMMED

17. The detainee stated he attended an al Qaida special operations training with one of the 11 September 2001 hijackers and was there for approximately 18 months.

18. The detainee received specialized training that included kidnappings and assassinations, bombings, poisons, weapons training and suicide missions.

19. The detainee stated he received training to perform attacks from moving cars and motorcycles during darkness.

20. The detainee was also trained in assassinations, rappelling, hand-to-hand combat, and the use of video simulation.

21. The detainee stated he attended an electrical technician's school to learn how to carry out attacks by means of explosions.

22. The detainee stated that he was specially selected to attend an advance explosive training course because he attended previous explosives training.

#### c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee knew one of the 11 September 2001 hijackers and they studied the Quran, jihad, and law together in Saudi Arabia.

2. The detainee stated he was friends with an 11 September 2001 hijacker.

3. The detainee stated that he met with an initial al Qaida screener and made arrangements to travel to Afghanistan to begin the al Qaida screening process.

4. The detainee stated he met al Zhawahiri three or four times and they had a very good relationship.

5. The detainee stated that once he became involved with al Qaida, he met regularly with multiple senior al Qaida leaders.

6. The detainee stated he met with Abu Musab al Zarqawi several times about logistics and personnel issues for the fight against the Northern Alliance.

7. The detainee stated he swore the third level of bayat to Usama bin Laden. The third level of bayat is called the bayat of death and it is a commitment for life.

#### d. Intent

1. The detainee stated he still remains loyal to al Qaida.

# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MUTI ZAHARAN, MOHAMMED**

2. The detainee stated America is ruled by the Jews, therefore Israel and America are his enemies.

3. The detainee stated he asked Muslim leaders and religious scholars about jihad training in Afghanistan.

4. The detainee used postal mail with hidden ink and sent faxes from bookstores to communicate with his classmate, one of the 11 September 2001 hijackers. This was done when discussing jihad and to avoid detection by a Foreign Government Service.

5. The detainee stated he wanted to participate in jihad while attending Islamic studies courses.

e. Detainee Actions and Statements

1. The detainee provided training on infiltration techniques and clandestine reconnaissance missions.

2. The detainee stated he was involved in the planning for the assassination of Northern Alliance leader Ahmad Shah Masoud.

3. The detainee stated he participated in surveillance missions to plan the assassination of an Afghanistan commander.

4. The detainee stated that he joined al Qaida because he respected the organization as a group and its individual members.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that he doubted the viewpoints of al Qaida because some of their operations contradict Islamic principles and go against Islamic laws.

b. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests. The detainee was queried regarding any knowledge or planning of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo Detention Facility, with negative results

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

22 November 2006

TO: BIN HADIDDI, ABDUL HADDI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BIN HADIDDI, ABDUL HADDI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. In early 2000 the detainee obtained a Pakistani visa for travel to Karachi, Pakistan with assistance from the Tablighi Jamaat.

2. The detainee was given plane fare and travel expenses to Pakistan by Tablighi Jamaat.

3. The detainee stayed six weeks at a mosque in Peshawar, Pakistan.

4. The detainee was identified as a known al Qaida associate.

b. Training

The detainee reportedly trained at al Qaida camps in Afghanistan.

c. Connections/Associations

1. In November-December 1999 the detainee encountered the Tablighi Jamaat, who convinced the detainee to abandon his wayward lifestyle and return to his Muslim roots.

2. The Tablighi Jamaat organization has been supporting Islamic terrorist groups in South and Southeast Asia under the cover of conducting religious activities. The group is closely aligned with other Pakistani terrorist organizations and the al Qaida network.

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UNCLASSIFIED

000778

ISN 717

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BIN HADIDDI, ABDUL HADDI**

3. The detainee is known to have provided logistical support to terrorist organizations. The detainee had charges of manufacturing false documents, trafficking counterfeit currency and weapons possession in support of terrorist organizations.

4. In August 2004 the detainee was on the Pakistan, Afghanistan border and was in telephone contact with a known member of a terrorist organization. The member informed the detainee that he had sent the detainee a package via airmail to a Pakistan address.

5. The two French passports found during a search of the detainee's apartment in Italy belonged to two individuals who were wanted for serious crimes in France and who were later arrested in Bosnia.

#### d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee is believed to be involved in a support network for the Algerian Armed Islamic Group. The support network was accused of terrorist support, specializing in document forgery and counterfeit of currency.

2. The Armed Islamic Group is designated a foreign terrorist organization by the United States Department of Homeland Security. The Armed Islamic Group is described as an Islamic extremist group whose aim is to overthrow the secular Algerian regime and replace it with an Islamic state.

3. In June 1998 a warrant for the detainee's arrest was issued on charges of being a member of a radical Islamic support network that support terrorism.

4. Approximately 1999 the detainee was charged for having promoted, constituted, organized and directed an association to conduct violent terrorist acts against democratic institutions.

5. On 20 February 1999 the detainee was sentenced, in absentia, by the Permanent Military Tribunal of Tunis to ten years in prison, without possibility of review, for belonging to a terrorist organization active on foreign soil in times of peace. Several warrants against the detainee were issued by the Tunisian Department of National Security.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denies any affiliation with the extremist network in Bologna, Italy, or in any plot against Tunisia.

b. The detainee admitted that he agreed to travel with the Tablighi Jamaat, but claimed within two weeks he found them too strict. The detainee then abandoned the Tablighi Jamaat mission and went his own way.



# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BIN HADIDDI, ABDUL HADDI**

- c. The detainee denied any participation in military training.
  - d. The detainee denied any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001. The detainee also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

000780

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

27 March 2006

TO: AL HASSAN, MUSTAFA IBRAHIM MUSTAFA

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF  
AL HASSAN, MUSTAFA IBRAHIM MUSTAFA

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. The detainee traveled to Malaysia and Thailand in August and September 2001 on a business trip to attempt to buy clothing for resale in Sudan.
    2. The detainee took approximately \$2,000 with him and ended up spending it all just on living expenses. The detainee met a Sudanese in Malaysia, a teacher, whom he stayed with for a few days and then he visited a couple of mosques in Malaysia, but does not remember their names.
    3. During the detainee's visit to Malaysia, he also crossed the border to the capital of Thailand. The detainee then returned to Sudan and did nothing, except make preparations for travel to Afghanistan.
    4. The detainee could not produce the name of the hotel where he stayed, the detainee gave two non-descript first names of Sudanese students he stayed with and could not name any of the shops or persons he visited during the entire trip.
    5. After hearing of the situation in Afghanistan between the Taliban and another Muslim faction and the requests for assisting the Taliban in their moment of need, the detainee made a decision to help the Taliban and travel to Pakistan and then to Afghanistan.

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UNCLASSIFIED

000781

ISN 719

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HASSAN, MUSTAFA IBRAHIM MUSTAFA**

6. The detainee was asked his purpose in traveling to Afghanistan for jihad. He responded that jihad is a part of the Islamic faith and as such, it was his duty as a Muslim to respond when the dispute is between Muslims.

7. The detainee said it is normal, when you hear Americans are killing innocent people, to fight. The United States came into war against two Muslim factions, then the United States is considered the enemy.

8. The detainee departed Khartoum on 30 December 2001 and transited to Damascus, Syria, where he stayed four to five days before going on to Karachi, Pakistan.

9. The detainee was traveling from Peshawar, Pakistan to Afghanistan when the Pakistanis in Parachinar arrested the detainee before crossing the border. At the time of his arrest, the detainee was wearing a burka to disguise himself as a woman.

10. The detainee claimed that in late November or early December 2001, during a visit to the al Kabeer mosque or great mosque in Khartoum, Sudan, the detainee became engaged in conversation with a man regarding the war in Afghanistan. Being convinced that the United States was intentionally attacking/killing innocent Muslim women and children, the detainee conveyed to this man his desire to perform jihad.

### b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was introduced to Sudanese national at the market of Libya mosque. The detainee said he never had a means to contact the Sudanese national, all meetings being prearranged in advance. Over a two-week period, the Sudanese obtained for the detainee a Pakistani visa and a ticket to Syria. The detainee also received from the Sudanese national 1,500 United States Dollars to purchase his ticket from Syria to Pakistan and other travel costs.

2. The detainee traveled with three other men who aspired to travel to Afghanistan for jihad, from Karachi to Peshawar, Pakistan via train. They were told in Karachi, that when they arrived in Peshawar, they needed to travel to the Pakistani center that assists Muslims who aspire to fight jihad.

3. The detainee was captured with three other men. The detainee stated that a well-known facilitator tried to help smuggle them across the border.

4. The detainee contacted a director of an organization in Pakistan, to assist them to travel to Afghanistan for the jihad.

### c. Intent

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HASSAN, MUSTAFA IBRAHIM MUSTAFA**

During debriefings conducted by the police, the detainee denied he was going to Afghanistan to participate in jihad. It was only after a traveling companion admitted to being a jihadist that the detainee changed his story.

### d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated that he was placed in isolation for twenty days for participating in a revolt with the other detainees. The detainee said that it was natural for the detainees to revolt when Military Police (MP) who are non-Muslim searched their Korans.

2. The detainee mentioned that there had been promises about food that were not kept and that was the reason that many of the detainees were on hunger strike. The detainee stated that the reason he was on hunger strike was that the food generally did not agree with his stomach, so he decided to go on strike with the rest.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee has never been trained on the use of explosive devices and has not seen any. The detainee has not heard of any plans to blow up places.

b. The detainee does not have any kind of animosity towards Americans or non-Americans. The detainee feels that it is unjust for someone to arrest you and keep you for more than a year.

c. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

d. The detainee was queried regarding any knowledge or planning of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo Detention Facility, with negative results.

e. The detainee was asked if he would be willing to go on a martyr mission such as that of the 11 September 2001 attack. The detainee did respond, stating that he did not believe in killing innocent people, and that he does not believe in martyr missions.

f. The detainee said he has nothing to do with the al Qaida. The detainee said he would never fight for anybody or an organization and Muslims fight for God only.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

14 April 2006

TO: YAKOUB MOHAMMED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF YAKOUB MOHAMMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated that when he was in Afghanistan the first time in 1991 for the jihad against the Russians, he belonged to a group called Jamaat al Dawa al Quran Wa Sunnah.

2. In March 1991 the detainee received airline tickets to go fight in the jihad against the Russians in Afghanistan. The detainee traveled from Khartoum, Sudan to Nairobi, Kenya. The detainee then traveled from Nairobi to Bombay, India. From Bombay, the detainee traveled to Delhi, India. From India, the detainee traveled to Lahore, Pakistan. From a guest house he traveled to a village called Bajour, Pakistan. From Bajour, the detainee was taken with 10 other individuals by pickup trucks to the capital of Konar, Afghanistan where he received military training.

3. Along his route, the detainee traveled to the Bayt Dhiyafa al Mujahid guest house, which was run and operated by the Jamaat al Dawa al Quran Wa Sunnah organization.

4. The Jamaat al Dawa al Quran is a militant religious group. Its university is oriented toward radical Islam, specifically the Salafi/Wahabi movements. In approximately 1997, the training camp was moved to Kashmir where it is being run by the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, a radical wing of Markaz a Dawa, which has significant interest in the Kashmir issue.

5. The Lashkar-e-Tayyiba is the armed wing of the Pakistan-based religious organization Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal-irshad, a Sunni anti-United States missionary organization formed in 1989. The Lashkar-e-Tayyiba is one of the three largest and best-trained groups fighting in Kashmir against India.

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000784

UNCLASSIFIED

ISN 720

## UNCLASSIFIED

6. The detainee was sent to the front lines to fight the Afghan Communist government for six months.

7. In 1993 the detainee began to associate more with members from Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal-irshad, which had historical ties to the local Jamaat al Dawa al Quran Wa Sunnah organization. The detainee joined Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal-irshad in their jihad to retake Kashmir from Indian control.

8. In February 2002 the detainee traveled from Khartoum, Sudan to Damascus, Syria. After three days, the detainee traveled through Doha, Qatar to Lahore, Pakistan. The detainee then went to Peshawar, Pakistan.

9. The detainee claims he went to Afghanistan to fight jihad against the occupiers of Afghanistan to include the Americans. The detainee claims he believed the heavy influence by the media that stated the Americans were trying to take the land away from the Muslims.

### b. Training

1. After two days at a guest house, the detainee departed in a mini-bus with some 25 other Arabs to the Afghan border and the Jamaat al Dawa al Quran Wa Sunnahin military training camp. For one month, the detainee trained on the use of Kalashnikov rifles, M-16 rifles, rocket-propelled grenades, 82-mm mortars, and an old piece of Soviet artillery.

2. The detainee was given limited classes on the T-54 tank; however, he was not able to operate the tank.

### c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee found the details of how to join Jamaat al Dawa al Quran Wa Sunnah from a Sudani veteran Mujahedin.

2. The detainee was a member of the Jamaat al Dawa al Quran Wa Sunnah non-governmental organization from 1991 to 1996.

3. En route to Afghanistan for jihad, the detainee visited a mosque in India where he misrepresented himself as someone interested in volunteer service with the Jamaat Tablighi in Pakistan. With this cover, he was able to secure a visa from the Pakistani Embassy.

4. Jamaat Tablighi is a Pakistan-based Islamic missionary organization used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists, including members of al Qaida.

5. After leaving the front lines in 1991, the detainee met Abu Ikhlas al Masri. The detainee worked with al Masri for approximately one year. In early 1994, the detainee spent approximately two additional years with Abu Ikhlas al Masri.

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6. Abu Ikhlas al Masri was identified as a close aide to al Qaida organization leader Usama bin Laden. Al Masri trained Arabs, Pakistanis, Chechnyans, and other newcomers at the camps in Paktia, Konduz, Nangarhar, and Rujar. Al Masri is believed to be one of the most skilled experts at making bombs and explosive devices and the author of a number of military books.

7. Abu Ikhlas al Masri ran an insurgent base in the Konar Province, Afghanistan.

8. Abu Ikhlas al Masri is an Egyptian extremist wanted for the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat.

9. A facilitator in Sudan obtained Pakistani visas and airline tickets for the detainee and a friend. The facilitator gave 1500 United States Dollars to the detainee for travel and expenses.

10. The detainee moved around with other individuals for a month in Peshawar. They spent time in five different houses. From the last house the detainee and three individuals left in a group. The driver of the vehicle made the detainee wear a burqa to facilitate travel and because of the detainee's dark skin.

11. The detainee identified one of the individuals he was captured with at the Afghan/Pakistan border. The detainee said the other person was traveling to Afghanistan to fight the jihad.

#### d. Other Relevant Data

1. The four people with the detainee were loaded into a mini-bus. Due to the fact that false documentation could not be procured, the Arabs were instructed to dress in women's clothing with full head covering. At the final checkpoint, the group encountered a female Pakistani military officer. When the disguised Arab men were required to lower their head coverings for the female officer, the Arab men were discovered and detained.

2. A foreign government service indicated that on 19 March 2002 the detainee and three other foreigners were detained on the border as they attempted to possibly enter Afghanistan. The foreign government service officer said he suspects the four are connected with al Qaida.

3. The detainee was identified as the person with the idea to go to Bara, Pakistan. The detainee procured the burqas and brought the driver of the hired car who then drove the four out of Bara.

4. The detainee was transferred to United States custody in Kandahar, Afghanistan after approximately eight weeks in Pakistan custody.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee said he detested the events of 11 September 2001. He mentioned that a true Muslim would never act or have participated in this kind of terrible act.

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b. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001. He also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

c. The detainee bears no grudge against America and claims he was rash in his decision to go to Afghanistan for jihad in 2002. He claims he did not realize the United States was fighting in conjunction with the Northern Alliance to punish the Taliban for harboring terrorists like Usama bin Laden. The detainee has no tolerance for Usama bin Laden and people that kill innocents and spread fear behind Islam.

d. Upon release, the detainee desires to return to his home in Sudan. The detainee stated he would have to start from the bottom and look for a job in anything that he could find.

e. The detainee stated that he does not have a direct relationship with the Taliban.

f. The detainee denied any involvement with al Qaida or any other terrorist group.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.



# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

25 April 2006

TO: OMAR, ABDULLAH BIN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF OMAR, ABDULLAH BIN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

- a. Commitment

The detainee was in charge of the Tunisian guest house and was responsible for greeting new arrivals to Afghanistan.

- b. Training

Reporting states the detainee attended al Qaida training camps, specialized in anti-aircraft missiles and eventually became a camp trainer.

- c. Connections/Associations

1. According to foreign government service reports, the detainee is known for having involvement with terrorist activities in the 1980s.
2. The detainee traveled to Pakistan under Usama bin Laden's protection.
3. The detainee's name appeared on a spreadsheet account of stipend assistance provided to al Qaida operative families covering a six-month period from May to October 2002. The spreadsheet was found on a 20-gigabyte laptop computer hard drive associated with al Qaida financial operative Mustafa Ahmad al Hawsawi.
4. Al Hawsawi, an al Qaida financial manager, was known to have provided funds for the 11 September 2001 hijackers.

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ISN 721

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF OMAR, ABDULLAH BIN**

5. Pakistani police arrested the detainee in the home he was renting from Nur al Zaman.
  6. Nur al Zaman is a known member of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba.
  7. Lashkar-e-Tayyiba an armed wing of the Pakistan-based religious organization Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal-irshad, a Sunni anti-United States missionary organization, formed in 1989. Lashkar-e-Tayyiba operatives have facilitated the movement of al Qaida members in Pakistan.
  8. A senior al Qaida lieutenant claimed he met the detainee in Jalalabad, Afghanistan and added the detainee to the list of individuals who received aid from the senior al Qaida lieutenant. The senior al Qaida lieutenant said that the detainee was friendly with the Libyans who had left the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.
  9. The senior al Qaida lieutenant was in charge of Usama bin Laden's camps.
  10. An al Qaida facilitator stayed with the detainee in Afghanistan.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
  - b. The detainee stated that he was not a member of any type of group or organization while he lived in Pakistan. He also stated if he ever wanted to be a member of some type of group he would have stayed in Tunisia.
  - c. The detainee denied being a member of any militant groups when he lived in Tunisia. He stated one group, called the Tablighs, were missionaries and he enjoyed listening to them in the mosques. The detainee stated they were not a militant organization, nor did he belong to the group.
  - d. The detainee stated he does not know anything about the Taliban. He also stated he does not know anyone who was a member of the Taliban.
  - e. The detainee stated that after he moved to Pakistan he never left Pakistan and never went to Afghanistan.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF OMAR, ABDULLAH BIN**

continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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**000790**

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

26 June 2006

To: DEYAB, JIHAD AHMED MUSTAFA

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF DEYAB, JIHAD AHMED MUSTAFA

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. In May 2000 the detainee and his family left Damascus, Syria for Tehran, Iran. The detainee says he stayed in Tehran for a month then went to Zahidan, Iran where he stayed with a sheikh. From Zahidan, Iran the detainee and family went through Quetta, Pakistan and on to Peshawar, Pakistan and then moved to Kabul, Afghanistan to start a business selling honey.

2. The detainee first left Afghanistan for medical treatment in Lahore, Pakistan in August 2001. Following hostilities in Afghanistan in October 2001 the detainee returned to Afghanistan to retrieve his family. The detainee claims he went to Kabul, Jalalabad, and finally Khowst, Afghanistan before he found them.

b. Training

1. The detainee went into the Syrian Air Force in 1991 and served until July or August of 1993. While in the Air Force, he received training on driving large trucks and he referred to his unit as Air Force College. The detainee eventually was assigned to operate smaller vehicles and drove an ambulance. He did not make deliveries and only transported patients.

2. The detainee had one month of basic training for the Air Force in Halib Aleppo, Syria. He learned how to take apart and clean a pistol. He could not recall the exact type of weapon. He did not have target practice with this weapon, since he only received nine bullets. He also received an AK-47 weapon, but did not receive adequate training.

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000791

ISN 722

# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF DEYAB, JIHAD AHMED MUJSTAFI**

3. The detainee is identified as having fled to Afghanistan where he joined al Qaida's military training camps.

4. A senior al Qaida operative commented that the detainee showed up in Afghanistan in 2000 expecting to be able to attend Khalden training camp because he had known another individual from their time together in Syria. The senior al Qaida operative's Khalden camp was closed at the time and he said he thought the detainee went to Khandahar airport camp instead, in Khandahar, Afghanistan. The senior al Qaida operative disapproved of the detainee because he had some Takfiri beliefs and because the detainee expected to be accepted into the camps without prior vetting.

## c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee is connected with the Islamic extremist group Asbat al Ansar.

2. Asbat al Ansar, the League of the Followers, is a Lebanon-based, Sunni extremist group, composed primarily of Palestinians and connected with Usama bin Laden. The group follows an extremist interpretation of Islam that justifies violence against civilian targets to achieve political ends.

3. The detainee's name was on a list of individuals whose telephone numbers were associated with assorted jihadists based in Yemen.

4. The detainee's name was found on a spreadsheet account of stipend assistance provided to al Qaida operative families covering a six-month period of May to October 2002. The spreadsheet was on a twenty-gigabyte laptop computer hard drive associated with an al Qaida financial operative.

5. The detainee's name was found on a list of Syrians who were trained in al Qaida camps in Afghanistan and believed to be fighting with or on behalf of Usama bin Laden.

6. The detainee allowed a senior al Qaida operative to stay in his house.

7. A senior al Qaida operative met the detainee under an alias in the mid-1990s. The senior al Qaida operative noted the detainee was an expert in passport and document forgery. The detainee also worked with the Libyan groups and used computers in his passport forgery work. The senior al Qaida operative saw the detainee again in Lahore, Pakistan, in approximately 2002.

8. The senior al Qaida operative saw the detainee in 2000 to 2001 in Kabul, Afghanistan with a group of Libyan jihad members; however these were not members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF DEYAB, JIHAD AHMED MUJSTAFI**

9. While the senior al Qaida operative was in Faisalabad, Pakistan, in March 2002, he received a telephone call from the detainee. The detainee stated that he needed the senior al Qaida operative's financial assistance to travel to Iran and onward to Europe.

10. During an 11 September 2002 raid by a foreign governmental agency on an alleged al Qaida residence on Tariq Road in Karachi, Pakistan they recovered a personal address book and pocket litter containing names and telephone numbers. The detainee's name and phone number were among a list of names and telephone numbers recovered.

d. Intent

The detainee would not talk; he spent the entire interrogation looking at the floor.

e. Other Relevant Data

From Khowst, Afghanistan the detainee was aided by a Pakistani who helped Arab families. The detainee was then transferred to a safe house in Rawalpindi, Pakistan then Lahore, Pakistan. In Lahore, Pakistan the detainee tried to leave Pakistan with the aid of the al Qaddafi organization to flee to Libya. The detainee was then moved to a second house in Lahore where he was captured with two other Arab families.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denies having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

b. The detainee was queried regarding any knowledge or planning of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo detention facility with negative results.

c. The detainee did not agree with the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and therefore did not associate with that group.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

# UNCLASSIFIED

**Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

8 August 2006

TO: DEGHAYES, OMAR AMER

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF DEGHAYES, OMAR AMER

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated that in 1993 he went to Bosnia to join the Mujahedin and stayed in Bosnia for one year at a Mujahedin Army camp.

2. A foreign government service reported transfers of two large sums of money involving the detainee and the Bahamas-based Bank al Taqwa. On 22 December 1994, the detainee and another individual deposited 225,774 United States Dollars into an account at Bank al Taqwa. On 25 May 1996, the amount of 45,762 United States Dollars from that account was wired to the detainee.

3. Al Taqwa Bank in the Bahamas is listed in Executive Order 13224, which blocks property and prohibits transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism.

4. The detainee stated that he traveled to Afghanistan in the summer of 1999 using a fake British passport which he purchased for 1,000 British pounds.

5. The detainee stated that he obtained airline tickets for 800 British pounds from an individual whom the detainee knew was a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.

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**UNCLASSIFIED**

**000794**

ISN 727

## UNCLASSIFIED

### **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF DEGHAYES, OMAR AMER**

6. The detainee stated that he flew from England to Islamabad, Pakistan via Karachi, Pakistan, where he was met by a contact provided by an individual whom the detainee knew was a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. The detainee stated that he stayed for three days at the contact's home, was driven to Jalalabad, Afghanistan by the contact and then rented a ride to Kabul, Afghanistan.

7. The detainee stated that while in Afghanistan he worked as a financial supervisor at the charity organization Sanibel.

8. A former member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group stated that Sanibil characterizes itself as a charitable organization, but Sanibil's first priority was providing support to the jihad activities of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.

9. Al-Aqsa Sanibil Establishment is listed in Executive Order 13224, which blocks property and prohibits transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit or support terrorism.

10. A senior al Qaida operative stated that the detainee stayed at an al Qaida guest house in Pakistan in 1998.

11. An individual stated that the detainee arrived in Pakistan in approximately 1998, joined the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group upon his arrival, and worked at the al-Sanabil Institution in Kabul, Afghanistan.

12. A detained Libyan Islamic Fighting Group member stated that the detainee used to be a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group but did not know if the detainee received training.

13. The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group is a foreign terrorist organization. Some members are aligned with al Qaida.

14. An individual stated that the detainee joined the Taliban movement and worked for a short while at the al-Sanabil Institution until the 11 September 2001 attacks.

15. An individual stated that the Ashara guest house was owned by al Qaida and used by al Qaida members from Saudia Arabia, Yemen, Iraq and Libya.

#### **b. Training**

1. A senior al Qaida operative stated that he facilitated the detainee's travel to a Libyan camp in Afghanistan.

2. An individual stated that the detainee came to Afghanistan in 1998 and was trained at Samarkhil or Samardil Camp.



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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF DEGHAYES, OMAR AMER**

3. A detainee of a foreign service stated that a Libyan Islamic Fighting Group camp was opened in the Samarkhil region near Jalalabad, Afghanistan in 1998.

4. The detainee was trained by and received Professional Association of Diving Instruction certification from an individual who has been associated with al Qaida and has provided dive training to jihadists.

c. Other Relevant Data

The detainee stated that when the bombing began in Afghanistan, he was transported by truck with Taliban members from Kabul, Afghanistan to the Peshawar, Pakistan area and was later arrested in Lahore, Pakistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that he did not know the individual who has been associated with al Qaida and has provided dive training to jihadists.

b. The detainee stated that he had no knowledge of Usama bin Laden or al Qaida, had no prior knowledge of the 11 September 2001 attacks and never worked for the Taliban.

c. The detainee stated that he was not connected to any terrorist groups, he did not attend any training camps and he has never engaged in jihad.

d. The detainee stated that he would not accept anyone committing attacks similar to those of 11 September 2001.

e. The detainee stated that he does not agree with the use of suicide bombers and car bombs.

f. The detainee stated that if released he would like to go back to Brighton, England to work in his family's property business which his mother and brother are currently running.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

11 August 2006

TO: SAID, JAMIL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SAID, JAMIL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

The detainee traveled from Yemen to Pakistan in late July 2001 and then to Kandahar, Afghanistan.

b. Training

The detainee attended a mandatory 30-day military training camp where he learned to dismantle and re-assemble a 7.63 mm Kalashnikov rifle.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stayed in a guest house in Quetta, Pakistan where Afghans came and went. The detainee thought they were Taliban.
2. The detainee is a member of al Wafa.
3. Al Wafa is listed as a terrorist support organization.
4. The detainee was identified by a senior al Qaida operative.

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UNCLASSIFIED

000797

ISN 728

## UNCLASSIFIED

### **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NASSIR, JAMIL AHMED SAID**

#### d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was arrested in Faisalabad, Pakistan, by Pakistani Military and/or Police while living in a Yemeni house.

2. A senior al Qaida operative was identified as the director of the Yemeni guest house in Faisalabad, Pakistan.

3. The detainee was identified by the al Wafa's chief medical advisor as someone who would obtain medicines and supplies.

4. An al Wafa official identified the detainee as a University of Karachi, Pakistan microbiology graduate student that purchased materials for al Wafa from the New Chemicals Company.

#### 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee claims he traveled from Yemen to Pakistan to have knee surgery for a soccer injury that caused him pain for fifteen years.

b. The detainee claims that he traveled to Afghanistan because he heard it was poor and in need of educators.

c. The detainee said that he did not know if the house in which he was arrested was affiliated with Taliban or al Qaida.

d. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001.

e. The detainee stated that the only camp that he had ever attended was a summer camp in 1985 or 1986 located in the suburbs of Taiz, Yemen on a military base. The detainee denied receiving any other training.

f. The detainee denied the accusation of being affiliated with al Wafa.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

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