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TAYLOR REPORT No. 2

SECRET

LONDON, November 12, 1941

Memorandum to W. D. Whitney.

From E. L. Taylor

1. In the course of my conversations with various branches of the PWE, I have discovered that they have accumulated a large collection of systematically filed and digested intelligence which would be invaluable to us in our work. In fact, if it were possible to transport bodily these dossiers to the United States, or even to obtain fairly complete digests of them, it would probably save us about a year's work. Every regional division of the PWE has reports which, to a large extent, summarize and bring up to date the results of two years' work in collecting and analyzing intelligence. There is also a Central Intelligence Division which contains much valuable information and all the branches are constantly putting out current intelligence reports which would be invaluable to us. Since it will be many months before we can hope to build up an organization of comparable size and efficiency, it seems only common sense to me to borrow as much as we can from the British in this field.
2. In view of the wonderful spirit of cooperation which they have shown throughout, I think there is a good chance that they will allow us to transmit in some way much of this information to the United States for our use in setting up our own services. However, any system of copying or digesting which might be worked out, would involve a heavy strain on the already overloaded PWE secretarial services, and the information itself is so valuable that it is no light request to make.
3. In order to be in a good position to make any such request, it seems to me that we should try, if possible, to be of such service as we possibly can to the British and on as many levels as possible. Fortunately I have discovered that there are a great many things, some of them fairly important, which we can do to help the British in their intelligence work. Even things which seem fragmentary and relatively unimportant to us may be of great value to them, as the efficiency of any system of intelligence analyzing depends to a large extent upon the volume of material examined. The time factor also plays an important role. There are many things which the British would be extremely grateful to have immediately, which would be much more important than a greater volume of material some weeks or months later.
4. I am obtaining detailed instructions as to the types of intelligence material desired here and will transmit them in due course, but in the mean time I would like to indicate in a general way what is required, so that the necessary steps can be taken without delay to start preparing this material.

- 2 -

5. For political warfare work four special types of intelligence are particularly important:

(i) Radio Intelligence

Reports on listening habits, jamming, reception of both American and British programs, popular reactions to them and so forth. Material of this sort is of particular value from France, Italy, Finland, and can easily be acquired by observers who are not specially trained.

(ii) Morale Intelligence

Optimism, pessimism, fears, hopes, emotional reactions to war developments and so forth. Refugees or travelers from occupied countries usually supply much material of this sort from personal observation, and foreign correspondents or diplomats on the spot often pick up valuable indications from conversations with natives.

(iii) Information about Enemy Propaganda Maneuvers

Such as whispering campaigns and verbal suggestions to prominent Americans, or other neutrals, by German agents.

(iv) Political Psychology

Political intelligence dealing chiefly or partly, with factors of political psychology.

6. With the exception of the first, and possibly the last, category listed, this type of intelligence hardly deals with real facts, or at least not with concrete facts, but with impressions and opinions, and is therefore badly neglected by the average diplomat or military observer.

7. In order to supply the British - and incidentally ourselves, for we need all this information at least as much as they do - I would suggest tentatively that the following provisional arrangements be made:

- (i) Until we have built up an efficient field service of our own, we should try to place a few observers in various neutral countries as fast as we can get them there. The countries most important at the moment are France, including North Africa, Sweden, Finland, Switzerland, Turkey, Spain and Portugal. Surprisingly enough, I am told by fairly competent persons here that one or two intelligent observers, even if they have had no previous training of any kind, can obtain almost immediately a mass of valuable information in any one of these countries. For speed and cover the most desirable method would be to get the State Department to send one of its men to be officially attached to the Embassy, or Legation, in each of these countries reporting through the usual diplomatic channels, but concentrating all his attention on assignments furnished through the State Department from us. Because of the nature of the work, there is absolutely no reason why this should create any embarrassment or

NND

DECLASSIFIED

877190

DATE

9/20/90

- 3 -

involve the State Department in political difficulties in any of the countries named. If this cannot be done - or for greater volume if it should be done - it might be desirable as well to send a newspaper correspondent to each of these countries, especially to France and Finland, or to Sweden for Finland, with instructions to collect information of this kind for us. In the case of Finland, if nothing else can be worked out, it would be valuable for the British to contact American businessmen and others there, and to question them about what they may have picked up in trips to Finland.

- (ii) Nearly all types of intelligence needed by the British are already collected - however incompletely - by the State Department, and it is merely necessary to work up some rapid channel of communication whereby this material can get without delay to the British services which will really utilize it. The best thing probably would simply be to explain to Pell and others in the State Department in great detail exactly what kind of information we need, and why it is important and get them to supply it to us, then we can turn it over to the British.
- (iii) Buxton's interviews could be exceedingly valuable if properly done. In the first place, it is absolutely essential that he interview all Clipper passengers as well as those traveling by boats. A detailed questionnaire and some rules of guidance which the British have worked out on the basis of experience will be communicated shortly for this purpose. It should be noted, however, that many travelers and refugees from Europe do not land in New York but proceed to Latin American ports, and others, of course, get no farther than Switzerland, Sweden or Portugal. Some kind of organization for interviewing outside our own borders must be created. Perhaps, for the time being, the Latin American consulates could supply us with some of the information with the help of local newspaper correspondents.
- (iv) Much of Warburg's material will also be valuable and the questionnaire should be taken over to him too.
- (v) American Isolationists, particularly the big business type of appeaser, might be very important in supplying the kind of information desired. They are the natural targets for Axis propagandists in America, and it would be very useful to know for counter-propaganda purposes just what propaganda suggestions are being made to them from time to time. To be really effective, this type of intelligence would probably involve a certain amount of police surveillance, since it is

NND

DECLASSIFIED
877190

MARS, DRC 9/20/90

- 4 -

important to know exactly when, in what circumstances and from what enemy agent, a given rumor or propaganda suggestion originates. Perhaps the FBI could be enlisted to cooperate on this point. Even without the FBI some useful scraps might be gleaned from the gossip columns and a careful study of the Isolationist press.

(vi) For the same reason, foreign language newspapers in America, which might be targets for German propaganda, should be closely watched. At the moment, I believe, the British Library of Information is reading German-American press for new propaganda themes and directives, but it is doubted that they are able to cover the whole field. The kind of propaganda analysis that Laswell is doing, differently orientated, might produce this type of intelligence as a by-product. In any case, someone in our office should discuss the problem with Laswell.

(vii) American business firms with connections abroad.

8. It has not yet been worked out here exactly how much of this material should be sent in the raw state to the British, or to what extent we should merely collect it for our own use and supply on request. Therefore, it is unnecessary to start sending any of it at once, but the sooner we are able to meet any requests that may be made, the more our efforts will be appreciated here. A further suggestion which has been made is that one of the American correspondents, who has lived for a long time in Berlin, should attempt to do a weekly analysis of monitoring reports on German radio propaganda, based on his own knowledge of the workings of the German censorship and propaganda departments. The idea would be to deduce from the internal evidence of the broadcasts themselves, plus a knowledge of Nazi technique, just what their directives are, what they are trying to cover up and what they are trying to get across. This need not be a very long, profound or carefully prepared analysis. Its value would be to serve as a further check on other analyses of German propaganda.