




S E C R E T // N O F O R N // 20320421

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09360



JTF-GTMO-CDR

21 April 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue, Miami, FL 33172

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9SA-000130DP (S)

JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

1. (S//NF) Personal Information:

- JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Faha Sultan
- Aliases and Current/True Name: Fahd Sultan Ubayd al-Usaymi al-Utaybi, Ahmad, Fahd Sultan al-Qosaybi, Abu Saad al-Taifi, Abdullah al-Hamiri, Fahed Abu Sultan, Abu Khaled, Moath
- Place of Birth: Jeddah, Saudi Arabia (SA)
- Date of Birth: 1972
- Citizenship: Saudi Arabia
- Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9SA-000130DP



2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in good health.

3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment:

a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously assessed detainee as Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) on 7 April 2006.

b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is assessed to be a member of al-Qaida who served as a logistics officer in Usama Bin Laden's (UBL) 55th Arab Brigade supporting the Taliban. Detainee reportedly stayed at al-Qaida facilities and received training at al-Qaida camps. Detainee has a history with jihad and it is highly probable that detainee participated

CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES
REASON: E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C)
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in hostilities in Afghanistan (AF) and Bosnia (BK). JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be:

- A **HIGH** risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.
- A **HIGH** threat from a detention perspective.
- Of **MEDIUM** intelligence value.

c. (U) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee's assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be annotated by ➤ next to the footnote.)

- (S//NF) Reporting identified detainee as part of the Qala-i-Jangi Prison uprising in Mazar-e-Sharif, AF.
- (S//NF) New alias identified for detainee.
- (S//NF) Information added concerning detainee's friend, al-Qaida military commander Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi.
- (S//NF) Fawaz Naman Hamoud Abdullah Mahdi, ISN US9YM-000678DP (YM-678), identified detainee as the director of supply distribution at Khwaja Ghar, AF.
- (S//NF) Removed information incorrectly attributed to detainee.

4. (U) Detainee's Account of Events:

The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.

a. (S//NF) Prior History: Detainee attended Taif Elementary School in Taif, SA, until the 5th grade. Detainee then went to work for his father as a shepherd.¹

b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: Detainee received a *fatwa* (religious decree) issued by Shaykh Hamoud Bin Uqla al-Shuaibi at a mosque in al-Qassim, SA.² With money he received from his father, detainee traveled to Afghanistan in January 2001³ to serve alongside the Taliban in a war to uphold Islamic law, and against the group led by Bulghat Massoud.⁴

¹ 000130 KB 21-FEB-2002, Analyst Note: Detainee has provided very little information regarding his background.

² IIR 6 034 0104 02, Analyst Note: Shaykh Hamoud Bin Uqla al-Shuaibi was a radical Islamic cleric who religiously and financially supported UBL and his cause.

³ IIR 6 034 0104 02

⁴ 000130 KB 21-FEB-2002, Analyst Note: Bulghat Massoud is assessed to be Ahmad Shah Massoud, supreme commander of the Northern Alliance.

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c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: Detainee served under al-Qaida commander Mullah Thaker.⁵ Mullah Thaker instructed detainee on the operation of the AK-47 assault rifle; however, detainee never engaged in combat operations.⁶

5. (U) Capture Information:

a. (S//NF) In late November 2001, General Dostum's forces captured detainee just north of Mazar-e-Sharif and placed detainee in the Qala-i-Jangi Prison located on the outskirts of Mazar-e-Sharif. On 25 November 2001, a large-scale uprising occurred, resulting in the deaths of CIA officer Mike Spann and several hundred prisoners. On 2 December 2001, the Red Cross arrived and detainee was transported to Sheberghan Prison. On 16 December 2001, US troops transferred detainee to a US-controlled prison in Kandahar, AF. On 30 December 2001, detainee was moved to the Bagram Detention Facility.⁷

b. (S) Property Held:

- 1 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) card (#ABZ-001897-01)
- 1 Small blue Koran

c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 13 February 2002

d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide information on the following:

- Taliban front line training and tactics
- Taliban recruiting techniques in Saudi Arabia

6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee's Account: Detainee has been completely uncooperative and provided negligible details regarding his associations and activities in Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, and Bosnia. There are large gaps in his timeline. Detainee has provided no substantive information on any topic except for minor details concerning Mullah Thaker.

7. (U) Detainee Threat:

⁵ 000130 KB 21-FEB-2002, Analyst Note: A variation for Mullah Thaker is Thacker and Zhaker. Thaker was a military commander in UBL's 55th Arab Brigade.

⁶ 000130 INITIAL SCREENING 30-DEC-2001

⁷ IIR 7 721 0162 02, NSA 3 OO 31834 01 (Tear line), Deception at Qala-I Jangi Prison - USSOC - May 2005 (JDIMS report)

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a. **(S) Assessment:** Detainee is assessed to be a **HIGH** risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.

b. **(S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention:** Detainee is assessed to be a member of al-Qaida and UBL's former 55th Arab Brigade. Detainee has significant ties to senior al-Qaida leaders and served in a position of trust. Detainee is a veteran jihadist who probably received advanced training at al-Qaida camps. Detainee stayed in al-Qaida affiliated facilities in Afghanistan. Detainee was wounded in the Qala-i-Jangi prison uprising.

- (S//NF) Detainee is assessed to be a member of al-Qaida who was in charge of logistics for the former 55th Arab Brigade in Khwaja Ghar, an area near Konduz, AF.⁸
 - (S//NF) Detainee admitted serving with the Muntazara section (NFI) behind the front lines for ten months under the command of Mullah Thaker. Mullah Thaker was the overall commander of both Taliban and Arab forces along the northern front.⁹
 - (S//NF) Admitted al-Qaida member John Walker Lindh photo-identified detainee as Abu Saad from Taif, SA, and claimed detainee was a senior Taliban member who once told Lindh that his real name was Ahmed. Lindh believed that detainee was an administrator who was always on the back lines in charge of purchasing food.¹⁰ However, Lindh also commented that he saw detainee on the front lines, and again during the retreat to Konduz.¹¹ (Analyst Note: Lindh received a 20-year sentence without parole for his participation as an al-Qaida member who supported the Taliban. Detainee has acknowledged living in Taif, and his alias al-Taifi identifies him as being from that city.¹²)
 - (S//NF) Ali Abdul Motalib Awayd Hassan al-Tayeea, ISN US9IZ-000111DP (IZ-111), photo-identified detainee and stated detainee spent a lot of time on the northern line and was responsible for supplying the Arab Group aka (55th Arab Brigade). IZ-111 stated detainee was a friend of senior al-Qaida member Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi, and detainee spent most of his time with Abd al-Salaam and Qaqaa al-Tabuki,¹³ both identified as sub-commanders of UBL's 55th Arab Brigade.¹⁴ (Analyst Note: The northern line is probably a reference to the forward line of troops

⁸ Analyst Note: The 55th Arab Brigade was UBL's primary formation supporting Taliban objectives. UBL was thought to participate closely in the command and control of the brigade. Furthermore, the commanders and numerous fighters of the Arab Brigade are known to have been al-Qaida members.

⁹ IIR 6 034 0265 02, 000130 302 07-AUG-2002

¹⁰ JOHN WALKER LINDH - 302 12-SEP-2002

¹¹ ➤ JOHN WALKER LINDH - 302 12-SEP-2002

¹² 000130 KB 21-FEB-2002

¹³ 000111 302 22-JUN-2002, IIR 6 034 0015 04 (revised version IIR 6 034 0183 06)

¹⁴ ➤ IIR 6 034 0913 03, IIR 6 034 0795 04, Analyst Note: For more information about al-Hadrami, see IIR 6 034 1519 03

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detainee's alias, Abou Saad Taifi.²⁴ (Analyst Note: Avdiu is linked to recruitment efforts for the Chechen and Iraqi insurgencies, and as of February 2007, remained active in extremist activities in Albania.²⁵)

- (S//NF) An unidentified individual told John Walker Lindh that detainee was a long-time Taliban member and had been in Afghanistan in the 1980s and in Bosnia in the 1990s.²⁶ (Analyst Note: The Taliban in the 1980s was a jihadist organization focused on fighting Soviet forces. This information, coupled with IZ-111's statement, corroborates the assessment that detainee fought as a jihadist in both Afghanistan and Bosnia.)
- (S//NF) Detainee probably stayed in extremist guesthouses and attended advanced training at al-Qaida militant training camps in Afghanistan.
 - (S//NF) A document seized during a Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID) raid on an al-Qaida residence in Karachi, PK, on 11 September 2002 listed detainee's alias, Saad al-Taifi. The file, entitled "khas jeddan.doc" (translates to "very private.doc"), lists individuals who had their money seized from safe deposit boxes in Kabul, AF, on the orders of senior al-Qaida member Sayf al-Adel. An individual named Abu Anas al-Azdi controlled the safe deposit boxes.²⁷
 - (S//NF) UBL's personnel security chief Sayf al-Adel²⁸ and al-Qaida operative Abu Anas al-Azdi al-Shamali²⁹ are linked with the Khat Guesthouse in Kabul.³⁰ (Analyst Note: Because detainee's belongings were held by al-Azdi, detainee is assessed to have resided at the Khat guesthouse.)
 - (S//NF) Detainee's name and alias were found on a document provided by the Central Cypriot Intelligence Service (KYP) listing 207 names of alleged terrorist training camp applicants.³¹ (Analyst Note: The report provided no information regarding the camp, its location, or the training involved. It is assessed that detainee planned to attend advanced or specialized training after his stay in the Khat Guesthouse in Kabul.³² As an individual who had participated in both the Soviet-Afghanistan war of the 1980s and in Bosnia during the 1990s, detainee would have been seen as qualified to receive advanced militant training in explosives, chemicals, or tactics.)

²⁴ IIR 2 360 0406 04, Paragraph 1.DDDD

²⁵ TD-314/04674-02, TD-314/11110-06, IIR 2 515 0113 06, TD-314/14178-07

²⁶ JOHN WALKER LINDH - 302 12-SEP-2002

²⁷ TD-314/43327-02

²⁸ IIR 6 034 0051 05

²⁹ TD-314/50977-02

³⁰ IIR 6 034 0051 05, TD-314/00684-02, IIR 6 034 0088 05

³¹ TD-314/47588-02

³² Analyst Note: The Khat Guesthouse is also known as Karti Barwan aka (Number Nine) aka (Number Ten) aka (Ghulan Faheem).

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- (C) In December 2001, US and Coalition forces raided an Arab office in Kandahar, seizing 160 “military training camp applications” (requests for training). Variations of detainee’s name and alias, Fahd Sultan Alqosaibi aka (Abu Sad Altaifi), as well as other identifying information, including the phone number 027326931, were found on one of the applications.³³ The phone number is listed as being in Taif, SA, and is the same phone number that was found in Ekrem Avdiu’s phone book (see above). (Analyst Note: The full phone number is probably 96627326931. Due to the differences in the content of the list, it is assessed that this application was submitted for training at an al-Qaida camp separate from the application mentioned above. The document notes detainee was from Taif, SA. The existence of a phone number tied to detainee in both Afghanistan and Albania indicates that he had associates in both places, and supports the assessment that he was involved in extremist activities in both places.)
- (S/NF) A variation of detainee’s name and alias, Fahd Sultan al-Oteibi Saad al-Taefi, was found in a document listing 324 Arabic names, aliases, and nationalities, recovered from raids on safe houses suspected to be associated with al-Qaida in Karachi, PK.³⁴ (Analyst Note: The document identified that detainee was in possession of a Saudi passport and airplane ticket, and indicated the documents were held by guesthouse administration in a trust account or safety deposit box. Such lists are indicative of an individual’s residence within al-Qaida, Taliban, and other extremist guesthouses often for the purpose of training or coordination prior to travel to training, the front lines, or abroad. Trust accounts were simple storage compartments such as envelopes or folders that were used to secure the individual’s personal valuables until completion of training or another activity.)
- (S/NF) Detainee was among approximately 800 Taliban soldiers who surrendered to Northern Alliance (NA) Commander General Dostum on 24 November 2001. Dostum placed the majority of the prisoners in Qala-i-Jangi, an old fortress just outside of Mazar-e-Sharif, which served as Dostum’s personnel headquarters.³⁵
 - (S/NF) On 25 November 2001, the prisoners, reportedly led by detained Arab fighters, revolted and killed American CIA officer Mike Spann, approximately fifty NA soldiers, and four generals. General Dostum’s forces reacted, killing several hundred Taliban prisoners while recapturing the fortress.³⁶ (Analyst Note: Research

³³ TRRS-04-11-0226, Paragraph FFFFF

³⁴ TD-314/40693-02

³⁵ IIR 7 721 0162 02, NSA 3 OO 31834 01, Analyst Note: Those prisoners that survived the uprising refused to surrender for seven days until the Red Cross was able to arrive and take survivors to the Sheberghan Prison. Many detainees stayed at Sheberghan Prison through the end of Ramadan (16 December 2001) before US troops arrived and transferred them to a prison in Kandahar under US control.

³⁶ AFGP-2003-800002, CIA #867251 30-NOV-2001, IIR 6 873 0189 02, IIR 7 721 0162 02

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shows a wide divergence on the actual number of Taliban forces killed during the operation, ranging from 200 to well over 1,000.)

- (S//NF) Detainee was in the same room with John Walker Lindh in the basement at Qala-i-Jangi Prison, where detainee was wounded during the first grenade attack. Detainee told Lindh that he was reluctant to surrender because he was afraid that Dostum's forces would torture them, stating it was "better to die here than be torn apart by the NA."³⁷
- (S//NF) Bajad Dhayfallah Hawaymal al-Ruqi al-Utaybi, ISN US9SA-000122DP (SA-122), identified detainee as Sultan from Saudi Arabia and stated they were together at Sheberghan and Kandahar.³⁸ (Analyst Note: Sheberghan was the collection point for individuals captured by the Coalition and NA forces, including all the survivors from the Qala-i-Jangi prison uprising.)
- (S//NF) Sulayman Saad Muhammad Awshan al-Khalidi, ISN US9SA-000121DP (SA-121, transferred), identified detainee as Sultan from Saudi Arabia. SA-121 saw detainee fighting in Konduz, and later in Qala-i-Jangi and Sheberghan prisons, and in Kandahar, AF.³⁹
- (S//NF) Abd al-Aziz Sad Muhammad Awshan al-Khalidi, ISN US9SA-000112DP (SA-112), photo-identified detainee as Fahed from Saudi Arabia. SA-112 saw detainee at Sheberghan and Kandahar.⁴⁰
- (S//NF) Muhammad Ibrahim Awzar, ISN US9MO-000133DP (MO-133, transferred) claimed he knew detainee from the Sheberghan Prison in Afghanistan in November 2001, and that detainee was a part of the Mazar-e-Sharif uprising. MO-133 also believed that detainee had a leadership role among detainees held at JTF-GTMO.⁴¹ (Analyst Note: Reporting indicated that detainee bullied MO-133 and told MO-133 to shut-up. MO-133 cowered and listened to detainee's demands. MO-133 appeared to feel uncomfortable that the interrogator was aware of the incident.)
- (S//NF) A variation of detainee's alias Sa'ad al-Taifi is included on a list of martyrs missing from action and imprisoned in Mazar-e-Sharif and the Qala-i-Jangi Prison. Detainee was noted belonging to the third convoy, along with sixty other individuals.⁴² (Analyst Note: Detainee may possess as yet undisclosed information

³⁷ > JOHN WALKER LINDH - 302 12-SEP-2002

³⁸ IIR 6 034 0346 02

³⁹ IIR 6 034 0265 02

⁴⁰ IIR 6 034 0345 02

⁴¹ >000133 SIR 15-JUN-2004

⁴² IIR 7 739 3111 02, Analyst Note: The list was found among handwritten notes in a compound in Shahe Kot, AF, located about 65 miles southeast of Tora Bora, AF. Other documents found at Shahe Kot included recipes for improvised explosives (see Harmony document AFGP-2002-004209).

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on others in his convoy that included fighters from Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Syria, Kuwait, and Algeria.)

- (S//NF) In July 2002, a delegation from Saudi Arabia visited JTF-GTMO and interviewed detainee. The delegation identified detainee to be of low intelligence and law enforcement value to the US, and unlikely to pose a terrorist threat to the US or its interests. Furthermore, the Saudi delegation indicated that the Government of Saudi Arabia would be willing to take custody of detainee for possible prosecution as soon as the US determined it no longer wanted to hold him.⁴³ (Analyst Note: JTF-GTMO does not concur with the delegation's assessment of this detainee. Detainee's assessed history of extremist activity in multiple locations over several decades sets a pattern that detainee would likely repeat if given the opportunity.)

c. (U//FOUO) Detainee's Conduct: Detainee is assessed as a **HIGH** threat from a detention perspective. Detainee's overall behavior has been non-compliant, but rarely hostile to the guard force and staff. Detainee currently has 26 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS, with the most recent occurring on 30 January 2007, when he was reported failing to comply with guard instructions to return a razor and using degrading and racial slurs toward a guard. Detainee has one Report of Disciplinary Infraction for assault, occurring on 14 April 2005, when he was reported throwing feces on a guard. Other incidents for which detainee has been disciplined include failure to follow instructions and camp rules, possession of non-weapon type contraband, participating in a mass disturbance, damage to government property, unauthorized communications, and an offense requiring use of the FCE team. Detainee has a total of eight Reports of Disciplinary Infraction for assault with the most recent occurring on 12 January 2004, when he threw his breakfast at the guards. Detainee had three Reports of Disciplinary Infraction in 2006, and one report so far in 2007.

8. (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:

a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of **MEDIUM** intelligence value. Detainee's most recent interrogation session occurred on 13 March 2007.

b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Detainee reportedly fought during the Soviet and Afghan war in the 1980s as well as the Bosnian civil war in the 1990s. Detainee was a member of UBL's 55th Arab Brigade for ten months as a logistics officer, providing him direct access to senior personnel and operational planning processes. Detainee probably visited UBL's Mall Six Complex and associated Tarnak Farm training facility, providing

⁴³ TD-314/30789-02

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access to al-Qaida's premier administrative and training compounds. Detainee probably stayed at the Khat Guesthouse and associated training camp located in Kabul, AF.

c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee's lack of cooperation leaves a complete void covering detainee's timeline from the Soviet and Afghan war to his capture. Detainee is assessed to have information on personnel and organizations involved in jihadist activities stretching from the 1980s to present. He has information on al-Qaida's global recruitment and travel activities from Saudi Arabia to Bosnia and Afghanistan. Detainee probably has information on operations and personalities at the Mall Six Complex, Tarnak Farm training facility, and the Khat Guesthouse. As logistics officer for the 55th Arab Brigade, detainee has information on al-Qaida's northern-Afghanistan resource infrastructure, to include procurement and distribution networks.


d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:

- Al-Qaida recruitment in Saudi Arabia
- Al-Qaida 55th Arab Brigade order of battle, including information on Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi
- Al-Qaida and Taliban logistical supply
- Al-Qaida military operations especially in Konduz, Taloqan, and Mazar-e-Sharif
- Al-Qaida individuals, including leadership still at large
- Chechen and Iraqi insurgencies
- Qala-i-Jangi Prison uprising and death of CIA officer Mike Spann
- Taliban and al-Qaida facilities, including associated personnel and operations
- Training camps and curriculum, including basic and advanced courses
- JTF-GTMO detainees' continuing hostilities, including possible leadership, identities of other detainees receptive to extreme resistance measures, and future operations

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9. (S) **EC Status:** Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 15 October 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant.



HARRY B. HARRIS, JR.
Rear Admiral, US Navy
Commanding

* Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessment can be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College October 2001 guide *Intelligence Warning Terminology*.