




S E C R E T // N O F O R N // 20300603

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09360



JTF GTMO-CG

3 June 2005


MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue,
Miami, FL 33172.

SUBJECT: Update Recommendation to Transfer to the Control of Another Country for
Continued Detention (TRCD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9AF-000972DP (S)

JTF GTMO Detainee Assessment

1. (FOUO) Personal Information:

- JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Alif Mohammed
- Aliases and Current/True Name: Alif Jana
- Place of Birth: Helmand Province, Afghanistan (AF)
- Date of Birth: 1 January 1946
- Citizenship: Afghanistan
- Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9AF-000972DP



2. (FOUO) Health: Detainee is in good health and he has no known drug allergies. He has been diagnosed with adjustment disorder with depression. His only current medication is Zoloft. Detainee has no travel restrictions.

3. (S//NF) JTF GTMO Assessment:

a. (S) Recommendation: JTF GTMO recommends detainee be Transferred to the Control of Another Country for Continued Detention (TRCD).

b. (S//NF) Summary: JTF GTMO previously assessed detainee as Transfer to the Control of Another Country for Continued Detention (TRCD) on 29 March 2004.

For this update recommendation, detainee is assessed as a possible Anti-Coalition Militia (ACM) member. He is assessed to be affiliated with Al-Qaida's terrorist network due to his extensive history with mujahideen (Islamic holy warrior) networks and his associations with Abdul Wahid Rais Baghrani, former Taliban commander, and others operating in the

CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES
REASON: E.O. 12958 SECTION 1.5(C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 20300603

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Helmand, AF, area. The Baghran Valley, Helmand Province, AF, is known for providing safe haven to senior Taliban and Al-Qaida members. Detainee was captured on ACM leader Abdul Wahid's compound after US forces had sustained fire from an ambush. Detainee stated he has been a mujahideen for 22 years. He lived in an area that supported activities aimed against US and coalition forces. Detainee possesses the experience to participate, orchestrate and/or lead hostilities against US and coalition forces. It is assessed this detainee is a MEDIUM risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.

4. (S//NF) Detainee Background Summary: Unless otherwise noted, the following paragraphs are based solely on the detainee's statements.

a. (S) Prior History: Detainee and his brother were farmers and shepherds until 1981 when detainee was conscripted by the Afghan militia operating in the Helmand Province, AF. Detainee defected from the Afghan militia and served as a mujahid for various leaders and groups for many years.

b. (S//NF) Training and Activities: About 1981, for approximately two and one half months, detainee was a member of a mujahideen group controlled by Mullah Nasim. Detainee and the other individuals in this group went from house to house collecting weapons. Subsequently, detainee fought for another mujahideen group in Baghran, AF. Detainee was a commander for approximately eight years (1982-1990). (Analyst Note: Detainee likely fought against the Russians in jihad during the Russian occupancy, 1979 until 1989.) Around 1990, detainee spent two years fighting as a mujahid under Mullah Karim Akhund until Karim's death approximately 1992. Around 1999, detainee traveled to Saudi Arabia to participate in Haj. About two years later in 2001, he went to Pakistan to visit his niece. Detainee worked as a farmer, gunsmith, and ironworker.

c. (S//NF) Capture Information: There is conflicting information about detainee's capture. One version is detainee was captured beside a creek near his house and taken to Abdul Wahid Rais Baghrani's guesthouse. Another version reported by the capturing unit is detainee was captured alone on Abdul Wahid's compound on 10 February 2003. (Analyst note: Detainee's capture data states the United States Special Forces (USSF) found him with weapons and magazines in a culvert system trying to hide and escape. USSF assessed him as a security or military commander of Abdul Wahid's compound in Lejay and believed he was responsible for orchestrating an ambush on USSF. This information was subsequently countered by a screening report that stated detainee was captured while washing himself in a river and did not possess weapons at time of capture. The true details of detainee's capture are unknown.) Following capture, detainee was then transferred to the Bagram detention facility.

d. (S) Transferred to JTF GTMO: 9 May 2003

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e. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF GTMO: Detainee's file does not indicate why he was sent to JTF GTMO.

5. (S//NF) Detainee Threat:

a. (S) Assessment: It is assessed the detainee poses a MEDIUM risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.

b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention:

- (S//NF) Detainee is associated with members of Al-Qaida's terrorist network operating in the Helmand province of Afghanistan. They are closely linked with the Taliban and Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG). (Analyst Note: HIG is a Tier 1 terrorist target, defined as terrorist groups, especially those with state support, that have demonstrated both intention and capability to attack US persons or interests.)
 - (S//NF) Abdul Wahid Rais Baghrani, a former Taliban commander and former Commander of Hekmatyar Gulbuddin, leader of the HIG. In debriefings, detainee has discussed communication between Abdul Wahid and Sher Mohammed, the governor Helmand province, AF. This indicates knowledge not typically associated with a low level individual or a loose association. (Analyst note: Baghrani was suspected of harboring senior Taliban and Al-Qaida members at the compound where detainee was captured.)
 - (S//NF) Abdul Razaq aka Baraso Ustaz, assessed to be ISN US9AF-000942DP, (ISN 942), is assessed as a mid-to-high level member of the Taliban who is associated with high-level members of the Taliban and Al-Qaida's terrorist network. Detainee has briefly described an association between ISN 942 and Bagrahni as well as a few of ISN 942's activities suggest ISN 942 was at odds with the Taliban. Analysis of ISN 942 shows contradictory statements appear to indicate detainee is attempting careful disclosure of information to prevent self-incrimination. This would suggest detainee possesses an unexploited relationship to ISN 942. (Analyst note: ISN 942 is a close associate of Baghrani.)
 - (S) Mullah Obaidullah Akhund, former Taliban Minister of Defense and current ACM leader who is primarily responsible for logistics and facilitation. Akhund is an US Central Command High Value Target/Individual (HVT). Detainee has claimed to have known Akhund as a near by village representative; however, it is assessed detainee has lied about Akhund's position to downplay his importance. (Analyst note: It seems highly unlikely Mullah Obaidullah Akhund would be a village representative. Village representatives are well known public figures and commonly accessible to the population they represent. Akhund is a notorious extremist leader who has been sought after by US and coalition forces throughout Operation Enduring

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Freedom. Furthermore, research identifies Akhund is closely associated with Baghrani.)

- (S) Detainee may have participated in the orchestrated ambush on US forces which took place on 10 February 2003 at 0200 hours as the US forces approached the village of Lejay (Abdul Wahid Rais Baghrani's stronghold).
 - (S) Adult males in the Baghran Valley, Helmand Province, AF, support local leaders and militias. In times of attack, all males pick up arms in defense of the valley against "invaders" (US or coalition forces). (Analyst note: Due to detainee's mujahideen experiences, it is likely he would have participated in defending his village.)
 - (S) At time of capture, detainee wore a green OD jacket identical to the jackets worn by the group of individuals that took part in the ambush.
 - (S) Detainee's circumstances of capture are suspect and remain questionable.
 - Detainee's initial screening report stated detainee was hiding in a culvert with weapons and magazines. Despite this fact, subsequent screening reports indicate detainee did not have a weapon or magazines and was washing himself at a creek near his house.
 - (S) Detainee's explanation of the capture event is questionable.
- (S) Detainee is, or may be, susceptible to recruitment for terrorist actions, organizations, or their support infrastructure due to his place of residence and extensive mujahideen experience.
 - (S) Many of the people of the Baghran Valley, Helmand Province, AF, are either related through family or work for the local leaders. Many, if not all, of these local leaders are Anti-Coalition Militia (ACM) leaders. Commonly, the local populace will lend their support to the area leaders out of fear of retaliation. (Analyst Note: The local Baghran Valley ACM leaders support, and are supported by, the Taliban, HIG, and Al-Qaida.)
 - (S) As a mujahideen, detainee fought under Mullah Nasim and Mullah Karim Akhund at various times and also supervised and led a group of mujahideen in Baghran Valley, AF.

c. (S//NF) Detainee's Conduct: Detainee's behavior has been for the most part compliant and non-aggressive. Detainee has a few cases of refusing to comply with the rules of the guard force and the cellblock. On 26 May 2003 at 2330 hours, detainee tried to commit self-harm by tying a sheet around his neck.

6. (S//NF) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:

a. (S) Assessment: JTF GTMO determined this detainee is of LOW intelligence value.

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
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- (S) Detainee is one of many individuals captured from this area immediately following an ambush on US forces. Detainee may be able to provide additional information on a number of individuals associated with Abdul Wahid Rais Baghrani as well as which senior Taliban and Al-Qaida members are known to receive safe haven at Baghrani's compound.

b. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:

- The political, military, and extremist climate operating in the Baghran Valley
- Taliban, HIG, and Al-Qaida members in the Baghran Valley
- Logistics and personnel of the ambush that took place on 10 February 2003
- Individuals he fought under as a mujahideen

7. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 21 November 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant.


JAY W. HOOD
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

JTF-GTMO Assessment
Afghanistan/Pakistan Detainee's

29 March 2004

ISN: US9AF-000972DP

Health Assessment: ISN 972 has a history of latent tuberculosis, Adjustment disorder with depressed mood, and Self Injurious Behavior. He is currently in good health.

Background and Capture Data: See TRCD Memo dated: 10 January 2004

Date of Capture: 11 February 2003

Risk Level: Medium

Risk Assessment: Detainee has been generally cooperative but has not been completely forthright. Detainee refuses to admit that the weapon he was found with was his or that he was a guard, posted outside of the Wahid compound. Detainee has admitted to having been a Mujahideen fighter for many years, but claims to have returned to being a farmer and an ironworker. 17

Detainee is believed to still be a low-level fighter and no reporting has surfaced to date that would identify the detainee as a leader.

Intelligence Value: Low

Recommendation: Transfer to the Control of Another Country for Continued Detention.

Exploitation Requirements:

CLASSIFIED BY: Multiple Sources

REASON: E.O. 12958 Section 1.5(C)

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