

[Nov. 18?, 1976]

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~/NODIS/XGDS

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

DATE & TIME: November or December, 1976

PLACE: The Oval Office

Kissinger: I would make a strong pitch on your papers. I would not have Phil in charge. It may be going great but I would move them and ask questions later.

President: I will look into it. As far as I know, it is going fine.

[Extended discussion on the above.]

Kissinger: I have two things. One is the Angola vote in the UN. I recommend we abstain, with a strong statement, but noting the unanimous recommendation of the OAU.


President: I agree.

Kissinger: I will tell Scranton.

The other question is cognac. You made a decision yesterday on the tariff on cognac. This is a fight between Dent and the French. I question whether you want a fight with the French in your last weeks. It will make an impression in France and maybe some nasty statements. I would reject the solution and keep on with the negotiation.

President: I took the middle position. Is it a big deal?

Kissinger: It's an emotional one. You might mention it at 11:15. It might cut off country exports, which it is designed to help.



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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, state review 8/10/04
BY: [signature], NARA, DATE 6/9/04

On the British thing, they have come half way. They are willing to agree to the IMF conditions, but they want a simultaneous safety net for the sterling balances. I would lean in that direction.

President: My indication is to be sympathetic, but it will be tough if Arthur is implacable.

Scowcroft: Burns will be opposed, but I think he will not be inflexible. It is my impression that he will accept a political override of his economic concerns.

[More discussion]

Kissinger: Let me bring you up on OPEC. [Discussed leak of comment yesterday.]

I called in the Saudi and Iranian Ambassador. The Saudi was sympathetic but the Iranian was a bit belligerent. We have weighed in with our European allies. I think a public mission would be counterproductive. So do the two Ambassadors and our own Ambassadors. Schmidt has already said he could absorb 15%. The Saudis said they might have to accept 5%.



Coyne

Saudi intercept

[Nov. 18(?) 1976]

P/K

? Nov or Dec 76

K I would make a strong pitch on your papers. I would not have Phil in charge. It may be going great but I would make them ask questions later.

P I don't look into it. As far as I know it is going fine.
(extended discussion)

K I have 2 trips. One is Cayala note in UN. I would not obtain the strong statement, noting various reasons of OAU.

P I agree.

K I will tell Stanton.

The other question is coverage. You make a decision yesterday on trips on coverage. This is a point bet Dent & Frank. I question whether you want a point w/c Fe. in your last weeks. It will make an impression on Fe & maybe some nasty statements if we don't reject a solution & delay on reject.

P I took a middle position. Is it a big deal?

K It is an emotional one. You might mention it at IIT. It might cut off party X, which it designed to help.

One British thing, they have come the way. They willing to agree to I & F conditions, but they want a summit. Safety net for Turkey

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- balances. I would lean in that direction.
- P My inclination is to be sympathetic, but it will be tough if Orstus is implacable.
- S Basso will be opposed, but I think he will not be inflexible. It my impression that he will accept a political overriding his own concerns.
(More discussion)

R Let me bring you up on OPEC. (Discussed last of evening yesterday)
I called in Sam's former Arab. The Sami was sejour. but a former was a bit belligerent. We have recognized in of our former allies. I think a public mission would be counterproductive. So do c 2 Arabs and one over Arabia. Schmidt has already said he could absorb 15%. The Sami said they might have to accept 5%.

