




DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09360



JTF-GTMO-CDR

18 July 2007


MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue,
Miami, FL 33172

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9SA-000216DP (S)

JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

1. (S//NF) Personal Information:

- JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Jamil Ali al-Ka'bi
- Aliases and Current/True Name: Jamil Ali Utayyan al-Kabi, Abu Rayan, Sufian, Jamil al-Hazni, Jamil al-Hind
- Place of Birth: Mecca, Saudi Arabia (SA)
- Date of Birth: 1973
- Citizenship: Saudi Arabia
- Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9SA-000216DP



2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in good health.

3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment:

a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously recommended this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) on 21 July 2006.

b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is assessed to be an al-Qaida member who engaged in combat against US and Coalition forces. Detainee is an associate of multiple known or assessed al-Qaida members, including senior al-Qaida leaders. Detainee is assessed to have stayed at al-Qaida guesthouses while he was in Afghanistan (AF). Detainee's connections and extensive international travel indicate he probably worked as a courier for al-Qaida operatives, using *dawa* (Islamic missionary duty) as a cover for his

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REASON: E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 20320718

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activities.¹ Detainee possibly received training at one or more al-Qaida training camps. His training possibly included advanced training in operational security tradecraft required for al-Qaida couriers. **[ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT THIS DETAINEE IS AVAILABLE IN AN SCI SUPPLEMENT.]** JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be:

- A **HIGH** risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies
- A **HIGH** threat from a detention perspective
- Of **HIGH** intelligence value

c. (S//NF) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee's assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be annotated by ➤ next to the footnote.)

- Added a clear statement of assessment that detainee participated in combat against US and Coalition forces based on his surrender with other armed combatants fleeing the Tora Bora battlefield
- Clarified detainee's capture information
- Noted that detainee's former associates, al-Qaida members Umar Faruq al-Kuwaiti, ISN US9KU-001206DP (KU-1206); and Abd al-Rahman Maadha Dhafir al-Hilala al-Umari, ISN US9SA-000199DP (SA-199), are now deceased
- Added reports that detainee was linked to the planners of the 2004 Madrid train bombing through his recruiter, Abu al-Barra al-Hijazi, and Fahd Umar Abd al-Majid al-Umari al-Sharif, ISN US9SA-000215DP (SA-215)
- Deleted report, now assessed to have been erroneous, that detainee was an associate of Zayn al-Abidin Muhammad Husayn, aka (Abu Zubaydah), ISN US9GZ-010016DP
- Incorporated reporting that detainee's name appeared on captured al-Qaida documents indicating he stayed at al-Qaida guesthouses
- Raised detainee's intelligence value from MEDIUM to HIGH based on his unique access and placement as a probable international courier for al-Qaida
- Added an SCI Supplement

4. (U) Detainee's Account of Events:

The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.

¹ Analyst Note: *Dawa* is an Islamic dedication or donation that includes religious instruction. This communal duty entails either organized efforts by missionary groups to spread the faith or personal testimony from a Muslim to those around him or her to join the religious community.

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a. **(S//NF) Prior History:** Detainee attended school in Mecca until approximately 1989, when he quit. From approximately 1989 to 1992, detainee was unemployed. He then began working as a Saudi Police Officer, but quit after three years because it was such demanding work. After leaving the police department, detainee began his own taxi service. In 2000 or 2001, detainee sold his vehicle to devote more time to *dawa*. During this time period, he supported himself with money from his savings and family. Detainee stated he was not a member of the Saudi military and received no weapons training.²

b. **(S//NF) Recruitment and Travel:** In June 2000, detainee decided to travel to Lahore, Pakistan (PK), for *dawa*. En route to the Pakistani Embassy in Jeddah, SA, detainee met an individual named Bakksh. Bakksh gave detainee the telephone number of Abu al-Barra in Lahore who could assist detainee with conducting *dawa*. Detainee obtained a one-year visa for Pakistan from the embassy and flew to Lahore via Qatar. In Lahore, detainee called Abu al-Barra, who picked him up and took him to a *dawa* guesthouse. In late November 2000, detainee returned to Mecca for Ramadan and to visit with his family. After two weeks in Mecca, detainee traveled to the Jamaat Tablighi (JT) mosque in Jakarta, Indonesia.³ While at the mosque in Jakarta, detainee met Luqman, who agreed to translate for him. Detainee remained with Luqman in Jakarta for seven months where he occasionally traveled to nearby islands within Indonesia.⁴ In mid to late July 2001, detainee traveled to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, where he resided in another JT mosque for approximately one month. While at the mosque, detainee met Shaykh Ustaz Omar, who suggested detainee travel to Pakistan. In approximately August 2001, detainee traveled to Karachi, PK.⁵

c. **(S//NF) Training and Activities:** Detainee stayed at the JT mosque in Karachi for one week before traveling to Quetta, PK, with four men he met in the mosque: Mohammad, Abdul Rahman, Shafiq, and Ghulam. After stopping briefly in Quetta, the group traveled to a mosque in Kandahar, AF, where they stayed for the night before proceeding on to the Wazir Akbar Khan neighborhood of Kabul, AF.⁶ Detainee stayed in a mosque in this area

² 000216 302 08-APR-2002

³ Analyst Note: JT is designated a National Intelligence Priority Framework (NIPF) Priority 2A Terrorist Support Entity (TSE). Priority 2A TSEs are defined to be groups that have demonstrated intent and willingness to provide financial support to terrorist organizations willing to attack US persons or interests, or provide witting operational support to Priority 2A terrorist groups. Affiliation with the JT has been identified as an al-Qaida cover story. Al-Qaida used the JT to facilitate and fund the international travels of its members.

⁴ 000216 MFR 26-MAR-2002, 000216 302 08-APR-2002, 000216 MFR 24-JAN-2003

⁵ 000216 302 08-APR-2002, TD-314/00685-02, 000216 MFR 26-MAR-2002

⁶ 000216 302 08-APR-2002, Analyst Note: The Wazir Akbar Khan area is a former diplomatic district occupied by the Taliban and al-Qaida for quarters and training (see TD-314/50195-02, TD-314/50977-02, IIR 6 034 0329 05, IIR 6 034 1192 03, IIR 6 034 1243 03, and IIR 6 044 0707 03).

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until approximately November 2001, when he heard that the Northern Alliance was approaching Kabul and slaughtering Arabs. Detainee fled Kabul with his four traveling companions, leaving behind all of his possessions, including his passport.⁷

5. (U) Capture Information:

a. (S//NF) Pakistani authorities captured detainee while he was attempting to cross into Pakistan in mid-December 2001. When he was captured, detainee was traveling with the commander of al-Qaida fighters at Tora Bora, Ali Muhammad Abdul Aziz al-Fakhri, aka (Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi), ISN US9LY-000212DP (LY-212), and a group of 82 other armed al-Qaida fighters fleeing Tora Bora. The group crossed the Afghanistan-Pakistan border in the Nangarhar, AF, region and arrived on 14 December 2001 at a Pakistani village, where their local contact convinced them to surrender their weapons. The contact then gathered the group in a mosque where Pakistani forces arrested them on 20 December 2001. Detainee was held by Pakistani authorities for about fifteen days before he was transferred to US custody on 2 January 2002 in Kohat, PK.⁸

b. (S) Property Held:

- Nine passport-size photographs and four photograph negatives
- 1,000 Saudi Arabian riyals (SAR)
- A Turkish currency exchange receipt for 4,120 Yemeni riyals, under the name Hussin Mohamed Saeed Dabeek, dated 2 November 1999
- A metal spoon and a vial containing perfume

c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 9 February 2002

d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide information on the following:

- Escape routes and tactics used by al-Qaida fighters evacuating from Afghanistan to Pakistan
- Use of *dawa* by Muslim extremists as a cover for terrorism-related travel
- Passport forgery networks in Saudi Arabia
- JT support to terrorist activities

⁷ 000216 302 08-APR-2002, 000216 MFR 26-MAR-2002

⁸ >000216 302 08-APR-2002, IIR 7 739 3396 02, IIR 7 739 3268 02 (number 60), TD-314/00845-02 (see section E, number 6)

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6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee's Account: The dates and locations of detainee's travel account are assessed to be true, while his account of his activities during those travels is assessed to be a fabrication to cover his jihadist activities. *Dawa* is a commonly used cover story among al-Qaida operatives. If detainee conducted all his travels just for *dawa*, he did so for an unusually long time. Multiple known al-Qaida operatives reported that they were in contact with him at locations where he claims to have been on a religious mission. Detainee's account fails to explain the appearance of his name on lists captured at al-Qaida safe houses, the facilitation of his travel by a known al-Qaida operative tied to the 2004 Madrid train bombings, his capture at the Pakistani border with a senior al-Qaida commander and 82 armed al-Qaida fighters fleeing Tora Bora, or his other associations with known al-Qaida operatives.

7. (U) Detainee Threat:

a. (S) Assessment: It is assessed that detainee poses a **HIGH** risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies.

b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: Detainee is assessed to be an al-Qaida member who engaged in combat against US and Coalition forces. Detainee is an associate of multiple known or assessed al-Qaida members, including senior al-Qaida leaders. Detainee is assessed to have stayed at al-Qaida guesthouses while he was in Afghanistan. Detainee's connections and travels indicate he probably worked as a courier for al-Qaida operatives, using *dawa* as a cover for his activities. Detainee possibly trained at one or more al-Qaida training camps. His training possibly included advanced training in operational security tradecraft required for al-Qaida couriers.

- (S//NF) Detainee is assessed to be an al-Qaida member who engaged in combat against US and Coalition forces.
 - (S//NF) Detainee was captured with LY-212 and 82 other al-Qaida fighters who fled the Tora Bora battlefield after the US bombardment and surrendered their weapons to a Pakistani guide. LY-212 was the UBL-appointed commander responsible for the defense of Tora Bora.⁹
 - (S//NF) Fahd Umar Abd al-Majid al-Umari al-Sharif, ISN US9SA-000215DP (SA-215), stated that a Saudi named Sufian (probably detainee) was in the trenches on the Bargam front line with SA-215.¹⁰
 - (S//NF) Detainee's travel was probably facilitated by a known al-Qaida operative. Detainee has stated that his travel was arranged by Abu al-Barra, who is

⁹ >IIR 7 739 3268 02 (number 60), IIR 7 739 3396 02, TD-314/13174-03 (page 9), 000216 302 08-APR-2002, TD-314/00845-02 (section E, number 6)

¹⁰ TD-314/00928-02 (see section B)

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probably Abu al-Barra al-Hijazi. According to Humud Dakhil Humud Said al-Jadani, ISN US9SA-000230DP (SA-230), Abu al-Barra was involved in a foiled 2001 attack in Morocco and the 2004 Madrid train bombings. Al-Hijazi is an associate of Zubair al-Halil, the mastermind of both attacks.¹¹

- (S//NF) Detainee is an associate of several known or assessed al-Qaida members, including senior al-Qaida leaders.
 - (S//NF) Senior al-Qaida operative Umar Faruq al-Kuwaiti, ISN US9KU-001206DP (KU-1206, deceased), who at the time of his capture in Indonesia was considered to be al-Qaida's operations director in Southeast Asia, photo-identified detainee as a person he knew as Sufian.¹² KU-1206 claimed he had seen Sufian in Indonesia and stated that Sufian came to Indonesia for jihad. KU-1206 also believed Sufian was from Saudi Arabia, and stated that he had asked Sufian to do chores for him.¹³ KU-1206 was a key jihadist facilitator and fundraiser in Indonesia during the time detainee was there.¹⁴
 - (S//NF) KU-1206 escaped from the Bagram Joint Interrogation Facility in July 2005 and was killed by British troops in Iraq on 25 September 2006.¹⁵
 - (S) Assessed al-Qaida member Abd al-Rahman Maadha Dhafir al-Hilala al-Umari, ISN US9SA-000199DP (SA-199, deceased), photo-identified detainee as being from the al-Taif area of Saudi Arabia.¹⁶
 - (S//NF) Admitted al-Qaida member SA-215 had detainee's name and phone number in his pocket when SA-215 was captured in December 2001.¹⁷ Detainee's phone number was also in the pocket litter of Yousef Abkir Salih al-Qarani, ISN US9CD-000269DP (CD-269), when CD-269 was captured.¹⁸
- (S//NF) Detainee is assessed to have stayed at al-Qaida guesthouses while he was in Afghanistan.
 - (S//NF) Detainee's name was found on lists of residents of al-Qaida guesthouses. The lists were recovered from computer media seized during an 11 September 2002 raid on an al-Qaida safe house in Karachi.

¹¹ 000216 MFR 26-MAR-2002, IIR 6 034 0355 05, IIR 6 034 0393 02

¹² TD-314/27674-02, TD-314/34424-02, TD-314/37629-02, TD-314/43019-02, IIR 6 044 0570 06

¹³ 001206 FM40 22-JUN-2005 (number 39)

¹⁴ TD-314/01678-03, TD-314/27674-02, TD-314/28932-02, TD-314/52757-02

¹⁵ IIR 6 044 0570 06, IIR 6 044 2271 07, OSC GMP20060925641003

¹⁶ IIR 6 034 0293 06

¹⁷ TD-314/00928-02 (section B), IIR 2 340 6122 02 (section B), Analyst Note: Detainee's phone number is listed as 5704655 (see TD-314/00685-02).

¹⁸ IIR 6 034 0023 07

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- (S//NF) One document listed detainee among 324 al-Qaida mujahideen and their trust accounts. Detainee was listed as having a Saudi passport.¹⁹
- (S//NF) Another document, entitled "Passports.doc," was recovered from a floppy disk seized at the same Karachi safe house. It lists the names and nationalities of 129 individuals, along with safety-deposit box numbers and their contents. Detainee's name was number 47 on the list. No contents were identified.²⁰
- (S//NF) Detainee's alias appeared on a list of captured mujahideen found on a hard drive linked to UBL senior lieutenant Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, aka (KSM), US9KU-010024DP (KU-10024). Detainee's name is listed on the same page with LY-212's alias and the alias of Riyadh Nasiri, aka (Abu Dujana al-Tunisi), ISN US9TS-000510DP (TS-510). The two were captured with detainee after fleeing Tora Bora.²¹
- (S//NF) Detainee's connections and travels indicate he probably worked as a courier for al-Qaida operatives, using *dawa* as a cover for his activities.
 - (S//NF) In June 2000, detainee traveled from Saudi Arabia to Pakistan, where he claims to have stayed for four or five months. He was met in Karachi by Abu al-Barra, who arranged for his lodging.
 - (S//NF) In November 2000, detainee claimed to have returned to Mecca, SA, for two weeks to celebrate Ramadan with his family. (Analyst Note: As detainee was originally recruited by Abu al-Barra in Saudi Arabia, it is possible detainee had contact with al-Barra or other associated al-Qaida operatives in Saudi Arabia during this stay.)
 - (S//NF) In late 2000, detainee traveled to the JT mosque in Jakarta. Detainee remained in Jakarta for seven months where he occasionally traveled to nearby islands within Indonesia.²² While in Indonesia, detainee was in contact with KU-1206, al-Qaida's director of operations in Southeast Asia. (Analyst Note: KU-1206 was a key facilitator and financier, and would have been a likely contact for an international courier.)

¹⁹ TD-314/40693-02 (detainee is number 51), Analyst Note: Such lists are indicative of an individual's residence within al-Qaida, Taliban, and other extremist guesthouses, often for the purpose of training or coordination prior to travel to the front lines or abroad. Trust accounts, also referred to as safety boxes or safety deposit boxes, were simple storage compartments, such as envelopes or folders, which guesthouse administrators used to secure the individual's personal valuables, such as passports and plane tickets. These items were entrusted to the guesthouse until completion of training or other activity.

²⁰ TD-314/42895-02, TD-314/47683-03

²¹ ➤TD-314/13174-03 (page 9)

²² 000216 MFR 26-MAR-2002, 000216 302 08-APR-2002, 000216 MFR 24-JAN-2003

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- (S//NF) In mid to late July 2001, detainee traveled to Kuala Lumpur for approximately one month.²³ (Analyst Note: KU-1206 would also have had good reasons to send detainee on errands to Malaysia, as al-Qaida was seeking to solidify its ties to Jemaah Islamiya, the dominant Islamic militant group in Southeast Asia.)²⁴
- (S//NF) In August 2001, detainee returned to Karachi, PK, and traveled onward to Kabul, AF.²⁵
- (S//NF) Detainee's cover arrangements and lack of a documented criminal record or known ties to terrorists at that time made him a good candidate to serve as an al-Qaida courier.²⁶
 - (S//NF) In June 2000, detainee obtained a one-year visa for Pakistan from the Pakistani Embassy in Jeddah. Prior to obtaining his visa, detainee established his cover story of traveling for *dawa*, and established contact with Abu al-Barra. Detainee met Abu al-Barra once he reached Pakistan, and was taken to a guest house he claims was affiliated with JT. Detainee claims to have stayed at JT-affiliated guest houses throughout his travel in Pakistan, Indonesia, and Malaysia.
 - (S//NF) Detainee served as a Saudi police officer for three years (approximately 1993-1996) and had no known criminal record. (Analyst Note: A clear record would facilitate his obtaining a visa and his freedom of travel.)
- (S//NF) Detainee possibly trained at one or more al-Qaida training camps. His training possibly included advanced training in operational security tradecraft required for al-Qaida couriers.
 - (S//NF) Detainee had a period of unexplained travel that provided the likely window for him to receive the required training. Detainee claimed he stayed in Karachi from June 2000 until November 2000. (Analyst Note: This is unlikely, as trip to Karachi immediately followed his recruitment in Saudi Arabia. Following this four- to five-month period, detainee began a period of extensive international travel, which ultimately concluded with his surrender with a senior al-Qaida commander following the fall of Tora Bora. It is more likely that detainee took the six-week basic training course at one of the al-Qaida training camps in Afghanistan, followed by the advanced course in operational security. Additionally, al-Qaida couriers, particularly those with international travel, were required to complete the basic training course at an al-Qaida-affiliated training camp and an advanced course in security.)

c. (U//FOUO) **Detainee's Conduct:** The detainee is assessed to be a **HIGH** threat from a detention perspective. The detainee's overall behavior has been semi-compliant and

²³ 000216 302 08-APR-2002, TD-314/00685-02, 000216 MFR 26-MAR-2002

²⁴ Analyst Note: Jemaah Islamiya is a Priority 1B CT target under the NIPF.

²⁵ 000216 302 08-APR-2002

²⁶ ➤ See "Al-Qaida Increasingly Dependent on Couriers To Communicate" (CIA, 19 APR 2003) in SCI Supplement

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sometimes hostile to the guard force and staff. The detainee currently has 31 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS, with the most recent incident occurring on 29 May 2007, when he was cross-block talking to another detainee. Other incidents for which detainee has been disciplined include inciting and participating in mass disturbances, provoking words and gestures, threats, damage to government property, unauthorized communications, failure to follow instructions and camp rules, and possession of food and non-weapon type contraband. Detainee has seven Reports of Disciplinary Infraction for assault with the most recent incident occurring on 28 February 2007, when detainee spat multiple times on a guard's face while being unshackled for his shower. Detainee had eight Reports of Disciplinary Infraction in 2006, and eleven reports so far in 2007.

8. (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:

a. (S) Assessment: JTF-GTMO determined this detainee is of **HIGH** intelligence value. Detainee's most recent interrogation session occurred on 30 October 2006.

b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: As an al-Qaida international courier, detainee would have had unique access to senior al-Qaida leaders, operatives, facilitators, and financiers in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Indonesia, and Malaysia. He traveled to mosques and guesthouses affiliated with JT throughout South and Southeast Asia. Detainee is assessed to have met with al-Qaida or JT facilitators in all these places. He probably lived and associated with terrorists and Taliban fighters in Kabul immediately prior to 11 September 2001. Detainee possibly attended a training camp in Afghanistan. Detainee is assessed to have fought on the front lines at Tora Bora, where he would have been placed in close proximity with senior and mid-level al-Qaida and Taliban commanders, operatives, and fighters, including other JTF-GTMO detainees. Detainee is assessed to have fled Afghanistan with LY-212 and other al-Qaida fighters from Tora Bora.

c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee probably has information of intelligence value, at both the strategic level and the operational level, but has not been cooperative with interrogators and therefore remains largely unexploited. Detainee can possibly provide valuable reporting about al-Qaida expansion in Southeast Asia, including significant contacts in Indonesia and Malaysia, financial networks, lines of communication between Pakistan, Afghanistan, Indonesia, and Malaysia, and al-Qaida's relationship with Jemaah Islamiya. Detainee can possibly provide information about messages and goods he delivered and about the senders and receivers of those messages and goods. Detainee can possibly provide information about al-Qaida operational security practices, and can likely provide information about al-Qaida training camps and guest houses in Afghanistan. Detainee also has knowledge of al-Qaida's network of safe houses and facilitators in Pakistan, which is probably still of value to US forces operating in Afghanistan.

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d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:

- Exploitation of JT by al-Qaida and affiliated terrorist groups in South and Southeast Asia for terrorist recruitment and facilitation
- Islamic extremist networks in Indonesia and Malaysia
- Al-Qaida operations in Afghanistan immediately prior to 11 September 2001
- Travel routes of foreign fighters between Afghanistan, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Malaysia
- Passport forgery

9. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 2 December 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant.

v/r,



MARK H. BUZBY
Rear Admiral, US Navy
Commanding

* Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessment can be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College October 2001 guide *Intelligence Warning Terminology*.