




**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09360**



JTF GTMO-CG

23 August 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue,
Miami, FL 33172.

SUBJECT: Update Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9AF-000968DP.

JTF GTMO Detainee Assessment

1. (FOUO) Personal Information:

- JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Bismullah
- Aliases and Current/True Name: Haji Bismullah, Klair Ullah,
Deria Khan, Nigava Barat
- Place of Birth: Fasil, Helmand Province, Afghanistan (AF)
- Date of Birth: 1980
- Citizenship: Afghanistan
- Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9AF-000968DP



2. (FOUO) Health: Detainee is in good health. He was followed by Behavioral Health Services in past for adjustment disorder but has since been discharged from their care. Has no known allergies and is not currently on any medication.

3. (S//NF) JTF GTMO Assessment:

(S) Recommendation: JTF GTMO recommends this detainee Retain in DoD Control (DoD).

a. (S//NF) Summary: JTF GTMO previously recommended detainee for Continued Detention under DoD Control (CD) on 13 August 2004.

CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES
REASON: E.O. 12958 SECTION 1.5(C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 20300823

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For this update recommendation, detainee is assessed as a senior-level Taliban member. Despite detainee's claims not to have been in Afghanistan during the Taliban period, detainee organized a network of personnel and logistic contacts to support their operations and his personal criminal ventures. Detainee organized operations to disrupt coalition operations when they threatened his profit making activities. Detainee facilitated operations that probably resulted in US casualties. It is assessed this detainee is a HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.

4. (S//NF) Detainee Background Summary: Unless otherwise noted, the following paragraphs are based solely on the detainee's statements.

a. (S//NF) Prior History: Detainee claimed his entire family fled Afghanistan in January 1996, soon after the Taliban gained control. According to his account, he returned to Afghanistan in November 2001, immediately after the defeat of the Taliban. Helmond's Governor, Sher Mohammed, named detainee Director of Transportation. Detainee oversaw operations, collected "tolls" on cargo trucks, and turned over money to the local bank.

b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: Detainee traveled to Saudi Arabia for the Hajj approximately 6-7 years prior to his arrest. Detainee claimed his only other travel outside Afghanistan was when he and his family fled to Pakistan after the Taliban took control in 1996. Detainee stated he knew nothing about HIG, Taliban, or Al-Qaida and further added that those against the new Afghan regime were becoming united in their efforts.

c. (S) Training and Activities: Detainee's position exposed him to many facets of bureaucratic procedures and governmental policies including: delivering payment to military troops, authorizing transportation of goods, attending counter-drug meetings, and running errands for numerous politicians in, and around, his area of responsibility. Detainee said that the governor assigned him bodyguards to protect him from enemies. Detainee stated that the Afghan government directed him to fight the opium trade in his district. The Governor of each province worked with district commanders to gather and burn all opium crops.

d. (S//NF) Capture Information: Detainee and three bodyguards traveled from Gereshk, AF, to Lashkar Gah, AF (Provincial capital) to meet Sher Mohammed. The group arrived at Lashkar Gah and traveled to Hotel Boast where Sher Mohammed had just finished a meeting with US forces. Detainee exchanged phone numbers with the Gereshk-based US troops and returned back to Gereshk. Detainee was awakened later that night to negotiate a problem between US forces and armed men associated with Sher Mohammed's brother, the sub-Governor of neighboring Musa Qala district. Detainee agreed to travel with US forces to their forward operating base (FOB) located in Gereshk. US forces detained him and transported him to Kandahar the following day.

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e. (S) Transferred to JTF GTMO: 25 February 2003

f. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF GTMO: To provide information on the following:

- Afghan military service issues
- Afghan politics and procedures
- Transit rights and authorization procedures
- Biographical data on political figures in new Afghan government

5. (S//NF) Detainee Threat:

a. (S) Assessment: It is assessed the detainee poses a HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.

b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention:

- (S//NF) Detainee is assessed as a senior-level Taliban member. Detainee served as the Director of Transportation for his province, commanded enemy forces, and facilitated numerous operations against US interests that resulted in US casualties. Detainee is associated with extremists who exploited the porous borders of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran to traffic drugs, weapons, and money.
- (S//NF) Detainee is assessed as Taliban member and supporter of extremist operations against US interests.
 - (S//NF) Detainee has a strong political and personal relationship with Sher Mohammed, Governor of Helmand. Sher Mohammed was originally the Taliban's second in command of the Helmand Province. Sher Mohammed and detainee's brother broke away from the Taliban and formed a resistance against the Taliban before 9/11. The new Afghan government identified Sher Mohammed as new governor of Helmand. (Analyst Note: Sher Mohammed probably broke away for financial reasons vice political or ideological differences. Sher Mohammed followed the path of several other post 9/11 governors in that they are really criminal heads of their respective provinces.)
 - (S//NF) Detainee and Sher Mohammed formed a partnership to warn each other about US Special Forces counterinsurgency operations. The pair used Afghan Military Forces (AMF) soldiers as scouts/spies to monitor US forces. AMF immediately notified detainee, who forwarded the information to insurgent operatives and Sher Mohammad. The network of operatives consistently

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compromised US forces and probably initiated several ambushes that led to American casualties.

- (S//NF) Sher Mohammed was very concerned about detainee's arrest. He attempted to gain his release because detainee had considerable information about the Taliban.
- (S//NF) Sher Mohammad assigned four bodyguards to protect detainee. (Analyst Note: The use of bodyguards was usually reserved for high-level Taliban and Al-Qaida officials.)
- (S//NF) Detainee and two of his bodyguards, Abdul Bari and Mohammad Agha, traveled to Pakistan to acquire a vehicle for a car bomb attack against US interests in the Deh Rawhud, Oruzgan Province area. A former Taliban member stated that the three men who traveled to Pakistan were associates of Mohammad Dost who planned a 107MM rocket attack against a US base in Afghanistan.
- (S//NF) Rozei Khan, former Taliban commander, identified detainee as a Taliban military sub-commander during Taliban's reign.
- (S//NF) Qari Abdul Rauf Qayumi US9AF-01443DP (ISN 1443), a known Taliban operative, identified detainee as working with the Taliban against coalition forces.
- (S//NF) Detainee was a member of an Al-Qaida supported 40-man Taliban squad led by Abdul Rais Wahid. This squad was credited with harboring and supporting hostile actions against US and Afghan interests. Their planned actions encompassed assassinations against Afghan government officials including Afghan President Kharzai.
 - (S//NF) Mohammed Hashim US9AF-000850DP (ISN 850) identified detainee as a Taliban member for over 6 years, and a member of Wahid's 40-man squad.
 - (S//NF) ISN 850 reported that detainee utilized a short-range radio and long-range satellite phone to provide information to "the team," referring to Wahid's group.
 - (S//NF) Wahid gave detainee and Sher Mohammad several vehicles as payment for providing logistical and intelligence support.
 - ◆ (S//NF) Sher Mohammed purchased a \$20,000 car for detainee.
- (S//NF) Fidayan Islam officials directed detainee to find local Afghans who were helping US forces and kill them. Detainee, augmented with 25-armed personnel and three trucks from Sher Mohammad, traveled the streets at night in search of US informants. (Analyst Note: Fidayan Islam is a local extremist cell that hoped to replace Afghan government through terrorist operations. The Taliban supported the organization with drug trafficking and transportation revenues. Detainee is assessed as a probable associate of Fidayan.)
- (S) The Central Intelligence Agency deemed detainee to be a threat to civil aviation in the US and abroad. The US counter-terrorism office further indicated that

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detainee could travel under two aliases, Deria Khan and Nigava Barat. Passports with these names were found on detainee at time of arrest.

- (S//NF) Detainee was involved in drug trafficking. Drug trafficking is the primary source of funds for Taliban operations. The Taliban uses drug profits to fund operations and to bribe government officials in efforts to “buy” their support.
 - (S//NF) Detainee was identified as major drug dealer in the Lashkar Gah area of Helmand Province and the Numruz Province. Detainee sold and transported heroin and opium.
 - (S//NF) Detainee was associated with numerous levels of counter-drug agencies and liked to attend anti-drug/smuggling meetings uninvited. (Analyst Note: Detainee probably used these meetings as a major source of intelligence concerning the latest government counter-drug activities. Detainee and his associates could use such awareness to circumvent any counter-drug operations/plans and continue his profitable venture.)
 - (S//NF) The pocket litter of dead Afghan extremist Hafez Abdul Rahim included detainee’s phone numbers. Rahim was killed while he attacked an Afghan militia base. Several other phone numbers found on the list were associated with known Taliban officials. The pocket litter also included three numbers associated with personnel involved in the Taliban execution of a Red Cross worker in Afghanistan.
 - (S//NF) Detainee’s belongings and pocket litter included the following items that indicate his senior status within the Taliban, Al-Qaida, or other extremist group:
 - (S//NF) A Thuraya satellite telephone. Detainee admitted the phone was solely his and that no one else ever used the phone to make calls. The phone memory contained several numbers associated with Taliban and Al-Qaida operatives. Detainee was asked about numbers stored in the phone’s memory and he became very defensive. (Analyst Note: Thuraya phones are common communication devices for Al-Qaida and extremist organizations operating in Afghanistan.)
 - (S//NF) A weapons list, including heavy machine guns and rockets. (Analyst Note: A Director of Transportation would not be involved with the procurement, accountability, or distribution of any weapons included on the list.)
 - (S//NF) Recovered documents included an invitation to a Taliban graduation in Quetta, PK.
 - (S//NF) Several stacks of money with a bribe list. 10 passports with various names associated with them, including a senior Taliban leader, then still at large. (Analyst Note: As Director of Transportation, detainee would likely not have had access, nor control of Afghanistan’s immigration and passport processes. Detainee probably provided illegal passports to Taliban members and supporters.)

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c. (FOUO) Detainee's Conduct: Detainee is assessed as a LOW threat from a detention perspective. Detainee's overall behavior pattern has been compliant and non-hostile towards the guards.

6. (S//NF) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:


a. (S) Assessment: JTF GTMO determined this detainee is of HIGH intelligence value.

- (S//NF) Detainee has information about extremist activities throughout the Helmand Province area. Detainee can provide information on drug trafficking, weapons movements, forgery rings, and financial networks supporting Taliban operations. Detainee can provide information on past and future operations concerning terrorist attacks on US interests in Afghanistan. Detainee can provide information on communications networks and protocols between anti-Coalition extremist operatives.

b. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:

- Taliban 40-Man Squad
 - Personnel
 - Past and Future operations
 - Al-Qaida support (money, equipment, intelligence)
- Information on High Value Targets within the Helmand Province area
- Travel facilitation on armed personnel and weapons
- Taliban Counter-Intelligence activity and procedures
- Location of weapon caches in Helmand Province area
- Taliban communication procedures and equipment.
- Helmand Province Drug Trafficking

7. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 30 November 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant.



JAY W. HOOD
Major General, USA
Commanding