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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Israel: - Yitzak Rabin, Prime Minister
Yigal Allon, Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Shimon Peres, Minister of Defense
Simcha Dinitz, Ambassador to the U. S.
Lt. General Mordechai Gur, Chief of Staff, IDF
Amos Eran, Director of Prime Minister's Office
Avraham Kidron, Director General,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

U. S. - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs
Malcolm Toon, U. S. Ambassador to Israel
Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary
of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Harold H. Saunders, Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Robert B. Oakley, National Security Council Staff
Peter W. Rodman, National Security Council Staff

DATE AND TIME: Sunday, August 24, 1975
6:15 - 10:30 p. m.

PLACE: Prime Minister's Office
Jerusalem

[David Kennerly took pictures of the Secretary and the Prime Minister in the Prime Minister's private office. The main meeting then convened. Photographers were admitted briefly.]

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

DECLASSIFIED *State Dept Review*
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *SA 9/18/03*

NSO MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

HR 10/16/03

CLASSIFIED BY HENRY A. KISSINGER
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (b) (3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to Det.

Kissinger: [On his talk during the day with Israeli editors:] It was a good session. They asked good questions, not at all hostile.

Dinitz: It's only us they're hostile to. [Laughter].

Kissinger: They're doing all right with me.

Peres: One wonders if it affects public opinion. The public makes its own judgment.

Rabin: Mr. Secretary, let's start. We have tried to. . . .

[A map is hung from an easel.]

Allon: Now you see Israeli generosity.

Rabin: We have tried to analyze the Egyptian demands vis-a-vis this area. I think what Sadat has put in the process of the talks is he stressed: one, the question of the oil; then he stressed the question of the passes; then, of course, the Beta Line. These were three basic principles, I would say, of this position.

What we believe that we can do now is: one, in the Giddi, to go [referring to the map] -- and we will go into the details later on. Then I think this completes his political demand in regard to the passes.

When it comes to the Beta Line, we looked first to his demand in the north.

Kissinger: It wasn't a demand. It was a strong Gamasy view, which I think would help him carry something.

Rabin: What we feel is that it is not any military need; I think it is psychologically needed by him. Because we are talking about the only forward line post of the Bar-Lev line that they didn't take in the war. And I think what he wants is to make sure that this famous position that didn't fall into their hands would be transmitted to Egyptian control. I see in this demand rather a political-psychological so-called victory, than any military consideration. I think what they would like to come up and say: "We have managed through this agreement to achieve that post that we tried so much to capture and we didn't." Since they will



make a hell of a publicity about it, it is very difficult under the present circumstances for us to transmit to Egypt. Anyhow we will evacuate; we might blow it up. It will be in the UN zone. But I think what they are really trying to achieve is not a military need but a political-psychological victory.

When it comes to the southern part, basically they said it is not important; it is nowhere. And it is very difficult, if it is nowhere, to make an issue. It is not related in any way to his basic political requirements. And it looks like a process of always grabbing more, grabbing more, for the sake of grabbing. If there were any real political considerations behind, that is one thing. But it is nowhere. They themselves say it is nowhere. It becomes unexplainable why it is a major issue for them.

Then comes the Beta Line and the Blue Line. I would like the Chief of Staff to explain these two lines.

General Gur: [getting up to the map] If we understood well yesterday, you emphasized two places -- one is the northern area, to which the Prime Minister just related, and the other was on that main road from Ismailia to Refidim, in that so-called knee in that area. And if we remember well, you said that Sadat would like some change in that area.

Kissinger: But that was not considered that important. He mentioned that as a secondary consideration.

General Gur: And then that if not to move their line, maybe we could move our lines to the same area. Now, what we suggest here is that there will be a certain move forward on that Beta Line in that area of the main road, in that knee, and there will be another move on the same road here in the Blue Line.

Kissinger: What is the distance we are talking about?

General Gur: Here [in the Beta Line] the maximum is about a kilometer and one-half, and here [in the Blue Line] it is about a kilometer. And I remind again the Giddi. . . .

Kissinger: Well, from this map, I can't at the Giddi see what it means.

General Gur: I will show you on the aerial photo. It is the place where you pointed yesterday with the pencil. I will show you.

Kissinger: Is it beyond 500 yards?

General Gur: Between 7-800 yards.

Kissinger: From the entrance?

General Gur: From the entrance! [Laughter]. Now, as we understood, for the Egyptians that area was not so important and for us it is, so what we suggest is if they get that area in the Red Line and that area in the Blue Line and the Giddi Pass, we should take back part of the fall-back position that was on the map that you showed the Egyptians. So that might be a certain change in the map. So we go toward them with two main changes on the main road. We move a little bit forward in the area of Umm Khisheiba and we move back in the Giddi Pass.


Rabin: What I wanted to say from the very beginning is, we take into our considerations the major political issues that he has tried to achieve but not just wherever he can to get half-a-mile here or half-a-mile there.

Kissinger: Is that all?

Rabin: On the lines, yes.

Kissinger: Well, I have to tell you candidly what I feared most is exactly what happened. I spent an hour with him defending that you should have the Beta Line, after having consistently told you that we would support some Egyptian advance over the Beta Line, and I defended this to him with the argument that it would enable you to be somewhat more generous with respect to his concerns.

I think you are totally wrong in your analysis of the north, because he's never pointed out that northern thing. That's been a Gamasy obsession, and he, according to all accounts, has some needs of bringing his military establishment along. This is the point at which Gamasy kept returning again and again. He didn't ever point it out himself. But when Gamasy kept returning to it, he finally said, "See whether, if he agrees to the rest of the line, you can at least do something up in the north."



So it is absolutely incorrect to say that Sadat wants to celebrate a political victory. Because he never raised this and he didn't even raise the Beta Line, on the assumption that my analysis to him was correct; namely, that this would enable you to be more forthcoming on some of the others.

Secondly, with respect to the southern line, I am in a totally impossible position for reasons which you know.


Peres: What are the reasons?

Kissinger: Well, you can't say you can't move out of the strategically important areas because they are strategically important but you can't move out of the strategically unimportant areas because they are unimportant and therefore why should anyone move you out of there. My assessment from having talked to people was that you were less insistent on holding to every last meter in the south than in the north, and therefore, I gave that as my personal impression. I hadn't even thought that this would be a debated item here.

Rabin: Now it is wanted everywhere.

Kissinger: Well, I can only say that we were under the impression when we were in Egypt that Sadat had attempted to be flexible with respect to your point and had given up what had been a fixed demand of his since March. When you say it is wanted everywhere, I mean, this mutual exchange here cancels itself out and he will never accept this, since he is already objecting to the other ones. So when you say it is wanted everywhere, what in effect you are saying is there will be no change at all in the line except in the Giddi: 200 meters more, after he's given up a major demand, which I sold to him on the argument you would be more generous.

On the south, I didn't even tell him this was needed to get a concession in the south. I told him that there might be a certain flexibility there, though I didn't give him any indication what. And in the north, he isn't getting anything, because it is a trade which even in terms of area is in your favor. And in the furthest point in the north, I believe it would have been extremely helpful to bring Gamasy along, not for a victory that he can celebrate. That was my impression.



So I will take it there. I don't think it will create the most congenial atmosphere. In fact, I think it is nothing. I don't think this is any movement on the Israeli side at all. On the contrary, it pockets every concession he's made and it gives nothing in return. That is my interpretation of this, which I will convey to him.

Peres: Why does he need the change? We go back to the same thing: 100 meters there; 200 here. We cabled to you, remember, that we are ready to make slight changes on the basis of mutuality. You said it is a final map and whatever we said in the cable we also told the Cabinet.

Let's see what is our problem: It is not a matter of 100 meters here or there. This morning, when they heard we may change 200 meters -- everything that is considered in the Cabinet is also becoming a public issue later on.


Kissinger: That's another problem I want to raise with you later.

Peres: So unless there are overriding reasons, what do we need all this trade? We listened to you carefully last night; maybe we got the wrong impression. What you have told us is that Gamasy is interested here and Sadat is interested here. We considered the two points. I don't think it is for him so much important as for us it may be important because "Budapest" is the last position we held during the war. Now it is going over to the United Nations. If it will go to the Egyptians, there will be a public outcry.

Kissinger: I don't make an issue of the northern part. I didn't know this. It is one of the many things which if you told me ahead of time.

Peres: We didn't know it until last night. We couldn't know it. Then you told us that for Sadat this part is important; otherwise, he wouldn't go for it. That was our impression, and then you said this point is important for him. So we went here; we went here [pointing to the map]. Now, here we changed a little bit so we can say with a straight face to the Cabinet that we did it on a mutual basis. For him here it is completely unimportant. His public never saw a map. Our public did see.

Kissinger: That's not his fault, that your public saw a map.



Peres: When I said "public", I mean the Cabinet and the Foreign Affairs Committee in the Parliament. I'm not speaking about the press. He doesn't have to go through the same motions that we have. But where maybe we can be a little forthcoming -- and I think this may be more important for Gamasy than the other -- is somewhere else, where we can also make a concession. Motta?

General Gur: Almost the same amount of area as here in the central place, we can do it here too. This is the southern part towards Ras Sudr.

Rabin: What is your major problem? Where do you consider the major problem?

Kissinger: I don't care about the south because I never raised it with him. My major problem is that, you know, if you showed the map to the Foreign Affairs Committee, you had to tell them that I consistently maintained that you had to move a kilometer and a half to two kilometers, he having asked for four kilometers. They can't now just pocket all of this and say, "Okay, that's done now and any other concessions you make shows that you are weak." I was told -- you convinced me on Friday -- that this was a major political thing for you, the Beta Line, when we talked alone. You convinced me of this. So I went to Sadat and said, "Don't go and ask the Israelis to move on everything simultaneously. I don't think you can ask a government that is already fighting courageously for this agreement to go to its Cabinet on Sunday and ask for more." So he came up with a formula on the Mitla that enables me to settle it -- which, after all, is, according to our own geographer, a very dubious proposition. But he agreed to that. He raised the Giddi. He said something in the north, and in the south he raised it partly for appearances and partly because I may have given him the impression that there was somewhat greater flexibility. Moreover, in the north I thought that there might be a few hundred yards for adjustment.

Peres: Did you suggest the forward position in the south?

Kissinger: Yes. When I go back to him and say, "they are willing to move back but in return for moving forward there they want a little stretch there" -- after he gave up the Beta Line, Umm Khisheiba....

Dinitz: But we are moving on the Beta Line.

Kissinger: He won't consider this....



Dinitz: This is exactly what you pointed out, Mr. Secretary.

Kissinger: I said to you, "If you want to do something that's generous, do it." But I don't think this will be considered a world-shaking event by him.

Allon: Basically, I think that during your last visit to Alexandria, you brought back good results. By and large, the lines are better than the Egyptians had in mind before your trip, and we appreciate that. What the Prime Minister tried to explain is this: Well, I am sure that you don't accept the Egyptian thesis that the unrest in this country vis-a-vis the interim agreement and the demonstrations and so on and so forth are organized by the government. We are facing a great psychological problem now and we are determined to get the agreement approved, and in such a situation, some points become symbolic, almost holy. So, as the Prime Minister pointed out, the Budapest is meaningless militarily for them and for us. It only can create. . . .

Kissinger: I didn't even know Budapest existed. I didn't even know the Bar-Lev line was that far back.

Allon: It has to be. It is only there because of the marshes, the swamps.

Kissinger: That thought never even crossed my mind. All I knew and all that Sadat noticed was that Gamasy kept coming back to that point. As a matter of fact, he already had it in the Disengagement Agreement. It is a Gamasy obsession. And that's why Sadat finally said, "See what you can do up there." The other one is more his idea, but, you know, both sides have to. . . . For the same reason that you say it is impossible for you to go back, I think it is impossible for him to let you go forward.

Allon: In the Giddi we are going back more than we promised the Cabinet and the Committee. In fact, we have still to bring it to the Cabinet for approval. But the three of us are determined to see to it that you get the Giddi to the line that more or less you pointed out, which is also a concession.

Kissinger: You know, I am getting very careful about talking to you at all. We are reaching a point that whenever I say something, then it



becomes a proposal, a joint position, an agreement, a demand. When I play around with a pencil, this doesn't mean necessarily.... I'll have to see it, and it may be helpful.

I want to talk to Joe. And Mac, you come too.

[A series of private conferences were held, on the American side and between Secretary Kissinger and Prime Minister Rabin, from 6:50 - 7:35 p.m. Then the meeting resumed.]

Rabin: Well, we will present a map after the meeting is over.

Kissinger: Can I see the Giddi idea?

[General Gur takes out and shows Dr. Kissinger the aerial map and indicates a line.]

Gur: That was the line we took seriously.

Rabin: Let's say this is the line, not accusing anyone of producing it.

Gur: In Washington, they already call it the "Gur map," so it's okay. They are going to blame me for it! This is the line that was before. We are talking now about going to the exact entrance. That is the rock that goes north; that curve that goes south.

Kissinger: That's what I already told them.

Gur: This is the line we showed before, the line of the exit.

Kissinger: I told them that you would go to where the rock goes north.

Gur: So this is exactly what we are doing.

Kissinger: That's no change from what I told them Friday.

Dinitz: Motta, the Secretary says that this is the same line that we have presented Friday.

Kissinger: I didn't present a line because you didn't give me a line. You presented to me orally that you could conceivably go half a kilometer, and then I said, where is that? And you said it is where the face of the mountain goes north.



Gur: This is exactly the exit.

Kissinger: But that's what I mean, since you didn't draw on a map where you were willing to go....

Rabin: But it is more than 500. I said 500 on the assumption that it is 500, but it is more than 500; it's 700 or 800.

Gur: According to your geographer, this is the exit.

Kissinger: No, according to my geographer it is down here somewhere.

Gur: No, your man was with me.

Peres: Hoskinson.

Gur: We were together in the area. We were walking all that area; we stopped here.

[Dr. Kissinger takes out the U.S. aerial photo.]

Kissinger: [to Sisco] What did I show them the other day?

Gur: What you showed them, I don't know. I am talking about your geographer. In the first place, he said that can be considered as the exit because the rocks open and the road opens to the lower area. And that's 7-800 yards from the point that I showed him in the area and that's the green line.

Kissinger: Can you make an X where you are going to go?


Gur: On your map?

Kissinger: Yes. [Gur does so.] This is a good map. Where did you get it?

Gur: It's a blow-up of yours. It's a blow-up of your first one.

Kissinger: It's a very good map. Could you give us a couple before we go?

Gur: It's much lower than the rocks here. More than 100 yards lower. You can see it on the photo. It's a very different kind of terrain.



Kissinger: Gamasy's argument is that you are dominating this whole area from here anyway.

Gur: Yes. Mr. Secretary, when we don't want them to drop their people with helicopters, we must be in that area. But if we are discussing the exit or the entrance to the strait, I think it is very clear that that goes south and that goes north, and that's what your geographer called the exit.

Allon: It is a fact that they, themselves, on their map [on the western end] refuse to consider it as a pass because they thought it was too wide. They can't use the same argument for defending opposite ends.

Kissinger: I will not do another disengagement negotiation in any event, but it is the second time I permitted myself to go to Egypt with an oral Israeli description and not a map. Because I will look like a fool. I will present it. What difference does it make to me? I told them that the points you are now giving to me are a concession for not giving the Beta Line; it is exactly the line you were going to go to anyway. It may or may not be true. I told him. I didn't measure whether it was 500 yards. I told him that it is a point which is about 500 yards. To define it precisely; it is a point where the mountain turns north, which is the exact description you gave me. And I gave it to him verbatim. To which their reply was that -- whatever one does in the Mitla Pass, where it is ambiguous -- it is folly, because any fool knows where the entrance is in the Giddi. It isn't there. That was Gamasy's reply.

Allon: We followed what was said by your geographer. Really, ask Motta.

Kissinger: Motta doesn't give one goddamn about my geographer. You know it. All I know is it does not exactly produce confidence. I told Sadat....

Rabin: You asked me for a description and I gave you the description. I didn't know there is another problem in addition to that.

Kissinger: You gave me the description to the point where the --

Rabin: This was before you left for Egypt?

Kissinger: Yes. In other words. I am going back to Egypt having told them that if they gave up on the Beta Line it would produce perhaps some generosity on the Israeli side, especially on the Giddi which is a matter of great concern to them. We are now in the position where I will have to tell them.... We didn't sit there measuring the 500 yards; I did it on the basis of the oral



description which the Prime Minister gave me that the line could be at the exact point where the face turns north.

Rabin: Exactly.

Kissinger: That is what you told me orally. They said this was not the entrance to the Pass.

Gur: So they are wrong.

Kissinger: So I will not go back to them and say, "you are wrong?"

Rabin: Dr. Kissinger, what I said to you orally on this issue....

Kissinger: You stick with?

Rabin: I stick with.

Kissinger: Then they said the Giddi is a special problem because you can't fake it in the Giddi. And they asked me to come back here and see whether I could get a more plausible definition. Because you are not doing it on the road. The road is still high up at this point, as you can see from this. On the Giddi we are bringing them next to nothing, next to no change from what they already heard.

Allon: I suspect that the Prime Minister was right in the description, but he was wrong about the length. It is longer than he thought.

Dinitz: Therefore, when you said 500 to the Egyptians, it could have misled you, but 750, whatever it is....

Kissinger: Look, we weren't sitting there measuring distances. We were sitting looking at terrain features. I gave them the oral description of where the line would be. We didn't have measuring criteria there. I said it is about 500 yards. I can tell them it is in fact 750 yards further. That isn't what interests them. What interests them is that they claim this is absolutely not out of the Passes. It is a dual problem in the sense that I sold them the other line, to begin with, on the basis of assurances that it was out of the Passes, and when Saunders first came up with his aerial map, I was astonished and thought there was some mistake.

Rabin: Allow me to say, Dr. Kissinger, it was your position, "out of the Passes." What we said was the eastern slopes of the Passes, and I believe



it is out of the Passes. It is not too far out of the Passes, I wouldn't deny. But it is out of the Passes. The line is not along the road in the Pass. I am sorry, but this is what I have told you orally. I said 500 meters, and then you asked me, instead, for a line.

Kissinger: It is senseless. I will present it. It is totally senseless to debate it. I will present it. But we are now in the position where I have made a massive effort with the Egyptians on the Beta Line with the argument that this might permit a rapid conclusion, might enable the Israeli government to be more generous, and they are getting about what one had reason to believe they might get anyway, plus no change in the Beta Line. We didn't sit there measuring 500 yards. We sat there looking where the face turns off and where the road turns off on that point, and they obviously think it is beyond the curve.

Gur: I have to add professionally -- I don't go into the other aspects of that line that you should notice -- but this is no doubt the exit of the Passes. There cannot be any discussion about that.

Kissinger: Well, I assure you there will be discussion about it. Because it is our own conviction....

Allon: He meant there can't be doubt; discussion can be.

Kissinger: It is doubted. We doubt it. Let's not delude ourselves. Our conviction is where I showed it to Dinitz; it is where our geographer thinks it is; it is where we think it is.


[Dr. Kissinger, Sisco, Toon and Atherton conferred in the Prime Minister's private office from 7:55 to 8:15 p.m. The following conversation took place at the table:]

Peres: Why does it make a difference?

Saunders: One could ask the same question of you.

Rabin: But we are withdrawing. He doesn't have the same problem. He has no Cabinet, no Parliament. He sees it as his territory. That's the psychological and political difference.

Saunders: It's hard to understand from our vantage point.



Peres: It's a problem of credibility. We were told: "Give a final line, and a fallback." Now we're asked again. It's a matter of credibility. [Rabin confers with Peres.] We were told to suggest a final line, so we suggested one.

The Giddi is of great importance to us. Even little children in Israel all know the map of the Sinai.

Saunders: I told the people who made the table model that they should make molds of it and make others to sell as Christmas presents! [Laughter]

[Dr. Kissinger returned to the meeting at 8:15 p.m.]

Kissinger: I can't add anything to what I have said. We will present it. It is not a procedure which we appreciate, but....

Rabin: Do you have anything about the warning station?

Kissinger: We have coordinates which are so different from what they showed us that I can't believe they are right. This is what we now got, but I think it is wrong again. [He hands a paper to the Prime Minister.]

Rabin: Do you have a map?

Kissinger: We do, but it has to be wrong because it is so different. [He shows on the map.]


Let me say with respect to the Giddi. I am not going to present it as the exit to the Pass. I am just going to present it as your position, and if he wants to accept it, that's fine. But I am not going to say anything further. He may accept it.

Rabin: Do you have anything about the open agreement?

Kissinger: Eilts and Fahmy had a discussion and we left it that I was going to discuss it in detail with Fahmy tomorrow.

Allon: What is their first reaction?

Kissinger: The major problem is that they don't want the Bab el-Mandeb and the cargoes in the open agreement. The other things, I think, are no major problem. But they are prepared to do them in a separate agreement. But that is not yet a formal position so that we would appreciate that this not be part of any....



Rabin: Which means that there is no change from the Disengagement Agreement on these two issues?

Kissinger: That's what we have to see, whether it is possible to have a change on those two issues from the Disengagement Agreement. That's what I want to see. I have sent a message to Fahmy today saying that it is a political necessity to show some change over the Disengagement Agreement. And that he should put his mind, if he doesn't like this, for an alternative for both. That's what I am going to discuss with him tomorrow.

Rabin: Then the American presence?


Kissinger: Well, his incentive for six stations is even less than it was before. Well, he's rejected that already. I have heard nothing more. We will let you know when we come back. We will have to make a decision on Tuesday whether to proceed or quit.

Allon: In addition to the geographic aspects of the agreement, what other problems do you think it is possible to negotiate on your next trip to Alexandria; I mean tomorrow?

Kissinger: You have to understand, Fahmy asked me that next time I start to come with things I am bringing rather than things I am asking. This he said to me "as a friend." You might say it is a trick. He said, as I was leaving, that he felt I spent a disproportionate time on what they need to do for Israel. You recognize that there is not a hell of a lot I am bringing with which to start.

No matter what you say, the Giddi thing is exactly what I told him before, according to your description. There is no change whatever. You know this. And we shouldn't keep playing these games. The fact that you said 500 yards and it is really 700 -- when I didn't measure -- it is not a change so far as he is concerned. He looked at the map which I showed him. So you are giving me exactly the same, after I told him the Beta Line change would elicit, in my view, some generous response. So there is a matter of American credibility involved here. Which doesn't mean he won't accept. He may accept it with a number of arrières pensées.

I don't have to explain at the beginning what I am bringing him. So we can turn immediately again to what you want. I will present it on the basis that I don't believe that the demonstrations are started by the Government and this is all you can do. If he wants an agreement, that's what he





has to do. Whether that's a basis of really bringing about a change in attitude, we can argue about some other time.

Peres: If I remember correctly, we shall go the whole way from down, from south up to north. About the southern part there were raised the following questions: (A), that the roads will remain temporarily, without reference to the future, which we accepted. The layout of the zone which was more or less accepted. And that no installations will be destroyed, which we have agreed.

Kissinger: But "temporary" is just a phraseology. The first phrase was "while a new road was being constructed." I think that helps you because it means that in two places where we were going to pretend that we were going to construct a road, we don't have to pretend. It doesn't help him particularly.

Peres: And you asked if we are going to keep the installations and we said, yes. And then the two possible changes in the south, which I still believe they may accept the Beta more than the other.

Allon: After the Giddi, what are the next topics that you think are possible to solve while you are in Alexandria?

Kissinger: Well, we have to come to some understanding about it. I will get from them a text of what they are willing to sign, as close to the text that we submitted to them as I can get it.

Allon: This is the one which we published?

Rabin: The agreement.

Kissinger: Yes. I have also asked them for some assurances on boycott and other matters, some of which should be in writing to us. But I have to tell you, so long as we are on that subject, when I read the Jerusalem Post today, I really find it now hard to know how it is possible to deal at all. Everything that's ever been discussed between us on the subject is in the Jerusalem Post. [See Tab A] And I don't know, it may be that Sadat wants this agreement so badly that he will swallow anything.

Rabin: On the other hand, whatever is discussed is coming from Egypt, too: no duration of three years. And, believe me, it doesn't help. Linkage to Syria.





Kissinger: Yes, but on this you know what the truth is. I am not complaining that you are telling lies. I am complaining that you are telling the truth. [Laughter] It makes it extremely difficult. All my colleagues and I were convinced today that we would face a very difficult time in Egypt. What can Sadat possibly do? One argument I had with him, with his colleagues on Friday night, which was not the most pleasant conversation I have had with Sadat, was that I was asking them to commit suicide by putting anything in writing towards Israel that was difficult to publish, since you would undoubtedly publish it. And since there was no possibility of having any secret understanding with Israel. So I found in the Jerusalem Post, "the following secret understandings will be included." Read the article [Tab A]. It is reasonably accurate. Accurate enough.

Allon: On what?

Kissinger: Everything we have ever discussed as possible Egyptian assurances are in there. At a time when we are discussing this. My colleagues and I were talking today and we said it would be bad enough if it were published after the thing were signed, But at a time when we are trying to elicit from them written assurances, to have them published is suicidal. We had always understood that eventually it would get slowly leaked out, so it was after the first Disengagement Agreement without severe penalty, and without excessive protest from us.

[Mr. Kidron obtains a copy of the Jerusalem Post and gives it to Minister Allon, who reads it. Allon and Rabin confer.]

Rabin: Can we have a break for a minute?

[The Israeli team retires to the Prime Minister's office from 8:32 to 8:38. Secretary Kissinger then confers in the office with Rabin, Allon, and Peres from 8:39 to 9:43 p.m. The meeting then resumed.]

Kissinger: You know that movie "Love and Death"? It's a parody of Russian literature. There's a character at the beginning who someone says is very attached to his land. He carries around a little patch of land. [Laughter]

Dinitz: Woody Allen.

Peres: [Reading from Israeli draft of Annex, Tab B:] "Thirty-six (36) artillery pieces (including heavy mortars) whose range shall not exceed twelve (12) kilometers" -- as we have told you.



"The total number of personnel shall not exceed seven thousand (7,000)."

"The parties will not be permitted to introduce into the area weapons of any sort whatsoever other than those detailed above. Without prejudice to the generality of this provision, this prohibition also applies to anti-aircraft guns or missiles of any sort whatsoever (including personally held anti-aircraft missiles), and to the preparation of mobile and fixed positions, fire-control centers or any other installations that are used or could be used in any way as part of an anti-aircraft missile system or network.

"Neither Egypt nor Israel will position in the Areas of Limited Forces and Armament any weapons with a range capable of reaching Line E and J respectively." These are the new lines of the Limited area.

"In that area of Limited Forces and Armament which this Agreement adds to Egyptian-held territory between Line A (in accordance with the Disengagement Agreement of January 18, 1974) and Line E of this Agreement, it will be prohibited to have fortifications or installations for forces of a size beyond that permitted in the area of Limited Forces and Armament in accordance with the present Agreement."

Now, stationing of weapons behind the area and anti-aircraft missiles. "Egypt shall not place anti-aircraft missiles within an area of 16 kms west of Line F."

Kissinger: What is Line F?

Gur: Suez Canal.


Rabin: It was 30 before.

Kissinger: Sixteen? They're now 20 kilometers behind. You let them move forward four kilometers?

Gur: So that they will be able to cover the forward line.

Peres: "Israel shall not place anti-aircraft missiles within an area of 16 kms east of Line K."

Rabin: Exactly as I explained to you.



Kissinger: My problem is entirely psychological. I couldn't care less. How far forward can they move their SAM's -- 14 or four kilometers?

Rabin: I don't know; we have to check.

Peres: The difference between the Alpha and Beta Lines is not alike, so there are places where they move maybe one kilometer, places where they move 6 or 7.

Kissinger: 30 kilometers from the Beta Line?

Peres: Yes, from the previous Beta Line.

Rabin: I don't know how it was defined in the Disengagement Agreement, either from the Suez Canal or from the Alpha Line.

Atherton: The Alpha Line which coincided with the Suez.

Rabin: I think you are right. But I'm not sure.

Sisco: [reads from the Disengagement Agreement:] "To a distance 30 kilometers west of the Egyptian line...."

Peres: 30 kilometers from the Alpha line. The worse they can claim is that it is 30 kilometers from the Beta Line which is now replacing the Alpha line. 30 kilometers is now 16, because the average is 14 kilometers from the Suez.

Sisco: There were two concepts. One, no weapons in the area that could reach the other line.

Peres: That's about the artillery.

Sisco: And then the missiles. Two different aspects is all I am saying.

Rabin: Allow me to explain: First, we see in it another step towards peace, which doesn't mean that we have to increase arms. We talked about 76 tanks because of the Syrians, but when it comes to artillery, if we will agree now that they can have artillery, that it is only short of the range to reach our line, we have got here not all equal lines in the new line. There are certain areas which are much smaller and certain areas which are wider. What will be then the range?



Kissinger: We have got to get a different concept.

Rabin: Therefore, we have to have a different concept. What is the concept? It is composed of three elements. First, to define specifically the type of arms based on what was in the past, in the Disengagement Agreement -- type of artillery, number of tanks, where we agreed it will be increased, and all types of arms. It is better to do it in positive definition of types.

Kissinger: I agree.

Rabin: And numbers and not to relate to range. Second, we have to add to that that there should be no weapons stationed in addition to that that can reach our line or in our line, for example. Why I say so? There are ground to ground missiles -- the Luna -- and they can be deployed either in the thinning-out or not the thinning-out area, but they can reach the range of our line. We don't want the deployment of Luna, or once we will have the Lance, to reach their line.

Third, the question of the SAM. We want to relate it not to the forward line, but to the lines that are the end, on both sides, of the thinning-out area, on equal distances.

Kissinger: Well, that's unfair to them because their thinned-out zone is much wider than yours.


Peres: But then we say 16 kilometers on each side. It doesn't matter.

Kissinger: It makes a hell of a lot of difference.

Peres: What we are suggesting there will be 16 kilometers from here, from the Suez, and 16 kilometers, say, from our line, which is here, east of our line, west of their line, west of the western Egyptian line and east of the eastern.

Kissinger: You have Hawks; they have SAM's, so the ranges aren't the same. But assuming the range is 40 kilometers of both, right? Then with your definition they can barely reach the front end of their zone but you can shoot well into the buffer zone.

Peres: No, we can cover....



Kissinger: Of course, because your thinned-out zone is nowhere as much as 10 kilometers, many places only two kilometers, so they get two kilometers plus 16, or 18, or if the range is 40, you can shoot 22 kilometers into the buffer zone. They, with the range, with 16 behind the end of their zone - why don't you make the same distance from the forward line? That is to say, the way we had it in the Disengagement Agreement: 30 kilometers from the forward edge? It amounts to more or less the same thing anyway.

Rabin: For us it creates a problem.

Kissinger: Why?

Rabin: Because we need to defend Refidim. Since we are withdrawing and we would like to keep the airfield in operation, it cannot be left without defense. And since we are moving back, we have to move not the air base, but the missiles, so that their missiles will not give an effective offense. Aircraft cannot defend it alone.

Kissinger: Yes.

Rabin: Let's not forget that we are moving backward and they are moving forward.

Gur: We did not change the concept: meaning that they will be able to protect quite efficiently their lines and if they are posted 16 kilometers, they still have 10 kilometers inside. If I want them to be relaxed, they must be sure about their ability to defend themselves.

Peres: There is a penalty for every Israeli retreat in this case.

Kissinger: I understand the concept. All right. Sixteen kilometers behind the thinned-out zone for both sides.


Peres: Otherwise, we would say, okay, stay at line Alpha.

Kissinger: In addition, you don't want weapons placed that can reach the other line?

Peres: That's right.

Kissinger: That may be interesting to them when you have the Lance. I don't know what the Luna is.

Peres: You mean Pershing? [Laughter]



Rabin: The Luna is the Frog.

Kissinger: You couldn't deploy the Pershing except out of Israel.

Peres: Except against Qaddafi!

Allon: How are we going to discuss this problem?

Kissinger: You apparently have a protocol on the military thing, technical protocol. Can you give us a copy in case it comes up tomorrow?

Peres: For the American party? Not to submit.

Kissinger: No.

Peres: Don't submit it to the Egyptians before we shall have discussions between us. The principles, you may, but the language I suggest that we shall go over it together.

Kissinger: You and we?

Peres: Yes. We can give you a copy.

Kissinger: Give us the principles, just in case it comes up tomorrow.

Rabin: We stressed the principles, the number which is based on the present number of arms.

Peres: No reason not to give them.

[Gur hands over copy of Tab B.]

Kissinger: I thought, in order to promote the work and since Sadat never meets with too many people, I thought I would leave Atherton and Oakley here tomorrow and anyone else who may be needed. Basically I only need Joe and maybe one other person. We will leave Atherton and Oakley to finish off the bi-lateral papers and to work on the draft agreement.

Sisco: The draft agreement for the surveillance?

Kissinger: For the American presence. So that we get that done. On the annexes, what work can be done on that? Assuming we get everything wrapped up, I will bring back from Egypt a version of the draft agreement



as close as I can get it to what we gave them and then we will have to decide where it leaves us on Tuesday. Secondly, I will bring back a letter on the duration as close as possible to what you agreed to.

Dinitz: The letter?

Kissinger: Duration.

Dinitz: That was agreed between us.

Kissinger: Let's not go through the same thing again now, Simcha!

Dinitz: I did not say that it was agreed with the Egyptians. I said it was agreed between us.

Kissinger: As close as possible as we have agreed to. That was agreed between us. Then we will see where we stand on those two documents. Maybe they make it impossible. Maybe there will be modifications. Maybe there won't be any.

On the annexes, how do we proceed?

Sisco: We have nothing drafted, so, (A), where the lines are is one of the aspects.

Kissinger: Where the line is, isn't that in Geneva?

Sisco: From A to B to C.


Rabin: The annex to the agreement. Without lines to be agreed to, there is no purpose to sign the agreement.

Kissinger: I am just trying to establish a work program. We can get the geography done tomorrow.

Rabin: What is the geography?

Kissinger: I will come back either tomorrow night or first thing Tuesday morning.

Allon: Do you think you will discuss also the other items, about economic and political warfare?



Kissinger: Yes. This is the station man [referring to Mr. Peres]: this is the political warfare man [referring to Mr. Allon]. I haven't figured out what Rabin's specialty is.

Rabin: The Beta Line!

Kissinger: You got yours!

Allon: Rabin is non-belligerency. [Laughter] We are simply dividing among ourselves. It's division of labor.

Rabin: What we have to prepare for you is the air photo for the Giddi and the maps.

Kissinger: Give me a separate map for the fall-back position for the Giddi. I need a map that shows that sliver you do in the north, the sliver you do in the south with an alternative of doing it on the Beta Line.

Allon: And the suggested spot for their early warning station.

Rabin: And we reject the other one.

Allon: It is agreed that their suggestion is not acceptable because it is too close to our line.

Kissinger: Their suggestion I will reject on our behalf. It might be that you have to fall back to the one they showed us to begin with.

[The Israelis get up and argue about another map which they mount on the easel.]

Peres: On the Egyptian warning station, you want a separate map or to put it on the same map as the Giddi?

Kissinger: I'm just trying to think. Give me a different map for the warning station.

Gur: It must be the same scale.

Kissinger: What would put Sadat's mind very much at ease is.... you mentioned to me once that it was perhaps possible to build a road to Umm Khisheiba from the north.



Rabin: Yes, I prefer it.

Kissinger: If one could say to Sadat that you won't use the Giddi road to get to Umm Khisheiba.

Peres: We would like to have it as an option because we can't do it overnight.

Kissinger: Until that road is built it would be something that would make it easier -- and otherwise only in an emergency.

Peres: Let us think it over.

Rabin: I don't see any problem.

Kissinger: I think it would be something that would help him.

Rabin: We will decide on it.

Kissinger: Let's think about it anyway, because it would take away one rationale for the American stations. So let's not rush into it. We might give you another American station. [Laughter]

Rabin: Then we will have to have seven posts. One for the road that enters.

Dinitz: We really want seven posts, but our fall back is six. [Laughter]

Sisco: What do we say to the press?

Allon: That it was a long and fruitful session.

Kissinger: We can't quit yet; it's only ten o'clock.

Rabin: Then we will have to discuss, Dr. Kissinger, on bilateral issues, the formulation of the letter.

Kissinger: Yes.

Allon: When will this take place?

Kissinger: Tuesday, or tomorrow night, the next time I am back.



Rabin: I would like to add a reference on two issues: The question of overall proposals, to relate it to what the President said in talks in June, when I was there. That is to say....

Kissinger: "Trust me."

Rabin: No, this was the second half.

Peres: "Don't pin me down."

Rabin: "One and one-half to two years, and on the rest, trust me." Instead of putting it this way, that it is impossible to do, and not to quote him, but to relate it to what was said in the talks on such and such date.

Kissinger: Let me think about that.

Rabin: And the same applies to the question of the Golan Heights, to relate it to what he said in September 1974. That is to say, not to say what he did say, but to relate it.

Allon: Not to quote him but to refer to the talk.

Sisco: In other words, to make references to them. We'd better get the papers out.

Kissinger: To look at it. We should put what he said to Mrs. Rabin. She did better! She elicited it from him first.

Rabin: He committed the U. S. to my wife not to press Israel to go down from the Golan Heights. [Laughter]

Kissinger: All right.

Rabin: We have also, what we discussed, the question of the timing.

Kissinger: Yes, on the timing. I think with all the time that has elapsed, I think we can get them to 6 months, but I don't think we can get them to more than that.

Allon: Six months for what?

Kissinger: Out of the central sector. Now, what would be best, two months for Abu Rudeis? It would be good if there were not a four-month interval doing nothing. If something happens after another two months.



Allon: It's three months.

Eran: Twelve weeks.

Rabin: I think we mentioned three months for Abu Rudeis. I have to check it. There are a lot of people who live there and we will have anyhow a real mess there in taking out the people, taking out the schools.

Kissinger: How many people do you have there?

Rabin: A few hundreds.

Allon: Families.

Peres: We would need busing!

Kissinger: A few hundred families?

Rabin: No. Children. And we have to find housing for them. We are dealing with civilians with all the problems involved.

Eran: Compensation.

Rabin: Negotiations about compensation. Who knows what? And especially finding housing for them.

Eran: 580 employees.

Allon: Is the old idea that the oil from Abu Rudeis will be sold to Israel through a third party still valid?

Kissinger: Wait a minute. This was your idea, which was one that we never agreed to.

There is certainly no trouble to have it transshipped, say, via Italy. That I think will be no problem. I think the less is said about this the better. I could imagine that this could work out in practice. You can't expect them to agree to it. It's an Italian company?

Rabin: 25 percent Italy, 75 percent Egypt.

Kissinger: The Egyptians asked me to raise one point with you-- two points. We got this message yesterday. One is on no destruction, which we raised. No destruction in the area.



Allon: We promise you that.

Rabin: In the area that goes down.

Kissinger: Yes. The second is, no demographic change in the Sinai. That is, no new Israeli settlements in the Sinai.

Peres: On their part as well?

Kissinger: They want no new Israeli settlements placed in the Sinai and that doesn't have to be in the agreement.

Peres: What do they call Sinai?

Kissinger: I didn't ask. I am sure they mean anything beyond the 1967 border.

Rabin: We don't ask anything in terms of the overall settlement from them and they can't ask us anything in terms of the overall settlement. It's either way.

Allon: At least you can tell them you tried and failed.

Kissinger: I've raised it.

Rabin: About the agreement?

Kissinger: I think it will fail.

Rabin: Then what else do we have? Then tomorrow we will work on the annexes.

Kissinger: Tomorrow they work on bilateral, on the annexes.


Sisco: I think we will work on the tripartite agreement.

Rabin: No, bilateral before we don't know anything.

Eran: The American-Israeli agreement?

Kissinger: Yes.

Atherton: On the American presence?



Rabin: Yes.

Kissinger: The Egyptian-Israeli we'll do in Egypt; the American-Israeli we'll do here.

Dinitz: The American-Israeli has three sections. One American-Israel, one American-Israeli-Egyptian....

Rabin: No, Egyptian assurances.

Sisco: That we want to leave alone for the moment.

Dinitz: And the third is Geneva, which can be....

Kissinger: The tripartite one will be worked on tomorrow. We will work on the tripartite -- and on Peres' definitions, what you gave us as a sort of annex to the tripartite agreement.

Sisco: No. Henry. This piece of paper [Tab B], we are going to try to pattern the tripartite agreement on this language. That's what we are going to try to do.

Peres: The American aegis.

Sisco: "Under the aegis of the US." Very good word, "aegis." Nobody knows what it means!

The President said in a speech he wanted a good American word for detente. Shimon suggested "rapprochement." [Laughter]

Rabin: Then we will have to send you the map.

Kissinger: To the press we'll say we can't give a progress report every day.

On the Giddi, don't get complicated. Just put an X on the road where it is going to be. Let the surrounding things be worked out by others. That's all I need. If you draw all the lines how they wind around, with the Vice-President sitting there, it will raise some questions in his untutored mind. [Laughter] Just put some X.

Rabin: We don't want misunderstandings.



Sisco: You want the line in the road or you want the X?

Kissinger: [thinks] Okay, draw the line.

Gur: Two lines.

Kissinger: How I wish we could have direct negotiations!

Peres: If we could have direct negotiations, it would be a permanent job, because we'd never finish.

Kissinger: Golda used to say: "If you get us direct negotiations, you'll be surprised by what we'll do." She was right! We got her direct negotiations and we were surprised by what you did. [Laughter]

Peres: About the technical protocol, when would you like us to sit to prepare the ground? The military protocol. Tomorrow? On these limitations.

Sisco: I think they are going to have enough to do on the rest of the things tomorrow.

Kissinger: If they can get to that, go ahead.

Allon: Can you give a hint to our friends here to get things moving and not just to waste a day on paper? We made some progress today and we are entitled to go ahead, as compared with yesterday or before yesterday.

Kissinger: Your definition of going along is accepting your proposal!

Sisco: We ought to be able to come to ad referendum some sort of an agreement on what this surveillance agreement is all about tomorrow. That's quite a complicated document.

Kidron: There are major problems?

Kissinger: Are there any major problems?

Atherton: There is the language on putting forward the US proposals.

Kissinger: That's a major problem.

[The meeting adjourned at 10:30 p. m. The Secretary's and Minister Allon's remarks to the press outside, and the Secretary's remarks on arriving at the King David Hotel, are at Tab C.]



PROVISIONS OF INTERIM PACT

Jerusalem Post Staff

The U.S. will not attempt to pressure Israel into large-scale withdrawals on the Golan Heights if and when interim negotiations begin between Israel and Syria. This is one of the American commitments to Israel included in the settlement complex now being completed.

Israeli sources recalled this commitment in connection with Dr. Kissinger's talks in Damascus yesterday with President Hafez Assad which reportedly concerned a future Golan interim accord.

Premier Rabin and other Israeli leaders have indicated they would be prepared for some minor territorial adjustments in an interim Golan accord but will not agree to the removal of any Israeli settlement from the Heights.

Other points in the current settlement complex, as learned from various sources, here and abroad, are as follows:

The formal, public agreement between Israel and Egypt contains six or seven sections. Its title is simply "An Agreement between Israel and Egypt" with no mention of the Geneva Conference. (The January 1974 Disengagement Agreement referred in its title to the Geneva Conference. Israel insisted that the new agreement drop this reference from the title, rendering the agreement more independent in format.)

The commitment by both sides to abstain from the use of force, both in their own dispute and in the broader Middle East conflict, is contained in the Preamble, which is an integral part of the agreement.

Other points are:

- Both sides undertake the UNEF mandate will be renewed "annually."
- Egypt undertakes to permit Israel-bound cargoes through the Suez Canal. (There is no distinction made between "strategic" and "non-strategic" cargoes in this formal agreement. Since the state of war is not ended, however, Egypt could still claim, theoretically, that it has the right to bar strategic cargoes.)

INTERNATIONAL WATERWAY

- Both sides recognize that Bab el-Mandeb, at the entrance to the Red Sea, is an international waterway and undertake to respect all international shipping passing through it and all air traffic passing over it.

- The agreement is to remain in force, the two sides undertake, until superseded by another agreement.

- Both sides undertake to pursue further negotiations aimed at an overall settlement of the conflict.

This formal agreement will be accompanied by a map and "annex" defining in detail the lines of withdrawal and the buffer zone, as well as the deployment of the American personnel in the Passes area. There will also be a "military protocol," to be hammered out by a joint Israel-Egypt working party in Geneva, which will precisely define the arrangements on the ground including in the "limited forces areas" on both sides of the new buffer zone.

- The Israeli line of withdrawal is all but agreed. It descends almost vertically from the Mediterranean coast to the Gidi Pass where it swings eastwards around the eastern entrances of the Passes. The towering Jebel Gidi, highest point in the region, remains in Israeli hands. South of the Mitla, the line swings west again to south of Suez City, whence it moves southwards parallel to the coastline.

- The "annex" will provide for Egyptian civilian administration of the coastal strip south to Abu Rodeis. The coastal road will be held by UNEF and Egyptian civilian traffic will be allowed on it. Israel will hold a parallel road further to the west on which both its civilian and military traffic will be permitted.

SHARE ROAD

- At two points, Abu Zneima, and south of the oil fields, where topography makes it impossible to build another road speedily, the two sides will share the road, under UNEF supervision, each using it at specific times each day.

- Each side will operate one surveillance station in the Passes area (the Israeli one at Umm Khaseba, the Egyptian one at an as yet undetermined site). American technicians will be present at these

stations in a passive capacity, but they will operate six other stations (although the final details of this arrangement are still under negotiation.)

The "secret" agreement between Israel and the U.S. contains several unpublished undertakings by Egypt, transmitted through the U.S. government to Israel, and also several political, economic and military commitments made by the U.S. government to Israel. This "secret" agreement will be deposited by the Administration with the Foreign Relations Committee of both Houses of Congress.

Most of its provisions do not, however, require Congressional approval under the U.S. constitution because they are "executive agreements." Israeli experts say that only the U.S. presence in the Passes and possibly also the U.S. commitment to guarantee Israel's oil supplies require Congressional approval.

EGYPTIAN COMMITMENTS

Among the Egyptian commitments contained in this "secret" agreement are:


- A commitment to agree to at least two further renewals of the UNEF mandate. This will mean, in effect, that the agreement will remain in force for at least three-and-a-half years, since an initial year-long renewal is provided for in the formal agreement, and this will only take place when the new deployments come into effect, some six months after signing.
- If any Permanent Member of the Security Council should veto the UNEF mandate renewal, the agreement provides for alternative methods of keeping the UNEF force alive or, failing that, for expanding the UNTSO (UN Truce Supervisory Organization, in existence in the area since 1949) to take its place.
- Egypt also undertakes in this "secret" accord not to join in a war on Israel launched by another Arab state during the term of the agreement. Egypt is free to act, however, if Israel is the aggressor.
- There is also to be a permanent mixed commission of Israeli and Egyptian officers and officials which will supervise the implementation and observance of the agreement. A UN representative will also take part in the commission's sessions, but Israel insists that, unlike in the now-defunct pre-1967 Mixed Armistice Commissions, the UN man will not have the casting vote. This point was debated in the U.S.-Israel technical working group on Friday, with officials on both sides casting about for an appropriate phrase to define (and limit) the UN role in the commission.



U.S. COMMITMENTS

Among the U.S. commitments to Israel in the "secret" agreement, in addition to the pledge not to press for substantial pullbacks on the Golan, are:

- A pledge of aid and assistance in the event of attack by another superpower. The two governments undertake to consult promptly on the nature of such assistance.
- An undertaking not to draw up an overall settlement plan for presentation at Geneva without Israeli agreement.
- An undertaking not to press for a further interim agreement with Egypt unless Israel agrees.
- A statement noting both parties' belief that no interim agreement with Jordan is possible but that peace between Israel and Jordan must come in one step.
- The U.S. undertakes not to recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization nor to hold political talks with it.
- There are also specific U.S. undertakings to supply sophisticated weapons to Israel — but details of these have not been revealed.
- The provisions relating to economic aid over the coming year have not yet been resolved, and discussions of them will continue during the shuttle.



Shaded area indicates the approximate territory to be evacuated by Israel under the interim agreement in Sinai. The new Egyptian line, which at present stops at the western edge of the UN Buffer Zone, is one of the points still under negotiation. Other outstanding issues include the positioning and manning of early warning stations, among them Umm Kasheba where Israel has insisted on retaining its presence.



243 15
Given to American Team
GRANT NO. 7 H. M. C.

(B)

~~SECRET~~

22.8.7

ANNEX TO THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN
EGYPT AND ISRAEL OF 1975

THIS ANNEX IS PART OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL OF 1975.

ARTICLE I

GENERAL PROVISIONS

1. Definitions

Lines and areas and other terms (as indicated in the map attached to the Agreement):

- 1.1 Line E: the Egyptian line.
- 1.2 Line J: the Israeli line.
- 1.3 Line K: the limit of the Israeli Limited Forces and Armament Area.
- 1.4 Line F: the limit of the Egyptian Limited Forces and Armament Area, (Suez Canal).
- 1.5 In the Mediterranean the Lines E and J will extend 12 nautical miles into the sea perpendicularly to the general direction of the coast, and the area between the Lines will be a buffer zone.
- 1.6 Buffer Zone 1: the buffer zone between Lines E and J.
- 1.7 Buffer Zone 2: the buffer zone of the Hamam Furoon area.
- 1.8 U.N. Area: U.N. demilitarized area with Egyptian Civilian Administration.
- 1.9 The White Sections: those sections of the Israeli road, along the Gulf of Suez, east of Line M, at (a) latitude UTM (3)235-(3)204, and (b) UTM (3)187-(3)175, as indicated on the map in
- 1.10 Line M: the eastern limit of the U.N. Area and Buffer Zone 2. This line separates those areas from the Israeli controlled area. This line will be 100 metres west of the Israeli road along the Gulf of Suez from the Ras Sudar area southwards.
- 1.11 Post E-1: Egyptian Early Warning Post at
- 1.12 Post J-1: Israeli Early Warning Post at Um Hashiba.
- 1.13 W.S.-1 -- W.S. ... : Points of USA presence (USA Warning Stations).
- 1.14 The map attached to the Agreement as an integral part thereof and on which will be indicated the aforementioned lines and areas, will be a map on a scale of 1 : 100,000 (USA Edition).
- 1.15 The limit of the zone for aerial photography of both parties in Buffer Zone 1 (the median line of the zone) is marked on the attached map.

10/16/03
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2. The Observance of the Cease-Fire

- 2.1 Egypt and Israel will scrupulously observe the cease-fire on land, sea and air



and will refrain from all military or para-military actions or blockade against each other, directly or indirectly. Each Party is unconditionally responsible for any such act conducted or emanating from territory under its control.

- 2.2 The Parties shall adopt all acts and measures as may be necessary for the full implementation of this Annex, and shall not adopt any acts or measures inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Annex.

3. Lines E, J

- 3.1 Egypt and Israel will refrain from and prevent any crossing of their respective lines (Line E and Line J) on land, sea and air, and will be unconditionally responsible for any such act conducted or emanating from territory under their control.
- 3.2 Any aircraft of either party will be permitted to fly freely, - Egyptian aircraft up to Line E and Israeli aircraft up to Line J.
- 3.3 Either party may fly up to the median line of Buffer Zone 1 (as marked on the attached map) for the purposes of aerial photography. Advance notice of any such flight will be given to the Joint Commission.

ARTICLE II

THE BUFFER ZONES

4. The Buffer Zones (as defined in para. 1.6 and 1.7)

- 4.1 The object of these zones is to serve as buffer zones separating the forces of the two sides.
- 4.2 In these zones a U.N. Force will be stationed. In Buffer Zone 1, in addition, there will be stationed other elements as specified in articles VI and VII.
- 4.3 It is forbidden for military forces, regular, irregular and para-military, to enter these zones or to be present except as specified in articles VII and VIII.
- 4.4 It is forbidden for civilians of either side to enter or to be present in these zones. Without prejudice to the aforesaid, both parties may agree on passage by civilians through Buffer Zone 1.
- 4.5 The U.N. Force will maintain observation posts and reconnaissance patrols along the length of the Lines of, and within the zones, in order to prevent incursions and other violations of the Agreement as relating to the Buffer Zones. The U.N. Force will deny and prevent access to unauthorized persons into these zones.

ARTICLE III

THE U.N. AREA

5. The U.N. Area (as defined in para. 1.8).
- 5.1 This area will be a U.N. demilitarized area with Egyptian Civilian Administration for the exclusive operation and administration of the oil fields in the area, and under the control of the U.N. Force.
- 5.2 There will be no change in the present practice of navigation in the Gulf of Suez, including the waters adjacent to the western coastline of the U.N. Area.
- 5.3 The armed forces or any other armed personnel of either party or of any other third party other than the U.N. may not enter or pass through the area or the airspace above the area.
- 5.4 Unarmed Egyptian civilians employed in the oil fields will be permitted to enter, stay in and exit from the U.N. Area. Access to and exit from the area will be exclusively in the Egyptian direction.
- 5.5 The U.N. Force will be stationed within the area and will maintain a network of observation posts, reconnaissance patrols and check-posts along the boundaries of the area and within the area. The U.N. Force shall enjoy complete freedom of movement and communication within the area and the Egyptian Authorities shall grant all necessary facilities, privileges and immunities necessary for the proper exercise of their functions.
- 5.6 Entry of civilians to the area shall be only by land or by sea through U.N. check-posts. The U.N. Force shall carry out checks and searches on anyone wishing to enter the area and on their personal belongings and cargoes, and means of transportation.
- 5.7 It is forbidden to erect in the area any fortifications, military infrastructures or military installations.
- 5.8 Egypt will be permitted to establish in the area of its civilian administration a small civilian police unit with the object of maintaining order among the civilians. This police unit will not exceed 120 policemen equipped with revolvers and soft, unarmed vehicles only.
- 5.9 No vessels or boats of any kind will be allowed to use any of the anchorages, harbours or ports, or any other facilities along the coast. Unarmed civilian vessels only, involved in the operation and administration of the oil fields in the area, will be permitted to make use of the anchorages, harbours or ports and other facilities along the coast, subject to the provisions of para. 5.6.
- 5.10 The use of light civilian helicopters in the operation of both on-shore and off-shore oil fields will be determined by the Working Group. The use of light civilian helicopters in the operation of both the on-shore and off-shore oil fields will be determined by the Working Group (as defined in para. 26). The use of air-fields or any other


installations or tracks in the area which might serve as airfields, will be forbidden, except for such helicopters.

ARTICLE IV
THE ISRAELI ROAD EAST OF LINE M

6. The Israeli Road and the White Sections (as defined in para. 1.9 and 1.10).
- 6.1 The road along the Gulf of Suez (east of Line M) will be under exclusive Israeli control, free of any restrictions whatsoever. Israel will be entitled to use it freely.
- 6.2 The White Sections will be open for use by Israel, Egypt and the U.N, until the construction of new alternative roads in the respective areas. Use of these sections by the parties will be based on the following principles:
- 6.2.1 Israel may use these sections free from any restrictions whatsoever.
- 6.2.2 Egypt will be permitted to use these sections for civilian transport only, under the supervision of the U.N.
- 6.2.3 A time schedule, and other arrangements relating to the use of these sections, by the respective parties, will be agreed upon by the Working Group, (as defined in para. 26).

ARTICLE V
LIMITATION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENT

7. Areas of Limited Forces and Armament
- 7.1 The area between Lines J and K, and the area between Lines E and F, will be areas of Limited Forces and Armament, in which neither party may station under any circumstances whatsoever, more than:
- 7.1.1 Eight (8) Infantry battalions - equipped with their presently standard equipment, (but not more than fifty (50) anti-tank missiles, Sager or Tow only, fifty (50) 81/82 mm mortars, fifty (50) recoilless guns).
- 7.1.2 Seventy-five (75) tanks.
- 7.1.3 One-hundred (100) armoured personnel carriers (these carriers will not include BMP-1 type and other APC's equipped with an anti-tank gun or artillery, which will not be permitted to be stationed in the area).
- 7.1.4 Thirty-six (36) artillery pieces (including heavy mortars) whose range shall not exceed twelve (12) km.
- 7.1.5 The total number of personnel shall not exceed seven-thousand (7,000).
- 7.2 The parties will not be permitted to introduce into the areas weapons of any sort whatsoever other than those detailed above. Without prejudice to the generality of this provision, this prohibition also applies to anti-aircraft guns or missiles of any sort whatsoever (including personally held anti-aircraft missiles), and to the preparation of mobile and fixed positions, fire-control centers or any other installations that are used or could be used in any way as part of an anti-aircraft missile system or network.



- 7.3 Neither Egypt nor Israel will position in the Areas of Limited Forces and Armament any weapons with a range capable of reaching Lines E and J respectively.
- 7.4 In that Area of Limited Forces and Armament which this Agreement adds to Egyptian-held territory between Line A (in accordance with the Disengagement Agreement of Jan. 18, 1974), and Line E of this Agreement, it will be prohibited to have fortifications or installations for forces of a size beyond that permitted in the Area of Limited Forces and Armament in accordance with the present Agreement (as defined in para. 7.1).
8. Limitations on Stationing of Weapons beyond the Area of Limited Forces and Armament
- 8.1 Israel shall not place within an area of thirty kilometres east of Line J any artillery pieces or other weapons which have a range of fire capable of reaching Line E. Egypt shall not place within an area of 30 km west of Line E, any artillery pieces or other weapons which have a range of fire capable of reaching Line J.
- 8.2 Anti-aircraft Missiles
- 8.2.1 Egypt shall not place anti-aircraft missiles within an area of 16 km west of Line F.
- 8.2.2 Israel shall not place anti-aircraft missiles within an area of 16 km east of Line K.
- 8.2.3 Within the areas west of Line F and east of Line K, the parties will be entitled to prepare bases for ground-to-air missiles. However they will not be permitted to position launchers and missiles in the areas referred to in paras. 8.2.1 and 8.2.2.
9. U.N. Supervision of the Areas of Limited Forces and Armament and other Limited Areas
- 9.1 The U.N. Force will conduct inspections at least once every ten (10) days in the Areas of Limited Forces and Armament, and in the other areas where restrictions as to armament are included in this Agreement, and will inform both Parties of the results of such inspections. Such inspections shall apply to all provisions of the Agreement. U.N. inspection teams shall be accompanied by liaison officers of the respective Parties. The Parties undertake to allow such inspections without any restrictions whatsoever within all parts of the Area of Limited Forces and Armament, and the other relevant areas as above.
- 9.2 The U.N. Force shall carry out additional inspections within 24 hours of receiving such a request from the other party, and will promptly furnish both parties with the results of each inspection.



10. Reduction of Forces

Both Parties shall, within the spirit of the Agreement, strive to reduce the total of their regular armed forces with the object of reducing the scope of a possible threat to the other party. Such reductions shall apply in particular to an area extending fifty (50) km from the Area of Limited Forces and Armament of either Party.

ARTICLE VI

EARLY WARNING POSTS WITHIN BUFFER ZONE 1

11. Early Warning Posts

- 11.1 Israel is entitled to maintain the early warning post at Um Hashiba (marked on the map as J-1).
- 11.2 Egypt will be entitled to maintain an early warning post at (marked as E-1).
- 11.3 Posts J-1 and E-1 will be excluded from the authority of the U.N. Force as according to this Annex.
- 11.4 In each early warning post installation the respective parties are entitled to station two-hundred (200) technicians and administrative personnel equipped with to operate and administer the warning post installation.
- 11.5 Each party may visit its respective warning post and may freely supply and replace personnel and equipment situated therein.

12. Approach Roads to the Warning Posts

Routes, methods of transport and other details relating to the approach roads will be agreed upon by the working group (as defined in para. 26).

13. Maintenance of Communication Cables and Water Lines


Communication cables and water lines passing through Buffer Zone 1, to E-1 and J-1 will be inviolable. Both Parties will have free and unimpeded access, accompanied by U.N. personnel, to such cables and water lines at all points for the purpose of their maintenance.

ARTICLE VII

THE USA PRESENCE AND FUNCTIONS

14. Function of USA Presence

- 14.1 The functions of the USA presence will be:
 - 14.1.1 Operation of USA Warning Stations.
 - 14.1.2 Presence in the close proximity of the early warning posts of both Parties.
 - 14.1.3 Aerial reconnaissance and photography.



- 14.2 Such USA presence will be independent of the presence of the U.N. Force, and shall continue until this Agreement will be superseded by another agreement. The USA presence will not be removed by unilateral Egyptian or Israeli demand.
- 14.3 General maintenance and other matters relating to the administration of the USA personnel, will be coordinated with the U.N. Force.
- 14.4 The administration of the warning posts will be under the exclusive authority of the Parties. Each Party will be free to operate its warning post in accordance with the functions of such warning posts.

15. Operation of USA Warning Stations

The USA personnel will operate warning stations within Buffer Zone 1 (WS 1 — WS ...).

16. Presence in the close proximity of the Early Warning Posts of the Parties

The functions of the USA presence in the close proximity of Posts E-1 and J-1 will be to verify that entry into, and traffic on the approach roads leading to the early warning posts will be in accordance with the provisions of this Annex. Such authority will not extend to the early warning posts themselves.

17. Aerial Reconnaissance and Photography

The USA will carry out aerial reconnaissance and photography of the Areas of Limited Forces and Armament held by either Party at a frequency of one mission every seven (7) to ten (10) days. Photographs will be made available by the USA to both Israel and Egypt expeditiously.

ARTICLE VIII
THE JOINT COMMISSION

18. Composition of the Commission

- 18.1 In accordance with Article V of the Agreement between Egypt and Israel of ...1975 Joint Commission of the Parties is hereby established under the auspices of the U.N. for the duration of the Agreement in order to consider any problem arising from the Agreement, and to assist the U.N. Force in the execution of its mandate.
- 18.2 The Commission will consist of three members: a senior and authorized representative of each Party and a senior and authorized representative of the U.N. Force. Each of the members of the Commission may be aided by advisors and assistants, and use methods of communication as they see fit.
- 18.3 The Commission will function one month from and will continue to function for the entire duration of the Agreement.



19. Tasks of the Commission

- 19.1 The task of the Commission is to supervise and to coordinate the implementation of all provisions of the Agreement and to deal with any matter that is raised by any member of the Commission.
- 19.2 The Commission may set up sub-commissions as it sees fit. Decisions of a sub-commission are subject to the approval of the Commission.
- 19.3 A special Sub-Commission comprised of both Parties will determine the process of transferring to the Egyptian Civilian Administration the oil-fields and the original civilian equipment situated therein.

20. Operational Procedure of the Commission

- 20.1 The Commission shall formulate its own rules of procedure.
- 20.2 The Commission shall be convened in its first meeting, one month after Thereafter the Commission shall meet once a week unless otherwise agreed.
- 20.3 In the event that either party requests a special meeting of the Commission, such a meeting will be convened not later than 24 hours after such a request is made.
- 20.4 The Commission will have its headquarters in Buffer Zone 1. Each one of the Parties shall establish and maintain in the Commission headquarters suitable means of communication enabling fast and efficient communication.
- 20.5 The members of the Commission, their advisors and assistants with their respective transportation will have unimpeded access to the Commission headquarters. They will also have immunity from all arrests, inspections or searches.
- 20.6 Decisions of the Commission shall be reached by mutual agreement of both Parties. Proceedings and documents will be in the English language.


21. Emergency (Hot) Line

- 21.1 A communications emergency (Hot) line will be set up for use in emergency cases and in cases where personnel, aircraft and vessels cross over into territory held by the other Party.
- 21.2 The technical details of this line will be worked out in the framework of the Joint Commission.

ARTICLE IX

TRANSFER, REMOVAL OR DESTRUCTION OF INFRASTRUCTURES IN THE AREAS VACATED BY ISRAEL

- 22. Israel will not remove or destroy any civilian foundations, infrastructures, installations or equipment that were in the area prior to the 1967 war.



ARTICLE X

THE U.N. FORCE

23. Presence of the U.N. Force and Status of the Buffer Zones and the U.N. Area

23.1 In the event that the U.N. Force be withdrawn without the prior combined agreement of Israel and Egypt before this Agreement is superseded by another agreement, the Agreement shall remain binding in all its parts.

23.2 Without prejudice to the generality of this provision it is agreed that the status of the Buffer Zones and the U.N. Area will be preserved. All arrangements in the Buffer Zones embodied in the Agreement and Annex will not be affected by the withdrawal of the U.N. Force.

23.3 This paragraph does not derogate in any way from the inherent rights of each of the Parties in the case of a material breach of the Agreement.

24. Agreement on the Status of Forces

The Parties undertake to enter into agreement with the U.N. as to the status of forces of the U.N. not later than after the signing of this Agreement.

ARTICLE XI

PROCESS OF IMPLEMENTATION

25. The Time Table

25.1 The redeployment of Israeli Forces to Line J will be accomplished by months from the date of the signing of the Protocol, to be drawn up by the Working Group (as defined in para. 26).

25.2 The redeployment of Israeli Forces to Line M will be accomplished by months from the date of the signing of the Protocol, drawn up by the Working Group (as defined in para. 26).

25.3 No transfer of any area by Israel will commence until the U.N. Forces referred to in the Agreement are present in full force as determined by the U.N. and the Parties, and are capable of immediately assuming their functions in the area.

25.4 The detailed timetable for the redeployment of the Israeli Forces, transfer of vacated areas to the U.N. Force, and the subsequent transfer by the U.N. of the specified areas to Egypt, will be determined by the Working Group.

26. The Working Group

26.1 A Working Group which will be composed of representatives of both Parties, shall meet (in Geneva) under the aegis of the U.N., not later than after the signing of this Agreement and will complete its task within



- 26.2 Each of the delegations shall be headed by
- 26.3 The Working Group will decide on the stages of the process of redeployment of forces, and other matters such as time schedule for Egyptian civilian use of the White Sections; approach roads to the warning posts; methods of demarcation of the lines; access points to the U.N. Area. It will decide on any additional measures for the implementation of the Annex. At the end of its deliberations the Working Group will draft a Protocol, including all resolutions adopted by the Working Group. This Protocol will constitute an integral part of the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement of 1975.

ARTICLE XII

FINAL PROVISIONS

- 27. This Annex constitutes an integral part of the Agreement between Egypt and Israel of 1975.
- 28. The map as according to paragraph 1.14 constitutes an integral part of this Annex.

* * *



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FROM USDEL SECRETARY IN
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E.O. 11652:

TAGS:

SUBJECT:

N/A

~~XXXX~~ PFOR, ISFONMIN ALLON AND SECRETARY KISSINGER STATEMENTS TO PRESS
FOLLOWING MEETING AT PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE, AUGUST 24, 1975

ACTION:

SEC STATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO:

AmEmbassy CAIRO IMMEDIATE

AmEmbassy AMMAN " "

AmEmbassy DAMASCUS " "

AmEmbassy JIDDA " "

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AmEmbassy TEL AVIV " "

AmConsul JERUSALEM " "

DEPARTMENT PASS NSC FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT AND NESSEN

UNCLASSIFIED SECTO 10089

Mr. Allon: Ladies and Gentlemen, we had a very long and fruitful session today. I think a great deal of agreement has been reached between us and the mediators on the American team. I do not think we can go into details for the time being, but we did discuss tangible problems related to the possible agreement. I think the Secretary of State can take with him important information to Egypt, and we shall be looking forward to his return to this country as soon as possible.

Kissinger: We reviewed those elements of the agreement

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Amb. Anderson 751

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S/S:R Sherman

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Page 2

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on which there is not yet accord between the two sides, and the Israeli negotiating team gave us some important clarifications and ideas which we shall be taking to Egypt now. We will have talks in Egypt tomorrow, and I will return here either tomorrow night or Tuesday ~~morning~~ morning. We are continuing to make ~~me~~ progress, and we have not encountered any unexpected difficulties.

Q: Would you say there has been a substantial narrowing of the gap between the two sides within the past twenty four hours?

Kissinger: Since we came into the area the gap has continued to narrow.

Q: Do you think it is possible to reach an agreement within the coming days or by the end of this week?

Kissinger: I still do not want to speculate on the basis of a deadline.

Q: Are you convinced that you can arrange an agreement between the two countries?

Kissinger: I said I am hopeful, and I continue to be

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hopeful. 7

Q: Is the question of the early warning sites now agreed upon by both sides?

Kissinger: We are making progress in that direction too.

Q: Do you expect to get the question of the American presence in the passes through the congress?

Kissinger: On the basis of consultation that we had before I came out here, we think that we will get it through the Congress, yes.

Q: Is there yet to be had an Egyptian agreement for American presence in the passes area?

Kissinger: We are working on that, and I think it is one of the areas in which differences are narrowing.

Q: Is the question of lines now agreed upon by both sides?

Kissinger: It is ~~an~~ another area on which we are making progress.

KISSINGER

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TAGS: PFOR, IS
SUBJECT: SECRETARY KISSINGER COMMENTS TO PRESS ON ARRIVAL AT KING DAVID HOTEL LOBBY FOLLOWING MEETING WITH ISRAELI NEGOTIATING TEAM, August 24, 1975
ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

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INFO: AmEmbassy CAIRO " "
AmEmbassy AMMAN " "
AmEmbassy DAMASCUS " "
AmEmbassy JIDDA " "
USDEL ALEXANDRIA " "
S/S-15 AmEmbassy TEL AVIV " "
AmConsul JERUSALEM

UNCLASSIFIED SECTO 10090

DEPARTMENT PASS NSC FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT AND NESSEN

Q: Will you please tell us the results of the meeting tonight?

Secretary Kissinger: We had an extensive meeting going over the various areas that remain to be settled. We made further progress in narrowing the differences, and I will take the Israeli ideas on a number of issues to Egypt. We will continue our exploration---

Q: Dr. Kissinger, do you think you have a deal at this point? Do you think it is all wrapped up?

APPROVED BY: *[Signature]* DRAFTING DATE: 8/25/75 TEL. EXT. CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY: Amb. Anderson *[Signature]* JEV

REFERENCES: S/S: R Sherman *[Signature]*

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Secretary Kissinger: I can not be sure because we have not actually started drafting anything yet? That will become clearer in a number of days, but we are making progress.

Q: What are your expectations as of now?

Secretary Kissinger: I am hopeful.

Q: That there will be a deal?

Secretary Kissinger: That there will be an agreement.
shuttles

Q: How many ~~shuttles~~/do you think it might take?

Secretary Kissinger: I have no idea, maybe three or four/
Um

~~WFF~~Q: (Inaudible---dealt with the problem of ~~Um~~/Hashiba?)

Secretary Kissinger: I do not want to go through every problem. This was one of the problems that remain to be dealt with. Since I came out here we have made good ~~progress~~ progress in relation to it.

Q: Have the Egyptians agreed to have American technicians man these listening posts?

Secretary Kissinger: That is another issue on which we have made progress.

The Press: Thank you.

KISSINGER

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