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MEMORANDUM

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

May 1, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Roger W. Hooker, Jr. *RWH*

Because of the apparent failure on the part of the White House to come forth with a plan to provide ongoing science and technology advice to the President, Senator Kennedy intends to schedule hearings in early June on S.32, his bill to:

1. Establish a Council of Science Advisors (similar to the Council of Economic Advisors) in the White House.
2. Require the Council to recommend annual levels of federal investment in R & D and to indicate how such funds should be allocated within broad categories.
3. Provide some money and technical assistance to assure greater input at the state and local level from the science and technology community.



According to Ellis Mottur, his principal staff person in this area, Senator Kennedy:

1. Is not wedded to the S.32 approach.
2. Was encouraged and impressed by his discussion with you on this subject some weeks back,
3. but is concerned that nothing has emerged from the White House.

THE WHITE HOUSE THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN...  
WASHINGTON

MEETING ON SCIENCE ADVISER  
Tuesday, May 13, 1975  
12:15 p.m. (30 mins.)  
The Oval Office

From: Jim Cannon



I. PURPOSE:

To resolve organizational issue on the Science Adviser question.

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS AND PRESS PLAN

A. Background: In December, you asked the Vice President to study this issue and report to you. Since that time various options have been recommended by the Vice President and others. A paper identifying these options is at Tab A.

B. Participants: The Vice President  
Don Rumsfeld  
Jim Lynn  
Jim Cannon

C. Press Plan: Not to be announced.





THE WHITE  
WASHINGTON

ACTION

April 24, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: JIM CANNON *JC*  
SUBJECT: Science and Technology  
Adviser to the President



BACKGROUND:

Some time ago you requested a recommendation from the Vice President on a Science and Technology Adviser to the Administration.

The Vice President submitted a proposal, then conducted additional research and submitted another proposal on March 3, 1975 (Tab I).

You then indicated an interest in having a study made of what previous Presidential science advisers had actually accomplished for the Presidents they served. One outside analysis is at Tab II. An evaluation by Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., who was the first adviser to President Eisenhower and one of the best of all science advisers, is at Tab III.

The 15-year record of the office indicates, in sum, that when a Presidential science adviser had a clear and specific objective within the President's broader goals, provided a wider range of solutions for the President, and kept his own ambitions and ego in check, he made great contributions to government and was a major political asset.

The best example of the effectiveness of the Presidential scientific apparatus came in the late Fifties, under President Eisenhower. It met a visible need to catch up with the Russian space and missile technological advances, gave a sense of confidence to the American people, and thereby became a political plus for the President.

Today's need for scientific and technological advances to meet energy needs appears to be somewhat analogous.

Any proposal for a Scientific Adviser would be a new spending program, but it seems to me that it could be justified if it were related closely to energy.

### CONGRESSIONAL SITUATION

1. Congress is likely to pass some kind of Science and Technology bill at this session. The House Committee on Science and Technology is committed to passage of a bill creating a Council of Advisers on Science and Technology in the Executive Office. On March 6, 1975 Representatives Teague and Mosher introduced a comprehensive bill that would--
  - a) write into law a national science policy,
  - b) create a five-member Council of Advisers, with a Chairman to be Science Adviser to the President,
  - c) establish a Cabinet level Secretary of Research and Technology Operations, and,
  - d) form a government corporation to promote public use of research and development.
2. Informal discussions with House Science and Technology Committee members and staff indicates that the House Committee is flexible and wants to work with your staff on passage of a bill that is acceptable to you. But it appears that Chairman Teague's Committee does want the President and his Administration to have a strong, effective and visible scientific advisory group.
3. The Senate is likely to pass a Science and Technology bill at least as extensive as the proposed House bill.



### OPTIONS

Following are three options offered by the Vice President and a fourth recommendation by Phil Buchen which have been staffed to your senior staff for comments and recommendations. Their responses have been summarized and are included with each option for your consideration on the following pages.

Description:

A three-member Council of Technology and Science Advisers with up to 20 assistants.

Cost:

\$2.5 - \$5 million annually.

Arguments for:

Such an approach would be a substantial commitment that would enable initiatives in a full range of subject areas. It would be well received by the scientific and academic community and would probably satisfy Congress.

Arguments against:

It would be a large and costly operation and difficult to integrate into the present White House Staff.

Recommend:

None

\_\_\_\_\_ Agree

DR7 Disagree

Description:

A single Director of Technology and Science with up to 17 assistants as needed.

Cost:

Initial cost would be \$1 - \$1.5 million annually.

Arguments for:

A single director would provide a better reactive capacity and a clearer identity. This option would probably be acceptable to Congress, and would be less costly than what Congress is likely to come up with. The staff would be easier to organize and integrate than Option 1.



Arguments against:

Expenditures and staff additions are still large and the organization could not be set up quickly.

Recommend:

Jim Cannon "Since previous Presidential science advisers were most effective in solving specific problems subject to scientific and technological resolution, I would recommend this option, with the Director specifically directed to work with your energy group toward reaching your energy independence goals. But I think the spending could be scaled down."

Russ Train "An organization comparable to the former office of Science and Technology, if established, could have strong positive reactions throughout the scientific and academic community."

Ted Marrs "With a larger budget this office would be a potentially, highly productive function which can pay its way - if properly managed - by savings through selectivity and coordination of scientific activities."

Russ Peterson "Important for President to have a separate and direct input from a scientific adviser; thus, a single person rather than a Council."

927  
Agree With more limited staff + less funding Disagree



Description:

A Science and Technology adviser with up to three assistants.

Cost:


\$100,00 - \$200,00 annually.

Arguments for:

Extremely simple approach whose cost would be relatively minor and such an effort could be in place quickly. Only administrative action would be required.

Arguments against:

This approach would have limited capability in terms of issues it could deal with on its own and thus would have to rely almost exclusively on outside resources. It probably would not preclude further action by Congress.



Recommend:

- Jack Marsh "This group could get cracking quickly and instead of trying to become the big problem solvers themselves, could draw on the manifold sources already in place in a dozen existing agencies."
- Bob Goldwin "Should avoid establishing one more operative group within the White House. There is already a vast scientific enterprise in America but the President does need to be advised and informed by an S & T Adviser. However, three assistants are too low, just as seventeen would be too many."
- Frank Zarb "Appointment of a Science Adviser, but with a small staff, would draw favorable response from the science community, the Congress and the public at large."
- Alan Greenspan "Recommends this option but holds out for the possibility of a more elaborate apparatus at some future time pending further evaluation and review."
- Paul O'Neill Supports this option, with comments (Tab IV).
- Max Friedersdorf Supports this option.

\_\_\_\_\_ Agree

MR7

Disagree

Description:

The appointment of a Scientific and Technology Liaison Adviser to the President who would serve simply as a point of contact between the Administration and the Scientific community.



Cost:

Minimal (no dollar estimate)

Arguments for:

A simple step which could be taken immediately at little cost. It would be understood as having no substantive responsibility other than liaison and as a point of contact and therefore would not create false expectations.

Arguments against:

Would probably not satisfy Congress and might be viewed in the scientific community as no more than a token effort.

Recommend:

Phil Buchen "The subject matter of science and technology is much too diverse to make feasible a substantive advisory role with anything less than the kind of staff indicated by Option 1. Since substantive advice is normally provided through the expertise of the departments and agencies who, if there is need on occasion for an additional viewpoint, can bring an appropriate outside adviser to the President -- not to formulate any in-house White House position on the subject."

Bill Seidman "The S & T proposal falls under the umbrella of no new spending programs, and every effort should be made to hold the line against unnecessary expenditures as well as the appearance of a new spending program. A White House staff member designated to undertake liaison with the already existing National Science Foundation seems adequate. Another layer of bureaucracy is not needed."

\_\_\_\_\_ Agree

WPS

Disagree




THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

March 3, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: The Vice President *Watz*

SUBJECT: Re-establishing a Science and Technology  
Advisory Apparatus in the Executive Office  
of the President



This is in response to your request for a memorandum concerning the re-establishment of a science and technology advisory apparatus in the Executive Office of the President.

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- Tab A - Problem
- Tab B - Background
- Tab C - Functions
- Tab D - Structure
  - Option 1 - Creation of a Council of Technology and Science Advisers
  - Option 2 - Creation of an Office of Technology and Science
  - Option 3 - Appointment of a Science and Technology Adviser to the President

PROBLEM

The dissolution of the science advisory structure in the White House in 1973 was greeted with great dismay by the scientific community. Pressure is growing steadily from scientific community leaders for action to restore some science presence in the White House.

A June 1974 report by a special committee of the National Academy of Sciences, recommending the creation of a Council on Science and Technology in the Executive Office of the President, has heightened this pressure and has made likely Congressional action to re-establish some kind of scientific and technical policy organization in the Executive Office of the President.

BACKGROUNDPresident Truman

The concept of providing scientific and technical advice directly to the President in a formal way was initiated by President Truman in 1951. The Scientific Advisory Committee in the Office of Defense Mobilization met occasionally with the President and, in spite of its location in the Department of Defense, had direct access to the President. President Truman, himself, recognized this function of the group and dealt with them as personal advisers.

President Eisenhower

The "Sputnik" crisis of 1957 created a political situation that made it advisable to locate a scientific advisory structure in the White House itself. Accordingly, the scientific advisory function which was located in the Office of Defense Mobilization was moved to the White House and greatly expanded. An official with the title of Science Adviser to the President was appointed and a President's Science Advisory Committee was established.

The President's Science Adviser also served as Chairman of the new interagency Federal Council on Science and Technology, which took over the function of coordinating all of the scientific research and technical development going on with the Federal Government.

President Kennedy

In 1962, under a reorganization measure of the Executive Branch, President Kennedy created a large staff office in the White House under the Science Adviser to assist in advising the President and in overseeing the burgeoning Federal responsibility for science and technology. This office, called the Office of Science and Technology, also served as the staff arm of the President's Science Advisory Committee.

The Office of Science and Technology and the President's Science Advisory Committee were remarkably successful in heightening the overall interest in scientific and technical developments among the various Departments of the Federal government. In fact, their creation sparked the establishment of line offices in charge of scientific research and development in all of the operating Departments of the Federal government.

Through the early and middle 1960s, the Office of Science and Technology enjoyed a fairly prominent position in the White House, as the space and defense programs dominated the national scene. As the national focus shifted to the economic and social problems of the late Sixties, however, the role of the Office of Science and Technology in national policy formulation became less clear and its influence in the White House less substantial.

### President Nixon

During the late Sixties and the early Seventies, the Office of Science and Technology became more and more of a "special pleader" for its science constituency -- advocating positions and ideologies not always consistent with Administration policy. Instead of serving to advise the President, the Office of Science and Technology often became his critic.

Finally, in July 1973, President Nixon abolished the position of Science Adviser, the Office of Science and Technology and the President's Science Advisory Committee. The functions of the Science Adviser were given to the Director of the National Science Foundation and those of the Office of Science and Technology and the President's Science Advisory Committee transferred to the National Science Foundation in civilian areas and the National Security Council in military areas.

Although many scientists viewed the dissolution of the science advisory structure in the White House as purely politically motivated, there were several good reasons for making some kind of change.

1. By the early 1970s, virtually all Federal Departments had developed their own scientific and technical arms. This significantly lessened the need for a large scientific and technical staff in the White House (which, after all, had no line functions).

2. The failure of the Office of Science and Technology's staff to relate to the White House policy formulating procedure made it difficult to integrate that Office's recommendations with those of other advisory functions in the White House. Therefore, as emerging national problems began to include components other than "hard" technology, the Office of Science and Technology became less effective and useful in contributing to Presidential-level decision-making.
3. As the Office of Science and Technology's allegiance to its constituency grew, its effectiveness in serving the President diminished.



## FUNCTIONS

The scientific community is now generally united in the belief that the President should have available to him an independent source of scientific and technological judgment on a wide range of areas, including:

- social and behavioral sciences;
- physical and life sciences;
- medicine;
- engineering;
- international aspects of science and technology;
- science and technology in the private sector;
- education and training of scientific manpower.

They have pointed out that a White House science and technology advisory apparatus could perform the following vital functions:

1. Advising the President in the formulation and review of national policies in areas involving science and technology development. Energy, transportation, environmental planning, health care delivery and food supply are examples of these.
2. Providing technical advice for the President and his staff, including the Domestic Council, the Council of Economic Advisers, and the Office of Management and Budget, on specific issues and questions dealing with science and technology.
3. Working with the Federal Council on Science and Technology in coordinating the large existing in-house capability of the Federal government in scientific and technological research and development. There are approximately 100,000 people employed in Federal research and development establishments, and it is important to see that this large and sophisticated work force is properly and effectively employed.



4. Identifying and reporting on gaps in scientific research and technological developments in the public and private sector and initiating studies where appropriate.
5. Providing the President with "early warning" of problems, opportunities or developments that have a scientific or technological component, including some longer-range forecasting of such problems, opportunities and developments.
6. Consulting with the President on the appointments of various scientific and technical officials in the Federal agencies.

Moreover, the scientific community is now in full agreement that the proper function of such an advisory apparatus is to advise and service the President -- not to be public advocates.



STRUCTUREOPTION 1. CREATION OF A COUNCIL OF TECHNOLOGY AND SCIENCE ADVISERS

The President could propose legislation creating a 3-member Council of Technology and Science Advisers in the Executive Office of the President. The Council would be similar in function to the Council of Economic Advisers. The members of the Council would be appointed by the President from among the different disciplines in the science and technology fields. The Chairman of the Council would also serve as the President's Technology and Science Adviser.

(VARIATION: Some have proposed creation of a 7-member Council, composed of four Presidential appointees and the Presidents of the National Academy of Science, the National Academy of Engineering and the Institute of Medicine serving ex officio.)

STAFFING: The Council's staff would consist of an Executive Assistant to the Chairman and a number of professional assistants (15-20) and supporting clerical staff. The Council would also be authorized to establish ad hoc committees composed of governmental and/or non-governmental experts to do in-depth analyses of selected problems and issues.

FISCAL IMPLICATIONS: \$2.5 - \$5 million annually.

ARGUMENTS FOR:

- In essence, this is the approach embodied in the "Kennedy bill" passed by the Senate last year. It incorporates the recommendation of the National Academy of Science's special committee, and is fully responsive to the scientific community's demands.



- This assures greater depth in the science and technology advisory apparatus and greater representation and input from the various disciplines in the science and technology field.
- This would ensure an ongoing structure in the Executive Office of the President fully capable of rendering scientific and technological advice or performing such other related responsibilities as the President may assign to it.
- The authority to create ad hoc groups permits tapping of the resources of the scientific community.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST:

- This structure might be difficult to integrate into the existing White House operation.
- It is more susceptible to "politization" both as to its internal operation (with each of the three members representing the views of his own constituency) and as to its relationship with the Administration (because of the structural autonomy of a council).
- It would result in a visible increase in the size and budget of the White House.
- This structure is larger than is necessary to meet the problem and is also unwieldy.



OPTION 2. CREATION OF AN OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY AND SCIENCE

The President could propose legislation creating an Office of Technology and Science in the Executive Office of the President. The Director of the office would be a highly qualified scientist appointed by the President, who would serve also as the President's Technology and Science Adviser.

STAFFING: In addition to the Director, the office would have a Deputy Director (for administration) and, as is required

- up to five Assistant Directors (for various specialties);
- up to twelve professional assistants; and
- supporting clerical staff.

The Director would also be empowered to establish ad hoc committees composed of governmental and/or nongovernmental experts to do in-depth analyses of selected problems and issues.

FISCAL IMPLICATIONS: \$1 - \$1.5 million annually.

ARGUMENTS FOR:

- This is largely responsive to the legitimate demands of the scientific community and could, therefore, be expected to satisfy the Congress.
- It assures to the President and his staff the availability of a broad range of scientific and technical expertise. This would be tremendously useful to the Domestic Council, the Council of Economic Advisers, the Office of Management and Budget, et al.

- This structure will help to assure the development of an ongoing scientific and technological capacity in the Executive Office of the President.
- The authority to create ad hoc groups permits tapping of the resources of the scientific community.
- This structure is sufficiently flexible to permit growth of in-house capacity when and as necessary.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST:

- This would involve Congressional action to implement (and, of course, to undo).
- There are those who feel that this would unduly increase the size of the President's staff.
- Some contend that the need for a science and technology capacity in the White House does not justify the creation of an office.



OPTION 3. APPOINTMENT OF A SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY  
ADVISER TO THE PRESIDENT

The President could, by administrative action, appoint a full-time Science and Technology Adviser to the President to serve on the White House staff.

STAFFING: The Science and Technology Adviser would be authorized a few (1-3) professional assistants and supporting clerical staff, but would otherwise have to rely on National Science Foundation professional staff for support.

FISCAL IMPLICATIONS: \$100,000 - \$200,000 annually.

ARGUMENTS FOR:

- This could be accomplished by administrative act of the President.
- It would relieve some of the pressure for Congressional action on this issue.
- This would make available to the President and his staff at least some independent scientific and technological expertise.
- This would be relatively inexpensive and would not significantly increase the size of the President's staff.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST:

- This approach would satisfy neither the scientific community nor the Congress and, therefore, it could not be expected to avert independent Congressional action on the issue.
- It is doubtful whether, under this structure, the Science and Technology Adviser could "cover the waterfront." Therefore, pressure to increase the size and scope of this apparatus will continue.
- This structure is not suitable for the development of an on-going scientific and technological capacity in the White House.
- This structure is not suitable for tapping the resources of the scientific community on an interim basis since the Science and Technology Adviser would not be empowered to create ad hoc panels for special research purposes.



PRESIDENTIAL DECISION

Proceed with further development of;

Option 1 \_\_\_\_\_

Option 2 \_\_\_\_\_

Option 3 gm

Discuss gm

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 18, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

JIM CANNON *JAC*

SUBJECT:

Contributions of Science Advisers to  
Previous Presidents

SUMMARY:

The Presidential scientific apparatus was a splendid tool in the early days under President Eisenhower. It met a visible need to catch up with the Russians, and was an important political plus for the President.

But in time, the scientists corrected the specific weaknesses that had at first made them necessary. Then their proposals became more diffuse, and seemed directed at preventing ills that had not yet materialized e.g., food and energy. Thus they lost out to greater demands within the White House for solutions to problems that were immediate and pressing. To make matters worse, the scientific community became politicized during the Vietnam war, and was perceived as critical and unfriendly.

The 15-year record of the office indicates that when a Presidential science adviser supported the President's goals, broadened his range of solutions, and kept his ego and ambitions in check, he made great contributions to government and was a major political asset.

EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION

James Killian of MIT became science adviser to President Eisenhower in 1957 and was later succeeded by George Kistiakowski, a Harvard chemist. This was probably the most effective and influential period for science advisers.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS:

1. Following SPUTNIK, helped assure the U. S. public that the country's missile and space program was in good hands and moving ahead.
2. Prompted creation of National Aeronautics and Space Administration.



3. Provided the scientific basis for President Eisenhower's proposal which ultimately resulted in the 1963 test ban treaty.
4. Made a major impact on the ICBM program, including emphasis on solid fuel rockets.
5. Accelerated the development of a ballistic missile early warning system and anti-submarine capabilities.
6. Assisted in advancing photo reconnaissance by satellite.
7. Helped make available scientific and technical information for dealing with such problems as food additives and environmental health.
8. Helped strengthen programs for the education of U. S. scientists and engineers.
9. Through the respect and prestige they commanded, Killian and George Kistiakowski, helped reassure a shaken public that the U. S. ballistic missile and space programs would close the "technological gap" between the U. S. and Soviet Union.

PROBLEMS:

No major problems other than some criticism of their focus on defense and space-related questions.

KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION

Dr. Jerry Wiesner of MIT was President Kennedy's science adviser. Some of the successes and most of the problems of this period were a product of Wiesner's personal and his assertive attempts to seek a bigger and bigger role in government decision making.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS:

1. Provided valuable guidance leading to the rejection of a number of Pentagon proposals which subsequent research has shown would have indeed been mistakes. e.g. the Dynasoar space plane.

2. Introduced interests beyond space and defense and focused on many other areas of government scientific research such as health.

PROBLEMS:

1. Bitter public debates with NASA over techniques to be used in moon landing, which became a personal struggle between Wiesner and Wernher von Braun.
2. Alienated the scientific community by high-handed attitude and suspicion that he was ambitious to become the "Czar" of American science.
3. Criticism of the Defense Department. For example, he boasted that he could make a better evaluation of defense development projects than Secretary McNamara.
4. Expanded his authority to the point that he was attempting simultaneously to be an unbiased and impartial staff adviser as well as director of a scientific operations unit advocating specific programs.

JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION:

President Johnson's adviser was Donald Hornig, a chemist from Princeton. Hornig has a stormy and unfriendly relationship with the President and therefore appears to have had very little influence on policy.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS:

1. Instituted many significant long-range studies, e.g. the potential of the oceans; the world food problem; restoring the environment.
2. In 1965 conducted the first major assessment of the U. S. energy situation.

PROBLEMS:

1. Despite the predictive merit of his proposals, Hornig had little impact because he had no access to the President and little standing within the White House staff.
2. As the Viet Nam war expanded, the scientific community's mounting opposition to the war made it even more difficult for Hornig to serve as an adviser.

NIXON ADMINISTRATION:

Lee DuBridge was President Nixon's first science adviser and was succeeded by Ed David of Bell Laboratories in 1970. The decline of influence which began during the Johnson Administration accelerated until 1972, when President Nixon abolished the science adviser.



ACCOMPLISHMENTS:

1. Attempted to develop practical applications of science research.

PROBLEMS:

1. Presidential Science Advisory Committee strongly and publicly opposed SST proposal at a time when the Administration was actively seeking support for the SST.
2. Acquired a reputation within the White House for generating proposals to spend more Federal money.
3. Scientific community regarded Ed David as lacking credentials because of his background as an engineer.

JAMES R. KILLIAN, JR.

77 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE  
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02139

March 20, 1975

The Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller  
Vice President of the United States  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Vice President:

In response to your request, I have prepared the attached list of some of the contributions to Presidential policy-making in the Eisenhower administration made by the Special Assistant for Science and Technology and the President's Science Advisory Committee. At the beginning of this list, I have summarized the longer statement which follows. In listing these contributions made during the period when I was a participant, may I express some personal views bearing on the study you are making of proposed science advisory arrangements.

I fully recognize that present circumstances differ from those of the Eisenhower years both in the organization of the Presidential staff machinery and in the diversity and complexity of the issues faced by the President.

President Eisenhower looked to his science advisory mechanism for assistance in the national defense area and for supporting the work of the National Security Council. I am aware that the National Security Council now has staff competence and consultant panels which are providing a technological dimension to the examination of national security issues. These did not exist in the Eisenhower period. This arrangement appears to be working

effectively and to have the confidence of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. I personally do not recommend that these arrangements be supplanted by a new science and technology advisory mechanism but I do feel that the proposals for the new mechanism are no less essential because these NSC panels exist. The existing NSC arrangements have a national security policy focus on a very limited number of problems, and I am convinced that there are important issues involved in assuring a healthy scientific and technological foundation for military research and development, and the proposals of the National Academy Committee are directed toward providing this foundation.

I am also convinced that the scientific and technical feasibility and soundness of major weapons systems developments evaluated by objective panels of the proposed advisory mechanism could serve the needs of the President and the Office of Management and Budget as well as the National Security Council as the NSC might request. In my view it would be a mistake to exclude the Science Adviser from the national security area and from the deliberations and studies of the National Security Council because of the inseparability of policy and program considerations and the special perspective and judgments that a science advisory group could contribute to Presidential-level discussion of national security issues.

In the Domestic Council area there is, of course, much greater emphasis on problems in the civilian sector, where developments in science and technology in many instances offer the best hope of long-term solutions. The existence of the Domestic Council means that there is a focus for scientific and technological assessments of domestic problems and an opportunity to couple scientific and technological considerations with economic, sociological, institutional, and political factors, all of which must

be brought to bear in developing options for Presidential consideration. The effectiveness of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology in the national security area in past years was in no small measure attributable to the existence of the National Security Council as a mechanism for assuring serious consideration of scientific studies.

In the latter days of the Special Assistants and the President's Science Advisory Committee many of the excellent, farseeing studies which were made by the advisory setup were not systematically considered and followed up because there was no mechanism such as the Domestic Council and its staff to receive and assess them. During the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations there were numerous important studies made by PSAC and its panels which dealt with environmental matters, energy policy, and the world food problem which could have been of great value to the administration in the formulation of policy and the taking of initiative in areas that later came to be of great national concern. There was a national loss in the fact that these farseeing studies did not receive the necessary follow-through attention.

In making these observations, I am mindful of the arguments that by strengthening the scientific and technical capabilities of the National Security Council, the Domestic Council, and the Office of Management and Budget, there may be less need for a separate White House level science and technology mechanism and that a separate mechanism might have difficulty in relating its scientific and technological analyses to the issues as they are perceived by those staff agencies. These arguments were carefully examined by the National Academy of Sciences Committee on Science and Technology, which I chaired. The membership



of that Committee included a former Assistant Director of the Office of Management and Budget and a former member of the Council of Economic Advisers, both of whom were experienced in the operations of the White House staff. It was the strongly held view of the Committee that the scientific and technical capabilities of the National Security Council, Domestic Council, and OMB should be strengthened and by so doing there would be a more effective interaction achieved and a two-way coupling between those offices and a new science and technology mechanism. The new mechanism proposed can look at the totality of the nation's scientific and technical resources in relation to national needs and by having this broader view, can help to offset a fragmented approach occasioned by the differing missions of the executive agencies, both at operating and Presidential staff levels.


The reasons supporting the establishment of a new science and technology mechanism have been intensively treated in the National Academy and other excellent reports and articles in the past year. My interest in making the foregoing observations is to emphasize a few points arising out of the discussions which were prompted by the Academy report.

I am in full accord with the comments made by President Handler of the National Academy of Sciences when he wrote you recently emphasizing that the mission of the new science and technology advisory mechanism which has been proposed should be to serve the needs of the President. "It should," as he wrote, "not be a privileged means to represent special interests of the scientific and technological communities. Nor should it be a privileged advocate

for science and technology per se. To be useful, its analyses must recognize the essential interdependence of science, technology and fiscal, economic, social, political, and institutional factors in developing policy alternatives."

I am grateful for this opportunity to provide supplemental information and to recall the many ways in which the scientific mechanism established by President Eisenhower served him and successive Presidents and assisted greatly in the formulation of sound national policies.

Yours respectfully,



J. R. Killian, Jr.

JRK:cp  
enclosure




EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

MAR 7 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: JIM CANNON

FROM: Paul O'Neill 

SUBJECT: Science Advisory Options Memorandum from  
the Vice President

I have reviewed the draft memorandum to the President concerning the reestablishment of a science advisory apparatus in the Executive Office of the President.

I am concerned that the problem statement does not seem to be related to the arguments presented for the three options. The only motivation given in the description of the problem is one of the constituent pressure by the scientific community. If that is the only problem we are concerned with, then it seems to me the options should be measured by that criterion and by that criterion alone. If on the other hand, we want to assert that there is a substantive problem as well, we should specify the problem as clearly as possible (with examples, perhaps) and show how each option would help to solve the "problem."

Second, I believe the range of options in the draft could be usefully expanded. Options 1 and 2 are virtually identical except for the multi-headed nature of the Council described in option 1 and the difference in funding for contractor and consultant support (i.e., \$1.0-1.5 vs. \$2.5-5 million). Beyond this, no options are presented which either strengthen or build upon the present apparatus or which might seek to integrate a science advisory apparatus into an existing Executive Office organization (the Domestic Council).

Third, I am concerned about the way some of the arguments for and against each of the options is presented. For example, it seems to me, use of such descriptions as "tremendously useful" and such judgmental terms as "unduly" belong in a recommendation section of the paper so that, as nearly as possible, we separate value judgments from facts.

Furthermore, the arguments are not presented consistently from one option to another. Specifically, all the arguments

cited for and against option 1 are equally valid for option 2. For example, the need for congressional action for implementation is cited as an argument against option 2 although it is also true for option 1. Also, the argument of difficulty of integration of science advice in broader policy issues and the susceptibility to "politization," which are cited as arguments against option 1, are equally valid arguments against option 2.


In sum, it is my view that the options paper put together a few weeks ago (see copy attached) was extremely well done and balanced. I would recommend strongly that you replace the options section of the present memorandum with something close to that version. I would be happy to discuss.

Attachment

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 12, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: JIM CAVANAUGH   
SUBJECT: Science and Technology in the Executive  
Office of the President

This memorandum (a) identifies arguments for and against the science advisory arrangements recommended by the Vice President's staff, (b) discusses and assesses other alternatives, and (c) recommends an alternative plan for assuring that adequate scientific and technical advice is available for you and your advisers.

Background

The Vice President's staff recommendations (Tab A) call for the creation by law of an Office of Technology and Science (OTS) in the Executive Office of the President, with the head of the office also designated as the President's science and technology adviser. In addition to the Director, there would be a deputy, five assistant directors, up to 12 professional staff, and additional supporting staff. The Director and office would be assisted by ad hoc panels of experts from outside the government.

The recommended arrangements are quite comparable to the science advisory apparatus which was abolished in July 1973 -- which included the Office of Science and Technology, with the Director designated as Science Adviser, and the President's Science Advisory Committee which included experts from outside the government. In 1973 the civilian functions were transferred to the National Science Foundation and its Director has served as Science Adviser.

Except for the single Director rather than a three member Council as the leadership, the Vice President's staff recommendations are like those recommended in June 1974 by a National Academy of Sciences Committee chaired by James Killian and provided for in a bill passed last November by the Senate (the Kennedy bill). There are a number of advantages and disadvantages of this proposal, and there are other alternatives that warrant consideration.



## Critical Considerations

Critical considerations that bear upon a decision on science advisory arrangements include:

1. Integration of staff advice. There are few problems and issues requiring Presidential or Executive Office attention that involve only scientific and technical considerations. A group limited primarily to scientists and engineers is not well equipped to deal with other pertinent considerations -- economic, social, legal, political, intergovernmental, etc. Thus, the output of a scientific and technical group, even if it reports to the President, must be integrated with the work of others to provide a full analysis of a problem or issue and a full range of alternatives -- not limited to scientific and technical alternatives.
2. Focus of special purpose offices. Past experience with special purpose offices in the Executive Office indicates that they tend to become "special pleaders" or advocates for particular alternatives or programs, thus making more difficult the job of reaching balanced decisions among competing interests. For example, they advocate programs which involve additional funding for their constituency.
3. Scientific community views. Pressure is growing steadily from scientific community leaders for action to restore some science presence in the White House. Arguments are often more emotional than substantive. (If not resolved this year, the subject could even be a campaign issue for scientists in 1976.)
4. Congressional action. There is a good chance that Congress will act on its own initiative this year to create some new Executive Office organization.

## Alternatives

There are four principal alternatives that have been advanced for organizing scientific and technical advice.

Alt. #1 Propose legislation to create an Office of Technology and Science (as recommended in the Vice President's staff report, Tab A)

### Arguments for:

- . Would be fully responsive to the scientific and technical community.
- . Would defuse the pressures in Congress to mandate their solution.

- . Having independent scientific and technical advice immediately available could be useful on occasions.

Arguments against:

- . As in the case of the arrangements existing prior to July 1973, there will be problems of integrating the work of this single purpose group with other elements of the Executive Office.
- . Reestablishes the special interest problem.
- . Would add substantially to the White House staff and would be costly.
- . Would be viewed as Administration endorsement of Senator Kennedy's bill. Establishes a permanent and rigid structure.

Alt. #2 Continue the existing arrangements, wherein the Director of NSF also serves as Science Adviser. Or strengthen it with a formal Science Adviser to the President designation and involve him in more issues, perhaps through Presidential assignment.

Arguments for:

- . White House scientific oversight is less important now than in the 1950's and 1960's, because line agencies and NSF are much better staffed to deal with technical considerations. The Science Adviser can devote more staff and funding resources to the function since he can draw upon all NSF resources.
- . The Science Adviser has functioned principally as an adviser to the OMB. His advice is integrated with other inputs -- avoiding the "special pleader" problem.

Arguments against:

- . The arrangement is not satisfactory to the scientific community which has complained of three principal weaknesses:
  - The Science Adviser is not involved in national defense issues, thus there is essentially no scientific and technical review from outside DOD. (In fact, NSC established in 1973 a scientific advisory apparatus consisting of technical staff and 25 technical consultants.)
  - The Science Adviser is too far removed from the President.
  - The Science Adviser has a "conflict of interest" in that he must seek and defend before OMB NSF's request for R&D funds while also evaluating R&D requests of other agencies.
- . Elements of the Executive Office other than OMB have received relatively little help from the Science Adviser.
- . The selection of this alternative will probably result in legislation such as the Kennedy bill.

Alt. #3 Appoint a Science Adviser to the President on the White House staff. Provide him with a few (1 to 3) professional assistants and expect him to draw upon scientific and technical expertise in agencies and from non-Federal ad hoc committees -- much the way Bob Goldwin functions with the academic community. The Science Adviser would continue to draw upon NSF for staff support. NSC's existing staff and advisory group would be continued and would work closely with the Science Adviser.

Arguments for:

- . Provides a "science presence" in the White House.
- . Provides additional expertise for addressing critical issues that involve scientific and technical considerations.
- . Avoids institutionalizing another large special purpose staff.

Arguments against:

- . This limited arrangement may not be adequate to satisfy the scientific community (e. g. , it might not meet the criticism that the President needs technical advice independent of NSC and DOD on defense matters) or head off Congressional action.
- . Once created, pressure may still be strong to expand it to a full-blown office or council.
- . The Science Adviser may become a special interest advocate.

Alt. #4 Expand significantly and restructure the policy analysis capability of the Executive Office of the President by creating a more broadly based analytical or planning group which includes scientific and engineering experts.

Arguments for:

- . The policy analysis and long range planning capabilities of the Executive Office are not adequate and should be expanded.
- . Scientific and technical expertise should be integrated with other parts of the policy analysis and decision making structure.

Arguments against:

- . This would involve rethinking and restructuring the roles of OMB, NSC and Domestic Council and has not been developed adequately to permit serious consideration at this time.
- . Such expanded White House-Executive Office capability probably would be opposed on the Hill and by line agencies.
- . Probably would not be acceptable to the scientific community which tends to view integration of its advice at some level below the President as de facto subordination of scientific advice.

Recommendation

From the standpoint of substantive contribution to improve decisions, I do not believe that it is necessary to provide new scientific and technical capability in the White House or Executive Office. However, the growing pressures from the scientific community and the Congress are compelling reasons for some action. I believe Alternative #3 (Science Adviser with small staff) is the best course of action and recommend that you direct that further development of this alternative be undertaken. I also recommend that you meet with leaders of the community before deciding a course of action.

Brent Scowcroft, Jim Lynn (Paul O'Neill), Phil Areeda and Phil Buchen also recommend Alternative #3.

Decision

Proceed with the development of a detailed proposal to:

- Create an Office of Technology and Science (Alt. #1)
- Strengthen existing arrangements (Alt. #2)
- Appoint a Science Adviser with limited staff (Alt. #3)
- Explore further the development of a broad policy analysis capability (Alt. #4)

SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND THE  
PRESIDENT'S EXECUTIVE OFFICE

Recommendations

February 5, 1975



SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND  
THE PRESIDENT'S EXECUTIVE OFFICE

Recommendations

1. There should be a scientific and technological capability directly available to the President
  - (a) Many issues that come to the President, either for decision or for initiative, involve science and technology, sometimes to a very high degree, in the analytical and judgmental process.
  - (b) While the federal departments and agencies have, and should have, scientific and technological competence of high quality, the President should have available to him an independent source of scientific and technological judgment of the very highest quality. The organization set up to provide such a source for the President must not be, or be perceived as, the representative of the scientific and technical community in the President's office.
  - (c) While the present need for such a capability is clear, in our complex and technologically varied society, the need to draw upon science and technology to meet urgent problems and opportunities will be even greater in the decades ahead.

2. This capability should be lodged in  
an Office of Technology and Science

- (a) An Office of Technology and Science should be established by Congressional action and should be headed by a Director who should also have the title of Science and Technology Advisor to the President.
- (b) An Office, better than a single Advisor, or a Council or Committee of Advisors, can
- cover the full range of necessary competence without seeming to subordinate one area to another;
  - interact with (and "translate" the reports of) ad hoc expert task forces of consultants drawn from a variety of disciplines in and out of science and technology;
  - call on and utilize the best scientific, technological and professional talents in the country for specific tasks relevant to the President's responsibilities;
  - resist the pressures to make the President's Science Advisor the "spokesman for science and technology" as distinguished from the President's need for scientific competence in meeting his national responsibilities.

[Note: Not all of the following activities need be undertaken at the outset. The functions of the Office should be allowed to grow as the President may require, as relationships with the departments and agencies of government develop, and as emerging national programs, policies and issues may make desirable and useful.]

- (a) To respond on scientific and technical matters to requests from the President with respect to issues that are before him for decision, or new initiatives.
- (b) To help the President resolve conflicting advice involving scientific matters that come to the President from departments, agencies or the Congress.
- (c) To organize ad hoc panels of consultants to assist in the collection and evaluation of relevant data with respect to particular technical and scientific issues.

The membership of such panels would be drawn from the special competence available in the private and public sectors including universities, the National Academies, industry, and government laboratories.

- (d) To provide the President with early warning of either
  - opportunities, or
  - problems

- that have a scientific or technological component, including some longer range forecasting of such opportunities, problems or developments.
- (e) To identify and report on any gaps in scientific research and technological development in the public or private sectors that merit attention.
  - (f) To consult with the President on the appointments of various scientific and technical officials in the federal agencies.
  - (g) To stay in contact with the professional staffs of the federal departments and agencies, and of state and local governments, as well as with private sector organizations involved in science and technology.
  - (h) To be available for participation in reviews of policies and programs of the departments and agencies having technical responsibilities and thus to assist in the formulation of national policy on technical and scientific matters.
  - (i) To assist the Domestic Council, the National Security Council and the OMB in reviewing department and agency programs that have technical and scientific content.
  - (j) To have a modest budget to initiate analyses and studies in support of the ad hoc panels mentioned in subparagraph (c) above. These analyses and studies would be performed in

universities, private industry or federally supported institutions.

4. Organization of the Office

- (a) The full-time Director of the Office should serve at the pleasure of the President.
- (b) The Director should have a full-time deputy responsible for the administration of the Office who need not be a scientist.
- (c) There should be provision for a flexible number of full-time Assistant Directors (up to five) so as to cover a decent range of professional disciplines without trying for "representation" of every professional discipline or interest, and to respond to the possible growth in Presidential needs for special competence.
- (d) Provision should be made for a flexible number of full-time professionally qualified staff (up to a dozen) as well as a clerical staff to meet the responsibilities of the Office as they may develop.
- (e) The ad hoc advisory panels (mentioned in paragraph 3 above) which are central to the effective functioning of the Office should:

- (i) be exempt from the Federal Advisory Committee Act.

Frank and objective advice cannot be expected to be available if exposed to continuous and public scrutiny and controversy.

- (ii) have their members, in general, appointed by the President.
- (iii) serve on a part-time basis for a limited term;
- (f) The Director would maintain close relationships with the National Academies of Science and of Engineering and the Institute of Medicine and, in establishing ad hoc panels, would make full use of their membership, as well as of academic faculties and such organizations as the Social Science Research Council.
- (g) The Office in its initial full year of operation should have an annual budget in the \$1 to \$3 million range.
- (h) Since science and technology are profoundly inter-related (not only among the scientific disciplines themselves, but with domestic and foreign social and political issues and the intellectual activity of the nation) the area of the Office's concern should be broad and include:

- social and behavioral sciences
- physical and life sciences
- medicine
- engineering
- military applications
- international aspects of science and technology
- science and technology in the private sector
- education and training of scientific manpower

##### 5. The Qualifications of the Director

The Director must have, or be the type of person who can readily gain, the personal confidence of the President.

He or she should be a scientist, engineer or medical person of proven scientific or technical capability, have some experience in public service or administration, and should preferably be a member of one of the National Academies of Science or Technology or the Institute of Medicine.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 14, 1975



ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: JIM CANNON  
FROM: JERRY H. JONES  
SUBJECT: Science and Technology  
Adviser to the President

Your memorandum to the President of April 24 on the above subject has been reviewed and the following was noted:

Option #1 -- A three-member Council of Technology and Science Advisers with up to 20 assistants. Disagree.

Option #2 -- A single Director of Technology and Science with up to 17 assistants as needed. Agree with the following notation:

-- With more limited staff + less funding.

Option #3 -- A Science and Technology adviser with up to three assistants. Disagree.

Option #4 -- The appointment of a Scientific and Technology Liaison Adviser to the President who would serve simply as a point of contact between the Administration and the Scientific community. Disagree.

Please follow-up with the appropriate action.

Thank you.

cc: Don Rumsfeld  
Jim Lynn



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 14, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JIM CANNON

SUBJECT: Science Adviser Decision and Action



I.

This is my understanding of your decision and your direction for action:

1. There will be a Science and Technology Adviser to the President.
2. The office and staff will be authorized by legislation.
3. There will be a single director, someone of the ability and scientific standing of Dr. Harold Brown, President of Cal Tech. The Director should know scientists, be able to attract the best minds, and know how to include their counsel in the executive decision-making process.
4. He will have assistants, but not as many as the 17 called for in Option 2 of the April 24, 1975 memorandum. He might begin, for example, with a staff of five assistants.
5. Extensive use will be made of consultants as members of scientific and technological task forces for various projects.
6. Initial costs would be \$1 million - \$1.5 million annually.
7. You will invite Representatives Teague and Mosher, Senators Tunney and Beall, and Senator Kennedy to the White House next week (perhaps on Thursday, May 22) to make known your decision, describe the kind of Science Adviser and staff you want, and express the hope that they will follow your proposal for legislation.

8. The Vice President, Jim Lynn, Brent Scowcroft and I will work together to define the role of Science Adviser and clarify his relationship to military and international science meetings.

II.

As the next steps to carry forward your decision after your meeting with members of the House and Senate, I propose that the Domestic Council Staff:

- Draft legislation to carry forward your decision
- Draft a message to the Congress.
- Work with Max Friedersdorf and his staff, to develop with Congressional leaders legislation that you and the Congress will support.

In broad terms, our objectives are to:

- assure the development of an ongoing scientific and technology capacity in the Executive Office of the President.
- assure the availability of a broad range of scientific and technical expertise;
- acknowledge Congressional support for an effective and visible science advisory group;
- demonstrate unequivocally the Administration's commitment to using the resources of the nation's scientific community and technology industry to meet the overriding needs of our times; and
- make known to the nation the Administration's ability to develop and support new and innovative ideas through the creation of Executive Branch task forces operating out of the Office of the Science and Technology Adviser to the President.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 14, 1975



TO: DONALD RUMSFELD

FROM: JIM CONNOR *JJC*

Jerry Jones asked me to bring to your attention the discrepancies between the President's decision on the Science Advisor and the attached information memorandum being submitted by Jim Cannon to the President.

Of particular concern are items 4, 5 and 6 on the first page. It appears that Cannon may be assuming a staff growing well beyond the 5 to 7 numbers that were discussed. The decision memorandum as I read it does not discuss the use of consultants, extensive or otherwise. The President had decided on "less funding" than the \$1 million to \$1.5 million annually.

*Jerry -  
See me  
to day -*

THE WHITE HOUSE



WASHINGTON

May 21, 1975

MEETING WITH MEMBERS OF CONGRESS  
ON THE SCIENCE ADVISOR ISSUE

Thursday, May 22, 1975  
9:45 a.m. (30 minutes)  
The Cabinet Room

From: Jim Cannon



I. PURPOSE

To discuss your decision on the Science Advisor with key Senators and Congressmen.

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS & PRESS PLAN

- A. Background: You requested this meeting.
- B. Participants: The Vice President; Senators Frank Moss, Barry Goldwater, J. Glenn Beall and Paul Laxalt; Congressmen Olin Teague, Charles Mosher, Ray Thornton, John Conlan and James Symington; Jim Cannon, Jim Lynn, Jack Marsh, and Max Friedersdorf.

Regrets: Senators John Tunney and Ted Kennedy.

- C. Press Plan: To be announced.

III. TALKING POINTS

1. I have considered the various options for providing the President science advice and have concluded that an advisory presence in the White House is desirable.
2. Dr. Stever, as science advisor, has done an outstanding job in assisting the Executive Office and the White House. He has assembled resources

devoted to science and technology policy in NSF which we expect him to retain and to use in support of the new White House group. I feel that this new arrangement can be even more effective in keeping me and my top White House staff advised on issues involving science and technology.

3. The new science advisory arrangement would consist of a single science advisor assisted by a small staff. I believe that through such an arrangement we can encourage more extensive use of experts from the scientific community who are knowledgeable on specific problems and issues that may arise. In addition, this office will be able to continue to draw on the resources of the National Science Foundation.
4. The major responsibilities of the science advisor and his office would include:
  - . Analyzing the scientific and technological aspects of major National policy problems or issues and examining their implications for policy alternatives.
  - . Acting as the President's spokesman on government-wide matters affecting the government's participation and conduct in R&D activities.
  - . Keeping me and my top advisors abreast of new discoveries or breakthroughs in science and technology that may have impact on National policies or government programs.
5. I would expect the science advisor to arrange for me occasional meetings with leaders of the scientific and technological community from both industry and academia so that I can gain from them first-hand information on matters of National importance.
6. I hope you agree with me that this new arrangement will be an effective vehicle in providing me scientific advice. I will be forwarding legislation shortly to establish this new office and I ask your support in deferring action on pending legislation in this area until the Congress can consider the approach I am recommending.

POINTS ON SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGY  
ADVISER TO THE PRESIDENT



A) The Vice President will probably bring this subject up in his 2:30 meeting tomorrow with the President.

B) The Vice President has commitments out to his friends in the scientific community (Baker, Teller, etc.). Apparently he has promised to secure a major voice inside the White House for the scientific community.

Q#2. C) The Cannon paper recommends a single Director of Science and Technology with up to 17 assistants at a cost of \$1,000,000 to \$1,500,000 annually. Basically, this is a high cost, large organization option. In choosing this option the paper fails to address the two key organization problems with such an office.

1) How does it fit with the rest of the White House Staff, what does it do, and how does it obtain an effective policy voice on scientific matters in White House deliberations? The last office was not able to find a place in the sun for very real reasons; why will a new office do better?

2) How do we organize it in such a way as to prevent it from becoming an advocacy office for special scientific interests. In essence, the paper recommends a large office without specifying its mission or how it would fit with all of the rest of us. In my view, this is a formula for establishing an unsatisfactory organization which will come back to haunt us. (Read the O'Neill paper at Tab 4 and the original Cavanaugh paper of February 12 at Tab 4).

D) The choice to do nothing is not realistic. Congress will force some type of organization on us.

E) As far as I can tell, the correct mission for an office of science and technology would be to perform a role for the scientific community like the one Bob Goldwin is presently performing for the intellectual community, e.g., the role of converging key concepts from the academic, private, and governmental organizations and individuals dealing with scientific policy in a way that can be used in the policy counsels of the White House. Ed David has suggested a third option (Tab A); upon reflection, his suggestion would surely give birth to an advocacy office.

Unless it can be proven that a large office can work effectively within the White House, we should not go that road, but rather stick to the Goldwin format. There are two keys to making the Goldwin format work:


1) The man selected to perform the role must be someone the President will work with and whose expertise the President will be willing to draw upon. Also, he has to be highly regarded in the scientific community if they are to accept such a limited role and office.

2) The President will have to personally sell this limited option if we are to sustain the position:

a) The Vice President must be convinced.

b) The Hill committees, and particularly Tiger Teague, must be convinced.

F) The NSC has not yet been consulted. This is a major oversight since the NSC assumed most of OST's duties within the White House when it went out of business. The NSC is sure to object to the formation of a new competing organization which will more than likely get into the business of commenting on weapon's technology (I have given a copy of the paper to Scowcroft for comment).



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