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KISSINGER-GROMYKO

MEMCONS

May 19-20, 1975 Vienna

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
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KISSINGER - GROMYKO MEMCONS

May 19 - 20, 1975 - Vienna

- Tab A. HAK/Gromyko (private)
May 19, 1975
5:05 - 6:10 p. m.
- Tab B. HAK/Gromyko (plenary)
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- Tab C. HAK/Gromyko (dinner)
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- Tab E. HAK/Gromyko (plenary)
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10:20 a. m. - 3:03 p. m.
- Tab F. HAK/Gromyko (private)
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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Andrei Andreyevich Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Viktor Mikhaylovich Sukhodrev, Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, National Security Council Staff

DATE AND TIME: Monday, May 19, 1975
5:05 - 6:10 p. m.

PLACE: Marble Room, Hotel Imperial
Vienna

[Photographers are let in, then ushered out.]

Kissinger: I've lost two kilos in the last four weeks. It's a great achievement. Fat.

Gromyko: No, just husky.

Kissinger: I'll be a lot in Austria, during the next two weeks. I'll give a press conference in Salzburg. Twice before we stopped in Salzburg on the way.


Gromyko: To get accustomed to the time.

Kissinger: In '72 on the way to Moscow; in '74 on the way to the Middle East.

Gromyko: You have to take a deep breath before starting.

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NSC MEMO, 11/24/00, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY: [redacted], NARA, DATE 12/22/03

U. S. -Soviet Relations

Kissinger: I notice the Foreign Minister is giving me publicity by name. [Laughter] I hope you are not disappointed that I didn't reciprocate. My father is glad.

Gromyko: But I praised you.

Kissinger: That paragraph wasn't reported.

Gromyko: I said Dr. Kissinger made a very good statement in favor of detente. And then a second paragraph I quoted you.

Kissinger: On the defense budget.

Gromyko: I quoted your statement that the President sees no higher duty than guarding against nuclear war. And then I just added one phrase: that perhaps it was a bit hard to bring into line those two good statements with a statement on inflated military budgets. That's all.

Kissinger: Not an inflated budget; an adequate budget. I never saw the text, only the press reports, which picked out the negative part.

Gromyko: That is what the press did -- it was mild, but negative, and the press picked it out.

Kissinger: Must have been extemporaneous.

Gromyko: I got the text, just a half hour before I spoke.

Kissinger: I meant the [St. Louis] speech to be constructive.

Gromyko: If you, for example, were to say in public that "Gromyko gave a high estimate of my statements about detente and diverting the threat of nuclear war, but was not in favor of my statement about military budgets," I'd be happy if you quoted me.

Kissinger: I avoid naming any Soviet leaders, because I know the tendency of the press to make a conflict out of it.

Gromyko: I certainly see the newspapers have a tendency to pick out what's to their advantage and leave out what isn't.



How do you think we should organize our meetings? Let me suggest perhaps today we should start with European affairs and other directly related matters, and tomorrow morning we could take up SALT and also the Middle East tomorrow. These are the three major topics which I'm sure will take up the lion's share.

Kissinger: I agree.

Gromyko: And then other intermediate points.

Kissinger: I agree. That's a good order. Maybe while we are here, we can have a brief assessment of how our relations are.

Gromyko: I agree. We can do it here, at the outset. Let me start by saying I bring you greetings from Leonid Brezhnev and he asked me to convey greetings also to President Ford.

Kissinger: And so did President Ford ask me to convey greetings to the General Secretary.

Gromyko: Thank you. If you have something to tell me regarding our bilateral relations, I'll be happy to reciprocate, and I'll be happy to hear yours.

Kissinger: Our assessment is that the reasons that caused us to pursue the policy of detente are still valid, and the main line of our policy should be continued. We have a Presidential election next year and we are prepared to defend very hard the policy of detente if our opponent is one who takes a critical view of our relations. We believe the majority of the American people support our policy. I have said many times publicly that if we don't solve the problems of our relations we will have 19 years of struggle, and somebody else will have to solve it. Neither of us can impose his will on the other. We believe we should use the favorable circumstances now as an opportunity to maintain or accelerate the momentum. President Ford and I are prepared to continue and if possible deepen this relationship.

On the other hand, there have been difficulties, especially in recent months, which perhaps neither of us was aware of. I believe both of us should look at areas where our rivalry could lead to confrontations. In Indochina, whatever the outcome was, it was



certainly accelerated by Soviet arms deliveries; in the Middle East we should both play a restraining role. There is no point discussing Indochina; because it's now past history. I mention it only as an example.

Our objective is to implement the principles we signed in 1972, to make progress in SALT, on the European question, and to start up progress in trade relations. If our relations proceed as we expect, the President is prepared in early summer to go to the Congress again. We should discuss how we can avoid an escalation of the crisis.

This is our assessment.


Gromyko: We can but voice our positive attitude to your statement that the reasons that caused the need for efforts on both sides to better our relations still exist. Therefore the policy of detente which has been pursued by both the Soviet Union and the U.S. has an objectively stable foundation, provided of course that neither side takes steps to make corrections in a negative direction. This is the firm conviction of Leonid Brezhnev and of our entire leadership. We have no intention to take negative corrections; we firmly intend to pursue that policy. What you said in that direction is a hopeful sign, and it means that both sides must take a positive attitude.

Previously President Nixon and later President Ford and you yourself have many times emphasized and reemphasized the fact that a great deal in terms of detente and the conditions of the world climate still depend on the policy taken by our two countries.

Kissinger: We still believe it.

Gromyko: We believe it is still correct, and we believe it brings great responsibility on the two of us. It is a duty rather than a privilege. That is something we recognize. We too recognize that neither of us can impose our policy on the entire world; we certainly don't attempt to do it, though there are some who do.

Kissinger: They have elevated the adjectives they use about us, without lowering the adjectives they use about you.



Gromyko: We believe we should continue our policy because it is in the interests of the entire world.

[In Russian to Sukhodrev:] He was talking about China?

Sukhadrov: Yes.

Gromyko: [to Kissinger:] The most characteristic feature of the relationship between our two countries has been the line that you and I just referred to; it must be continued. Neither of us should allow any room for the display of emotions in these relations. Of course, matters will not always follow the course that suits the line of both of us, but we should ensure that coolness and logic should always have the upper hand. But we have noticed in the recent past.... Perhaps not at all times matters would proceed in a direction that either one or the other of us would like, but we must always be guided by the need to be cool in our thinking and logic must prevail. We have noticed a certain toughness in language and attitude in certain statements by President Ford and yourself, and you must agree that statements of that kind are fundamental to U. S. foreign policy. And certain attempts are made to explain those statements. We believe nothing can justify those statements or the lack of consistency in that line. There is no such change in our behavior towards the United States. And we do not in our own papers or magazines use any such language -- or in official statements. So if both sides proceed from the statement that one side can pursue a line and the next week say "we're not sure the other side wants to take that line," what would the situation come to if both start taking that attitude? If both of us do that, no doubt that a crack will appear in our relationships and the policy will be shaken and undermined. It will only cause glee on the part of those who attack detente and do not wish good to the Soviet Union and also yourselves.

We believe that all our business should be conducted in a serious and statesmanlike way.

You cannot reproach our side because we never tried to cause doubt on the foundations of detente. But it is a fact that you and the President publicly called the relations into question.

And you have publicly called the Soviet Union an adversary [protivnik]. As if it were night instead of daylight, you just up and call us adversary. Nowhere in the Soviet press will you



see the U.S. called an adversary. And such statements of the United States leaders cause our people to wonder, "how can that be? So many documents have been signed -- on the prevention of nuclear war, for better understanding--and then it turns out the U.S. calls us adversary." We have given no response up to now, even though it's harder to make no response than to take the initiative. We certainly cannot accept as justification for those statements the existing domestic situation or any other circumstances that may crop up from one time to another.

Kissinger: I agree that we both should exercise restraint both in language and in action. I will take a look at speeches; I am conscious.... but in January there was intensified treatment in the Soviet press of American difficulties. I called it to the attention of your Ambassador. This was from January to the end of March. There was intensified treatment of the domestic situation and the historical situation of the United States. So serious people began to wonder whether it was a major decision at the Central Committee meeting in December. Since then we have seen, and you have reconfirmed it tonight, that there is no change. But there were statements, not of your leaders but of your public organs, which, however, are not responsive.

Secondly, events this spring have had an impact on public opinion. When the American position in some part of the world is overthrown by Soviet arms, that is an historical fact. You could argue that it would have happened sooner or later, but it was not in our interest that it happen sooner. It strengthened the hand of those who questioned it [detente] from the beginning. But the basic policy laid down in the documents at two summits and reaffirmed by President Ford when he met the General Secretary is the same. But I will pay attention to our public statements.

Gromyko: If there is anything that strikes the eye in an objective study of our press, it's that the Soviet press and radio and television displayed the greatest restraint in the treatment of the United States. If what you refer to relates to ideological struggle, ideological matters, that's a different matter. Whatever appears there in the Soviet press, it's an infinitesimal part of what's written about the Soviet Union in the United States and in Western Europe. You know a veritable mountain of material appears there, which is essentially hostile. You were right to refer in your speech to differences, but it's entirely wrong to confuse the two areas, foreign policy and the area of ideology, the struggle of ideology.



Let me say in your remarks that the United States can't be a passive observer if events have a negative impact on the United States and happen through the existence of Soviet arms. Let me say that wherever there are Soviet arms, on the other side there are American arms. That was the case in Vietnam, in Cambodia, in the Middle East. So wherever there are Soviet arms there are American arms on the other side -- with the sole difference that there are rather more American arms. Take Africa as one case. There are Soviet arms, but again, more American arms. And on a purely commercial basis. When a war starts with the arms of both sides, every time are we to quarrel? Are we to allow that to lead to the heating up of our relations? There is, after all, a basic foundation on which our relationship is built, and that must surely be most important.

That is what I wanted to say in the introductory part of our meetings. I hope you understand the concern of Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev and the leadership, and the concern for the great responsibility of the two of us for matters in the world, and that is why we cannot but be concerned. But let me repeat that we stick to the line, and I'm authorized to confirm this, and I hope you report to President Ford.

Kissinger: I appreciate these last remarks and I will report meticulously to President Ford, and he will appreciate it.


With regard to arms, there are different types of situations. In Vietnam, it is not true there were more American than Soviet arms, and ours were on defensive along 700 miles, and yours were always on the offensive.

In Africa, if we look at Somalia, the amount of arms in Somalia is greater than the number of American arms in any surrounding country.

Gromyko: Are you sure?

Kissinger: Yes. And we're not sending much arms to Ethiopia.

In South Vietnam, South Vietnam did not have the capability and we would not have permitted them, to launch an offensive -- maybe harassment but not a general offensive. The North Vietnamese had the capability always for an offensive, and to



give more arms in that situation is significant. However we got it, it was bound to have an impact on the international situation and the domestic situation, though we can handle both. The Middle East is a special case, which I will discuss tomorrow. But I think that both sides should show restraint in situations where indirectly it could lead to problems. We have shown great restraint in East Europe. There are many areas where activities take place that could have indirect significance.

Therefore both sides should -- on the basis of reciprocity -- look carefully at situations where our actions could cause embarrassment to the other.

I had a long talk with President Ford Friday and Saturday before I came. He too wants me to reaffirm that the basic policy remains. He wants to work on the remaining difficulties that exist and move forward and accelerate our relations. Perhaps we should focus on these efforts.

Gromyko: Let me just say that we will most firmly keep to the line that has taken shape in our relationships with the United States the last several years. In our view, neither side should allow third countries, wherever they may be situated, to shake that line in any measure. Either through direct influence or indirectly, and no extraneous factors. When I say no third countries, I mean no small countries, no big countries, and no combination of countries should be allowed to shake the line.

Kissinger: We agree with that.

[The private meeting ended at 6:10 p.m. On the way to the dining room, the Foreign Minister gave the Secretary a note quoting the text of the Foreign Minister's comments on the Secretary's St. Louis speech. Tab A.]



Given to HAK by 21
Gromyko 5/14/75

Just two days ago Secretary of State Kissinger gave a lengthy speech on foreign policy at St. Louis. There was a number of correct propositions put forward in his speech. He stated on behalf of the President of the United States of America that the U.S. should follow the line of international detente and should conduct this line in their relations with the Soviet Union as well. A good proposition. In that same speech there was another phrase: "The President of the United States has no higher duty than to relieve our people from the danger of a major nuclear war". A good phrase, too.

Yet, at the same time, the U.S. Secretary of State rather sharply criticised those American statesmen who-though timidly and with no great insistence - come out nonetheless against inflated military budgets and who are in sympathy with their reduction, the U.S. military budget included.

The U.S. Secretary of State criticised those politicians, he spoke in defense of the inflated military budgets and upheld the line at their further growth. To put it mildly, these two things-sympathy for the policy of detente and the growth of military budgets - are not quite in accord with each other.



B

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

- Andrey A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee, CPSU and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
- Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the United States
- Georgi M. Korniyenko, Chief of the American Department and Member of the Collegium, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Vasily G. Makarov, Chef de Cabinet to the Foreign Minister
- Oleg M. Sokolov, Chief, American Section of the American Department
- Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)

- Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- Ambassador Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Ambassador to the USSR
- Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department of State
- Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
- William G. Hyland, Director, INR
- Jan M. Lodal, NSC Staff
- Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff *PHR*

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
 NSC MEMO, 11/24/88, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
 BY tdg, NARA, DATE 10/20/03

DATE AND TIME:

Monday, May 19, 1975
6:15 - 8:35 p. m.

PLACE:

Gobelin Saal
Hotel Imperial
Vienna, Austria

SUBJECT:

CSCE



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Gromyko: [points to portrait on wall, next to tapestry] There is a good view of a hunter there. It's good for Sonnenfeldt. We need a wild boar.

Kissinger: Sonnenfeldt will shoot it.

Gromyko: Perhaps, as we agreed, we could start by having an exchange on European affairs and the European Security Conference.

Kissinger: I agree. And Mr. Foreign Minister, since we're technically on our ground, I'd like to take this opportunity to reaffirm what I told you privately:

The basic line of United States policy remains intact and we are determined to overcome problems where differences exist. I want to say this in front of my colleagues, and I was asked specifically by President Ford to say this.

Gromyko: Let me say briefly what I've just had occasion to tell the Secretary of State personally, that the line of the Soviet Union towards the United States is the same as the line that has taken shape in recent years mainly as a result of the Soviet-American summits and the documents signed by the two countries. We, for our part, are rigorously following that line and we believe both sides should pursue it. We feel we should not allow events or any countries or combination of countries to cause any harm to that policy or the principles underlying that policy. In other words, we should follow the line to strengthen detente and Soviet-American relations and strengthen peace.


That is something that reflects the thinking of the entire Soviet leadership and of General Secretary Brezhnev personally.

Kissinger: Should we turn to European matters?

Gromyko: Yes, I think we should turn to European matters and take up the European Security Conference first.

Kissinger: As one of the world's great experts on the European Security Conference and as the only Foreign Minister who has read the documents, why don't you start.

Gromyko: I don't know.



Kissinger: Did I tell you the story about Vladivostok, how you undermined the President's confidence in me?

Gromyko: Yes.

Kissinger: He [the President] turned to me and asked "What is he talking about?" and I said I didn't know. [Laughter]. That problem is settled -- between "equal validity" and "equal applicability." I had two difficulties -- I couldn't tell the difference between the two positions, and what is more embarrassing for a Foreign Minister, I didn't know which side had which position. [Laughter].

Gromyko: Your mind must have been on more significant matters than the European Security Conference.

Kissinger: It's now solved, isn't it?


Gromyko: Let us then turn to those matters, and I trust our discussion will be both serious and productive.

Kissinger: That is our intention.

Gromyko: I may have to say some words on this subject that may not be very pleasant for you to hear. Maybe pleasant, but not very pleasant.

Kissinger: The Foreign Minister is a disciple of Maréchal Foch, always on the attack.

Gromyko: Of late we have formed the impression that the American position at the Conference has become harsher and tougher on several matters related to the European Security Conference and the questions in that forum. In the past the Soviet Union and the United States have in several examples shown they can cooperate quite well. In this context, I'd like to refer to the understanding you and I reached in Geneva on peaceful change of frontiers, and there are other examples of such cooperation. But of late -- I say this just half in jest -- I say it's as if someone has switched somebody else for the American delegation at Geneva, though it's the same good people. Someone has done this.



Kissinger: Sonnenfeldt.

Gromyko: I hope the line pursued by the United States will be a line aimed at removing differences and reaching agreement. Of course, only you can give clarity to this situation. I say this by way of introductory remarks and I'm sure you'll have something to say in reply.

Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, I'm aware of your view that the United States has perhaps not proceeded as rapidly as desirable. I do not believe this is the case. I believe perhaps it's the Soviet Union that has not made all the moves it could. Be that as it may, I have reviewed the European Security Conference and we believe it's possible to conclude the European Security Conference in substantially the time frame we've discussed, and concluded at the summit level, and have it all concluded by the end of July.

So perhaps we could most usefully spend our time on what needs to be done.

Kissinger: The principles are done. Quadripartite rights and responsibilities. We have the problem of Basket III, of confidence-building machinery, and while we are here we should say something about how it [the summit] should be conducted -- the length of time, speeches, if you're ready.


Gromyko: I am ready.

Kissinger: So that's how we think we should spend the time.

Gromyko: I certainly agree to that approach. Let's direct our gaze into the future and see how we can do away with the remaining complexities and difficulties and see how we can conclude in the period we have agreed upon.

Kissinger: On confidence-building measures, the differences concern the number of days of prior notification, the depth of the zone to be covered, and the size of forces that would be concerned. Those are the three issues.

Regarding the length of time, the Soviet view is 14 days and the Western view is 40 days.



Hartman: 49 days.

Kissinger: [to Hartman]: How did we arrive at that?

Hartman: Seven weeks.

Gromyko: Ours is 12 days.

Kissinger: Well, we won't accept 12.

On the depth of the area, we have said 500 kilometers, and you had said 100 kilometers. On the size of forces, you had said 30-35,000, informally. What is the formal position.

Hartman: 40,000.

Kissinger: And we had said 20-25,000.

We are prepared to find a compromise on all of these points, and not to insist on our position, if you don't insist on yours. And we could instruct our delegations accordingly to find a compromise.

Gromyko: Let's take up point by point. Depth.

Kissinger: On depth, we'd be prepared to settle in the middle, say 300 kilometers, we had said 500 and you had said 100.

Gromyko: [Thinks] That is not the basis. Even now, 100, when you say it takes all the territory, when compared to Western Europe, our territory is larger, and the whole line, from north to the south. Try to compare it--all the territory, a stripe down.

Kissinger: There is more territory because the Soviet Union is larger?

Gromyko: Eastern Europe is covered. But this is not taken into account by your and the Western European delegations.

You mentioned formal and informal positions.



Sonnenfeldt: On numbers.

Gromyko: No, on depth.

Kissinger: We gave you no informal position on that.

Gromyko: On numbers.

[Kissinger and Sonnenfeldt confer]

150. I think 150 is much larger if you compare the territory.

Dobrynin: In square miles.

Kissinger: Our problem is some of our allies -- I don't want to mention names because we don't want to be in the position of negotiating separately--say that 300 is their minimum. So we want to agree on something that has a chance to be implemented. I really think the lowest number we could get without difficulty or checking with our allies is 250 kilometers. This is not bargaining because I've taken no interest, but we think that's the lowest.

Gromyko: 150 is our position. This is on depth.

On numbers.....


Kissinger: The official allied figure is 12,000. Our personal compromise is 20-25,000. Your position is 30-35,000.

Gromyko: Yes.

Kissinger: If we would get everything else worked out, we'd recommend to our allies something between 25-30,000 and that would bring us very close to each other.

[There is a conference on the Soviet side.]

Gromyko: On 30,000, that's good. We would be prepared to agree on that, but without being conditioned on another condition. 30,000, that we could agree on, because that represents the maximum you



are prepared to agree to and it's the minimum we are prepared to accept, but we cannot accept the other figure regarding depth. But the area of the Soviet Union that would be subject to notification would be greater than all of the area in Western Europe.

As regards the third element, that is, the time of notification, frankly speaking we believe this question is raised especially artificially. Why should we be expected to give two months' notice in advance?

Kissinger: Seven weeks. So we can mobilize to go to war.

Gromyko: Let us reason coolly on this. Maybe for one country, one regiment or two or an entire division is a great force which, when it starts moving, really causes the whole world to shake, and maybe they take three or four months to plan. It may take three months for them to get boots and uniforms fitted. But for us a division is nothing.

Kissinger: You're talking about number.

Gromyko: I'm talking about preparation.

Kissinger: My view is, when we need the warning we won't get it, and when we get the warning we won't need it. If one is going to attack, one can violate the agreement.

So I'm not going to insist on seven weeks. I was supporting you. Because I was prepared to settle for six and one-half weeks.

Gromyko: I was just about to come out in solidarity with you when you said the same thing about me.

Two weeks.

Sonnenfeldt: From twelve to fourteen days.

Gromyko: Two weeks ahead of time we notify you that 30,000 troops are about to move.



Kissinger: In two weeks that information couldn't possibly get from the Secretary of Defense to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They couldn't put it on the agenda of a NATO meeting in two weeks.

Gromyko: Maybe we should put an effort to rectify matters where it is really needed.

Two weeks.

Kissinger: I gave up four days; you gave up two days. How about 30 days?

Gromyko: Mr. Secretary, I can't give an agreement to that because we think, especially after what you said about the real importance of such matters, that someone is just giving vent to psychology matters.

Kissinger: The whole thing is psychological.

Gromyko: The whole thing is being lauded to the skies.

Kissinger: But you want it to be, because that gives the European Security Conference its importance.

Gromyko: You think it's that that will give it importance.

Kissinger: No, it's "equal applicability" compared to "equal validity."

Gromyko: Is that Mintoff's view?

Kissinger: Mintoff got a tremendous reception in the People's Republic of China and hasn't been the same since.

Gromyko: We read about that.

Kissinger: The minimum we could convince our friends to do is 25 days.

Gromyko: In that case we will have to leave that question open.

Kissinger: All right. Then we have depth and warning....

Gromyko: We cannot accept that figure.

Far more important than this question of number of days are the questions of depth and warning. On numbers, like Apollo, we've managed a docking.



Kissinger: If it's too short a time and too narrow [an area], it has no significance.

Dobrynin: Here, you can pick up the telephone and call anywhere in two minutes.

Gromyko: Mintoff must have frightened everybody.

Kissinger: A very persuasive man.

Gromyko: He must be virtually terrorizing everyone at the Conference.

Kissinger: He's threatening to join Libya.

Gromyko: Let me add to that, that those who want agreement on a different time should give earnest thinking to our latest proposal. And generally speaking, a strange phenomenon is visible at the Conference, that it's only the Soviet Union and the Socialist countries that should retreat and retreat and retreat and then we'll come to an agreement.

You know our delegation at the Conference has told the Conference that the Soviet Union is prepared to send notification to all participating countries and not only to those bordering on the Soviet Union.

Then when we mention a depth of 100 kilometers, that depth will apply also to Turkey.

Kissinger: What do you mean?

Hyland: Turkey has to notify countries of movements 100 kilometers from its borders.

Gromyko: Turkey won't have to notify everyone of movements, but only those 100 kilometers from its borders.

Kissinger: Not on Bulgaria and Greece. [to Sonnenfeldt:] Well, what's your answer?



Gromyko: I'm sure your advisers are advising you to accept that proposal.

Dobrynin: They're all making notes urging you to agree.

Makarov: Even Sonnenfeldt.

Gromyko: Even Sonnenfeldt.

Try measuring in terms of square mileage the size of the zone about which we intend to give notification.

Kissinger: Yes, but that's not the problem. It cannot be done on the basis of territory, but it has to be done in terms relevant to the problem people are concerned about.

Dobrynin: It's on the whole border, north to south.

Kissinger: Let me say this: that the problem of voluntary notification raises this problem. When we testify to Congress we will say that though its voluntary, we will expect it to be done, and if it is done and not notified, it will be inconsistent with the spirit of the treaty.

Sonnenfeldt: Agreement.

Kissinger: Agreement. If it is not voluntary, since we will hold you to it anyway, we could be more flexible on other elements.


Gromyko: When we mention the figures we are prepared to accept, we can accept them only on the condition that the principle of the voluntary notification is recognized. This is the principle we discussed with you at Geneva. All we accept is conditioned on that.

Kissinger: Yes.

Gromyko: And we discussed it with France and England, and they accepted. So we consider that's accepted.

Kissinger: Yes, but

Gromyko: We received the suggestion of the form of words from Britain or NATO; we are not entirely satisfied with those, but we have some amendments. Not big ones, but some amendments.



Let me also say, if the voluntary principle is accepted, the mechanism of notification would operate more effectively in fact than if some other principle will be agreed upon. It's a less sharply worded formula, and would affect the scheme of things less than the other formula. It would be more acceptable politically and legally, and would in fact be more effective. I want to emphasize, more effective.

Kissinger: But in fact that means there would be notification.

Gromyko: Yes.

Kissinger: And we would testify to that effect to Congress.

Dobrynin: Yes, Henry.

Gromyko: If you are prepared to look into this British formula, we are prepared to discuss an amendment to it.

Kissinger: May I see it?

Sukhodrev: This is in Russian, sir.

Gromyko: But we are prepared to lend it to you in Russian. At a very low interest rate.

[Hartman looks for it]

If you are prepared, I could make our suggestions

[Sukhodrev hands over Tab A. Hartman discusses it with Secretary Kissinger]

Korniyenko: The top part, Mr. Secretary.

Sukhodrev: The top part is the British.

Kissinger: What's the second part?

Korniyenko: Some neutral countries.

Gromyko: Don't pay attention to that.



Korniyenko: The Minister would like to suggest some changes in the British text.

Gromyko: My suggestion is the following:

Sukhodrev: Here is the amendment.

Kissinger: We'll agree to take it out if you add 50 kilometers.

Gromyko: We already added 50 kilometers. [laughter]

Kissinger: 50 more. We have both learned that in some parts of the world that you never get paid anything for services already rendered.

[There is a conference on the Soviet side.]

Gromyko: The preamble does not cause enthusiasm.

Kissinger: I have no particular recollection of this preamble. If this is the agreed text, I have no problem with deleting "therefore" from the preamble. Let us check it. If this is correct text, we agreed to drop "therefore."

Gromyko: This is the original English.

Kissinger: We'll agree to drop the word "therefore". If the British disavow this, then we're in a new situation. But on the assumption that this is the agreed text, we agree to drop the word "therefore".

Gromyko: Check with your delegation and verify it.

Kissinger: We will do it tonight. By the end of the meeting tomorrow, we'll have it.

Gromyko: What I've told you is my tentative concern. Tentative.

Kissinger: We just want to check. If they confirm it, we agree to drop the word "therefore".

Gromyko: The Third Basket.

Kissinger: We'll leave this then. I just want to check. We have not settled the issues of depth.....



Dobrynin: And timing.

Kissinger: And length of notification.

Can I have a 3-minute break?

[There was a break from 7:25 to 7:34 p.m. The meeting then reconvened.]

Makarov: [Shows a bottle of mineral water on the table labeled Güssinger.] Kussinger.

Kissinger: I saw it. I had the same idea.

Gromyko: Cult of personality. [Laughter]

[Kissinger and Sonnenfeldt confer]

Kissinger: Shall we leave the confidence-building measures now and go to Basket III. Have we finished?

Gromyko: Let's take up Basket III.

Kissinger: All right.

Gromyko: Let me ask you: Is it your intention to set up a state within a state? Because that's a new one in international practice. Up until now we have spoken in terms of -- and this is something you have spoken of on several occasions -- that domestic legislation must be respected. Now it appears -- and I repeat you have spoken of it on several occasions -- that newsmen are to set up a state within a state?

Kissinger: That's already the case in the United States.

Gromyko: On that we can only sympathize with you, but here we are dealing with an international agreement.

Kissinger: We have made a major effort to get our allies to make a global proposal on Basket III, where in turn, we have made a major effort to meet your concerns. If this is acceptable as the basic approach, in Geneva we could instruct our delegation to be flexible in dealing with yours and make an effort to meet your concerns. But we have made a major effort.



As for journalists, no one has suffered more from journalists than I have, so I have no particular affection for them. But in the United States how it will be received will depend very much on how the press presents it, so to be hard on all the press points would be counterproductive.

Gromyko: To accept it as the basis for discussion wouldn't solve the problem. We would be prepared to discuss the text, but only after we get clarification on what we regard as the most thorny, the most prickly. So let's take those points up one by one.

You, in that text, try to put forward the point of view -- even though not in those literal words -- that journalists should enjoy absolute freedom. If we accept the point of view that both journalists and the practices of the states concerned would take into consideration the laws operating in the country concerned, that would help us overcome that difficulty.

Kissinger: Don't we already have that in there?

Gromyko: But, secondly, there is the question of sources of information and accessibility of those sources.

We see one provision, one clause, which says in effect that there must be free access to information including individuals. Now we see that as a sally against us, and we don't think any state could sign such a clause. We don't have any laws that state that journalists cannot have access to individuals. There are no such laws. So if the present situation continues in being, that should suit everybody concerned. But to demand that we give our stamp of approval to an idea which for some reasons -- and you know best for what reasons -- is aimed against us, is at best an insult.

And there is the clause calling for equality in terms of treatment between journalists and so-called technical personnel. I'm sure there are people who come in your office every couple of months to check on maintenance and so on; it's as if we called them diplomats. Just because they work in the same roof.

Kissinger: Are you sending people into my office to check my telephones?



Gromyko: It is the same with journalists and technical people -- why should we extend the same rights to them on the same footing? That's not in your interest. That's another one that has thorns in it. Even from a purely technical standpoint, if a certain apparatus is used unlawfully, whatever such persons are called -- whether journalist, technician or an angel -- he'll get slapped down.

Kissinger: There is no question about doing something unlawful. There is no question here of sending TV crews onto your strategic missile bases.

I have to go back to the original question. If we could reach an agreement on this as the basic approach, we could take a look at some of the concerns you raise. We are not saying every point here is on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. I can say now, several of the points you raise here are reasonable -- without going into language.

Gromyko: Let's take out the parts of it that are objectionable, and we will not be against taking it as a basis for discussion.


Then there is another question, and that is the freedom of broadcasting. Where did that question spring from? Let me quite frankly say, do you expect us to sign a document whereby we would be sanctioning the creation of radio stations directed against us and other Socialist countries? Do you expect us to accept that?

Kissinger: We can always try. I didn't think you would notice it.

I understand your point on this one. There are two aspects to this. So that we get to the key issues. I have innumerable times expressed my view on Basket III. I don't think you'll change your system as a result of Basket III.

Gromyko: I think there are grounds for doubts.

Kissinger: This paragraph has to do, to put it crudely, with jamming. I think it's poor drafting. It shouldn't be put in terms of sanctioning broadcasting into the Soviet Union. We'd be prepared to put it into better language.



Gromyko: The problem here doesn't simply boil down to polishing the text. Because you yourself would never accept calling for broadcasting of all forms of propaganda for friendship, peace, detente....

Kissinger: I wouldn't accept it?

No, it's not a question of polishing the text. It's a question of encouraging information flow and not interfering with legitimate broadcasting. One is a positive concept; one is a negative concept.

Gromyko: The word "legitimate" wouldn't solve anything because immediately we'd come to polarization along ideological lines. You know we'd never accept broadcasting that undermined our system or offended public morality. There are some countries that permit publication of pornography or other materials.

Kissinger: Your objection is to access to individuals as laid down in this document, second to treating technicians as journalists, and to this text. Those are your objections.

Gromyko: No. It's not just freedom of journalists. What about questions of security?

Kissinger: What do you mean by freedom of journalists?

Gromyko: If a journalist drove up to a missile installation, I don't think he'd be comfortable there after a while.

Kissinger: Where is it in the text?

[Hartman indicates for the Secretary the place in the text, in his briefing paper.]

But this makes a specific reference to areas closed for security reasons.

Gromyko: You submitted many versions.

Kissinger: The version we submitted on May 18 refers to "regulations relating to the existence of areas closed for security reasons."



Gromyko: We have areas closed for security reasons, but we would have to open up some.

Kissinger: [reading from briefing paper] The text says "to ease on a reciprocal basis, the procedures for arranging journeys by foreign journalists, thereby facilitating wider travel by them within the country in which they are exercising their profession subject to the observance of regulations relating to the existence of areas closed for security reasons."

Gromyko: It says "wider" in comparison to the existing situation. It means we would have to get rid of some areas.

Dobrynin: We want the status quo.

Kissinger: My impression is that it's not easy for journalists to travel in the Soviet Union. It would have to be somewhat wider, yes.

Is security the only reason?

Gromyko: Yes. Only security.

Kissinger: Can a journalist just buy a ticket and go to Khabarousk?

Stoessel: He would have to get permission.

Dobrynin: It is the same in your country.

Kissinger: But we would abolish some too. It would be reciprocal.

Gromyko: I don't think this can be done.

Kissinger: Let me say a word on some other matters, I see your concerns. On this one, all we want is that in areas permitted for travel, that it be facilitated on a wider basis than before.

Gromyko: I'm sure travel in open areas and assistance given to such travel is greater than in many countries, even the United States.

Dobrynin: In six years, I don't remember a single case where the State Department arranged a tour for Russian journalists.



Kissinger: It's a different system. We don't organize trips, but we approve them.

Gromyko: We pay attention more to "facilitate" in this country.

Kissinger: You can also keep an eye on them better that way.

Dobrynin: You can too.

Kissinger: We suggested this to take account of the concerns of the journalists. Do you have any other concerns?

Gromyko: Let me make just one general comment. The media and journalistic people generally should be concerned with one basic task -- to strengthen friendship among peoples, and they should do nothing hostile to the social system of the country of their stay.

Kissinger: Can we apply that to American journalists in America?

Gromyko: It would be an interference in your domestic affairs!

But when formulated proposals are placed before us, it turns out they amount to absolute freedom. When someone walks down Park Avenue and insults someone or knifes someone, the police can't do anything?

Kissinger: It happens every day on Park Avenue. We had Human Kindness Day in Washington last week -- we had five people killed. I went to a meeting of the Organization of American States last week and I noticed my security had increased. I asked why? They say, "they're celebrating Human Kindness Day across the street." One senior official lost an eye.

Gromyko: You have efficient writers on your staff. You can change it.

Kissinger: This is something we worked out with our allies, and we made a major effort to meet your concerns. This was not made on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.

Gromyko: You said that.



Kissinger: There are some of your points we could take into account.

Gromyko: If you take them into account, I would like to see what text you come up with.

Kissinger: I suggest our Ambassador meet with yours in Geneva, rather than my negotiating it here where I can't consult with other countries.

Gromyko: If that is your suggestion, there is nothing we can do about it. That's an expression of a perfectly good desire. But even when we make certain understandings with you, it is very hard to get it across to Geneva.

So what I want to emphasize here is the question of time.

Kissinger: I agree with you. If we work with your characteristic precision, Mr. Foreign Minister, I think we are going to have trouble meeting the deadline. If you can tell us tomorrow which of these paragraphs you can accept, if we give you a new text on three paragraphs, after which the negotiation only begins -- as the entrance price to a negotiation.....

Gromyko: Which do you want? Who can do it? We or you? We, ourselves, could sit down and look.

Kissinger: That's a good idea. We'll take Korniyenko. It's nine paragraphs.

Gromyko: Do you swear by that? Only nine paragraphs?

Kissinger: Ours has nine.


Gromyko: This is a human text.

We'll give you a text with our corrections.

Kissinger: Ours begins with human contacts.

Korniyenko: There are two separate things, contacts and information.

Kissinger: Yes, but we've given you both and we'd like a reaction to both.



I think this would be a good way to proceed.

Gromyko: I haven't yet read the text on contacts.

Kissinger: This is an historic occasion. Never have we had an occasion when my friend Gromyko hadn't read every document.

Korniyenko: We just got it from Moscow.

Kissinger: When did we present it?

Korniyenko: Today in Geneva.

Kissinger: If you keep in mind that the fewer changes you have, the easier it will be to meet your concerns on the key paragraphs.

Gromyko: All right.

Kissinger: What else?

Gromyko: You mentioned certain organizational matters with the third stage in Helsinki.

Kissinger: Yes. One of our concerns, Mr. Foreign Minister, is the length of the Conference. If we give every speaker a half hour, it would take four and a half hours. The most our President can give is two and a half days, and we would prefer two days. The symbolic importance is not in the speeches made, but in the documents that will be signed. The newspapers will have to report every day. It will devalue the conference. We should focus on a few key speeches.

Gromyko: I spoke also to the General Secretary on this. He, too, would prefer three days, two and a half.

Kissinger: We think it should be two days for speeches and a half day for ceremony.

Gromyko: We're thinking in the same categories.

Kissinger: So, shall we work in the same direction?

I'll tell you, the President won't come for more than two and a half days, so if they want more, it will have to be at a lower level.



Gromyko: How can we work it out as far as length of time is concerned?

Kissinger: It will be tough.

Gromyko: Mintoff the Terrible.

Kissinger: Mintoff the Terrible will want a half hour. The Greeks and Turks will want a half hour.

Gromyko: We're thinking in the same terms.

Kissinger: The alternative is to begin at the lower level and have the heads of state arrive later.

Gromyko: That will not be good.

Kissinger: If necessary, we'll agree to 10 minutes for everybody.

Gromyko: I think it's better what you said -- five key countries.

Kissinger: If 35 heads of state each speak a half hour, that's 17 hours. No head of state can leave while another head of state is speaking.

Gromyko: Yes.

Kissinger: It's mind-boggling.

Gromyko: You convinced us.

Kissinger: Let's work together on it.

Gromyko: Let's work together on it.

Kissinger: I have to tell you, the President just can't come for five days. I think two days of speeches and one day of ceremony.

Gromyko: You convinced us.

Kissinger: Reluctantly.

Gromyko: So, the other way: We convinced you.

Kissinger: Let's discuss post-Conference machinery.



Gromyko: What's your thinking?

Kissinger: We would support the Danish proposal, that a group of deputies meet two years from now to discuss....

Gromyko: Foreign Ministers?

Kissinger: Deputy Foreign Ministers, senior officials.

Gromyko: What will be the terms of reference?

Kissinger: To see how best to implement the agreement, and to see what steps should be considered.

Gromyko: Some kind of conference?

Kissinger: Yes.

Gromyko: In two years, such a group would be convened?

Kissinger: Yes.

Gromyko: To see how it's going?

Kissinger: And to see what could be done to strengthen the terms of the agreement and to consider possibly what permanent institutions there might be.

Gromyko: You are not in favor of consultative machinery?

Kissinger: No.

Gromyko: The terms of reference should be simple: to consider the terms and possible institutions.

Kissinger: I would add: to review the progress in implementation, and number two, your formula.

Gromyko: Let us think this over.

Kissinger: All right.

Gromyko: Will your European friends go along with this?



Kissinger: I think we could convince them.

Gromyko: What about the neutrals?

Kissinger: The neutrals are more difficult.

Gromyko: What about Mintoff?

Kissinger: Yes. We could discuss shortening the interval, if this helps anybody -- to 18 months.

Gromyko: Three to four years.

Kissinger: No, shorten it.

Gromyko: So we would have more experience.

Kissinger: This would not help us with the neutrals.

Gromyko: Fine. Let us think it over.

Kissinger: All right.

Should we have something to eat?

Gromyko: Probably. For the time being. [Laughter]

Kissinger: For the time being? That's all we wanted you to do. We don't expect you to eat all night.

Gromyko: We're in a plot with the Secretary of State to have the dinner last only 30 minutes flat.

Kissinger: We can't do it with dinner, but we'd appreciate it if we could do it with lunch tomorrow. Seriously. A working session. All my colleagues would appreciate it -- a very light lunch.

[The meeting ended]



C



19 May 1975

5-2

Подкомиссия по мерам
укрепления доверия

Добровольная основа

16 мая 1975 г.

ПРЕДЛОЖЕНИЕ ВЕЛИКОБРИТАНИИ

Convinced of the political importance of prior notification of major military manoeuvres for the promotion of mutual understanding and the strengthening of confidence, stability and security;

Accepting the responsibility of each of them to promote these objectives;

Convinced that implementation of this measure in accordance with the accepted criteria and modalities is indispensable for the realization of these objectives;

Recognizing that this measure derives from political decision and ~~therefore~~ rests upon a voluntary basis;

ПРЕДЛОЖЕНИЕ АВСТРИИ, КИПРА, ШВЕЦИИ, ШВЕЙЦАРИИ,
ФИНЛЯНДИИ И ЮГОСЛАВИИ

Accordingly, recognizing their political responsibility of strengthening confidence through appropriate joint measures, the participating States have found it important to agree, on a voluntary basis, to give prior notification of major military manoeuvres whenever the following provisions are met:

Поправка Мальти: поставить слова "on a voluntary basis" после слов "the participating States".

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 1.5
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY ltd . NARA DATE 10/24/03



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee, CPSU, and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
 Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the U. S.
 Georgiy M. Korniyenko, Chief of the American Department, and Member of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
 Mikhail D. Sytenko, Chief of the Near Eastern Countries Department and Member of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
 Vasilii G. Makarov, Chef de Cabinet to the Minister
 Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)
 Oleg M. Sokolov, Chief, American Section of American Department

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
 Amb. Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Ambassador to the Soviet Union

Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department
 Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs

Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

William G. Hyland, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research

Jan Lodal, Director of Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council Staff

Peter W. Rodman, National Security Council Staff

DATE AND TIME:

Monday, May 19, 1975
 9:00 - 10:00 p. m. (dinner)

PLACE:

Dining Room
 Hotel Imperial, Vienna



CLASSIFIED BY HENRY A. KISSINGER

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION

SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652

EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (b) (1, 3)

AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to Det.

~~SECRET~~/NODIS/XGDS

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
 NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
 BY , NARA, DATE 10/20/03

Kissinger: We heard you are going to Canada. If you do, we could meet about the Middle East, in the next weeks or months.

Dobrynin: Weeks or months?

Kissinger: In the next six weeks.

Because we're seeing Sadat and Rabin in June.

Gromyko: When does the Special Session begin?

Kissinger: The 6th.

Gromyko: The 6th of September. Will you be there?

Kissinger: I haven't decided.

One thing I want to discuss tomorrow briefly. We are concerned that sometime over the next two years India is going to attack Pakistan.

Gromyko: Are there some movements?


Kissinger: It's just our instinct.

Gromyko: What do your friends in the Far East say about us? This time.

Kissinger: It's getting worse. They are also saying nasty things about us.

Dobrynin: About what?

Kissinger: Cambodia. They're very heroic after the event, did you notice? They didn't say anything before. [The Mayaguez incident]



Dobrynin: Before, he [Teng] said there was nothing they can do.

Kissinger: But afterward, they're in good form.

They warn us against your hegemony.

They're strongly in favor of NATO. They like NATO.

Gromyko: Like?

Kissinger: They urge all European countries to be strong in NATO. They like Franz Josef Strauss. They compare me unfavorably with Schlesinger.

Gromyko: They like you?

Kissinger: Not lately. They are comparing me unfavorably to Schlesinger.

Dobrynin: Maybe they're hoping you'll improve.

Kissinger: What do you hear from them?

Gromyko: Not much.

Kissinger: How are your border talks going?

Gromyko: They use argument number one, then argument number two, and so on.

Kissinger: One of my pleasures of life is to present the Chinese Ambassador with a problem for which he has no instructions. It produces paroxysms of anxiety. Once he got reprimanded. If he says nothing, he can get into trouble. If he says the wrong thing, he can get into trouble.

Gromyko: Have you met their Foreign Minister?

Kissinger: Many times. Every time I've been there, except the first time, I've dealt with him. He comes to the UN. Last time he came with Teng. He's very intelligent. You know him.

Gromyko: I met him first in 1954.

Kissinger: Once Chou En-lai said to me, "You're very intelligent." I said, "You mean, by Chinese standards I'm of moderate intelligence."



He didn't say, "No, you're intelligent by Chinese standards." He laughed! [Laughter]

Gromyko: In 1958 Chou came to negotiate. Once someone started to point: Oh, oh, oh. I saw nothing. Then some assistants began to jump and, I would say, "undertook efforts," to kill one fly. There was one fly on the ceiling. All of them, except Chou En-lai. They conducted this very successfully.

Kissinger: Did they have a big celebration?

Dobrynin: A communique!

Kissinger: In that big square, Heavenly Peace, they have big signs of Marx and Stalin.

Gromyko: Lenin.

Kissinger: No. And on the other side, on the wall of the Forbidden City, there is a picture of Mao.

Gromyko: What's going on there?

Kissinger: We don't know. The last time they took me to the hospital, and wouldn't allow me to bring any security or staff. It looked like a normal house, and he looked better than he did before.

Whenever we got to a difficult question, he would say, "The doctors won't let me discuss it." [Laughter]

He was out of the line of fire.

Whenever I've been there before, I've seen Mao. But they never tell you until a half hour before.

Dobrynin: Who helps him?

Kissinger: The girls there help him up. Whenever I was there, his mind was very clear.

It is clear he has had a stroke, because he has difficulty speaking. When you read it afterwards, it's clear he's unusually alert. When he speaks,



you're aware of the difficulty he has. When you read it afterwards, it's more impressive than the actual conversation. Usually it's the other way around.

He has a tremendous grasp of strategy. He doesn't have the Foreign Minister's grasp of the details of the European Security Conference.

Gromyko: He speaks in generalities. When he was younger, he was able to [deal in details]. I first met him in 1950.

Kissinger: Was he a powerful man?

Gromyko: He wanted to have a conversation with me. We sat for three to four hours in the Kremlin. At that time he was normal. "Britain, Britain. China will produce more steel than Britain in ten years."

Kissinger: Have they done it?

Gromyko: Of course they failed. At that time they produced 30 million tons.

Kissinger: What is their production now?

Gromyko: I think around 30 million.

Kissinger: [to Hyland] Check for me. [The statistics were reported by cable, Tab A.]

Gromyko: And they build this great number of small furnaces.

Kissinger: That they started only in the Great Leap Forward, in 1956. You still see it. I drove through the countryside last time I was there. It doesn't look like it could produce much.

Gromyko: But they're still frozen on the same level. The plant that's the best in China -- we built it.

Dobrynin: In Manchuria.



Sonnenfeldt: Mao was there for several weeks, after October 1949. You signed your treaty then.

Gromyko: Yes.

Kissinger: The Chinese like long conversations.

Gromyko: They think you're not serious unless you talk long.

Kissinger: They'd be great at CSCE.

Gromyko: We should have one for Asia.

Kissinger: That's what they say you want. It would be a great conference -- Mao, Mrs. Gandhi.

Gromyko: Bhutto.

Dobrynin: Marcos.

Sisco: Would you include Cambodia?

Kissinger: Do you have any idea what's going on there? Do you have any information?

Gromyko: If I answered it wasn't complete, it would be an understatement.

Kissinger: Our understanding is that tens of thousands are going to die from what they're doing. To move everyone into the country when there is no harvest...

Sonnenfeldt: Do you have a mission there?

Kissinger: No. They put everyone into the French Embassy. They have diplomatic relations only with North Korea, China and North Vietnam. Poor Sihanouk has no idea what's going on there. He has to read AFP.

Gromyko: Sihanouk is in Peking.

Dobrynin: Yes, he still is there.



Kissinger: It did not turn out to be a good investment. We told them. He had a great investment in having some part of the Lon Nol structure survive. For the last two years, they've been fighting not against Lon Nol but against Sihanouk. They're killing anyone who could possibly be a supporter of Sihanouk. Then they'll let him back.

What is your assessment? Do you think there will be a separate South Vietnamese state? Or will they unify?

Gromyko: For a certain period of time... Or, to put it this way: It will take some period of time.

Kissinger: To unify.

Gromyko: Yes. Given the character of the social structure. It will take time, probably. But ultimately....

Kissinger: They'll unify.

Gromyko: It's the natural course.

Kissinger: That's our estimate also. That's why we're not rushing into recognition.

The North Vietnamese are the most perverse people I've ever met.

When I was there --

Gromyko: When?

Kissinger: After the signing. I wanted to see some of the city. We went for a walk. Our guest house was the old French Governor General's palace. Then we came back and were stopped at the gate. They let my colleagues in and not me. I said, "Why?" They said, "Because you don't have a pass." I said, "Why don't I have a pass?" They said, "Because heads of delegations don't get passes." [Laughter]

Gromyko: The circle is complete!

Dobrynin: You can't say there is no logic!

Kissinger: It was Catch-22.



Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, this is an informal occasion. We meet regularly.

I think it's one of the good results of recent years that U.S. and Soviet leaders meet to exchange ideas. Because of our importance and size, we have a great responsibility. Given our ideological differences and size, there are sometimes difficulties. But there is an interest we both have in restraint. And in this spirit I would like to propose a toast to the friendship of the Soviet and American peoples. [All toast]

Gromyko: Mr. Secretary, I thank you for your kind words. It is certainly true the need does arise from time to time for us to meet and exchange views. And it is my firm personal conviction that it is not only good but necessary for us to exchange views on the questions before us. The necessity for this lies in the fact we are two big states with broad interests. Our bilateral relations are important, and there are very big international questions that concern us. Therein lies the need for us to meet. From each of these matters, there branch out certain other big questions, for instance, strategic arms. Even one who is not an expert can see the importance of this question. And that is why we regard these meetings with you as important.


If we did not, we would certainly be in error. Even if we don't achieve full satisfaction on all issues. I don't think there are two nations who can achieve full satisfaction on all questions.

But the point I want to emphasize is, if we both stick to the basic line, there is nothing that is impossible. If someone told me 15 years ago that these relations would be possible, I would have said, "I don't know." But it has proved possible. So it is necessary to have more optimism, and we can achieve success. This is the attitude of our entire leadership. To say how we value our relations, I would say: Bolder, bolder, with a firmer tread, following the course we've chosen to detente and peaceful relations. Therefore, to our friendly relations. [All toast.]

Kissinger: We appreciate that film on Vladivostok that you were kind enough to send.

Sonnenfledt: Did we do films of the General Secretary's visit to the U.S.?

Kissinger: We should do it this time.



I must say I was very impressed by Vladivostok. I must say I had a better understanding of some of your problems, after being in Japan and just about to go to China. To see a western city in that location. I expected people there to be....

Dobrynin: Chinese! [Laughter]

Kissinger: I made a faux pas in China when I said to them that in Vladivostok it was so cold I could understand why the Chinese had never lived there. They spent an hour and explained to me that Chinese had lived there and when.

Gromyko: How are relations going between China and Japan?

Kissinger: They're hung up on the hegemony clause. I think the Japanese will eventually sign. That's my judgement.

Gromyko: How do you feel about hegemony?

Kissinger: We're against the hegemony of either. Or of both of them.

Gromyko: How do you feel about such a provision?

Kissinger: About that particular provision, we've signed something similar. I'm not eager to bring about joint action by those two.

We can talk about that tomorrow.

The Japanese Socialists went further than the government. They're so nationalistic they think they can do anything.

Gromyko: By being nationalistic they can get only something negative. Nothing positive.

Kissinger: Oil. I'm just trying to understand their thinking.

Each of them thinks they can use the other.

This is why, whatever happens now, the prospects over ten years for detente are very good. History will drive us together. Therefore, it is foolish now for us to weaken each other.



Dobrynin: Are we doing that?

Kissinger: Therefore trying to cut us off every place is a bad idea. Indochina was unnecessary.

Gromyko: It's good you have two friends there, Japan and China. You once called one of them our ally.

Kissinger: And Japan is our ally too.

Gromyko: Ally and friend. Soon we'll each have an ally and no friend.
[Laughter]

Kissinger: The long-term trend is one that deserves consideration.

Gromyko: We have eaten. Tomorrow we will do it faster; we will organize a bistro. [A pun in Russian -- "bystro" means "faster"].

Kissinger: That will be much better.

Gromyko: So, 9:30 tomorrow.

Kissinger: At the Embassy?

Gromyko: Yes.

Kissinger: And we'll tell the press...

Gromyko:...that we had a general review of the situation, and discussed European questions and strategic arms. And tomorrow will continue.

[The dinner ended and the Secretary escorted the Foreign Minister to the door.]



6.2

TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

INCOMING AMERICAN EMBASSY VIENNA

SECRETARY OF STATE
VISIT, MAY 1975

UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

305 MAY 20

05:08

*Grady's
memo*

ACTION:
S/S 15

DUMMY
FILE

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 0085
BT
UNCLAS STATE 117134 TOSEC 010063

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PINR,

SUBJECT: 1974 STATISTICS FOR STEEL PRODUCTION IN PRC AND UK

ATTN: MR. HYLAND

THE FOLLOWING STATISTICS PROVIDED PER YOUR REQUEST FOR PRC AND UK STEEL PRODUCTION IN 1974:

CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC:

TOTAL CRUDE STEEL: APPROX. 25 MILLION TONS,
FINISHED STEEL: APPROX. 18 MILLION TONS,
STEEL EXPORTS: NONE. CHINA IS A NET IMPORTER, AND IMPORTED APPROX. 2-3 MILLION TONS OF FINISHED STEEL, MAINLY FROM JAPAN.

UNITED KINGDOM:

TOTAL CRUDE STEEL: 22,412,000 TONS,
TOTAL FINISHED STEEL: 18,150,600 TONS,
STEEL EXPORTS: 4,446,009 TONS OF FINISHED STEEL.

INGERSOLL

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UNCLASSIFIED

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 2.6
NSC MEMO, 11/24/00, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY bn, NARA, DATE 10/27/03

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee, CPSU, and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff *PWR*
Viktor Mikhaylovich Sukhodrev, Counsellor, MFA (Interpreter)

DATE AND TIME: Tuesday, May 20, 1975
9:50 - 10:17 a. m.

PLACE: Soviet Embassy
Vienna

SUBJECTS: CSCE Summit; India-Pakistan

Gromyko: Your press is very ingenious.

Kissinger: But we are going to beat them down. I am going across the country and speaking.

Gromyko: Of the newspapers, which ones do you recommend I read?


Kissinger: In Washington, the Washington Post and New York Times are the most influential because everyone reads them. In the country, in St. Louis, no one reads the New York Times and the Post.

Gromyko: Well, Mr. Secretary, what do you think we should discuss, just the two of us?

Kissinger: I leave it up to you.

Gromyko: After all, in which direction are you and your friends conducting matters at the All-European Conference? Can I tell General Secretary Brezhnev

~~SECRET~~ - XGDS (3)
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

and my colleagues the thing is in good hands, that Dr. Kissinger and President Ford have things firmly in hand and are working toward an early conclusion?

Kissinger: We are working toward a summit the last week of July. What is the Monday?

Sukhodrev: [Checks calendar] The 28th.

Kissinger: No.

Sukhodrev: The 21st.

Kissinger: Yes. We are planning on that week.

Gromyko: Regarding the length of time to be set aside, I have had several occasions to talk this over with the General Secretary, and his opinion is not in discord from President Ford -- that is, two, two and a half, three days. That too is acceptable to us. It should be conducted in a businesslike style. Who needs those speeches?

Kissinger: I talked to Kreisky and he agrees. I'll talk to Schmidt tomorrow.

Gromyko: I heard he wants four-five days.

Kissinger: So have I.

Gromyko: But I don't think he will be very strong on it.


Kissinger: If we can get Schmidt, I think the French and British will go along.

May I tell him this is agreeable to you?

Gromyko: You may. You may.

Another question I have is this: Yesterday you and I discussed certain specific matters regarding the European Security Conference. You said you would continue to be in touch with your West European friends -- this is our understanding.

Kissinger: That is correct.



Gromyko: Are you sure they won't cast reproaches on you for being in some kind of collusion? Am I correct you were speaking with their knowledge?

Kissinger: No. It was my best estimate.

Take the confidence-building measures: If we say 30,000, 21 days and 250 kilometers, that I am sure we can get them to accept. If we said less, I can only say we will try. I am not saying it is impossible. It is our best estimate.

Gromyko: I was now asking really about the broad fact. In your estimate, will no one reproach us for collusion?

Kissinger: On what?

Gromyko: On CSCE generally. The French will say, "we are not bound"? I am just asking; because in the past it has happened.

Kissinger: Yes. Look, it is a problem, and it depends how it is handled. If we come to an understanding here and you let us handle it first with them before you approach them . . .

Gromyko: All right.

Kissinger: I think it is better we deal with it.


Gromyko: All right. Let me say quite frankly what we would be prepared to accept on these CBM's. I was quite frank in my opinion yesterday on the depth of the zone. I would like you to understand our situation. And the same with the numbers.

Kissinger: Thirty.

Gromyko: But as regards the time limit of notification, we would be prepared to agree to 18 days. Our private position was twelve. We would be willing to do 18.

Kissinger: Why don't we talk urgently to our allies, and let you know by next Monday, or Tuesday. We want to move it to a conclusion. There is no sense arguing about two days and 50 kilometers.

Gromyko: All right. Do that.



Kissinger: I think they will find it 50 kilometers too little. But why don't we talk to them and make counterproposals if we have to?

Gromyko: Up'til now we have felt that whenever the U.S. really had the desire, problems were solved to mutual advantage. It happened in many cases, and we feel it will happen in the future.

Kissinger: We will talk to them.

Gromyko: As regards journalists, we have revised your text and made amendments. Korniyenko is supposed to give it to Hartman. But as regards the first part, human contacts, that is for the delegations to go into because I haven't had time.

Kissinger: Except we should discuss them together. Our delegations can do it. Journalists and contacts together. Let them do it at Geneva. But they will move it.

Gromyko: Yes, but please don't forget to give your delegation instructions at Geneva. In earlier cases when we reached agreement, sometimes we had the impression they didn't get instructions.

Kissinger: Sometimes we had the impression your delegation didn't get instructions. [Laughter] Maybe our delegations are both very cautious. We will do it, in the meeting. It depends really on what instructions you give. We have made a major effort; we would like to see some Soviet move.

Gromyko: Please don't demand of us the impossible. Surely you don't want to topple the Soviet system with that document.

Kissinger: I had great expectations. [Laughter]

Gromyko: We don't try to topple the capitalist system.

Kissinger: If the Soviet system toppled, which I don't expect by this document or otherwise, I am not sure the successor wouldn't be more of a problem. The government Solzhenitsyn would establish would be more aggressive.

Gromyko: To us, Solzhenitsyn is a zero within a zero.



Kissinger: On Basket III, we have met several of your points, and made a major effort. On several points of yours yesterday, I told you your positions were reasonable.

Gromyko: On "appropriate" points.

Kissinger: But also it depends on whether you accept some of the other points.

Gromyko: Then on those several points, Korniyenko probably already has given you our final communique. He has probably already done it.

Kissinger: It should not be significantly shorter than on the earlier occasion. It can be somewhat shorter.

Gromyko: This is a little bit shorter. It might be hard to go into detail, and not good to repeat formulas.

Kissinger: Let's look at it.

There is one point I raised at dinner, that is, our view of Indian intentions, especially since India is buying a lot of Soviet arms. I just hope you keep an eye on it. Because so far, we have sold nothing to Pakistan. We have lifted the embargo but sold nothing.

Gromyko: India's behavior gives us no concern.

Kissinger: If there were another Indian attack, it is something we would not take lightly.

Gromyko: We, generally speaking, are behaving very modestly regarding arms supplies to India. Maybe the information you have is exaggerated. We have absolutely no information that would cause us any concern regarding Indian intentions. There would be no sense for us to ignore any danger there because we are very concerned with the situation there, if there were any. And we say this to India.

Kissinger: And we say it to Pakistan and Iran. There is no danger now. It is for the long range.

Gromyko: We will act in this direction.

Kissinger: Good.



[At 10:17 a.m. the Secretary and Foreign Minister Gromyko joined their colleagues in the conference room for the main meeting.]





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