



S E C R E T // N O F O R N // 20331001

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09360



JTF-GTMO-CDR

1 October 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue,
Miami, FL 33172

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9TS-000174DP (S)

JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

1. (S//NF) Personal Information:

- JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Ahmad Muhammad Jumr al-Masaudi
- Current/True Name and Aliases: Hasham Bin Ali Bin Amor Sliti, Hamza, Ahmad Bin Muhammad Bin Omar, Hassan Sofi, Imed Hadj Said Ben, Abu Fadil, Abu Esma, Aziz Burdarbala, Abu Konah
- Place of Birth: Hammam Lif, Tunisia (TS)
- Date of Birth: 12 February 1966
- Citizenship: Tunisia
- Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9TS-000174DP



2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in overall good health.

3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment:

a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) on 22 May 2007.

b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: *If released without rehabilitation, close supervision, and means to successfully reintegrate into his society as a law abiding citizen, it is assessed detainee would immediately seek out prior associates and reengage in extremist activities. Since arriving in JTF-GTMO, although detainee has appeared cooperative during recent debriefings, he has not provided anything of intelligence value. It appears detainee employs*

CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES
REASON: E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 20331001

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counter-interrogation techniques during custodial interviews, indicating his continuing support for extremism. Additionally, detainee holds anti-US sentiment and on more than one occasion has threatened to kill members of the guard force. Detainee was a member of the Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG), an Islamic terrorist organization with active cells in Europe, a former active presence in Afghanistan (AF), and close ties to the Global Jihad Support Network (GJSN),¹ the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA), and the al-Qaida network. In 2004, detainee was convicted *in absentia* on terrorism-related charges for his role in TCG suicide attacks, including a foiled attack against US military personnel at the Kleine Brogel Air Base in Belgium and assassination of the Northern Alliance leader, Ahmad Shah Massoud. Detainee probably participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces in Afghanistan, and accepted a *fatwa* (religious decree) to engage in combat alongside Pakistani militants in the Kashmir region. Detainee is assessed to have received training on weapons, and possibly explosives. The DIA assesses detainee to be among the top 52 enemy combatants at JTF-GTMO who pose the most significant threat of reengagement in acts of terrorism if released. **[ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT THIS DETAINEE IS AVAILABLE IN AN SCI SUPPLEMENT.]** JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be:

- A **HIGH** risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies
- A **HIGH** threat from a detention perspective
- Of **MEDIUM** intelligence value

c. (S//NF) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee's assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be annotated by ➤ next to the footnote.)

- Added reporting indicating detainee is employing counter-interrogation techniques
- Added reporting that confirms detainee's anti-US stance
- Added reporting on death threats made by detainee to the guard force
- Updated capture information
- Included listing of foreign criminal judgments against detainee
- Included statement of detainee's motive for going to Afghanistan

4. (U) Detainee's Account of Events:

¹ The GJSN is designated as a National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF) Counterterrorism (CT) Priority 1 target. These targets are defined as issues, opportunities, or threats that rise to, or are expected to rise to, the level of interest of the President, Vice President, Director of National Intelligence (DNI), and NSC/HSC Principals and Deputies. This includes terrorist groups, countries that sponsor terrorism or countries that have state organizations involved in terrorism that pose a clear and immediate danger to US persons or interests and those preparing to employ Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).

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The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.

a. (S//NF) Prior History: Detainee speaks Arabic, French, and Italian. Detainee received formal education from 1972 to 1982, and then worked as a mechanic for the Tunisian National Guard, maintaining and repairing military vehicles from 1982 to 1984 in lieu of active military service. He later completed three years of college, obtaining a degree in mechanics and a certificate in car repair.² In 1995, detainee traveled to Italy (IT), where he lived with friends who allegedly introduced detainee to drugs. In 1997, Italian authorities arrested detainee for narcotics possession and sentenced him to three years and eight months in jail. He served only eleven months, and after two additional months in a drug rehabilitation center, detainee escaped and returned to drug use and thievery. In September 1998, detainee's cousin, Amor Sliti, aka (Abu Nadhir), met detainee in Genoa, IT and drove him to Belgium. There, detainee lived and worked out of Sliti's residence as a mechanic. Because of detainee's continued involvement with drugs, detainee moved from Sliti's home to the residence of another cousin. Detainee was eventually arrested at the French-Belgian border as he attempted to return to Italy and was imprisoned for 62 days in Belgium.³

b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: After detainee's release from prison, Sliti suggested detainee travel to Afghanistan to distance himself from drugs and find the right path to Allah.⁴ Sliti introduced detainee to a Moroccan named Tawfiq, aka (Kamal), aka (Khattab), who acquired a forged Belgian passport and visa for detainee's travel.⁵ In May 2000, detainee left Belgium for the UK where he came into contact with Abu Ahmad and Abu Khalid, aka (Kamel Ben Moussa), who assisted detainee by purchasing an airline ticket to Pakistan (PK) and securing a 12-day tourist visa. On 20 May 2000, detainee traveled from London, UK to Islamabad, PK. An Afghan named Julaybib met detainee at the airport and accompanied him to Peshawar, PK. Detainee then traveled to Jalalabad, AF. Detainee was housed at the Tunisian Guesthouse headed by Abu Ayadh for between five and seven months.⁶

c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: Detainee stayed in Jalalabad for a total of 18 months studying the Koran, polishing his Arabic, and performing household chores.⁷ Detainee

² IIR 2 340 6712 02, 000174 302 17-MAY-2002, 000174 KB 20-MAY-2002

³ IIR 2 340 6712 02, TD-314/02157-03, Analyst Note: Variants of Amor include Omar and Omer. Variants of Nadhir include Nadir and Nadher.

⁴ TD-314/02157-03, 000174 302 08-JUN-2002, Analyst Note: Detainee has presented conflicting accounts. In another account, detainee has stated it was Abu Khalid, aka (Kamel Ben Moussa), the TCG contact in London, who prompted detainee to travel to Afghanistan (see 000174 302 17-MAY-2002).

⁵ IIR 2 340 6712 02

⁶ IIR 2 340 6712 02, TD-314/36335-03, 000174 302 08-JUN-2002, IIR 2 340 6785 02

⁷ 000174 302 08-JUN-2002, IIR 2 340 6712 02

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suspected other Arabs in the neighborhood were attending the nearby Derunta Training Camp, but did not attend training himself.⁸ In approximately October or November 2000, detainee decided to leave Afghanistan and return to Europe because he felt the guesthouse was too structured. Other guesthouse residents scorned and marginalized him for being too European, and tasked him with menial janitorial duties. Pakistani authorities detained him at the airport as he attempted to leave the country with a false passport and identity papers. As Belgian consulate officials examined his papers, detainee escaped and returned to Jalalabad with the help of Julaybib.⁹ Detainee returned to the Tunisian Guesthouse, staying until either October 2000 or January 2001. Detainee then contacted Abu Qaqa and requested to stay at the Abdallah Azzam Mosque in Jalalabad. There, detainee also clashed with others who attended the mosque. They called him a spy, immoral, and a threat to neighborhood children because they did not approve of him living in the mosque.¹⁰ US and Coalition forces captured Jalalabad in December 2001, at which time detainee fled to Pakistan.¹¹

5. (U) Capture Information:

a. (S//NF) After fleeing to Pakistan, detainee was captured by the Pakistani Army in December 2001. Detainee provided the pseudonym Ahmad Muhammad Umr al-Masaudi to the Pakistanis presenting himself possibly as a Palestinian which he was listed as when handed over to US authorities.¹² Detainee was transferred from Kohat, PK into US custody at Kandahar, AF on 30 December 2001.¹³

b. (S) Property Held:

- Money
 - \$100 US
 - 10,250 Pakistani rupees (PKR)¹⁴

c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 1 May 2002

⁸ IIR 6 034 0534 04, 000174 MFR 14-JUL-2002

⁹ IIR 2 340 6712 02, 000174 302 17-MAY-2002, TD-314/02157-03, 00174 302 08-JUN-2002.

¹⁰ 000174 302 30-JUN-2002, IIR 6 034 0577 02

¹¹ 000174 302 17-MAY-2002, TD-314/36335-03, TD-314/02157-03

¹² >TD-314/02157-03, 000174 302 17-MAY-2002, 000174 INITIAL SCREENING 31-DEC-2001, Analyst Note: The initial screening report states detainee was captured on 5 Ramadan (approximately 21 November 2001), however, during subsequent custodial interviews detainee stated he was captured on the same month he fled Jalalabad in December 2001.

¹³ TD-314/00845-02

¹⁴ Analyst Note: Approximately equivalent to \$168 US.

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d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide information on the following:

- Drug trafficking; the criminal and drug culture of North African immigrants in Italy
- Recruitment and indoctrination of North Africans into Muslim extremist groups in Europe
- Smuggling of North Africans through Europe and into Afghanistan; including the use, manufacture and procurement of forged documents, routes used and methods of bypass for checkpoints and security personnel
- A safe house in the vicinity of Sehat Aama Hospital in Jalalabad
- Individuals and activities associated with the Abdallah Azzam Mosque in Jalalabad
- Islamic extremist groups from Tunisia; to include: The TCG, the Tunisian Islamic Front (FIT), the GIA, and elements of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC)¹⁵

6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee's Account: Detainee's account omits key facts, contacts, and events, and important periods in detainee's past remain unexplained. When first interrogated detainee presented a fabricated cover story and disavowed knowledge of his associates in Europe and Afghanistan—an account he later retracted. Moreover, detainee reportedly instructed other Kandahar detainees to corroborate his cover story. The lack of detail regarding detainee's activities during the 18 months he spent in Jalalabad living among known terrorists clearly indicates deception, particularly in light of reports that detainee accepted a *fatwa* to fight with Kashmiri militants during that time frame and his conviction *in absentia* in the Trabelsi plot. Detainee was obviously shaken when confronted with the coded address book that was confiscated by Belgian authorities after his October 2000 arrest in Islamabad, an item omitted in detainee's account of that arrest. Detainee's consistent denials of personal involvement in jihadist activities are not credible in light of his involvement in key TCG activities and his close association with so many known and admitted terrorist operatives.

7. (U) Detainee Threat:

a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a **HIGH** risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies.

b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: *If released without rehabilitation, close supervision, and means to successfully reintegrate into his society as a law abiding citizen, it is assessed detainee would immediately seek out prior associates and reengage in extremist activities. Since arriving in JTF-GTMO, although detainee has appeared cooperative during*

¹⁵ The GSPC, now known as al-Qaida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), is designated as a NIPF CT Priority 1 target.

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recent debriefings, he has not provided anything of intelligence value. It appears detainee employs counter-interrogation techniques during custodial interviews, indicating his continuing support for extremism. Additionally, detainee holds anti-US sentiment and on more than one occasion has threatened to kill members of the guard force. Detainee was a member of the TCG, an Islamic terrorist organization with active cells in Europe, a former active presence in Afghanistan, and close ties to the GJSN, GIA, and the al-Qaida network. In 2004, detainee was convicted *in absentia* on terrorism-related charges for his role in TCG suicide attacks, including a foiled attack against US military personnel at the Kleine Brogel Air Base and assassination of the Northern Alliance leader, Ahmad Shah Massoud. Detainee probably participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces in Afghanistan, and accepted a *fatwa* to engage in combat alongside Pakistani militants in the Kashmir region. Detainee is assessed to have received training on weapons, and possibly explosives. The DIA assesses detainee to be among the top 52 enemy combatants at JTF-GTMO who pose the most significant threat of reengagement in acts of terrorism if released.

- (S//NF) Detainee was a member of the TCG, an Islamic terrorist organization with active cells in Europe, a former presence in Afghanistan, and close ties to the GJSN, GIA, and the al-Qaida network.
 - (S//NF) Detainee was recruited into the TCG by his cousin, TCG co-founder Amor Sliti.
 - (S//NF) Detainee stated that his move to Belgium in late 1998 and his later travel to Afghanistan in 2000 were at the insistence of Sliti. Detainee resided in Sliti's house while in Belgium, and when Sliti moved with his family to Afghanistan, detainee followed shortly thereafter.¹⁶
 - ◆ (C//NF) In September 2004, the Belgium government found Sliti guilty of providing support to the assassins of Northern Alliance leader, Ahmad Shah Massoud.¹⁷
 - (S//NF) Detainee was present in a founding meeting for the TCG in Jalalabad's Tunisian Guesthouse, held in June 2000 by the former *emir* (leader) of the TCG, Abu Ayadh, aka (Sayfullah Omar Bin Hussayn). Others present included Amor Sliti; Abdallah Bin Ali al-Lutfi, aka (Julaybib), ISN US9TS-000894DP (TS-894); Adil Bin Ahmad Ibrahim Hakimi, aka (Abu Bilal), ISN US9TS-000168DP (TS-168); Adel Bin Muhammad Abbess Ouerghi, aka (Abu Musab), ISN US9TS-000502DP (TS-502); Khlifa Ben Hassan; and possibly Hedi Ben Hedili Hammami, aka (Zubayr), ISN US9TS-000717DP (TS-717).¹⁸

¹⁶ TD-314/23097-02, IIR 6 807 0090 04, IIR 6 807 0067 05, IIR 6 807 0074 03, TD-314/35898-03, TD-314/36335-03

¹⁷ IIR 6 807 0067 05

¹⁸ TD-314/34119-03, TD-314/20628-03, Analyst Note: No further information is available about Khlifa Ben Hassan. See CIR 316-19550-06.

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- (S//NF) Detainee resided in the TCG associated Tunisian guesthouse in Jalalabad between early to mid-2000 through November 2001.¹⁹
 - (S//NF) Detained senior al-Qaida facilitator, Zayn al-Abidin Muhammad Husayn, aka (Abu Zubaydah), ISN US9GZ-010016DP (GZ-10016), stated he meet detainee in the Tunisian Guesthouse in Jalalabad. In approximately October 2000, detainee requested a French passport from GZ-10016 so he could travel to France. However, GZ-10016 was unable to obtain a passport of quality for detainee.²⁰
- (S//NF) Detainee was associated with a GIA cell in Bologna, IT in 1997 that included the other TCG members from the Tunisian Guesthouse. In December 2002, Italian national military police, Ros Carabinieri, indicated detainee had an outstanding Italian arrest warrant for his ties to the Bologna GIA cell. At least seven other Tunisian detainees (Ridah Bin Saleh al-Yazidi, US9TS-000038DP (TS-38), Riyadh Bin Muhammad Tahir Bin Lakhdar Nasri ISN US9TS-000510DP (TS-510), TS-502, TS-168, TS-717, TS-894, and Lutfi Lagha, ISN US9TS-000660DP (TS-660, transferred)) also had outstanding warrants or were otherwise identified as suspects in the 1997 investigation.²¹ (Analyst Note: This suggests detainee's involvement in the Tunisian terrorist network began during or prior to his residency in Italy, years before his travel to Afghanistan.)
- (S//NF) Detainee was convicted *in absentia* in Belgium in 2004 on terrorism related charges for his role in TCG suicide attacks, including a foiled 2001 attack against US military personnel at the Kleine Brogel Air Base and the assassination of Northern Alliance leader, Ahmad Shah Massoud. Detainee was sentenced to four years imprisonment. Seventeen other TCG members, including Tariq Maaroufi, Nisar Trabelsi, Amor Sliti, and TS-168, also received sentences ranging from several months to ten years. Paris TCG cell leader Djamel Beghal, was tried in Paris on related charges.²²
- (C) The Tunisian government has issued the following criminal judgments against detainee: the first judgment #16851 dated January 26, 2005 sentences detainee *in absentia* to eight years imprisonment for belonging to a terrorist organization operating abroad, the second judgment #26585 dated March 24, 2006 sentences detainee *in absentia* to eight years imprisonment for belonging to a terrorist

¹⁹ IIR 2 340 6606 02, IIR 6 034 0577 02, IIR 2 340 6785 02, TD-314/34119-03, TD-314/39191-05, 000174 SIR EXT 30-MAR-2002, Analyst Note: According to detainee, the other occupants of the guesthouse included Abu Ayadh, Amor Sliti, TS-894, Lutfi Lagha, ISN US9TS-000660DP (TS-660), Dujana (possibly TS-510), Bilal (possibly TS-168), Musab (possibly TS-502), Zubayr (possibly TS-717), Abu Hamza (possibly, (aka Djamel Beghal)), Abu Qaqa (possibly Nisar Trabelsi), Khudeyfa, Khalil, and Abu Ubayda.

²⁰ TD-314/39191-05

²¹ IIR 5 398 6003 03, TD-314/38907-01

²² AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 30-SEP-03

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- organization operating abroad at a time of peace intending to incite hatred and religious fanaticism.²³
- (S//NF) Detainee probably participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces in Afghanistan.
 - (U//FOUO) During a custodial interview on 11 March 2005, detainee acknowledged he was going to Afghanistan to help support them against the American invasion of their country.²⁴
 - (C//REL TO USA, GCTF) Detainee admitted that mistakes were made by him in Afghanistan. According to detainee, religious people would ask a person to go to Afghanistan to learn about religion but when the person got there, they learned about military operations as well. Afterwards, the person would be asked to engage in combat.²⁵
 - (S//NF) TS-502 stated that all of the Tunisians detained at JTF-GTMO had sided with UBL against US and Coalition forces.²⁶
 - (S//NF) Detainee's TCG associates engaged in combat operations against US and Coalition forces after the US invasion of Afghanistan. Abu Ayadh and TS-717 organized "the Jalalabad group" and volunteered to defend UBL and the embattled al-Qaida fighters at Tora Bora, AF.²⁷ TS-168 also reportedly fought US and Coalition forces in Tora Bora.²⁸
 - (S//NF) Detainee is assessed to have received weapons training that included small arms and possibly explosives. This training was probably conducted at al-Qaida's Derunta Camp.
 - (S//NF) Detainee admitted receiving "visual" weapons training from "Cheboutti al-Jazeera."²⁹ Detainee admitted Cheboutti briefly lived in the Abdallah Azzam Mosque with detainee. Cheboutti worked in a Jalalabad shop repairing weapons and was likely receiving training at Derunta Camp.³⁰
 - (S//NF) Amor Sliti's second wife, Christine Volcke, testified in the Belgian trial of Sliti, Trabelsi, detainee, and others that she had heard talk of training camps and saw an exercise book belonging to detainee that contained drawings of electrical circuits, possibly related to explosives, while in Jalalabad.³¹
 - (S//NF) Detainee demonstrated knowledge of Derunta Training Camp cover stories and code words ("Going swimming" and "buying fish"), layout ("very

²³ >AMEMBASSY TUNIS 221510Z JUN07

²⁴ >000174 FM40 11-MAR-2005

²⁵ >IIR 6 034 0409 08

²⁶ IIR 6 034 0893 04

²⁷ TD-314/12008-03

²⁸ TD-314/34119-03, TD-314/24907-02, TD-314/55272-05

²⁹ 000174 SIR EXT 25-MAR-2002, Analyst Note: A variant of Cheboutti is Shabuti.

³⁰ 000174 302 10-JUL-2002

³¹ FBIS EUP20040229000162

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- military--lots of checkpoints”), and key personnel such as explosives trainer Midhat Mursi al-Sayyid Umar, aka (Abu Khabab). Detainee described Abu Khabab’s reputation as very knowledgeable about chemistry, physics, and fabrication of explosives.³² (Analyst Note: Derunta was one of UBL’s most important training camps in Afghanistan, known to provide small arms, explosives, and possibly biological and chemical weapons training.)
- (S//NF) Many other TCG members who stayed at the Tunisian Guesthouse are known or suspected to have attended Derunta Training Camp.³³
 - (S//NF) Detainee accepted a *fatwa* to conduct combat alongside Pakistani militants in the Kashmir region.
 - (S//NF) GZ-10016 recalled that he heard detainee had accepted a *fatwa* to fight alongside Pakistani militants in Kashmir.³⁴ (Analyst Note: Additional information is available in an SCI supplement.)
 - (S//NF) DIA assess detainee to be among the top 52 enemy combatants at JTF-GTMO who pose the most significant threat of reengagement in acts of terrorism if released.³⁵
 - (S//NF) Detainee has been repeatedly uncooperative during custodial interviews, has acknowledged providing false information to debriefers, and often employs counter-interrogation techniques indicating his continuing support for extremism.³⁶
 - (S//NF) Detainee has threatened guard staff at JTF-GTMO and in Iraq upon release and holds anti-US sentiment.³⁷

c. (S//NF) Detainee’s Conduct: Detainee is assessed as a **HIGH** threat from a detention perspective. His overall behavior has been non-compliant and hostile to the guard force and staff. Detainee currently has 388 reports of disciplinary infraction listed in DIMS with the most recent occurring on 2 July 2008, when he refused to remove a towel from cell window. He has 153 reports of disciplinary infraction for assault with the most recent occurring on 28 February 2008, when he threw food at the guard force. Other incidents for which he has been disciplined include inciting and participating in mass disturbances, failure to follow guard instructions and camp rules, inappropriate use of bodily fluids, unauthorized communications, damage to government property, attempted assaults, provoking words and gestures, and possession of food and non-weapon type contraband. On 5 July 2007, detainee was found in possession of string with razor attached to the end (shank). In 2007, detainee had a total of 32 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction and 33 so far in 2008.

³² 000174 302 10-JUL-2002, IIR 6 034 0534 04

³³ IIR 6 034 0629 03, IIR 2 340 6606 02, TD-314/05602-03

³⁴ TD-314/39191-05

³⁵ >Defense Analysis Report 11-JUL-2008

³⁶ > 000174 FM40 27-JUL-2006, GUAN-2005-T02809,000174 FM40 24-JUN-2005, 000174 SIR 17-MAY-2007, TD-314/02157-03,000174 302 17-May-2002,000174 INITIAL SCREENING 31-DEC-2001

³⁷ >JIG INCIDENT 04-NOV-2006 19:51:00, JIG INCIDENT 20-APR-2006 19:16:00

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8. (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:

a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of **MEDIUM** intelligence value. Detainee's most recent interrogation session occurred on 18 July 2008.

b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Detainee resided or associated with key Tunisian extremists in Europe, Afghanistan, and Pakistan for at least three or four years prior to his capture. During that time, he had direct access to the core contingent of Tunisian extremists in Italy and later in Jalalabad, including involvement in key organizational meetings of the TCG. Detainee had close access to senior TCG and al-Qaida figures including Abu Ayadh, GZ-10016, and Djamel Beghal. Detainee is in a position to provide information about militant operations in Kashmir.

c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee likely possesses intelligence of value not yet exploited. Detainee has provided extensive and specific information on extremist operatives and facilities in both Afghanistan and Europe, to include derogatory accounts of his own cousin's money couriering in support of the TCG.³⁸ Many of detainee's associates are now in custody of the US, Belgium, France, and Tunisia.³⁹ However, a number of TCG members are still unaccounted for.⁴⁰ Detainee has yet to divulge the full details of his participation in the TCG and his association with al-Qaida networks. Specifically, he should have information concerning recruitment, facilitation and activities of key members within the North African extremist network in Europe and Afghanistan. Detainee still has additional incriminating information against Amor Sliti, Abu Ayadh, TS-510, TS-168, and other detainees.

d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:

- Extremist organizations and operations in Europe including operations against US personnel or interests
- TCG organization and operations, including leadership; cells in Belgium, Italy, UK, and Jalalabad; operations; training; facilitation and logistic support, including use of and role in GJSN; and relationship with al-Qaida.
- Hostile acts committed by TCG, GJSN, GIA, and al-Qaida members now in custody at JTF-GTMO
- GIA cells and operations in Italy and the relationship between GIA and the TCG.
- Recruitment and facilitation of extremist in Europe

³⁸ IIR 2 340 6785 02, 000174 SIR 24-MAY-2004

³⁹ IIR 6 807 0067 05

⁴⁰ TD-314/42171-05

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- European narcotics trade
- Assassination of Ahmad Shah Massoud, the perpetrators, and support for the operation by extremist elements
- Militant operations in Kashmir

9. (S) **EC Status:** Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 6 December 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant.



D. M. THOMAS, JR
Rear Admiral, US Navy
Commanding

* Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessment can be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College October 2001 guide *Intelligence Warning Terminology*.