




S E C R E T // N O F O R N // 20301216

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09360



JTF GTMO-CG

16 December 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue, Miami, FL 33172.

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9SA-000206DP (S)

JTF GTMO Detainee Assessment

1. (S//NF) Personal Information:

- JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Abdullah Muhammed Abdel Aziz
- Aliases and Current/True Name: Muhammed Abdel Aziz; Abdullah Mohammad Mohammad Yahia Al-Edaini; Abdullah Muhamed Ibn Muhamed Bin Yehia Al-Udani Al-Yamani
- Place of Birth: Taif, Saudi Arabia (SA)
- Date of Birth: 1976
- Citizenship: Saudi Arabia
- Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9SA-000206DP



2. (FOUO) Health: Detainee is in good health. Detainee has history of GSW to left foot prior to his detention and has been evaluated by orthopedic surgery and podiatry. He has history of hemorrhoids. He went on hunger strike in July 2005. He is currently on proctofoam cream qd. He has no known drug allergies.

3. (S//NF) JTF GTMO Assessment:

a. (S) Recommendation: JTF GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). **If a satisfactory agreement can be reached that ensures continued detention and allows access to detainee and/or to exploited intelligence, detainee can be Transferred Out of DoD Control (TRO). A visiting Saudi delegation indicated that the Government of Saudi Arabia would be willing to take**

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custody of detainee for possible prosecution. JTF GTMO previously assessed detainee as Retain in DoD Control (DoD) on 21 May 2004.

b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is an assessed Al-Qaida member. He traveled to Afghanistan intent on preparing for jihad. Detainee received militant training at an Al-Qaida camp. Detainee is assessed to have affiliated with Al-Qaida members while residing in Al-Qaida associated guesthouses. Detainee was present on the Kabul front lines during hostilities and was involved in the Mazar-E-Sharif uprising. It is assessed this detainee is a MEDIUM risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies. JTF GTMO determined this detainee is of MEDIUM intelligence value.

4. (S//NF) Detainees Account of Events:

The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.

a. (S//NF) Prior History: Detainee reported that he graduated junior high school in approximately 1997 and then attended the Institute of Secondary School for Industry in Medina al Manawa, SA, where he studied electricity. Detainee claimed he left the secondary school in 2000, without graduating, and obtained a job with a private communications company as a receptionist. An Algerian named Osama El Hashimi owned the company. (Analyst Note: No information exists to further identify El Hashimi.) Detainee worked for Hashimi until 2001, when the business was sold. Detainee then worked in his father's record store for a short time.

b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: While working for his father, detainee was attended the El-Haram mosque in Medina, SA. At the mosque, he claimed to have met a Saudi named Ibrahim who brought up the subject of Afghanistan.¹ (Analyst Note: It is possible that Ibrahim was known Al-Qaida recruiter Ibrahim Husayn 'Ali Al-Harithi, aka Anjasha. Anjasha is known to have actively recruited young Saudis for jihad, to include several other detainees.)² Detainee stated that Ibrahim explained verses of the Koran, which mandated that a Muslim's duty was "to prepare himself to stand against anyone who is against Islam." Ibrahim told detainee he could get free training, specifically on the Kalashnikov, in Afghanistan. Detainee claimed he departed Saudi Arabia sometime between June and August 2001 with travel instructions from Ibrahim. Ibrahim provided no contact information for Afghanistan other than telling the detainee the "Arabs would provide him

¹ 000206 FBI 302 Summary 6 April 2002

² IIR 6 034 1258 03, TD-314/47512-02

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with the guidance he needed.” Detainee traveled to Afghanistan via Damascus, Syria (SY), Tehran, Iran (IR), Meshad, IR, and Taibad, IR. In Taibad, detainee paid the Afghan guards approximately 30 USD to cross the IR/AF border. Once over the border, detainee claimed he traveled to Herat, AF, where he spent a day in a guesthouse. (Analyst Note: While the exact guesthouse is unknown, it is probable that the Taliban managed the guesthouse.) While in the guesthouse, he told the Afghan owner that he was there to receive training. The next day the owner sent detainee to Kandahar, AF. When detainee arrived in Kandahar, he reportedly told the driver to take him to “where the Arabs were.” He was taken to a guesthouse near a mosque where he stayed for four days. (Analyst Note: Based on location of the guesthouse near a mosque and his instructions to the taxi driver, it is assessed that detainee was taken to the Hajji Habash Guesthouse aka Azzam aka Al Ansar aka Al Nebras.) At the guesthouse he met Abu Walid (who detainee believed might have run the guesthouse), who told detainee that he should go to Kabul, AF, for training. (Analyst Note: Abu Walid is probably Abu Waheed. Abu Waheed was one of the leaders of the Hajji Habash Guesthouse.)³ Detainee traveled to Kabul prior to 11 September 2001.⁴

c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: In Kabul, AF, detainee stated he went to a guesthouse where he met Abu Ziad who suggested detainee train with Abdel Salam. (Analyst Note: Abdel Salam is probably Arab Brigade sub-unit leader Abdel Salam al Hadrami.)⁵ Abu Ziad reportedly drove detainee to a training camp about fifteen to twenty minutes outside Kabul and introduced him to Abdel Salam.⁶ At the camp, detainee claimed he was trained to operate the Kalashnikov and PK machine gun. He saw others being trained, on the rocket-propelled grenade and bazooka. (Analyst Note: It is assessed, based on location and types of training detainee participated in and witnessed, that the camp was the Malek Center.)⁷ Detainee’s training reportedly lasted approximately one to one and a half months. He lived in the guesthouse in Kabul and traveled to the training camp during the day. His training followed no set pattern. Detainee claimed he traveled to the front lines twice with Abu Ziad but was not issued a weapon, remained in the rear, and did not fight. When detainee’s training was concluded, he remained in the guesthouse for approximately another four months. When he heard that Kabul was to be bombed by US forces, he reportedly fled to Konduz, AF. In Konduz, he claimed to have stayed in a guesthouse

³ IIR 6 034 0999 04

⁴ 000206 FBI 302 Summary 6 April 2002

⁵ (S//NF) (Analyst Note: Assessed Al-Qaida member Said Ibrahim Ramzi Al-Zahrani, ISN US9SA-000204DP (SA-204), also identified Adel Salam al Hadrami as a trainer. See IIR 6 034 0699 02)

⁶ 000206 FBI 302 Summary 6 April 2002

⁷ (S//NF) (Analyst Note: Assessed Al-Qaida member Abdullah Y Yahia, ISN US9SA-000240DP (SA-240), attended training at Malek Center and stated that it was “located some fifteen or twenty minutes from Kabul.” See IIR 6 034 0744 02)

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operated by Abu Al-Ayna⁸ for approximately one month. After this time, Konduz was attacked and detainee's group decided to surrender to General Dostum's forces at Mazar-E-Sharif, AF. Prior to leaving Konduz, detainee claimed he was issued a Kalashnikov and ammunition by Abu Al-Ayna, but denied ever firing it.⁹

5. (S//NF) Capture Information:

a. (S//NF) Detainee's group reportedly traveled from Konduz, AF, to Mazar-E-Sharif, AF, where he surrendered to Dostum's forces. The group was searched and then taken to a castle called Jenki.¹⁰ A riot erupted; detainee was shot in the leg and then escaped to the basement of the castle to hide. He denied taking an active role in the uprising. After several days, the group was allowed to surrender and the Red Cross treated detainee. He was taken to a jail in Sheberghan, AF, and delivered to US custody on 01 January 2002.¹¹

b. (S) Property Held:

- 1 – Prayer beads, green and red in color
- 25 – white pills
- 1 – tan pill
- 8 – red pills
- 6 – red and yellow capsules¹²
- 10 – 10,000 Afghani currency notes

c. (S) Transferred to JTF GTMO: 21 January 2002

⁸ (S//NF) (Analyst Note: Abu Al-Ayna's true identity and role inside Al-Qaida, outside of operating a guesthouse, remains unknown. Several others at Guantanamo Bay have identified a Konduz, AF, guesthouse owner / operator by the name of Abu Al-Ayna.)

⁹ (S//NF) (Analyst Note: Detainee stated this was the first and only time he was ever issued a weapon in Afghanistan, and it was only for self-defense. See 000206 FBI 302 Summary 6 April 2002)

¹⁰ (S//NF) (Analyst Note: Numerous GTMO detainees surrendered to General Dostum's troops in late November 2001. Dostum's forces took the prisoners to the Qala-I-Jenki prison located outside Mazar-E-Sharif, AF, on 24 November 2001. After one night in captivity, the prisoners revolted leading to the deaths of members of the Northern Alliance forces and a CIA operative. Detainee and others at Guantanamo Bay survived the assaults, secured the prison and hid in the basement until re-captured.)

¹¹ 000206 FBI 302 Summary 6 April 2002

¹² (S//NF) (Analyst Note: A chemical analysis has not been performed on the medication detainee was carrying. One of the pills was an amoxicillin capsule.)

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d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF GTMO: To provide information on the following:

- Taliban safe house used for mission planning and rest in the city of Konduz, AF
- Taliban controlled farm on the outskirts of Kabul, AF, where small arms training was conducted

6. (S//NF) Evaluation Of Detainee's Account: Detainee has provided incomplete accounts of his activities. The vagueness of his story makes it difficult to assess his true role within the jihadist network. His timeline after arrival in Kabul, AF, is inconsistent with historic events, making it more difficult to determine his activities. Other detainees in custody have similarly reported on names and locations he identifies, thereby corroborating what information he has provided. His denial of combat despite admitted weapons training is highly suspect.

7. (S//NF) Detainee Threat:

a. (S) Assessment: It is assessed the detainee poses a MEDIUM risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.

b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: Detainee is an assessed Al-Qaida member who received militant training at an Al-Qaida supported training camp in Afghanistan and resided in several Taliban/Al-Qaida guesthouses.

- (S//NF) Detainee admittedly traveled to Afghanistan for the express purpose of gaining jihadist training.¹³
 - (S//NF) Detainee attended training for one to one and a half months at a facility located approximately fifteen to twenty minutes outside Kabul, AF. While at this facility he trained under Abdel Salam.¹⁴ (Analyst Note: Based on location of the camp and the types of training in which detainee participated and witnessed, it is assessed that detainee attended Malek Center. Malek Center is a known Al-Qaida training facility outside Kabul. It was typically attended after an initial training camp, usually Al Farouq. It is probable that detainee attended another camp to which he has not admitted. Malek Center taught specialized training on air defense, artillery, and mines. It is assessed that Abdel Salam is Arab Brigade sub-unit commander Abdel Salam Al Hadrami. It is possible that detainee was a member of the Arab Brigade.)
 - (S//NF) An individual named Ibrahim recruited detainee.¹⁵ Ibrahim is assessed to be known Al-Qaida recruiter Ibrahim Husayn 'Ali Al-Harithi, aka Anjasha. As of

¹³ 000206 FBI 302 Summary 6 April 2002

¹⁴ 000206 FBI 302 Summary 6 April 2002

¹⁵ 000206 FBI 302 Summary 6 April 2002

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- November 2002, Anjasha was actively being sought by the Saudi Government for his active recruitment of young Saudis for jihad.¹⁶ Anjasha recruited several individuals detained at JTF-GTMO.¹⁷
- (S//NF) Detainee resided in several probable Al-Qaida/Taliban supported safe houses while in Afghanistan.¹⁸
 - (S//NF) Detainee stayed in an unidentified safe house in Herat, AF, run by an unidentified Afghan.¹⁹ (Analyst Note: It is assessed that this guesthouse was a Taliban operated guesthouse frequently mentioned by other detainees as a way station upon entry into Afghanistan.)
 - (S//NF) When detainee arrived in Kandahar, AF, he requested to be taken to “where the Arabs are.” Detainee was taken to a safe house near a mosque.²⁰ (Analyst Note: It is assessed that this guesthouse was the Hajji Habash Guesthouse. Other detainees made a similar request upon their arrival in Kandahar and were taken to the facility. The Hajji Habash Guesthouse was used primarily for Arabs awaiting training at Al Farouq. The guesthouse also served as a way station for recruits traveling north to Kabul.)
 - (S//NF) When detainee learned that the coalition was going to bomb Kabul, he traveled to Konduz, AF, where he stayed in a safe house operated by Abu Al-Ayna. When bombing began in Konduz, Abu Al-Ayna provided detainee with a weapon and they traveled to Mazar-E-Sharif, AF, to surrender to Dostum’s forces.²¹ He further stated that up to 110 Taliban fighters were housed or receiving aid and supplies from this location. An individual named Garib operated the house.²² (Analyst Note: Garib is assessed to be Gharib Al-Sunai (variant: Ghareeb) who assumed leadership after Abu Salem’s death.)
 - (S//NF) While in Kabul, AF, detainee traveled to the front lines twice with an individual by the name of Abu Ziad, but remained in the rear and denied engaging in combat.²³ (Analyst Note: There is no further information available to identify Abu Ziad. Detainee’s travel to the front line is suspect, as most jihadists did not travel to the front lines just to visit, but rather to assume a watch or fighting position.)
 - (S//NF) Detainee was captured in the aftermath of the Qala-I-Jenki prison uprising in Mazar-E-Sharif, AF.²⁴

¹⁶ TD-314/47512-02

¹⁷ IIR 6 034 1258 03, 000195 SIR 12 May 2004, 000081 MFR 3 April 2002,

¹⁸ 000206 FBI 302 Summary 6 April 2002

¹⁹ 000206 FBI 302 Summary 6 April 2002

²⁰ 000206 FBI 302 Summary 6 April 2002

²¹ IIR 6 034 1258 03, 000195 SIR 12 May 2004, 000081 MFR 3 April 2002,

²² 000206 KB 02-06-2002

²³ IIR 6 034 1258 03, 000195 SIR 12 May 2004, 000081 MFR 3 April 2002,

²⁴ 000206 FBI 302 Summary 6 April 2002

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- (S//NF) After the July 2002 Saudi delegation visit, detainee was identified by the Saudi Ministry of Interior, General Directorate of Investigations (Mabahith) as one of the seventy-seven Saudi nationals of low intelligence and law enforcement value to the US Government but of whom the Saudi Government would attempt to prosecute if transferred to their custody from JTF GTMO.²⁶

c. (FOUO) Detainee's Conduct: The detainee is assessed as a MODERATE threat from a detention perspective. The detainee's overall behavior has been non-compliant, yet non-hostile to the guard force and staff. The detainee currently has 36 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS, with the most recent occurring on 24 July 2005 when he failed to follow instructions by refusing to come out of his cell after being asked three times by the escort team, guards, block NCO, SOG, and PL. Other incidents for which the detainee has been disciplined include using provoking words and gestures with the guards, possession of non-weapon type contraband, unauthorized communications, damage to property, and assault. The detainee was not disciplined for a threat he made to a guard on 19 July 2005 when he made a motion with his thumb across his throat and told the guard that he was going to kill him. On 29 June 2005, he was noted making racist slurs towards a guard. The detainee has only 2 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction in 2005.

8. (S//NF) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:

- (S) Assessment:** JTF GTMO determined this detainee is of MEDIUM intelligence value.
- (S//NF) Placement and Access:** No evidence indicates detainee had direct access to leadership. After residing in several guesthouses along a known Al-Qaida ingress route, he attended a training camp located outside Kabul, AF, under the tutelage of Abdel Salam. He claimed limited exposure to front line hostilities north of Kabul, but remained in a nearby guesthouse for several months during hostilities. This may have afforded him access to logistics operations. He was present at the Qala-I-Jenki prison uprising, but his role in the incident cannot be confirmed.
- (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment:** Detainee's vague timeline makes it difficult to assess his true intelligence value. However, his admitted presence at numerous guesthouses along a known Al-Qaida ingress route, detainee may have information on guesthouse visitors, residents, and operational procedures. Detainee's participation in training at an assessed Al-Qaida specialized training facility should provide specific

²⁵ 000568 SIR 18 November 2004

²⁶ TD-314/30789-02

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
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information about practices, procedures, personalities in attendance, and methodologies of Al-Qaida training programs. His possible previous attendance at a basic training facility such as Al Farouq would provide similar information as well as the process by which recruits were selected for specialized training. Detainee's visit to the frontlines in Kabul, potentially provide information on the fighting doctrines of the Arab Brigade. Detainee is assessed as a very intelligent and deceptive individual who possibly possesses significant information on Al-Qaida personnel and operations.

d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:

- Guesthouses
- Training camps
- Personalities on the Kabul front line
- Qala-I-Jenki prison uprising

9. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 25 October 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant.


JAY W. HOOD
Major General, USA
Commanding