THE DAILY BEE,
PUBLISHED BY
G. F. WEISSE & CO.,
EDITORS AND PROPRIETORS
G. F. WEISSE, A. BARDY,
H. DUVERGER, F. DUFOUR.
DAILY PAPER, (one year in advance).....$12
WEEKLY PAPER, semi-weekly, (one year in advance).....$5
Country subscribers must give the week's notice of the time they can be allowed to discontinue.

The New Orleans Bee.

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NEW ORLEANS, TUESDAY MORNING, JULY 24, 1855.

Vol. XVI.—NEW SERIES. Vol. XXVIII.—Whole No. 2700.

THE DAILY BEE.

Tuesday Morning July 24th, 1855.

THE NORTHERN MAIL came through yesterday with the latest dates.

THE WAR.

The truthful and accurate correspondence of the London Times, writing from the Crimea, concludes a most graphic and interesting narrative of the repulse of the Allies on the 18th June, with reflections of gloomy augury to the ultimate success of the besieging army. He cannot see any possibility of the Allies being able to abandon their present position on the South side of Sebastopol, or to make a general attack on the Russian armies encamped before them. Every ravine has been made another Sebastopol by their engineers. This is in direct conflict with the general impression. It has therefore been believed that the only practicable mode of reducing Sebastopol was for the Allies to take the field and in a series of engagements cripple or destroy the Russian forces, and compel them to withdraw from the Crimea. When once the Allies should become masters of the Peninsula, they would be enabled to command the avenues of approach to Sebastopol, by intercepting the supplies, would ultimately leave to the beleaguered garrison the alternative between death by famine or an unconditional surrender. This, however, does not seem to be the conclusion of the intelligent observer and impartial writer referred to. He says:

"It is to be presumed that the Allied Generals have reckoned with some facts respecting the character of the Russian army, which we have from time to time thought would be unavailable to us. Our camp and try to force the passes of Perekop. They may distrust their own strength or the efficiency of their means of transport, or they may be deterred by the force of the valor of the enemy. They may be influenced by considerations, and may act on it, which of which we are ignorant, but the be many, first of internal rank and of great service is that the proper way to attack a place is to get the start of and thwart an invasion, no matter how far the place may be removed from the great organ itself, and let it alone. We are but strong enough, it is said, to act in the manner indicated outside, for we have 210,000 men, and it is said we require at 250,000 or 260,000 men to occupy the ground which enable them to resist at all times in turn without the pardon of invest. Perekop is inaccessible and poisonous. It is a vital to the Russian army, which it is to think it would be unavailable to us. Our camp and try to force the passes of Perekop. They may distrust their own strength or the efficiency of their means of transport, or they may be deterred by the force or valor of the enemy. They may be influenced by considerations, and may act on it, which of which we are ignorant, but the be many