

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Scowcroft file

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: July 21, 1975 - Monday
9:30 a.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office
The White House

SUBJECTS: SALT: Helsinki Trip; Middle East; Panama

Kissinger: Schlesinger says the Soviet proposal is just a repackaging. But the MIRV verification has been the big issue in the press -- with charges of me leaking. The silo volume and SS-19 as the maximum size are also compromises. I think this is your best chance of getting a SALT agreement.


President: When will you meet?

Kissinger: He says Wednesday.

Scowcroft: He told me maybe Tuesday. It really must be Tuesday.

Kissinger: I agree. And you shouldn't be there. And I think the best chance for agreement is between you and Brezhnev. If you don't do it now it will be well into next year and it will be a divisive election issue.

President: We will make a maximum effort to make an agreement.



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CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger
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BY sk, NARA, DATE 5/21/04

Kissinger: I think we are at the limit of what our defense budget will take.

On mobile land ICBM's I think he is totally wrong, but I don't give a damn.

Scowcroft: I fear they would build one and Congress and the environmentalists would prevent us from doing it. Then we would be in trouble.

President: I think the pressure against it would be overwhelming. When will we meet? Friday?

Kissinger: That will be too late. I think Wednesday. We must get something to the Soviet Union by Friday night.

We have some scheduling problems on the trip. Dobrynin suggests a dinner there.

President: I think that would be better. I think it's better optically.

Kissinger: On the lunches....

Now Auschwitz. It is sort of bad taste to go to someplace which commemorates, not an outrage basically against Poles but against Jews.

President: Your judgment is better than mind on this.

Kissinger: I shouldn't have asked Schmidt about Gdansk.

Scowcroft: I think we can separate the wreath-laying from the museums, etc.

President: I don't want to go to the horror parts.

[There was discussion of Jack Ford's participation]

Kissinger: We have heard from Sadat. He hasn't rejected the Israeli offer. He objects to the six American stations. He doesn't mind us substituting for Israelis but not where no one was before. He says they won't do any good and the Arabs will portray it as U.S. protection



of Israel. He objected to Israeli technicians in the warning station because then they in effect control the pass. We could say they must be unarmed. But he will give us a formal reply this evening.

President: If he answers as you indicated, what is the next step?

Kissinger: I'm not crazy about the six American stations. We would be there in nine stations -- six and the three warning stations. Israel has designed them as an American pocket designed to give us the passes -- Sadat is right. Sadat accepts the three warning stations in principle.

[Scowcroft left for the map and then returned.]

President: I think the six stations and three are too much.

Kissinger: I think we should wait and see. We just went from four to six and the Israelis are not too good at giving up things they have pocketed. Let's wait -- we may have to pressure the Israelis some more.

We are having a meeting on Panama this week. If we don't settle Panama, I fear we will have a Vietnam in the Western Hemisphere. Our Army will be engaged in guerilla warfare, pilloried in international forms -- all for something we will give up eventually, and on worse terms if we wait. I think we could make it if we had a conceptual understanding with nothing signed or initialled.

President: When do the negotiations reconvene?

Kissinger: They should have in June. We have been holding and every day the situation gets tougher.

The issues are: Does Bunker go back? If so, with what instructions? And how do we work with the hill?

President: The longer we can drag it out the better it is domestically. The conservatives and liberals will join.

Kissinger: The liberals won't join except cynically to hit you.

President: Did you see the New York Times editorial on CSCE?

Kissinger: On Panama, I don't think you should stonewall. We can drag out the negotiations if the other departments play ball and don't leak.

President: The Reagan forces need something on which to dramatize. If we can get by the next four or five months, Reagan will be finished.

Kissinger: That we can do if you keep everyone quiet.

President: Reagan will make the decision this fall. We need that much time.

Kissinger: I can stretch it 'til February and ensure that you sign nothing until '77. We can hold off a treaty initialling 'til '77.

Castle Jachs - Official Party
- Castle vs Brown.
- Wicks - Speaker from J.S.
- Kephner meeting call.

Call for a meeting

Press Conf - Ker P. ✓

P/K 21 July 75

K. Schlos says SO proposal is just a rephrasing. But
a Major complication has been a big issue re-
press-w/ changes of one thing. The file volume
+ SSYF as max size are also complications.
I think this is your best chance of getting a substantive
agreement.

P. When will you meet.

K. He says Wed.

S. He told me maybe Thurs. It really went to Thurs.

K. I agree. And you shouldn't be there. And I think
a best time for agreement is about you + Burg. If you
don't do it now it will be well into next year
and it will be a division ^{issue}.

P. We will make a max effort to make an agreement.

K. I think we are at a limit of what our def budget will
take. ⊕

On taxable land Texas, I think he is totally wrong
but I don't give a damn.

S. I fear they would bill one + Cong + a Revenue table
would prevent us from doing it - then we in trouble.

P. I think a pressure against it would be overwhelming.

Q. When will we meet? (Friday?)

K. Too late. I think Wed. We must get something to
SO by Friday night.

Scheduling probs - ~~Burg~~ Burg suggests dinner.

P. I think that would be better. I think it better sympathy.

K. On a bunch - ~~on a basis~~ (nothing)

Now Christy. It is sort of bad taste to go to some place
which commemorates not only outrage historically against
Polos from against Jews.

P. Your judgment is better than mine on this.

K. I shouldn't have asked Schmidt about Glauk.

S. I think we can separate a wealth laying from
muson, etc.

P. I don't want to go to the honor parts.

⊕ (Jachs participation)



- What people in Panama: why
Get NY Tribune at beginning: price for CSSE

K We have heard from Sadr. He hasn't rejected -
I agree. He objects to c 6 US stations - doesn't mind
no subs. for I, but not where we one was before. He
says they want to say good + c Arabs will protect it as US
protection of I. He objects to I tech. in - warning station
because then they in effect control - pass. We could
say they must be unarm'd. But he will give us
a formal reply this evening.

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in 7 stations - 6 + the 3 warning stations. I had
designed them as an Am pocket also good to give
us a pass - Sadr is right. Sadr accepts c
3 warning stations in principle

(I left for camp)

P I think c 6 stations + 3 are too much.

K I think we should wait & see. We just want for
4 to 6 + c I am not too good at giving up things they have
promised. Let's wait - we may have to pressure it
some more.

We rely on Panama this week. If we don't settle
Panama, I fear we will have UN in W. Hem. Our
army will be engaged in guerrilla warfare, pillaged
in with farms - all for something we will give up
eventually, and on worse terms if we wait. I think
we could waste it if we had conceptual understanding
nothing significant installed.

P When do we get - answers


K Should have in June. We have had a very
day & sit gets tougher.

Answers are: does Bunker go back, if so w/what
instructions, & how do we work w/c Hill.

P The larger we can buy it and c better it is
domestically. The circumstances & bits will join

K The bits will join except cynically to hit you.

P Did you see c NY Tribune on CSSE.



KR On Panama - I don't think you should stall.
We can change our negot if a other depts play
balls don't leak.

The Reagan faces need something in which to dramatize.
If we can get by next 4-5 mos, Reagan will be
finished.

K That we can do if you keep everyone quiet.

P Reagan will make decision this fall. We need that
much time.

K I can stretch it til Feb & advise you sign
nothing til 77. We can hold off treaty negotiations
till 77.

