

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

18 September 2006

TO: AGIL ALNAHDI, SULEMAN AWAD SULEMAN BIN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AGIL ALNAHDI, SULEMAN AWAD
SULEMAN BIN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee stated that in approximately June 2001 he traveled to Mecca, Saudi Arabia and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia to visit the holy places.
 2. The detainee stated after traveling to Saudi Arabia, he traveled to Afghanistan to receive training as outlined in a fatwa he heard issued.
 3. The detainee stated he went to Afghanistan to prepare for Palestine.
 4. The detainee stated he went to Tora Bora and stayed in the mountains for ten to fourteen days.
 - b. Training
 1. The detainee stated he trained for approximately one month with the Yemen military at Buwesh, Yemen. The detainee stated he received physical training and instruction on the Kalashnikov rifle.
 2. The detainee stated he arrived at Camp Farouq sometime before Ramadan 2001.

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3. A source stated the al Farouq training camp was funded by al Qaida and was more advanced than the other camps in Afghanistan. The training at the al Farouq consisted of two week periods of weapons training, basic commando course, topography and explosives.

4. The detainee stated he knew al Forouq was run by al Qaida, but not everyone at the camp was necessarily a member of al Qaida.

5. The detainee stated his training consisted of small arms training with the Kalashnikov and pistols.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stayed at a guest house in Karachi, Pakistan.

2. The individual that ran the guest house in Karachi, Pakistan, was an al Qaida operative who fought jihad in Bosnia prior to joining the jihad in Afghanistan. This operative went to a safe house in Pakistan to assist Mujahedin trying to enter Afghanistan and raised and passed on over 500,000 United States Dollars.

3. The detainee stated that about a week after his arrival at al Farouq, he saw Usama bin Laden.

4. The detainee stated that while in Tora Bora, Afghanistan, he saw Usama bin Laden a second time. Usama bin Laden talked about the jihad for approximately one hour and then another individual made a few comments.

5. The individual that was with Usama bin Laden was a senior al Qaida operative who was a member of the al Qaida Shura Council, which is the most powerful al Qaida committee. The individual was also a member of the al Qaida religious committee.

6. The detainee's name was found on a hard drive, which was associated with a senior al Qaida operative.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he was never asked to take an oath to al Qaida. The detainee stated that even if he was asked, he would not have taken the oath.

b. The detainee stated he knew nothing about al Qaida. The detainee said the only thing he knew about al Qaida was from what he had read in a newspaper article.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AGIL ALNAHDI, SULEMAN
AWAD SULEMAN BIN**

c. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and denied any knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

2 May 2006

TO: AL KHAWLAN, ABD AL RAHMAN MUHAMMAD HUSAYN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF
AL KHAWLAN, ABD AL RAHMAN MUHAMMAD HUSAYN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee's desire to go to Afghanistan was based on the posted fatwa, his decision to marry, his desire to lose weight, and his subsequent meeting with an individual.

2. The individual told the detainee that he would arrange for him to travel and requested his passport, which the detainee provided. The detainee stated his passport was returned with a paid airline ticket to Khandahar, Afghanistan.

3. The detainee advised that he received 3,000 Saudi Ryals (799 United States Dollars) for personal expenses.

4. The detainee stated in August 2001 he flew from Jeddah to Qatar to Karachi, Pakistan to Khandahar, Afghanistan.

b. Training

1. The detainee stated while at Camp Farouq they were issued a pen and notebook, woodland camouflage uniform, a blanket, and shoes. The detainee trained on the Kalashnikov assault rifle, PK machine gun, automatic grenade launcher, the rocket-propelled grenade, and an unidentified light anti-tank weapon.

2. The detainee said his training at Camp Farouq was interrupted, so he never finished his training. The detainee said they were told they should leave the camp.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL KHAWLAN, ABD AL RAHMAN MUHAMMAD HUSAYN

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee met a person, a Saudi in his early 30s. This person sold dates outside a mosque the detainee attended. The detainee stated over time they talked periodically after Friday prayer.
2. The detainee traveled from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia through Qatar to Karachi, Pakistan.
3. The detainee stated upon his arrival in Karachi he checked into a room at a hotel and waited to receive further information.
4. The detainee stated that he was taken to a safe house in Karachi where he stayed for a week. The detainee then traveled to Quetta, Pakistan.
5. Upon arrival in Quetta, Pakistan the detainee was taken to a safe house where he stayed for a period of less than a week.
6. The detainee claims that while in Afghanistan he saw Usama bin Laden at the al Ansar house in Kandahar, Afghanistan and at the al Farouq camp.

d. Detainee Actions and Statements

1. While at Camp Farouq, the detainee ended up fighting Afghans and Northern Alliance troops in Dostun.
2. The detainee stayed at the Najim al Jihad safe house for approximately three to four months. He then went to a forest near Jalalabad for one and a half weeks, then to Tora Bora until 10 December.
3. The detainee was sent to Tora Bora where he subsequently surrendered to Afghan Forces.

e. Other Relevant Data

1. At the time of his capture, the detainee had in his possession, currency in the amount of 2,000 United States Dollars, a Kalashnikov rifle, and three full magazines of ammunition.
2. During a 17 March 2005 interview the detainee stated America was his enemy because they are infidels and puppets of the Jews.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

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a. The detainee went to Afghanistan for a couple of reasons. His first priority was to lose weight. He would receive good exercise, which would help him lose weight. His intention was to get training for two months, then return to Saudi Arabia, take over his father's business, and get married. He would also learn to maintain a weapon.

b. The detainee stated he had lied in the past about his travels to Afghanistan. The detainee said he was working with an unidentified Saudi Arabian businessman in a joint venture to find the clothing of the Prophet Mohammed, which was rumored to be in Afghanistan. The detainee said he was given a large sum of money by the businessman and traveled by airplane to Karachi, Pakistan.

c. The detainee said he has a brain and is not stupid and would not take an al Qaida oath. He said he does not have any association with al Qaida. The detainee said that he never heard anything about al Qaida at Camp Farouq until after the war started.

d. The detainee denies having any knowledge of the attacks in the U.S. prior to their execution on 11 September 2001. The detainee also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the U.S. or U.S. interests.

e. The detainee claims he was responding to a fatwa that required all Muslims to train and be prepared to defend Islam at any time. He intended to return home after learning of the attacks of 11 September 2001.

f. The detainee states that he would like to return to Saudi Arabia to get married, start a family, and take over his father's business, a small store. The detainee said he would never fight or leave Saudi Arabia again.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

17 May 2006

TO: AL ANZY, ABDULLAH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ANZY, ABDULLAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. In the summer of 2000, the detainee and a friend decided to travel to Afghanistan for training.

2. The detainee said he did not anticipate participating in jihad, but just wanted to prepare himself for duty as required by his religion.

b. Training

1. The detainee trained for approximately four weeks in basic military training at al Farouq Camp. He trained in small arms (Kalashnikov, M-16, Pakistani Light MG, pistol, and Uzi), individual and small group tactical movements, foot marches, camouflage, and digging trenches.

2. The al Farouq Camp was funded by al Qaida and therefore was more advanced than the other camps in Afghanistan. The training at al Farouq consisted of two-week periods of weapons training, basic commando course, topography, and explosives.

3. The detainee did not finish the training because it was very difficult. He said that it was very hot and he always felt dirty. There was too much running, climbing, and sliding. He missed his family and wanted to take a vacation.

c. Connections/Associations

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ANZY, ABDULLAH

The detainee's name was found on a list of 324 suspected al Qaida members recovered from safe house raids in Karachi, Pakistan. The document listed names, aliases, nationality, and possessions.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee returned to Afghanistan with his friend in October 2001.
2. United States Military Forces commenced bombing in Tora Bora, Afghanistan, and 30 individuals within the detainee's group, including the detainee's friend, were killed.
3. After being jailed for two weeks, the detainee was turned over to United States Military Forces.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee said that had he known such a war would have taken place, he would not have gone to Afghanistan.
 - b. The detainee said that he was not going to a jihad where Muslims were killing other Muslims as was the case in Afghanistan.
 - c. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001.
 - d. The detainee denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
 - e. The detainee said he never engaged in any combat operations with anyone.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

23 June 2006

TO: AL HAR, GHANIM ABD AL RAHMAN GHANIM AL HUWAYMADI
SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HAR, GHANIM ABD AL RAHMAN
GHANIM AL HUWAYMADI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee was arrested in 1998 for involvement in protests against a foreign government service and placed on a travel restriction list issued in November 1999.

2. The detainee responded to a fatwa that requires all Muslims to train and be prepared to defend Islam at any time.

3. In August 2001, the detainee traveled by bus from his hometown of Dammam, Saudi Arabia to Manama, Bahrain, where he continued his trip by air to Pakistan.

4. The detainee chose this route because he was not allowed to travel outside of Saudi Arabia and it was common knowledge that Saudi immigration and border officials rarely scrutinized the passports of individuals traveling by bus through this particular checkpoint.

5. A guide that the detainee hired to help him leave the country via Jalalabad, Afghanistan said it was not safe so he took the detainee to the Tora Bora Mountains and, on 14 November 2001, turned him over to a group of approximately 65 Arabs traveling toward the border.

6. The group stayed in the Tora Bora Mountains for the entire period of Ramadan.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HAR, GHANIM ABD AL RAHMAN GHANIM AL HUWAYMADI

7. On the 29th of Ramadan, two guides were going to take the group to the Pakistani border, when intense bombing started. The detainee was wounded. He stayed three days in a valley with the other wounded before a group of Afghans picked them up.

8. The detainee turned himself in to the Northern Alliance, asking for help, and was taken to a hospital in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. He tried to convince the people helping him to take him to the Saudi Embassy or to United States troops so they could take him to the Saudi Embassy. He was turned over to United States and transported to Cuba two weeks later.

b. Training

1. The detainee was at al Farouq from July to September 2001.

2. A senior al Qaida operative identified the detainee as training at the al Farouq camp in Afghanistan in 2000. The operative said he often saw the detainee prior to 11 September 2001, but he had not heard anything about the detainee since September 2001.

c. Connections/Associations

1. In the summer of 2000, three months prior to leaving for Afghanistan, the detainee began working as a volunteer for the Islamic Relief Organization, based out of Jeddah. He volunteered twice weekly in the finance department.

2. The detainee stayed at an Arab house in the Haji Habash neighborhood of Kandahar, Afghanistan.

3. The Haji Habash house is an al Qaida-maintained safe house. The house was typically used for Arabs going to military training.

4. Usama bin Laden came to speak at al Farouq camp three weeks after the detainee arrived. Attendance to the speech was encouraged, but the detainee did not attend due to fear of being investigated upon return to Saudi Arabia.

d. Intent

The detainee was reported to have talked about engaging in jihad against the United States once he is released.

e. Other Relevant Data

The detainee was on a foreign government's list of detainees being held at Guantanamo Bay whom they designated as a high priority.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HAR, GHANIM ABD AL RAHMAN GHANIM AL HUWAYMADI

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee had two cousins who took up arms against the Iraqis during the 1990 Gulf War. They were taken prisoner by the Iraqis and have not been seen since.

b. The detainee's two missing cousins and watching innocent Kuwaitis being killed caused him to think about getting military training to protect his land in case of a similar invasion. The detainee said that based on the teachings of Islam, it was his duty to prepare for the possibility of war.

c. While at al Farouq, the detainee did not attend Usama bin Laden's speech because he does not agree with Usama bin Laden's teachings, nor does he respect him as a religious leader.

d. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001. The detainee denied knowledge of any rumors or plans for future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

30 August 2006

TO: AL QUWARI, MAHRAR RAFAT

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL QUWARI, MAHRAR RAFAT

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee had a job with the Kuwaiti Joint Relief Committee distributing food and clothing.

2. The detainee was at al Farouq Training Camp. The detainee was in charge of delivering food to the caves.

3. The leader in a camp in Tora Bora, Afghanistan assigned the detainee to work as a supply distributor.

4. The detainee was the supply person in charge of bookkeeping and distributing food and weapons in Tora Bora. The detainee carried a hand held radio and often met with Usama bin Laden.

b. Training

1. The detainee was identified as someone who trained in hand weapons at al Farouq and later fought in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

2. Training was conducted on numerous weapons at al Farouq. The students received training on the Kalashnikov rifle, AKM and PK machine gun. They also familiarized themselves with the rocket-propelled grenade.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL QUWARI, MAHRAR RAFAT

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee became acquainted with the leader of a humanitarian organization in Herat, Iran.
2. The leader of the humanitarian organization was a major operator for the Al Wafa Non Governmental Organization who likely transferred large sums of money through a front company called Summit Health Club in Afghanistan.
3. The detainee was in Tora Bora handing out supplies to the Mujahedin fighting there. The detainee was working for al Wafa at the time.
4. The detainee was seen in the Towr Khom Mountains at the same time as Usama bin Laden.

d. Detainee Actions and Statements

The detainee stated he would go into Afghanistan and collect a list of items to bring.

e. Other Relevant Data

During evacuation from Tora Bora to Pakistan, the detainee and the leader of the humanitarian organization were captured by the Northern Alliance.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee continued to deny that he was ever in Tora Bora, Afghanistan.
 - b. The detainee claims to have no prior knowledge of past or present terrorist activity.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

8 April 2006

TO: KERIMBAKIEV, ABDULRAHIM

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KERIMBAKIEV, ABDULRAHIM

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee and his family departed Kazakhstan for Afghanistan in September 2000. They traveled from Kazakhstan to Kabul, Afghanistan via Karachi, Islamabad, and Peshawar, Pakistan and then through Kandahar, Afghanistan.

2. The detainee and his family lived in Kabul, Afghanistan in a house assigned to them by Taliban officials.

3. In Kabul, Afghanistan the Taliban supported the detainee's entire family financially for thirteen months while the detainee and his three brothers studied the Koran full-time at a nearby mosque.

4. In Kabul, Afghanistan the detainee and a friend worked as assistant cooks with the Taliban for 10 Afghani Rupees twice per month.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee's uncle worked for the Taliban as a simple soldier.

2. The detainee and his friend were offered jobs as Taliban cooks by an associate of the detainee's uncle.

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ISN 521

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KERIMBAKIEV, ABDULRAHIM

3. According to a foreign government service, the detainee was a first-generation member of extremists associated with a criminal/jihadist group in Almaty, Kazakhstan who left Kazakhstan for Afghanistan circa 2001.

4. According to a foreign government service, the detainee traveled to Afghanistan to join the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Party/Movement leader to become a terrorist.

5. The Department of Homeland Security lists the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement as a foreign terrorist organization. It is described as a small Islamic extremist group based in China's western Xinjiang Province and it is one of the most militant of the ethnic Uighur separatist groups. This group is suspected of having received training and financial assistance from al Qaida.

c. Intent

The detainee renounced his Kazakh citizenship, stating that he abandoned it when he moved to Afghanistan. The detainee stated that if he was released he would attempt to move to Mecca, Saudi Arabia.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was captured by United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan troops on 2 December 2001, during Ramadan, in Sharakambar, Kabul district, Afghanistan.

2. The detainee was captured in a group of eight people assessed to be al Qaida members.

3. When asked what his thoughts were regarding the attacks on America, the detainee laughed and smiled.

4. The detainee has a history of being non-cooperative and has stated to previous interrogators that he is proud of himself for resisting during questioning.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that he chose to travel to Afghanistan from Kazakhstan because he was promised money and food. While in Afghanistan the detainee made money growing and selling marijuana.

b. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KERIMBAKIEV, ABDULRAHIM

c. The detainee claimed he is not a member of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan or the Islamic Movement of Tajikistan.

d. The detainee denied having any terrorist affiliation or information about terrorist activities directed or planned against the United States. The detainee further denied knowing about anyone possibly having such information.

e. The detainee stated that he did not take part in any military activities in Afghanistan.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

14 July 2006

TO: QASIM, YASSIM QASIM MOHAMMED ISMAIL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF QASIM, YASSIM QASIM MOHAMMED
ISMAIL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee stated that he went to Afghanistan to train to go fight in Chechnya.
 2. The detainee stated that he traveled by airplane from Sana, Yemen to Karachi, Pakistan, where he stayed in a hotel for four or five days, and then he was driven to a guest house in Qandahar, Afghanistan.
 3. The detainee stated that he stayed in guest houses in Kabul, Qandahar and Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
 4. The detainee stated that he saw Usama Bin Laden at guest houses in Kabul, Qandahar and Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
 5. The detainee stated that he went to Tora Bora, Afghanistan where he was eventually captured.
 - b. Training
 1. The detainee stated that he went to Kabul, Afghanistan to train at Camp Farouq where he trained on the Kalashnikov rifle, the PK general purpose machine-gun, rocket propelled grenades, explosives, topography and mountain fighting and tactics. The detainee stated that he was at Camp Farouq for four months.

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ISN 522

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF QASIM, YASSIM QASIM MOHAMMED ISMAIL

2. The detainee stated that he went to the Malek Training Camp north of Kabul, Afghanistan where he trained on anti-aircraft weapons, heavy artillery and surface-to-air missiles. The detainee stated that he was at Malek Training Camp for three weeks to one month.

3. The detainee stated that he returned to Malik Training Camp for about one month for training in 82 and 75-millimeter mortars, the SPG-9 and the recoilless rifle. The detainee fired one 82-millimeter round.

4. The detainee stated that he returned to Camp Farouq for a two-week course on the PK general purpose machine-gun.

5. The detainee stated that he went to Bagram, Afghanistan to take a two-week mine course.

c. Connections/Associations

The detainee's name is on a list of captured mujahedin found on a computer hard drive connected with a senior al Qaida operative.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that he did not know about plans to attack the World Trade Center prior to 11 September 2001.

b. The detainee stated that he does not belong to al Qaida. The detainee stated that he has never been asked to join al Qaida and, if he had been asked, he would have refused.

c. The detainee stated that he was in Tora Bora, Afghanistan to hide and denied he was fighting.

d. The detainee stated that he received weapons training for the purpose of fighting in Chechnya. The detainee stated that the instructors at al Farouq Training Camp did not talk about fighting Americans. The detainee stated that he did not know he had joined a Taliban unit and only found out afterwards.

e. When asked what he might do with the training he received in Afghanistan, the detainee stated that he received the training to fight in Chechnya and was not intending to use it for any other purpose. The detainee stated that he does not intend to fight any longer because he fears he might return to jail. The detainee stated that if he was approached for recruitment by al Qaida upon his release, he would again tell them no because he just wants to live a normal life and never return to prison.

UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF QASIM, YASSIM QASIM
MOHAMMED ISMAIL**

f. The detainee stated that he did not believe in the fighting that was going on in Afghanistan because it was between Muslims and other Muslims, and he believes that the Taliban and the Northern Alliance were wrong. The detainee stated that he joined the jihad and trained for fighting in Chechnya, not Afghanistan. The detainee stated that he never fought in Afghanistan.

g. The detainee stated that if he were released, he would not join the jihad in Chechnya because he does not want to return to prison. The detainee stated that he wants to return home, start a family and live a quiet life. The detainee stated that he believes he has fulfilled his commitment to jihad.

h. The detainee stated that if he were released he would like to go to college and earn a degree.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

1 November 2006

TO: ZAMIRI, HASAN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ZAMIRI, HASAN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee said his family did not identify with any specific tribal affiliation, but the detainee did attend three mosques in Montreal, Canada.
 2. While in Canada, the detainee stated he engaged in illegal activities. The detainee recalled that he attempted once to buy a Canadian passport, worked in Canada without valid work authorization and engaged in theft, stating that he shoplifted clothing from stores and stole purses and camcorders from tourists. The detainee was once arrested in Canada for attempting to steal a computer from a tourist.
 3. The detainee and his wife together defrauded Canadian banks and credit cards for large sums of money.
 4. The detainee was arrested in Canada with his friends for stealing.
 5. The detainee stated he traveled during June 2001 from Montreal, Canada to Afghanistan on a stolen passport.
 6. The detainee described various guest houses used along his route of ingress from Pakistan to Afghanistan.
 7. The detainee claimed he immigrated to Afghanistan with his wife because they desired to live in an Islamic country.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ZAMIRI, HASAN

b. Training

1. The detainee said the only military training he received was as a conscript in the Algerian Army from 1988 to 1990. The detainee's primary weapons training was with the Kalashnikov rifle.

2. While the detainee stayed at the Toran Camp in Afghanistan, the detainee received instruction in the use of small firearms. The detainee claims that he learned how to use these firearms for fun.

c. Connections/Associations

1. An associate considered the detainee a close friend in Montreal. The associate gave the detainee 3,500 Canadian Dollars and a video camera weeks before the planned Los Angeles bombing so that the detainee could fund his trip and do surveillance of the Los Angeles airport. The associate said that the detainee was not privy to the details of the bomb plot, but that the detainee wanted to be part of the operation.

2. This associate is an Algerian who came to Montreal, Canada as a refugee and built a powerful bomb in a Vancouver, Canada motel room that he intended to detonate at Los Angeles International Airport. United States border agents caught this associate in Washington State in December 1999 with the bomb in his car trunk.

3. The detainee advised he last saw the associate in either June or July 1999.

4. The detainee denied being the type of person who would be involved with terrorists, but then also confirmed he had a good relationship with the associate and considered him a close friend.

d. Intent

1. A source stated the detainee was planning on doing a jihad in Algeria and was looking for a way to get there. The detainee wanted to fight with the Jamaat in Algeria.

2. According to an open source, the Preachers of Islam or Tablighi Jamaat organization has been supporting Islamic terrorist groups in South and Southeast Asia under the cover of conducting religious activities. The group is closely aligned with other Pakistani terrorist organizations and the al Qaida network.

3. The detainee stated the Taliban was a good government and that Afghanistan was a good country.

4. The detainee stated he had no respect for the Arab regimes of Iraq, Libya and Syria because of their oppression and injustice.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ZAMIRI, HASAN

e. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was captured in the Tora Bora region of Afghanistan by Northern Alliance forces.

2. The detainee stated he was questioned about his wife's detention with 13,000 United States Dollars, a mini-computer containing addresses/telephone information of some al Qaida figures and her connection and communications with a lawyer in Qatar. The detainee denies knowing much about this.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee claimed his knowledge of the associate was merely a coincidence. They both played soccer together and frequented coffee shops and dance clubs.

b. The detainee stated he simply wanted to immigrate, live and retire peacefully in Afghanistan. He had no intention of ever returning to Algeria or Canada.

c. The detainee claimed he never had any involvement with jihad, and the detainee never discussed jihad with anyone.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

12 July 2006

TO: AHMED, MOHAMMED ABUDULLAH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AHMED, MOHAMMED ABUDULLAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated that he agreed to travel to Afghanistan with another member of the mosque.

2. The detainee stated that he departed Saudi Arabia for Afghanistan approximately one and one-half months before Ramadan in 2001.

3. The detainee stated that he paid his own travel expenses.

4. The detainee stated that he traveled from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia to Mashad, Iran, then to Herat, Afghanistan, and finally to Kabul, Afghanistan.

5. The detainee stated that he sought training at an Arab guest house in Afghanistan and stayed at that guest house for approximately one month.

b. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated that he was taken hostage by a group of armed men. The detainee was assaulted and robbed prior to being turned over to a local warlord.

2. The detainee stated that while imprisoned in Kabul, he was told he could buy his freedom, remain in prison for life, or be killed. The detainee stated that eventually he was turned over to the Americans.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AHMED, MOHAMMED ABUDULLAH

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee stated that he did not have any military service, military training or weapons training.
 - b. The detainee stated that he went to Pakistan for jihad but never received any training.
 - c. The detainee stated that he had no intentions of fighting in Afghanistan and that he wants to return home to take care of his family.
 - d. The detainee indicated that he wants to return home, get married, and go back to work.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

**Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

19 June 2006

TO: AL ALI, MAHMUD SALEM HORAN MOHAMMED MUTLAK

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ALI, MAHMUD SALEM HORAN
MOHAMMED MUTLAK

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee developed an interest in receiving jihad training as the result of his ownership of several commercially available videos, which he had purchased in a shop in Kuwait.
 2. On or about 20 October 2001, the detainee traveled from his home in Kuwait to Damascus, Syria to Tehran, Iran to Mashad, Iran and then on to Tayebat, Iran in an attempt to cross the border into Afghanistan. The detainee was finally successful in crossing the Afghanistan border at Zabol, Iran.
 3. The detainee stated that an unidentified Taliban official in Tamrouz, Afghanistan cited that people who wanted to fight in the jihad should go to Kandahar, Afghanistan to receive military training. The detainee was informed that the base at Kandahar was damaged and that he should go to Kabul, Afghanistan for his training.
 4. The detainee stated that he knew that the training camp was run by Usama bin Laden's al Qaida organization prior to leaving Kuwait.
 5. The detainee was identified as a Taliban fighter who was in Kabul, Afghanistan approximately two weeks before he was captured. At the time of his capture, the detainee was carrying his Kalashnikov rifle.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ALI, MAHMUD SALEM HORAN MOHAMMED MUTLAK

b. Intent

When the detainee was asked whether he wanted to fight against the United States, he replied that it was his desire to fight against non-Muslims categorically.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that he received no training at the guest house in Kabul.

b. The detainee claims that he had not wanted to fight against the forces of the United States, but only against the Northern Alliance.

c. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001.

d. The detainee said that he is a religious man with strong convictions. He stated that he is perfectly content in Cuba and that prison life had changed him, and he is a new man that is comfortable with a simple solitary life style.

e. The detainee stated if he ever left Cuba, he would like to take on another wife and start a business.

f. The detainee spoke positively about the modernization and western influence of the Middle East. He stated that it is a beautiful thing and it makes everyone's life easier.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

5 July 2006

TO: ADAYN, OMAR SAID SALEM

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ADAYN, OMAR SAID SALEM

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. In August 2001, the detainee traveled from Sana, Yemen to Afghanistan via Dubai, United Arab Emirates and Karachi and Quetta, Pakistan.

2. A Yemeni from al Mukallah, Yemen arranged for the detainee's airline tickets and gave him 500 United States Dollars to cover travel expenses.

3. In Karachi, Pakistan, the detainee was met by a Saudi national and stayed at the Dubai Hotel. When the detainee arrived in Quetta, Pakistan, he met the individual responsible for the Arab Room at the Daftar Taliban. Also in Quetta, the detainee met up with the Yemeni who assisted him with his travel.

4. When the detainee arrived in Kandahar, Afghanistan, he was taken to a safe house run by a Saudi Arabian. The detainee was at this safe house for one day before becoming ill with malaria.

5. The detainee claimed that due to his illness he had trouble standing and walking during his stay at the safe house. He claims not to have received any training at the safe house, nor did he see any weapons.

6. After half a month at the Kandahar, Afghanistan safe house, the Arabs present were told to go to Jalalabad, Afghanistan, due to the increase in bombing in Kandahar. The detainee traveled to Jalalabad by car and arrived at a safe house run by a Saudi.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ADAYN, OMAR SAID SALEM

7. After half a month, the detainee was told to head to Tora Bora, Afghanistan with the rest of the Arabs present at the Jalalabad, Afghanistan safe house.

8. When the detainee arrived in Tora Bora, Afghanistan, he was shown to his position. A Saudi Arabian who led the position issued the detainee a Kalashnikov and showed him where to go. There were between 10 and 12 Arabs in this position.

9. All members of the detainee's group were armed with Kalashnikovs except for one individual who was armed with a rocket-propelled grenade launcher. The group spent most of its time hiding in the one of the three caves located close to its position. The detainee was in this position for a month before being wounded in the leg by a missile.

10. The detainee was wounded, knew he was going to the hospital and feared the Afghans would take his money, so he gave 500 United States Dollars to two acquaintances.

11. The detainee was evacuated by an Afghan on a donkey to a nearby village. From the village he was driven to Jalalabad, Afghanistan, where he stayed in a hospital for approximately two months before being taken by Americans to a prison in Kabul, Afghanistan. He was eventually taken to Kandahar, Afghanistan.

b. Connections/Associations:

1. A Saudi Arabian al Qaida member managed the guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan. Arabs awaiting training at the al Farouq camp stayed at this house.

2. The detainee's name was found on list of 324 Arabic names, aliases, and nationalities recovered from safe house raids connected with suspected al Qaida members in Pakistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the 11 September 2001 attacks prior to their execution. He also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or its interests.

b. The detainee denied any desire to be part of the Palestinian Mujahedin.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

3 February 2006

To: Z Aid, Walid Said Bin Said

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF Z Aid, Walid Said Bin Said

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee was recruited to go to Afghanistan for training and was introduced to a person who financed and facilitated the detainee's travel to Afghanistan.

2. The detainee traveled voluntarily from Yemen with an associate to Karachi, Pakistan.

3. The detainee stayed in a Taliban guesthouse for four days in Quetta, Pakistan.

4. The detainee spent nine days in a Taliban guesthouse in Kandahar, Afghanistan where his passport, money and other identification was collected.

5. The detainee was taken to the al Farouq training camp and was scheduled to stay there for two months.

6. The detainee explained the reason he attended training at al Farouq was because he wanted to support the Taliban in their struggle against the Northern Alliance.

b. Training

1. The detainee arrived at al Farouq Training camp on approximately 1 August 2001.

2. The detainee trained at al Farouq for six weeks on the Kalashnikov rifle, PK machine gun, RPG, land navigation and combat tactics.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ZAID, WALID SAID BIN SAID

3. The detainee had a firearms instructor and a physical trainer and stated that the instructors often discussed the exploits of the Taliban with the detainees.

4. The detainee's training was interrupted when al Farouq shut down in the wake of the 11 September 2001 attacks.

5. The detainee stated that the camp leaders gave the order to evacuate the camp in anticipation of attacks. The trainees left al Farouq and went to an area of dense woods located in the foothills of the Tora Bora Mountains.

c. Connections/Associations

1. While the detainee was in training at al Farouq, Usama Bin Laden and a group of guards came to visit.

2. The detainee's name was on a document listing 324 Arabic names, aliases and nationalities recovered from a safehouse raid of suspected al Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee repeatedly stressed the only reason he supported the Taliban was because he thought they were good Muslims.

2. The detainee sustained multiple injuries as a result of the United States bombing campaign in the mountains surrounding Jalalabad. The detainee was taken to a hospital in Jalalabad where he was eventually detained by United States Forces.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee claims training was only a prerequisite to obtaining employment in the country of Afghanistan.

b. The detainee claims that he did not know the camp was affiliated with al Qaida or Usama Bin Laden.

c. The detainee stated that he has been treated well since he was captured and harbors no ill feelings toward the United States or the Northern Alliance. The detainee only wishes to return home and put this part of his life behind him.

d. The detainee also stated he believes the American involvement in Afghanistan is a good thing as long as the Americans are assisting the Afghan people.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ZAID, WALID SAID BIN SAID

e. The detainee denies having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and also denies knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

12 July 2006

TO: AL RABAI, SALMAN FOUAD

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL RABAI, SALMAN FOUAD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. An individual stated that the detainee is a high level al Qaida member.
2. An individual stated that the detainee was well connected to several Arab Gulf sheikhs who constituted a major financial and extremist donor network.
3. An individual stated that the detainee collected money from mosques and businessmen in Kuwait City, Kuwait. The detainee gave it to an individual who sent people to Afghanistan.
4. An individual stated that the detainee was at the al Faruq camp in Afghanistan for a week to ten days in January 1991 and that while he was there, the detainee was in charge of the camp.
5. An individual stated that the detainee was supervising on the front lines in Gardiz, Afghanistan in February 1992.
6. An individual stated that the detainee worked for a Kuwaiti relief agency in Bosnia in 1995 distributing clothes and food to refugees. The detainee also gave money out of his own pocket to Arab Mujahedin fighters.
7. An individual stated that the detainee owned a health club in Kuwait which trained young men to prepare for jihad.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL RABAI, SALMAN FOUAD

8. The detainee stated that he met one time with prominent members of al Wafa in July 2001 in Kandahar, Afghanistan and twice in October 2001 in the Kabul, Afghanistan area.

9. The detainee stated that he sat in the place of honor, directly to the right of the head of al Wafa, when he met with members of al Wafa during his second trip to Afghanistan.

10. The detainee stated that on approximately 18 September 2001, an individual discussed with him the possibility of going to Afghanistan for jihad. The detainee stated that he agreed to go to Afghanistan with this individual.

11. The detainee stated that he flew to Lahore, Pakistan where a young Arab man whom the detainee believed to be al Qaida met them. The detainee stated that the next day, they took a taxi to the border, rode motorcycles around the checkpoint and then traveled by taxi to Kandahar, Afghanistan.

12. An individual stated that the detainee left the al Qaida media house and traveled to the front lines in Bagram, Afghanistan in October 2001.

13. An individual stated that the detainee had been at the Malik guest house in northern Kabul, Afghanistan and helped coordinate Taliban and al Qaida efforts at the Bagram, Afghanistan front line.

14. The detainee stated that he traveled from Kabul, Afghanistan to Jalalabad, Afghanistan hiding from the Northern Alliance and United States Forces. The detainee stated that before departing for Tora Bora he stayed at an Arab guest house in Jalalabad, Afghanistan that was full of armed Mujahedin and stores of ammunition, clothes and sleeping bags.

15. The detainee stated that after he was informed that Jalalabad, Afghanistan had fallen to the Northern Alliance, Tora Bora filled up with Mujahedin and everyone, including him, prepared for the impending Northern Alliance attack.

16. The detainee stated that he advised an individual in charge on supply logistics at Tora Bora. The detainee stated that he was sent to a storage depot location and his job was to coordinate the transportation of supplies to various locations in the Tora Bora mountain complex. The detainee stated that he headed a meeting of approximately eleven representatives of the twenty Tora Bora camps to resolve supply distribution problems.

17. An individual stated that the detainee was in charge of logistics in Tora Bora and distributed ammunition.

18. An individual stated that the detainee was the chief of supply in Tora Bora and the detainee supplied money, weapons, ammunition, food and supplies. The individual stated that the detainee also led a ten to twenty-five man group of fighters.

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UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL RABAI, SALMAN FOUAD

19. An individual stated that in the Tora Bora Mountains in late October 2001, the detainee attended a meeting to discuss fighting strategy and the distribution of approximately twenty SAM-7 surface-to-air missiles and other anti-aircraft weapons.

b. Training

The detainee stated that he attended two weeks of basic military training in Kuwait in 1988 and spent three months in the military as a cook.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated that the individuals that trained at his health club in Kuwait included a jihadist and a jihadist recruiter.

2. The detainee's name and phone number were found in a handwritten telephone and address book associated with an al Qaida operative. The document was found at the residence where a senior al Qaida operative was captured.

3. The detainee's alias was on a list of individuals obtained from an alleged al Qaida residence in Pakistan. The list showed individuals with safety deposit boxes in Afghanistan and the amount of money taken from each to be added to the budget.

4. The detainee stated that in July 2001 he personally met with Usama bin Laden on four different occasions: twice at Usama bin Laden's house in Kandahar, Afghanistan, once at an old airport in Kandahar, Afghanistan and once outside of Kandahar, Afghanistan, where an Arab was hosting a dinner in Usama bin Laden's honor. The detainee stated that he was one of Usama bin Laden's honored guests at the dinner.

5. An individual stated that he was at a feast attended by Usama bin Laden, the detainee and others. The individual stated that the detainee sat to the immediate right of Usama bin Laden's bodyguards and the detainee's bodyguards sat to the immediate right of the detainee. The individual stated that the detainee met with Usama bin Laden after the meal for a private discussion.

6. An individual stated that the detainee gave Usama bin Laden a suitcase full of money and that the detainee was carrying a pistol by his side for protection.

7. An individual stated that the detainee was at the al Qaida media house in October 2001.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated that after he was imprisoned by the Northern Alliance, he made up a cover story about his second trip to Afghanistan.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL RABAI, SALMAN FOUAD

2. An individual stated that he and the detainee established their cover story after being captured by the Northern Alliance. The individual stated that the detainee instructed the individual to say that they were both relief workers who had entered through Iran and were trying to flee the country.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that known terrorists must have gotten his personal information from his business cards through his clubs or his website.

b. The detainee stated that in October 2001, he traveled to Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan to conduct a field study of the Afghan refugee situation. The detainee stated he was to be hired by a joint relief committee.

c. The detainee denied discussing anything related to SA-7 missiles while at Tora Bora.

d. The detainee denied having any prior knowledge of the attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

3 July 2006

TO: AL KANDARI, FAIZ MOHAMMED AHMED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL KANDARI, FAIZ MOHAMMED
AHMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. An individual stated that the detainee fought in Bosnia.
 2. An individual stated that in April 2000 the detainee traveled to Islamabad, Pakistan, stayed at a guest house for one month, and then went to Kabul, Afghanistan, where he stayed two days at another guest house.
 3. The detainee's travel arrangements were made by a senior al Qaida operative.
 4. An individual stated that the detainee stayed at the Usama bin Laden guest house in Qandahar, Afghanistan for one month.
 5. An individual stated that the detainee worked strongly for funding jihad through fliers and pamphlets, collected money for Usama bin Laden in Kuwait, and created and distributed videotapes to support jihad. The individual stated that the detainee traveled often back and forth between Afghanistan and Kuwait.
 6. An individual stated that the detainee was a representative of Usama bin Laden and was both a religious and military leader within al Qaida and the Taliban.
 7. An individual stated that the detainee frequently gave speeches to recruits at al Qaida training camps and to al Qaida and Taliban fighters in Afghanistan.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL KANDARI, FAIZ MOHAMMED AHMED

8. An individual stated that while in Tora Bora, the detainee wore a military uniform, carried an AK-47 and fought with al Qaida and the Taliban.

9. An individual stated that the detainee was in charge of a group in Tora Bora.

10. An individual stated that in late October 2001 in the mountains of Tora Bora the detainee attended a meeting of fighting location leaders to discuss fighting strategy and the distribution of surface-to-air missiles and other anti-aircraft weapons.

11. The detainee stated that his most recent employment was in Afghanistan with the al Wafa organization.

12. Al Wafa is a Terrorist Exclusion List designee. This gives the United States Government the ability to exclude aliens associated with al Wafa from entering the United States.

b. Training

1. An individual stated that the detainee trained on the Kalashnikov and other automatic rifles, rocket propelled grenades and anti-aircraft guns at the Khalden camp.

2. An individual stated that the detainee received explosives training, to include the production of TNT bombs, setting explosives, detonating synchronized timed bombs, Molotov cocktails, petrol bombs and grenades at the al Farouq camp.

3. An individual stated that the detainee took a course in snipe-shooter training at the Airport Training Camp near Qandahar, Afghanistan.

c. Connections/Associations

1. An individual stated that the detainee was very close to Usama bin Laden, and while in Tora Bora, the detainee frequently slept near Usama bin Laden and carried out his instructions.

2. The detainee's name was on a list of captured Mujahedin found on a hard drive associated with a senior al Qaida member.

3. The detainee's name appeared on a chart developed by a foreign government service depicting the relationship between al Qaida elements and Kuwaiti extremists.

4. An individual stated that the detainee was the leader of a three-member Mujahedin group in Kuwait.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL KANDARI, FAIZ MOHAMMED AHMED

5. An individual spoke of the detainee's involvement with Usama bin Laden and connection to the 11 September 2001 hijackers.

d. Intent

1. An individual stated that the detainee recorded a propaganda tape titled "Jihad, Your Way to Heaven."

2. The detainee and his relatives are all capable of carrying out operations against United States, Western or Kuwaiti interests.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied ever visiting a training camp in Afghanistan.

b. The detainee denied ever meeting Usama bin Laden.

c. The detainee stated that he is not an extremist and does not have ties to high-level al Qaida members.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

18 February 2006

TO: AL BEDANI, ABDUL KHALED AHMED SAHLEH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL BEDANI, ABDUL KHALED
AHMED SAHLEH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee resided in Yemen for many years, although he was born in Saudi Arabia. He traveled to Kabul, Afghanistan in 2001 via Quetta, Pakistan and Kandahar, Afghanistan.

2. The detainee was recruited by a known al Qaida/Taliban recruiter to travel to Afghanistan for training and participation in jihad.

3. The detainee states that he went to Afghanistan to receive military training.

4. The detainee has admitted that he has spoken about committing jihad against the United States if released from detention.

5. The detainee was identified by sources as Abdul Halak.

b. Training

The detainee was interrupted in his attempt to acquire military training by the United States' retaliatory bombing campaign, but did receive very basic instruction in use of the Kalashnikov rifle while fleeing Afghanistan through the Tora Bora region.

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c. Connections

1. The detainee stayed in a number of Arab guesthouses in Pakistan and Afghanistan, including one in Kandahar, two in Kabul and one in Jalalabad.
2. The detainee had direct access to reactions to the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States due to his presence in a Kabul safehouse on 11 September 2001.
3. Following the al Qaida attacks on the United States, the detainee attempted to leave Afghanistan with a large group of Arabs for refuge in Pakistan to avoid Northern Alliance Forces and bombing attacks.
4. The detainee stayed in various bunkers during the bombing of the Tora Bora region. While in these bunkers, he was in the close presence of armed Arab men, possibly al Qaida. Some of these men were actively engaged in fighting against the Northern Alliance.

d. Intent

The detainee has discussed committing jihad against the United States if released from detention.

e. Other Relevant Data

The detainee was wounded by United States bombing in Tora Bora and then picked up by local Afghans who took him to the Northern Alliance.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a. The detainee denies having any knowledge of the al Qaida attacks on the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001. He also denies knowledge of rumors or plans of future attacks.
- b. The detainee originally entered Pakistan to establish a textile trading business.
- c. The detainee insists that he did not travel to Afghanistan to train for jihad.
- d. The detainee said that he wanted military training in order to fulfill his religious obligations.
- e. The detainee denies using any weapons against the Northern Alliance, but admits that he was provided with a rifle while in the Tora Bora region.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL BEDANI, ABDUL KHALED
AHMED SAHLEH**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

26 March 2006

TO: AL SANI, FAHMI SALEM SAID

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SANI, FAHMI SALEM SAID

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee was encouraged to go to Afghanistan for training by his friend, Salam. Salam provided the detainee money for the bus trip from his home to Sanaa, Yemen.

2. The detainee traveled from Yemen to Afghanistan via Pakistan in August 2001.

3. The detainee's travel from Sanaa, Yemen to Afghanistan was facilitated by Muath.

4. Muath presented the detainee with a passport for the detainee that had a visa for Pakistan. Muath also provided the detainee and two other men with tickets from Sanaa to Karachi, Pakistan via Dubai.

5. After arriving in Karachi, the detainee and two other men met three other males of similar age who were also traveling with the detainee. They were all traveling to Pakistan to receive training in Afghanistan.

6. The detainee was required to leave his passport, money, and all other forms of identification at a guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan in return for a receipt of those inventoried items.

7. The detainee remained in Afghanistan after hearing about the events of 11 September 2001.

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8. The detainee traveled with approximately 45 others from the Mudafa to the al Farouq training camp, Afghanistan where the detainee stayed for approximately two and a half weeks.

9. Training stopped in October 2001 due to United States attacks on Taliban targets.

10. The detainee was assigned to augment Taliban and al Qaida forces already in defensive positions in Tora Bora, Afghanistan.

11. Near the end of Ramadan (16 December 2001) United States Forces began bombing the detainee's location. With the assistance of a guide, the detainee and his group withdrew to another unspecified location. At this unspecified location, the detainee was injured in his lower right side by shrapnel from United States bombing.

12. The group subsequently surrendered to Afghan soldiers. The Afghan soldiers took the injured to a hospital in Kandahar, Afghanistan where the detainee spent a month and a half recuperating from his injuries.

b. Training

1. The detainee completed military training at al Farouq.

2. The detainee received training on the Kalashnikov rifle.

3. Training conducted at al Farouq training camp in September 2001 through October 2001 included three weeks of operation and maintenance of the Kalashnikov rifle.

4. The detainee received additional training at a camp located in a mountainous region very far from Kabul on the road toward Jalalabad.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee heard a speech from Usama bin Laden while at the al Farouq training camp.

2. The detainee saw Ayman Al-Zawahiri who accompanied Usama bin Laden on his visit to the al Farouq training camp.

3. Ayman Al-Zawahiri is believed to be Usama Bin Laden 's advisor and policy maker.

4. The detainee saw Abu Gayth who accompanied Usama bin Laden on his visit to the al Farouq training camp.

5. Abu Gayth is a spokesman for al Qaida.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SANI, FAHMI SALEM SAID

6. The detainee stayed at the al Nibras guesthouse.

7. The al Nibras Arab guest house was used by fighters heading to the al Farouq training camp and by Usama bin Laden.

8. The detainee's name was found on a list of 324 suspected al Qaida members recovered from safe house raids. The document listed names, aliases, nationalities, and possessions.

d. Other Relevant Data

The detainee had surgery on his back for wounds sustained in Afghanistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001. The detainee was queried if he knew where Usama bin Laden is, if Usama bin Laden spoke publicly about anti-American feelings, or planned attacks on the United States, with negative results.

b. The detainee was queried about plans to escape Guantanamo Bay or harm the guards, with negative results.

c. The detainee stated his intention was to go to Afghanistan for a couple of months of training and then to return home. The detainee cited his inability to receive the mandatory military training in his own country as another reason he desired to receive the training.

d. The detainee wants to go home. He wants to serve his parents if he ever goes home. The detainee has no specific career aspirations and believes that Allah will find him a job.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

10 September 2006

TO: ABDULLA (FIRST NAME UNKNOWN)

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDULLA (FIRST NAME UNKNOWN)

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he joined a group of Mujahedin to fight the Soviet invasion.
2. A source stated that the detainee was a Mujahed.

b. Training

1. The detainee stated that he knows how to operate a Kalashnikov rifle, but never received formal training in how to use it. The detainee stated he never attended any military style training camps, but he did attend a physical fitness camp for six months.

2. The detainee stated that while fighting for the Northern Alliance, he used a Kalashnikov rifle but had only witnessed the use of explosives.

3. During the raid of the detainee's location, 19 English-language manuals were discovered. The manuals covered the manufacture of improvised explosives and detailed explanations of the manufacture of poisons.

4. The detainee stated the Pakistani authorities accused him of being an explosives expert who smuggled explosives from Tora Bora. The detainee's hands were tested for explosive residue and the test result was positive.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDULLA (FIRST NAME UNKNOWN)

5. An al Qaida detainee identified the detainee and said he took basic training at the Khalden camp in Afghanistan in 1998.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated that he was arrested by Pakistani police because Arabs had previously occupied the house.

2. The detainee became acquainted with two Arabs while attending Jamiah Asri Madrassa. The detainee was introduced to the passport maker who offered to provide the detainee with a counterfeit passport. The detainee borrowed 700 United States Dollars to purchase the passport.

3. A source stated that the detainee had an appointment to purchase a forged passport with the name of Ali Uzdamir.

4. The detainee said he purchased a passport with the name Ali or Urqhan from a source for 500 United States Dollars.

5. An individual who used his home to exchange forged documentation stated he hosted the detainee in his house.

6. The detainee stated that just prior to his capture he met the host of the house that he was captured in. The detainee stated that the host does not know him well.

7. A source introduced the detainee to the passport maker, and the detainee stated he had never met the passport maker prior to purchasing the passport.

8. The detainee stated that two days after receiving the passport, the police raided the homeowner's residence where he was apprehended.

9. Pakistan authorities raided the house where the detainee was located looking for an explosives expert named Abdul Latif al Turki.

10. The detainee stated that the Pakistani authorities may have arrested him because the name of the explosive expert was printed on his passport.

11. The detainee stated he did not read the passport. The detainee stated that he was coached on what to say in case officials questioned the detainee during his travels. The detainee could not recall what he was told about the passport.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDULLA (FIRST NAME UNKNOWN)

12. The detainee stated that the Pakistani authorities were looking for the passport maker.

13. A source stated the detainee was at the Khana Gulam Bacha guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan.

14. A source identified the detainee and said he saw the detainee several times at the al Ansar guest house in Peshawar, Pakistan.

15. An al Qaida operative stated that the detainee was a Turkish Mujahedin travel facilitator that brought Mujahedin from Turkey to a guest house in Pakistan.

16. A known al Qaida member claimed that the detainee was at the Nebras guest house. The known al Qaida member stated that the detainee was either Taliban or al Qaida in hiding.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was likely the commander of the Margun al Qaida camp in 1997 and reportedly an explosives expert.

2. The detainee stated he was not at Tora Bora. The detainee claimed he was in Pakistan at the Islamic school throughout this time period.

3. The detainee stated he was not at Tora Bora. The detainee stated that the Pakistan authorities had previously arrested him and held him in detention at that time. The detainee claims he was released after the battle of Tora Bora had ceased.

4. Six passports were found at the detainee's capture location. The detainee claimed he was unaware of their existence.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

The detainee said if he were released he would like to be released to a country where there is peace and he would have the ability to obtain a job to make ends meet such as Canada, Turkey, Germany or America.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

19 May 2006

TO: BIN QUMU, ABU SUFIAN IBRAHIM AHMED HAMUDA

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF
BIN QUMU, ABU SUFIAN IBRAHIM AHMED HAMUDA

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. In the Sudan, the detainee joined the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.

2. The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group emerged in 1995 among Libyans who had fought against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. They declared the government of Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi un-Islamic and pledged to overthrow it. Some members maintain a strictly anti-Qadhafi focus and organize against Libyan Government interests, but others are aligned with Usama bin Laden's al Qaida organization or are active in the international Mujahedin network.

3. An al Qaida/Libyan Islamic Fighting Group facilitator described the detainee as a noncommittal Libyan Islamic Fighting Group member who received no training.

b. Training

1. The detainee was in the Libyan Army from 1979 until 1990. He was a tank driver and left the army as a private first class.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee worked as a truck driver in Sudan for the Wadi al Aqiq Company.

2. The Wadi al Aqiq Company was owned by Usama bin Laden.

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ISN 557

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BIN QUMU, ABU SUFIAN IBRAHIM AHMED HAMUDA

3. The detainee's alias was found on a document associated with Usama bin Laden. The document stated the detainee worked for Usama bin Laden in Sudan.
4. The detainee was friends with a known al Qaida member in Peshawar, Pakistan.
5. The detainee was at a guest house run by a known al Qaida member.
6. The detainee met a senior al Qaida facilitator on ten or twenty occasions.
7. The detainee lived with another detainee in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
8. The detainee worked for al Wafa as an accountant.
9. The nongovernmental organization "Wafa," officially named al Wafa al Igatha al Islamia (Wafa Humanitarian Organization) and headquartered in Saudi Arabia, is believed to have had connections to Usama bin Laden and Afghan Mujahedin.
10. Al Wafa is a terrorist exclusion list designee.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. While serving in the Libyan military, the detainee was arrested and jailed multiple times on several occasions for drug and alcohol offenses, going absent without leave and attempted rape.
 2. The detainee was arrested by Libyan authorities and was sentenced to four years in prison for drug trafficking. He escaped from prison and fled to Sudan in 1992.
 3. The detainee made two trips to Mazar-e-Sharif in September and October 2001 to deliver rice and equipment to dig wells.
 4. A foreign government considers the detainee a dangerous man with no qualms about committing terrorist acts. They believe he was one of the extremist commanders of the Afghan Arabs.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of terrorist activity and insisted that he only worked for al Wafa as a means to feed his family.
 - b. The detainee insists that he never delivered weapons, never fought, never went to a guest house and was never around weapons in Afghanistan.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF
BIN QUMU, ABU SUFIAN IBRAHIM AHMED HAMUDA**

c. The detainee stated that he does not want to be sent back to Libya because of previous criminal charges related to drug trafficking and escape from prison.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

22 August 2006

TO: MOHMAD, HAJAWALI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHMAD, HAJAWALI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee was a moneyman for Usama bin Laden from 1996 to 1997. The detainee conducted most of his money transactions at three money exchangers with offices in Dubai, United Arab Emirates.

2. The detainee worked for the President of the Central Bank of Afghanistan. The detainee was sent to Dubai, United Arab Emirates to purchase gold for the bank and was given 1,500,000 United States Dollars.

3. The detainee became indebted to the Taliban for 500,000 United States Dollars. The detainee maintained a good relationship with the Taliban leadership because of his history of support and generosity.

4. The detainee admitted he was in business with Taliban and worked with the Taliban because of the money. The detainee stated that his business relationship with Taliban lasted approximately three months.

5. On one occasion, the detainee served as an intermediary for funds passed through the al Rasheed Trust.

6. The al Rasheed Trust and the Habib Bank were previously reported as conduits for funds going to extremist organizations and has provided financial and logistic assistance to al Qaida, Kashmiri extremist organizations and Pakistani sectarian groups.

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ISN 560

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHMAD, HAJAWALI

7. The detainee is allegedly involved in smuggling gold for al Qaida through the Peshawar Airport and admitted being in the gold business and having a currency exchange business in Peshawar, Pakistan.

8. The detainee facilitated transfers and exchanges of funds from Usama bin Laden controlled accounts for the purchase of surface-to-air missiles for al Qaida.

9. In 1997, the leader of the Taliban provided the detainee with 3,200,000 United States Dollars to invest in various projects. The funds were provided as a favor and as repayment for the detainee's generosity to Taliban figures during the early days of the Taliban movement.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was closely affiliated with the Taliban and was considered to be very close to Taliban leaders.

2. Prior to 11 September 2001 the detainee fought with Afghan Taliban members against the Northern Alliance and United States Forces.

3. The detainee was identified as being a wealthy Afghan Saraf, or moneychanger, who was affiliated with the Hizbi-Islami Gulbuddin.

4. The Hizbi-Islami Gulbuddin was founded by Gulbuddin Hikmatyar as a faction of the Hizb-l Islami party in 1977 and is one of the major Mujahedin groups in the war against the Soviets. In the early 1990's, Gulbuddin Hikmatyar ran several terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and was a pioneer in sending mercenary fighters to other Islamic conflicts. Hikmatyar also offered to shelter Usama bin Laden after the latter fled Sudan in 1996. The Hizbi-Islami Gulbuddin has long established ties with Usama bin Laden.

c. Other Relevant Data

The detainee was part of a group of Afghan refiners that purchased poppy crops worth up to 600,000 United States Dollars.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee adamantly stressed that his relationship with the Taliban was simply business and despite their business relationship, he never agreed with the manner in which they treated people.

b. The detainee insists he has not conducted business with the Taliban since 1996, which he explains was about the timeframe the Taliban started fighting with the Northern Alliance.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHMAD, HAJAWALI

c. The detainee stated that he did not meet with Taliban government officials and did not attempt other business deals involving individuals or entities associated with Taliban.

d. The detainee claims that he had no knowledge of al Qaida prior to his arrest and never heard of Taliban converting cash to gold or other commodities to earn a profit.

e. The detainee stated that he never heard of al Qaida or Taliban shipping gold out of Pakistan.

f. The detainee claims to have never conducted any currency exchanges or other financial transactions for Hekmatyar or any known associates of Hekmatyar.

g. The detainee stated that if released he would like to return to his former trade as a moneylender.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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**Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

7 February 2006

TO: AWAD, JALAL SALAM AWAD

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AWAD, JALAL SALAM AWAD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee admitted he went to train because Muslims have a religious duty to do so.
 2. The detainee traveled from Hadramaut, Yemen to Sanaa, Yemen. The detainee then proceeded to Karachi, Pakistan and on to Quetta, Pakistan. The detainee continued on to Kandahar, Afghanistan and then to Kabul, Afghanistan.
 - b. Training
 1. While traveling to Kabul, Afghanistan, an individual attempted to convince the detainee to train at the Libyan camp and then go fight the jihad in Chechnya. However, the detainee did not agree.
 2. The detainee trained at the Libyan Camp Annex in the vicinity of Kabul, Afghanistan.
 3. The detainee received training for the Kalishnikov rifle, the rocket-propelled grenade launcher, the PK machine gun and other weapons.
 4. The detainee stated that he was not trained at the Libyan camp, but he was trained by a Libyan man.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AWAD, JALAL SALAM AWAD

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was identified as one of the individuals who stayed in a safe house in Karachi, Pakistan.
2. The detainee reported that he spoke with an individual who was a recruiter and travel facilitator for military training in Afghanistan. The detainee met the individual in Hadramaut, Yemen.
3. The detainee stated that he was told by the recruiter how nice Afghanistan was and the recruiter pushed the idea of going for military training. The detainee was told that if he trained in Afghanistan he could go to Chechnya afterwards to fight in the jihad.
4. The detainee stayed in Kabul, Afghanistan at a guesthouse called al Ansar before deciding to go to the Libyan camp for training.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The al Ansar guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan is a two-story house with a basement. It accommodates Arabs immigrating to Afghanistan.
2. The detainee fled Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban.
3. The detainee advised that there was an escape network that helped fleeing Arabs and Afghans evade arrest by Pakistani authorities.
4. The detainee stated that the border crossing route began at a safe house in Kabul, Afghanistan but is centered in the border town of Khowst, Afghanistan. The Kabul guest house was located in the Katib Birwan neighborhood of the city.
5. The detainee was arrested at a Karachi, Pakistan safe house.
6. The detainee said the lack of progress with his case is the reason for his uncooperativeness.
7. The detainee would not talk about details of his case file at this time as he has medical conditions that have not been attended to. The detainee would not discuss the specifics of his medical requirements stating that he has requested medical treatment many times in the past and has not received treatment.
8. The detainee stated that he has heard of al Qaida throughout the camp and since his detention, but he did not really understand what al Qaida was.

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9. The detainee made mention of future unrest amongst the detainee population. The detainee was angry with the treatment of those in the camps. The detainee acted this way because he is frustrated with the four years already spent in Cuba. The detainee advised that detainees will soon show their dissatisfaction by hunger striking.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan ostensibly for the purpose of getting married, finding work and settling down.

b. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001.

c. The detainee denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

d. The detainee was queried regarding any knowledge or planning of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo detention facility, with negative results.

e. The detainee said that he was not interested in training, but wanted to move to Afghanistan to start a family.

f. The detainee maintains that he originally went to Afghanistan to immigrate and not for training.

g. According to detainee's brother, the detainee traveled to Pakistan prior to 11 September 2001. The detainee traveled to Pakistan with missionaries. The detainee was interested in seeing new places and meeting people from different cultures as well as the missionary work.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

20 July 2006

TO: ABDUL, HAKIM MOUSA

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDUL, HAKIM MOUSA

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee began his travels from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan. From Riyadh, the detainee traveled to Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, where he obtained a visa at the Pakistani embassy. The detainee then proceeded to Karachi, Pakistan.

2. The detainee stayed at a safehouse near the main road to Quetta, Pakistan for two days, a safehouse in Quetta for over one month and a safehouse in Kandahar, Afghanistan for approximately one month.

b. Training

The detainee claimed to have received training in an unidentified house in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was arrested with a senior al Qaida member.
2. The senior al Qaida member was an integral part of the al Qaida network responsible for moving Arabs to and from Afghanistan.
3. Information strongly suggests that the detainee may be identifiable with senior personnel of al Wafa.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDUL, HAKIM MOUSA

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or its interests.

b. The detainee provided three reasons for his travel to Afghanistan: he wanted to defend himself against thieves, defend Saudi Arabia and learn how to shoot a weapon for the purpose of hunting.

c. A foreign government delegation deemed the detainee to be of low intelligence or law enforcement value to the United States, and unlikely to pose a terrorist threat to the United States or its interests.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

000656

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

4 July 2006

TO: ALI, MASOUR MOHAMED MUTAYA

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALI, MASOUR MOHAMED MUTAYA

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee was influenced to go to Afghanistan after viewing a video dedicated to training for the Bosnian War.
 2. The detainee made all the travel arrangements himself and obtained the necessary visas and airline tickets.
 3. The detainee spent approximately three months in Yemen before traveling to Afghanistan. The detainee traveled to Kabul, Afghanistan, via Karachi and Quetta, Pakistan.
 4. The detainee spent approximately one month in Loghar, Afghanistan while waiting for training. The detainee walked to a fighting position and stayed for approximately five weeks. The detainee left for Pakistan after the first week of Ramadan, around 22 November 2001.
 5. The detainee traveled to the border with a guide and stayed at the guide's house for approximately three weeks planning a trip back to Saudi Arabia. The detainee spent six weeks traveling to Karachi and hiding at several homes along the way.
 6. The detainee was taken to a home in Karachi, Pakistan and spent three weeks there. There were approximately 15-16 people living in the house. The home's owner was reported to have been helping the detainee obtain a new passport so he could return home.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALI, MASOUR MOHAMED MUTAYA

7. The detainee was arrested with the rest of the occupants of the home when the Pakistani Police raided the house. The detainee spent approximately three weeks in Pakistan custody before being transferred to United States custody.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee heard two men speak about the jihad in Afghanistan at a local mosque. They encouraged males to travel to Afghanistan to receive military training.

2. The detainee's name was among the names of 324 suspected al Qaida members listed on a document found in a safe house raided in Karachi, Pakistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001. The detainee also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or its interests.

b. The detainee stated that he had not heard of al Qaida until the American World Trade Center attack.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

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UNCLASSIFIED

**Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

4 October 2006

TO: BARRE, MOHAMMED SOLIMAN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BARRE, MOHAMMED SOLIMAN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

The detainee was identified as a Mujahedin in Afghanistan until 1992.

b. Training

1. The detainee was identified as a member of an institute operated by a senior al Qaida member in Qandahar that used to be associated with religious and language studies near a Mujahedin guest house.

2. The detainee was identified as a participant of jihadist training in Afghanistan.

c. Connections/Associations

The detainee knew Usama bin Laden personally and, from 1992 to 1995, worked on Usama bin Laden's compound in Khartoum, Sudan. The detainee worked in the building occupied by Usama bin Laden's security detachment.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he never went to Afghanistan.

b. The detainee stated he was never involved in an Islamic Militant group or knowingly transferred funds for their cause.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BARRE, MOHAMMED SOLIMAN

c. The detainee stated he never heard of the al Wafa Organization prior to his arrest by the Pakistani police.

d. The detainee stated the recipients of the funds he transferred were recorded in his business records on his computer that was seized by authorities.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

12 October 2006

TO: SAID, ZOHAIR MOHAMMED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SAID, ZOHAIR MOHAMMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee immigrated to Afghanistan in 1999 to train at the Libyan camp near Kabul, Afghanistan.

2. The detainee stated he lived in the al Ansar guest house located in Kabul, Afghanistan for fifteen months until he moved across the street to a new guest house when the guest house closed. The detainee lived at the new guest house for eight months.

3. The detainee was sent to the front lines to fight, he saw an associate who was in charge at the battlefield near Qandahar, Afghanistan.

4. In approximately mid-February 2000, the detainee stayed at a large, well known Taliban guest house in Quetta, Pakistan.

5. In approximately February 2000, the detainee stayed at the Arab guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

6. In approximately February or March 2000, the detainee stayed at the guest house located in Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee went back and forth from the frontline to this guesthouse.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SAID, ZOHAIR MOHAMMED

7. The detainee was on the frontlines on 11 September 2001. He remained on the frontline until Kabul, Afghanistan fell to the Northern Alliance, then retreated. The detainee and three Saudis drove from Kabul to the Arab guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

8. After the fall of Kabul, Afghanistan, the detainee stayed at the Arab guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan for about a week before going with an Afghan guide to Quetta, Pakistan. From Quetta, the detainee traveled to Karachi, Pakistan.

9. The detainee was arrested at a safe house in Karachi, Pakistan.

b. Training

1. The detainee trained at a camp located near the Al Ansar guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan.

2. The detainee completed 40 days of training that included physical fitness, self-defense, small weapons training on pistols and Kalashnikovs and geographic and topographic training.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee traveled to Malaysia with a senior al Qaida operative. The detainee met him at the Arab guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee knew this individual for a year prior to traveling with him to Malaysia.

2. While the detainee was in Malaysia, he stayed in a condominium with a senior al Qaida operative, Khalid al-Midhdar and Nawaf al-Hazmi.

3. The senior al Qaida operative gave the detainee money while they were in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Malaysia.

4. The senior al Qaida operative gave the detainee money to purchase an airline ticket to Yemen from Malaysia.

5. The detainee worked as a guard at the Kandahar, Afghanistan airport prior to 11 September 2001. The detainee was seen in the company of Usama bin Laden and another senior al Qaida operative. The detainee is believed to be al Qaida because of his access to Usama bin Laden.

6. The detainee's passport photo, false identification card and flight coupon from Sana, Yemen to Karachi, Pakistan were recovered during the arrest of a known Usama bin Laden bodyguard. The detainee's documents were found with photos and documents of other Usama bin Laden bodyguards.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SAID, ZOHAIR MOHAMMED

7. A source identified the detainee as being at the Ashara guest house and closely associated with the individual in charge of the guest house that also commanded on the front lines. This individual was known to be al Qaida and the source believed the detainee was also al Qaida.

8. The detainee was identified as one of Usama bin Laden's drivers.

d. Intent

The detainee stated he went to Afghanistan to die as a martyr for God.

e. Detainee Actions and Statements

1. The detainee acquired a false Yemeni passport in the name of Imad Muhamed Ali Said.

2. The detainee wore Afghan clothing while traveling from Karachi, Pakistan to Afghanistan so as not to raise suspicion.

3. The detainee stated he was willing to sign a statement saying he is a member of al Qaida and put his fingerprints and toe prints on the document.

4. The detainee stated he is in trouble for being a member of and being associated with al Qaida.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he has never sworn bayat to Usama bin Laden.

b. The detainee stated that he never used his weapon or killed anyone.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

**Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

29 March 2006

TO: AL QURASHI, SABRI MOHAMMED EBRAHIM

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL QURASHI, SABRI MOHAMMED
EBRAHIM

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee traveled to Pakistan to purchase perfume for resale and to fulfill his religious Dawa.

2. The detainee arrived at the Karachi, Pakistan airport and identified other Jamat-al-Tabligh members arriving there with him.

3. Jamat-al-Tabligh is a Pakistan-based Islamic missionary organization used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists, including members of al Qaida.

4. The detainee decided to travel to Afghanistan after he met a man in Pakistan.

5. The detainee arrived in Afghanistan with 3,000 United States Dollars.

6. After Kabul, Afghanistan fell to the Northern Alliance, the detainee joined a group of about 100 Arabs in the mountain region. More than half were armed with Kalashnikov rifles and they were led by Abu Muhammad al Musri.

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ISN 570

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL QURASHI, SABRI MOHAMMED EBRAHIM

b. Training

1. The detainee trained at the al Farouq military training camp. The detainee identified Abu Muhammad al Musri as the leader of the camp.
2. The detainee stated he spent about three days learning to disassemble the Kalashnikov rifle and then trained on a different type of weapon, identified as a PK machine gun.
3. The detainee stayed at the al Farouq camp for a total of about 45 days.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated that when he was arrested, all his property was taken from him, including his Casio watch.
2. The Casio digital watch was commonly given to al Farouq attendees.
3. On 7 February 2002, the Pakistanis raided a Karachi safe house and captured the detainee and approximately 15 other individuals.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee stated he did not know al Farouq was an al Qaida training center until he later reached Kabul.
 - b. The detainee stated he did not receive any weapons, explosive or terrorist training while at al Farouq.
 - c. The detainee continues to claim that while in Pakistani custody the Pakistani authorities forced him to say he had been at al Farouq for training.
 - d. The detainee further claimed the Pakistani authorities fed him the details he provided about the al Farouq camp as well.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

**Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

23 March 2006

To: AL WADY, HAMOUD ABDULLAH HAMOUD HASSAN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF
AL WADY, HAMOUD ABDULLAH HAMOUD HASSAN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee wanted to fight for jihad in Afghanistan.
2. The detainee had 2,000 United States Dollars of his own money saved for the trip.
3. The detainee was recruited to go to Afghanistan by Abu Abdul Rahman at the Hayel Said Mosque in Adan, Yemen. Rahman gave the detainee 500 United States Dollars and travel instructions to Afghanistan.
4. The detainee was motivated to do jihad after learning that any muslim who dies for jihad goes straight to Allah and into paradise.
5. The detainee served as an assistant officer at Kho Ajagir, the northern Afghanistan front.

b. Training

1. The detainee admits he knows how to use the Kalashnikov rifle, but stated he never went to an al Qaida or Taliban training camp.
2. The detainee stayed at the Said Center, a military post in the Bagram area, for twenty-five days.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL WADY, HAMOUD ABDULLAH HAMOUD HASSAN

3. The Said Center Training Camp was a Taliban-run training camp for Arab recruits enroute to fight General Dotsum's soldiers to the north of Khonduz, Afghanistan. The training consisted of small arms familiarization and range qualification.

4. The detainee has been identified as an expert in using the SAM-7 missile systems.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stayed at the Arab guest house in Kandahar; an unidentified guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan; and at a guest house in Karachi, Pakistan where the detainee was detained in a raid before he could leave.

2. The Arab House was a Taliban sponsored safe house for Arab Mujahedin in Kandahar.

3. The detainee made three trips delivering money in Herat, Afghanistan.

4. The detainee was given 2,000 Saudi Riyals, 20,000 Pakistani Rupees and about 10,000 Pakistani Rupees worth of Afghan money to be taken to Herat, Afghanistan. The detainee met the assistant to the governor of Herat, who directed him to an unidentified Afghan who took the money.

5. The detainee was identified by another individual (who worked for al Wafa) as having been present at Aziz's Karachi guest house. Aziz is an alias for al Qaida member "Riyadh" the Facilitator.

6. The detainee is a Yemeni national who is an al Qaida member who fled Afghanistan and stayed at a guesthouse in Pakistan.

7. The detainee has been identified as being part of a group of Yemenis that were considered to be dangerous extremists and which were still active in Sanaa in April 2002.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee explained he had traveled to approximately four or five different countries throughout his life, which began when the detainee left Yemen for Saudi Arabia with his father. Other countries the detainee visited include: Afghanistan, Pakistan and Turkey.

2. The detainee traveled through Syria on his way to Afghanistan; he also made two other trips to Syria. On the second trip, the detainee flew to Baku, Azerbaijan.

3. The detainee was detained by Pakistani police with 6,000 United States Dollars, 2,700 Saudi Riyals, 6,000 Pakistani Rupees, a camera and a new cellular phone.

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL WADY, HAMOUD ABDULLAH HAMOUD HASSAN

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that he had never received any type of training in Afghanistan because it was well known that Yemeni citizens know how to use weapons. The detainee had sold the only weapon he owned prior to his marriage because he needed the money.

b. The detainee was adamant about the fact that while in Afghanistan he did not fire any weapons, kill any people or fight in any way.

c. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or its interests.

d. The detainee never received permission from anyone to leave the front lines. The detainee felt it was wrong to fight against his muslim brothers so he returned to Kabul on his own.

e. The detainee claims that while at the Aziz guest house he did not see any weapons and did not associate with anyone there.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

**Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

16 November 2006

TO: AZNI, JARD AL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AZNI, JARD AL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee related that he is part of a group called Jamaat Tablighi.

2. Jamaat al Tablighi is a Pakistan based Islamic missionary organization which is believed to be used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists, including members of al Qaida.

3. The detainee went to Pakistan to study religious science. The detainee's cousin purchased an airplane ticket for the detainee's travel from Yemen to Pakistan and provided the detainee 100 United States Dollars in cash. The detainee later gave the cash to a sheikh at the school in Pakistan.

4. The detainee's request for permission to preach Islam in Pakistan was found in a collection of receipts and with materials linked to al Qaida.

5. The detainee lived and studied for two years at an institute located east of Kandahar, Afghanistan.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee identified the institute where he studied as the Institute of Islamic Studies. The detainee stated the students at the institute consisted primarily of Afghan and Philippine Taliban members.

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ISN 575

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AZNI, JARD AL

2. The detainee stated the Institute of Islamic Studies in Kandahar, Afghanistan was run by a Mauritanian.

3. The person who ran the Institute of Islamic Studies was the leader of the Mauritanian al Qaida cell. The Mauritanian al Qaida cell leader is a personal advisor to Usama bin Laden.

4. A search was conducted on a safe house in Pakistan used by the al Qaida facilitator. Two aircraft passenger personal floatation devices (life vests) complete with CO2 inflation cartridges were found in a backpack at the safe house.

5. An initial analysis of the two life vests and backpack found in the safe house used by the al Qaida facilitator tested positive for Pentaerythritol Tetranitrate (PETN). PETN is one of the most powerful explosives used in blasting caps and core explosive materials.

6. The detainee attended a gathering where Usama bin Laden gave a speech and talked to approximately thirty students at an institute in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

7. One of the detainee's known aliases, along with passport information, was found on a list recovered during raids against al Qaida connected safe houses.

8. A source identified the detainee as one of approximately 25 bodyguards for Usama bin Laden.

c. Other Relevant Data

The detainee was captured by Pakistani Police with Tabligh papers, a Koran and excessive amounts of United States Dollars.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee claims he has no military service or experience.

b. The detainee stated he is not aware of any individuals who have received training to conduct terrorist operations and who may have been dispatched to carry out unspecified attacks.

c. The detainee stated he does not have knowledge of any potential operatives who may be involved in terrorist activities against the United States or Western interests.

d. The detainee later denied ever seeing Usama bin Laden.

e. The detainee stated he does not like Usama bin Laden or terrorism. The detainee has never been approached by anyone seeking assistance or money for terrorist related activities. The detainee has not observed anyone preparing to conduct terrorist acts.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AZNI, JARD AL

f. The detainee stated he never saw any life vests in the safe house where he was arrested.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

20 August 2006

TO: KHAMIS, ZA HER OMER

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHAMIS, ZA HER OMER

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. A parishioner at the Takwa Mosque convinced the detainee to go to Afghanistan for Dawa. The detainee went to Afghanistan eight months after graduating high school.

2. The detainee was at guest house called Muddafah al Ansar in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

b. Training

1. The detainee trained at Camp al Farouq for two to three months on various weapons including the Kalishnikov, M-16, pistols, PK, rocket-propelled grenades and hand grenades.

2. The al Farouq Camp was funded by al Qaida and was more advanced than other training camps in Afghanistan.

3. When the detainee arrived at Camp Farouq, he was asked to take weapons training for jihad and the detainee agreed willingly.

4. The detainee identified the commander of Camp Farouq.

5. An individual identified the detainee as the primary weapons instructor at Camp al Farouq. Reportedly, the detainee also taught explosives.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHAMIS, ZA HER OMER

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee states he stopped at a house called Madafa, known as the House of the Saudi Ambassador, located in Wazir Akbahr Khan, Shahree Nao, Afghanistan.
2. The Ambassador of Saudi Arabia Guest House is known as Azzam Guest House.
3. The Azzam Guest House is run by one of Usama bin Laden's most trusted people.
4. The detainee stayed at a house in Karachi, Pakistan. During this stay, all travel arrangements, food and clothing was taken care of by an individual at the house.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee, contrary to previous statements, stated that he had never trained at any training camp, including al Farouq.
2. The detainee said Usama bin Laden visited Camp Farouk during his training to give a lecture on the battle of Jagi in Northern Afghanistan.
3. The detainee, contrary to previous statements, stated that he had never seen Usama bin Laden in person but that he only saw him on the television.
4. The detainee, contrary to previous statements, stated that the Commander of Camp al Farouq was not the Commander previously acknowledged and that the detainee didn't know what his job was.
5. At the time of the detainee's arrest, life jackets from an airline were found at the house in Karachi, Pakistan. The detainee acknowledged seeing one vest lying on a second floor balcony.
6. Initial testing on the two life vests and a backpack found at the safe house in Karachi, Pakistan, tested positive for explosives.
7. The detainee's passport indicates he was in Jordan 14 April to 18 August 2000. The detainee states he had never been to Jordan and that an acquaintance forged his passport.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

The detainee states he had no prior knowledge of the events leading up to the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHAMIS, ZA HER OMER**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

25 November 2006

TO: ALWAI, JAMAL MUHAMMED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALWAI, JAMAL MUHAMMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee began working at al Haramayn, a humanitarian organization, in 1997. After one year, the detainee became an executive of the organization, and although not formally promoted, the detainee took over as director.

2. The detainee denied al Haramayn had anything to do with funding the Chechnyan jihad or Mujahedin fighters. The detainee endorsed the Chechnyan jihad, but did not use al Haramayn to assist the fight.

3. In May 2001 the detainee took a job working for an al Wafa Islamic relief organization in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

4. In July 2001, the detainee returned to Karachi, Pakistan to establish an al Wafa organization and received 110,000 United States Dollars. Part of the detainee's mission was to establish an al Wafa office in Karachi, Pakistan.

5. The detainee stayed at a special, Taliban guest house while in Pakistan.

6. The detainee relied heavily on the local Taliban office for storage space and access to office equipment because his Karachi, Pakistan, al Wafa organization was not yet established. Medical supplies the detainee purchased were sent directly from the vendor to the Taliban office for storage. The detainee would then go to the Taliban office and forward the supplies to Afghanistan.

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ISN 577

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALWAI, JAMAL MUHAMMED

7. The detainee's al Wafa office had boxes which contained notebooks with handwritten notes of weapons capabilities, explosives, chemical and pharmaceutical lists and attack scenarios.

8. The detainee had 11,300 United States Dollars in his possession when he was arrested.

b. Connections/Associations

1. Al Haramayn was founded in 1992 to disseminate the Saudi Arabian version of the Sunni Islamic religion with Wahabistic influences/teachings. In addition to providing legitimate humanitarian aid to promote Islamic teachings, this organization has provided support to families of Islamic suicide attackers, freed activists from prisons, procured fraudulent travel documents, provided medical care for wounded Mujahedin, smuggled weapons into Algeria and transferred radical fundamentalists into Bosnia.

2. The detainee assisted at al Haramayn in as early as 1995.

3. Al Haramayn has provided logistical support to the Mujahedin fighting in Afghanistan since the 1980's. Their annual budget was between 50 to 60 million United States Dollars. Al Haramayn provides support to Islamic extremist elements in seventeen countries or regions that includes freeing of activists from prisons, procurement of fraudulent travel documents and weapons smuggling to Algeria. Forty bank accounts connected to terrorist activities have been linked to offices and sub-departments of al Haramayn.

4. A source stated al Haramayn worked closely with members of al Wafa. A former al Qaida member stated organizations such as al Haramayn and al Wafa allowed easier access to funds which financed al Qaida. These organizations provided a legitimate cover for al Qaida members to travel world-wide under the guise of humanitarian operations. These groups would build mosques for the purpose of recruiting future al Qaida members.

5. A senior al Qaida operative traveled to Azerbaijan in 1997 at the invitation of al Haramayn.

6. Al Haramayn established an office in Azerbaijan to provide a legitimate organization, which was also providing money and materials to Mujahedin, military leaders throughout Chechnya. Authorities accused al Haramayn of supporting activities not in alignment with the humanitarian aims of the organization in January 2000 and the office was subsequently closed.

7. The detainee admitted the Taliban and al Wafa were connected in some ways, but he denied any connection between al Wafa and al Qaida.

8. The detainee claims to have never met any al Qaida members with al Haramayn, although he admitted to knowing two al Qaida members.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALWAI, JAMAL MUHAMMED

9. An al Wafa associate of the detainee had past contacts with Usama bin Laden and Usama bin Laden's senior operative.

10. An al Wafa associate of the detainee was in contact with a microbiologist involved in al Qaida's anthrax program.

11. The detainee received a telephone call stating the Kandahar, Afghanistan office was closing for fear of United States air attacks. The detainee was informed that documents and paperwork from the Kandahar office was being sent to him for safekeeping.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. All employees of al Haramayn worked for the detainee by 1998. The detainee oversaw the finances that were used for payroll, food, medical supplies, Islamic publications and general aid.

2. The detainee was responsible for the supply and care of five camps of displaced people located in Azerbaijan. Financial support for the organization came from Saudi Arabia. The organization did not have bank accounts and operated solely on cash.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated the head office in Saudi Arabia wanted to close the Baku, Azerbaijan office of the al Haramayn because it was getting fewer donations and, there was a conflict because it was a Sunni establishment providing aid to Shiites. A new director was sent to relieve the detainee despite operations being closed.

b. A source stated there is no relation between al Qaida and al Wafa because al Qaida and al Wafa disliked each other and were in a disagreement.

c. The detainee maintained that he had no contact with members of the Taliban government or the al Qaida terrorist organization.

d. The detainee stated the al Wafa charity in Karachi, Pakistan was strictly a charitable organization.

e. The detainee claims his business in Karachi, Pakistan was not a part of al Wafa.

f. A source stated the detainee has no connection to al Qaida or the Taliban.

UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALWAI, JAMAL MUHAMMED**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

000678

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

17 November 2006

TO: ALSUWEDY, ABDUL AZIZ

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALSUWEDY, ABDUL AZIZ

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee attended a mosque in Yemen where he heard about jihad from a sheikh. An individual urged the detainee to go to Afghanistan to participate in a jihad against the Russians.

2. The detainee traveled from Damascus, Syria to Tehran onto Mashaad and to Tibatt, Iran. From Iran, the detainee traveled to Qandahar, Afghanistan.

b. Training

1. In 1991 to 1992, the detainee completed basic training and served as a volunteer in the Yemen National Guard.

2. The detainee received training with the Rocket Propelled Grenade, Kalashnikov rifle, PK and a weapon similar to the .50 caliber machine gun. The training took place around 1991 to 1992.

3. The detainee attended the explosives course at al Farouq Camp, Afghanistan. After graduation, the detainee was chosen as an assistant to teach an explosives course at Tarnak Farms.

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ISN 578

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALSUWEDY, ABDUL AZIZ

4. The al Farouq Training Camp provided a general program that consisted of a fundamental or basic course, lasting 40 days. This course consisted of a basic review of relevant military topics. A different topic was covered each week, providing the trainee with fundamental military skills including light and heavy weaponry, field guns, warheads, topography, and explosives.

5. The Tarnak Farms facility in Afghanistan housed an al Qaida poison and explosive training laboratory and an advanced operational training camp. No one was allowed to train at Tarnak Farms without first passing through basic training at al Farouq Training Camp. The Tarnak Farms camp was considered the most important al Qaida training camp in Afghanistan since it was where al Qaida operatives received advanced operational training including urban assault and other tactics.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee and the others were awaiting training while in Afghanistan. An operative assumed the detainee was traveling to Chechnya for jihad.

2. An operative saw the detainee in January 2002 at a guest house in Karachi, Pakistan where the detainee was eventually captured. The operative did not know exactly how the detainee traveled there from Afghanistan, but stated typically, a network of Pakistanis would bring them accompanied by an operative that greeted Yemenis.

3. The detainee was in a Karachi, Pakistan guest house before his arrest. During that time, the Yemenis were waiting to travel home to Yemen. All the men had turned their cash, passports and identification over to al Qaida facilitators for safekeeping upon their arrival in Afghanistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks prior to their execution on 11 September 2001.

b. The detainee denied having any knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States.

c. The detainee denied any knowledge of bomb making or knowledge of explosives instructors. The detainee claimed the entire notion of building a bomb out of homemade materials seemed very strange and foreign to him.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

16 June 2006

TO: KHAIRKHA, KHIRULLAH SAID WALI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHAIRKHA, KHIRULLAH SAID
WALI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. In 1994, when the Taliban started their rise to power, the detainee traveled from Pakistan to Afghanistan and lived in Spin Boldak, Afghanistan.
 2. The detainee acted as the Pashtu spokesman for the Taliban from 1994 to 1999.
 3. The Taliban chose the detainee to become their spokesperson for BBC and Voice of America (VOA). As Taliban spokesperson the detainee traveled to Chaman, Pakistan; Kandahar, Afghanistan; Charasia, Afghanistan; county of Kabul, Afghanistan; and Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan.
 4. While serving as the Taliban spokesperson in Spin Buldak, Afghanistan, the detainee also served as county supervisor in that area.
 5. The detainee is a former Taliban Interior Minister and was the commander of Taliban forces that took Mazar-i-Sharif in 1996.
 6. The detainee worked as a deputy sheriff in Spin Buldak, Afghanistan and knew of shipments of Taliban-seized weapons from Mazar-e-Sharif to Khandahar, Afghanistan.
 7. In 1998, the detainee shipped weapons captured by the Taliban to Khandahar, Afghanistan.

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000681

ISN 579

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHAIRKHTWA, KHIRULLAH SAID WALI

8. The detainee was appointed by the Taliban to be Governor of Herat Province to improve relations between Iran and the Taliban government.

9. The detainee was trusted by the Taliban to keep order in Herat, Afghanistan and to send taxes collected back to senior Taliban members.

10. After arriving in Herat as Governor, the detainee spent much of his time establishing himself as the premier narcotics trafficker in the region. The detainee purchased three walled compounds in Herat and transformed these compounds into large storage facilities for opium and vehicles which would be used in smuggling operations.

11. On 25 October 2001, the detainee provided money for troops and money for fuel purchases used to send 300 men from the Taliban 17th Army Division in Herat to Sabzak Pass in Badghis Province.

12. The detainee fought against the Northern Alliance and United States Forces in November 2001.

13. When bombing of Afghanistan started, the detainee traveled in a convoy of 10 vehicles to Arghastan, Afghanistan. The vehicles were full of weapons.

b. Training

The detainee received military training for a short period of time at Camp Marof, near Kandahar, Afghanistan when the detainee was in his teens.

c. Connections/Associations

1. As Taliban spokesperson, the detainee met many influential Taliban leaders. On one occasion at the Kandahar Airport, the detainee saw Usama bin Laden with his entourage.

2. The detainee was known to have close ties to Usama Bin Laden.

3. In 1996, the detainee attended a meeting in Kandahar, Afghanistan, which included jihad fighters and guests of Usama bin Laden, who was also present.

4. On 7 January 2000, the detainee and three other Taliban officials attended a meeting with Iranian and Hizbi Islami-Gulbuddin Hikmatyar faction officials. Topics of discussion included United States intervention in the region, restoration of peace in Afghanistan, and strengthening the Taliban's nascent ties with Iran.

5. In the fall of 2001, the detainee met with senior Taliban leaders for a period of approximately 10 minutes, at a house across from the Kharq-e-Sharif shrine.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHAIRKHA, KHIRULLAH SAID WALI

6. In November 2001, the detainee met with an Iranian diplomatic delegation. The Iranian Government was prepared to offer anti-aircraft weapons to the Taliban for use against the United States and Coalition Forces operating in Afghanistan.

7. On 20 December 2001, the detainee met with Taliban leaders in Afghanistan.

8. When the Taliban lost control of the government, the detainee called a senior Taliban leader for counsel. The detainee met with one of the leader's representatives and discussed the new government and the detainee's future safety.

d. Intent

The detainee has instigated other detainees to cause problems, including making noise, not eating, killing themselves, not showering, and pushing the door during a search.

e. Other Relevant Data

1. In February 2002, the detainee traveled to Chaman, Pakistan.

2. During the second day in Pakistan, the detainee went for lunch to the home of the former Taliban Governor of Kabul, Afghanistan. Pakistani authorities arrested the detainee when they raided the house in a search for the Governor of Kabul.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that upon his return to Afghanistan he will rest.

b. The detainee stated if the government is stable he intends on being part of the government. He will grow crops and work at the bazaar.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

28 November 2006

TO: BATARFI, AYMAN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BATARFI, AYMAN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he was easily persuaded by friends in Pakistan to attend training in Afghanistan. The detainee traveled with a small group of friends from Pakistan to Afghanistan to fight against Soviet occupation forces. The detainee stayed at the Khalden Training Camp in Afghanistan for two to three weeks and then moved to the Hugay area in Afghanistan where he stayed for approximately one month.

2. The Khalden Camp is an al Qaida training camp near Kabul, Afghanistan. Instruction at the camp included urban guerilla tactics, physical conditioning and endurance.

3. The detainee stated he decided when he was in Saudi Arabia to go to Chechnya to assist in a medical capacity. The detainee was advised in Yemen that there was an opportunity for him to get to Chechnya in Afghanistan. The detainee traveled to Karachi, Pakistan and then to Lahore, Pakistan. He traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan with a group by crossing the border near Quetta, Pakistan. This trip was facilitated through the office of the Taliban.

4. The detainee stated he stayed at the Hajji Habash Guest House when he traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan in June 2000.

5. The Niberas and Hassan Guest Houses located near the Haj Habbash Mosque in Kandahar, Afghanistan were al Qaida guest houses.

6. The detainee stated he tried to get to Chechnya again in May or June 2001.

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000684

ISN 627

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BATARFI, AYMAN

7. The detainee stated he stayed in the Ghulam Bacha Guest House in Kabul, Afghanistan for five or six days during his trip to Afghanistan in May 2001.

8. The detainee stated he believed that the Ghulam Bacha Guest House was supported by Usama bin Laden.

9. The detainee stated he visited the al Wafa office director in Kabul, Afghanistan to inquire about working for al Wafa in Kabul. The Kabul office director arranged for the detainee to meet with the al Wafa director in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

10. Al Wafa al Igatha al Islamia has been designated as a terrorist organization on the United States Department of State Terrorist Exclusion List.

11. The detainee stated he traveled from Kandahar, Afghanistan to Karachi, Pakistan to assist al Wafa with medical purchases.

12. The detainee stated he stayed at the Taliban guest house in Quetta, Pakistan, on his way to Karachi, Pakistan.

13. The detainee claimed al Wafa paid the cost of the airline ticket for his flight from Quetta, Pakistan to Karachi, Pakistan.

14. The detainee stated he worked for al Wafa for approximately nine months in 2001 and became al Wafa's medical advisor.

15. The detainee stated he left Lahore, Pakistan, for Afghanistan in November 2001, and traveled through the tribal area of Gendab, Pakistan.

16. The detainee stated that, following his escape from Pakistan in 2001, he worked with the head of the al Wafa clinic in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. The head of the clinic had contact with the Taliban.

17. The detainee stated he left the al Wafa clinic in Jalalabad, Afghanistan during the bombing of the city and escaped to the Tora Bora Mountains in Afghanistan. The detainee traveled between small groups of fleeing individuals providing medical attention to those in need.

18. The detainee stated he told Usama bin Laden at a meeting at Tora Bora, Afghanistan during Ramadan in 2001 that the detainee needed assistance to find a safe route to depart from Afghanistan and to secure medical equipment that was in the hands of the Taliban in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BATARFI, AYMAN

19. The detainee stated those in charge of every area of operation were assigned a personal radio that was the method of communication utilized by the al Qaida network within Afghanistan.

20. The detainee carried a gun while he was in the Tora Bora Mountains in Afghanistan and was not searched upon entry to the cave for a meeting with Usama bin Laden.

b. Training

1. The detainee stated he trained for one and one half months during the summer of 1988 with the Mujahedin in Afghanistan at the Khogay Training Camp where he received training on the Kalashnikov and small anti-aircraft weaponry such as the heavy Grinov.

2. The detainee stated he trained with the AK-47 assault rifle and participated in at least two night time raids against Soviet outposts while he was in Afghanistan.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated that during his graduate studies, he studied under a doctor who was a member of the Pakistan Islamic Medical Association. The detainee stated he attended one Pakistani Islamic Medical Association meeting with the doctor in 1998 or 1999.

2. The doctor was reported to have treated al Qaida members who required medical care and also would readily treat fugitive al Qaida operatives.

3. The detainee stated he met the Taliban Minister of Health during his trip to Afghanistan in June 2001 to seek permission for employment and to facilitate the distribution of medicines and supplies.

4. The detainee stated he met a Malaysian microbiologist at the Haji Habbash Guest House in Kandahar, Afghanistan in August 2001.

5. The same microbiologist was involved in developing anthrax for al Qaida.

6. The detainee stated he met with a friend, a Yemeni merchant, in Islamabad, Pakistan, who facilitated the detainee's travel into Afghanistan when the detainee fled Pakistan.

7. The detainee's friend was a member of al Qaida and in overall control over the movement of al Qaida fighters and their families from Afghanistan through Pakistan.

8. The detainee stated he saw Usama bin Laden four or five times at various guest houses and in person in Afghanistan.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BATARFI, AYMAN

9. The detainee stated he talked to Usama bin Laden on two separate occasions in Afghanistan.

10. The detainee stated that at a meeting in the Tora Bora Mountains in Afghanistan, Usama bin Laden requested the detainee help supply medicine to the Tora Bora region.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated he purchased 0.5 kilograms of cyanide that he claimed was stolen from a warehouse in Kabul, Afghanistan and was never recovered.

2. The detainee stated he told another al Wafa volunteer to purchase four to five thousand United States Dollars worth of medical equipment presumably for the Malaysian microbiologist.

3. The detainee stated he stayed in the Tora Bora Mountains in Afghanistan until he was severely wounded. A group of Afghans took him to the Central Jail in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. The next day he was taken to the hospital where he was treated for over four weeks then returned to jail. The detainee stated he asked to be turned over to United States Forces so he would receive better treatment. The detainee was taken to Bagram, Afghanistan on 27 January 2002.

4. The detainee stated he traveled to Herat, Afghanistan, likely after 11 September 2001, to pick up three trucks to be used by al Wafa as ambulances. Al Wafa paid approximately 15,000 United States Dollars for the three trucks.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of biological agents or ever having discussed biological agents with anyone.

b. The detainee stated he did not attend any training camps in Afghanistan as he was a doctor not a fighter.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

15 June 2006

TO: AL SHAMMARI, ZIBN THAHIR ZIBN AL FADHILI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF
AL SHAMMARI, ZIBN THAHIR ZIBN AL FADHILI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee traveled in a group with four others on Saudi airlines from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia; to Qatar and then to Karachi, Pakistan. The detainee paid for his trip with his own money.

2. The detainee and his group stayed in Karachi, Pakistan for one or two days and paid a Yemeni to buy tickets and Pakistani clothes for their trip to Quetta, Pakistan.

3. The detainee and his group stayed at a guest house in Quetta, Pakistan. The detainee and his group remained there for one or two days before traveling to Kandahar, Afghanistan.

4. The detainee stayed at a guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan before going to al Farouq with two others. The detainee stayed at al Farouq for one week before being transferred to Madafat Azzam al Arabi in Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee stayed there for two or three days before being taken to Camp Malik.

5. The detainee stated that he didn't get to finish his training because he was sick and returned to Kandahar, Afghanistan. Although the detainee wanted to go home, he was told he couldn't because it was too dangerous and the borders were closed.

6. The detainee returned to Kabul, Afghanistan when he realized the borders would not reopen. The detainee met the man in charge of the training camp in Kabul who said he could help the detainee finish the training.

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UNCLASSIFIED

000688

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SHAMMARI, ZIBN THAHIR ZIBN AL FADHILI

7. The detainee was wounded by the shellings after being in the camp for two days and was taken to a military hospital in Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee was captured at the hospital two days later and was imprisoned for four months before being turned over to the United States.

b. Training

1. The detainee trained at Camp Malik for one and a half months. The detainee trained two times a week on physical conditioning, Kalashnikovs, pistols, rocket-propelled grenades and Russian automatic Bekas.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was identified by a senior al Qaida operative.

d. Intent

1. The detainee stated that he went to Afghanistan to train for jihad. The detainee intends to fight for his brothers in Palestine if ever released from detention.

2. The detainee chose Palestine because his parents had always taught him that even though jihad is fought in many locations, the Palestinian cause should hold a special place in the hearts of all Muslims.

3. The detainee admitted to hating Americans and stated he desired to be released so he could return to Saudi Arabia to visit his family. The detainee would then travel on to Palestine to fight jihad against the Israelis.

4. The detainee stated that he does not care if he ever leaves the detention camp as he sees it as a form of martyrdom.

5. The detainee considers his interviewers to be infidels. The detainee stated that the interviewers were non-Muslims who represented George Bush and anyone who represents George Bush is an enemy of his.

6. The detainee stated that he was an enemy of the United States, the interviewers were his enemies and the victims of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks had probably received their punishment from God and gotten what they deserved.

7. The detainee told his interviewers that if he had the ability or access to a weapon that he would kill all Muslim non-believers and especially Americans due to their hatred of the Muslim people and the Quran.

UNCLASSIFIED

000689

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SHAMMARI, ZIBN THAHIR ZIBN AL FADHILI

8. The detainee stated that it is a religious, moral and political duty to prepare for jihad and to participate in one if he has the means to do so.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

The detainee did not appear to have any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

25 April 2006

TO: AL QAHTANI, JABIR HASAN MUHAMED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL QAHTANI, JABIR HASAN
MUHAMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. In March 2001 the detainee traveled from Saudi Arabia to Cairo, Egypt then flew from Cairo to Doha, Qatar and on to Lahore, Pakistan with his travel partly financed by the head of Al Wafa.

2. The detainee worked for the head of Al Wafa in an Al Wafa warehouse for 6 months in Lahore, Pakistan.

3. The detainee accepted an offer to work in the Kabul, Afghanistan Al Wafa warehouse for one month.

4. The detainee was paid 1000 United States Dollars a month to work for Al Wafa.

5. The detainee elected to stay in Kabul, Afghanistan after the Al Wafa warehouse had been closed due to fighting.

6. The detainee was identified as a fighter who preferred to spend most of his time lounging around the Azam guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan and other guest houses.

b. Training

The detainee depicts many counter-interrogation techniques attributed to al Qaida training and consistent with al Qaida members.

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c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was recruited by the head of Al Wafa to work for the Al Wafa charitable organization.

2. Al Wafa became a Specially Designated Global Terrorist entity on 24 September 2001 per Executive Order 13224.

d. Intent

The detainee was identified as the leader of the cell block, and has issued a fatwah on the United States.

e. Other Relevant Data

The detainee was captured by the Northern Alliance in mid-November 2001 (the 28th of Shaban 1422) and turned over to American forces 4 months later.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee claims he had no specific knowledge on who was receiving the supplies from the Al Wafa warehouses in Lahore, Pakistan or Kabul, Afghanistan.

b. The detainee stated he is thankful to the United States for saving his life by removing him from Afghanistan.

c. The detainee desires to return to Saudi Arabia, marry, work and visit his mother.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

10 May 2006

TO: ARKAN, MOHAMMED RAFIL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ARKAN, MOHAMMED RAFIL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee stayed at the Arabic House in Kabul, Afghanistan with 30 to 35 other fighters. He was given a Kalashnikov rifle and performed guard duties. He took orders from Abdel Aziz and Abu Hamza, who received their orders from Abdul al Hadi al Iraqi.
 2. The detainee was a weapons engineer on the front lines, repairing small arms for the Taliban.
 3. The detainee claimed that he was in charge of Usama bin Laden's weapons depots in Khandahar, Afghanistan and Kabul, Afghanistan from 1999 to 2000.
 4. The detainee was responsible for the storage of cash, weapons and ammunition for Usama bin Laden.
 5. A source reported that the detainee had control of the keys to the weapons storage container in Hadi al Iraqi's Gulam Bacha guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan.
 6. A source reported that the detainee trained soldiers in the tactics of entering a structure and arresting or detaining persons in the given structure.
 7. The detainee claimed he was an al Qaida member who worked for Usama bin Laden for 13 years conducting weapons maintenance.

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ISN 653

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ARKAN, MOHAMMED RAFIL

8. The detainee claimed he was a mechanical engineer for weapons within al Qaida. He claimed he went to London, England for al Qaida.

9. The detainee claimed that he was an expert in the areas of poisons, explosives, martial arts, and weapons. The detainee claimed to have carried out an operation in Kuwait in which he blew up a building he believed was being used by the Israelis.

10. A source reported that while in the Sarpooza prison, the detainee poisoned a seventy-year-old Afghan journalist who survived the poisoning.

11. The detainee had a training camp in Qarga, Afghanistan where poisons were taught.

12. A source reported that the detainee also boasted of kidnapping a Kuwaiti intelligence officer to gain the release of one of his comrades being held in a Kuwaiti prison. The detainee claimed to have taken up jihad in the Philippines, Chechnya and Bosnia.

13. The detainee claimed that he was an al Qaida member who ate frequently with Usama bin Laden. He also stated he had specific knowledge of the al Qaida organization and the attacks on the World Trade Center. He claimed he traveled to England, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Malaysia. The detainee claimed he was a third-degree black belt in Tai Kwon Do, which he learned while in Malaysia.

b. Training

1. While in the Iraqi Army, the detainee attended basic training and received training on the following weapons: AK-47 rifle, 7.62mm PK machine gun, and 82mm, 120mm and 160mm mortars.

2. The detainee received specialized training in poisons at al Farouq camp.

c. Connections/Associations

1. After deserting the Iraqi Army and being held by the Kurds, the detainee said he provided a fake last name of al Hashimi.

2. The detainee had a close relationship with an Iraqi Kurd known as Abu Bassam.

3. The detainee's kunya or nickname while serving on the front lines in late 1999 with the Taliban was Islam.

4. An al Qaida member identified the detainee as an al Qaida contact in Kabul, Afghanistan.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ARKAN, MOHAMMED RAFIL

5. A source reported that the detainee claimed to be an understudy of Sheik Abdallah Azzam.

6. Abdallah Azzam led a successful campaign to recruit rich young Saudis using a three-tape series he released in 1987. He called individuals to follow Usama bin Laden by imitating his devotion to Islamic Jihad, both physically and financially.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. Abdul Rahim Janko was tortured by al Qaida and eventually told them that he and the detainee were spies for the United States. The detainee was also tortured by al Qaida, but never admitted to being a spy.

2. The detainee was imprisoned for two years at Sarpooza prison. During Ramadan when the Taliban fell, the detainee was transferred to Kabul, Afghanistan and was imprisoned by the Northern Alliance for three months.

3. An individual captured by the Northern Alliance claimed the detainee was used by the Northern Alliance to torture him.

4. The Northern Alliance turned the detainee over to the Americans on 8 June 2002.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee claimed he was not a member of al Qaida, never swore bayat to Usama bin Laden, received no training or fought for al Qaida, and he was not an expert on poisons.

b. The detainee claimed his enemies have wrongly accused him of being an al Qaida member.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

13 September 2006

TO: ALGHAZAWY, ABDULLAH HAMID ABDALSALAM

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALGHAZAWY, ABDULLAH HAMID
ABDALSALAM

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he was imprisoned in Afghanistan because he entered Afghanistan with a fraudulent Iraqi passport.

2. The detainee traveled extensively between 1987 and 2001 to cities in Saudi Arabia, Malta, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Malaysia, Dubai, Sudan, Yemen, Egypt, Jordan, and the United Kingdom. The detainee requested asylum in the United Kingdom and Malta and attempted to immigrate to Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, and Norway.

3. The detainee was listed by the Libyan authorities as belonging to the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.

4. The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group is a foreign terrorist organization.

5. An al Qaida operative stated the detainee was a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.

6. A member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group stated the detainee took part in the fighting in Afghanistan.

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000696

ISN 654

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALGHAZAWY, ABDULLAH HAMID ABDALSALAM

7. The detainee stated that when he went to Afghanistan to attend training, he did not tell his family what he was going to do. Instead the detainee informed his family that he was going to Pakistan to look for gold and to check things out.

b. Training

1. The detainee stated he spent approximately one year on active duty with the Libyan Navy. According to the detainee, he attended basic training where he learned basic tasks such as firing a weapon and trained on small patrol boat operations.

2. The detainee stated he went to the Jaji and Sadah Training Camps.

3. The detainee stated that at the Sada Camp he received training on several different types of firearms including 6-mm and 8-mm pistols, a machine gun, and a Kalashnikov rifle.

4. The detainee identified the 7.62-mm RPK rifle as the weapon he trained on while at the Khalden Training Camp.

5. The detainee stated that after attending training in Sudda, Pakistan, he traveled to a camp in Khowst, Afghanistan. The detainee trained there for approximately 15 days, receiving training on an unnamed heavy machine gun and the Kalashnikov rifle.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated that he resided at a madafa in Pakistan where many people came to train before they went to the front lines of Afghanistan.

2. The detainee stated he stayed in the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group house in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, in 1997.

3. The detainee stated that he stayed at the Libyan madafa for approximately a total of five months from 1997 to 1998. While residing at this madafa, the detainee was shown a video of an attempted assassination of a Libyan leader. The detainee stated all of the residents of this madafa, except for himself, were members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.

4. The detainee stated that when he was in Pakistan there were many al Qaida members and that he met people from al Qaida.

5. A noted jihadist stated the detainee was a security leader for Usama bin Laden during a trip to a guest house in Afghanistan.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALGHAZAWY, ABDULLAH HAMID ABDALSALAM

6. An al Qaida operative stated he saw the detainee several times between 2000 and 2001 in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, and believed the detainee was in charge of a guest house for the Libyans.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee had a Casio F-91W watch in his possession at the time of apprehension.
2. The type of Casio watch the detainee had in his possession at the time of apprehension has been used in bombings that have been linked to al Qaida and radical Islamic terrorist groups with improvised explosive devices.
3. The detainee stated he is wanted in Libya for not complying with orders to serve again in the Navy.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee stated he is not a member of either al Qaida or the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.
 - b. The detainee stated he had gone to Pakistan originally to find work, not to fight as a jihadist. The detainee stated he did not fight at all in Afghanistan and that he did not have the will to fight.
 - c. The detainee denied receiving any terrorist training or being a fighter.
 - d. The detainee stated that in the total of 13 years in which he lived in Afghanistan, he never fired a single shot.
 - e. The detainee stated that he was pressured to train as a fighter, but he refused.
 - f. The detainee stated the only support he gave the jihad was to teach the children of the Mujahedin. For this, the detainee stated he received a salary, so it was not voluntary work for the jihad.
 - g. An al Qaida operative stated the detainee is not a member of al Qaida or of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.
 - h. The detainee claimed to have no prior knowledge of the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States. The detainee stated that if anyone knew of such attacks but failed to act to prevent them would be just as guilty as the perpetrators of the attack.

UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALGHAZAWY, ABDULLAH
HAMID ABDALSALAM**

i. The detainee stated that all religions teach peace and that killing innocents is not acceptable. The detainee stated that individuals and/or groups that engage in terrorism are not preaching real religion, they are merely distorting Islam.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.