

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

7 November 2005

TO: AL DAYI, OMAR SAID SALIM

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL DAYI, OMAR SAID SALIM

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Connections/Associations
 1. The detainee was given airline tickets and \$500 USD to travel from Yemen to Afghanistan.
 2. The detainee stayed in the "Daftar Taliban" in Quetta, Pakistan.
 3. The detainee stayed in safehouses in Kandahar and Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
 4. The detainee relocated from the Jalalabad, Afghanistan safehouse to one of the rear echelon camps in the Tora Bora region. The detainee was shown to his position by Abdul Quduz.
 5. The detainee was in the Tora Bora region for about a month before he was wounded in the leg by a missile fired at the caves.
 6. The detainee's name was included in a list of 324 Arabic names, aliases and nationalities recovered from raids on safehouses associated with suspected al Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan.

b. Detainee Actions and Statements

The detainee gave his \$500 USD to two others before he was taken to the hospital for treatment of his leg wound. He wanted to prevent the Afghan people from taking his money.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL DAYI, OMAR SAID SALIM

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

The detainee denies any desire to be part of the Palestinian Mujahideen.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

20 June 2005

To: AL SANI, FAHMI SALEM SAID

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SANI, FAHMI SALEM SAID

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee was encouraged to go to Afghanistan for training by his friend, Salam. Salam provided the detainee money for the bus trip from his home to Sana, Yemen.
 2. The detainee's travel from Sana, Yemen, to Afghanistan was facilitated by Muath.
 3. The detainee traveled from Yemen to Afghanistan via Pakistan in August 2001.
 4. The detainee was required to leave passport, money, and all other forms of identification at a guesthouse in Kandahar, Afghanistan, in return for a receipt of those inventoried items.
 5. The detainee remained in Afghanistan after hearing about the events of September 11, 2001.
 6. The detainee was assigned to augment Taliban and al Qaida forces already in defensive positions in Tora Bora, Afghanistan.
 7. The detainee was injured during a U.S. bombing campaign in Tora Bora, Afghanistan, in December 2001.
 - b. Training

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SANI, FAHMI SALEM SAID

1. The detainee completed military training at al Farouq.
2. The detainee received additional training at a camp located in a mountainous region very far from Kabul on the road towards Jalalabad.
3. The detainee received training on the Kalashnikov rifle.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee heard a speech from Usama Bin Laden (UBL) while at the al Farouq training camp.
2. The detainee saw Ayman Al-Zawahiri, who accompanied UBL on his visit to the al Farouq training camp.
3. Ayman Al-Zawahiri is believed to be UBL's advisor and policy maker.
4. The detainee saw Abu Gayth, who accompanied UBL on his visit to the al Farouq training camp.
5. Abu Gayth is the official spokesman for al Qaida.

d. Intent

1. The detainee stayed at the Al-Nibras guesthouse.
2. The Al-Nibras guesthouse is a known collection point for al Qaida recruits.

e. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee's name and information on his alias, nationality, passport, and personal belongings was found on a list of 324 suspected al Qaida members recovered from safehouse raids in Karachi, Pakistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. While at Guantanamo Bay, the detainee has very few citations, primarily for non-aggressive infractions including physical training, prayer, and eating in cell; talking with other detainees; and limited verbal assaults on guards.

b. The detainee stated his intention was to go to Afghanistan for a couple of months of training and then to return home. The detainee cited his inability to receive the mandatory military training in his own country as another reason he desired to receive the training.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SANI, FAHMI SALEM SAID**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

12 August 2005

TO: MUHAMMED, ABDUL MAJID

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MUHAMMED, ABDUL MAJID

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee worked for a time as a drug courier between Afghanistan and Iran.

2. The detainee had an Afghani person obtain a letter from the Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin allowing the detainee to cross the border from Iran to Afghanistan. The detainee paid 5,000 in Iranian money (NFI).

3. Hizb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) has long-established ties with Usama Bin Ladin. HIG founder Gulbuddin Hikmatyar offered to shelter Bin Ladin after the latter fled Sudan in 1996. HIG has staged small attacks in its attempt to force U.S. troops to withdraw from Afghanistan, overthrow the Afghan Transitional Administration (ATA), and establish a fundamentalist state.

b. Training

The detainee was in the Iranian army in the 3-4 years before he went to Afghanistan. While in the military he was trained in basic drill and the AK-47.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee has been diagnosed with severe borderline personality disorder.

b. The detainee answered no to questions about belonging to anti U.S. groups, attacking coalition forces, or plans to attack coalition forces if released.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MUHAMMED, ABDUL MAJID**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

28 June 2005

TO: BIN QUMU, ABU SUFIAN IBRAHIM AHMED HAMUDA

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BIN QUMU, ABU SUFIAN IBRAHIM
AHMED HAMUDA

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. In the Sudan, the detainee joined the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG).

2. The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) emerged in 1995 among Libyans who had fought against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. They declared the government of Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi un-Islamic and pledged to overthrow it. Some members maintain a strictly anti-Qadhafi focus and organize against Libyan Government interests, but others are aligned with Usama Bin Ladin's al Qaida organization or are active in the international mujahidin network.

3. An al Qaida/LIFG facilitator described the subject detainee as a noncommittal LIFG member who received no training.

4. A LIFG member stated the subject detainee used to be a member of the LIFG but he left. He had not heard that the detainee attended any military training.

b. Training

The detainee was in the Libyan Army from 1979 until 1990. He was a tank driver and left the army as a PFC.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BIN QUMU, ABU SUFIAN IBRAHIM AHMED HAMUDA

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee's alias was found on a document associated with Usama Bin Laden. The document stated the detainee worked for Bin Laden in Sudan.
2. In 2001, the detainee worked for Wafa in Afghanistan.
3. The nongovernmental organization "Wafa," officially named al Wafa al Igatha al Islamia (Wafa Humanitarian Organization) and headquartered in Saudi Arabia, was believed to have had connections to Usama Bin Laden and Afghan mujahidin.
4. The detainee met a senior al Qaida facilitator on between ten and twenty occasions.
5. The detainee was at a guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan run by Ibn al Shaykh al Libi.
6. Khalidoun Camp was supervised by Ibn Cheikh al-Libi. Training in the camp included rockets, explosives and destructive techniques.
7. The detainee's alias was found in a document titled "New Families" on a computer associated with an al Qaida financial operative.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee made two trips to Mazar-e-Sharif in September and October 2001 to deliver rice and equipment to dig wells.
 2. A foreign government considers the detainee a dangerous man with no qualms about committing terrorist acts. They believe he was one of the extremist commanders of the Afghan Arabs.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee stated he never delivered weapons, never fought, never went to a guest house and was never around weapons in Afghanistan.
 - b. The detainee stated he does not want to be sent back to Libya because of previous criminal charges related to the sale of hashish and escaping from prison. He stated he is willing to go to a country where "You (the United States) can watch me."
 - c. The detainee denied having any knowledge of terrorist activity and insisted that he only worked for Al Wafa as a means to feed his family. He stated he had no knowledge Al Wafa was involved in any illegal activity and, if he did know of such activity, he would not have worked for the organization.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF
BIN QUMU, ABU SUFIAN IBRAHIM AHMED HAMUDA**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

6 October 2005

TO: MOHAMMED, HAJI WALI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMMED, HAJI WALI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee admitted he was in business with the Taliban and worked with the Taliban because of the money. The detainee stated that his business relationship with the Taliban lasted approximately three months.

2. The detainee served as an intermediary for funds passed through the al Rasheed Trust.

3. The detainee was a moneymen for Usama Bin Laden from 1996 to 1997. The detainee conducted most of his money transactions at three money exchangers with offices in Dubai, United Arab Emirates and Pakistan National al Almas Exchange.

4. The detainee is allegedly involved in smuggling gold for al Qaida through the Peshawar Airport and admitted being in the gold business and having a currency exchange business in Peshawar, Pakistan.

5. The detainee did business with the Taliban Supreme Leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar, in April 2000. He had given the detainee one million United States dollars to manage.

6. The detainee purchased vehicles for the Taliban.

7. The detainee facilitated transfers and exchanges of funds from Usama Bin Laden controlled accounts for the purchase of surface-to-air missiles for al Qaida.

b. Connections/Associations

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMMED, HAJI WALI

1. The detainee is an associate of Usama Bin Laden.
2. The detainee is associated with senior members of the Taliban.
3. The detainee was closely affiliated with the Taliban and was considered to be very close to Taliban leaders Mullah Mohammad Rabbani and Mullah Mohammad Omar.
4. The detainee was working with a person who was a Jamaat Tabligh member from Pakistan.
5. The detainee was identified as being a wealthy Afghan moneychanger who was affiliated with the Hizbi Islami Gulbuddin.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was arrested by a Pakistani Police official in his house in Peshawar, Pakistan for being a suspected drug smuggler.
 2. The detainee was repaying his debts to the Taliban through installments and on two separate occasions the detainee paid for Taliban Vice President Mullah Mohammad Rabbani to travel, once to Dubai for cancer treatment and once to Saudi Arabia for the Hajj.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee claims that he never joined any other religious organization nor did he participate in the Hizbi Islami Gulbuddin after he departed to Pakistan.
 - b. The detainee adamantly stressed that his relationship with the Taliban was simply business and despite their business relationship, he never agreed with the manner in which they treated people.
 - c. The detainee insists he has not conducted business with the Taliban since 1996, which he explains was about the timeframe the Taliban started fighting with the Northern Alliance.
 - d. The detainee stated that he did not meet with Taliban government officials and did not attempt other business deals involving individuals or entities associated with Taliban.
 - e. The detainee claims that he had no knowledge of al Qaida prior to his arrest and never heard of the Taliban converting cash to gold or other commodities to earn a profit.
 - f. The detainee claims to have never conducted any currency exchanges or other financial transactions for Hekmatyr or any known associates of Hekmatyr.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMMED, HAJI WALI

g. The detainee stated that if released he would like to return to his former trade as a moneylender.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

7 July 2005

TO: PEERZAI, QARI HASAN ULLA

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF PEERZAI, QARI HASAN ULLA

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee was arrested in early February 2002 in the village of Kajacki in the Helmand Province.

2. The detainee was identified as Taliban and turned over to Americans by the two individuals for whom he worked.

3. When captured, the detainee was in possession of pocket litter containing a list of known Taliban.

4. Notebooks found on the detainee at the time of capture contain codes known to be used by the Taliban.

5. The detainee confirmed that he had two million Afghanis in his possession when arrested. He claims 600,000 came from his brother, 1,000,000 from his father and 400,000 were his own.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee tried on at least two occasions to get a job with the Taliban government.

2. The detainee worked as a clerk for Haji Mullah Sharif Adin, who was the Governor of the Tangi or Khajaki District.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF PEERZAI, QARI HASAN ULLA

3. Haji Sharif Adin worked for Taliban Intelligence Chief, Qari Hamid Ghul, during the Taliban rule.

4. Haji Sharif Adin was expected to attend a meeting at the home of Haji Ghul Agha. Agha is responsible for an explosion in front of the Kandahar Mayor's office in May 2002.

5. Agha and the Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin are suspected of planning several of the recent bombings in Kandahar and are planning to target U.S. personnel in the near future.

6. Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) has long established ties with bin Laden. HIG has staged small attacks in its attempt to force U.S. troops to withdraw from Afghanistan, overthrow the Afghan Transitional Administration, and establish a fundamentalist state.

7. The detainee had a working relationship with persons known by him to be associated with the Taliban.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee spent 9 years and 4 months in various Iranian prisons for possession of hashish, which he had been trafficking.

2. The detainee is extremely evasive and uses multiple resistance techniques. He was likely recruited by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) or the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), trained and returned to Afghanistan as a collector and for operational use.

3. Contacts with al Qaida were said to have been established through the Iranian Ministry Intelligence and Security (MOIS). All Iranian Intelligence Chiefs had contact with al Qaida as of the mid 1990's.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denies having any knowledge of the attacks in the U.S. prior to their execution and denies having any knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the U.S. or U.S. interests.

b. The detainee states that Usama bin Laden is responsible for his current incarceration and he would like to kill him if he could get his hands on him.

c. The detainee stated that the current idea of jihad is wrong. He believes that jihad is the spreading of Islam or preaching. Jihad is not brutality and killing.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF PEERZAI, QARI HASAN ULLA**

Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

10 November 2005

TO: QATTAA, MANSOOR MUHAMMED ALI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF QATTAA, MANSOOR MUHAMMED ALI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee attended a talk about military training in Afghanistan at a mosque in Taif, Saudi Arabia and later watched a military training video.
 2. The detainee left the kingdom of Saudi Arabia on the 15th day of the 4th month 1422 (approximately July 2001), traveling from Taif, Saudi Arabia to Sanna and Hayuddah, Yemen. The detainee then traveled to Karachi, Pakistan and on to Quetta, Pakistan.
 3. The detainee stayed briefly at a guesthouse in Quetta with others individuals who were interested in traveling to Afghanistan for jihad or training before continuing on to Kabul, Afghanistan.
 4. The detainee then traveled to Loghar and spent five weeks waiting in an abandoned "old school". After this time he was moved at night to a location that had trenches.
 - b. Other Relevant Data
 1. Late in November 2001, the detainee began to move back toward Pakistan. He stayed at a guide's house near the border for about three weeks, before making the journey to Karachi, Pakistan.
 2. The detainee spent three weeks in an unknown individual's house in Karachi before being arrested by Pakistani Police.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF QATTAA, MANSOOR MUHAMMED ALI

- a. The detainee denied having any prior knowledge of the 11 September 2001 attacks.
 - b. The detainee stated he had not heard of al Qaida until after the World Trade Center attack.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

22 September 2005

TO: BARRE, MOHAMMED SULAYMON
SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BARRE, MOHAMMED SULAYMON

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Connections/Associations
 1. The detainee worked for the Dahabshiil Company in Karachi, Pakistan.
 2. Dahabshiil is closely related to Al-Barakaat, a Somali financial company designated by the U.S. Government as a terrorism finance facilitator. Following Al-Barakaat's designation and shutdown, Dahabshiil took over much of Al-Barakaat's business.
 3. The detainee was identified as a member of the non-governmental organization al Wafa.
 4. The al Wafa organization has been identified as a terrorist organization on the U.S. State Department's Terrorist Exclusion List.
 5. The non-governmental organization al Wafa reportedly was believed to have had connections to Usama Bin Laden and Afghan Mujahidin.
 6. The detainee received a Tablighi Jamiat Visa to Pakistan.
 7. Jama'at Al Tablighi, a Pakistan based Islamic missionary organization that is being used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists, to include members of al Qaida.
 - b. Other Relevant Data
 1. The detainee ran an illegal money transfer business out of his home.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BARRE, MOHAMMED SULAYMON

2. Some of the detainee's counterparts in the United States did not have licenses. They were operating illegally, also out of their houses. In addition, there was reason to believe that the detainee had contact with people involved in the support network for al Qaida.

3. The detainee lied to obtain his three-month Pakistani Visa.

4. The detainee was captured after the Pakistani authorities had conducted three raids on his home and finally detained him for illegal money transfers.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he was never involved in an Islamic Militant group or knowingly transferred funds for their cause.

b. The detainee, during his oral CSRT statement, stated that he had no knowledge of al Wafa until he entered prison in Pakistan.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

25 October 2005

TO: AL SHARABI, ZUHAIL ABDO ANAM SAID

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW
BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SHARABI, ZUHAIL ABDO ANAM SAID

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee immigrated to Afghanistan in 1999 to train under Omar Al Libi at the Libyan camp near Kabul, Afghanistan.
 2. In approximately mid-February of 2000, the detainee stayed at a large, well known Taliban guesthouse in Quetta, Pakistan.
 3. In approximately February of 2000, the detainee stayed at the Arab guesthouse run by Abu Khaloud in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
 4. The detainee lived in the Al Ansar guesthouse located in the Karti Barwan neighborhood of Kabul, Afghanistan for fifteen months. He lived in another nearby guesthouse for eight months.
 5. In approximately February or March of 2000, the detainee stayed at the guesthouse located in the Karti Barwan section of Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee went back and forth from the frontline to the guesthouse.
 6. After the detainee was sent to the front lines to fight, he saw an associate who was in charge at the battlefield near Kandahar.
 7. The detainee was on the frontlines on 11 September 2001. He remained on the frontline until Kabul fell to the Northern Alliance and they retreated. The detainee and three Saudis drove from Kabul to Abu Khaloud's guesthouse in Kandahar.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SHARABI, ZUHAIL ABDO ANAM SAID

8. After the fall of Kabul, the detainee stayed at Abu Khaloud's guesthouse for about a week before going with an Afghan guide to Quetta, Pakistan. From Quetta, the detainee traveled to Karachi, Pakistan and was arrested at a safehouse.

b. Training

1. The detainee trained at a camp located near the Al Ansar guesthouse in Kabul, Afghanistan. The leader of the camp was Abu Omar Al-Libby.

2. The detainee completed 40 days of training that included physical fitness, self-defense, small weapons training on pistols and Kalashnikovs and geographic and topographic training.

3. A senior al Qaida operative identified the detainee as a participant in an elite training course at the Mes Aynak camp in Lowgar, Afghanistan, in 1999.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee traveled to Malaysia with a senior al Qaida operative. The detainee met him at the Arab guesthouse in the Karti Barwan section of Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee knew this individual for a year prior to traveling with him to Malaysia.

2. The senior al Qaida operative who traveled with the detainee to Malaysia is a close associate of Usama Bin Laden. He was known to be one of the closest persons in charge of Usama Bin Laden's security.

3. The detainee's trip to Malaysia with the senior al Qaida operative was directed by Usama Bin Laden for the purpose of collecting information on airport and aircraft security. The objective of fitting him (the senior al Qaida operative) with a prosthetic device was a cover for the trip.

4. While the detainee was in Malaysia, he stayed in a condominium with two individuals.

5. These two individuals have been identified as 11 September hijackers.

6. The detainee worked as a guard at the airport prior to 11 September 2001. The detainee was seen in the company of Usama Bin Laden and another senior al Qaida operative. The detainee is believed to be al Qaida because of his access to Usama Bin Laden.

7. In February 2001, the detainee attended a speech by Usama Bin Laden at a center for Arabs near Kabul, Afghanistan.

8. The detainee may have sworn bayat to Usama Bin Laden.

9. The detainee was identified as one of Usama Bin Laden's guards.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SHARABI, ZUHAIL ABDO ANAM SAID

10. The detainee was identified as one of Usama Bin Laden's drivers.
 11. The detainee's passport photo, identification card and flight coupon from Sana to Karachi were recovered during the arrest of a known Usama Bin Laden bodyguard. The detainee's documents were found with photos and documents of other Usama Bin Laden bodyguards.
 12. The detainee was identified as being at the Ashara guesthouse and closely associated with the individual in charge of the Ashara guesthouse and who also commanded on the front lines. This individual was known to be al Qaida and the detainee was suspected of being al Qaida.
 13. The senior al Qaida operative gave the detainee money to purchase an airline ticket to Yemen from Malaysia.
 14. The senior al Qaida operative gave the detainee money while they were in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Malaysia.
- d. Intent
- The detainee stated he went to Afghanistan to die as a martyr for God.
- e. Detainee Actions and Statements
1. The detainee acquired a false Yemeni passport in the name of Imad Muhamed Ali Said.
 2. The detainee wore Afghan clothing while traveling from Karachi to Afghanistan so as not to raise suspicion.
 3. The detainee stated he was willing to sign a statement saying he is a member of al Qaida and put his fingerprints and toe-prints on the document.
 4. The detainee stated he is in trouble for being a member of and associated with al Qaida.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee stated he has never sworn bayat to Usama Bin Laden.
 - b. The detainee stated that he never used his weapon or killed anyone.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

26 July 2005

TO: AL QURASHI, SABRI MOHAMMED EBRAHIM

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL QURASHI, SABRI MOHAMMED
EBRAHIM

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee traveled to Pakistan to purchase perfume for later resale, and to fulfill his religious Dawa.

2. The detainee traveled from Sanaa, Yemen to Karachi, Pakistan; then on to Quetta, Pakistan; Spin Boldok, Afghanistan and Kandahar, Afghanistan.

3. The detainee arrived in Afghanistan with \$3,000.00.

4. A senior al Qaida lieutenant recognized the detainee in a photograph. He saw the detainee in 2001 at a guesthouse on the frontlines in Afghanistan.

5. The detainee was identified as a mujahideen fighter.

6. After Kabul fell to the Northern Alliance, the detainee joined a group of about 100 Arabs in the mountain regions. More than half were armed with Kalishnikov weapons, and they were led by Abu Muhammad Al Musri.

b. Training

1. The detainee trained at the al-Farouq military training camp. He identified Abu Muhammad Al Musri as the leader of the camp.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL QURASHI, SABRI MOHAMMED EBRAHIM

2. The detainee stated he spent about three days learning to disassemble the Kalishnikov, and then trained on a different type of weapon, identified as a PK.

3. The detainee stayed at the al-Farouq camp for a total of about 45 days.

c. Connections/Associations

1. Abu Khaloud offered to assist the detainee with travel arrangements, but was unable to complete them due to the heightened state of alert in Pakistan.

2. Abu Khaloud has been identified as the manager for the Al Ansar guesthouse. He arranged for individuals to go train at the al-Farouq camp.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated that when he was arrested all of his property was taken from him, including his Casio watch.

2. The Casio digital watch was commonly given to al-Farouq attendees.

3. The Casio watch model F-91W has been used in bombings that have been linked to al Qaida and radical Islamic terrorist improvised explosive devices.

4. On 7 February 2002, the Pakistanis raided a Karachi safehouse and captured the detainee and approximately 15 other individuals.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he did not receive any weapons, explosives or terrorist training while at al-Farouq.

b. The detainee stated he did not know al-Farouq was an al Qaida training center until he later reached Kabul.

c. The detainee adamantly denies having been at al-Farouq.

d. The detainee stated he learned details about the al-Farouq camp from Khalid Dossieri, a Saudi who was staying at a guesthouse in Kabul, Afghanistan.

e. The detainee claimed the Pakistani authorities fed him the details he provided about the camp.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF
AL QURASHI, SABRI MOHAMMED EBRAHIM**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

24 June 2005

TO: AL WADY, HAMOUD ABDULLAH HAMOUD HASSAN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF
AL WADY, HAMOUD ABDULLAH HAMOUD HASSAN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan for jihad.
2. The detainee was recruited and his travel instructions to Afghanistan were facilitated by Abu Abdul Rahman at the Hayel Said Mosque in Adan, Yemen.
3. The detainee also had 2,000 USD of his own money saved for the trip.
4. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan from Yemen via Iran and Syria in early 2001.
5. The detainee served as an assistant officer at Kho Ajagir, the Northern Afghanistan Front.
6. The detainee has been identified as being part of a group of Yemenis that a foreign government service considered dangerous extremists that was still active in Sana'a in April 2002.

b. Training

1. The detainee stayed at the Said Center, a military post in the Bagram area, for 25 days.
2. The Said Center Training Camp was a Taliban-run training camp for Arab recruits in route to fight General Dotsam's soldiers to the north of Khonduz, Afghanistan. Training consisted of small arms familiarization and range qualification.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL WADY, HAMOUD ABDULLAH HAMOUD HASSAN

3. The detainee has been identified as an expert in using the SAM-7 missile systems.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stayed at multiple safehouses in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

2. The detainee couriered money to Herat on three occasions and was supposed to give the money to Abul Hannan, Deputy Governor of Herat.

3. A senior al Qaida operative identified the detainee as an al Qaida member who fled Afghanistan and stayed at the Khalid al-Pakistani Guest House in Pakistan.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee explained he had traveled to approximately 4 or 5 different countries throughout his life, which began when he left Yemen for Saudi Arabia with his father. Other countries the detainee visited are as follows: Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Turkey.

2. Besides traveling through Syria on his way to Afghanistan, the detainee made two other trips to Syria. On the second trip, he also traveled to Azberbaijan.

3. Detainee's overall behavior is generally compliant, but he has shown signs of aggression on occasions. Detainee threatened to kill a guard and he attempted to incite a riot.

4. The detainee was detained by Pakistani police with 6,000 USD, 2,700 Saudi Riyals, 6,000 Pakistani Rupees, a camera, and a new cellular phone.

5. In Yemen, the detainee owned a Kalashnikov rifle and knew how to use it.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee related he had never received any type of training in Afghanistan because it was well known that Yemeni citizens know how to use weapons. The detainee had sold the only weapon he owned prior to his marriage, because he needed the money.

b. The detainee was adamant about the fact that while in Afghanistan he did not fire any weapons, kill any people or fight in any way.

c. The detainee claimed he never fought the Americans.

d. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or its interests.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF
AL WADY, HAMOUD ABDULLAH HAMOUD HASSAN**

- e. The detainee never received permission from anyone to leave the front lines. He felt it was wrong to fight against his Muslim brothers so he returned to Kabul on his own.
- f. The detainee denied he is associated with al Qaida.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

12 July 2005

TO: HAMDOUN, ZAHAR OMAR HAMIS BIN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HAMDOUN, ZAHAR OMAR HAMIS
BIN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee decided to go to Afghanistan eight months after graduating high school. Abdu Salem, a parishioner at the Takwa Mosque, convinced him to go to Afghanistan for "dawa" (religious calling to teach Islam).
 2. Abdul Salem, a possible al Qaida or Taliban recruiter and travel facilitator, provided the detainee airline tickets and 50 U.S. dollars for his travel to Afghanistan.
 - b. Training
 1. The detainee attended Farouk camp for two to three months where he trained on the Kalishnikov (AK-47), M-16, pistols, PK, RPG, and hand grenades.
 2. The detainee was identified as a trainer at al Farouq who taught everything from basic weapons to explosives.
 - c. Connections/Associations
 1. While training at the camp, Usama Bin Ladin visited the camp to give a lecture.
 2. After training, the detainee claimed he stayed at an unidentified Arab house with Sheik abu Hassen.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HAMDOUN, ZAHAR OMAR HAMIS BIN

3. The detainee described Abu Hassan as Egyptian, six feet tall, 200 lbs and 40 years of age, with short black hair and a long beard.

4. Sheik Hassen, a high level al Qaida official at the al Qaida basic training course, is an Egyptian national, approximately six feet tall with medium build, white skin, black hair and a long black beard. Sheik Hassen came to ensure that the jihad was being taught properly.

5. In Karachi, the detainee stayed at an Arab guesthouse while waiting for Abu Aziz to arrange travel for the detainee.

6. Al Qaida operative Riyadh the Facilitator was well known in Karachi as Aziz. He assisted mujahaddin departing Pakistan.

7. Sixteen individuals resided in the Karachi house waiting for Aziz to get stamps or visas for their passports in order to get out of Pakistan. Pakistani security raided the Karachi safehouse on 7 February 2002. They captured Riyadh (Aziz) and 15 other individuals.

8. The detainee was part of the group arrested with Aziz.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. During a 14 July 2002 interview, the detainee, contrary to previous statements, claimed that he had never trained at any training camp, including al Farouq, and had never seen Usama Bin Laden in person.

2. The detainee stated that although there was a stamp for Jordan in his passport, he had never been to Jordan.

3. When captured, the detainee had his passport, a Koran, and \$1000 U.S. currency in his possession.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. When asked how he felt about Americans, the detainee stated just because someone is not a Muslim doesn't mean he won't treat them well.

b. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the U.S. prior to their execution on September 11th and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the U.S. or U.S. interests.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HAMDOUN, ZAHAR OMAR
HAMIS BIN**

unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

26 October 2005

TO: MARI, JAMAL MUHAMMAD ALAWI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MARI, JAMAL MUHAMMAD ALAWI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. In 1997 the detainee was hired to work at the al Haramayn office in Baku, Azerbaijan.
2. In 1998 the detainee was placed in charge of the al Haramayn office in Baku.

3. A foreign government agency identified the detainee as the al Haramayn director since August 1998. The agency stated the detainee also took part in high-level illegal activity. The agency reported that al Haramayn, in the guise of providing humanitarian assistance, disseminated propaganda of an extremist and separatist nature.

4. The detainee stated that he left al Haramayn in Baku in January or February 1999 and attempted to obtain a position at the al Haramayn office in Sanaa, Yemen.

5. An associate of the detainee from al Haramayn helped the detainee get a job with al Wafa. The detainee then moved to Karachi, Pakistan in May 2001.

6. In May 2001 the detainee traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan through Karachi and Quetta, Pakistan and Spin Balduk, Afghanistan. In Kandahar, the detainee visited the director of al Wafa for about two weeks while learning about the organization and what was expected of him.

7. At the beginning of June 2001, the detainee traveled from Kandahar to Karachi and opened the al Wafa office in Karachi. The detainee's office purchased medicine and supplies

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MARI, JAMAL MUHAMMAD
ALAWI**

and sent them to Afghanistan. The detainee was given a cell phone and was in daily contact with the director of al Wafa.

8. The detainee headed the al Wafa office in Karachi. This office was responsible for buying medical supplies and also facilitated travel of al Wafa personnel into Afghanistan.

9. The detainee was the only person with access to the al Wafa account at the Bank of the Emirates in Karachi.

10. The detainee rented a house in his name for the al Wafa organization in August 2001. The detainee used this rental as a base of operations.

11. The detainee relied heavily on the local Taliban office for storage space and access to office equipment. The detainee would forward supplies to Afghanistan from the Taliban office to avoid the official authorization required by the Pakistan Government.

12. The detainee stated that during the three months he worked for al Wafa in Pakistan, he handled several shipments of medical supplies and worked with the Taliban for the storage and shipping of supplies.

13. The detainee admitted the Taliban and al Wafa were connected to facilitate movement of supplies and food into Afghanistan.

14. While in Karachi, the detainee received boxes of records from the director of the al Wafa office in Kandahar. The boxes contained information regarding explosives and attack plans.

15. The detainee was arrested in his home by Pakistani officials on 23 September 2001. A suitcase with clothes and \$11,300 U.S. Dollars were found.

16. At the time of the detainee's arrest, several items were seized, including lists of chemicals and pharmaceuticals and handwritten notes regarding the characteristics of different military weapons, explosives and attack scenarios.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee disclosed that an al Qaida member contacted the al Wafa office in Karachi requesting assistance in purchasing medical equipment to set up a laboratory in Pakistan.

2. The detainee admitted that he knew two al Qaida members. One member was from Kuwait and worked for al Wafa. The other member sent his family to Kuwait just prior to 11 September 2001 and knew people in Jordan who were with Usama bin Laden.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MARI, JAMAL MUHAMMAD ALAWI

c. Detainee Actions and Statements

The detainee stated that he personally endorses the Chechnyan jihad.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee maintains that neither al Haramayn nor al Wafa was involved with funneling money to Mujahidin fighters or terrorist groups in either Chechnya or Afghanistan.

b. The detainee denied that al Wafa had any ties to al Qaida, Usama bin Laden or any other terrorist activities to his knowledge.

c. The detainee denied having any prior knowledge of the 11 September 2001 terror attacks and had not heard any information concerning the attacks.

d. The detainee stated he would not have been involved with al Wafa if he had known that it was connected to al Qaida.

e. The detainee denied having any military training or attending any training camps.

f. The detainee stated he was unaware if senior al Wafa members ever dealt directly with Taliban or al Qaida entities.

g. The detainee stated he had no knowledge of the transfer of money, weapons or commodities other than medical supplies to the Taliban or al Qaida.

h. The detainee did not believe that al Wafa would be associated with explosives and attack plans. The detainee believes the information seized from his office on explosives and attack plans was planted by Pakistani Intelligence.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

4 November 2005

TO: AL SUADI, ABDUL AZIZ ABDULLAH ALI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF
AL SUADI, ABDUL AZIZ ABDULLAH ALI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee attended a mosque in Yemen where he heard about jihad from a Sheikh. An individual urged him to go to Afghanistan to participate in a jihad against the Russians.

2. The detainee was urged to help with the jihad and he traveled to Afghanistan near the end of 2000.

3. The detainee traveled from Damascus, Syria, to Tehran, Iran to Mashaad, Iran to Tibatt, Iran and then to Kandahar, Afghanistan.

b. Training

1. In 1990-1991, the detainee completed basic training and served as a volunteer National Guardsman in the Yemen National Guard.

2. The detainee received training with the Rocket Propelled Grenade, AK-47, Pulemyot Kalashnikov and a weapon similar to the .50 caliber machine gun. The training took place between 1991-1992.

3. The detainee attended the explosives course at the al Farouq training camp in Afghanistan. After graduation, the detainee was chosen as an assistant to teach an explosives course at Tarnak farms.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SUADI, ABDUL AZIZ ABDULLAH ALI

c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was seen at a guest house in Kandahar during August 2001.
2. The detainee and the others were awaiting training while in Afghanistan. An operative stated that he assumed the detainee was traveling to Chechnya for jihad.
3. An operative saw the detainee in January 2002 at a guesthouse in Karachi, Pakistan where the detainee was eventually captured. The operative did not know exactly how the detainee traveled there from Afghanistan, but stated typically, a network of Pakistanis would bring them.
4. The detainee was in a Karachi guesthouse for approximately one month before his arrest. During that time, the Yemenis were waiting to travel home to Yemen. All the men had turned their cash, passports and identification over to al Qaida facilitators upon their arrival in Afghanistan, for safekeeping.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks prior their execution on 11 September 2001.
 - b. The detainee denied having any knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States.
 - c. The detainee denied any knowledge of bomb making or explosives instructors. The detainee claimed the entire notion of building a bomb out of homemade materials seemed very strange and foreign to him.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

7 October 2005

TO: KHAIRKHA, KHIRULLAH SAID WALI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHAIRKHA, KHIRULLAH SAID
WALI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee acted as the Pashto spokesman for the Taliban from 1994 to 1999.

2. The Taliban chose the detainee to become their spokesperson for BBC and Voice of America. As Taliban spokesperson, the detainee traveled to Chaman, Pakistan, Kandahar, Charasia County of Kabul, and Mazar-e-Sharif.

3. While serving as the Taliban spokesperson in Spin Buldak, Afghanistan, the detainee also served as county supervisor in that area.

4. The detainee is a former Taliban Interior Minister and was the commander of Taliban forces that took Mazar-e-Sharif in 1996.

5. The detainee worked as a Deputy Sheriff in Spin Buldak and knew of shipments of Taliban seized weapons from Mazar-e-Sharif to Khandahar.

6. The detainee was trusted by the Taliban to keep order in Herat and to send taxes collected back to Mullah Omar.

b. Training

The detainee received military training for a short period of time at Camp Marof, near Kandahar, when the detainee was in his teens.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHAIRKHA, KHIRULLAH SAID WALI

c. Connections/Associations

1. As Taliban spokesperson, the detainee met many influential Taliban leaders, such as Mullah Omar.
2. The detainee was known to have close ties to Usama Bin Laden.
3. In 1996, the detainee attended a meeting in Kandahar. Jihad fighters, Usama Bin Laden and his guest attended the meeting.
4. The detainee was appointed by the Taliban as Governor of Herat Province for a two-year period from about 1999 to 2001. The detainee's job was to improve relations between Iran and the Taliban government.
5. On 7 January 2000, the detainee and three other Taliban officials attended a meeting with Iranian and Hizbi Islami-Gulbuddin Hikmatyar faction officials. Present at the meeting were Afghan Hizbi Islami-Gulbuddin leader, Gulbuddin Hikmatyar and Ayman Al-Zawahiri. Topics of discussion included United States intervention in the region, restoration of peace in Afghanistan and strengthening the Taliban's ties with Iran government.
6. The detainee visited Mullah Omar for the funeral of Omar's brother, which was sometime in November 2000.
7. Mullah Omar approached the detainee prior to the 9/11/2001 attacks and voiced his distrust of Hamid Karzai and Omar's concerns over the detainee's relationship with Karzai.
8. In the fall of 2001, the detainee met with Mullah Omar for about 10 minutes, outside of Omar's house, across from the Kharq-e-Sharif shrine.
9. In November 2001, the detainee met with an Iranian diplomatic delegation. The Iranian government was prepared to offer anti-aircraft weapons to the Taliban for use against the United States and coalition forces operating in Afghanistan.
10. On 20 December 2001, the detainee met with Taliban leader Mullah Omar in the Rais-Baghra House in Baghran, Helmand Province.
11. When the Taliban lost control of the government, the detainee called Hamid Karzai for advice. The detainee met with one of Karzai's representatives and discussed the new government and the detainee's future safety.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHAIRKHWA, KHIRULLAH SAID WALI

12. In early 2002, the detainee stayed at the home of Haji Abdul Bari in Chaman, Pakistan. While staying at Bari's residence, the detainee met with Abdul Manan, the Governor of Kabul.

d. Intent

The detainee has encouraged other detainees to cause problems, including making noise, not eating, killing themselves, not showering, and pushing the door during a search.

e. Detainee Actions and Statements

1. In 1994, when the Taliban started their rise to power, the detainee traveled from Pakistan to Afghanistan and lived in Spin Boldak, Afghanistan.

2. In 1998, the detainee shipped weapons captured by the Taliban to Khandahar, Afghanistan.

3. After arriving in Herat as Governor, the detainee spent much of his time establishing himself as the premier narcotics trafficker in the region. The detainee purchased three walled compounds in Herat and transformed these compounds into large storage facilities for opium and vehicles that would be used in smuggling operations.

4. On 25 October 2001, the detainee provided money for troops and money for fuel purchases used to send 300 men from the Taliban 17th Army Division in Herat to Sabzak Pass in Badghis Province.

5. The detainee fought against the Northern Alliance and United States forces in November 2001.

6. Just prior to the day of his arrest, the detainee and his cousin crossed the Afghanistan/Pakistan border during the day on a motorcycle, in an effort to avoid Pakistani roadblocks checking for identification and obtaining tolls.

7. When bombing of Afghanistan started, the detainee traveled in a convoy of 10 vehicles to Arghastan. The vehicles were full of weapons.

8. In February 2002, the detainee traveled to Chaman, Pakistan.

9. During the second day in Pakistan, the detainee went for lunch to the home of Abdul Manan Niazi, the former Taliban Governor of Kabul, Afghanistan. Pakistani authorities arrested the detainee when they raided the house in a search for Niazi.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHAIRKHA, KHIRULLAH SAID WALI

- a. The detainee stated upon his return to Afghanistan, he will rest.
 - b. The detainee stated if the government is stable, he intends on being part of the government. He will grow crops and work at the bazaar.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

1 July 2005

TO: NOORI, ADEL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NOORI, ADEL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. Detainee is an ethnic Uighur wanted by the communist Chinese government for involvement in an uprising that took place in Southern Xinjiang province in 1990.

2. Detainee went to Afghanistan to train and return to fight Chinese oppression of ethnic Uighurs.

3. The detainee arrived at a safe house in Kabul on July 26, 2001.

4. When bombing began in Kabul, Afghanistan, the detainee sought refuge in Sara, Afghanistan and then traveled to Pakistan.

5. On January 15, 2002, the detainee and three other men, were arrested dressed in burkas (clothing worn by females), by Pakistani Police in Lahore, Pakistan.

b. Training

The detainee received training on an AK-47, a rifle and a Makarov pistol at the safe house.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee traveled to a Uighur safe house in Kabul, Afghanistan to receive training.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NOORI, ADEL

2. The Emir of the safe house was Hassan Mahsum, the leader of the East Tajikistan Islamic Party.

3. The detainee said that he was attempting to join the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM).

4. The Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) is designated an Other Foreign Terrorist Organization by the United States Department of Homeland Security.

5. Hassan Mahsum visited the safe house a few days after detainee arrived at the safe house in August 2001, and again at the onset of the United States bombing campaign in October 2001.

6. Hassan Maksoon (ph) oversees the operation of a small school in Kabul, Afghanistan, where groups of three Uighurs train in Islam and light weapons operations.

d. Intent

1. Detainee was encouraged to go to Afghanistan where training is available for fighting the Chinese government.

2. Detainee advised that the purpose of the training was to return to his home and fight the Chinese.

e. Other Relevant Data

1. When the detainee was arrested by Pakistani authorities, he told them he was Uzbeki to avoid being turned over to Chinese authorities.

2. The three men arrested wearing burkas along with the detainee were Manch and Ibrahim from Saudi Arabia, and Ibrahim from Morocco.

3. In 1990, detainee's friend Abdulhamid, was killed in an uprising known as the Baren War. The detainee had studied Martial Arts with Abdulhamid.

4. Detainee advised he was very good friends with Abdrahim Otkur, a famous Uighur author. Otkur was arrested by the Chinese during the Cultural Revolution and served time in Chinese prison.

5. The detainee met an American, through his friend Abdurehum Otkur, whom he knew as Dr. David Alim, a Physics professor at Xinjiang University, that reportedly speaks Uighur.

6. The detainee stated he knew Nurmamet Kenji, Chairman of a Bishkek committee known as "The Uighur Union".

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NOORI, ADEL

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. Upon release the detainee said he would like to be part of the action to defend the Uighur people and fight for human rights.

b. Detainee said he had no negative feelings toward the United States. He was never asked to participate in a Jihad against the United States while in Afghanistan. He said he would submit to a polygraph examination.

c. Detainee stated he would not fight against the United States even if his religion told him to.

d. Detainee acknowledges that if he returns to China he will face execution. He is very fearful that information about him will be passed to the Chinese government. He requests asylum in the United States.

e. Detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th, and also denied knowledge of any rumors of plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MARI, JAMAL MUHAMMAD ALAWI

c. Detainee Actions and Statements

The detainee stated that he personally endorses the Chechnyan jihad.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee maintains that neither al Haramayn nor al Wafa was involved with funneling money to Mujahidin fighters or terrorist groups in either Chechnya or Afghanistan.

b. The detainee denied that al Wafa had any ties to al Qaida, Usama bin Laden or any other terrorist activities to his knowledge.

c. The detainee denied having any prior knowledge of the 11 September 2001 terror attacks and had not heard any information concerning the attacks.

d. The detainee stated he would not have been involved with al Wafa if he had known that it was connected to al Qaida.

e. The detainee denied having any military training or attending any training camps.

f. The detainee stated he was unaware if senior al Wafa members ever dealt directly with Taliban or al Qaida entities.

g. The detainee stated he had no knowledge of the transfer of money, weapons or commodities other than medical supplies to the Taliban or al Qaida.

h. The detainee did not believe that al Wafa would be associated with explosives and attack plans. The detainee believes the information seized from his office on explosives and attack plans was planted by Pakistani Intelligence.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

4 November 2005

TO: AL SUADI, ABDUL AZIZ ABDULLAH ALI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF
AL SUADI, ABDUL AZIZ ABDULLAH ALI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee attended a mosque in Yemen where he heard about jihad from a Sheikh. An individual urged him to go to Afghanistan to participate in a jihad against the Russians.

2. The detainee was urged to help with the jihad and he traveled to Afghanistan near the end of 2000.

3. The detainee traveled from Damascus, Syria, to Tehran, Iran to Mashaad, Iran to Tibatt, Iran and then to Kandahar, Afghanistan.

b. Training

1. In 1990-1991, the detainee completed basic training and served as a volunteer National Guardsman in the Yemen National Guard.

2. The detainee received training with the Rocket Propelled Grenade, AK-47, Pulemyot Kalashnikov and a weapon similar to the .50 caliber machine gun. The training took place between 1991-1992.

3. The detainee attended the explosives course at the al Farouq training camp in Afghanistan. After graduation, the detainee was chosen as an assistant to teach an explosives course at Tarnak farms.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF
AL SUADI, ABDUL AZIZ ABDULLAH ALI**

c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was seen at a guest house in Kandahar during August 2001.
2. The detainee and the others were awaiting training while in Afghanistan. An operative stated that he assumed the detainee was traveling to Chechnya for jihad.
3. An operative saw the detainee in January 2002 at a guesthouse in Karachi, Pakistan where the detainee was eventually captured. The operative did not know exactly how the detainee traveled there from Afghanistan, but stated typically, a network of Pakistanis would bring them.
4. The detainee was in a Karachi guesthouse for approximately one month before his arrest. During that time, the Yemenis were waiting to travel home to Yemen. All the men had turned their cash, passports and identification over to al Qaida facilitators upon their arrival in Afghanistan, for safekeeping.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks prior their execution on 11 September 2001.
 - b. The detainee denied having any knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States.
 - c. The detainee denied any knowledge of bomb making or explosives instructors. The detainee claimed the entire notion of building a bomb out of homemade materials seemed very strange and foreign to him.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

7 October 2005

TO: KHAIRKHA, KHIRULLAH SAID WALI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHAIRKHA, KHIRULLAH SAID
WALI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee acted as the Pashto spokesman for the Taliban from 1994 to 1999.

2. The Taliban chose the detainee to become their spokesperson for BBC and Voice of America. As Taliban spokesperson, the detainee traveled to Chaman, Pakistan, Kandahar, Charasia County of Kabul, and Mazar-e-Sharif.

3. While serving as the Taliban spokesperson in Spin Buldak, Afghanistan, the detainee also served as county supervisor in that area.

4. The detainee is a former Taliban Interior Minister and was the commander of Taliban forces that took Mazar-e-Sharif in 1996.

5. The detainee worked as a Deputy Sheriff in Spin Buldak and knew of shipments of Taliban seized weapons from Mazar-e-Sharif to Khandahar.

6. The detainee was trusted by the Taliban to keep order in Herat and to send taxes collected back to Mullah Omar.

b. Training

The detainee received military training for a short period of time at Camp Marof, near Kandahar, when the detainee was in his teens.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHAIRKHA, KHIRULLAH SAID WALI

c. Connections/Associations

1. As Taliban spokesperson, the detainee met many influential Taliban leaders, such as Mullah Omar.
2. The detainee was known to have close ties to Usama Bin Laden.
3. In 1996, the detainee attended a meeting in Kandahar. Jihad fighters, Usama Bin Laden and his guest attended the meeting.
4. The detainee was appointed by the Taliban as Governor of Herat Province for a two-year period from about 1999 to 2001. The detainee's job was to improve relations between Iran and the Taliban government.
5. On 7 January 2000, the detainee and three other Taliban officials attended a meeting with Iranian and Hizbi Islami-Gulbuddin Hikmatyar faction officials. Present at the meeting were Afghan Hizbi Islami-Gulbuddin leader, Gulbuddin Hikmatyar and Ayman Al-Zawahiri. Topics of discussion included United States intervention in the region, restoration of peace in Afghanistan and strengthening the Taliban's ties with Iran government.
6. The detainee visited Mullah Omar for the funeral of Omar's brother, which was sometime in November 2000.
7. Mullah Omar approached the detainee prior to the 9/11/2001 attacks and voiced his distrust of Hamid Karzai and Omar's concerns over the detainee's relationship with Karzai.
8. In the fall of 2001, the detainee met with Mullah Omar for about 10 minutes, outside of Omar's house, across from the Kharq-e-Sharif shrine.
9. In November 2001, the detainee met with an Iranian diplomatic delegation. The Iranian government was prepared to offer anti-aircraft weapons to the Taliban for use against the United States and coalition forces operating in Afghanistan.
10. On 20 December 2001, the detainee met with Taliban leader Mullah Omar in the Rais-Baghra House in Baghran, Helmand Province.
11. When the Taliban lost control of the government, the detainee called Hamid Karzai for advice. The detainee met with one of Karzai's representatives and discussed the new government and the detainee's future safety.

UNCLASSIFIED

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHAIRKHA, KHIRULLAH SAID WALI

12. In early 2002, the detainee stayed at the home of Haji Abdul Bari in Chaman, Pakistan. While staying at Bari's residence, the detainee met with Abdul Manan, the Governor of Kabul.

d. Intent

The detainee has encouraged other detainees to cause problems, including making noise, not eating, killing themselves, not showering, and pushing the door during a search.

e. Detainee Actions and Statements

1. In 1994, when the Taliban started their rise to power, the detainee traveled from Pakistan to Afghanistan and lived in Spin Boldak, Afghanistan.

2. In 1998, the detainee shipped weapons captured by the Taliban to Khandahar, Afghanistan.

3. After arriving in Herat as Governor, the detainee spent much of his time establishing himself as the premier narcotics trafficker in the region. The detainee purchased three walled compounds in Herat and transformed these compounds into large storage facilities for opium and vehicles that would be used in smuggling operations.

4. On 25 October 2001, the detainee provided money for troops and money for fuel purchases used to send 300 men from the Taliban 17th Army Division in Herat to Sabzak Pass in Badghis Province.

5. The detainee fought against the Northern Alliance and United States forces in November 2001.

6. Just prior to the day of his arrest, the detainee and his cousin crossed the Afghanistan/Pakistan border during the day on a motorcycle, in an effort to avoid Pakistani roadblocks checking for identification and obtaining tolls.

7. When bombing of Afghanistan started, the detainee traveled in a convoy of 10 vehicles to Arghastan. The vehicles were full of weapons.

8. In February 2002, the detainee traveled to Chaman, Pakistan.

9. During the second day in Pakistan, the detainee went for lunch to the home of Abdul Manan Niazi, the former Taliban Governor of Kabul, Afghanistan. Pakistani authorities arrested the detainee when they raided the house in a search for Niazi.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHAIRKHA, KHIRULLAH SAID
WALI**

- a. The detainee stated upon his return to Afghanistan, he will rest.
 - b. The detainee stated if the government is stable, he intends on being part of the government. He will grow crops and work at the bazaar.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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**Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

1 July 2005

TO: NOORI, ADEL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NOORI, ADEL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. Detainee is an ethnic Uighur wanted by the communist Chinese government for involvement in an uprising that took place in Southern Xinjiang province in 1990.

2. Detainee went to Afghanistan to train and return to fight Chinese oppression of ethnic Uighurs.

3. The detainee arrived at a safe house in Kabul on July 26, 2001.

4. When bombing began in Kabul, Afghanistan, the detainee sought refuge in Sara, Afghanistan and then traveled to Pakistan.

5. On January 15, 2002, the detainee and three other men, were arrested dressed in burkas (clothing worn by females), by Pakistani Police in Lahore, Pakistan.

b. Training

The detainee received training on an AK-47, a rifle and a Makarov pistol at the safe house.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee traveled to a Uighur safe house in Kabul, Afghanistan to receive training.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NOORI, ADEL

2. The Emir of the safe house was Hassan Mahsum, the leader of the East Tajikistan Islamic Party.

3. The detainee said that he was attempting to join the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM).

4. The Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) is designated an Other Foreign Terrorist Organization by the United States Department of Homeland Security.

5. Hassan Mahsum visited the safe house a few days after detainee arrived at the safe house in August 2001, and again at the onset of the United States bombing campaign in October 2001.

6. Hassan Maksoon (ph) oversees the operation of a small school in Kabul, Afghanistan, where groups of three Uighurs train in Islam and light weapons operations.

d. Intent

1. Detainee was encouraged to go to Afghanistan where training is available for fighting the Chinese government.

2. Detainee advised that the purpose of the training was to return to his home and fight the Chinese.

e. Other Relevant Data

1. When the detainee was arrested by Pakistani authorities, he told them he was Uzbeki to avoid being turned over to Chinese authorities.

2. The three men arrested wearing burkas along with the detainee were Maneh and Ibrahim from Saudi Arabia, and Ibrahim from Morocco.

3. In 1990, detainee's friend Abdulhamid, was killed in an uprising known as the Baren War. The detainee had studied Martial Arts with Abdulhamid.

4. Detainee advised he was very good friends with Abdrahim Otkur, a famous Uighur author. Otkur was arrested by the Chinese during the Cultural Revolution and served time in Chinese prison.

5. The detainee met an American, through his friend Abdurehum Otkur, whom he knew as Dr. David Alim, a Physics professor at Xinjiang University, that reportedly speaks Uighur.

6. The detainee stated he knew Nurmamet Kenji, Chairman of a Bishkek committee known as "The Uighur Union".

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NOORI, ADEL

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. Upon release the detainee said he would like to be part of the action to defend the Uighur people and fight for human rights.

b. Detainee said he had no negative feelings toward the United States. He was never asked to participate in a Jihad against the United States while in Afghanistan. He said he would submit to a polygraph examination.

c. Detainee stated he would not fight against the United States even if his religion told him to.

d. Detainee acknowledges that if he returns to China he will face execution. He is very fearful that information about him will be passed to the Chinese government. He requests asylum in the United States.

e. Detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th, and also denied knowledge of any rumors of plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

18 July 2005

TO: AL TABI, MANA SHAMAN ALLABARDI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL TABI, MANA SHAMAN
ALLABARDI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. According to a foreign government service, during his teenage years the detainee was involved in criminal activity to include armed robberies of a private residence and a bank.
 2. Detainee entered the Saudi Arabian Army, and worked as a driver for three months. Detainee was released because the physical training was too intense.
 3. According to a foreign government service, the detainee went absent without leave from the military.
 4. Detainee went to a Jami'at al-Tabligh missionary school in Qatar to perform 40 days of missionary work. While there, he met Hamad Al-Ali, an emirati, who convinced the detainee to travel to Pakistan with him to do a five-month mission there.
 5. Detainee's travel from Abu Dhabi to Karachi, Pakistan was paid for and facilitated by the Tabligh.
 6. Jama'at Al-Tabligh is a Pakistan based Islamic missionary organization believed to be used as a cover for action by Islamic extremists, including members of al Qaida.
 7. Detainee used a false passport and donned women's clothing in order to circumvent the Pakistani checkpoints.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL TABI, MANA SHAMAN ALLABARDI

b. Connections/Associations

1. One of the individuals the detainee was arrested with was named Ibrahim Bin Shakaran.
2. Ibrahim Bin Shakran trained at the al Farouk training camp and fought on the Taliban front lines.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. Detainee was alleged to have met with suspicious individuals (NFI) and disappeared from Saudi Arabia, traveling to Bahrain on 25 August 2001.
 2. Detainee has repeatedly harassed and assaulted Guantanamo military police (spitting, throwing plates, water, rocks, and toilet water; slapping a plate of food; and pulling an MP's arm through the bean hole (food slot).
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. Detainee denies having ever been involved with any terrorist organization.
 - b. Detainee hopes someday to become an Imam, get married and have a family.
 - c. Detainee wants to return to Saudi Arabia and continue schooling and religious education.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

31 October 2005

TO: BATARFI, AYMAN SAEED ABDULLAH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BATARFI, AYMAN SAEED
ABDULLAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee traveled with a small group of friends from Pakistan to Afghanistan to fight against Soviet occupation forces. They crossed into Afghanistan on foot eventually arriving at the Khaldan camp. The detainee stayed at the camp for two to three weeks and then moved to the Hugay area in Afghanistan where he stayed for approximately one month.
 2. The Khaldan camp is a known al Qaida training facility near Kabul, Afghanistan.
 3. In the summer of 2000, the detainee decided to go to Chechnya to assist in a medical capacity. The detainee was advised he could get to Chechnya through Afghanistan. The detainee flew to Karachi and then to Lahore, Pakistan. He traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan with a group by crossing the border at Quetta, Pakistan. This trip was facilitated through the Taliban office.
 4. While in Kandahar in June 2000, the detainee stayed at a guesthouse.
 5. This guesthouse was run by a known al Qaida operative.
 6. The detainee tried to get to Chechnya again in May or June 2001.
 7. During a May 2001 trip to Afghanistan, the detainee traveled from Kandahar to Kabul and stayed in the Ghulam Bacha guesthouse for five or six days.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BATARFI, AYMAN SAEED ABDULLAH

8. The detainee believed the Ghulam Bacha guesthouse was supported by Usama bin Laden.

9. In May 2001 the detainee visited the director of the al Wafa office in Kabul to inquire about working there. The Kabul office director arranged for the detainee to meet with the al Wafa director in Kandahar.

10. Al Wafa is known to have provided financial and logistical support to al Qaida and the Taliban.

11. The detainee returned to Kandahar and agreed to travel to Karachi, Pakistan to assist al Wafa with medical purchases.

12. On the way to Karachi, the detainee stayed overnight at the Quetta Taliban guesthouse where he met an individual.

13. The individual the detainee met was an al Qaida facilitator.

14. The detainee claimed that al Wafa paid the cost of the airline ticket for his flight from Quetta to Karachi.

15. The detainee worked for al Wafa for approximately nine months in 2001. He soon held the position of medical advisor for al Wafa.

16. After the detainee learned that he was being sought by Pakistani intelligence, he left Lahore, Pakistan for Afghanistan on 10 November 2001, traveling through the tribal area of Gendab to avoid the main road.

17. Following his escape from Pakistan in 2001, the detainee worked with the head of the Jalalabad, Afghanistan clinic who had contact with the Taliban.

18. The detainee left the al Wafa clinic in Jalalabad during the bombing of the city and escaped to the mountains of Tora Bora.

19. At Tora Bora, the detainee told Usama bin Laden that he needed assistance to find a safe route to depart from Afghanistan and to secure medical equipment in Jalalabad that was in the hands of the Taliban.

20. The detainee carried a radio during his time in Tora Bora in November 2001.

21. Radios were given to those in charge of their area of operations in the al Qaida network in Afghanistan.

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22. The detainee carried a gun while he was in the Tora Bora region.

b. Training

1. The detainee trained with the Mujahidin in Afghanistan during the summer of 1988 for one and a half months. The detainee received training on the Kalashnikov and small anti-aircraft weaponry.

2. While in Afghanistan, the detainee trained with the Kalashnikov assault rifle and participated in at least two nighttime raids against Soviet outposts.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee followed his mentor to four hospitals and assisted him during surgeries at the mentor's private clinic in Lahore, Pakistan.

2. The detainee's mentor was a member of the Pakistan Islamic Medical Association. The detainee attended a Pakistan Islamic Medical Association meeting with his mentor in 1998 or 1999.

3. The detainee met the Taliban Minister of Health during his June 2001 trip to Afghanistan.

4. In mid-August 2001 the detainee met a Malaysian microbiologist in Kandahar at the Haji Habbash guesthouse. This microbiologist wanted to equip a lab and train the Afghans to test blood.

5. The same microbiologist was involved in developing anthrax for al Qaida.

6. When the detainee fled Pakistan, he traveled through Islamabad where he met with a friend who was a Yemeni merchant.

7. The Yemeni merchant was an al Qaida member who was in overall control over the movement of al Qaida fighters from Afghanistan through Pakistan to Iran.

8. The detainee saw Usama bin Laden four or five times in Afghanistan.

9. The detainee talked with Usama bin Laden on two separate occasions in Afghanistan.

10. During a meeting in the Tora Bora mountains on the 15th day of Ramadan in 2001, Usama bin Laden requested that the detainee help supply medicine to the Tora Bora region.

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11. The detainee's name was found in list of al Qaida martyrs, personnel missing in action and imprisoned brothers under the heading, "Names of brethren who are in the prison."

d. Intent

1. The detainee purchased half a kilogram of cyanide. The cyanide was among the many items stolen from a warehouse in Kabul and never recovered.

2. The detainee told another al Wafa volunteer to purchase four to five thousand United States Dollars worth of medical equipment for the Malaysian microbiologist.

3. Sometime after 11 September 2001, the detainee traveled to Herat where he bought three trucks to be used by al Wafa. The detainee paid \$15,000 United States Dollars for the trucks.

e. Other Relevant Data

The detainee stayed in the Tora Bora mountains until he was severely wounded. A group of Afghans took him to the Jalalabad Central Jail. The next day, he was taken to the hospital where he was treated for over four weeks, then returned to jail. The detainee asked to be turned over to United States Forces because he believed he would receive better treatment. On 27 January 2002 the detainee was taken to Bagram, Afghanistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of biological agents or ever having discussed biological agents with anyone.

b. The detainee stated he did not attend any training camps in Afghanistan, as he was a doctor not a fighter.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

18 October 2005

TO: AL SHAMAREE, ZABAN THAAHER ZABAN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SHAMAREE, ZABAN
THAAHER ZABAN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee believes that Islam is the only true religion. He advised he does not agree with the freedom of religion as practiced in the United States. He stated that it is a religious, moral and political duty to prepare for jihad and to participate in one if one has the means to do so. According to detainee, all true Muslims are aware of this obligation just as they are aware of their duty to pray. The detainee stated he went to Mecca, Saudi Arabia after high school to learn the Quran. He continued on from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia to Qatar and then to Karachi, Pakistan. He funded his entire trip with money his father left him when he passed away.

2. The Detainee was told that it was a religious obligation to prepare for war. The detainee was told that even though jihad is fought in many locations, the Palestinian cause should hold a special place in the hearts of all Muslims. When asked specifically if he stated that he went to Afghanistan to train for jihad and intends to fight for his brothers in Palestine if ever released from detention, he stated that that was true.

3. The detainee did not care if he ever went home nor does he care about being transferred to Camp Four. He would like to maintain his silence because it allowed him to stay true to his cause and any participation would be considered a compromise. He advised if he were to remain at Camp Delta it would be God's will and the fact he believes he is a martyr would bring comfort to him, knowing he would one day die and go to heaven. The detainee believes there are Muslims, more specifically family and friends, who would consider him a martyr.

b. Training

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SHAMAREE, ZABAN THAAHER ZABAN

The detainee went to Camp Farouq and stayed for one week. Camp Farouq was where all of the Arabs staying at a Kandahar guesthouse went to receive training. After leaving Camp Farouq, he spent one and one half months at Camp 9, also known as Camp Malik. He received training in physical fitness, the Kalashnikov, beka and the RPG. He identified several instructors that were present during the course of his training. He did not get to finish his training because he is epileptic and was having seizures. He returned to Kandahar, Afghanistan wanting to go home but was unable to because it was too dangerous and the borders were closed. He waited one to two weeks for the borders to reopen, they did not and he returned to Kabul, Afghanistan. There he then resumed his training at a camp near Kabul.

c. Connections/Associations

The detainee met an individual at the Mosque in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. He felt that this individual was evaluating his responses to discussions in order to gauge the detainee's interest in jihad. He gave this individual money, who then assisted him by facilitating the acquisition of a passport, necessary visas and airline reservations. After making contact with a facilitator, the detainee traveled with four other individuals to Afghanistan August 2001. He was identified by some of those individuals to be a prospective trainee for military training in a foreign country and they were taking him to Afghanistan. While traveling, the detainee stayed at several guesthouses.

d. Intent

The detainee advised that upon his return from detention, he would contemplate traveling to Palestine to assist the Palestinians with their fight against Israel.

e. Other Relevant Data

1. An individual at the Mosque in Mecca, Saudi Arabia prepared large feasts every Monday and Thursday and other men often joined him in breaking their fasts and the individual could be a very passionate and persuasive speaker. Although, the Detainee does not directly know of anyone else who was recruited he speculated that there were probably many.

2. After several days at one camp, the detainee was wounded by shelling and taken to the military hospital in Kabul, Afghanistan. He stayed in the hospital for several days when the Northern Alliance came and took him into custody, where the detainee stayed for approximately four months, before being turned over to United States Forces. Due to the nature of his injuries, he was transported, for a short stay, to a United States Field Hospital.

3. The detainee stated he did hear a tape saying Usama Bin Laden did the attack on the United States. He advised that he is unsure if Usama Bin Laden and his al Qaida network is responsible for the attacks on the United States. He believes UBL is a human being and refused

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to call him a terrorist. He believes UBL has religious physical features and he could be construed as a religious leader.

4. The detainee is at behavior level 4 and the reason for this is because he fought with guards when there was a revolt in the block sometime in 2003. He states that he likes Camp Delta and wants to stay here as long as God wills. He has no desire for a wife or to see his family again in Saudi Arabia. The detainee feels that he is even with the United States. That the United States provided treatment for his wounds and he provided information when initially captured. The detainee denied that he ever told interviewers that his initial story was a cover story and a lie. The detainee considered the interviewers Infidels and he made the following statements: he was an enemy of the United States, the interviewers were his enemies and the victims of the September 11th terrorist attacks had probably received their punishment from God and had gotten what they deserved. He further stated that the interviewers are non-Muslims and represent George Bush and anyone who represents George Bush is an enemy of his. He made a comment to the interviewers present that if he had the ability or access to a weapon that he would kill all Muslim non-believers and especially Americans due to their hatred of the Muslim people and the Quran.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee did not appear to have any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th.

b. The detainee claimed he did not hear of any plan to attack the United States in Kandahar.

c. The detainee stated that if given the opportunity to be released, he would return to Buraideh, Saudi Arabia and live with family members.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

24 June 2005

TO: AL QAHTANI, JABIR HASAN MUHAMED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL QAHTANI, JABIR HASAN
MUHAMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. In March 2001 the detainee traveled from Saudi Arabia to Cairo, and then flew from Cairo to Doha, Qatar, and on to Lahore, Pakistan, with his travel partly financed by Abdullah Almatrafi.

2. The detainee worked for Almatrafi in an Al Wafa warehouse for 6 months in Lahore, Pakistan.

3. Abdallah Al-Matrafi's organization had neither an office nor a warehouse in Lahore, Pakistan.

4. The detainee accepted an offer to work in the Kabul, Afghanistan Al Wafa warehouse for one month in the post September 11 timeframe.

5. The detainee elected to stay in Kabul after the Al Wafa warehouse had been closed due to fighting.

6. The detainee was identified as a fighter who preferred to spend most of his time lounging around the Azam Guesthouse in Kabul, and other guesthouses.

7. The detainee was captured by the Northern Alliance in mid-November 2001 (the 28th of Shaban 1422) and turned over to American forces four months later.

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b. Training

1. The detainee depicts many counter-interrogation techniques attributed to al Qaida training and consistent with al Qaida members.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was recruited by Abdullah Alamatrafi to work for the Al Wafa charitable organization.

2. Abdullah Alamatrafi identified himself to the detainee as the head of Al Wafa.

3. Abdullah Alamatrafi provided cover to smuggle Usama Bin Ladin operatives and supporters to Afghanistan. Al Wafa provided employment opportunities to individuals who are connected to the Usama Bin Ladin network.

4. Al Wafa became a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) entity on 24 Sep 2001 per Executive Order 13224.

5. Abdullah Alamatrafi provided military training conducted in Al-Wafa's offices in Kabul, Afghanistan, and consisted of familiarization with light weapons such as AK-47s and rocket propelled grenades.

d. Intent

1. The detainee was identified as the leader of the cellblock, and has issued a Fatwah on the United States.

e. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was paid \$1000 US dollars a month to work for Al Wafa.

2. The accountant in charge of Al Wafa's Kabul office was paid \$350 US dollars per month, and the director of Al Wafa was paid \$600 US dollars per month, but only when his family was visiting in Afghanistan.

3. The detainee was captured with 16 \$100 US dollar bills.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee claims he had no specific knowledge on who was receiving the supplies from the Al Wafa Lahore, Pakistan or Kabul, Afghanistan warehouses.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
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MUHAMED**

b. The detainee stated he is thankful to the United States for saving his life by removing him from Afghanistan.

c. The detainee desires to return to Saudi Arabia, marry, work and visit his mother.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

19 October 2005

TO: KABIR, USAMA HASSAN AHMED ABU

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KABIR, USAMA HASSAN AHMED ABU

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee joined the Tablighi group in Jordan in 1998 and went to Pakistan for the yearly Tablighi Committee meeting in November 2000.
 2. The detainee traveled to Karachi, Pakistan in October 2001 to preach Tablighi beliefs and to attend the annual Jama'at Tablighi Conference in Raiwind, Pakistan.
 3. The detainee remained in Pakistan for nearly five weeks and stayed at various mosques.
 4. The detainee received a flyer with a fatwa written on it while outside of the Makki Mosque in Pakistan. The fatwa encouraged Muslims to join the jihad in Afghanistan.
 5. A Tablighi member facilitated the detainee's illegal travel to Afghanistan. The detainee traveled with the facilitator and another Tablighi member, who was from Singapore. They traveled to Afghanistan via Karachi, Peshawar, Khowst and finally Kabul. The detainee and the individual from Singapore continued on to a checkpoint outside of Jalalabad.
 6. The detainee was the subject of a television interview dated 25 November 2001, while he was a prisoner in Kabul, Afghanistan. During the interview, the detainee stated that he supported and provided aid for the Afghans in the jihad.

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b. Training

1. The detainee was in the Jordanian military for 18 months beginning in March 1991.
2. The detainee was trained with a M-16 rifle.
3. The detainee and his travel companion demonstrated they were proficient in handling weapons. They requested and were sent to the front lines to fight.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee and his travel companion set up an ambush on Northern Alliance fighters.
2. The detainee and his travel companion from Singapore were arrested near Jalalabad on 22 November 2001.
3. The detainee was captured with a digital Casio watch.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee claims he will not answer another call to jihad and regrets going in the first place.
 - b. The detainee wants to return to Jordan to his job and raise his children. He felt he was deceived by the people who encouraged him to travel to Afghanistan for the jihad because they did not reveal the bad things the Taliban and al Qaida were involved with.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

3 June 2005

TO: AL QAHTANI, ABDULLAH HAMID

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL QAHTANI, ABDULLAH HAMID

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee departed Saudi Arabia in February 2001 and arrived in Afghanistan in August 2001 via Pakistan.

2. Prior to being turned over to U.S. forces, the detainee had \$5000 in his possession. The detainee claims that the Afghan troops, which beat him and his cousin, seized \$3000 and did not find the other \$2000 hidden in his clothes.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee worked for al Wafa in its offices in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

2. The detainee was recruited to work for al Wafa in Afghanistan by the leader of al Wafa.

3. The same al Wafa leader who recruited the detainee paid for the detainee's travel to Pakistan.

4. The same al Wafa leader who recruited the detainee and the detainee's father had been employed together in Saudi Arabia.

5. The same al Wafa leader who recruited the detainee has close ties to Usama Bin Laden.

6. Al Wafa is listed on the U.S. State Department's Terrorist Exclusion list, which identifies it as an organization that has been found to either commit, or incite to commit, a

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terrorist activity; prepare or plan a terrorist activity; gather information on potential targets for terrorist activity; or provide material support to further terrorist activity.

7. Al Wafa activities in Afghanistan include the purchase of weapons and chemical warfare equipment, suspicious money transactions, providing a cover to smuggle Usama Bin Laden operatives and sympathizers to Afghanistan, knowledge of a possible pending attack against American interests, and providing employment opportunity and cover to Usama Bin Laden connecting operatives.

8. In anticipation of the American attack, military training on AK-47's and rocket-propelled grenades was provided in al Wafa's Kabul offices.

9. The detainee traveled to Pakistan and Afghanistan with his cousin.

10. The detainee and his cousin worked with Mohammed Agha.

11. Mohammed Agha was the liaison between the al Wafa Organization and the Taliban Government.

12. The detainee's cousin has issued a Fatwah against the United States.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was offered \$800 to \$1,000 per month to work for al Wafa.

2. Detainee claims his Afghan captors took his passport.

3. Detainee had a roll of 20 \$100 USD dollar bills when turned over to U.S. Forces.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee said the only reason he went to Afghanistan was to pick up money owed to him by a senior al Wafa principal.

b. During his employment at al Wafa, the detainee was never asked to nor did he handle weapons of any kind.

c. The detainee had no knowledge that the employees at the Lahore or Kabul al Wafa warehouses were associated with al Qaida or the Taliban. He never observed weapons in the Lahore warehouse.

d. The detainee has an extreme dislike of the Taliban and al Qaida. He believes they are the cause of his current detention, and that Usama Bin Laden is no different than a common criminal. The detainee would not consider supporting Usama Bin Laden or his distorted causes.

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e. Neither the detainee, nor anyone he knows, had prior knowledge of the September 11, 2001 attacks or knowledge of future attacks against the United States or its interests.

f. The detainee does not blame the United States Government for detaining people as the result of the attacks on America. He is grateful toward the United States, which he believes saved his life after he was captured by the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan.

g. The detainee intends to marry and seek employment upon his return to Saudi Arabia. He would not return to Pakistan or Afghanistan.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

23 August 2005

TO: AL KARIM, ARKAN MOHAMMAD GHAFIL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL KARIM, ARKAN MOHAMMAD
GHAFIL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stayed at the "Arabic House" in Kabul with 30-35 other fighters. He was given a Kalashnikov rifle and performed guard duties. He took orders from Abdel Aziz and Abu Hamza, who received their orders from Abdul al Hadi al Iraqi.

2. Abdul Hadi al Iraqi was a member of al Qaida and part of Usama Bin Laden's inner circle. He commanded 200 Arab and Taliban fighters in Kabul, and was also responsible for sending Arab fighters to Chechnya.

3. In 1999, the detainee fought on the front line north of Kabul with an Arab unit for approximately 3-1/2 months. The Taliban supported this unit with food, drinks, ammunition and a truck. Al Qaida supported the fighters by providing logistical support and access to the Walam Bacha safe house in Kabul for rest and relaxation.

4. The detainee was a weapons engineer on the front lines, repairing small arms for the Taliban.

5. The detainee was in charge of Usama Bin Laden's weapon depots in Kandahar and Kabul from 1999-2000.

6. The detainee was responsible for the storage of cash, weapons and ammunition for Usama Bin Laden.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL KARIM, ARKAN MOHAMMAD GHAFIL

7. The detainee had control of the keys to the weapons storage container at the Gulam Bacha guesthouse in Kabul. The detainee was also a trainer of soldiers in the tactics of entering a structure and arresting or detaining persons in the given structure.

8. The detainee claimed he was an al Qaida member who worked for Usama Bin Laden for 13 years conducting weapons maintenance.

9. The detainee claimed he was an expert in the areas of poisons, explosives, martial arts and weapons. The detainee claimed to have carried out an operation in Kuwait in which he blew up a building he believed was being used by the Israelis. He also boasted of kidnapping a Kuwaiti Intelligence Officer to gain the release of one of his comrades being held in a Kuwaiti prison. The detainee claimed to have taken up jihad in the Philippines, Chechnya and Bosnia.

10. The detainee claimed he was a mechanical engineer for weapons within al Qaida. He claimed he went to London for al Qaida.

11. The detainee claimed he was an al Qaida member who ate frequently with Usama Bin Laden. He also stated he had specific knowledge of the al Qaida organization and the attacks on the World Trade Center. He claimed he traveled to England, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Malaysia. The detainee claimed he was a third-degree black belt in Tai Kwon Do, which he learned while in Malaysia.

b. Training

1. While in the Iraqi Army, the detainee received training on the following weapons: AK-47 rifle, 7.62mm PK machine gun, and 82mm, 120mm, and 160mm mortars.

2. The detainee received specialized training in poisons at the al Farouq camp.

c. Connections/Associations

1. After fleeing the Iraqi Army and being held by the Kurds, the detainee said he provided a fake last name of Al Hashimi.

2. The detainee's kunya (nickname) was Islam.

3. Islam Abdul Rahman Al Hashimi is a known al Qaida member and chemical specialist. One of Al Hashimi's associates is Abu Bassam, an Iraqi businessman who supported Al Hashimi financially.

4. The detainee had a close relationship with an Iraqi Kurd known as Abu Bassam.

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5. Abu Bassam was a member of Usama Bin Laden's inner circle. He met frequently with al Qaida members and Bin Laden, and knew about the 11 September 2001 attack on the United States prior to its occurrence.

6. An al Qaida member identified the detainee as an al Qaida contact in Kabul.

7. The detainee claimed to be an understudy of Sheik Abdullah Azzam.

8. Abdallah Azzam led a successful campaign to recruit rich young Saudis using a three-tape series he released in 1987. He called individuals to follow Usama Bin Laden by imitating his devotion to Islamic jihad, both physically and financially.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. Abdul Rahim Janko was tortured by al Qaida and eventually told them he and the detainee were spies for the United States. The detainee was also tortured by al Qaida, but never admitted to being a spy.

2. The Taliban imprisoned the detainee for two years at Sarpooza prison. During Ramadan when the Taliban fell, the detainee was transferred to Kabul and was imprisoned for three months.

3. The Northern Alliance turned the detainee over to the Americans on 8 June 2002.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee claimed he was not a member of al Qaida, never swore bayat to Usama Bin Laden, received no training or fought for al Qaida, and he was not an expert on poisons.

b. The detainee believes his enemies have wrongly accused him of being an al Qaida member.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

17 October 2005

TO: AL GHAZZAWI, ABDEL HAMID IBN ABDUSSALEM IBN MIFTAH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF
AL GHAZZAWI, ABDEL HAMID IBN ABDUSSALEM IBN MIFTAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee is of the Wahhabi Islamic sect.

2. While in Saudi Arabia for Umra the detainee learned of the plight of the Afghan people in their war with the Soviet Union. He returned to Libya and was encouraged to go to Afghanistan to fight with the Mujahideen. The detainee moved to Pakistan to take up the "Afghan case."

b. Training

1. The detainee completed basic training and served in the Libyan Navy. He completed small arms training and received training in small patrol boat operations

2. The detainee studied meteorology through a training program in the Philippines.

3. The detainee worked at a weather station in Libya.

4. The detainee attended the Sada training camp. He was trained on the Kalashnikov rifle, 6 and 8 mm pistols and other types of firearms including a machine gun.

5. The detainee attended the Khalden training camp in Khowst, Afghanistan in 1989.

6. The detainee was trained to fire the 7.62 mm RPK rifle at the Khalden training camp.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL GHAZZAWI, ABDEL HAMID IBN ABDUSSALEM IBN MIFTAH

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stayed at the Madafa al-Ansar, a guesthouse that served many men heading to the front lines in Afghanistan.
2. The detainee knew Ibn Sheikh al Libi in Peshawar.
3. Ibn Sheikh al Libi was associated with the Khalden training camp.
4. The detainee admitted to being friends with a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and saw various members staying at the Babi Guesthouse.
5. At times throughout 1995-2001 the detainee stayed at the Jafar al-Jazeri Jalalabad guesthouse, a suspected Libyan Islamic Fighting Group guesthouse.
6. The detainee resided at the Libyan Madafa in Jalalabad, Afghanistan for a total of approximately five months spread over the course of a year in 1997-1998. While there he met many members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group who stayed there also.
7. The detainee was identified as a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group by a senior al Qaida member.
8. The detainee was identified as a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group by a foreign government agency.
9. The Islamic Fighting Group has been identified as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.
10. The detainee resided next door to members of the Northern Alliance in Kona, Afghanistan.
11. The detainee was reported to serve as Usama Bin Laden's bodyguard and security detail at the Nibras guesthouse in 2001.
12. When asked a direct question about knowing any al Qaida, the detainee stated he had met Abdul Abdullah in Jalalabad.
13. The detainee met members of al Qaida. He stated there were many al Qaida members in Pakistan.
14. The Khalden training camp was managed by a senior al Qaida.

d. Detainee Actions and Statements

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL GHAZZAWI, ABDEL HAMID IBN ABDUSSALEM IBN MIFTAH

1. The detainee did not tell his family what he was going to do when he went to Afghanistan to attend the training camp.
 2. The detainee passed verbal messages as he traveled throughout Afghanistan from guesthouse to guesthouse.
 3. The detainee entered Afghanistan with a fraudulent Iraqi passport.
 4. The detainee does not think it is a problem to travel with bad documents so long as one doesn't intend to hurt people.
 5. The detainee admitted to lying to interviewers in Bagram.
- e. Other Relevant Data
1. The detainee speaks Arabic and a little English, Pashtu and Farsi.
 2. The detainee was armed with an AK-47, three additional magazines and two grenades while serving as Usama Bin Laden's bodyguard at the Nibras guesthouse.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee claims that most of his extensive travels were as a tourist.
 - b. The detainee stated he always used his true name to travel, even when he used an Iraqi passport while traveling from the Sudan to Yemen.
 - c. The detainee stated he did not fight in Afghanistan and did not have the will to fight.
 - d. The detainee stated that in the total of thirteen years he lived in Afghanistan, he never fired a single shot.
 - e. The detainee stated he is not a member of either al Qaida or the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.
 - f. The detainee stated he never supported any terrorist organization and never trained at any camps for jihad.
 - g. The detainee stated he attended the Khaldan training camp out of obligation rather than desire.
 - h. The detainee claimed to not know that Ibn Sheikh al Libi was associated with the Khaldan training camp until after al Libi was arrested.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF
AL GHAZZAWI, ABDEL HAMID IBN ABDUSSALEM IBN MIFTAH**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

11 July 2005

TO: DAD, KHUDAI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF DAD, KHUDAI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee, who places himself in his late forties, states he has a brother, Zainullah, who is twelve years old.

2. Zainullah is the name of a 35-year-old Taliban facilitator, who is suspected of conducting bombings and utilizing improvised explosive devices against U.S. Forces and the International Community of the Red Cross.

3. The detainee said he lived in Taryitmak Village, Deh Rawud District, Oruzgan Province in Afghanistan. He said there were three houses in his village. The detainee lived in one house and his cousin Abdul Khaliq owned the other two.

4. Zainullah's associate in Deh Rawood District, Oruzgan Province was Abdul Khaliq.

5. Mullah Zainullah is the former Taliban district chief of Deh Rawud Village in Oruzgan Province. He is a known associate of Taliban commanders, including Mullah Mohammed Omar, the Taliban Supreme commander.

b. Other Relevant Data

1. On 12 April 2002, the detainee was captured by American forces at a compound utilized by Mullah Berader.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF DAD, KHUDAI

2. Mullah Berader is a Taliban Commander who, along with another senior Taliban facilitator, plotted to kill the current Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the U.S. prior to their execution on September 11. He also denied knowledge of any future attacks on the U.S. or its interests.

b. The detainee has never been a member of any terrorist or mujahadin organization.

c. The detainee is a migrant farmer with no military experience.

d. According to the detainee, approximately 10 months before he was captured, the Taliban came to his village and attempted to recruit him to fight for the Taliban. When the detainee refused, he was tied up and beaten.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

29 August 2005

TO: ABDENOUR, SAMEUR

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDENOUR, SAMEUR

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee fought in Bosnia in 1995.

2. The detainee traveled from Tunisia to the United Kingdom via Italy, passing through Rome, Naples, and Sicily.

3. In the summer of 2001, the detainee traveled to Jalalabad, Afghanistan where he stayed at a Algerian guesthouse.

4. The detainee traveled from London, United Kingdom to Islamabad, Pakistan and then was escorted to Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

5. The detainee volunteered to go see the Al Farouq camp. While visiting Al Farouq, attempts were made to recruit the detainee and other visitors.

6. Upon hearing that the Taliban were fleeing, detainee set out with about 150 others towards the mountains of the Afghanistan and Pakistan borders.

b. Training

1. The detainee received weapons training during his time in the military.

2. While at the Algerian guesthouse the detainee was trained on small arms.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDENOUR, SAMEUR

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee traveled to the United Kingdom. There he became involved with other Algerians.
2. While at the Finsbury Park Mosque, four individuals attempted to recruit the detainee to go to Afghanistan.
3. The detainee gave money to the Finsbury Park Mosque. He later found out that part of the money went to fund individuals going to Afghanistan and other areas of the world where Jihad was being fought.
4. The detainee was eventually told that he "needed to go to Afghanistan".
5. The detainee socialized with four men at the Algerian house. Two died in the bombing of Afghanistan and two died at the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

d. Intent

1. The detainee was intentionally deceptive during questioning.
2. The detainee has recounted the details of his travel from Algeria to Italy, including his purchase of a fake identification.

e. Other Relevant Data

1. In 1992, the detainee served in the military. The detainee deserted the Algerian military.
2. The detainee deserted the Algerian military because of bad food and poor treatment. He also resented being sent to the front lines to fight Mujahideen. He disliked fighting Mujahideen.
3. The detainee acknowledged having been told that something would happen to the United States within one week of the September 11th attacks.
4. The detainee, at a later time, when asked to discuss his time at Al Farouq, stated it was "one of the lies". He had never been to Al Farouq.
5. The detainee is a strong supporter of the Al-Jibhat Al-Islamia Al-Inqatha, elsewhere referred to as the Islamic Liberation Front (ILF). Though not a member himself, the detainee supports the group. He loves the ILF because of its opposition to the Algerian government, which is largely corrupt.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDENOUR, SAMEUR

6. The detainee fled to cross the border into Pakistan, but was captured by the Pakistani Army.

7. As he and others were transported from the scene of arrest, there was a bus accident. The detainee escaped, but was recaptured.

8. The detainee denied ever having been to Bosnia. He admitted saying this in the past and that it was a lie.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee does not like the Algerian government as it has become corrupt, with mafia style leadership.

b. The detainee left Algeria because he hated the country. He denied going to fight jihad and denied being a member of al Qaida.

c. The detainee knows nothing of Usama Bin Laden or any ties between ILF and the al Qaida or Taliban.

d. The detainee denies knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

e. The detainee has stated that if the "United States is killing innocent civilians like we are told, that is not right, but if they are just fighting with the Taliban and other armed groups, I do not have a problem because I am not part of any of it".

f. The detainee does not feel that the United States is a threat to Islam as a religion, just to groups that use Islam as a reason to fight against the United States. He does not agree with using religion as a reason to fight because that is not what Islam is about.

g. The detainee was queried regarding any knowledge or planning of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo Detention Facility, with negative results.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

8 June 2005

To: UWAYDAH, RASHID AWAD RASHID AL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF UWAYDAH, RASHID AWAD RASHID
AL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

The detainee voluntarily traveled from Saudi Arabia to Pakistan in June or July 2001.

b. Connections/Associations

1. A list containing the detainee's name was found on a floppy disk recovered from the raid of an al Qaida residence in Pakistan.

2. The detainee's name is on a list of 'trust' accounts of al Qaida Mujahideen found during raids against al Qaida safe houses in Pakistan.

3. The detainee's name is on a list of names, aliases and nationalities recovered during raids of suspected al Qaida safe houses in Pakistan.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee traveled to Pakistan to escape possible arrest by Saudi authorities for drug dealing. In Pakistan, he attempted to acquire drugs for resale in Saudi Arabia.

2. The detainee was arrested in Islamabad, Pakistan with several Libyans who were helping Arabs get out of Pakistan.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF UWAYDAH, RASHID AWAD RASHID AL

3. The detainee stated he is not a terrorist; however, he believes Americans are enemies of God. The detainee explained that because the Koran states Americans are infidels, all fighting against them is justified.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee was identified by a delegation from his country of origin as being of low intelligence or law enforcement value to the U.S. and unlikely to pose a terrorist threat to the U.S. or its interests. Further, the delegation indicated the government it represented would be willing to take custody of the detainee for possible prosecution.

b. The detainee said he had never been in Afghanistan until the Americans put him in prison there.

c. The detainee denied having any affiliation with al Qaida or the Taliban.

d. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the U.S. prior to their execution on September 11th and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the U.S. or U.S. interests.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

25 October 2005

TO: AHMED ZAID SALIM ZUHAIR

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AHMED ZAID SALIM ZUHAIR

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee is believed to be responsible for the firearm murder of a U.S. person, William Jefferson, on 21 November 1995 in Tuzla, Bosnia-Herzegovina.
 2. A source states that after the war in Bosnia, the detainee remained in Bosnia for the purpose of fighting Americans, whom he saw as the greatest threat to Islam. The detainee recruited a small number of fighters to remain and actively seek out American targets.
 3. Multiple press reports indicate the detainee and four other Islamic terrorists had direct involvement in a car bombing that damaged many buildings and injured dozens of people in Mostar, Bosnia on 18 September 1997.
 4. Between January and September 1997, in the municipalities of Zenica, Zepce and Mostar, the detainee and others planned the emplacement of an explosive device with a timing mechanism in a car bomb. On 18 September 1997 they took the explosive device from Zeljezno Polje to Mostar where it exploded, inflicting heavy material damage to residential housing and automobiles and injuring a large number of people.
 5. Under a Bosnian Supreme Court Decision, dated 18 April 2000, the detainee was sentenced to 12 years in prison for the criminal act of terrorism, but the detainee is a fugitive.
 6. Sometime in October 2001, the detainee traveled from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia to Sana, Yemen to see his wife and children. He then traveled to Karachi, Pakistan to purchase

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AHMED ZAID SALIM ZUHAIR

motorcycle parts. While in Karachi, he met with another individual and continued to Lahore, Pakistan.

7. The detainee traveled from Pakistan to Afghanistan to recover his niece, who had been taken by an Afghan. He then traveled to Gardez, Afghanistan by way of Khowst, Afghanistan. He spent five days in Afghanistan then returned to Lahore, Pakistan, where he was arrested by the Pakistani police and charged with kidnapping.

8. The detainee was identified as a Mujahidin commander who was sponsored by a member of the Qatari royal family.

9. The detainee was seen on a flight from Yemen to Dubai, United Arab Emirates and then to Pakistan. He was also seen at the Nebras guesthouse and then in Kabul and at the Azem guesthouse. He was identified as an old fighter who encouraged jihad.

10. The detainee admitted to another detainee that he was involved in the planning of the attack on the USS Cole in October 2000.

11. The detainee was a member of the Army of the Bosnia and Herzegovina military unit in Travnik, which was the 7th Reconnaissance-Diversionary Battalion. The command of this unit allowed him unlimited movement away from his home unit and throughout the free territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

b. Training

The detainee was identified as a trainer at the al Farouq camp.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee is affiliated with the terrorist group Takvir Ve Hijra, which is connected to the al Qaida network.

2. A document seized during a raid of the Tirana, Albania headquarters of the al Waqf al Islami non-governmental organization included the detainee's name. The detainee was listed under the heading of Finance and Support.

3. In January 2002 Allied Forces recovered a date book in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, which contained names and addresses of al Qaida members and Taliban officials. The detainee's name was found listed in the date book.

4. The detainee has connections with Taliban leaders and used to meet with Usama Bin Laden.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AHMED ZAID SALIM ZUHAIR

d. Intent

The detainee was implicated as a member of a terrorist cell in Kuwait that was capable of conducting attacks against U.S. interests there.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or its interests.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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**Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

30 Jun 2005

TO: HEKMAT, ABDULLAH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HEKMAT, ABDULLAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. Detainee was a Taliban member.

2. Shortly after joining the Taliban, the detainee was placed in charge of the 3rd Police Precinct in Mazir-e-Sharif where his duties included conscription and receiving bribes in lieu of conscription.

3. In his role at the 3rd Police Precinct, the detainee signed all official government paperwork while he was in charge for two months.

4. The detainee was identified as President of the Department of Research and Exploration in Sherberghan Province for 18 months during the late 1990s.

5. Appointment to the position the detainee held as President of the Department of Research and Exploration required one to be well educated and connected. The appointment process involved a written proposal submitted to the Prime Minister for careful review before the Prime Minister would issue the appointment order to the Cabinet for final approval.

b. Other Relevant Data

The detainee was turned over to a commander of Dostum's forces. He was in prison for four months and then turned over to U.S. forces as a Taliban and al Qaida operative.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HEKMAT, ABDULLAH

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee was arrested by four armed men from Mazir-E-Sharif under the pretense of protecting him from Hazrat tribes. The detainee was imprisoned when he was unable to pay a \$5,000 (USD) ransom for his release.

b. The detainee was convinced by his father-in-law to join the Taliban because it would keep their family safe.

c. The detainee claims he was indifferent regarding the Russian government, the Taliban, or the United States, as he was too busy with his businesses and trying to make money to worry about issues pertaining to their agendas.

d. When asked how he felt about Jihad, the detainee stated that he had no desire for Jihad or "other stupid things" (NFI), and that he just wanted to go home, be with his family, and try to restart his business.

e. When asked what he would do if released back to Afghanistan, the detainee stated that he would return to his businesses and family.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

9 November 2005

TO: KASIMBEKOV, KAMALLUDIN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KASIMBEKOV, KAMALLUDIN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee fled Uzbekistan for a training camp in Tajikistan.
 2. While the detainee was in Tajikistan he joined the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.
 3. The detainee went to Afghanistan with an automobile and weapons in May of 2000.
 4. The detainee decided to go to the area where the fighting was and spent 40 days on the front lines fighting with the Taliban.
 5. The detainee and other Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan members went to Northern Afghanistan to fight against the Northern Alliance.
 6. The detainee fought with the Taliban and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan Mujahidin against General Fahim and General Dostum's troops.
 7. The detainee was captured in a village near the front lines when his unit retreated around 10 November 2001.
 8. The detainee claims he never fired a weapon and only helped to transport weapons and ammunition to the fighters involved in combat.
 - b. Training

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KASIMBEKOV, KAMALLUDIN

The detainee attended a training camp at Hait, Tajikistan for one week where he learned about the AK-47, a Russian-made machine gun and the Rocket Propelled Grenade.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was sent to Kabul where he worked for an individual named Mohammed Tahir Faruq fixing cars in a garage.

2. Mohammed Tahir Faruq was at one time the senior member of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.

3. The detainee worked for the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan as an ambulance driver and for a doctor as a chauffeur.

4. This doctor treated Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan members and other Uzbeks living in Kabul, Afghanistan. The doctor maintained an office in Kabul located near the Red Cross office.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee spent five months in prison at Mazar-E-Sharif for trying to escape the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.

2. The detainee was released from prison in September 2001.

3. The detainee eventually signed a confession admitting to being an Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan member and admitting participation in a crime.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated as long as he isn't returned to Uzbekistan he has no problem with the United States.

b. The detainee stated he does not care about the Taliban.

c. The detainee tried to flee the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan because he was really just a criminal not a terrorist.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

2 Jun 2005

To: TA HAR, MOHMMAD AHMAD ALI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF TA HAR, MOHMMAD AHMAD ALI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee traveled from Yemen to Pakistan in mid-September 2001.
2. The detainee stated he is a terrorist.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was sent to Pakistan by a member of the Jama'at al-Tablighi.
2. The detainee obtained his travel visa through the Jama'at al-Tablighi.
3. Jama'at al-Tablighi, a Pakistani based Islamic missionary organization, is being used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists including members of al Qaida.
4. A senior al Qaida lieutenant recognized the detainee in a photograph.
5. The senior al Qaida lieutenant ran an al Qaida safehouse where a number of al Qaida members were captured.
6. The detainee was captured in this safehouse.
7. The detainee was sent a personal greeting from the Taliban Deputy Minister of Intelligence.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF TAHAR, MOHAMMAD AHMAD ALI

c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated if Muslim scholars said the attacks of September 11, 2001, were the correct actions to take, he would support the scholars.

2. The detainee stated that if Muslim scholars say that people must die, Muslims must follow their words.

3. The detainee stated he wants the infidels (non-Muslims) destroyed.

4. The detainee said those who do not follow Islam will go to hell or be killed.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the U.S. prior to their execution on September 11, 2001.

b. The detainee denied having any knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the U.S. or U.S. interests.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

7 December 2005

TO: HASSAN, EMAD ABDALLA

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HASSAN, EMAD ABDALLA

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan to fight in the jihad.
2. The detainee traveled to both Kandahar and the Tora Bora region of Afghanistan.
3. The detainee had a Kalashnikov with four magazines and did not wear a uniform while in Tora Bora.
4. The detainee told interrogators, "you will never defeat us".
5. The detainee fought on the front line and was asked to become a trainer but refused a training position.

b. Training

The detainee received training at the al Farouq training camp.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was one of fifty men selected to guard Usama bin Laden.
2. A Yemeni facilitator responsible for moving money and fighters to and from Afghanistan facilitated the detainee's travel to Afghanistan in the beginning of 2000.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HASSAN, EMAD ABDALLA

d. Intent

1. When asked if he would follow a fatwa that declared Jihad the detainee stated that it is the law of the land and he would not question the guidance of his leader.
2. The detainee said that if a leader of his tribe ordered an attack on America he would be bound by duty to obey.

e. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was arrested by Pakistani authorities in Faisalabad, Pakistan along with several others living in the same house. The others were from Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Palestine, Libya, Russia and Pakistan.
2. The detainee was captured with others who used similar cover stories.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee denied ever attending a Taliban or al Qaida training camp and denied receiving medical training at the Tora Bora region.
 - b. The detainee denied that he had knowledge of any participants involved in the bombing of the USS Cole.
 - c. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001. The detainee also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States interests.
 - d. The detainee stated that if he were to be released from United States custody he would either return to the university or go to Yemen and sell Khat with his father.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

13 June 2005

TO: AHMED, FAYAD YAHYA

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AHMED, FAYAD YAHYA

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. Detainee traveled to Pakistan to study and be part of the Jammāt Tabliqeh.

2. Jama'at al-Tabligh is a Pakistani-based Islamic missionary organization which is believed to be used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists including members of al Qaida.

3. The detainee is a Yemeni citizen who traveled to Pakistan via Yemen; Karachi, Pakistan, and finally Lahore, Pakistan, prior to 11 September 2001.

b. Connections/Associations

1. In 1997 or 1998 detainee studied under Sheik Muqbil Bin Hadi Al-Wadi at the Demaj Mosque in Sadah, Yemen. Al-Wadi suggested the detainee travel to Pakistan with the Tabliqeh Jammāt.

2. The detainee was arrested at Issa's house during a raid by the Pakistani police.

3. The detainee was one of several individuals captured in the Crescent Mill residence in Faisalabad, Pakistan during a 28 March 2002 raid.

4. A senior al Qaida lieutenant was the director of the "Yemeni" guesthouse in Faisalabad, Pakistan.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AHMED, FAYAD YAHYA

5. The detainee was recognized by a senior al Qaida lieutenant.
 6. One of the individuals captured with the detainee at the Faisalabad guesthouse was Noor Uthman.
 7. Noor Uthman was a primary weapons instructor at Khalden training camp and came into contact with many members of al Qaida leadership in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
- c. Other Relevant Data
1. Detainee often incites disturbances, harasses and has assaulted MP's while at GTMO.
 2. Detainee has been witnessed acting as a lookout for other detainees.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. Detainee stated part of his motivation to go to Pakistan was that the country was strong with religion. Additionally the detainee stated that studying in Saudi Arabia was too expensive.
 - b. The detainee stated he first heard of Jammal Tablique when he was young. It was his understanding that Jammal Tablique was a group who wanted to prove themselves through good deeds and through the spread of religion.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

21 November 2005

TO: TAHAMUTTAN, MOHAMMED ABDULLAH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF TAHAMUTTAN, MOHAMMED
ABDULLAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee has been a member of the Tablique Jammal for approximately ten years.

2. The detainee traveled to Jordan in order to obtain a Pakistani visa in 2001.

3. The detainee studied at the Tablique Jammal headquarters in Rywand, Pakistan for four months where he met an Afghani Tablique Jammal member who wanted the detainee to travel with him to Afghanistan.

4. The detainee traveled with the Afghani to Quetta, Pakistan where they discovered they could not get into Afghanistan. They met a group of three Arabs and returned via bus to Lahore, Pakistan.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee has two uncles who are associated with Hamas.

2. The detainee stated he was Usama Bin Laden's deputy and had struck out at the United States.

c. Other Relevant Data

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF TAHAMUTTAN, MOHAMMED ABDULLAH

1. The detainee was identified as being with the Tablighi group, going for training in Afghanistan and then returning to Faisalabad, Pakistan when Kabul fell.
 2. The detainee was asked to go to Afghanistan to fight the jihad. He wasn't interested in jihad but had considered going to Afghanistan as a tourist.
 3. The detainee stayed at a guesthouse in Faisalabad, Pakistan for approximately one month before Pakistani police raided it and the detainee was arrested.
 4. The detainee believes the United States is responsible for the situation in Palestine and that Israeli tanks are made in the United States and essentially used to kill Muslims.
 5. The detainee stated that the Government of Pakistan is corrupt and responsible for his confinement by the United States.
 6. The detainee stated President Bush has called for a war against Islam and Muslims all around the world.
 7. The detainee mentioned he hates all enemies of Islam to include Americans, Jews, Christians and Muslims who do not think like he does.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee accepted an invitation to go to Afghanistan for the purpose of tourism. The detainee related he was not part of any opposition forces and went to Afghanistan believing that the fighting was not occurring all over the country but just in areas that he was going to stay away from.
 - b. The detainee does not want to return to Palestine because of the on-going war with Israel. He would like to live in either Saudi Arabia in the city of Mecca or Medina or in Doha, Qatar to pray and study Islam. The detainee would not want to live in Jordan because of the regional conflict.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

27 July 2005

TO: ABDELRAHMAN, ABDELRAZAK ALI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDELRAHMAN, ABDELRAZAK ALI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee attended Khalden Camp for several months in 1997. He remained in Afghanistan after training and served as a driver at the Algerian Guest House in Jalalabad.
 2. Abu Jaffar, an Algerian, controlled the Algerian House in Jalalabad. Students are known to have received explosives training while staying at the Algerian House.
 3. Abu Jaffar al Jazeeri is a known Algerian al Qaida facilitator in Afghanistan.
 4. A senior al Qaida lieutenant said the detainee spent some time in Sudan looking for jihad.
 5. A man recruited to go to Afghanistan for training identified the detainee as member of his group of Arabs fleeing Kabul.
 6. A known jihadist identified the detainee as someone he saw in Khowst, Afghanistan, during Ramadan 2001.
 7. A senior al Qaida lieutenant stated that the detainee was with him in Birmal, Afghanistan. They moved from there to Lahore, Pakistan, with assistance from Lashkar-e-Tayyiba members.
 8. The Secretary of State has designated Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. The LT is the armed wing of the Pakistan-based religious organization, Markaz-

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDELRAHMAN, ABDELRAZAK ALI

ud-Dawa-wal-Irshad (MOI), a Sunni anti-United States missionary organization formed in 1989. The LT has conducted a number of operations against Indian troops and civilian targets in Kashmir since 1993.

9. Lashkar-e-Tayyiba moved the detainee and his group several times from house to house in Lahore before finally moving them to Faisalabad.

10. A well-known Lashkar-e-Tayyiba member trusted by al Qaida found a safe house in Faisalabad for a senior al Qaida lieutenant. He then drove the detainee, along with the senior al Qaida lieutenant and others, to this house.

11. A senior al Qaida lieutenant stated the safe house in Faisalabad was housing Arab/Afghan fighters. It was also used for training on the construction of remote control devices.

12. A man who received jihad training in Afghanistan and was captured with the detainee in Faisalabad stated the detainee received English language training while at Abu Zubaydah's safe house in Faisalabad.

b. Training

1. The detainee received 18 months of military training in the Algerian army when he was stationed at Camp Thaknah, Al Jilffah, Algeria.

2. A senior al Qaida lieutenant stated the detainee had trained at the Khalden Camp around 1996 or 1997.

3. In July 2001, the detainee was in Kabul staying with others, including a senior al Qaida lieutenant, attending the Khalden Camp.

4. The Khalden Camp was located near Kabul and was operated by Ibn Shaykh Al-Libi and Abu Zubaydah. Instruction at this camp included urban guerrilla tactics, physical conditioning, and endurance.

5. A senior al Qaida operative stated the detainee took general training at Khalden Camp that included mortar training.

6. A senior al Qaida lieutenant stated the detainee went to Khalden Camp and may have also attended Derunta Camp in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

7. Derunta Camp was reportedly one of Usama Bin Laden's most important camps in Afghanistan, located just west of Jalalabad. It is known to provide small arms, explosives, and possibly biological and chemical weapons training.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDELRAHMAN, ABDELRAZAK ALI

8. A secondary base at Derunta Camp is the "Algerian Center," which is a branch of the Khalden Camp. Ibn Al-Shaykh ran this camp, where individuals were trained on assault rifles, machine guns, RPG-7 rocket launchers, and hand grenades. A foreign intelligence service reported that trainees at this camp must be graduates of the Khalden Camp in Khowst.

c. Connections/Associations

A senior al Qaida lieutenant identified the detainee as a member of his cell.

d. Intent

1. On 11 September 2001, the detainee was at the Khalden Camp guesthouse in Kabul along with Abu Zubaydah and others. When they heard the news of the attack on the United States, they immediately celebrated.

2. In November 2004, the detainee admitted for the first time that he had been lying for two years about his nationality. He now states he was born in Algeria, not in Libya.

3. The detainee is attempting to develop a new cover story since he originally claimed that he was a Libyan. Since the Libyan distinguished visitor came to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in August 2004, the detainee was confronted about his nationality.

e. Other Relevant Data

The detainee was captured at the Abu Zubaydah safe house in Faisalabad, Pakistan, on 28 March 2002.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied any involvement with al Qaida.

b. The detainee claims that he never received training in Afghanistan.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

1 August 2005

TO: HAKIM, ABDEL GHALIB AHMAD

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HAKIM, ABDEL GHALIB AHMAD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee advised he went to Pakistan to study the Koran.

2. The detainee traveled to Pakistan with a group of Tabligh. He flew from Sana'a, Yemen, to Karachi, Pakistan and then took a train to Lahore, Pakistan, in order to study at the Raywan Religious Center.

3. The preachers of Islam, or Tablighi Jama'at, organization is closely aligned with other Pakistani terrorist organizations and the al Qaida network.

4. The Raywan Center is the world headquarters of the Tablighi movement.

5. The director of the Center, Abd Al Wahab, suggested to the detainee he visit the Salafia University in Faisalabad.

6. The Jamia Salafia school in Faisalabad, Pakistan taught religious subjects and was based on the Sunni school of thought.

7. While in Faisalabad, the detainee stayed at a guesthouse owned by Issa.

b. Training

A senior al Qaida operational planner recalled seeing the detainee at al-Faruq when Zawahiri and Jama'at al-jihad joined with al Qaida in summer 2001.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HAKIM, ABDEL GHALIB AHMAD

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was arrested at Issa's house located near the Salifiya University in Faisalabad, Pakistan along with 16 other individuals.
2. The detainee was seen in Kandahar, Afghanistan and was very well respected by all the fighters. Usama bin Laden used to travel to various places in Afghanistan, to give speeches and have people swear bayat to him, and the detainee used to travel with bin Laden on these trips.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee advised a local benefactor paid for his plane ticket to Pakistan.
 2. The detainee stayed at Issa's house from after Ramadan until his capture.
 3. A 7.62mm ammunition round was found on the detainee at the time of capture.
 4. When asked questions about the Koran since he had spent extensive time with the Tabligh group and was so committed to his religion, the detainee advised that he only memorized the Koran and had no real idea about its meaning.
 5. The detainee could not identify the five pillars of Islam or discuss the phrase "People of the Book".
 6. The detainee stated that he knew very little about the Koran or religion in general.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee plans to return to Yemen and resume khat farming.
 - b. The detainee said he learned of the attacks on America from interrogators and he considered the attacks unacceptable. The detainee believes the people who attacked the United States need to be captured and prosecuted.
 - c. The detainee denied having ammunition in his possession when he was arrested.
 - d. The detainee denied any intention to fight in any conflict.
 - e. The detainee has continually denied ever being elsewhere other than Pakistan.
 - f. The detainee has denied being at the al Farouq training camp.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HAKIM, ABDEL GHALIB AHMAD**

Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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**Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

20 May 2005

From: Presiding Officer
To: AL NOOFAYAEE, ABDALAZIZ // KAREEM SALIM
Via: Assisting Military Officer
SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF
AL NOOFAYAEE, ABDALAZIZ // KAREEM SALIM

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. Originally from Saudi Arabia, the detainee traveled to Karachi, Pakistan in late 2001 via Jeddah, Saudi Arabia; Damascus, Syria; Tehran, Iran and Lahore, Pakistan.
 2. In March 2002, the detainee was arrested by Pakistani police during a raid on the Issa guesthouse in Faisalabad, Pakistan.
 3. The detainee has been cited for numerous incidents of failure to comply, guard harassment and an assault during his detention.
 - b. Training
 1. A senior al Qaida lieutenant stated that the detainee attended the Khaldan camp in 1997.
 2. The Khaldan training camp was co-managed by senior al Qaida officials. The training program at Khaldan was six months in length and consisted of instruction in light weapons, heavy weapons, explosives, topography and tactics.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF
AL NOOFAYAEE, ABDALAZIZ // KAREEM SALIM**

c. Connections / Associations

1. The detainee, along with several of the individuals arrested with him in the guesthouse raid, were identified by a senior al Qaida lieutenant.
2. While in Lahore, Pakistan the detainee stayed at the Raywan Islamic Center for one month.
3. The Riwind Center in Lahore, Pakistan is the headquarters of the Jamat Tabligh.
4. Jama'at Al Tablighi, a Pakistan-based Islamic missionary organization, is being used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists including members of al Qaida.

d. Intent

The detainee stated that justification for killing infidels is written in the Koran. The detainee also stated that Jews and Christians are enemies of Islam and should be dealt with as prescribed by the Koran. The detainee believes Usama Bin Laden is a great man.

e. Other Relevant Data

1. Detainee was captured with a Casio F-91W watch, known to be used by members of al Qaida.
2. The F-91W Casio watch has been associated with numerous al Qaida and radical Islamic terrorist improvised explosive devices.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th.
 - b. The detainee stated that if he were released he would like to open a fruit store and perhaps get married and start a family.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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