

Ed

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Gerald Ford
 Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
 and Assistant to the President
 for National Security Affairs
 Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
 to the President for National Security Affairs
 Congressional Leadership

DATE AND TIME: Thursday, February 20, 1975
 7:28 - 9:30 a.m. - Breakfast

PLACE: First Floor Private Dining Room
 The White House

The President: I am happy to have you here.

[He introduced new people.]

I thought the leaders would like to have Secretary Kissinger's observations of his trip to the Middle East. We talked for two hours last night. We face the problem of sorting out the difficulties of a most difficult area of the world. I want to thank you, Henry. The country is very lucky to have you. Would you make some observations?

Kissinger: Let me talk in several categories: (1) The trip; (2) The Soviet Union, (3) The Europeans and energy.

What are we trying to do? Many say that Geneva is an alternative to the step-by-step approach and also that we should cooperate with the Soviet Union. We don't consider either accurate.

Our problem is how to go to Geneva so that it doesn't lead to confrontation, and how to cooperate with the Soviet Union in a way that the Soviet Union does not act as the lawyer for radical Arabs.

~~SECRET/NODIS~~



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We know we must go to Geneva soon, but it makes an enormous difference under what conditions we go. If we go under circumstances where the chief moderate -- Sadat -- has achieved something, it will be known that moderation pays and that only the U.S. can achieve progress. Then we will have some control. But if we go there with Egypt having failed, with pressure from the Soviet Union and the radicals, and the Europeans would be nervous. So it is not a trivial matter how we get to Geneva. And we have to prove to the Soviet Union that if it wants to get into the game it must be on our rules. So the issue is, will Geneva be the prelude to a confrontation or a negotiation?

We are talking now about a withdrawal which is not just token -- so it is painful for Israel. So they want reciprocal measures that are hard for Egypt to make publicly. It is even difficult for Egypt to make a separate move at all. So we have to get a quid pro quo in a way that doesn't serve to overthrow Sadat. We are making progress.


Israel's domestic situation is difficult. Also, compared to Israel, American standards of secrecy are extraordinary.

We have a long way to go, but you can see where with luck and perseverance we might make progress on an agreement. The next problem is Syria. Earlier Syria said she wouldn't participate in another partial move. She now wants to, but Israeli settlements are placed so close to the line that any withdrawal is impossible without moving them. So how we manage this is the problem. Egypt wanted us to do this negotiation in one trip because she wanted it done quickly. I wanted two because the Israelis said they needed time. Faisal is now supporting Asad but we don't know how seriously.

The next issue is the Soviet Union. They are like a football team with only one play, which they keep running.

However, they want in but they don't want to contribute. Israel and Egypt don't want them in, nor would Syria if they could get three kilometers withdrawal. We don't want to antagonize them; they could create massive problems -- with the radical Arabs and thus with the Europeans and Japanese. Maybe even an embargo.

So we will attempt another stage, then Geneva. I will go back in March and it will be hairy. The Soviets will oppose, but not actively, so long as



they think it may succeed. We should keep this quiet because much is riding on this. If we go to Geneva and the Soviet Union puts forward a proposal, we will have to do so. It will be a constant crisis where the Soviet Union, the Europeans, the Japanese beat on us constantly with threats of economic disaster and an embargo.

I think the leaders of Israel understand but they have a massive domestic problem.

Our other discussion with the Soviet Union went well. There is a certain cooling because of uncertainty about the results of agreements they reach with us, which seem to create a vast American debate and may be reversed. Their trade action resulted from the reaction here to Vladivostok.

They are playing up to the Europeans. The Europeans are now lending billions to the Soviet Union untied to any projects. This is being done by countries who haven't the power to tie it to political progress. So the argument is not only that the agreement is lost, but the loss of the leverage we could get if these big deals were ours. So long as we had an active sense of detente, the Europeans were afraid to move with the Soviet Union, now that there seemed to be dangers. After a few months we may wish to talk to Congress about this. Our European relations have never been better. We have an agreement on a minimum oil price -- and on everything else except alternative sources. We will be ready next month for preparation of a consumer-producer meeting.

If we can keep going with conservation and domestic alternative source programs, we will be okay. A price weakening is starting. The difference in atmosphere is amazing -- both in South America and Europe. If we can just keep on.

At the risk of beating it to death, one can't but be impressed by foreign concern over what is happening between the legislature here and the executive. Asad said last October he thought we were seeking Cyprus as a base for intervention. He thought he had it figured out. Now he can't figure it out!

Makarios is the only party who is interested in continued chaos. Cyprus is a millstone to the Greeks. Only the President and the Prime Minister in Turkey are holding things back. The President and I eight times urged restraint on them. A meeting with Bitsios and Esenbel was screwed up by the cutoff. A meeting with Bitsios was scrubbed by the Turkish step.



Scott: What will the Turks do?

Kissinger: They will sever, step-by-step, their contact with us, and get more active in Middle East affairs. They will soon be running out of spare parts.

McFall: Won't Karamanlis say something privately to the Greek leaders here?

Kissinger: He is a great leader. He is flanked by Papandreou and Makarios. He wants a settlement but he has to watch his flanks. The result of setting a deadline was counter productive. Makarios pushed everything against the deadline, the radicals wanted it to cut Turkish aid, and the Turks rejected the appearance of operating under pressure. We were moving on the airport and Famagusta. It is not in the American Greek's interest to have to show daily progress -- because it can't be enough to satisfy the Brademas constituents.

This has effects not only for Turkey -- although there it is approaching catastrophe. All the Europeans are worried about us and about the possibility of working usefully with us.

Albert: Wouldn't Turkey handicap operations like in the last war?

Kissinger: Yes. We have installations there which are irreplaceable. And if there is another Israeli-Syrian war and the Soviet Union behaves more intransigently, a hostile Turkey would be very dangerous.

The Clerides-Denktash talks are now suspended. Even if we reversed the situation today, it would take time.

The chief loser is Karamanlis, who wants to put it behind him, to build Greek democracy. He doesn't want Cyprus to be an issue in Greek domestic politics.

McFall: Can't Karamanlis say that?

Kissinger: No.

Rhodes: What is Iakovos' role? He just gave an anti-American speech. I think they are under Makarios.



Scott: It looks to me like the Jewish interests are being imperiled by Greek interests.

Kissinger: No question about it.

President: Just prior to Henry's departure, I had down Sarbanes, Mansfield, Brademas, and Case to see if something couldn't be worked out. If we could get some action or a waiver which would require reports rather than a cutoff, that would be extremely helpful. If we could get it reasonably soon, it would be immensely helpful. I think the environment is changing.

Sparkman: I spoke to Brademas -- I got nowhere. He is set against everything.

Mahon: We have a vehicle in the CRA, and in the appropriations bill if we have the vote.

Albert: We could get a vote; that isn't the problem -- it is the votes in the House.

Cederberg: Papandreou is the problem. He is not for Karamanlis. He wants to get back in Greece.

Kissinger: You are absolutely right. Papandreou and Makarios profit by chaos. There is now coup talk in Greece.

Byrd: Can the Jewish community help?

Kissinger: My impression is that Rosenthal is trapped. He recognizes his problem but he doesn't know how to get off it.

Burton: Ben just has to be convinced on the merits. He is not playing for votes.

Sparkman: I think Ben is trying to work out something. I have the waiver sitting on my desk because I thought it was futile.

But if we could introduce by me and Case, Mansfield...

Mansfield: I would be glad to. All the leaders in both Houses.



Sparkman: If it is introduced by the leaders in both houses, we might have a chance.

Byrd: I think it is time that the Jewish community became visible in this.

Kissinger: I will talk to Dinitz. I think they are sympathetic, but I don't know how much capital they are willing to invest.

Turkey even asked Israel for spare parts. They are getting \$300 million from Libya.

Mansfield: Our position is legally correct but politically wrong. We endanger our foreign policy and NATO. I support NATO.

Cederberg: If we decide these by whether there are more Greek or Turkish votes . . .

Anderson: Sparkman's idea may work, but we have a huge problem. If Secretary Kissinger could make himself available to the Republican and Democratic caucuses, it would help.

Kissinger: If you want, I would be happy to.

The President: What is the best legislative way to do it? The foreign aid appropriation or a CRA?

Burton: The easiest route would be for you to declare there is progress and us not to oppose it, rather than reverse the legislation.

Mansfield: Legally Brademas and the others are correct; practically they are wrong. I think Phil and Byrd are right.

Cederberg: We have said before there was not sufficient progress. How can it be reversed?

Kissinger: I have to say one thing about the law: We obeyed the law last fall. We made no new contracts, but we didn't announce it. We were obeying the law but trying to get a package of concessions. But the new law cuts off even things that were already contracted for.



Before February 5, Burton's proposal could have been possible. There was not substantial progress, and Makarios would have disrupted it. Karamanlis would have been forced to support that. Since then, there has been retrogression. I don't know how it could be managed. If it is voted down, the effect could be worse.

Scott: Couldn't we have Brademas, Sarbanes and the others down here with the leaders?

Albert: It keeps within the House, not just for those.

Broomfield: How about a special envoy of the President? Dean Rusk or someone. This might be far-fetched, but it is a way to save face.

Mansfield: You downgrade the Secretary of State.

The President: I think Hugh's idea is the most practical. And tie the waiver to the CRA.

Albert: There has been no test with the new members. I think most now lean to Rosenthal.

Rhodes: Can't Ben talk with Sarbanes, Brademas, et al? If they see they are not getting the results they thought

Kissinger: I have no problem with a special envoy if it's not someone who is in business for himself. It would be no reflection on me. Rusk, Bruce would be great.

Price: Any envoy short of someone from Karamanlis won't change Brademas' mind.

The President: If this would help, we would go along with Bruce. But if it didn't pay off, we will be worse off than before.

Moss: If the others could have the vital exposure I have had, I think it would work.

Burton: You would have to break through the ethnic tie-ups: Greeks, Italians, Jews, Blacks -- and limit it to this issue.



The President: Can it be limited?

Burton: Maybe under the guise of a trip report.

Cederberg: I think you have to talk to the tough ones first. If not, the wild ones will come out of the corners and blast Henry on the TV.

The President: If that is a danger, than Henry would be going out with the rug pulled out from under him. That we can't have.

The Vice President: Combine the special envoy with a waiver while it is going on.

The President: I will talk with the leaders.

Byrd: There is no substitute for convincing the Jewish community.

The President: We will talk to Dinitz. I would not agree to a special envoy if in any way that could be construed as undercutting the Secretary of State. His authority is too important to the country to risk that.

Albert: I will endorse putting in a resolution. But we shouldn't go out of here feeling we are on the move, because we aren't.

Kissinger: We would have to prepare the idea of a special envoy with Greece, Turkey and Cyprus beforehand or we end up with egg on our face.

I think we might be able to work out a lifting of aid ban in conjunction with a special envoy.

The President: We have to keep this discussion quiet.

Mahon: If word of a special envoy gets out, Kissinger will be discredited.

Griffin: This has been a very fruitful discussion but if it gets out it would be a disaster.

[The meeting ended.]



Leadership Breakfast

20 Feb 75

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P Happy to have you here.

(Introduced some people)

I did a walk-around to hear R observations of trip. We talked for 2 hrs last night. Faced problems of entering with a diff of a most diff area of world.

Thank you K, a country is very hungry to have you. Would you make some observations.

K Let me talk in general & why (1) Trip

(2) S.U. (3) Europe & energy

What are we trying to do? Many say that Geneva is an attempt to stop & try to do that we should engage w/ S.U. We don't consider other alternatives.

① report is how to go to Geneva which so it doesn't lead to confrontation & break to engage w/ S.U. in way that S.U. won't lawyer for nuclear arms!

We know we must go to Geneva soon, but it needs some diff. what conditions are needed which we go.

If we go under circumstances where

Chief moderator - Sakat - has achieved something, it will be better than multination page & only a US can get prog. Then we will control.

But if we go w/ E partially, a presence by a S.U., radical, & E was would be unpleasant.

Since not a timid matter how we get to Geneva. And we have to press to S.U. if it wants into Geneva it must honor our rules.

So each session is will Geneva be prelude to confrontation & negot. we talking now w/ chances which are not just taken - so it painful for E. if they want recip measures hard for E to make feasible - even diff for E to make a separate meas. So we have to get quid in way that don't force some to overthrow set.



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
We making prog.
I domestic industry. Also regional
FI, US structures of secrecy are
extraordinary.

We have a long way to go but you can
see where w/ bank + fishermen we
might make prog on a agreement.

Next prob is Syria. Either Syria send
ambassador participate in another partial
peace. Now wants to, but I settlements
are placed so w/ channel impossible w/
out making them. ^{how we manage this} So that is a prob.

E wanted to do this right in / trip
because... I wanted 2 cause they
needed time. Fiscal year
supporting and but we don't know
how seriously.

The next issue is SU. They are like
a football team w/ only one play, which
they keep using.
However, they want in but don't



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want to contribute.

I + E don't want them in, nor would
Europe if they could get 3 km.
We don't want to outgrow them.
They could create massive jobs - w/
radical deals of this w/ Euro + Japs.
They to have embargo. (^{the question stays}
_{then leaves})

I would go back in 2 weeks it will be
hair. SV will oppose but not actively
to delay as they think it may succeed.
We should keep this point because
much riding on this. If we go to Geneva
& SV puts forward a proposal we will
have to do so. It will be a constant
crisis where SU, Euro, J beat
we constructively w/ threat of real
disaster undergo.

I think Lindner of I understand
but they have a massive
chronic prob.

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On other side w/ SU next week.
There is a certain volatility because
of uncertainty about ~~of~~ results of
agreements w/ us creating next
US debate + maybe misused. There
trade action resulted from election
here to black.

They are playing up to Euro. Euro
now looking like to SU rather to
play by countries who haven't power
to tie to political prep.


So agreement is not only a agreement
is lost but a loss of a language
could get if these big lines were
ours. So long as we had certain
detents, Euro were afraid to move
w/ SU, more than are dangers. After a
few more we may wish to
talk to long about this.

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On Euro relations - more than
both. Agreement in main
price - every thing else kept to
all sources. We nearly next month
for pay. 5-1 party.

If we can keep assurances +
drawn the all source pay, we will
back. Real marking is starting.
The dip in atmos is concerning - both
in SA + Euro. If we can just
begin.

at risk of beating it to death,
One can't be but be impressed
by Euro foreign concern over what
is happening but less + less.
Asad said last out to that we creating
for begin base for intervention. Then
to say - . . . (Makareos)



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Makarios is a very party interested
in chaos. Express a wish
to back. Only a PMS & PM waterbury
holding things back. P & D merged
8 times restraint. The rule, but
money is 28. of A wty w/ B + E
scuffed by entire. Wty w/ B
scuffed by Tank step.

- Sc att. what will Turkish do.
- R They will never step by step their
contract w/ us, get more active in
M E affairs.
They will soon be running out of
spare parts.

Mc Fall - I will know say something
probably to back back here
R H is a great leader. He is flanked
by Papandreu & Makarios. He emits
a sentiment but must watch his flanks.
The deadline must be considerable

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Makarios pushed everything against
a deadline, reaches until it is out
Turk air & Turbo rejected fact
appearance of operating under pressure.
We were moving on airport & Turkey.
It was in US banks interests to have
to show daily prog - because it
isn't so easy to retify problems
constantly.

Eff to not only for Turkey on the three
it approaching catastrophes. All E was
winded about me + possibility pushing
especially w/ us.

Albnt - Wouldn't Turkey handing you
later in last war?

- R Yes. We have instillation which are
irreversible. And if another T-S war
+ S U behavior was intransigent,
a hush Turkey would be very
dangerous.
C/D talks never suspended.
Even if is referred today it

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would talk him.
The chief leader is Kare, who
wants to put it behind ~~the~~ him to
build back democracy. He doesn't
want Cyprus an issue in Greek
domestic politics.

Useful - Can't Kara say that
K-20

Phonics - Factors just gone over. Over
speech, I think they work. Unk
S-11 looks to me like Jewish interests
being impeded by Greek interests
K No question about it.

P Just prior to K departure, I had down
S, U, B, C to see if something
couldn't be worked out. You could
get some action on a universe
which would require reports within
three weeks, that would be extremely
helpful. It could get unusually

to one two for part in
Case NYT

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to see, would be unusually helpful.
I think environment changing.
Spartan - I spoke to Brokers - got
overcome. He set against ~~the~~ anything
Anson - we have a vehicle in CR ~~at~~
+ one approx level if we have votes.
Albert - also could get a rule, that not
- part - it is a vote in a house
Believing Byzantine is a prob. He
not for Kare. He wants to get back
in Greece
K Absolutely right. Fagan & Unk
profit by chaos. There is now
way talk in Greece.
Byrd - Can Jewish community help.
K My impression is power essential
is trapped.
He says he's part but he doesn't
know how to get off it

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Phil Beaton

- ~~Ben~~ first has to be convinced
on a merits. He not playing for
votes.

Spokane - I think Ben trying to work
out something. I have a vision
settling on my desk case that
it forth.

But if we could introduce by
us + case, Mansfield [be
glad to]. (All backs in
both houses). If introduced
by backs in both houses, we
might have a chance.

Bye I think it time that Jewish
community become visible in
this.

R I will talk to Rindy. I think
they are sympathetic but I don't
know how much credit

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they willing to invest.
Turkey even asked I for spare
parts - they getting 300 mil from
Litha.

Mansfield - Our position which
isn't correct but politically
was OK to change over
FP + NATO. I support NATO.

Secretary - If we check these by
what's there on more back +
Trench water.

Ambliss - ~~to~~ Spokane idea may
work, but we have a huge
prob. If R could make himself
available to Repet + Demo Councils,
it could help.

R If you want, I be happy to.
P What best by you way R do it
(For and app / CPP)



START

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Barton - Exist with would be for
you to disclose program & we want
to oppose it rather than reverse
- Regis.

Manfield - Legally Beckman et al
correct, practically they are wrong.
I think Phil & Byrd are right.

Pilbury - We have said before not
self pay. How come it happened?

R. Abner - Law, we changed a law last
fall. We made no new contracts
but we didn't announce it. We
were changing a law but trying
to get a package of amendments.
But now law costs seem things
already contracted for.

Before Feb 5, Barton proposal could
have been possible - not substantiated,
and Markers would have disappeared.

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Rosen would have been forced to
suggest that. Since then there
has been retrogression. Don't know
how it could be managed. If it were
done ^{done} effect could be worse.
S. State (but that's how State I think know
how w/ markers?

Abner - A day w/ in a House, not
just for this.

Brenfield - How about a general survey
of P&S - look, etc
This might be far fetched, but it
way to some place

Manfield - from down grade - (Sec of State)
P-I think Hough idea most practical.
And tie a waiver to C.R.A.

Abner - There has been no test w/c
now member I think west now
mean to Reiser.

Rhodes - I met Ben talk w/S, B et al. If
they see they not getting a result they might

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K I know we put w/ Spc. today if
not someone in business for himself
It would be no objection at all.
Rusk, Bauer, would be great.

Pries Any lawyer short of someone from
Kane would change Broad mind.

P If this would help, we would go along
w/ Bauer. But if it didn't pay off, we
would then have

mass - If ~~cases~~ could have a total
appears show had, I think it would
work.

Burton - you would have a heck then
the ethnic groups - Greeks, Italians,
Jews, Blacks - and hunt it to
this issue.

P Can it be limited?

Burton - maybe under guise of trip
report.

Leland - I think you have to
talk to a tough one 1st. If not,

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c could work will come out of a
Cancer + blast K on the TV.

P If that a change, then K would be
going out ~~with~~ w/ bag pulled
out from under him. That
we can't have.

V P Curbin spec. today w/
wince while it going on.

P I will talk w/ c bushes

Byrd. There no substitute for convincing
c Jewish community.

P We will talk to B. today, I would not
agree to Spc. Every if in any
way that could be construed as
undermining Sec State. It is authority
to report to a country to make
that.

Albert - I will discuss putting in
a resolution, but we should not
go any of what feeling we are

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the more, because we aren't,
K We would have to prepare a series
of spec money w/ R, T + P years
hyperbolic or we end up with
our own face.
I think we might be able to make
~~and~~ lifting of air law in violation
of spec money.
P We have to keep this government
print
in mind if word of spec money gets
out, K will be crushed
Griffin. This has been ^{very} fruitful discussion
but if gets out would be disaster

